^k;>kg'i}jf'<''.:i'>jv,jjj,.;;v^,.  ,..■ 


■^''3  ■'•".7 :>■'■.■    '■•;;  .+.<-" 


vim-. 


A^.-:^:-- 


HISTORY    OF    ROME 


A  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


TO  THE   DEATH  OF  C/ESAR 


W.  W.  HpW,  M.A. 

FELLOW   AND   TUTOR   OI'mEKTON    COLLEGE,   OXFORD 


H.  D.  LEIGH,  M.A. 

FELLOW    ANU    TUTOH    OK   CORPUS   CHRISTI    COLLEciK,    OXFORD 


contohniate.    drbs  koma.  and  wolf  with  twuo 
NE  W  IMPRESSION 

LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

39    PATERNOSTER    ROW,    LONDON 

NEW   YORK   AND   BOMBAY 

1901 


All  rights    reserved 


PREFACE 

In  writing  this  short  history  of  Rome  the  authors'  have 
endeavoured  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  upper  forms  in 
schools  and  of  the  pass  examinations  at  the  Universities. 
With  this  object  in  view  they  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on 
the  more  important  and  eventful  wars,  and  on  the  history  of 
the  Roman  army.  Literature,  which  never  at  Rome  reached 
the  heart  of  the  people,  they  have  designedly  omitted.  A 
mere  outline,  which  is  all  that  space  would  allow,  would  have 
been  worse  than  useless,  since  it  might  have  led  to  the  neglect 
of  the  separate  histories  of  the  subject.  On  the  other  hand 
they  have  attempted  to  describe  clearly,  if  briefly,  the  de- 
velopment of  a  constitution,  interesting  to  Englishmen  both 
from  its  likeness  and  its  unlikeness  to  that  of  their  own 
country.  In  so  doing  they  have  derived  assistance  from  the 
researches  of  many  scholars,  both  at  home  and  abroad ;  but 
their  deepest  debt  is  due  to  the  master  of  all  modern  his- 
torians of  Rome,  Professor  Mommsen.  On  constitutional 
and  antiquarian  questions  they  have  bowed  to  his  paramount 
authority,  and  even  from  his  somewhat  sweeping  judgments 
of  parties  and  person:?  they  have  never  dissented  without 
hesitation.  Like  other  Oxford  students  they  owe  much  to 
the  lectures  and  articles  of  Professor  Pelham ;  they  have  also 
drawn  upon  Mr.  Warde  Prowler's  works,  and  Mr.  Strachan 
Davidson's  Cicero  and  Polybius.  From  the  latter,  through 
the  kindness  of  the  Clarendon  Press,  they  have  been  allowed 


viii  PREFA  CE 

to  take  a  plan  of  Cannae ;  for  other  maps  and  plans  they  are 
indebted  to  Kraner's  "  Ccesar,"  to  Mr.  R.  Bosworth  Smith,  and 
to  Mr.  R.  F.  Horton,  who  has  been  good  enough  to  permit 
them  to  revise  the  useful  series  appended  to  his  History  of  the 
Romans.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  they  are  intended  not  to 
supersede  but  only  to  supplement  the  classical  atlas. 

For  the  insertion  of  numerous  illustrations  the  authors 
have  to  thank  Messrs.  Longmans;  for  their  selection  they  are 
indebted  to  Mr.  Cecil  Smith  of  the  British  Museum.  They 
are  in  all  cases  derived  from  authentic  archaeological  sources, 
and  have  been  taken,  so  far  as  possible,  from  well-known  and 
accessible  collections,  above  all  from  the  British  Museum.  In 
the  list  which  follows  references  have  been  given  to  standard 
works.  The  authors  are  not  without  hope  that  even  scholars 
and  teachers  not  primarily  interested  in  history  may  welcome 
the  appearance  of  trustworthy  copies  from  many  among  the 
coins  and  inscriptions  which  illustrate  the  art,  language,  and 
writing  of  the  Romans  in  the  days  of  the  Republic. 

The  authors  have  as  a  rule  adopted  modern  improvements 
in  the  spelling  of  Latin,  but  in  accordance  with  English 
custom  they  have  retained  the  familiar  forms  of  well-known 
names,  such  as  Pompey  and  Catiline,  and  in  the  Index 
they  have  sacrificed  scientific  accuracy  to  convenience  of 
reference. 


Oxford, 

April  1896. 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGE 
I.    THE   LAND   OF    ITALY  ...,....! 

IL    PEOPLES    OK    ITALY II 

III.    THE    LEGENDS   Ol'    THE    KLN'OS 20 

IV.    THE    REGAL    PERIOD 34 

V.    THE    INSTITUTIONS    OK    THE    NEW    REPUBLIC         ...  47 

VI.    THE   FIRST   STRUGGLES    OK    IHIC    PLEBEIANS          ...  $2 

VIL    EARLY   WARS   AND    ALLIANCES    OK    THE    REI'UBLIC        .            .  58 

VIII.    THE   DECEMVIRATE 65 

IX.    PROGRESS   OF   THE    PLEBEIANS 72 

X.    W^ARS    FROM    THE    DECEMVIRATE   TO    THE    FALL   OF    VEII    .  77 

XI.    THE   GAULS 84 

XII.   THE    LICINIAN     LAWS    AND    THE     E(jUALISATION     OF     THE 

ORDERS 91 

XIIL    THE    SUBJUGATION    OF    LATIUM    AM)    CAMPANIA             .            .  97 

XIV.    THE    SECOND   SAMNITE   WAR I05 

XV.    THE    CONQUEST   OF   THE    ITALIANS II4 

XVL    THE    WAR   WITH   TARENTUM    AND    PYKRHUS          .            .            .  I20 

XVII.    THE    POSITION    AND    RESOURCES    OF    ROME   AND   CARTHAIJE  IJI 

XVIII.   THE    FIRST    PUNIC    WAR I49 

XIX.    THE  EXTENSION   OK    ITALY   TO   ITS   NATURAL   BOUNDARIES  162 

XX.    HAMILCAR    AND    HANNIBAL 169 

XXL    THE   SECOND    PUNIC    WAR    UP   TO  THE   BATTLE  OF   CANNA;  1 74 

XXII.    THE   SECOND    PUNIC    WAR    FROM    CANN^   TO   ZAMA     .            .  I99 

XXIII.  FIFTY   YEARS    OF    CONQUEST — THE   WARS    IN    THE   WEST     .  234 

XXIV.  FIFTY    YEARS   OF    CONQUEST — AFRICA             ....  245 
XXV.    FIFTY   YEARS   OF    CONQUEST^THE    EASTERN    STATES    AND 

THE   SECOND    MACEDONIAN    WAR 253 

XXVI.    FIFTY   YEARS   OF   CONQUEST — THE   WAR   WITH   ANTIOCHUS  265 

XXVII.    FIFTY   YEARS   OF   CONQUEST — ^THE  FALL  OF  MACEDON  AND 

GREECE 273 

ix 


COyTEiYTS 


CHAr. 

XXVIIl. 


XXXI. 
XXXII. 

XXXIII. 
XXXIV. 
XXXV. 

XXXVI. 

XXXVII. 

XXXVIII. 

XXXIX. 

XL. 

XLI. 

XLII. 

XLIII. 

XLIV. 

XLV. 

XLVI. 

XLVIl. 

XLVIII. 

XLIX. 

I,. 

LI. 

LII. 


INTERNAL  HISTORY  (266-I46  H.l  . ;— RKLUJIOUS  ANIJ  CON- 
.STITUTIONAI 

INTERNAL     HISTORY    (266-I46    B.C.) — I'OLITICS    AND    AI>- 
MINISTRATION 

INTERNAL    HISTORY    (266-146    B.C.) — SOCIAL    AND    ECO- 
NOMIC   PROBLEMS  

CAUSES    OF    THE    FALL   OF   THE    REPUBLIC 

FOREIGN    AND    PROVINCIAL   AFFAIRS    (I46-I29    B.C.) 

INTERNAL    AFFAIRS    AND   TIBERIUS    GRACCHUS  (133  B.C.) 

i;AIUS    GRACCHUS 

THE      RESTORED      OLIGARCHY      AND      THE      WAR      WITH 
JUGURTHA     

THE    WARS    IN    THE    NORTH 

SATURNINUS,    MARIUS,    AND    THEIR    TIMES 

THE    LAWS    OF    DRUSUS        .... 

THE   SOCIAL   WAR 

SULPICIUS,    MARIUS,    AND    SULLA    (8S    B.C.) 

THE    FIRST    MITHRADATIC    WAR 

THE    CINNAN    REVOLUTION    AND    THE    CIVIL    WAR 

THE    PROSCRIPTIONS    AND   THE    NEW    DICTATORSHIP 

THE    CONSTITUTION    OF   SULLA. 

THE    RULE    OF   THE   SULLAN    RESTORATION 

THE     WARS     WITH     THE     PIRATES    AND     MITHKADAJ 
POMPEY    IN    THE    EAST  .... 

CICERO    AND    CATILINE 

THE    FORMATION    OF   THE    FIRSl    TRIUMVIRATE 

THE   CONQUEST   OF    GAUI 

THE    RULE   OF    THE   TRIUMNIRATE   AND  ITS  DISSOLUI 

THE    CIVIL    WAR 

THE    RULE   OF    C/ESAR  .... 


APPENDIX    I. — ASSEMBLIES    AT    ROME  .... 
APPENDIX    II. — LIST   OF   THE    MOST   IMPORTANT"    ROMAN 
OF   REPUBLICAN   TIMES  


INDEX 


rioN 


287 


316 
322 
326 

343 

357 
371 
384 
394 
399 
412 
419 
434 
445 
449 
460 

471 
484 
496 

503 
S16 
526 
539 

553 

555 

557 


LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS 


Kiruacan  Temple  and  Altar,  re.sturcil  (Semper,  Der  Slil,  plate  xiii.) 

Frontispiece 

Contorniate — Urbs  Roma,  ami  Wulf  with  Twins  (Sabalier,  plate  14A) 

Title-page 
View  of  the  Cami)agua,  with  Atjueduct    ..... 
Model  of  a  Primitive  Etruscan  House  (Baumei.sler,  tig.  146) 
Wall  and  Gateway  of  Perugia,  showing  Etruscan  Work    . 
Contorniate.     .Eneas  leaving  Troy — Head  of  Trajan  (Sabatier,  plate 

14-10) 

Wolf  with  Romulus  and  Remus.     Bronze  in  the   Palace  of  the  Con 

servatori  at  Rome     ........ 

Denarius  of  First  Century  B.C. — Titus  Talius  and  the  Rape  of  the 

Sabines  (Babelon,  ii.  496,  7)     .....         . 

Wall  of  Servius  Tullius  (Baumeisttr,  fig.  1591) 

Roman  Coin  after  268  B.C. — Head  of  Rome ;   Castor  and    l'ullu> 

(Head,  Coins  of  the  Ancients,  plate  44.  2)  ... 

Ficus  Ruminalis,   with   Picus  and  Parra ;    Urbs  Ruma  ;    and    Wolf 

suckling  Twins  (Rom.  Mitth.,  i.  plate  i,  1886)  . 
Wall  on  the  Aventine  (Parker,  Historical  Photographs  of  Rome) 
Cloaca  Maxima        ......... 

(iround-Plan   and    Elevation    of    the    Teni[)le    of    Vesta,     restoretl 

(Jordan,  Tempel  der  Vesta,  plate  4) . 
Sella  Curulis  and  Fasces  (Menard,  La  Vie  Privee  des  Aucien>,  i.  482, 
Etruscan  Helmet  (Dennis,   Etruria,  vol.  ii.  p.  103)   . 
Suovetaurilia.     Sacrifice   after   the    Numbering   of   the    People    (P 

Bouillon,  Musee  des  Antiques,  tom.  ii.  98) 
Etruscan  Helmet  dedicated  by  Hiero  I.  after  his  Victory  in  474  1;.  1; 

(British  Museum,  Etruscan  Saloon,  c.  93)  ... 

Etruscan  Terra-Cotta  Sarcophagus  from  Clusium  (British  Museum) 
Faliscan  Vase  in  the  British  Museum,  4  feet  3  inches  in  height  . 
The  Libral  As  {M.%  Grave).     From  a  Cast  in  the  British  Museum 


10 
14 


-J 

27 


36 
39 
41 

43 
49 
63 

75 

78 
83 
89 
93 


xii  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

lAt.E 

Romano-Campanian  Coin,  338-317  B.C.  (Head,  op.  cil.,  jilate  33.  5)     105 
ChimEEra.      Etruscan    Bronze    in    iho    ArchEcological    Museum    al 

Florence.         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         -113 

Tomb  of  L.  Cornelius  Scipio  BarbaUis,  now  in  the  Vatican  (Baunieister, 

fig.  1621) 117 

Faliscan  Vase  in  the  British  Museum 121 

Tetradrachm  of  Pyrrhus  struck  in  Italy — Head  of  Zeus  of  Dodona, 

and  the  Goddess  Dione  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  46.  27)  .         .127 

King   in   Cliariot.      Terra-Cotta  of   Punic  Workmanship  (Heuzey, 
Les  Figurines  Antiques  de  Terre  Cuite  du  Musee  de   Louvre, 

plate  V.) 132 

Plan  of  Roman  Camp  (Seyfifert-Sandys,  117) 140 

The  Smaller  Cisterns  at  Carthage  (Bosworth  Smith,  Carthage)  .      144 

Siculo-Punic   Tetradrachm — Head   of  Persephone,   with   Dolphins, 

copied  from  Syracuse  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  35.  38)     ,         .         .      145 
Siculo-Punic   Tetradrachm — Head  of  Persephone,   with    Dolphins, 

copied  from  Syracuse  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  35.  37)    .         .  .      147 

Siculo-Punic   Tetradrachm — Head   of  Herakles   (Melkarth),   copied 

from  Alexander's  Coins  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  35.  36)  .         .149 

The  Cokimna  Roslrata,  restored  (Fougere,  fig.  60S)  .         ,         .153 

Epitaph  of  Lucius  Scipio  (Ritschl,  plate  38)     .         .         .         .         -154 
Denarius  struck  circa  133  B.C.,  to  commemorate  Victory  of  Panormus 

(Babelon,  i.  263) 1 58 

Milestone  of  P.  Claudius  Pulcher  and  of  C.  Furius,  ,'luliles  (C.  I.  L. , 

X.  6838,  and  Rcim.  Mitth.,  iv.  84,  1S89) 159 

Remains  of  the  Town  of  Eryx  (Duruy,  i.  490)  .....     161 
Coin  struck  al  Carthage — Head  of  Persephone  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate 

35-35) •         •         -163 

Denarius  of  circa  45   B.C. —  Marcellus  and  Sjiolia  Opima  (Bal)elon, 

i-  352) 16S 

Roman  in  Toga  (Statue  in  the  British  Museum)        ....  173 

Tombstone  of  Roman   Horse-Soldier  from  Hexham  (by  kind  per- 
mission of  the  Society  of  Antiquaries  of  Newcastle-on-Tyne, 

from  Bruce's  Roman  Wall,  handbook,  p.  78)      ....  184 

The  Aufidus  near  Cannae          ........  195 

Carthaginian  Helmet  found  at  Cannte  (British  Museum)   .          .          .  198 

Coin  of  Hiero  H.  of  Syracuse  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  46.  31)        .         .  205 
Bust  of  Scipio  Africanus,  in  the  Capitoline  Museum  at  Rome  (Bei^ 

nouilli,  Rom.  Ikon.,  vol.  i.  plate  i)  .         .         .         .         .         .216 

Panoramic  View  of  the  Peninsula  of  Carthage  .         ....  227 

Carthaginian  Dodecadrachm- — Head  of  Persephone  (Head,  op.  cit., 

47-42) 234 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS  xiii 

PACK 

Decree  of  L.  ^-Emilius  PauUus,  I'rx'tor  of  l*"urther  Sixiin,  regulating  the 
Position  of  a  S]ianish  Client-Community,  1S9  R.c.  (C.  I.  L.,  ii. 

5041) 241 

Remains  of  Ancient  Harbours  at  Carthage  (Bosworth  Smith)    .  .  246 

Trilingual  Inscription  on  an  Altar  dedicated  to  the  God  Eshmun,  by  252 

Cleon,  an  Officer  of  the  Salt-Revenue,  circ.  150  B.C.  (Cast  in 

the  British  Museum)  ........  252 

Tetradrachm   of  Philip  V. — Athena   Alkis   hurling    I"'ulnien   (Head, 

op.  cit.,  41.  8) 259 

Gold   Octadrachm   of  Antiochus  HI. — .\pollo  seatetl  on  Onijihalfjs 

(Head,  op.  cit.,  38.  19) 266 

Cippus  of  a  Roman  Marine  of  late  date  (Schreiber-.Vnderson,  xliii.  20)  269 

Tetradrachm  of  Perseus  (Head,  op.  cit.,  54.  10)        ....  275 

Temple  and  Acropolis,  Corinth        .......  284 

Dedicatory  Inscription  of  L.  Mummius  (Ritschl,  5 1  a)       .         .         .  286 

A  Roman  sacrificing  (Baumeister,  fig.  1304)      .....  289 

Letter  of  the  Consuls  to  Local  Magistrates,  containing  the  .Senatus 

Consultum  de  Bacchanalibus  (Ritschl,  plate  iS)  .         .         .  292 

E\tispicia  (.Schreiber- Anderson,  plate  17.  3)  .  .  .  .  .  293 
Epitaph  of  P.  Cornelius  .Scipio,  Flamen  Dialis,  (?)  .Son  of  Africanus, 

who  died  young  (Ritschl,  plate  391O  .....  301 

Roman  in  Toga  (Baumeister,  fig.  191 7)     ......  307 

Roman  Soldiers  with  Scutum,  of  a  late  period  (.Schreiber- Anderson, 

42.  8) 314 

Lamp    with    Circus    Scene   (British    Museum,    Terra-Cotta    Room, 

Case  C.) 319 

Gladiators.    From  a  Pompeian  Wall-Painting  (Les  Ruines  de  Pompeii, 

F.  Mazois,  vol.  iv.  plate  48)      .......  321 

Milestone  set    up  by   P.    Popillius    Lcenas,  in   Lucania,   as   Consul, 

132  B.C.  (C.  I.  L.,  i.  551,  Ritschl,  plate  51B)  ....  339 
Termini  set  up  by  the  Land  Commission  in  the  Land  of  the  Ilirpini, 

130-129  B.C.  (Ritschl,  plate  55C.n.) 344 

Ruins  of  Aqueduct,  Carthage  ........  348 

A  Camillus,  or  Attendant  at  .Sacrifice  (Baumeister,  fig.  1305)    .  .  355 

View  of  Cirta  (Delamare,  Expedition  .Scientifique  d'Algerie)  .  .  y:)"^ 
Plan  and  .Section  of  the    Mamertine  Prison.     (Middleton,   Ancient 

Rome)     ...........  370 

Roman  Soldier  (Lindenschmidt,  Tracht  und  Bewafifnung,  plate  i.  6)  376 
Combat  of  Gladiators :  the  vanquished  Combatant  appealing  to  the 

Audience.  From  a  Pompeian  Painting  (Baumeister,  fig.  2347) .  3S0 
Denarius  struck  loi  B.C. —Triumph  of  Marius     the  Goddess,  Rome 

(Babelon,  i.  515) 383 


xiv  LIST  OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 

HAGK 

Part  nfa  Statue  of  a  Vestal  (Museoalle  Teniic,  Knme)  .  .  .  386 
Denarius  of  the  Confederates — Taking  tlie  ( )ath  :  and  I  lead  of  Tialia 

(Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  6S.  14)     ......         .  400 

Denarius    of   Mutilus — Samnite   Bull   goring  Wolf;    Head   of  P.ac- 

chante  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  6S.  15)          .          .          .         .         .  404 

Sling-Bullets  from  Asculum  (Duruy,  ii.  570)     .....  409 

Temple  of  P'ortuna  (?)  at  Rome  (so-called  P'ortuna  Virilis)                  .  415 

Tetradrachm  of  Mithradates  \T.[(Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  60.  2)  .  ,  421 
Tetradrachni  struck  by  Sulla  in  Athens — Athena  and  thcO^l  (Pritish 

Museum)          ..........  430 

Etruscan  Arch  at  Volaterra;     ........  444 

Head  of  Pompey  on  a  Coin  struck  circ.  38-36  B.C.  (Bahclon,  s.  v. 

Nasidius,  ii.  251,  2)  .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .  463 

Gladiators — Combats  of  Secutor  and  Retiarius  (IJaunieister,  fig.  2352)  467 

Helmet  of  a  Gladiator  (Baunieister,  fig.  2346)  .....  469 

Coin   of   Tigranes   struck   in    Syria   before   69   B.C. — (i)    Head    of 

Tigranes  ;  (2)  Anlioch  sealed  on  a  Rock  (Head,  op.  cit.,  61.  13)  473 

Gold  Stater  of  Mithradates  VI.  (Head,  op.  cit.,  60.  i)  .  .  .  474 
Tombs  of  the   Kings   of   Pontus   (Perrot,    Exploration  Arch,  de  la 

Galatie)    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .481 

Golden  Gate  of  Temple  at  Jerusalem  (Duruy,  ii.  S31)        .          .          .  483 

Bust  of  Cicero  (Bernouilli,  Rom.  Ikon.,  i.  jjlate  11),  in  the  \'atican  .  489 

Sacrarium  in  a  House  at  Pompeii  (Overbeck,  Pompeii,  \.  299)          .  498 

Bust  of  Julius  Coesar  (Naples  Museum)     ......  501 

Stater  of  Philip  I.  of  Macedon — (i )  Head  of  Apollo  ;  (2)  Charioteer 

(Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  22.  17)     .         .         .         .         .         .          .  505 

Gallic  Imitation  of  Stater  of  Philip  (Head,  op.  cit.,  plate  57.  i)  505 

Figure-head  of  Roman  Ship  (Torr,  Ancient  Ships,  plate  8)        .         .  509 
Roman  Arch  at  S.  Remy  (France)  .         .         .         .         .         .          -515 

Head  of  Cleopatra  (British  Museum)         ......  537 

Denarius  struck  44  B.C. — (i)  Head  of  Caesar  ;  (2)  Venus  with  Victory 

(Babelon,  ii.  20.  21) 539 

Bust  of  C.  Octavius,  afterwards  Augustus  (in  the  Vatican)          .         .  543 

Bust  of  Brutus  (in  the  Capitoline  Museum  at  Rome)          .                   .  549 

Parody  of  a  Scene  in  School  (Rom.  Mitlh.,  V.  plate  I.  1S90)      .         .  551 


The  Illustrations  anil  Plans  engraved  by  Messrs.   ]]'alker  and  Boutall. 


MAPS    AND     PLANS 


I.    MAPS    LITHOGRAPHED 


Italia  before  the  Roman  Conquest 

Urbs  Roma,  Republic  (llorton,  I  list,  of  the 

Romans)         .... 
Italia,  showing  the  Colonies  (Ilortnn,  ^i^t 

of  the  Romans)        .... 
Sicily  (Bosworth  .Smiili,  Carthage) 
The  Carthaginian   Em]iire  (Bosworth  Smith 

Carthasie)         .  .  .         .  . 


Carthage  and  her  Neighliourhooil  (llosworth  1 
Smith,  Carthage)    .         .         .         .         ■  \ 
Rome  and  her  Neighbours  (Horton) 
Gallia  (after  Kiepert,  in  Kraner's  CcEsar) 
The  Roman  Empire       .... 


Before  page     I 
Be/ween  pages  38  aful  39 

I  Between  pages  134  and  135 

To  face  page  150 

'  Between  pages  1 74  and  1 7  5 


To  face  page  249 

Between  pages  402  and  403 

,,  506  and  507 

552  a;;./ 553 


II.    PLANS   AND    MAPS    IN   TEXT 


Battle  of  Ecnomus  (Bosworth  Smith) 

Battle  of  Lake  Trasimene  . 

Battle  of  Cannn?  (from  Strachan  Davidson,  I'olybius) 

Campania  ....... 

The  Harbours  at  Carthage  (Bosworth  Smith 
The  East  when  Rome  began  to  interfere 
Greece       ...... 

The  East,  temp.  Mithradates  and  Tigranes 
Alesia  (Kraner)  .... 

Ilerda  (Kraner) 

Macedonia  and  Greece  (Kraner) 
Battles  near  Dyrrhachium  (Kraner)    . 


PAGE 

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•  423 

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•  532 

•  533 


ADDENDA  AND  CORRIGENDA 

Page  37,  line  8  from  the  bottom,  "  Roma  Quadiata."  The 
meaning  of  this  term  is  disputed.  Lanciani,  Ki/i>is  of 
Aucicnt  Rome,  p.  60,  denies  its  application  to  the 
Palatine  city. 

Page  44,  line  3  from  bottom.  The  original  meaning  and 
derivation  of  the  word  '"''  tribus"  is  far  from  certain. 

Pages  159,  i6o,/^r  "Calatinus"  the  Fasti  ?ra^"  Caiatinus," 
and  similarly  Mommsen  prefers  "Caiatia"  to 
"Calatia"  on  page  114,  line  3, 


HISTORY    OF    ROME 

CHAPTER   I 

THE     LAND    OF    ITALY 

Rome  and  Italy. — The  history  of  Rome  is  the  history  of  Italy. 
It  has  been  much  more  ;  it  has  never  been  much  less.  Her  early 
efforts  aimed  at  predominance  in  Italy  ;  she  wielded  the  strength 
of  Italy  in  her  wars  of  defence  and  aggression,  and  if  in  her  selfish 
and  centralising  policy  she  merged  the  land  in  the  city,  and  sacri- 
ficed its  population  and  prosperity  to  her  own  interests,  she  made 
Italy  mistress  of  the  world,  and  stood  to  the  end  as  the  head  and 
representative  of  the  Italian  land.  In  her  beginnings,  and  indeed 
constitutionally  throughout,  she  was  but  a  city-state  of  the  sole  type 
recognised  by  Pericles  or  Aristotle,  as  distinct  and  individual  as 
ancient  Athens  or  mediaeval  Florence  :  she  became  in  later  days 
an  imperial  power,  stamping'  the  civilised  world  with  the  unity  of 
the  Roman  name.  But  the  Rome  of  Augustus  is,  equally  with  the 
Rome  of  the  Fabii,  Italian  in  sentiment,  interests,  and  policy.  Her 
youth  was  singularly  free  from  non- Italian  influences  ;  and,  however 
much  her  maturer  age  received  and  diffused  an  alien  cultivation, 
she  remained  rooted  and  grounded  in  Italy,  as  Italy  was  in  that 
West  to  which  its  face  is  turned.  The  struggle  of  Octavian  and 
Antony,  of  East  and  West,  is  typical  of  her  history  from  first  to 
last.  Hence  to  understand  the  place  of  Rome  in  history,  we  must 
understand  the  place  of  Rome  in  Italy,  and  the  place  of  Italy  in 
the  Mediterranean  basin.  To  comprehend  the  special  character 
of  her  own  laws  and  institutions,  and  of  the  ideas  and  civilisation 
which  she  implanted,  we  must  comprehend  the  relation  of  Rome 
to  Italian  peoples,  and  of  the  Italian  country  to  its  immediate 
neighbours. 

Historically,  only  those  features  of  a  country  are  important 
which  affect  the  power  of  a  nation  for  offence  or  defence,  which 

A 


2  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

determine  its   splicre   of  action   and   the   nature   of  its  resources, 
or  wliicli  influence  its  national  character  and  type  of  life. 

The  work  of  Rome  in  liistory  was  twofold, — first  and  foremost  to 
create  Italian  unity,  and  then,  with  the  power  so  gained,  to  solve 
the  problem  her  rivals  could  not  solve,  the  maintenance  of  peace 
and  order  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  civilisation  of  the  ruder  races 
round  its  coasts,  and  the  defence  of  that  civilisation  against  the 
barbarians  of  the  East  and  North.  The  place  of  Rome  in  Italy 
partly  explains  the  union  of  Italy  under  Roman  supremacy  ;  the 
place  of  Italy  in  the  Mediterranean  is  a  still  larger  factor  in  the 
extension  of  that  supremacy  over  the  civilised  world. 

Marked  Features.  —  Italy,  the  central  peninsula  of  the  three 
masses  of  land  projecting  into  the  southern  sea,  with  the  islands 
that  essentially  belong  to  her,  enjoys  a  position  favourable  to 
independent  development,  and,  in  the  hands  of  a  strong  people 
with  adequate  sea-power,  admirably  adapted  for  the  control  of  tlie 
Mediterranean.  Apart  from  the  untrustworthy  barriers  of  the  Alps 
and  Po,  her  great  depth  and  narrow  front  were  a  powerful  aid  to 
her  defences  on  the  north  ;  by  her  central  position  she  severed  the 
East  from  the  West,  and  holding  the  inner  lines,  could  meet  with 
security  the  combinations  of  Hannibal  or  Pompey. 

She  lay  back  to  back  with  Greece,  her  more  accessible  coast 
turned  to  the  lands  and  waters  of  the  West.  The  tip  of  her  toe 
touches  Sicily,  the  meeting-place  of  Hellene,  Phoenician,  Sicel, 
and  Latin,  and,  through  Sicily,  touches  upon  the  hump  of  Africa 
which  projects  Carthage  upon  the  Sicilian  shores.  To  her  front 
lay  Spain,  the  Eldorado  of  antiquity,  blocked  as  yet  by  Phoenician 
cruisers.  To  the  north  the  Celtic  and  Germanic  tribes  swarmed 
round  and  through  the  mountain-passes.  In  addition  to  these 
points  in  her  position  which  materially  influenced  the  destinies  of 
Italy  and  Rome,  the  most  striking  features  of  the  land  are  the 
projecting  boot-like  shape,  the  peculiar  mountain-system  which  is 
its  cause,  the  double  length  of  coast  which  is  its  effect,  and  which 
exposes  both  flanks  to  naval  attack  as  much  as  it  opens  them  to 
friendly  intercourse,  and  finally  the  marked  contrast  between  the 
northern  plain  of  the  Po  and  the  central  and  southern  hill-country. 

Contrast  with  Greece  and  Spain. — Not  only  in  position,  but  in 
form  and  character,  Italy  stands  intermediate  between  the  striking 
contrasts  of  Greece  and  Spain.  Greece  has  no  single  definite 
mountain-barrier  ;  Spain  is  abruptly  severed  from  Europe  by  the 
frowning  lines  of  the  Pyrenees  ;  the  Alps  partially  protect,  but  do 
not  isolate,  Italy.     Italy,  diversified  by  sweeping  bays  and  fertile 


MOUNTAINS  OF  TTAL  V  3 

coast-lands,  by  nortlicrn  plain  and  sontliern  slopes,  remains  one  land, 
the  land  of  the  Apennines  ;  Spain  surrounds  her  vast  and  sinj^le 
plateau  with  a  rej^ular  and  little-broken  coast  ;  Greece  is  split  by 
windiu",'-  chains  and  deep  indented  gulfs  into  geographical  and 
political  atoms.  Greece,  facing  eastwards,  expanded  eastwards, 
and  early  assimilated  Oriental  culture  ;  Spain,  till  Columbus  the 
western  limit  of  the  world,  remained  for  centuries  a  barbarous 
country  fringed  by  factories  ;  Italy,  expanding  to  the  west,  passed 
on  to  Spain  what  she  had  received  from  Greece,  and  returned  with 
increased  power  to  absorb  the  sources  of  her  own  culture. 

Size. — The  land  of  Italy  lies  roughly  between  parallels  37°  and 
46"  of  north  latitude.  Its  greatest  length,  from  N.W.  to  S.E.,  is  a 
little  over  700  miles  ;  its  average  breadth  hardly  exceeds  100,  though 
from  the  western  Alps  to  the  head  of  the  Adriatic  it  extends  to 
340  miles.  The  total  area  may  be  put  at  go,ooo  square  miles.  In 
size,  therefore,  though  not  in  shape,  Italy  bears  some  resemblance 
to  Great  Britain. 

Mountains. — The  frontier  of  the  peninsula  to  the  north  is  formed 
by  the  wavering  line  of  the  Alps,  which,  stretching  for  700  miles, 
with  abundant  passes,  forms  a  rampart  more  striking  than  formid- 
able, and  one  that  has  never  sufficed  to  shelter  the  sunny  south 
from  the  inroads  of  the  cevetous  north.  Rising  precipitously 
enough  from  the  Lombard  plain,  the  Alps  slope  less  steeply  to  the 
north.  A  short  march  brings  the  enemy  who  has  climbed  the 
less  difficult  ascent  down  at  one  swoop  upon  the  plain.  But  the 
Alps  are  not  Italian  as  a  matter  of  geography  or  history.  For 
centuries  they  remained  beyond  the  sphere  of  Italian  life.  Not 
till  Augustus  were  their  robber-tribes  thoroughly  tamed  and  their 
passes  paved  with  roads  ;  scarcely  then  did  they  cease  to  the  true 
Roman  mind  to  be  a  dubious  defence,  a  commercial  barrier,  and 
a  limit  of  Italian  land  and  life. 

The  Apennines,  on  the  contrary,  are  the  backbone  of  the  country. 
Breaking  off  from  the  Maritime  Alps  above  Savona,  they  stretch 
away  E.  and  S.E.  from  coast  to  coast,  severing  the  great  triangle 
of  Cisalpine  Gaul  from  the  true  soil  of  Roman  Italy.  Above 
Genoa  the  range  reaches  but  a  moderate  height  (3000-4000  feet) ; 
rising  rapidly  to  cover  Etruria,  it  thrusts  up  higher  peaks  (5000- 
7000  feet)  both  here  and  in  northern  Umbria,  where  it  turns  de- 
finitely S.E.  After  a  slight  break  in  Lower  Umbria  comes  the 
massive  quadrilateral  of  the  Abruzzi,  a  group  of  lofty  summits 
(9000  feet),  cleft  by  torrents  into  deep  ravines,  and  breaking  down 
to  pleasant  upland  vales.     Such,  too,  but  of  lesser  height,  is  the 


4  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

mountain  s^irdlc  of  Samnium.  Ilenccfortli  tlic  main  mass  clianges 
direction  to  the  south,  runs  down  to  form  tlic  projecting  loe,  and 
jumping  the  narrow  rift  at  Rhegium,  spreads  itself  out  into  the 
three  corners  of  Sicily.  Apart  from  their  natural  beauties,  the 
Apennines  have  exercised  a  decisive  influence  on  the  history  of 
the  land  and  the  character  of  its  people.  This  single  and  continu- 
ous backbone  has  given  to  Italy  the  regular  conformation,  which 
contrasts  so  markedly  with  the  complexity  of  outline  stamped  upon 
Greece  by  its  chaos  of  mountains.  The  difference,  too,  between 
its  eastern  and  western  slopes  determines  the  different  character 
of  the  Adriatic  and  Tyrrhenian  coasts.  From  the  steep  eastern 
side  run  down  short  spurs  and  swift  torrents,  which  seam  the 
narrow  seaward  strip  with  deep  ravines.  Scant  room  is  left  for 
cultivation  ;  and  until  the  mountains  leave  the  coast  and  we  reach 
the  good  harbours  of  Brindisi  and  Otranto  (Brundisium  and 
Hydruntum),  in  the  Apulian  plain,  there  is  no  natural  harbour  of 
refuge  from  the  Adriatic  storms,  except  the  open  roadstead  of 
Ancona,  and  the  useless  lagoons  beneath  Mount  Garganus.  The 
western  side  presents  a  marked  contrast  ;  fertile  plains  are 
watered  by  ample  streams,  good  and  spacious  ports  formed  at  the 
river-mouths,  or  flanked  and  fronted  by  jutting  headlands  and 
sheltering  islands,  foster  navigation  and  commerce  on  the  tideless 
waters  of  the  Tyrrhene  sea.  Italy,  in  fact,  if  we  except  Apulia 
in  the  extreme  south-east  and  the  lower  valley  of  the  Po  in  the 
extreme  north,  which  maintained  some  connection  with  Greece 
and  Illyria,  turns  her  face  westward,  and  found  in  the  civilisation 
of  the  west  her  most  important  work.  This  decisive  fact  in  her 
history  is  due  to  the  Apennine  range. 

Again,  the  mountains  of  Greece  divide;  the  Apennines  may 
be  even  said  to  unite.  A  dividing  line  between  peoples  they  have 
never  been.  Even  in  the  most  rugged  region  of  the  Abruzzi,  the 
easy  intersecting  passes,  the  table-lands,  and  upland  valleys  fit 
them  for  the  labour  and  habitation  of  men.  When  the  grass  of 
the  lower  country  is  parched,  the  flocks  and  herds  are  driven  up 
from  the  plain  of  Apulia  to  the  mountain-pastures  of  Samnium. 
This  happy  combination  is  a  special  characteristic  of  Italy.  In 
early  times,  indeed,  the  freebooters  of  the  highlands,  the  Rob  Roys 
of  those  days,  harried  and  blackmailed  the  rich  dwellers  on  the 
sunny  coasts.  The  struggle  of  highland  and  lowland,  and  the  final 
victory  of  civilisation  under  the  leadership  of  Rome,  achieving 
their  natural  union,  is  another  marked  feature  which  Italian  history 
owes  to  the  Apennines. 


RIVERS  OF  ITALY  5 

V^olcanic  forces  have  been  largely  at  work  in  the  formation 
of  Italy.  Apart  from  the  acti\e  craters  of  /Etna,  Stromboli,  and 
Vesuvius,  the  Campanian  plain  owes  to  its  volcanic  origin  its 
peculiar  beauty  and  richness  ;  while  in  the  Roman  land  itself, 
stretching  from  Clusium  to  the  Alban  hills,  and  from  the  Apennines 
to  the  sea,  lovely  lakes  fill  the  extinct  craters,  and  from  their  pre- 
historic lava-streams  and  dust-showers  come  the  tufa  and  the 
famous  concrete  of  which  Rome  was  built. 

Rivers. — The  river-system  of  a  country  usually  exercises  an 
influence  on  its  history  only  second  to  its  general  position  and  its 
relation  to  the  sea.  In  Roman  history  it  has  played  a  lesser  part. 
For  centuries  the  largest  river  of  Italy  flowed  unregarded  through 
an  alien  territory.  Gradually  the  Roman  outposts  were  pushed  up 
to  Arretium  and  Ariminum,  and  thence  to  Placentia  and  Aquileia  ; 
but  in  Caesar's  time  the  Cisalpine  plain  was  still  a  province,  and 
Roman  Italy  ended  at  the  Rubicon.  The  contrast  of  the  two 
regions  is  marked  and  obvious.  Tlie  rivers  of  the  peninsula 
proper  are  naturally  small  in  size,  and,  however  famous  in  story, 
geographically  far  less  important.  Upper  Italy  forms  the  basin  of 
a  single  large  stream,  the  Padus  (Po),  or,  as  Virgil  calls  it,  Erida- 
nus,  king  of  rivers,  a  great  central  artery  whose  network  of  veins 
stretches  on  either  hand  to  the  Alps  and  the  Apennines.  Spring- 
ing from  its  sources  in  Monte  Viso  (Mons  Vesulus),  it  rushes  to  its 
junction  with  the  Ticino,  swollen  by  the  torrents  of  the  two  Doras 
(Duria),  the  Sesia,  and  the  Tanaro.  But  in  its  long  and  winding 
lower  course  its  sluggish  stream  needs  the  impulse  of  swifter 
tributaries,  the  Ticino,  the  Adda,  and  the  Mincio,  which  act  as 
outlets  for  the  large  northern  lakes,  and  draw  through  them  the 
waters  of  the  Alps.  Of  the  smaller  feeders  from  the  southern 
ridges  the  most  famous  is  the  Trebia  ;  the  largest  are  the  Taro  and 
Secchia.  About  its  mouths  the  Po  forms  a  vast  system  of  marshes 
and  lagoons.  In  this  work  it  is  aided  by  the  Adige  (Athesis),  which 
descends  from  the  Tyrol,  affording  an  important  issue  to  the  north, 
and  enters  the  Lombard  plain  at  Verona,  and  by  the  Reno,  from 
the  Apennines,  which  reaches  the  lowlands  near  Bologna  (Bononia). 
The  ever-growing  deposit  and  the  constant  floods  have  made  this 
district  an  Italian  Netherlands,  a  labyrinth  of  streams  and  canals, 
of  lagoons  and  sandbanks,  of  reedy  swamps  and  grassy  meadows, 
noisy  with  frogs,  and  plagued  by  low  fevers  and  mosquitos. 
Venice,  by  diverting  the  Brenta,  keeps  her  waters  intact,  but 
Ravenna,  the  naval  harbour  of  Augustus,  is  now  six  miles  from 
the  sea,  and  the  same  fate,  yet  earlier,  befell  both  Atria  and  Spina. 


6  HISTORY   OF  ROME 

M;iny  of  tlic  southern  tributaries  of  ihe  I'oare  in  summer  notliin^ 
more  than  wide,  dry  water-courses,  but  the  main  stream,  thouj^h  its 
unhealthy  swamps  prevented  towns  from  ckistering  on  its  banks,  as 
on  the  Rhine  or  Rhone,  was  yet  the  highway  of  internal  commerce, 
and  with  its  numerous  branches  and  canals  irrigated  and  fertilised 
the  entire  plain,  whose  extraordinary  productiveness  is  recorded 
by  Polybius.  At  the  same  time  there  is  constant  danger  of  flood 
from  the  melting  snows  in  May  and  from  the  autumnal  rains.  To 
meet  this  danger,  the  lower  courses  of  the  larger  rivers  are  lined 
with  double  rows  of  massive  dykes.  But  the  disease  grows  by  the 
remedy.  The  mud,  unable  to  escape,  chokes  the  channel  and  raises 
the  river-bed  above  the  level  of  the  land.  There  comes  a  time 
when  the  ever-rising  bank  fails  to  bear  the  pressure  of  the  confined 
waters,  which  burst  the  barriers  in  a  raging  torrent.^ 

Of  the  rivers  of  the  peninsula  proper,  the  Arno  and  the  Tiber 
are  the  largest,  and  furnish  the  key  to  the  formation  of  central 
Italy.  Separated  at  their  sources  by  less  than  thirty  miles,  their 
lower  courses  widely  diverge.  The  Arno  (i6o  miles)  at  first  flows 
southward,  but  turns  abruptly  to  the  north-west  at  Arezzo  (Arre- 
tium),  and  thence  past  Florence  westward  to  the  sea.  Its  marshes 
formed  a  line  of  defence  which  almost  baffled  Hannibal  ;  otherwise 
its  place  in  Roman  history  is  but  slight.  The  Tiber,  running  nearly 
due  south,  receives  as  its  main  tributaries,  on  the  right  bank  the 
Chiana  (Clanis),  and  on  the  left  the  Nera  (Nar)  and  Teverone 
(Anio).  Of  these  the  Chiana,  whose  upper  waters  have  recently 
been  diverted  into  the  Arno,  rising  above  Chiusi  (Clusium),  comes 
in  below  Orvieto  ;  the  Nar  has  carried  the  waters  of  the  Sabine 
highlands  since  Manius  Curius  cut  the  rocks  that  hem  the  Veline 
lake  and  formed  the  falls  of  Terni  (Interamna)  ;  while  the  Anio, 
issuing  from  the  yEquian  hills,  makes  Tivoli  (Tibur)  beautiful  with 
its  waterfalls,  and  enters  the  main  stream  above  the  city,  below 
which  the  Tiber  turns  westward  to  Ostia  and  the  sea.  The  tawny 
mud  {flavtis  Tiberis)  has  now  partially  silted  up  the  river-bed,  but 
in  ancient  days,  though  it  was  more  usual  to  unload  at  Ostia,  ships 
of  burthen  could  make  their  way  to  Rome.  The  wine,  corn,  and 
timber  of  the  inland  districts  were  floated  down  in  barges  from 
the  upper  waters  to  the  quays  of  the  capital.  It  was  this  river- 
commerce  which  first  made  Rome  the  trading  centre  of  middle 
Italy  ;  but  her  position,  if  favourable  to  trade,  exposed  her  then, 
as  now,  to  the  ravages  of  floods,  which  wasted  the  swarming 
slums  in  the  valleys  (not  then  filled  in  with  rubbish  or  levelled 
1  Cf.  Verg.  Georg.,  i.  481,  iv.  372;  Lucan,  Phars.,  vi.  272. 


RIVERS   OF  ITALY  7 

by  the  enj^incci),  and  called  for  constanL  1  emulation  and  careful 
embankment. 

The  next  considerable  stream,  the  Liris  (Clarigliano),  rises  near 
LacLis  Fucinus,  and  flowing  S.E.  by  S.,  edges  gradually  westward 
between  the  Volscian  and  the  central  range,  then  turning  sharply 
beyond  Interamna,  falls  into  the  Mediterranean  at  Mintuniic.  Be- 
neath Fregelkc  it  is  joined  by  its  chief  feeder,  the  Trerus  (Sacco), 
along'  whose  valley  ran  the  great  Latin  road  from  Latium  to  the 
Hernican  country,  and  thence  by  the  bridg^e  of  Fregelhe  to  Casinum 
and  Capua.  From  its  junction  with  the  Trerus  the  Liris  ceases 
to  be  fordable,  and  serves  as  a  defensive  line  to  the  south  for  the 
coast-land  of  Latium. 

The  Volturnus  from  the  north  and  the  Calor  from  the  south 
drain  the  mountain-valleys  of  Samnium  ;  their  united  stream,  turning 
to  the  west,  leaves  Capua  on  the  left,  and  passing  the  ielc-dc-pont 
of  Casilinum,  where  the  Appian  and  Latin  roads  converge,  forms 
the  natural  highway  from  the  hill -country  to  the  sea,  and  an 
equally  natural  bone  of  contention  in  the  long  and  keen  struggle 
of  Romans  and  Samnites  for  the  mastery  of  Italy.  The  Silarus 
(Sele),  the  last  considerable  western  stream,  rises  in  the  Lucanian 
Apennines,  and  enters  the  sea  near  Piestum.  Henceforward  the 
closeness  of  the  watershed  to  the  sea  admits  but  of  short,  swift 
torrents.  From  the  less  abrupt  slopes  that  skirt  the  instep  of  the 
boot  there  flow  into  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum  four  streams  of  moderate 
size,  Siris  and  Aciris,  Bradanus  and  Casuentus. 

One  stream  of  mark  alone  threads  the  poorly  watered  levels  of 
Apulia,  Horace's  loud-roaring  Aufidus  (Ofanto),  which,  rushing 
rapidly  down  from  the  mountain  angle  of  Samnium  and  Lucania, 
winds  gently  through  the  plain  past  Canusium  and  the  fated  field 
of  Cannae.  North  of  Mount  Garganus,  again,  which  juts  like  a 
misplaced  spur  above  the  heel,  the  one  large  stream  among  in- 
numerable rivulets  and  swift-falling  torrents  is  the  Aternus  (Pes- 
cara).  Its  valley  served  as  a  natural  link  between  the  hills  and 
the  small  emporium  at  the  river's  mouth,  Aternum,  and  gave  an 
obvious  route  for  the  Via  Claudia  Valeria,  the  direct  road  from 
Rome  to  the  Adriatic.  Corfinium,  at  the  sharp  angle  of  the  stream 
where  it  turns  on  itself  to  the  north  and  east,  the  most  central  point 
in  the  widest  part  of  the  valley,  became,  in  the  last  struggle  of  the 
Marsic  highlanders  with  Rome,  the  headquarters  and  formal  capital 
of  the  insurgent  tribes.  The  roll  of  Italian  livers  may  well  close  with 
the  historic  name  of  Metaurus  in  the  Gallic  m.arch  of  Umbria. 

Lakes. — The  lakes  of  Italy  deserve  a  passing  mention  for  their 


8  FUSrORY  OF  ROME 

geological  interest  and  inarvellous  beauty.  Here  once  more  ap- 
pears the  contrast  of  north  and  south.  The  great  lakes  of 
northern  Italy,  natural  reservoirs,  which  store  and  regulate  the 
waters  of  the  Alpine  feeders  of  the  Po,  Maggiore  (Verbanus)  on 
the  Ticino,  Como  (Larius)  on  the  Adda,  and  Garda  (Benacus)  on 
the  smooth-sliding  Mincius,  rich  with  the  praise  of  poets  from 
Catullus  to  our  own  Tennyson,  are  chasms  carved,  it  may  be,  in 
some  age  of  ice,  and  filled  at  a  later  time,  like  fjords  in  Norway, 
by  the  sea  which  once  rolled  its  waves  to  wash  the  feet  of  the 
Alps.  The  lakes  of  the  peninsula  are  inferior  in  size  and  depth. 
Some,  like  the  pools  of  Greece,  are  shallow  meres  with  no  out- 
let, due  to  accumulation  of  water  in  upland  valleys.  Such  was 
Lacus  Fucinus  in  the  Marsic  hills,  which,  like  Lake  Copais  in 
Bceotia,  has  recently  (1875)  been  drained,  by  an  extension  of  the 
"  emissarium  "  of  Claudius  ;  such  still  are  the  famous  mere  of 
"  reedy  Trasimene,"  threatened  with  a  like  fate,  and  the  smaller 
lake  of  Clusium,  both  in  Etruria.  Others  again  are  found  thickly 
scattered  in  the  volcanic  districts  of  central  Italy.  The  Alban 
lakes  and  the  Ciminian  pool  fill  deep  cup-shaped  craters  of 
extinct  volcanoes  ;  the  basins  of  the  "great  Volsinian  mere"  and 
the  Lacus  Sabatinus  may  have  been  formed  Ijy  subsidence  and 
erosion.  The  two  latter  are  linked  by  small  rivers  to  the  sea  ;  in 
other  cases  the  water,  as  in  Greece,  pierces  a  subterranean  passage, 
or  is  carried  off  in  artificial  channels  often  of  remote  antiquity. 

Climate  and  Products. — Taken  as  a  whole,  Italy  is  a  healthy 
country.  The  summer's  heat  is  tempered  by  the  mountain  breezes, 
the  winter's  cold  by  the  nearness  of  the  sea.  Yet  differences  of 
latitude  and  the  natural  configuration  of  the  land  cause  a  consider- 
able variety  in  climate.  In  the  basin  of  the  Po  the  conditions  are 
continental  rather  than  Mediterranean.  In  winter  bitter  winds 
blow  from  the  Alps,  snow  lies  even  on  the  plain,  and  the  olive 
barely  survives  the  keenness  of  the  frost  ;  the  rains  of  summer 
save  the  land  from  all  danger  of  drought.  The  southern  sea- 
board, with  its  sub-tropical  climate,  presents  a  direct  antithesis. 
Campania,  the  coasts  of  the  Tarentine  gulf,  and  the  Italian  islands 
are  seldom  shrouded  in  snow  ;  their  winter  is  pleasant  as  a  genial 
spring.  Both  regions  were  early  occupied  by  strangers,  the  north 
by  the  roving  Gaul,  the  coasts  and  islands  by  the  adventurous 
Greek.  The  land  of  the  native  Italians,  which  falls  between  the 
two  extremes,  is  itself  far  from  uniform  in  character,  the  chief 
contrast  being-  between  the  seaward  fringe  and  the  central  hills. 
The  Tuscan   and   Apulian   plains   under  adequate   irrigation   are 


CLIMATE  AND   J 'RO DUCTS  9 

still  of  great  fertility,  for  all  the  ruin  wrought  by  slavery,  by  war, 
and  by  the  heavy  hand  of  Sulla.  The  lower  slopes  of  the  hills, 
especially  on  the  western  side,  bear  the  most  characteristic  products 
of  Italy,  the  vine  and  the  olive,  as  well  as  corn.  The  higher  hills, 
now  bleak  and  bare,  were  once  partly  clothed  with  beeches  and 
chestnuts,  or  gave  a  summer  pasture  to  flocks  and  herds.  In 
winter  snow  covers  the  Samnite  and  Sabine  highlands. 

A  rich  variety  of  products  corresponds  to  this  marked  diversity  of 
climate.  It  is  true  that  the  lemons  and  oranges  of  the  south,  the  rice 
and  maize  of  the  north,  with  the  mulberry-tree  and  the  silk-worm, 
have  been  introduced  in  modern  times.  The  plain  of  Lombardy, 
the  market-garden  of  more  than  Italy,  was,  in  the  days  of  Poly- 
bius,  studded  with  oak-coppices,  where  herds  of  swine  fattened 
on  acorns.  But  wheat,  the  olive,  and  the  vine  were  from  an  early 
age  common,  if  not  indigenous,  in  the  land.  In  the  production 
of  olive-oil  Italy  early  took,  and  still  holds,  the  foremost  place  in 
Europe  ;  her  wines  from  the  Massic  hill  and  the  Falernian  fields 
stood  high  with  the  connoisseurs  of  the  early  empire,  if  they  yield 
to-day  before  the  rival  vintages  of  France  and  Spain.  These  staple 
products  were  partially  protected  by  the  policy  of  the  Senate 
from  foreign  competition.  Corn-growing  soon  became  unprofitable, 
and  failed  to  hold  its  ovm  against  imported  wheat,  sheep-farming-, 
and  market-gardening,  whose  economic  effects  were  exaggerated 
by  bad  legislation  and  capitalism  resting  on  slave  -  labour.  Of 
manufactures  Italy  had  little  to  boast,  though  the  wool  industry 
must  have  attained  a  great  development.  Essentially  an  agricul- 
tural land,  with  the  decline  of  field  industries,  and  the  growth 
of  foreign  speculation,  militarism,  and  luxury,  the  balance  of  com- 
merce must  have  gone  increasingly  against  her,  and  the  drain  in 
payment  for  the  food-stufi's,  the  art-products,  the  wines  and  luxuries 
of  the  East,  only  came  back  in  the  dangerous  shape  of  tribute,  of 
extorted  interest  and  official  plunder. 

But  with  all  its  advantages  of  climate,  Italy  suffers  from  one 
deadly  scourge,  the  fever-  laden  air  {malaria).  The  western 
plains,  the  southern  coast,  the  margins  of  the  islands,  above  all 
the  Maremma  and  the  Campagna  of  Rome,  studded  once  with 
prosperous  cities,  thronged  with  hurrying  feet,  crowned  with 
towers  and  beautified  with  temples,  lie  waste  and  desolate.  Even 
in  the  first  century  of  our  era  the  Tuscan  coast  was  becoming 
dangerous,  and  more  than  one  Punic  army  had  long  since  melted 
away  by  the  marshes  of  Syracuse.  Far  wider  tracts  have  been 
smitten  with  the  curse  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  in  modern  times. 


HISTORY   01'    ROME 


A' ACES  OF  A'OR'I'II  ITALY  il 

Land  in  Etruria  and  Lalium  now  si^en  up  to  the  froj,>-  and  the 
buffalo  was  in  antiquity  well  drained  and  well  tilled.  The  people 
were  kept  warm  l)y  the  woollen  clothing  and  blazing  hearths  dear 
to  the  Romans,  and  dwelt  in  cities  whose  great  walls,  as  the 
Sardinians  still  find,  helped  to  keep  out  the  deadly  mist.  Even 
now  the  malaria  retires  before  the  ad\ancing  plough,  and  crops 
of  corn  wave  once  more  by  the  abandoned  temples  of  Pa;stum. 


CHAPTER  II 

PEOPLES     OF     ITALY 

The  variety  of  races  within  the  peninsula  was  no  less  marked 
than  the  variety  of  its  products  and  of  its  climate.  The  causes 
are  not  far  to  seek.  Waves  of  wandering  barbarians,  pushed 
by  pressure  from  the  north  and  east,  or  tempted  by  the  famed 
fertility  and  beauty  of  the  land,  stormed  one  after  another  through 
the  undefended  passes,  while  its  long  coasts  lay  open  to  every 
bark  of  adventurous  mariners  from  Hellas  or  the  Punic  settle- 
ments. Moreover,  though  Italy  enjoys  a  unity  denied  to  Greece, 
yet  the  frequent  intersection  of  the  peninsula  by  mountains 
favoured  the  division  of  the  soil  among  a  number  of  tribes, 
whose  differences  were  naturally  accentuated  by  the  divergences 
of  local  conditions. 

Races  of  North  Italy. — The  Apennines  of  the  north-west  and 
the  shores  of  the  gulf  of  Genoa  were  the  home  of  the  Ligurians. 
Into  these  mountain-fastnesses  stronger  races  had  driven  them 
from  their  once  wide  territory,  which  had  stretched  northwards 
over  the  valley  of  the  Po,  westward  to  the  Rhone,  and  southward 
to  the  Arno.  The  men,  a  small  dark  race,  wi.'d  as  their  own  land, 
hunters,  cragsmen,  and  robbers,  fought  stoutly  for  their  huts  and 
caves  with  Gauls,  Etruscans,  and  Romans  alike.  To  the  legions, 
which  they  long  harassed  with  guerrilla  warfare,  they  contributed 
later  an  admirable  light  infantry. 

The  Gauls  or  Celts,  who  gave  their  name  to  the  Cisalpine 
district,  the  latest  wave  of  immigrants,  descended  the  Alps,  and 
pushing  before  them  their  Etruscan  predecessors,  seized  the  upper 
valley  of  the  Po  as  far  as  the  Mincio.  Wandering  bands  pene- 
trated deep  into  the  peninsula,  but  the  genuine  settlements  of  the 
Celts  were  closed  by  the  Apennines  and  the  /Esis.     To  the  Roman, 


12  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

as  to  the  Creek,  the  Ciaul  is  the  type  of  the  northern  barbarian, 
a  name  indiscriminately  apphed  to  the  Celt  and  the  Teuton.  The 
steadfast  courage  of  disciplined  troops  prevailed  at  length  over 
the  impulsive  valour  and  impetuous  charges  of  the  chivalrous  but 
unstable  northerners.  But  the  terror  of  a  Gallic  tumult  brought 
Italy  as  one  man  to  the  aid  of  Rome,  and  the  memory  of  the 
terrible  day  on  the  Allia  survived  in  Roman  minds  to  give 
additional  lustre  to  the  victories  of  Caesar.  By  the  end  of  the 
Hannibalic  war  the  corn-lands  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  were  won,  and 
became  the  most  prosperous  in  Italy.  In  the  time  of  Polybius  the 
Celts  were  largely  merged  or  extinct,  and  Roman  life  and  culture 
pressed  steadily  up  to  the  Alps. 

The  province  of  Venetia  still  recalls  the  name  of  its  most  ancient 
inhabitants,  the  Veneti,  an  Illyrian  stock,  who  held  the  land  at 
the  head  of  the  Adriatic  as  far  inland  as  the  Mincio  against  the 
intruding  Gauls.  In  the  fifth  century  B.C.  they  were  partially 
civilised  by  the  Greek  colony  of  Atria  founded  on  their  coast, 
and  in  later  days  acted  with  Rome  against  their  more  barbarous 
neighbours. 

The  Etruscans. — Beyond  the  Apennines,  from  the  Macra  to  the 
Tiber,  dwelt  the  mysterious  people  of  the  Rasenna  known  to  the 
Romans  as  Etruscans,  to  the  Greeks  as  Tyrrhenians,  the  standing 
riddle  of  Italian  history.  Neither  language  nor  customs  enable  us 
to  connect  them  assuredly  with  any  known  nation.  They  ^  entered 
Italy  almost  certainly  by  land  over  the  Alps,  and  before  the  coming 
of  the  Gauls  ruled  on  both  sides  the  Po.  Atria,  Melpum,  and 
Mantua  were  once  Etruscan  cities,  and  Felsina  (Bononia)  proudly 
styled  herself  head  of  Etruria.  For  a  time,  too,  they  held  Campania 
and  an  Etruscan  dynasty  lorded  it  in  Rome  itself,  but  their  per- 
manent home  lay  in  the  district  called  Etruria,  where  the  twelve 
great  cities  long  outlived  the  sister-leagues  of  Campania  and  Gaul. 
To  the  north  they  had  a  double  line  of  defence  in  the  Apennines 
and  the  marshes  of  the  Arno  ;  to  the  south  they  were  severed  from 
the  Italian  races  by  the  Tiber,  and  sheltered  from  the  rising  power 
of  Rome  behmd  the  barrier  of  the  Ciminian  forest,  a  line  unbroken 
till  the  famous  march  of  Fabius. 

The  Rasenna  were  to  the  Romans  a  foreign  nation  speaking  an 
unknown  tongue.  In  contrast  with  the  slender  Italians;  their  monu- 
ments represent  them  as  a  sturdy,  thick-set,  large-headed  race ;  their 

1  The  Rngti,  in  Switzerland,  spoke  Etruscan,  and  have  left  behind  them  inscrip- 
tions in  that  language  near  Lugano  and  in  the  Valtellina.  The  Lydian  origin 
of  the  Etruscans  is  an  hypothesis  due  to  confusion  of  names  (Herod.,  i.  94). 


ETUUSCAArs 


13 


religion  was  apparently  a  gloomy  mysticism,  which  readily  degene- 
rated into  superstition.  Their  cities,  which  in  earlier  times  were 
governed  by  monarchs,and  afterwards  by  close  and  long-lived  aristo- 
cracies, were  formed  into  three  loosely-knit  leagues  of  twelve  cities, 
one  in  the  Po  valley,  one  in  Campania,  and  one  in  Etruria  itself. 
Each  league  recognised  a  federal  metropolis  at  least  for  religious 
purposes,  but  there  was  little  concerted  action  even  in  time  of  war. 
At  first  the  Etruscans  showed  vigour  on  water  as  on  land. 
Their  galleys  infested  the  sea,  which  took  from  them  its  name, 
"Tyrrhenian,"  and  joined  the  Carthaginians  in  their  effort  to  keep 
the  Greeks  from  gaining  a  foothold  in  Sardinia  and  Corsica.     Not 


MODEL   OK    A    PRIMITIVE    ETRUSCAN    HOUSE. 


till   Hiero   I.   of  Syracuse  defeated  the  allied  powers  off  Cumae 
(474  V,.c.)  were  the  Etruscan  Corsairs  driven  from  the  seas. 

To  fasten  their  grip  upon  the  land,  they  crowned  the  steepest 
and  most  isolated  hills  with  fortress-cities,  whose  mighty  walls, 
arched  g^ates,  and  huge  drains  still  testify  to  the  skill  and  power 
of  their  builders  ;  witness  the  city-gate  of  Perusia,  the  frowning 
hold  of  Volaterrre,  or  Cortona's  "  diadem  of  towers."  But  in  his- 
torical times  the  vigour  of  the  race  is  on  the  wane.  The  Greeks 
destroy  their  navy  ;  the  Gauls  overrun  their  country.  Campania 
IS  lost  to  the  Samnites  (450  R.c).  Etruria,  south  of  the  Ciminian 
hills,  submits  to  Rome.  Hard-pressed  and  inwardly  decayed,  the 
Rasenna  yielded,  after  a  few  faint  struggles,  to  their  most  resolute 


14 


///SrOA'V  OF  ROME 


enemy.  The  causes  of  this  feeble  resistance  lay  partly  in  the 
disunion  of  the  cities,  partly  in  the  deep  discontent  of  the  op- 
pressed masses,  but  more  llian  all  in  the  enervating  efifecls  of 
luxury.  Gross  materialism,  that  found  its  expression  in  feasting 
and  drunkenness,  in  tasteless  display  and  the  cruel  sports  of  the 
amphitheatre,  is  the  leading  characteristic  of  the  later  Etruscans. 
Their  influence  was  deeply  felt  in  the  early  art  and  architecture, 
in  the  religious  ideas,  the  soothsaying  and  divination,  as  well  as  in 
the  gladiatorial  shows  and  the  later  agricultural  villeinage  of  Rome. 


%/^^;m^^ 


WALL    AMI    (JATI'.W.W    (U     I'KKUGIA. 


Italian  Stocks. — The  genuine  Italian  race  may  be  divided  into 
four  branches,  the  Umbrians  of  the  north,  the  Oscans  in  the 
south,  and  in  Central  Italy,  the  men  of  the  plain  (Latium),  and  the 
hill-tribes,  who,  claiming  descent  from  the  .Sabines,  may  be  styled 
Sabellian. 

The  Umbrians,  reputed  the  most  ancient  race  in  Italy,  ^\•ho 
had  once  held  the  countr)'  on  either  side  the  mountains  from  the 
Adriatic  to  the  Tyrrhene  Sea,  were  early  expelled  from  Etruria 


SABELLTANS  15 

by  the  invading  Rasenna,  and  lost  their  eastern  coast  to  the 
Senones,  tlie  latest  immigrants  from  Gaul.  In  historical  times 
they  were  confined  within  the  district  which  still  bears  their  name 
between  the  Tiber  and  the  Apennines. 

In  the  struggle  with  the  Etruscans  the  petty  divisions  of  their 
numerous  communities  were  fatal  to  a  common  defence,  and,  to 
purchase  revenge  on  their  ancient  enemy,  they  sacrificed  their 
independence  later  to  Rome.  The  great  Haminian  road,  secured 
by  tlie  fortresses  of  Narnia  and  Spoletium,  riveted  their  allegiance 
to  their  new  mistress. 

Central  Italy.— The  small  people  of  the  Sabines,  who  dwelt  in 
the  hills  and  dales  east  of  Tiber,  from  the  Nar  to  the  Anio,  a 
folk  of  primitive  virtues  and  proverbial  simplicity,  were  held  to 
be  the  parent  stock  whence  sprang  the  hill-tribes  of  Central  and 
Southern  Italy.  Tradition  tells  how,  during  a  war  with  the  Um- 
brians,  the  pious  folk  vowed  to  the  gods  a  sacred  spring  {ver 
sacnnii),  and  sent  in  due  time  their  sons  and  daughters  born  in 
the  next  year  to  seek  new  homes  wheresoever  the  gods  should 
please.  From  two  such  bands  which  journeyed  to  the  south  was 
formed  the  nation  of  the  Samnites  (Sabinites) ;  whereof  one  com- 
memorated the  ox  of  Mars,  their  guide,  in  the  name  of  their  city, 
Bovianum  ;  the  other  called  itself  "  the  tribe  of  the  wolf"  that  led 
them  on  their  way  (Hirpini,  from  hirpics).  The  clans  of  the  centre 
were  even  more  closely  related  to  the  Sabines.  The  Picentines  of 
the  coast  took  their  name  from  another  emblem  of  Mars,  the 
wood-pecker  {pictis)  ;  while  the  Marsi,  grouped  round  the  Fucine 
lake,  arrogated  to  themselves,  as  bravest  of  the  brave,  the  name 
of  the  war-god  himself.  Near  akin  to  these  latter  tribes  were  the 
other  peoples  of  the  Abruzzi,  such  as  the  Marrucini,  the  Vestini, 
and  Pasligni,  between  whom  and  the  Oscan  races  of  Samnium  and 
Apulia  lay  the  Frentani,  a  people  of  mixed  blood.  In  the  long 
wai-s  of  Rome  and  Samnium,  all  these  Sabellian  tribes,  closely 
connected  as  they  were  in  origin  and  history,  adhered  generally 
to  the  Latin  power ;  and  although  in  the  Social  War,  the  last 
struggle  for  independence,  the  Marsi  took  the  lead,  the  contest 
was  fought  out  to  the  bitter  end  by  Samnites  and  Lucanians  alone. 
In  their  customs  and  institutions,  again,  there  is  great  similarity. 
The  mountains  which  split  them  into  fractions  were  at  once  a 
bar  to  intercourse  and  a  strong  protection.  Content  with  their 
scattered  hamlets,  nestling  in  secluded  valleys,  they  never  de- 
veloped an  urban  civilisation,  and,  like  the  Arcadians  in  Greece, 
formed  not  organised  states  but  loose  confederacies  of  cantons. 


1 6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

The  iEqui,  Hernici.  and  Volsci.— South-east  of  the  Sabines  lived 
tlic  kindred  tril)e  of  tiic  /lujui,  fierce  enemies  of  rising  Rome,  but 
curbed  later  by  the  fortresses  of  Alba  Fucens  and  Carsioli.  On 
the  rocky  hills  of  the  Trerus  valley  were  perched  the  strongholds 
of  the  Hernici,  Anagnia,  Ferentinum,  and  Frusino.  The  hostility 
of  this  tribe  to  the  yEqui  and  Volsci,  between  whom  its  land 
is  sandwiched,  explains  its  persistent  and  most  useful  loyalty  to 
Rome.  The  Volsci,  whose  more  level  territory  included  the  coast 
from  Antiurn  to  the  Pomptine  marshes  and  the  lower  valley  of  the 
Liris,  were  a  nation  of  obscure  origin,  ecjually  opposed  to  Roman 
and  Samnite.  In  early  times  the  chief  enemies  of  Rome  and 
Latium,  pushing  their  conquests  to  the  southern  slopes  of  the  Alban 
hills,  they  fell  at  length  before  the  combined  attacks  of  Samnites 
and  Romans,  and  left  their  land  as  a  prize  for  "  the  fell,  incensed 
opposites"  to  wrangle  over. 

Latins. — The  Roman  Campagna,  now  a  type  of  picturesque 
desolation,  was  once  thickly  peopled  by  Rome's  nearest  kinsmen 
and  closest  friends — the  Latins.  Their  league  of  thirty  cities  filled 
the  plain  from  the  Tiber  and  the  Anio  to  the  Volscian  hills,  from 
the  sea-shore  to  the  western  spurs  of  the  Apennines.  On  these 
spurs  stood  two  of  their  strongest  and  most  famous  cities,  Tibur 
and  Praeneste  (Palestrina),  but  the  centre  and  capital  of  the  con- 
federacy was  the  ancient  town  of  Alba  Longa,  raised  on  an  isolated 
ridge  of  volcanic  hills,  which  stands  out  boldly  above  the  surround- 
ing plain.  On  the  Alban  mount  was  held  the  Latin  festival,  when 
all  Latin  towns  joined  in  annual  sacrifices  to  Jupiter  Latiaris.  With 
the  religious  festival  was  connected  a  meeting  of  deputies  from  the 
several  communities,  which  formed  a  federal  court  of  justice  and 
arbitration.  In  both  assemblies  Alba  presided,  but  it  is  unlikely 
that  this  titular  leadership  implied  a  real  political  supremacy. 
Each  city  retained  its  independence,  but  the  possession  of  a 
common  centre  and  the  habit  of  common  action  c[uickened  in  the 
Latin  race  the  sense  of  national  unity. 

Oscans. — As  the  Apennines  grow  more  regular  and  uniform 
the  tribal  divisions  become  larger  and  less  marked.  There  are 
but  three  branches  of  the  great  Oscan  race  which  spread  itself 
over  the  highlands  of  South  Italy.  Of  these,  by  far  the  most 
important  are  the  Samnites,  the  Lucanians  and  Bruttians  being 
impure  and  inferior  representatives  of  the  same  stock. 

The  Samnite  niountains  were  the  refuge  of  the  Oscans  when 
Greeks  and  lapygians  occupied  their  coasts,  and  the  stronghold 
from    which    they   swooped   down   later  to    reclaim   their  ancient 


TKIliES   OF  SOUTH  ITALY  17 

heritage.  'I'licir  wandering  Ijands  of  warlike  adventurers  seized 
for  themselves  large  tracts  of  the  Apulian  and  Camjjanian  plains, 
but  neither  here  nor  there  could  they  cope  with  the  masterly  and 
resolute  policy  of  Rome.  The  league  of  the  four  cantons,'  firm  for 
defence,  was  ill  organised  for  aggression.  Their  random  conquests 
were  achieved  in  pursuance  of  no  definite  policy  and  supported 
without  concentrated  purpose.  They  founded  no  town  like  Rome,  to 
he  their  leader  in  war  and  peace.  The  long  struggle  of  Rome  and 
Samnium  is  the  struggle  of  lowland  and  urban  civilisation  against 
a  people  of  highlanders,  husbandmen  and  freebooters,  content  with 
the  old-fashioned  village  life  and  tribal  ties.  Samnium  fought  to 
the  death  ;  and  even  after  superior  policy  and  the  forces  of  civilisa- 
tion had  prevailed,  their  undying  love  of  liberty  and  restless  valour 
broke  out  in  bloody  revolts  from  the  days  of  Pyrrhus  and  Hannibal 
till  Sulla  destroyed  the  nation  root  and  branch. 

The  population  of  Campania  was  made  up  of  many  elements. 
The  older  Oscan  inhabitants  were  conquered  and  civilised  partly 
by  Greeks  and  partly  by  Etruscans.  Some  centuries  later  (450  B.C.) 
new  streams  of  Oscans  poured  down  on  the  bright  and  pleasant 
coast-lands,  and  turned  the  tables  on  the  foreign  colonists.  About 
the  same  time  the  Samnites,  spreading  southward,  formed  the  new 
nation  of  Lucanians,  whose  weight  pressed  heavily  on  the  Greek 
cities  of  the  south,  and  hastened  their  decline. 

From  the  Lucanians,  a  century  later,  broke  off  the  Bruttians, 
rucie  robber-herdsmen  who  lived  in  the  deep  forests  and  inacces- 
sible granite  mountains  of  the  toe  of  Italy.  Always  subject  to 
foreign  lords,  these  savage  tribesmen  remained  under  the  Romans 
little  better  than  slaves. 

lapygians. — Sharply  distinguished  from  the  Oscan  races  are 
the  lapygian  clans — Daunians,  Peucetians,  Messapians,  who  par- 
celled out  among  themselves  the  heel  and  spur  of  Italy.  Con- 
nected doubtless  with  the  Illyrians  of  the  opposite  coast,  they 
must  have  crossed  thence  to  Apulia  by  sea.  Their  natural  affinity 
to  the  Greeks  is  proved  by  their  ready  adoption  of  Greek  writing 
and  civilisation,  and  by  the  similarity  of  local  and  tribal  names. 
But  the  persistence  of  the  primitive  authority  of  the  chieftain  in 
the  clan  dates  their  settlement  in  Italy  ages  before  the  era  of 
the  Greek  colonies.  After  resisting  for  centuries  the  attempts  of 
Tarentum  to  enslave  them,  they  were  forced  by  the  aggression  of 
the  Samnites  to  welcome  the  intervention  of  Rome. 

Greeks. — The  coast  of  Southern  Italy  from  Cuma;  to  Tarentum 

1  In  ordei"  from  north  to  south,  Caraceni,  Pentri,  Caudini,  Hirpini. 

B 


1 8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  so  studded  witli  Circek  settlements  as  to  earn  for  the  district 
the  name  of  Magna  Cnecia.  The  description  of  the  colonies  of 
Italy  and  Sicily  belongs  properly  to  Hellenic  history.  But  a  cer- 
tain number  play  an  important  part  in  the  history  of  Rome. 

The  Ionian  colony  of  Cum;c,  on  the  Campanian  coast,  the  earliest 
and  boldest  of  these  great  adventures,  was  the  first  centre  of  Greek 
culture  and  influence  in  Italy.  Dorian  Tarentum,  the  queen  of 
the  south,  the  first  of  Italian  cities  in  manufactures  and  commerce, 
with  its  sheltered  harbour,  its  purple-fisheries,  and  its  wool,  led  the 
Itahot  Greeks  in  their  struggle  with  Rome.  Messana  and  Rhegium 
commanded  the  passage  of  the  straits,  a  point  of  vital  importance 
in  the  Punic  wars.  In  those  wars  Neapolis  and  the  Greek  sea- 
ports manned  with  their  sailors  the  young  fleet  that  won  the 
sovereignty  of  the  seas.  Syracuse,  long  preserved  from  subjection 
by  the  wise  policy  of  Hiero  1 1.,  who  held  the  balance  between  Rome 
and  Carthage,  became  the  capital  of  a  rich  province.  Wealthy 
and  luxurious  Sybaris,  it  is  true,  had  perished  and  left  its  place 
desolate  ;  Acragas,  the  most  western  stronghold  of  Hellenism, 
ceased  to  be  a  Greek  city  ;  and  Croton,  the  home  of  philosophy, 
athleticism,  and  medicine,  fell  to  the  Bruttians  ;  but  the  persistence 
of  the  Greek  language  in  Italy  and  Sicily  forces  us  to  recognise 
this  foreign  element  in  the  population. 

Sicily. — Sicily  is  an  Italian  island,  but  it  is  no  mere  appendage 
of  Italy.  Largest  and  most  fertile  of  Mediterranean  islands,  it 
lies  in  the  centre  of  the  sea,  at  once  parting  and  uniting  its  eastern 
and  western  halves.  It  offered  many  attractions  to  the  great 
colonists  of  antiquity,  the  Phoenicians  and  the  Greeks.  There  are, 
indeed,  no  navigable  rivers,  and  the  central  districts  are  obstructed 
by  mountains,  but  a  long  series  of  harbours  welcomes  the  sailor 
everywhere  but  on  the  dangerous  southern  coast,  and  the  plains 
and  valleys  of  the  isle,  known  later  as  "  the  granary  of  Rome,"  grew 
rich  crops  of  corn  and  pastured  a  famous  breed  of  horses.  Thus 
Sicily  became  the  meeting-place  of  the  nations,  the  battle-ground 
of  East  and  West.  The  native  races,  Sicels  and  Sicans,  Italian 
perhaps  in  origin,  became  by  adoption  Greek  in  speech  and 
manners,  and  the  story  of  Sicily  was  henceforth  the  story  of  the 
struggle  of  the  Carthaginian  and  the  Greek,  till  Rome,  the  successor 
of  the  Syracusan  tyrants  and  of  Pyrrhus  the  Epirot,  as  champion 
of  Europe  against  Asia,  and  Hellene  against  Semite,  drove  the 
Punic  ships  from  the  seas,  and  their  garrisons  from  the  great 
fortresses  of  the  western  coast.  Greek  civilisation  was  saved,  but 
independence  was  lost,  and  Sicily  became  the  earliest  province  of 


POSITION  OF  RO.]rE  19 

Rome,  to  whose  destinies  her  own  were  united  for  nearly  seven 
hundred  years. 

Sicily  owed  its  early  civilisation  to  its  central  position  on  the 
main  trade-route  of  the  ancient  world  ;  Corsica  and  Sardinia  re- 
mainctl  in  a  backward  state  not  so  much  from  natural  poverty  as 
from  the  exclusive  policy  of  Carthage,  and  the  fact  that  they  lay  out 
of  the  beaten  path  of  commerce.  The  Punic  settlers  who  tilled  the 
plains  and  worked  tlie  mines  of  Sardinia,  and  the  Etruscans  who 
held  the  fringe  of  Corsica,  failed  themselves  to  introduce  even  the 
elements  of  civilisation,  and,  from  selfish  fear  of  Greek  competition, 
combined  to  expel  the  Phocicans  from  Alalia.  Under  Roman  rule, 
Sardinia,  malarial  as  it  was,  rivalled  Sicily  in  her  output  of  corn, 
and  Corsican  forests  supplied  excellent  timber  to  the  dockyards. 

Position  of  Rome. — Such  being  the  geographical  conditions 
of  Itah',  and  such  and  so  many  its  tribes  and  states,  what  were 
the  special  advantages  and  qualifications  of  Rome  for  welding 
these  divided  elements  into  a  coherent  whole?  In  the  first  place, 
she  was  allowed  to  develop  without  interference  on  Italian  lines. 
The  policy  of  Carthage  was  content  with  the  monopoly  of  com- 
merce and  navigation,  and  aimed  only  at  the  reduction  of  her 
Greek  rivals.  The  Greeks,  absorbed  in  their  intestine  struggles 
and  with  minds  turned  to  the  East,  had  no  eyes  for  the  growth  of 
Rome.  The  ambitious  projects  of  Athens  were  shattered  in  the 
harbour  of  Syracuse.  The  Etruscan  power  was  on  the  wane,  and 
the  casual  incursions  of  marauding  Gauls  served  only  to  unite 
Italy  round  its  strongest  state.  In  herself  she  was  fitted  for  her 
mission  not  only  by  the  excellence  of  her  mihtary  system,  the 
steady  courage  of  her  soldiers,  and  the  tenacious  policy  of  her 
statesmen,  but  also  by  her  geographical  situation.  The  eternal 
city  lies  in  the  very  centre  of  Italy,  on  the  one  navigable  river  of 
the  peninsula.  The  seven  hills,  flanked  by  the  great  outwork  of 
Janiculum,  are  the  most  defensible  position  on  the  lower  Tiber. 
Near  enough  to  the  sea  for  purposes  of  commerce, — and  Rome  was 
ever  a  commercial  city, — it  was  far  enough  from  it  to  be  safe  from 
pirates.  Rome,  in  fact,  was  the  predestined  capital  of  Latium 
and  the  mart  of  Central  Italy.  The  leader  of  Latium  became  the 
champion  of  the  plains  against  the  highland  clans.  During  the 
long  contest  for  the  supremacy  of  Italy,  her  masterly  diplomacy 
was  powerfully  aided  by  her  central  position  in  the  task  of  isolating 
her  foes  and  beating  them  in  detail.  Her  legions,  moving  on  inner 
lines,  struck  with  concentrated  force  against  her  scattered  enemies. 
She  bestrid  the  narrow  peninsula  and  severed  the  north  from  the 


20  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

south.  Arkno\vIcdL;ed  mistress  of  Italy,  it  l)ccainc  her  thity  to 
provide  for  its  defence  and  to  wrest  from  its  Semitic  foes  the 
control  of  its  seas  and  islands.  The  inevitable  conflict  with  the 
Punic  sea-power,  and  the  equally  inevitable  extension  of  the  Italian 
frontier  to  the  Alps,  launched  Rome  on  a  career  of  victory  which 
ended  only  with  the  subjug^ation  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE    LEGENDS    Ol"    THE    KINGS 
TRADITIONAL   DATES 

Y-X.  .\.U.C. 

Romulus 753-717  1-37 

Numa  Pompilius 715-673  39-81 

Tullus  Hostilius 673-642  81-112 

Ancus  Marcius 642-617  112-137 

L.  Tarquinius  Priscus 616-579  138-175 

Servius  Tullius 578-535  176-319 

L.  Tarquinius  Superbus 535-5'°  219-244 

It  is  as  hopeless  to  retell  as  it  is  impossible  to  omit  the  legendary 
stories  of  the  birth  and  growth  of  Rome.  Shadowy  as  are  the 
personages,  and  unhistorical  as  are  their  achievements,  the  genius 
of  poets  and  painters  and  the  unquestioning  faith  of  a  people  has 
thrown  a  halo  of  consecration  around  them.  They  may  have  no 
foundation  in  fact,  they  remain  a  part  of  history. 

The  Founding  of  Rome — When  Troy  was  taken  by  the  Greeks, 
the  hero  /Eneas  fled,  bearing"  with  him  his  father,  Anchises,  and 
his  household  gods.  Led  by  the  star  of  his  mother,  Venus,  at 
length  he  reached  his  fated  home  on  the  far-otf  western  shore. 
The  king  of  the  land,  Latinus,  welcomed  the  stranger,  and  would 
have  given  his  daughter,  Lavinia,  to  be  his  bride.  But  the  king's 
people  and  the  new  folk  quarrelled,  and  by-and-by  Latinus  was 
slain  and  his  city  taken.  Then  ^neas  married  Lavinia,  and  built 
a  city  and  called  its  name  Lavinium  ;  and  the  peoples  became  one, 
and  were  called  Latins  after  the  old  king.  But  Turnus,  king  of 
the  Rutulians,  took  to  him  Mezentius,  king  of  Etruscan  Ca^re,  and 
fought  with  /Eneas  at  the  river  Numicius,  and  was  slain.  And 
/Eneas  vanished  away,  but  was  worshipped  of  his  people  as  a  god. 
And  Ascanius,  his  son,  who  was  also  called  lulus,  I'eigned  in  his 
stead.  Ascanius  slew  Mezentius  in  battle,  and  built  a  city  on  a  high 
hill,  and  called  it  Alba  Longa.  There  he  reigned,  he  and  his 
children,  for  three  hundred  years. 


FOUNDATION  OF  ROMF  21 

Rut  when  the  a])pointccl  limes  were  fulfilled  the  king  Numitor 
was  reigning  in  Alba,  and  his  younger  l^rother,  Amulius,  rose  up 
against  him.  He  took  his  kingdom  and  slew  his  sons,  and  his 
daughter,  Rhea  Silvia,  he  set  to  watch  the  sacred  fire  of  Vesta  that 
she  might  be  a  virgin  and  not  marry.  But  the  god  Mars  loved 
the  maiden,  and  she  bore  him  twins.  And  Amulius  cast  the  babes 
into  the  Tiber  to  drown  them  ;  but  the  river  had  overflowed,  and 
the  floods  floated  the  basket  in  which  the  twins  were  to  the  foot 
of  the  Palatine  hill  by  the  sacred  fig-tree  ;  and  they  were  thrown 
nut  on  land,  and  a  she-wolf  from  the  cave  of  Lupercus  suckled 
them.  Then  Faustulus,  the  king's  herdsman,  found  the  twins  and 
Inought  them  up  as  his  own  sons,  and  called  them  Romulus  and 
Remus.     But  when  they  were  grown  men,  it   clianced,  out   of  a 


CONTOKMATF,.       /TINEAS    LEAVING   TROV — HEAP    r)l'   TRAJAN. 


certain  cjuarrcl  of  the  herdsmen,  that  they  were  made  known  to 
their  grandfather,  and,  when  they  had  slain  the  tyrant,  they  set 
Numitor  again  on  his  throne.  And  from  Alba  they  went  forth  to 
build  a  new  city  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber  where  they  had  been 
saved  ;  and  a  question  arose  between  them  who  should  be  its 
founder,  and  they  sought  answer  of  the  gods  by  the  flight  of  birds, 
watching  the  heavens  all  night.  At  sunrise  Remus  beheld  from 
the  Aventine  hill  six  vultures,  but  Romulus  from  the  Palatine  saw 
twelve.  So  he  built  the  city  there  and  called  it  by  his  own  name, 
and  when  Remus  leaped  the  unfinished  wall  and  scorned  the  work, 
he  smote  him  that  he  died,  and  said,  "  So  be  it  with  any  who  dare 
cross  this  wall."     And  the  city  was  called  Rome. 

Romulus. — To  fill  his  new  town  with  men,  King  Romulus  made 
an  asylum  or  place  of  refuge  on  the  Capitol  for  the  bloodguilty 


22  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  the  exile.  And  tn  win  wives  for  tlic  outcasts  he  devised  a 
festival  and  games,  to  whicli  llie  men  of  the  country-side  and, 
above  all,  the  Sabines  brought  their  wives  and  daughters.  But 
in  the  midst  of  the  shows  armed  men,  at  a  sign  from  the  king,  bore 
off  the  women  to  be  their  wives.  This  was  the  "  Rape  of  tlie 
Sabines,"  which  brought  many  wars  upon  Rome.  But  Romulus 
slew  Acron,  king  of  C;enina,  with  his  own  hand  and  dedicated 
his  arms  to  Jupiter  {spolia  opiDia),  and  drove  back  the  men  of 
Crustumerium    and    Antemnit".      Then    came    the    Sabines    with 


WOLF    WITH    ROMULUS   AND   REMU.S. 

(Bronze  in  the  Palace  of  the  Consej~vatori  at  Rome.) 


Titus  Tatius,  their  king,  and  made  their  camp  On  the  Quirinal  hill. 
And  they  took  the  Capitol  by  treachery  and  gave  treason  its 
meed.  For  Tarpeia,  daughter  of  the  captain  of  the  citadel,  for  the 
promise  of  the  bright  things  they  wore  on  their  left  arms, — their 
golden  rings  and  armlets, — opened  to  them  the  gate  ;  but  they 
cast  their  shields  on  her  that  she  died.  Then  the  Sabines  fought 
with  the  Romans  in  the  valley  between  the  Capitol  and  the  Pala- 
tine, and  drove  them  back  to  the  very  gate  of  their  city,  till 
Romulus  vowed  a  temple  to  Jupiter,  "  the  Stayer  of  Flight."  So 
the  flight  was  stayed,  but  as  the  battle  raged  anew  the  Sabine  wives 


ROMULUS  23 

of  the  Romans  rushed  in  between  their  husbands  and  their  kinsmen, 
and  made  them  at  peace  with  one  another.  So  they  became  one 
people,  and  the  two  kings  Romukis  and  Tatius  ruled  over  them. 

But  after  Tatius  had  been  killed  by  the  men  of  Laurentum, 
Romulus  reigned  alone  and  made  laws  for  his  people.  He  parted 
them  into  three  tribes,  the  Ramnians,  Titians,  and  Luceres,  and  in 
each  tribe  he  made  ten  divisions  called  curia".  From  each  curia 
he  chose  one  hundred  men  to  fight  on  foot  and  ten  on  horseback, 
so  that  the  number  of  the  legion  was  3000  footmen,  and  of  the 
horsemen,  called  celeres^  three  hundred.  And  when  the  bur- 
gesses met  together  at  the  summons  of  the  king,  they  voted 
by  ctiricc, — that  is,  the  voice  of  each  curia  went  by  the  majority  of 
votes  in  that  curia,  and  that  of  the  whole  people  by  the  majority 
of  curia".  Then  from  the  heads  of  houses  Romulus  chose  his 
Senate  or  council  of  elders,  that  they  might  advise  him  for  the 


DENARIUS   OF   FIRST   CF.NTUKY    B.C. — TITUS   TATIUS    AND   THE    RAPE 
OF   THE    SABINES. 


common  weal.  But  in  private  each  burgess  father  of  a  family 
ruled  his  household  with  power  of  life  and  death  ;  and  he  was 
bound  to  protect  his  dependents  {clientes)  from  wrong,  while  they 
must  do  him  loyal  and  faithful  service. 

Now  when  Romulus  had  ruled  for  nearly  forty  years,  there  was 
one  day  an  assembly  in  the  Field  of  Mars  ;  and  a  great  storm 
befell,  with  thunder  and  lightning-,  so  that  the  people  were  scattered. 
And  when  the  storm  passed  Romulus  was  not.  But  as  one  Julius 
Proculus  came  from  Alba,  he  appeared  to  him  on  the  way,  and 
bade  the  Romans  be  of  good  cheer,  for  Rome  should  rule  the  earth  ; 
and,  so  saying,  departed  heavenward.  So  he  became  a  g^od,  and 
they  worshipped  him  as  Quirinus,  "  the  Lord  of  Spears." 

Numa  Pompilius.  —But  the  senators  would  choose  no  one  to  be 
king  after  him,  but  ruled  in  turn  each  man  five  days.  And  there 
was  strife  among  the  people  for  a  year  between  Roman  and  Sabine. 
At  last  they  so  devised  that  the  Romans  should  choose  a  king 


24  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

from  among  the  Salines.  So  they  chose  Niima  Pompilius,  for 
he  was  wise  and  Iioly  ;  and  he  took  the  kingdom  when  lie  had 
inquired  of  the  gods  by  the  flight  of  birds  and  the  ciiricc  had 
consented  to  him.  Now  King  Numa  was  a  man  of  peace,  and  cared 
most  for  the  worship  of  the  gods  and  the  ways  of  husbandry.  And 
he  learned  wisdom  of  his  wife,  the  nymph  Egeria,  who  met  him  by 
night  in  her  sacred  grove.  So  lie  set  up  the  holy  brotherhoods, 
the  Pontifices,  who  ordered  the  rites  of  the  gods,  and  the  Augurs, 
to  divine  their  will,  and  the  Flamines  to  minister  to  the  great 
gods,  Jupiter,  Mars,  and  Quirinus,  and  the  Salii  to  worship  them 
with  song  and  dance  and  to  keep  the  shield  that  fell  from  hea\en. 
And  he  made  the  Vestal  Virgins  to  watch  the  fire  on  the  holy 
hearth  of  the  city.  Moreover,  he  divided  the  lands  that  Romulus 
had  won,  and  set  up  landmarks  sacred  to  Terminus,  laying-  a  curse 
on  any  who  should  move  the  same.  Also  he  parted  the  crafts- 
men by  their  callings  into  nine  guilds,  and  built  a  temple  of  Faith. 
So  in  his  days  there  was  peace  in  the  land  and  the  gates  of  Janus 
were  closed.  And  he  died  at  a,  good  old  age,  and  was  buried 
under  the  hill  Janiculum,  and  the  books  of  his  ordinances  by  him  ; 
and  Tullus  Hostilius  was  chosen  in  his  place. 

TuUus  Hostilius. — In  the  days  of  Tullus  there  was  war  between 
Alba  and  Rome.  For  when  a  quarrel  arose  upon  the  border,  each 
sent  heralds  to  the  other  and  would  have  satisfaction  for  the  wrong. 
But  Tullus  kept  the  men  of  Alba  without  answer  till  word  came 
that  their  city  had  denied  justice,  and  that  the  Roman  Fetiales  had 
declared  war,  so  that  the  reproach  might  lie  with  Alba.  Then 
Cluilius  led  the  Albans  against  Rome,  and  the  trench  of  his  camp 
is  called  to  this  day  "the  ditch  of  Cluilius,"  and  it  lies  within  five  miles 
of  the  city.  And  when  he  died  Mettus  Fufetius  was  made  dictator 
in  his  room.  But,  ere  the  armies  met,  the  chiefs  agreed  together 
and  chose  champions  to  decide  the  quarrel,  for  each  side  three 
brothers  born  at  a  birth — the  Horatii  for  the  Romans,  and  for  the 
Albans  the  Curiatii.  So  they  fought  before  the  hosts,  and  two 
Romans  were  slain,  and  the  Alban  three  were  wounded.  Then 
the  last  Horatius  made  show  of  flight  that  he  might  separate  his 
enemies  as  they  pursued,  and  so  turned  and  slew  each  as  he  came 
up,  for  they  were  hindered  by  their  wounds.  But  as  the  Romans 
returned  in  triumph,  with  Horatius  at  their  head  bearing  his  triple 
spoils,  his  sister,  who  was  betrothed  to  one  of  the  dead,  came  forth 
to  meet  him  by  the  gate  ;  and  when  she  saw  the  cloak  her  own 
hands  had  broidered  for  her  lover  on  her  brother's  shoulders,  she 
cried  out  and  wept.     And   Horatius,  angered,  stabbed  her  to  the 


EARLY  KINGS  25 

heart,  with  bitter  words,  because  she  wept  for  her  country's  foe. 
For  this  thing  the  two  judges  of  Ijlood  sentenced  him  to  death, 
ikit  he  made  appeal  to  the  people  with  the  king^s  will  ;  and  the 
people  rememliered  the  deeds  he  had  done  for  them,  and  gave  car 
to  his  fathei-'s  prayer.  So  he  was  set  free  from  the  guilt,  after  he 
liad  passed  beneath  the  yoke  and  made  offering-  to  the  spirit  of 
the  dead.  And  the  yoke  was  called  thereafter  "  the  sistei-'s  beam  " 
{soron'iai!  ligiUiim)^  but  the  spoils  were  hung  on  a  pillar  in  tlie 
Forum — \\\(tpila  Hoj-aiia — to  be  a  memorial  in  later  days. 

JUit  when  Tullus  bade  the  Albans  aid  him,  according  to  their 
bond,  in  battle  with  the  men  of  Veil  and  Fidenas,  Mettus  came 
with  his  host,  but  stood  aloof  waiting  on  the  end.  So  Tullus,  after 
he  had  won  the  battle,  called  the  Albans  together  unarmed,  as  the 
custom  was,  for  a  speech,  and  placed  armed  Romans  round  that 
they  might  neither  fight  nor  flee.  Then  he  took  the  traitor  and 
bound  him  to  two  chariots  and  drave  them  different  ways,  so  that 
he  was  torn  asundei'.  And  he  sent  horsemen  to  destroy  Alba,  but 
the  people  he  set  to  live  on  Mons  C;elius  in  Rome.  But  when 
he  had  prevailed  in  war  against  the  Etruscans  and  Sabines,  his 
heart  was  puffed  up  and  he  forgot  the  service  of  the  gods.  And 
after  that  he  had  reigned  thirty-two  years,  Jupiter  smote  him  with 
hghtning  and  consumed  him  and  his  house. 

Ancus  Marcius.  — Now  the  next  kingr  was  the  grandson  of  Numa, 
and  he  brought  back  his  ordinances  and  set  them  up  in  the  Forum 
on  wooden  taljlets  for  all  to  see.  Ancus  loved  peace,  but,  when 
the  Latins  plundered  his  lands,  he  took  their  cities  by  the  sword, 
and  set  their  people  on  the  Aventine  hill.  So  he  made  the  city 
larger,  and  dug  a  great  trench  across  the  valleys  to  strengthen 
it  without,  and  for  evil-doers  within  he  built  a  prison  under  the 
citadel  hard  by  the  Foruni.  He  also  fortified  the  hill  Janiculum 
and  joined  it  to  the  city  by  a  wooden  bridge,  and  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Tiber  he  built  the  harbour  of  Ostia  and  made  a  colony 
there.  So  Ancus  ruled  honourably  for  three  and-twenty  years, 
and  went  down  to  the  grave  in  peace. 

Lucius  Tarquinius  Priscus. — In  the  days  of  Ancus  Martins  came 
one  Lucumo  to  Rome  from  Tarquinii  in  Etruria,  whither  his  father, 
the  noble  Demaratus,  had  fled  from  Corinth.  Lucumo  left  Tar- 
quinii by  counsel  of  his  wife,  Tanaquil,  for  there  he  was  denied  ad- 
vancement, because  his  father  was  a  stranger,  though  his  mother 
was  a  noble  Etruscan.  Now  at  Rome  she  hoped  he  would  win 
honour  and  worship  by  reason  of  a  sign  ;  for,  as  they  drew  near 
in  their  chariot,  an  eagle  bore  off  his  cap  on  high,  and  wheeling 


26  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

replaced  it  on  his  head.  And  the  Romans  called  him,  after  the 
name  of  his  city,  Lucius  Tarquinius,  and  he  served  King  Ancus 
well  in  council  and  in  war.  So  the  king"  made  him  guardian  of 
his  sons  ;  but  Tarquin  persuaded  the  people  to  choose  him  to  reign 
over  them,  for  the  kingship  went  by  choice.  And  he  overcame 
the  nations  round  about  and  took  their  cities,  so  that  the  Etruscans 
sent  him  the  golden  crown  and  the  sceptre,  the  ivory  chair,  the 
purple  robe,  and  the  twelve  axes  in  the  bundles  of  rods  {fasces), 
which  were  the  emblems  of  royalty  among  them.  """"" 

Then  Tarquin  began  the  great  temple  on  the  Capitol  which 
he  had  vowed  in  war  to  Jupiter,  and  built  huge  drains  to  carry 
off  the  water  from  the  valleys  between  the  hills,  and  levelled  the 
inarket-place  or  Forum,  surrounding  it  with  booths  and  a  covered 
walk.  Moreover,  he  made  a  circus  or  racecourse  for  horses  and 
chariots,  after  the  manner  of  the  Etruscans.  But  when  he  pur- 
posed to  make  new  tribes,  and  centuries  of  horsemen,  the  augur 
Attus  Navius  forbade  it.  Then  the  king  mocked  at  him,  and 
asked,  "  Can  the  thought  of  my  mind  be  fulfilled?"  and  the  augur 
answered  by  the  birds  that  it  might.  So  the  king  said,  "  Cut  me, 
then,  this  whetstone  with  this  knife  ; "  and  he  did  so,  and  the  omen 
of  the  birds  was  made  true.  And  from  that  time  forth  the  king 
obeyed  his  voice.  Yet  did  he  double  the  number  of  noble  houses 
in  each  tribe,  and  so  did  he  with  the  centuries  of  the  knights  and 
the  Senate  also. 

Now  there  was  a  certain  slave  of  the  king  named  Servius  Tullius, 
and  men  said  he  was  the  child  of  the  hearth-god,  for  one  day,  as 
he  slept,  a  flame  played  round  his  head  and  did  him  no  hurt.  So 
Tanaquil  made  him  free,  and  he  served  the  king  faithfully  and 
was  in  favour  with  all  men.  But  when  the  sons  of  Ancus  heard 
that  the  king  had  wedded  him  to  his  daughter  and  would  make 
him  heir,  they  plotted  to  slay  Tarquin  and  strike  for  the  crown. 
And  they  smote  the  king  by  the  hands  of  hirelings,  as  he  sat  to 
give  judgment,  but  got  no  profit  of  their  treason  ;  for  Tanaquil 
shut  the  gates  of  the  palace  and  gave  out  that  the  king  was  not 
dead,  but  had  appointed  Servius  to  rule  till  he  should  be  healed  of 
his  wound.  And  even  when  men  knew  that  the  king  was  dead 
indeed,  Servius  kept  his  state  and  ruled  the  land  without  consent 
of  Senate  or  people. 

Servius  Tullius. — This  Senius  won  the  goodwill  of  the  com- 
mons, for  he  divided  among  them  the  conquered  lands,  and  upheld 
the  cause  of  the  poor,  so  that  in  later  ages  men  still  lo\ed  the 
memory  of"  good  King  Servius."    He  subdued  the  Etruscans  under 


SER  VI  US    TUT.  I.  TUS 


27 


him,  but  made  alliance  with  the  Latins  and  built  a  temple  to  Diana 
on  the  Aventine,  where  Latins  and  Romans  might  make  common 
sacrifice.  And  he  brought  the  Quirinal  and  Viminal  and  the 
Esquiline  hills  within  the  city,  and  all  the  seven  hills  he  com- 
passed about  with  a  great  ditch  and  rampart,  which  is  known  to 
this  day  as  the  wall  and  the  mound  of  Servius. 

Moreover,  he  divided  the  city  in  four  parts — the  Suburan, 
Esquiline,  Colline,  and  Palatine — and  the  land  without  into  twenty- 
six,  and  the  parts  he  called  "  Tribus."  The  tribes  were  made  up 
of  men  who  dwelt  together  in  one  place,  and  they  had  common 


WALL  OF   SERVIUS   TULLIUS. 


sanctuaries  and  common  feasts  and  head-men  over  them.  And 
he  arranged  the  assembly  of  the  people  so  that  men  should  vote 
according  to  their  wealth  in  land  and  cattle,  and  to  the  order  of 
the  army  in  the  field.  For  he  divided  the  whole  people  into  five 
classes,  and  in  each  class  he  parted  the  elder  and  the  younger,  the 
younger  from  seventeen  to  forty-five  years  for  service  in  the  field, 
the  elder  men  for  the  defence  of  the  town.  And  the  ordering  of 
the  classes  was  this  : — Each  man's  place  in  the  assembly  was  as 
his  place  in  the  ranks  of  battle,  and  his  place  in  the  ranks  was  as 
his  power  to  clothe  himself  with  armour  and  bear  the  burdens  of 
war  ;   so  his  place  went  by  his  estate,  by  his  acres  of  land,  and  by 


28 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


his  sheep  and  oxen.  Moreover,  he  divided  the  classes  into  hundreds 
or  centuries  for  service,  and  to  each  century  he  gave  one  vote  in 
the  assembly  ;  yet  he  left  not  the  classes  ecpal,  but  gave  the  chief 
power  to  the  richer  men  who  served  the  state  on  horseback  or  on 
foot  in  full  armour.  For  to  the  first  class  he  assigned  eighty 
centuries,  forty  of  the  older  and  forty  of  the  younger  men  ;  to  the 
fifth  class  he  gave  thirty  centuries,  divided  in  like  manner  ;  but  to 
each  of  the  other  three  he  gave  but  twenty.  Of  the  trumpeters, 
the  armourers,  and  carpenters  he  made  four  centuries  ;  but  the 
other  craftsmen  and  men  who  had  less  than  a  certain  sum  he 
sufiTered  not  to  serve  in  the  army,  but  made  of  them  a  separate 
century,  that  of  the  Proletarians.  Lastly,  he  made  of  the  horse- 
men eighteen  centuries,  adding  to  the  six  old  twelve  new  ones 
formed  of  the  richest  and  noblest  citizens  ;  and  they  received  a 
horse  from  the  state,  so  long  as  they  served,  and  were  called 
''  Knights  of  the  Public  Horse."  ^ 

1  TABLE  OF  CLASSES  AND  CENTURIES. 


EXERCITUS. 

Number. 

Census. 

Arms. 

Equites. 

18  centuries 

100,009  asses 

(  Cavalry  equipment  and 
\      equus  publiciis. 

Pedites. 

C  Helmet,  shield  (clipei/s), 
■I  greaves,  breastplate, 
(     lance,  and  sword. 

ist  Class 

80  centuries 

100,000  asses 

2  centuries  of  smiths 

and  carpenters. 

1"  Helmet, shield (.fr;////w), 
I  greaves,  lance,  and 
(     sword. 

2nd    ,, 

20  centuries 

75,000     ,, 

(  Helmet,    shield,   lance. 

3rcl     ,. 

20        ,, 

50,000 

(      and  sword. 

41I1     ,, 

20        ,, 

25,000 

Lance  and  javelin. 

5th     „ 

30    .   „ 
2  centuries  of  trum- 
peters. 

II.OOQ 

Darts  and  slings. 

I  century  of  proletarii. 

N.B. — The  term  class,  as  applied  to  the  four  lower  grades,  is  an  anticipation 
of  later  usage  [vide  pp.  46  and  296).  Similarly,  the  rates  given  are  the  later 
money-equivalents  of  original  assessments  by  land  and  cattle. 


THE  LAST  KINGS  29 

So  the  king  gave  votes  to  tlie  poorest  and  lowest,  hut  no  power- 
in  the  state.  Nor  were  there  many  poor  nor  many  ricli  in  those 
days,  for  the  holdings  of  land  were  small,  and  trade  was  but  simple 
as  yet.  The  stout  farmers  had  the  chief  voice,  and  though  the 
younger  were  more  in  number  than  the  elder,  yet  Servius  gave 
equal  weight  to  the  centuries  of  the  seniors,  that  age  might  liavc 
its  say.  Thus  was  made  the  great  assembly  of  the  centuries,  that 
suffered  change,  but  was  not  done  away  till  the  people  lost  their 
freedom. 

King  Servius  had  no  son,  but  two  daughters,  and  them  he  had 
wedded  to  the  two  sons  of  King  Tarquin.  Now  the  sweeter  maid 
he  gave  of  set  purpose  to  the  haughty  Lucius  ;  to  Aruns,  the  good- 
natured,  he  gave  the  proud  and  cruel  Tullia.  But  the  thing  fell 
out  otherwise.  For  those  evil  ones,  when  they  had  rid  them  of 
their  gentler  mates,  came  together,  as  their  souls  desired,  to  work 
wickedness.  Now  Tarquinius  feared  the  purpose  of  the  king  to 
do  away  with  the  kingship  and  set  the  people  free,  and  made  a 
conspiracy  against  him  with  the  young  nobles,  who  hated  him  for 
his  goodness  to  the  common  folk.  So  when  the  appointed  day 
came  he  seized  the  king's  throne,  and  sat  thereon.  And  when 
the  king  came  and  rebuked  him,  young  Lucius  claimed  it  for  his 
father's  son,  and  took  the  old  man  and  cast  him  down  the  steps 
of  the  senate-house,  and  sent  armed  men  who  slew  him  as  he  fled. 
And  Tullia,  his  wife,  drove  furiously  to  the  Forum  to  greet  her  lord 
as  king,  and  as  she  went  back  her  father's  body  lay  bleeding  in 
the  way.  But  she  turned  not  aside  from  her  driving,  so  her  chariot 
and  dress  were  splashed  with  her  father's  blood.  Wherefore  men 
called  that  street  "  the  street  of  crime  "  {vicics  scelcratus). 

Tarquinius  Superbus. — So  by  bloodshed  and  violence  came  the 
proud  Tarquin  to  the  throne,  and  so  by  violence  he  kept  it,  till 
they  made  an  end  of  him  and  his  house.  He  reigned  as  a  tyrant, 
neither  regarded  he  justice  and  judgment,  but  he  spoiled  the  rich 
and  oppressed  the  poor.  Moreover,  he  joined  himself  to  Octavius 
Mamilius  of  Tusculum,  and  set  up  his  power  over  Latium.  And 
when  Herdonius  of  Aricia  spake  against  him  in  the  federal  meeting 
he  compassed  his  death  by  false  witness,  and  that  easily,  for  all 
men  feared  him.  But  the  men  of  Gabii  stood  out  against  him, 
till  Sextus,  his  son,  betrayed  them  into  his  hands  by  craft.  For  he 
fled  to  Gabii  for  refuge  from  his  father's  wrath.  And  the  men  of 
the  city  received  him  gladly,  and  by  degrees  they  moved  him  to 
the  chief  place,  for  the  young  man  prospered  in  all  he  undertook, 
the  Romans  ever  fleeing  before  him,  as  the  king  bade  them.     Then 


30  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

he  sent  a  messenger  to  know  his  father's  will.  Now  Tarquin 
walked  with  the  messenger  in  a  garden  and  said  no  word,  but 
smote  down  the  tallest  popjjies  with  his  stick.  And  Sextus  under- 
stood the  thing,  and  by  false  charges  brought  the  chief  men  of 
Gabii  to  death,  and  then  gave  up  the  town  into  the  hands  of 
Tarquin. 

The  king  iinished  the  great  works  which  his  father  liad  begun. 
He  built  the  great  temple  on  the  Capitol,  and  removed  from  the 
site  many  shrines  of  the  gods  of  the  Sabines  ;  but  the  shrines  of 
Terminus  and  of  Youth  would  not  be  moved,  so  he  enclosed  them 
within  his  temple.  Moreover,  as  they  dug  for  foundations,  they 
lighted  on  a  human  head.  Now  these  things  were  signs  that 
Rome  should  be  head  of  the  earth,  and  that  its  youth  should  not 
fade  nor  its  bounds  go  back.  And  he  dedicated  the  temple  to  the 
great  Etruscan  three,  to  Jupiter,  Juno,  and  Minerva. 

And  on  a  certain  time  there  came  a  strange  woman  to  the 
king,  who  would  have  him  buy  at  a  price  nine  books  of  the  pro- 
phecies of  the  Sibyl  of  Cuma;  ;  and  when  he  refused,  she  burnt 
three  and  offered  the  rest  at  the  same  price.  But  he  mocked  at 
her  for  a  mad  woman.  And  she  came  yet  again  with  but  three 
left  and  asked  the  same  price  :  so  the  king  was  astonished,  and 
took  counsel  of  the  augurs  and  bought  the  books.  These  were 
the  Sibylline  books  that  w^ere  kept  in  a  stone  chest  beneath  the 
Capitol,  and  two  men  were  set  to  keep  them  and  consult  them 
in  the  hour  of  need.  And  on  another  time  a  snake  came  out  of 
the  altar  in  the  king's  house  and  ate  the  offering  on  the  altar. 
So  Tarquin  sent  his  sons  Titus  and  Aruns  even  to  Delphi  to 
inquire  of  the  oracle  of  the  Greeks,  and  with  them  their  cousin 
Lucius  Junius,  whom  men  called  Brutus,  the  dullard,  because  he 
feigned  to  be  witless  for  fear  of  the  tyrant.  And  his  oftering  was 
like  to  himself,  for  he  gave  a  simple  staff,  but  within  it  was  filled 
with  pure  gold.  Now  when  the  young  men  had  inquired  for  the 
king,  they  asked  Apollo  which  of  them  should  reign  at  Rome. 
So  the  voice  said,  "Whichever  of  you  shall  first  kiss  his  mother." 
Then  Titus  and  Aruns  drew  lots  for  this,  but  Brutus,  as  they  left 
the  temple,  fell  down  as  by  chance,  and  kissed  our  common  mother 
Earth. 

But  the  end  of  the  Tarquins  came  on  this  wise.  When  the 
host  was  besieging  Ardea  of  the  Rutulians,  and  the  king's  sons 
were  supping  with  their  cousin,  Tarquinius  of  Collatia,  they  dis- 
puted of  their  wives  which  was  worthiest.  So  they  rode  to  Rome 
to  see.      There  found  thej^  the  wives  of  Aruns  and  Titus  and 


FALL    OF  THE  MONARCHY  31 

Sextus  making  merry  ;  but  wlien  they  came  to  CoUatia  at  dead  of 
night,  they  found  Lucretia,  Collatinus'  wife,  working  with  her  hand- 
maids at  the  loom.  So  they  judged  her  worthiest,  and  rode  back 
to  camp.  But  Sextus  was  smitten  with  an  unholy  passion  for 
Lucrece,  and  he  came  alone  to  Collatia,  and  was  welcomed  as  a 
near  kinsman.  But  he  paid  back  good  with  evil,  and  wrought  his 
wicked  will  by  foul  threats.  Then  good  Lucretia  sent  for  her 
father,  Lucretius,  and  her  husband,  and  they  came  with  their  trusty 
friends,  Publius  Valerius  and  Junius  Brutus.  And  when  she  had 
told  them  her  tale  and  bidden  them  avenge  her  of  her  shame,  she 
drove  a  knife  into  her  heart.  Then  Brutus  drew  out  the  knife 
from  the  wound,  and  swore  to  visit  her  blood  on  Tarquin  and 
upon  all  his  race,  and  that  no  man  should  henceforth  be  king  in 
Rome.  And  they  took  her  body  to  the  market-place  that  men 
might  see  the  deeds  of  the  Tarquins.  Moreover,  Brutus,  the 
captain  of  the  horse  {tribunus  ccleruiii)^  assembled  the  people, 
and  won  them  to  depose  the  tyrant  and  banish  his  whole  house. 
And  he  went  down  to  the  camp  and  drave  out  the  king's  sons, 
for  Tarquin  had  gone  to  Rome  to  quell  the  tumult.  But  he  found 
the  gates  shut  in  his  face,  and  he  fled  with  his  sons  to  Ctcre  in 
Etruria.     And  this  was  the  end  of  kings  in  Rome. 

The  First  Consuls, — Then  the  people  gathered  in  their  centuries 
in  the  Field  of  Mars,  and  were  minded  to  choose  year  by  year  two 
men  to  share  the  royal  power,  to  be  called  consuls.  So  they  chose 
Brutus,  and  with  him  at  the  first  Collatinus.  But  the  people  feared 
Collatinus  for  his  name's  sake,  because  he  was  a  Tarquin,  and 
they  prayed  him  to  depart  from  Rome.  And  in  his  room  they 
chose  Publius  Valerius.  And  the  consuls  filled  up  the  places  in 
the  Senate  which  the  king  had  left  empty,  and  each  ruled  for 
a  month  at  a  time,  and  had  the  lictors  then  to  bear  the  fasces 
before  him.  "    "  ' 

Then  came  men  from  the  banished  king  to  claim  his  goods, 
and  they  made  a  plot  with  many  of  the  young  nobles  to  bring  the 
king  back,  and  among  these  were  the  two  sons  of  Brutus.  But 
the  consuls  were  warned,  and  had  the  young  men  seized.  And 
Brutus  sat  on  the  judgment-seat,  and  bade  scourge  and  behead 
them  all,  nor  spared  his  two  sons,  nor  turned  his  face  from  the 
sight,  for  he  loved  his  country  more  than  his  own  flesh  and  blood. 
And  the  goods  of  the  Tarquins  they  gave  for  a  prey  to  the 
commons,  to  break  all  thought  of  peace  between  the  princes  and 
the  people  of  Rome. 

Then  Tarquin  stirred  up  the   men   of  Veii   and  Tarquinii,   in 


32  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Elruria,  to  make  war  on  Komc.  And  ere  the  liatlle  was  joined, 
Aruns  spurred  liotly  upon  Hrutus,  when  he  saw  liini  in  royal  array 
marshalling  the  horse  ;  and  each  ran  upon  the  other  with  the 
spear  tliat  they  died.  'I'hen  the  hosts  fought  stubbornly  till  even- 
ing. But  in  the  night  the  Etruscans  went  home,  hearkening  to  a 
divine  voice.  And  the  Romans  bore  Brutus  back  to  the  city  and 
buried  him  ;  and  the  matrons  mourned  for  him  a  full  year  because 
he  had  avenged  Lucrece. 

Valerius  now  ruled  alone,  and  built  a  great  house  on  the  hill 
Velia,  above  the  Forum,  and  men  feared  that  he  would  make  him- 
self king,  and  use  the  hill  as  a  hold  for  his  guards.  Therefore  he 
assembled  the  people  and  came  with  lowered  fasces  for  a  sign  of 
submission,  and  pulled  down  his  house  and  rebuilt  it  at  the  foot 
of  the  hill.  Then  he  passed  two  laws  to  protect  the  people.  The 
first  declared  that  man  accursed  and  worthy  of  death  who  should 
seek  to  become  king;  the  second  allowed  a  citizen  condemned  to 
death  to  appeal  from  the  magistrate  to  the  general  assembly.  So 
Valerius  was  hailed  the  People's  Friend  (Publicola).  And  in 
Brutus'  place  the  people  chose  Spurius  Lucretius,  and  when  he 
died,  Marcus  Horatius.  Now  both  Valerius  and  Horatius  wished 
to  dedicate  the  temple  on  the  Capitol  which  Tarquin  had  built, 
but  the  lot  fell  on  Horatius,  to  the  great  displeasure  of  the  friends 
of  Valerius.  So  he  dedicated  the  temple,  but  even  as  he  was 
praying  with  his  hand  on  the  door-post,  one  told  him  that  his  son 
was  dead.  But  he  said  simply,  "Then  let  them  bury  him,"  and 
made  no  lament  of  evil  omen,  because  he  honoured  the  gods  above 
his  son. 

Lars  Porsenna. — And  by-and-by  caine  Lars  Porsenna,  king  of 
Clusium  and  head  of  Etruria,  with  a  great  host  to  bring  back 
Tarquin,  and  took  the  fortress  on  the  hill  Janiculum,  and  drove 
the  Romans  back  over  the  Tiber-bridge.  Now  the  bridge  was 
of  wood,  and  as  the  rest  fled,  three  brave  men  turned  in  the 
narrow  way,  and  faced  the  Etruscan  army,  even  Horatius  Codes, 
Spurius  Lartius,  and  Titus  Herminius.  These  three  made  good 
their  post  till  the  bridge  was  cut  down  behind  them.  As  the  last 
supports  gave  way  Lartius  and  Herminius  ran  back,  but  still 
Horatius  stood  alone  on  the  farther  bank.  And  when  the  bridge 
had  fallen,  he  prayed  to  Father  Tiber  and  gave  his  life  and  his 
arms  into  his  keeping,  and  so  swam  back  to  the  city  he  had  saved, 
sore  spent,  but  unhurt  by  flood  or  foe.  And  for  this  deed  the 
Romans  set  up  his  statue  in  the  Comitium,  and  gave  him  as  much 
of  .the  common  land  as  he  could  plough  in  a  day. 


LEGENDS   OE   THE   EARLY  KEPUBLLC  33 

But  Rome  was  liard  l^eset  by  siej^e  and  famine.  So  Caius 
Mucins,  a  )oung-  noble,  went  forth  to  slay  Porsenna  and  make  an 
end.  He  found  entrance  to  the  camp  ;  and  when  he  saw  a  man 
in  a  purple  robe  sitting  on  a  throne  and  giving  pay  to  the  soldiers, 
he  went  up  into  the  crowd,  and  stabbed  him  for  the  king  ;  yet  was 
it  but  the  king's  scribe.  So  they  dragged  him  before  the  kmg-. 
But  when  they  threatened  torture  if  he  revealed  not  the  whole 
matter,  he  thrust  his  hand  into  the  fire  that  was  on  an  altar,  crying 
that  pain  was  a  small  thing  compared  with  glory.  But  Porsenna 
marvelled,  and  bade  him  go  in  peace.  So  Mucins  was  won  by 
kindness  to  tell  the  king  what  no  torture  could  wring  from  him, 
how  three  hundred  noble  Romans  had  sworn  to  take  Porsenna's 
life,  and  would  follow  the  first  adventure,  each  in  his  turn.  Thus 
won  Mucius  his  name  of  Scaevola,  the  left-handed.  liut  Porsenna 
made  peace  with  the  Romans,  taking  from  them  all  the  land  of 
Veii,  and  for  hostages  ten  youths  and  ten  maidens.  And  when 
Clcelia  taught  her  fellows  to  escape,  and  they  swam  across  the 
Tiber  to  the  city,  the  Romans  kept  faith  and  sent  the  maidens 
back.  Then  Porsenna  marvelled  again  both  at  the  courage  and 
the  good  faith  of  the  Romans,  and  he  set  Clcelia  free.  And  the 
land  and  the  other  hostages  he  gave  back  later,  because  the 
Romans  entreated  his  beaten  armies  kindly,  what  time  they  fled 
before  the  Latins  to  the  gates  of  Rome. 

Battle  of  Lake  Regillus. — So  Tarquin,  foiled  once  more,  went 
to  Tusculum,  unto  his  son-in-law,  Octavius  Mamilius,  the  chief  of 
all  the  Latins.  Then  the  Romans,  fearing  the  power  of  the  great 
League,  named  a  single  leader  to  rule  the  people  as  king  for  six 
months,  lest  with  two  chiefs  their  counsels  should  be  divided.  .So 
Titus  Lartius  was  the  first  Dictator,  and  two  years  after,  they  chose 
Aulus  Postumius,  who  made  Titus  ^butius  his  Master  of  the 
Horse.  Then  the  Latins  came  with  the  house  of  Tarquin  and  the 
Roman  exiles,  and  fought  with  the  Romans  by  the  Lake  Regillus,  in 
the  land  of  Tusculum.  In  the  centre  the  banished  king  charged 
the  Dictator,  but  fell  wounded,  and  was  borne  out  of  the  throng. 
But  on  the  left  Mamilius  ran  .^butius  through  the  arm,  and 
pressing  on  for  all  his  wounds,  restored  the  fight.  And  the  battle 
swayed  this  way  and  that  :  here  fell  M.  Valerius  ;  there  Herminius 
sniote  Mamilius  down,  but  fell  himself  ere  he  could  spoil  him 
of  his  armour.  At  last  Postumius  vowed  a  temple  to  the  twin 
brethren,  Castor  and  Pollux,  if  they  would  give  him  the  victory. 
And,  as  he  spake,  two  youths  on  horses  white  as  snow  rode  in  the 
Roman  front,  and  pressed  the  Latins  back,  and  drove  them  to  their 

C 


34 


HISTORY  OF  NOME 


camp.  And  when  men  sought  tlicm,  they  found  no  trace  of  them 
save  a  hoof-mark  on  the  rock,  that  no  earthly  liorse  had  made. 
But  as  the  old  men  sat  in  Rome  waiting-  for  news,  behold  two 
horsemen  young  and  beautiful  on  white  horses  bathed  with  the 
foam  of  battle,  who  washed  their  horses  in  the  pool  by  Vesta's 
House,  and  told  the  people  of  Rome's  victory.  And  when  they 
had  done  this  they  rode  away  and  were  seen  no  more.  So  the 
Romans  built  a  rich  temple,  as  Aulus  had  vowed,  to  Castor  and 
Pollux  on  the  spot  where  they  washed  their  horses  ;  and  its  pillars 
stand  in  Rome  to  this  day.  But  King  Tarqum  went  to  Aristodemus, 
the  Greek  tyrant  of  Cumaj,  alone,  for  all  his  sons  had  fallen  in  the 
wars.  So  evil  met  its  reward,  and  Rome  was  delivered  from  the 
rule  of  kings. 


HEAD    OF   ROME.       CASTOR    AND    POLEUX. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE    REGAL    PERIOD 


The  Legends  are  Unhistorical. — The  legends  told  by  Roman 
chroniclers  about  the  founding  and  the  early  history  of  the  city 
cannot  be  regarded  as  sober  narratives  of  real  events.  They  rest 
on  the  insecure  basis  of  oral  tradition  alone,  for  the  written  records 
perished  at  the  sack  of  Rome  by  the  Gauls  in  390  B.C.  Nor  are 
the  traditions  in  themselves  so  probable  as  to  inspire  belief  They 
give  us,  indeed,  admirable  pictures  of  old  Roman  ideals  and  institu- 
tions, but  the  personages  and  events  portrayed  in  them  are  shadowy 
and  unreal.  Romulus  and  Numa,  for  instance,  simply  personify  the 
two  great  elements  of  ancient  law,  the  secular  and  the  religious, 
which  find  a  later  and  weaker  embodiment  in  the  slightly  different 
figures  of  Tullus  Hostilius  and  Ancus  Marcius.     But  formal  criti- 


SOURCES  OF  THE  LEGENDS  35 

cism  is  not  now  needed  to  prove  that  we  have  here  to  do  with 
myth,  not  history. 

Euhemerism. — What  then  is  the  origin  of  these  myths,  and  to 
what  causes  may  their  growth  be  ascribed?  The  first  and  most 
obvious  source  is  to  be  found  in  Euhemerism,  ^  which  turned  into 
plain  history  the  tales  told  of  the  gods.  The  method  was  intro- 
duced at  Rome  by  Ennius,  and  was  readily  followed  by  the 
Augustan  writers,  who  rationalised  the  legends  by  the  omission  of 
the  supernatural  and  the  conversion  of  Italian  gods  into  primitive 
kings.  It  suited  the  more  prosaic  and  literal  mind  of  the  Roman, 
and  harmonised  with  his  view  of  things  spiritual.  The  vivid 
imagination  of  the  Greeks  peopled  the  hills  and  streams  with 
Naiads  and  Oreads,  and  saw  in  the  motion  of  the  cloud  the  hand 
of  Zeus,  the  bounty  of  Demeter  in  the  produce  of  the  earth.  The 
art  of  their  sculptors  fashioned  ideal  forms  in  the  likeness  of  men 
and  women,  whose  sayings  and  doings  made  an  ever-growing  story 
full  of  human  interest,  enriched  and  fixed  by  the  genius  of  their 
great  poets.  The  Italians,  on  the  other  hand,  worshipped  with 
deeper  but  more  distant  reverence  shadowy  beings,  rarely  em- 
bodied in  wood  or  stone,  whose  name,  attributes,  and  cult  alone 
were  saved  from  oblivion.  And  so  the  very  reverence  of  the 
Italian  mind,  together  with  its  literalness,  as  scepticism  advanced, 
made  the  historical  explanation  a  natural  and  popular  method. 
To  take  examples  from  the  legend  of  Romulus  :  the  twin-brothers 
are  the  two  Lares  or  guardian-deities  of  the  city  ;  in  the  story 
they  are  born  of  a  Vestal,  because  their  worship  was  closely  con- 
nected with  that  of  the  Hearth-goddess  ;  their  names  are  derived 
from  that  of  the  town,  for  Remus  is  but  a  variant  of  Romulus. 
So,  again,  Titus  Tatius  is  the  eponjaiious  hero  of  the  religious 
brotherhood,  the  Sodales  Titii,  and  of  the  ancient  tribe  of  the 
Titles.  Quirinusis  the  old  Italian  god  of  war,  identified  by  Diony- 
sius  of  Halicarnassus  with  Mars  ;  hence  even  the  legend,  which 
deifies  Romulus  as  Quirinus,  represents  him  as  the  son  of  Mars. 

./Etiological  Legends.  —  In  the  story  of  a  founder  we  naturally 
look  for  the  mythical  element  ;  elsewhere  other  influences  are 
more  marked.  Setting  deliberate  fiction  aside,  the  most  potent 
factor  in  the  making  of  traditional  history  is  the  desire  to  explain 
obsolete  usages  and  half-forgotten  institutions,  and  to  give  some 
account  of  the  origin  of  public  buildings  and  ancient  monuments. 
In  the  wedding-ceremony  of  the  Romans  are  observed  traces  of 

*  Euhemerus  was  a  Greek  (circ.  300  B.C.)  wlio  first  systematically  explained 
myths  as  history,  treating  the  gods  as  heroes  worshipped  for  their  valour. 


36 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


tho  i)riiiiitive  system  of  marriage  by  capture,  relics  without  doubt 
from  an  earlier  stage  of  society.  'I'lic  feigned  violence  with  which 
the  bride  was  snatched  from  her  mother's  arms  and  her  hair 
parted  with  a  spear  is  found  in  the  marriage-ritual  of  savage  tribes 
throughout  the  world.  The  Romans  explained  this  by  a  legend, 
"the  Rape  of  the  Sabines,"  and  e.xpressed  its  anticjuity  by  telling 
the  story  of  the  founder  himself.  So,  too,  the  legend  of  Remus 
symbolises  the  inviolability  of  the  city-wall. 


FICUS    RUMINAI.IS,    WITH    PICUS    AND    PARRA  : 
SUCKLING   TWINS. 


URBS    ROMA  ;    AND   WOLF 


Again,  legends  tend  to  gather  about  places  of  worship  and 
memorials  of  a  forgotten  past.  The  story  of  the  infancy  of  Romulus 
and  Remus  centres  round  the  sacred  fig-tree  {Funs  Riiiiiinalis)  and 
the  worship  of  Faunus  Lupercus  in  the  cave  hard  by.  Faunus, 
the  god  who  keeps  the  flock,  is  transformed  into  Faustulus,  the 
shepherd  who  scares  the  wolf  from  the  twins.  The  temple  of 
Jupiter  Stator  may  have  suggested   the  legend    of  the   rally  of 


SOURCES  OF  THE  LEGENDS  37 

the  Romans  there,  while  the  details  at  least  of  the  tale  of  the 
Horatii  may  well  have  been  invented  to  account  for  a  group  of 
monuments  1  which  stood  together  near  the  Carinie. 

Greek  Fiction. — The  remaining  source  of  tradition  is  deliberate 
fiction,  probably  due  to  Greek  influence.  The  connection  of 
yEiieas  with  Egesta  (/En.  v.)  and  Cunii^  can  be  traced  back  to  the 
Sicilian  poet  Stesichorus,  and  to  the  tradition  of  the  colonisation 
of  the  Italian  from  the  /Eolic  Cyme.  The  fable  that  Numa  was 
a  pupil  of  Pythagoras  was  invented  by  some  ingenious  Greek  so 
ignorant  of  Roman  chronology  that  he  ante-dated  the  philosopher 
by  two  centuries. 

Especially  deep  is  the  debt  of  the  Greek  historical  novelists 
to  their  father  Herodotus.  Not  to  speak  of  the  marked  resem- 
blances between  the  tales  of  the  childhood  of  Cyrus  and  of 
Romulus,  the  stratagem  of  Sextus  Tarquinius  at  Gabii,  and  the 
story  of  the  poppy-heads  are  taken  straight  from  Herodotus' 
narrative  of  the  capture  of  Babylon  (iii.  154),  and  of  the  strange 
behaviour  of  the  tyrant  Thrasybulus  (v.  92).  With  equal  certainty 
we  may  ascribe  the  embassy  to  Delphi  to  the  lively  fancy  of  some 
patriotic  Greek. 

The  Truth  in  the  Legends. — Such  being  the  main  sources  of 
error  in  the  traditional  history,  it  remains  to  discover  and  piece 
together  the  scattered  fragments  of  truth  preserved  in  the  legends, 
like  flies  in  amber.  In  this  task  we  gain  great  help  from  two 
sources.  The  researches  of  archaeologists  into  the  early  buildings 
of  ancient  Rome  reveal  some  glimpses  of  the  city's  material 
growth,  while  the  study  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  a  later  day, 
with  the  aid  of  the  science  of  comparative  law,  sheds  some  rays 
of  light  on  the  original  institutions  of  the  Roman  state.  To  deal 
first  with  the  growth  and  history  of  regal  Rome. 

The  Original  Settlements. — The  germ  of  the  eternal  city  lay  in 
that  square  town  (Roma  Quadrata),  whose  well-built  tufa  walls  may 
still  be  traced  on  the  slopes  of  the  Palatine.  Here  stood  the  relics 
of  Romulus,  the  sacred  fig-tree  and  the  thatched  hut  ;  round  it  ran 
the  Pomerium  traced  by  the  founder's  plough  ;  by  one  of  its  gates 
was  the  shrine  of  Jupiter  Stator.  An  extension  of  this  scjuare  city 
of  the  Palatine  is  found  in  the  Septimontium — the  original  seven 
hills — which  included  the  Palatine  mount  with  its  two  outlying 
ridges  (the  Cermalus  overhanging  the  swampy  Velabrum,  and  the 

1  These  were  the  altar  of  Janus  Curiatius,  near  the  sororium  Tigillum  {cf. 
p.  25),  and  that  of  Juno  sororia  at  which  the  Horatii  sacrificed,  and  the  Pila 
Horatia  in  the  Forum. 


38  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Velia  running  towards  the  Esqiiilinc),  together  with  the  three  peaks 
of  the  hitter  hill,  Fagutal,  Oppius,  and  Cispius,  and  the  fortress 
built  to  protect  the  low  valley  of  the  Subura.  But  this  settlement 
of  the  Septimontium  was  not  the  only  city  enclosed  in  the  circuit 
of  the  later  walls.  On  the  Quirinal  and  Viminal,  opposite,  stood 
a  town  perhaps  Sabine,  perhaps  merely  Latin,  in  origin,  distinct 
certainly  from  the  Palatine  city  and  probably  hostile.  Of  the 
existence  of  this  separate  settlement  there  are  man)  proofs.  Dis- 
tinctive names  survived  to  later  days.  There  were  duplicate 
worships  of  Mars  and  double  colleges  of  Salii  and  Lupcrci,  while 
the  legends  of  the  double  kingship  and  the  twofold  door  of  the 
double-headed  Janus  may  point  to  the  same  conclusion.  Hence 
the  hypothesis  that  there  were  originally  two  rival  towns,  divided 
at  first,  united  afterwards,  the  settlement  of  the  Montani  on  the 
Palatine  mounts,  and  of  the  Collini  on  the  Quirinal  hills. 

The  Unification  of  the  City. — In  the  next  period  of  develop- 
ment, the  age  of  the  Tarquins,  the  names  and  remains  of  Roman 
buildings  serve  more  fully  to  confirm  the  substance  of  the  tradi- 
tional account.  The  legends  themselves  show  that  no  great  ex- 
tension of  Roman  territory  took  p'ace  under  the  first  four  kings. 
Fidenaa  remains  Etruscan,  the  Anio  is  the  boundary  towards  the 
Sabines,  and  in  all  probability  the  fossa  Cluilia,  but  five  miles 
from  Rome,  served  to  mark  the  frontier  towards  Latium.  Only 
along  the  Tiber  towards  the  sea  does  Rome  extend  her  boundaries, 
securing  command  of  the  river  by  the  fortification  of  JanicuJum 
and  the  foundation  of  Ostia.  But  with  the  advent  of  the  Tarquins, 
Rome  becomes  an  important  state,  mistress  of  Latium  and  Southern 
Etruria — a  position  she  again  loses  on  the  expulsion  of  the  kings. 
To  the  same  monarchs  are  ascribed  the  buildings  which  first 
made  Rome  a  great  city.  Round  the  scattered  settlements,  already 
noticed,  .Servius  Tullius  built  a  wall,  whose  colossal  size  may  be 
estimated  from  the  remains  still  existing  on  the  Aventine,  and  the 
rampart  {cig'ii'cr)  recently  destroyed  in  part,  to  make  room  for  a 
railway  station.  Within  this  wall  was  included  the  whole  of 
Republican  Rome,  as  well  the  older  towns  on  the  Palatine  and 
Esquiline,  the  Quirinal  and  \'iminal,  as  three  more  hills  now  first 
brought  within  the  bounds  of  the  city,  the  Caelian,  the  Aventine, 
and  the  Capitol.  On  this  last,  the  most  famous  of  the  seven  hills, 
was  built  the  citadel,  with  the  well-house  (Tullianum)  and  prison, 
the  treasury,  and  the  great  temple  of  Jupiter,  the  chief  monument 
of  the  Tarquins.  To  the  Tarquins,  too,  are  attributed  the  great 
drains    {cIoiwct),    which    turned    the   marsh-lands   of  the    Subura, 


THE  PRIMITIVE   CITY 


59 


the  Forum,  and  Velabrum  into  firm  ground.  On  the  land  thus 
reclaimed  was  the  Comitium,  or  place  of  assembly,  and  the 
Forum,  or  market-place  of  the  united  Roman  people.  Near 
the  north-west  corner  of  this  oblong  stood  the  Curia,  or  senate- 
house,  and  on  the  south-east  the  buildings  that  typified  the  unity 


WALL   ON    THE    AVENTINE. 


of  the   new   city,  the   temple   of  Vesta,  the   city  hearth,  and  the 
house  of  the  king  {rcgia). 

The  Etruscan  Kings  of  Rome.— It  is  hard  to  resist  the  impres- 
sion  that  all  these  great  undertakings  are  the  handiwork  of  the 
master-builders  of  Italy,  the  Etruscans.     The  massive  walls,  the 


40  HISTORY  01'   ROME 

arched  drains,  and  tlic  Capitolinc  lcnij)lc*,  with  its  tlircc  shrines 
of  Jupiter,  Juno,  and  Minerva  set  side  by  side,  and  its  long,  low 
front,  resting  on  but  six  pillars,  are  all  eminently  characteristic  of 
Etruscan  architects  ;  and  when  we  find  that  great  nation  spreading 
in  early  times  from  the  Alps  to  the  Bay  of  Naples,  we  cannot  but 
suppose  that  Rome  and  Latium  came  beneath  its  sway.  Nor 
are  there  wanting  traditions  of  their  rule  in  this  district.  In  the 
yEneid,  Turnus  (Turrhenus  or  Tuscan)  of  Ardea  is  closely  allied  with 
Mezentius,  the  Etruscan  tyrant  of  Cicre.  Cato  declares  the  Volsci 
were  once  subject  to  Etruscan  rule,  and  his  statement  is  borne 
out  by  the  name  of  one  of  their  cities,  Tarracina  ( =  city  of  Tarchon), 
and  the  Etruscan  remains  found  at  Velitrae.  Roman  legends 
assert  the  Etruscan  origin  of  the  Tarquins,  whose  name  (Tarchon 
or  Tarchnas)  means  lord  or  prince  ;  Tuscan  tradition,  preserved  to 
us  by  the  Emperor  Claudius  and  a  tomb  at  Volci,  makes  Servius 
Tullius  an  Etruscan  prince,  Mastarna,  the  friend  of  Caeles  Vibenna. 
The  legend  of  Porsenna  is  but  another  attempt  to  conceal  the 
fact  of  an  Etruscan  conquest  of  Rome.  Hence  we  infer  that  the 
monarchy  of  the  Tarcjuins  represents  the  rule  of  Etruscan  princes 
over  a  concjuered  Latin  race,  and  their  expulsion  a  rising  of  the 
natives  of  the  land  against  their  foreign  rulers. 

The  Institutions  of  Rome  :— The  Familia. — Yet,  though  there 
may  have  been  a  Sabine  settlement  on  one  of  the  Roman  hills, 
and  though  Etruscan  princes  once  were  lords  of  the  city,  primitive 
Rome  is  essentially  a  Latin  town,  Latin  in  its  character,  its  customs, 
and  its  institutions.  The  foreign  elements  were  absorbed  or  thrown 
off;  they  modified,  may  even  have  profoundly  affected,  but  never 
controlled  its  true  development. 

The  unit  of  the  Roman  state  was  the  family,  built  up  of  father 
and  mother,  sons  and  daughters,  slaves  and  clients.  In  law  the 
household  was  governed  absolutely  by  the  paterfamilias  ;  to  its 
master  each  member  was  subject,  wife  and  child  as  much  as  slave 
and  dependent.  He  is  absolute  owner  of  all  property  possessed  or 
acquired  by  its  members  ;  he  disposes  of  their  persons  and  their 
goods  at  pleasure.  By  custom,  however,  thougdi  not  by  law,  the 
house-father  acts  as  representativ^e  rather  than  despot ;  he  is  con- 
trolled by  the  tiios  inaiorum,  by  public  opinion,  and  by  the  council 
of  the  near  relations.  He,  too,  is  priest  of  the  household,  and 
maintains  the  worship  of  the  ancestors  and  the  household  gods. 
By  his  side  within  the  gates  stood  the  mistress,  high  in  reverence 
and  dignity,  who  kept  the  house  and  ruled  the  maidens  working 
at  the  distaff.     When  the  father  died  the  sons  or  nearest  males 


EARLY  INS'rJTUTIONS 


41 


inlicntcd  his  goods  and  his  authority  ;  the  daughters  remained  as 
children  or  as  wives  in  the  hand  of  their  male  protectors. 

The  Gens  and  the  CHents.  From  the  family  develops  the  house 
or  clan  {gens).  All  descendants  in  the  male  line  of  a  single  ancestor, 
whether  by  blood  or  adoption,  regarded  themselves  as  members 
of  one  house.  Bound  to  the  house  by  ties  of  dependence  were 
the  clients,  enfranchised  slaves,  or  refugees  who  placed  themselves 
under  the  protection  of  some  Roman  chief,  and  handed  down  the 


CLOACA    MAXIMA. 


relation  to  their  children.  In  strict  law  their  persons  and  property 
were  wholly  at  the  disposal  of  the  head  of  the  house  ;  by  custom 
they  enjoyed  almost  complete  freedom.  The  patronus,  indeed,  was 
morally  bound  to  protect  the  person  and  advance  the  interests  of 
his  client  in  return  for  the  services  rendered  by  the  client  to  his 
protectors. 

The  Plebs. — From  these  dependents  in  the  first  instance  arose 
a  new  class  in  the  community,  the  "plebs"  or  common  people. 
Men  who  for  years  had  enjoyed  this  practical  freedom  gradually 


42  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

emancipated  themselves  from  the  legal  bonds  of  clientship,  and 
gained  a  right  to  the  protection  of  the  state  against  their  ancient 
masters.  The  number  and  importance  of  this  protected  popula- 
tion grew  apace,  as  Rome  became  a  power  in  Central  Italy.  Com- 
merce drew  within  her  strong  walls  merchants  from  less  favoured 
towns,  who  lived  as  settlers  under  the  king's  guardianship.  And 
to  these  elements  of  the  new  body  must  be  added  the  inhabitants 
of  conquered  cities  brought  to  Rome,  as  tradition  tells  us,  and 
settled  there  as  clients  of  the  community,  that  is,  of  the  king. 

The  King. — The  Roman  state  sprang  from  the  union  of  clans 
and  families.  Its  institutions  grew  naturally  from  those  of  the 
smaller  associations,  and  upon  their  model.  At  the  head  of  the 
united  community  was  the  father  and  ruler  of  the  state,  the  re.\  or 
king.  The  Roman  kingship  is  compounded  of  three  elements. 
From  one  point  of  view,  the  king  is  the  hereditary  and  patriarchal 
chief  of  the  people,  as  the  father  is  of  the  household  ;  from  another, 
the  chief  priest  of  the  nation,  as  the  father  is  of  the  family  ;  but 
most  distinctively,  differing  herein  from  the  father  of  the  family, 
he  is  the  elected  representative  and  magistrate  of  a  free  state. 
The  compromise  on  which  the  monarchy  rested  is  best  seen  in  the 
traditional  method  of  election.  On  the  death  of  the  king  the 
supreme  power  reverted  to  the  assembled  "  fathers  "  {paircs)^  the 
representatives  of  the  old  houses  {gcntcs).  This  council  of  elders 
appoints  an  inter-rex,  who  holds  office  for  five  days,  and  then 
nominates  another  elder  to  take  his  place  ;  eventually,  by  some 
inter-rex  so  nominated,  the  new  king  is,  with  the  advice  of  the 
elders,  chosen.  Next  the  inter-rex  proposes  to  the  assembled 
people  the  election  of  the  king  thus  designated.  Finally,  the  vote 
of  the  people  is  ratified  by  the  approval  of  the  gods,  as  given  in 
the  solemn  ceremony  of  inauguration,  and  by  the  assent  of  the 
fathers,  the  guardians  of  the  religion  of  Rome.  Thus  the  king  is 
nominated  by  his  predecessor,  chosen  by  the  Senate,  elected  by  the 
people,  who  bestow  on  him  the  sovereign  power  {iinperiuiii)^  and 
confirmed  in  his  office  by  the  assent  of  Heaven. 

He  is,  during  his  life,  the  sole  magistrate  of  the  state,  the 
guardian  of  the  city  hearth  and  high  priest  of  its  religion,  the 
leader  of  his  people  in  war,  and  the  supreme  judge  in  peace.  His 
orders  and  his  judgments  are  not  fettered  by  written  statutes  ;  all 
officials,  whether  religious  or  secular,  derive  their  authority  from 
him  and  are  but  his  assistants  or  deputies  ;  he  alone  can  convene 
the  Senate  or  people,  and  has  the  right  to  propose  new  laws  to  the 
people,  and  to  address  them  publicly  in  their  assemblies.     Yet  the 


THE   KING 


43 


GROUND-PLAN   AND   ELEVATION   OF   THE   TEMPLE    OF    VESTA    [reitored). 


44  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

authority  of  the  king  is  limited,  not  al)sohite,  for  lie  is  the  minister, 
not  the  maker,  of  the  law.  His  ])lenary  ]KJwcr  is  given  him  by  the 
assembled  burgesses,  whose  allegiance  is  due  to  the  law-abiding 
ruler,  not  the  lawless  lord,  of  the  state.  When  the  kings  trans- 
gressed the  ancient  customs  {^inos  maioruDi)  of  the  land,  they 
forfeited  their  claim  on  the  allegiance  of  the  people. 

The  Senate — By  the  side  of  the  monarch  stands  the  Senate, 
the  council  of  the  "fathers"  or  heads  of  the  great  houses  of 
Rome.  Orig-inally,  no  doubt,  the  elders  had  been  chieftains  of  the 
separate  clans  from  whose  union  the  Roman  people  was  formed. 
Thus  in  one  aspect  the  Senate  is  a  representative  council  of  chiefs, 
whose  ancient  independence  is  proved  by  their  lifelong  tenure  of 
office,  and  whose  claim  to  be  the  ultimate  source  of  authority, 
civil  and  religious,  is  shown  by  the  appointment  of  the  inter-rex, 
and  by  its  right  to  confirm  or  annul  all  resolutions  of  the  people 
{pairum  auctoritas\  including  the  election  of  the  king.  But  when 
the  allied  clans  became  one  people,  under  one  chief  magistrate, 
the  Senate  lost  its  ancient  supremacy.  Nor  is  there  any  relic  left 
in  historical  times  of  its  representative  character.  The  king,  as 
head  of  the  united  state,  nominates  whom  he  will  to  fill  up  its 
ranks,  and  may  at  his  pleasure  refuse  to  consult  his  council,  or 
reject  the  advice  it  has  tendered. 

The  Comitia  Curiata, — The  earliest  assembly  of  the  Roman 
people  was  that  in  which  the  free  men  voted  by  curies  {comitia 
curiata).  The  whole  Roman  people,  plebeian  as  well  as  patrician, 
were  members  of  the  thirty  curies,  and  were  summoned  to  the 
assemblies  in  the  Comitium.  Originally,  however,  the  plebeians 
were  purely  passive  members  Oi  the  assembly,  and  only  acquired 
the  right  to  vote  at  a  later  period.  Each  curia  comprised  several 
gentes,  knit  together  by  participation  in  common  rites  and  festivals, 
by  the  possession  of  a  common  chapel,  hall,  and  hearth,  and  the 
tradition  of  a  common  ancestry.  The  curies  were,  in  the  earliest 
days  which  history  records,  the  only  important  division  of  the 
Roman  people.  Their  number,  it  is  true,  reminds  us  of  the 
shadowy  triple  division  of  the  people  into  Ramnes,  Titles,  and 
Luceres,  and  the  traditional  number  of  the  Senate,  three  hun- 
dred. A  comparison  of  the  figures  with  the  ordinary  number  in 
colonies — ten  curies  and  a  hundred  decurions  or  senators — taken 
in  conjunction  with  the  derivation  of  the  old  Roman  name  for 
a  division  of  the  people  {tribus  =  a.  third),  confirms  the  suggestion 
that  the  city  was  formed  by  the  aggregation  of  three  distinct 
settlements. 


KEFOKMS   OF  SERVIUS  45 

But  these  three  obsolete  tribes  and  tlie  ancient  houses  were  no 
longer  effective  political  divisions  ;  for  such  purposes  the  curia  is 
the  only  unit  recognised  by  the  primitive  constitution.  In  the 
assembly  the  vote  of  each  curia  was  decided  by  the  majority 
of  individual  voters  ;  that  of  the  whole  people  by  tlie  majority  of 
curies.  The  assembly,  however,  only  met  when  summoned  by 
the  king  or  inter-rex,  and  in  the  earliest  times  had  but  few  oppor- 
tunities of  exercising  its  powers.  Its  right  to  elect  magistrates  is 
limited  to  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  new  king  ;  the  necessity 
for  its  concurrence  in  all  important  innovations  is  exemplified  only 
perhaps  in  the  case  of  the  rupture  of  an  existing  treaty  with  a 
foreign  power,  in  the  grant  of  the  franchise  to  a  non-citizen,  or 
the  transference  of  a  citizen  from  one  family  to  another  by  the 
ceremony  of  adoption.  But  the  assembly  was  also  called  to- 
gether to  witness  the  most  solemn  acts  of  a  private  or  religious 
character,  the  making  of  wills,  the  inauguration  of  flamens.  and 
the  proclamation  of  festivals. 

Of  the  three  powers  in  the  Roman  state,  the  king,  the  Senate, 
and  the  people,  the  first  alone  is  constantly  active  ;  yet  for  all 
great  changes  the  concurrence  of  the  people  and  the  sanction  of 
the  Senate  are  requisite,  so  that  the  monarchy  is  limited  on  all 
sides  by  the  rights  of  the  burgesses.  But  to  these  rights  is  attached 
the  corresponding  duty  of  the  defence  of  the  state  in  war,  for  on 
the  burgesses  fell  the  burden  of  personal  service  in  the  legion  and 
of  building  the  city  walls. 

The  Reforms  of  Servius  Tullius. — The  first  great  constitutional 
reform,  the  foundation  of  the  comitia  centuriata,  is  ascribed  to  one 
of  the  Etruscan  kings  of  Rome,  Servius  Tullius.  But  it  is  probable 
that  the  changes  made  by  these  prmces  were  in  the  first  instance 
financial  and  military.  The  royal  army  had  been  composed  of  1000 
footmen  and  100  horse  from  each  of  the  old  three  tribes.  Tar- 
quinius  Priscus  meant,  we  are  told,  to  create  three  new  tribes 
and  centuries  of  horsemen,  but,  daunted  by  the  opposition  of  the 
augurs,  left  the  old  forms  unchanged,  while  he  accomplished  his 
purpose  by  doubling  the  strength  of  each  division.  Servius 
Tullius  undertook  a  more  thorough  reform,  by  reorganising 
the  army  on  a  new  basis,  that  of  property.  Though  the  old 
six  centuries  of  horsemen  were  left  untouched,  twelve  fresh 
squadrons  were  formed  of  the  richest  citizens  ;  and  in  the  ranks 
of  the  footmen  were  included  the  rest  of  the  freeholders,  patri- 
cians and  plebeians  alike,  arranged  according  to  the  value  of 
their  landed  estate.     The  unit  adopted   in  the  new  organisation 


46  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  the  existing  century  or  company  of  a  hundred  men  ;  these 
companies  were  grouped  in  grades,  and  drawn  up  in  phalanx. 
The  richest  citizens,  in  complete  armour,  formed  the  four  front 
ranks  of  the  phalanx  {classis).  Behind  them  stood  the  less  perfectly 
armed  spearmen  of  the  second  and  third  grades,  while  the  fourth 
and  fifth  grades  served  as  light-armed  skirmishers,  all  four  inferior 
grades  counting  technically  as  infra  classctn.  The  whole  force  is 
divided  into  two  equal  parts,  the  field  army,  coinposed  of  the 
younger  men  {jiiniorcs),  and  the  army  of  reserve  of  older  men 
{seniores)^  each  part  containing  eighty-five  centuries  and  forming 
most  probably  two  legions  {cf.  pp.  28  and  296). 

Traces  of  the  Military  Origin  of  the  Comitia  Centuriata.— 
That  the  original  purpose  of  the  Servian  reform  was  military  is 
sufficiently  proved  by  the  forms  retained  in  the  later  assembly. 
The  people  in  the  comitia  centuriata  is  called  the  army  {exerdtus), 
and  organised  for  war,  not  peace.  Its  divisions  are  the  century 
or  company  of  horse  or  foot,  the  "  classis"  representing  an  original 
distinction  by  armament,  the  corps  of  juniors  and  seniors.  The 
president,  who  is  of  necessity  invested  with  full  military  power 
(hnperium),  summons  the  burghers  to  meet  him  outside  the  walls, 
in  the  field  of  Mars,  by  the  sounding  of  the  war-trumpet  and  the 
hoisting  of  the  standard.  In  the  earliest  times  the  citizens  as- 
sembled in  arms,  and  were  arrayed  under  their  standards  in  order 
of  battle,  and  even  in  later  days  the  companies  of  smiths  and 
trumpeters  maintained  their  separate  existence  in  the  assembly. 
The  original  purpose  of  the  Servian  reform  was  the  imposition 
of  military  service  and  the  war-tax  {tribiituni)  on  all  freeholders 
{assidj/i),  but  the  duty  of  defending  the  state  could  not  long  be 
separated  from  the  right  of  deciding  its  policy.  The  natural 
consequence  was,  that  the  Servian  army  was  converted  into  the 
comitia  centuriata,  which,  at  least  from  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic,  ranked  as  the  chief  assembly  of  the  Roman  people. 

The  Local  Tribes. — Another  institution  ascribed  to  KingServius 
underwent  a  similar  transformation.  To  facilitate  the  levying  of 
troops,  Servius  divided  the  city  and  its  territory  into  four  local 
districts,  the  Palatine,  Esquiline,  Suburan,  and  Colline  tribes. 
Each  tribe  at  first  included  not  only  a  district  of  the  city,  but  also 
a  portion  of  the  country  outside  the  walls.  In  later  days  the  four 
original  tribes  were  confined  to  the  city,  while  the*  country  was 
portioned  out  in  new  tribes.  Throughout  history  the  tribe  is 
a  local  district,  marked  off  for  administrative  purposes  ;  but  just 
as  the  Servian  classification  was  originally  military,  and  only  later 


THE   CONSULATE  47 

political,  so  the  tribe,  at  first  intended  to  serve  as  the  basi's  for 
the  levying  of  troops,  became  in  its  turn  the  most  important 
political  division  in  the  Roman  people. 

It  would  therefore  appear  that  the  memory  of  good  King  Servius 
has  been  preserved  rather  by  the  consequences  which  followed  in 
the  course  of  years  from  his  reforms  than  by  their  original  pur- 
pose. Yet  we  cannot  doubt  that  those  reforms  were  conceived  by 
a  master-mind.  They  have  not  the  air  of  being  a  compromise 
reached  by  hard  contlict  between  two  hostile  parties,  but  bear  the 
stamp  of  a  great  legislator.  Rome  would  seem  to  owe  to  Servius 
the  debt  which  Athens  acknowledges  to  Solon  and  England  to 
Alfred. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    INSTITUTIONS    OF    THE    NEW    REPUBLIC 

The  Consulate. — The  traditional  account  of  the  expulsion  of 
the  kings  is  no  doubt  an  historical  romance,  but  it  is  a  romance 
founded  on  fact.  The  bitter  and  abiding  hatred  of  the  very  name 
of  king  at  Rome  proves  the  truth  of  the  tradition  that  the 
monarchy  became  a  tyranny  and  was  abolished  by  a  revolution. 
But  it  is  characteristic  of  the  Roman  people  to  retain  as  far  as 
possible  existing  institutions.  Hence,  even  in  abolishing  the  mon- 
archy, they  retained  the  title  of  king  for  a  priestly  functionary 
{rex  sacrorum)  debarred  from  holding  any  other  office. 

A  more  important  legacy  left  by  the  monarchy  to  the  new 
Republic  is  the  conception  of  sovereign  power  {iinperiuiii).  This 
power,  it  is  true,  is  no  longer  held  for  life  by  a  single  individual, 
but  entrusted  to  two  colleagues,  the  consuls,  for  the  term  of  a 
single  year.  Yet  the  consuls,  though  only  annual  magistrates,  are 
true  successors  of  the  king,  and  joint-inheritors  of  his  authority. 
For  if  in  practice  there  must  have  been  from  the  first  a  division 
of  functions,  the  law  recognised  no  such  distinction.  A  consul  had 
in  all  cases  the  right  to  forbid  what  his  colleague  had  enjoined, 
and  by  his  intercession  to  annul  the  force  of  the  command.  By 
this  peculiar  institution  of  co-ordinate  magistrates  the  Romans 
contrived  to  maintain  the  sovereign  power  intact,  and  yet  to 
provide  against  its  abuse  by  individual  self-will. 

With  the  same  purpose,  the  tenure  of  office  was  limited  to  a 


48  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

single  year  ;  and  thougli  in  law  the  official  acts  of  a  consul  were 
valid,  even  if  he  refused  to  resign  his  magistracy  at  the  end  of  the 
appointed  term,  in  practice  the  consuls  seldom  dared  to  disregard 
in  this  way  the  spirit  of  the  new  constitution.  Hence,  whereas 
the  king  had  been  practically  irresponsible  because  his  authority 
ceased  only  with  his  life,  the  consul,  on  his  retirement  from  office, 
was  responsible  for  the  use  he  had  made  of  his  power. 

The  two  great  differences  which  distinguished  the  position  of  a 
consul  from  that  of  a  king  were  the  existence  of  a  colleague  and 
the  annual  tenure  of  office  ;  but  others  of  the  old  royal  prerogatives 
were  also  lost  in  the  change  of  the  constitution.  By  the  Valerian 
law  the  consul  was  compelled  to  allow  an  appeal  to  the  people 
against  a  sentence  which  affected  the  life  or  status  {caput')  of  a 
citizen.  This  measure,  though  it  prescribed  no  penalty  but  infamy 
for  its  transgression,  and  needed  repeated  re-enactment,  was  for 
centuries  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act  of  Rome  and  the  keystone  of  her 
citizens'  liberties. 

Another  royal  prerogative  much  limited  at  this  time  was  the 
right  to  delegate  powers.  The  two  lieutenants  of  the  king  for 
peace  and  war,  the  guardian  of  the  c\\.y  {prccfectiis  urbi)  and  the 
master  of  the  horse  {viaglsier  equittiDi)  play  no  part  under  the 
Republic.  The  prasfectship  becomes  a  mere  form,  and  the 
mastership  of  the  horse  is  called  to  life  only  when  a  serious 
emergency  demands  the  temporary  restoration  o^  monarchy  in 
the  shape  of  the  dictatorship.  The  consuls  may  delegate  their 
military  functions,  but  they  cannot  name  at  pleasure  deputies 
to  represent  them  as  judges  or  magistrates.  Their  assistants 
in  these  departments  attain  the  rank  of  standing  officials  with 
definite  functions.  The  quaestores  parricidii,  if  they  existed  at 
all  under  the  kings,  were  mere  deputies  ;  they  are  now  regularly 
entrusted  with  criminal  jurisdiction  and  the  care  of  the  state  chest. 
Till  the  year  447  B.C.  these  officials  were  appointed  by  the  consuls, 
but  the  annual  tenure  and  the  clearly  marked  duties  of  their  office 
made  them  in  a  measure  independent  of  the  superior  magistrate. 
Again,  though  the  consul,  like  the  king,  had  the  right  of  naming- 
his  successor,  yet  his  prerogative  was  limited  by  the  people's  claim 
to  designate  the  man  on  whom  the  nomination  should  fall.  He 
was,  it  is  true,  no  mere  returning  officer  at  a  Roman  election.  He 
might,  and  did,  reject  particular  candidates,  either  refusing  to  record 
votes  tendered  for  them  or  recalling  to  the  poll  centuries  who  had 
given  them  their  suffrages.  But,  though  at  a  crisis  the  consul 
might  reassert  the  old  right  of  a  supreme  magistrate  to  name  his 


THE   IMPERIUM 


49 


successor,  as  a  rule  he  bowed  to  tlie  expressed  will  of  the  people.^ 
Lastly,  the  appointment  of  the  priests  was  withdrawn  from  the 
consuls.  The  priestly  colleges  obtained  the  right  of  filling  up  their 
ranks  by  co-optation,  while  the  Vestals  were  nominated  by  the  chief 
college,  that  of  the  pontifices.  In  this  way  a  separation  is  made 
between  ci\il  and  religious  authority. 

Imperium  Domi  and  Imperium  Militiae.— Another  distinction  of 
greater  significance  in  history  first  appears  at  this  time,  that  be- 
tween civil  and  military  authority.      In    war  the    consul   retains 


SELLA    CURULIS   AND    FASCES. 


absolute  power  of  life  and  death,  in  token  of  which  the  lictors  bear 
the  axes  before  him,  but  in  peace  his  authority  is  subject  to  the 
right  of  appeal  to  the  sovereign  people,  in  deference  to  whom, 
within  the  city,  the  axe  is  laid  aside  by  the  lictors.  Thus  there  is  a 
clear  distinction  between  the  absolute  power  of  the  general  over  his 
army  in  the  field  {iviperiuni  niiliticc)  and  the  constitutional  authority 
of  the  magistrate  over  the  people  at  home  {imperium  domi). 

Dictatorship. — This  limitation   and  division  of  the   powers  of 
the  magistrates  secured  in /ordinary  times  the  liberties  of  the  people, 

D 


50  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

but  in  time  of  war  the  divided  command  was  a  source  of  serious 
danger.  To  meet  such  emergencies  the  Romans  retained  the 
monarchical  principle  in  the  dictatorsliip.  After  consuUing  the 
Senate,  either  consul  had  the  right  of  nominating  whom  he  would 
as  dictator,  or  master  of  the  people.  The  dictator  possessed  the 
old  royal  powers  untrammelled  and  unlimited  ;  he  disposed  at  will 
of  the  treasure  of  the  state  and  the  lives  of  the  citizens.  From 
his  sentence  there  was  no  appeal,  and  all  magistrates  were  subor- 
dinate to  him.  In  fine,  he  was  a  temporary  monarch,  and  as  such 
named  his  second  in  command,  the  master  of  the  horse  ;  and  was 
accompanied  by  four-and-twenty  lict^srsjjcaring^axes  in  the  fasces. 
lUit  in  no  case  might  the  dictator  retain  office  for  mor'e  tlian  six 
months,  nor  name  a  successor  to  take  his  place.  Broadly  speaking, 
then,  though  kingship  was  abolished,  royal  power  was  retained, 
and  that  power  might  be  revived  at  a  crisis  in  all  its  ancient  fulness 
and  entrusted  to  a  single  man  ;  yet  the  essence  of  the  new  consti- 
tution was  the  limitation  of  the  old  regal  authority  by  the  collegiate 
character  and  annual  tenure  of  the  magistracy,  and  by  the  explicit 
recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people. 

The  Senate. — The  abolition  of  the  monarchy  left  the  legal 
position  of  the  Senate  unaltered.  The  consuls  called  the  Senate 
together,  presided  over  its  debates,  and  enforced  its  resolutions  just 
as  the  king  had  done  in  the  past.  The  Senate  cannot  legally  give 
commands  to  the  magistrate,  but  may  only  offer  advice.  Yet  in 
practice  the  permanence  of  the  Senate  gave  it  a  decisive  influence 
over  a  shifting  and  divided  magistracy,  and  enabled  it  to  dictate 
the  policy  of  Rome.  It  is  probable  that  plebeians  were  at  this 
period  first  admitted  into  the  ranks  of  the  Senate,  but  this  infusion 
of  new  blood  did  not  alter  the  character  of  the  council,  which 
remained  the  chief  bulwark  of  the  old  patrician  aristocracy.  One 
most  important  privilege,  the  right  to  ratify  or  reject  all  proceedings 
of  the  centuries,  the  election  of  magistrates,  as  well  as  the  passing 
of  laws,  was  reserved  for  its  patrician  members.  By  withholding 
their  sanction  {patricm  auctoritas)  the  heads  of  the  old  burgess 
houses  could  make  the  decisions  of  the  assembly  void,  and  so  keep 
the  commons  in  subjection  to  the  will  of  the  patricians. 

Assembly. — By  the  expulsion  of  the  kings  the  people  had 
acquired  the  important  rights  of  annually  electing  its  rulers  and  of 
acting  as  a  court  of  appeal  in  capital  cases.  The  sovereign  people 
to  whom  these  rights  belonged  was  the  army  of  freeholders  (comitia 
centuriata)  created  by  Servius  Tullius,  not  the  old  curiate  assembly, 
which  was  now  gradually  confined  to  mere  formalities,  such  as  the 


PATRICIAN  GOVERNMENT  51 

confirmation  of  llic  niaj^istrales,  already  chobcn  by  the  assembly  of 
the  centuries,  in  their  authority  {lex  curiata  dc  impcrio).  All  the 
chief  prerogatives  of  the  sovereign  people,  the  right  of  legislation 
and  the  power  of  peace  and  war,  as  well  as  the  election  of  magis- 
trates and  the  decision  of  criminal  appeals,  passed  to  the  new 
comitia  centuriata.  In  this  assembly  the  plebeians  doubtless 
formed  the  large  mass  of  the  voters,  but  since  it  was  a  majority 
of  centuries,  not  of  individual  votes,  that  determined  the  decision 
of  the  people,  their  numerical  superiority  was  of  little  service  to 
them.  For  the  centuries  of  the  knights  and  of  the  first  class, 
which  mainly  consisted  of  old  burgesses,  outnumbered  those  of  the 
lower  classes  ;  and,  further,  the  six  patrician  centuries  of  knights 
possessed  the  valuable  privilege  of  voting  first  {prccrogathui).  Thus, 
while  the  comitia  centuriata  formally  secured  the  liberties  of  the 
commons,  it  left  the  substance  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  upper 
classes  {cf.  Table,  p.  28). 

Patrician  Government. — Nobles  and  commons  had  united  to 
throw  off  the  galling  yoke  of  despotic  monarchs,  but,  now  that 
this  overshadowing  authority  was  gone,  there  begins  a  long'^  and 
fierce  struggle  between  the  orders  for  the  fruits  of  victory.  The 
lion's  share  fell  in  the  first  instance  to  the  patricians.  The 
plebeians  had  indeed  gained  the  clear  recognition  of  their  rights 
as  citizens  of  Rome  ;  they  had  won  the  right  to  vote  in  the 
assembly  of  freeholders,  and  the  right  to  appeal  from  the  sentence 
of  the  patrician  magistrate  to  the  verdict  of  that  assembly.  Never- 
theless, while  the  plebeians  won  the  shadow  of  liberty,  the  old 
burgesses,  now  become  a  patrician  nobility,  retained  the  substance 
of  power.  In  the  comitia  centuriata  their  vote  and  influence  could 
as  a  rule  secure  them  a  safe  majority  ;  but  even  had  it  been  other- 
wise, that  body  had  too  little  independence  of  action  seriously  to 
contest  their  supremacy.  Resolutions  in  the  comitia  were  intro- 
duced by  patrician  magistrates  after  consultation  with  an  aristocratic 
Senate,  and  subsequently  required  the  sanction  of  the  patrician 
members  of  the  Senate  {patrutn  aiictoritas).  In  elections  the  voters 
could  only  choose  patrician  candidates  nominated  by  patrician  magi- 
strates, and  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  curies,  in  which  patrician 
influence  preponderated,  and  to  that  of  the  patrician  senators.  The 
useful  machinery  of  the  omens  and  the  working  of  the  calendar  was 
controlled  by  patrician  priests.  Thus  the  legal  supremacy  of  the 
people  in  their  assembly  was  at  every  turn  hedged  in  and  crippled 
by  the  powers  of  a  patrician  magistracy  and  Senate. 

The  first  eflect  of  the  Revolution  was  the  transference  of  power 


52  HISTORY  OF  NOME 

IVoiii  an  indix  idual  king  to  a  close  corporation,  represented  by 
its  special  organ,  the  Senate,  and  working  through  the  magis- 
trates. The  ensuing  period  of  constitutional  history  is  naturally 
filled  with  the  long  struggles  by  which  the  plebeian  masses  wrung 
from  the  patricians  those  cherished  privileges  which  secured  them 
the  monopoly  of  office  and  authority.  The  ruling"^  corporation  was 
far  more  influenced  by  aristocratic  prejudice  than  the  monarch, 
who,  standing  on  a  height  above  all  his  subjects,  was  more  likely 
to  be  a  just  judge  between  different  classes  and  different  orders. 
The  king  might,  and  probably  did,  lean  on  the  support  of  the 
masses  against  the  power  of  the  aristocracy,  but  the  annual 
republican  magistrate  had  neither  time  nor  inclination  to  shake 
himself  free  from  the  fetters  of  patrician  prejudice.  Even  if  there 
arose  a  man  bold  enough  to  defy  his  order,  his  actions  could  be 
thwarted  by  the  opposition  of  his  colleague  or  the  gloomy  pre- 
dictions of  patrician  priests,  and,  in  the  last  resort,  his  power 
suspended  by  the  appointment  of  a  dictator.  Thus  at  first  sight  it 
would  appear  as  if  the  commons  of  Rome  had  escaped  the  tyranny 
of  a  single  monarch  only  to  place  on  their  necks  the  harder  yoke 
of  a  narrow  aristocracy.  Yet  the  privileges  gained,  the  clear  re- 
cognition of  their  claims  as  individuals  to  citizenship,  and  of  the 
full  sovereignty  of  the  whole  people  assembled  in  their  centuries^ 
though  at  the  time  rendered  nugatory  by  the  powers  entrusted 
to  the  patricians,  were  an  earnest  of  their  future  victory  in  the 
struggle  between  the  orders,  and  of  the  complete  ecjuality  between 
patrician  and  plebeian  which  crowned  that  victory. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    FIR.ST    STRUGGLES    OF    THE    PLEBEIANS 
TRADITIONAL    DATES 

B.C.      A.  U.C. 

Secession  of  the  Plebs 494       260 

Spurius  Cassius'  Agrarian  Law 486        268 

Publilian  Law 472        zSz 

Grievances  of  the  Plebeians. — The  plebeians  were  not  slow  to 
discover  the  real  meaning  of  the  late  changes.  To  them  the  new 
oligarchy  was  as  oppressive,  at  the  least,  as  the  old  monarchy.  It 
was,  indeed,  the  natural  and  obvious  policy  of  the  patriciate  to  thwart 
the  rising  ambition  and  depress  the  social  status  of  their  discarded 


GKTEVANCES  OF   THE   PLEBEIANS  53 

allies.  Class  feeling-  and  political  uUercst  alike  urged  them  to 
exclude  the  rich  plebeian  from  the  charmed  circle  of  the  official 
order,  and,  by  robbing  the  poor  farmer  of  his  hard-won  liberties, 
to  re-establish  the  client  system  in  full  force  for  their  own  benefit. 

Political  and  social  inequalities,  however,  formed  a  small  part 
of  the  burden  which  afflicted  the  lower  classes,  whose  sufferings 
from  direct  oppression  were  further  aggravated  by  the  losses 
sustained  by  Rome  in  the  wars  which  followed  the  fall  of  the 
monarchy.  Material  distress,  in  the  first  instance,  precipitated  the 
inevitable  conflict,  and,  like  true  Romans,  the  plebeians  attacked 
first,  not  the  rule  of  the  aristocracy  in  the  abstract,  but  the  practical 
oppressions  of  the  patrician  magistrates  and  Senate.  The  most 
glaring  examples  of  cruelty  and  misgovernment  were  the  savage 
law  of  debtor  and  creditor,  the  arbitrary  action  of  the  executive 
magistrates,  and  the  exclusive  use  and  shameful  maladministra- 
tion of  the  public  lands.  As  regards  the  last,  the  magistrates  and 
Senate  had  leagued  themselves  together  to  exclude  the  plebeians 
from  all  use  of  the  common  pastures  and  all  share  in  the  arable 
domains,  the  enjoyment  of  which  was  confined  to  the  privileged 
class.  At  the  same  time  they  failed  to  exact  the  legal  dues  for 
the  usufruct  of  the  land,  and  thus  robbed  the  treasury  of  present 
revenue  and  gave  the  occupant  a  claim  to  the  equitable  forbear- 
ance of  the  state  in  future.  With  a  decreasing  territory  allotments 
to  the  poor  were  out  of  the  question.  Thus  the  public  domain  was 
monopolised  by  the  old  burgesses  to  the  detriment  alike  of  the 
poor  and  the  public.  Against  this  monopoly  the  plebeians  were 
to  figdit  many  a  weary  battle,  but  their  first  efforts  were  aimed 
against  the  arbitrary  sentences  imposed  by  patrician  magistrates, 
and  the  stern  cruelty  of  the  old  Roman  law  of  debt.  The  horrible 
injustice  perpetrated  in  the  name  of  law  moved  the  masses,  not  so 
much  to  diminish  the  power  of  the  magistrates,  as  to  provide  them- 
selves with  a  refuge  from  its  abuse. 

The  First  Secession. — If  we  may  trust  Livy  and  Dionysius,  it 
was  the  law  of  debt  which  first  caused  an  open  revolt  of  the  poor 
against  the  government.  The  small  farmer  was  called  away  from 
home  by  continual  wars,  and  often  returned  only  to  find  his  home- 
stead a  heap  of  ashes.  In  his  distress  he  fell  into  the  hands  of 
some  patrician  money-lender,  and  finally  found  his  way  into  a 
private  prison,  there  to  be  loaded  with  chains  and  torn  with 
stripes.  Driven  to  despair  at  length,  the  plebeians  refused  to 
serve  in  a  war  against  the  Volscians,  and  only  enrolled  them- 
selves in    the   legions   after  the   consul    Ser\alius   had  freed  the 


54  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

clel)tor.s  from  prison  and  ))romisc(l  thcni  liis  ])r()tcction  for  the 
future.  But  when  the  troops  returned  victorious  from  tlie  field, 
the  other  consul,  Appius  Claudius,  enforced  the  law  of  debt  with 
merciless  severity.  So,  on  the  renewal  of  the  war,  the  plebeians 
again  refused  to  serve,  till  Manius  Valerius,  of  the  "house  that 
loved  the  people  well,"  was  made  dictator.  Victory  again  crowned 
the  Roman  arms  ;  but  when  the  dictator  proposed  reform  in  the 
.Senate,  he  was  met  by  a  selfish  and  oljstinate  opposition.  At 
length  the  patience  of  the  army  waiting  before  the  gates  gave 
way  ;  they  deserted  their  general,  and  marched  in  full  array  to 
the  "Sacred  Mount"  between  the  Anio  and  the  Tiber.  Here  the 
leaders  of  the  secession  threatened  to  found  a  new  plebeian  city, 
a  rival  to  the  old  Rome  of  the  burgesses  and  their  clients.  But 
at  this  point  the  Senate  yielded,  and  authorised  Valerius  to  treat 
with  the  plebeians.  The  seceding  party,  too,  had  the  sense  to  see 
the  community  of  interest  which  bound  them  to  the  other  half 
of  Rome,  and  recognised  in  the  old  fable  of  the  belly  and  the 
members,  told  them  by  Menenius  Agrippa,  the  moral  that  union 
is  strength.  They  stipulated,  however,  that  the  miseiy  of  the  lower 
classes  should  be  relieved  by  the  foundation  of  colonics  for  poor 
farmers  on  the  public  land. 

Tribunes  of  the  Plebs.— But  the  kernel  of  the  covenant  between 
the  orders  lay  in  the  provision  for  the  appointment  of  two  tribunes 
of  the  plebs,  to  be  chosen  annually  by  the  plebeians  from  their 
own  body,  who  received  power  to  protect  the  commons  from  the 
high-handed  injustice  of  patrician  magistrates,  and  whose  personal 
security  {sacro  Siincfuui)  was  guaranteed  for  ever  by  the  solemn 
oath  of  the  people.  The  tribunate  thus  created  was  henceforward 
the  representative  of  the  plebeian  body,  its  constant  safeguard  and 
sanctuary,  and  the  instrument  of  its  political  victories.  The  first 
duty  of  the  tribune  was  to  succour  the  oppressed,  his  chief  function 
to  cancel  any  command  of  a  consul  which  infringed  the  liberties 
of  a  citizen.  But  his  "intercession"  was  in  no  case  valid  against 
the  "imperium"  of  a  dictator,  or  even  of  the  ordinary  magistrate 
a  mile  beyond  the  walls.  His  power  was  confined  to  the  city,  and 
his  protest,  limited  to  the  acts  of  executive  magistrates,  must  be 
made  in  person.  Hence  he  must  always  sleep  in  his  own  house 
at  Rome,  with  his  door  open  night  and  day,  that  none  might  seek 
his  aid  in  vain.  This  right  of  interference  with  special  acts  was 
at  first  used  simply  for  the  protection  of  an  aggrieved  individual, 
but  was  gradually  stretched  till  the  tribune  could  forbid  almost 
any  administrative  act. 


THE    TRIBUNATE  55 

The  Judicial  Powers  of  the  Tribune, — The  judicial  powers  of 
the  tribunes  were  large  and  undefined.  They  claimed  the  right 
to  arrest  even  the  consul,  to  imprison  him,  and  eventually  to  con- 
demn him  to  death.  In  minor  cases,  where  the  penalty  was  but 
a  fine,  they  were  assisted  by  the  plebeian  .xdiles,  and  probably 
by  a  board  of  ten  judges  {decemviri  liiibtts  iiidicandis).  It  may 
be  questioned  whether  the  power,  claimed  by  the  tribunes,  of 
condemning  and  executing  offenders  against  the  rights  of  the 
commons  was  ever  strictly  legal,  or  fully  recognised  by  the  Senate, 
but  their  jurisdiction  in  minor  cases  was  authorised  and  regulated 
by  later  laws. 

Concilia  Plebis  Tributa. — The  most  momentous  consequence 
of  the  tribunes'  judicial  position  was  the  formation  of  a  new 
assembly  to  serve  as  a  court  of  appeal  from  their  sentences.  This 
is  the  assembly  of  plebeians  in  which  they  voted  by  tribes,  or  local 
districts.  These  tribes  included,  in  all,  four  urban  and  seventeen 
country  wards  ;  and  in  this  mode  of  voting  the  influence  of  birth 
and  wealth  was  entirely  ignored.  The  right  of  the  tribunes  to 
hold  assemblies  of  the  plebeians  was  guaranteed  by  the  Icilian 
law,  which  forbade  any  magistrate  to  disperse  such  assemblies, 
or  to  interrupt  a  tribune's  speech  to  them.  This  law,  or  rather 
"  resolution  of  the  commons "  {plcbisciimn)^  was  itself  but  an 
instance  of  the  growing  custom  of  taking  the  votes  of  the  commons 
on  legislative  proposals.  Such  resolutions  were  binding  on  the 
plebeians  who  passed  them,  but  not  as  yet  on  the  whole  Roman 
people. 

The  final  step  in  this  organisation  of  the  plebeians  as  a  sepa- 
rate corporation  was  an  alteration  in  the  mode  of  election  of 
the  tribunes.  At  first,  it  would  seem,  they  were  elected  by  the 
plebeians,  voting  by  curies,  but  after  the  plebiscitum  of  Publilius 
Volero  (472  B.C.)  the  plebeians  adopted  for  elections,  as  well  as  for 
other  purposes,  the  division  by  tribes.  The  gradual  increase  in 
the  number  of  tribunes,  from  two  to  ten,  no  doubt  secured  more 
efficiently  the  primary  aim  of  the  institution,  the  protection  of  the 
oppressed. 

Value  of  the  Tribunate.— On  a  general  review  of  the  effects 
of  this  formation  of  a  new  plebeian  state  within  the  pale  of  the 
Roman  people,  with  officers  at  its  head,  whose  permanent  duty 
it  was  to  oppose  the  magistrates  of  the  whole  community,  the 
anomalies  and  inconveniences  of  such  a  system  are  more  obvious 
and  prominent  than  its  merits.  The  tribune,  resting  on  the  personal 
inviolability  accorded  him  hy  the  solemn  law  and  covenant  {lex 


56  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

sacrata)  of  the  people,  was  strong  for  resistance  but  weak  for 
reform.  He  could  obstruct  the  action  and  restrain  the  injustice 
of  the  patrician  magistrate  by  the  exercise  of  his  right  of  inter- 
cession, but  he  could  not,  without  a  new  revolution,  get  the  unjust 
laws,  which  the  consul  enforced,  repealed  ;  nor  could  he  cure  the 
worst  diseases  of  the  state,  the  occupation  of  the  domain  land  and 
the  other  economic  evils  which  impoverished  the  plebeians.  Yet, 
though  the  tribunate,  in  early  days,  rather  legalised  than  remedied 
the  duality  of  the  Roman  state  and  the  dissensions  of  its  two  parts, 
nevertheless  before  the  Punic  wars  it  had  served  to  secure  the 
equality  of  the  orders,  and  thus  to  promote  and  maintain  the  unity 
of  the  people.  When  this  object  was  attained  it  became  an  anach- 
ronism. The  tribune  of  later  Rome  is  an  officer  of  a  markedly 
different  character  from  the  old  protector  of  the  unprivileged 
plebs. 

The  Public  Land. — The  other  chief  grievance  of  the  ple- 
beians, the  occupation  of  the  public  land  by  the  patricians,  needs 
further  explanation.  The  common  land  {J>2iblici(s  agcr)  of  Rome, 
mainly  derived  from  conquest,  had  formed  the  royal  domain  of 
the  monarchs.  The  minute  size  of  the  traditional  Roman  farm 
(2  jugera  =  ij  acres)  makes  it  certain  that  the  citizen  from  the 
first  had  licence  to  pasture  sheep  and  cattle,  to  cut  wood,  and 
perhaps  even  to  grow  corn  on  the  common-land.  When  the 
government  passed  from  the  king  to  the  nobles,  the  latter  seem 
to  have  claimed  and  secured,  as  a  right  and  privilege  of  their  order, 
the  exclusive  management  of  this  public  property.  There  were 
two  methods  of  dealing  with  the  soil  which  were  peculiarly  advan- 
tageous to  the  rich  and  powerful.  Firstly,  the  state  might  allow 
its  citizens  to  take  over  and  cultivate  the  arable  land  without  con- 
ferring absolute  ownership.  Thus,  by  means  of  their  clients,  the 
patricians  occupied  {occiipare)  and  enclosed  large  tracts,  for  which, 
whether  legally  or  not,  they  paid  the  state  no  rent.  This  system 
of  tenure,  called  possession,  which  made  \h^  domains  a  monopoly 
of  the  ruling  class,  was  a  deep  and  lasting  injury  to  the  smaller 
farmers.  Secondly,  the  effect  of  this  was  aggravated  by  the 
exclusion  of  the  yeomanry  from  the  public  pastures.  As  stock- 
raising  grew  in  importance  the  right  to  use  the  common  pastures, 
formerly  granted  to  all  on  payment  of  a  tax  {scriptufa),  was  con- 
fined more  and  more  to  the  upper  classes,  from  whom  the  magis- 
trates neglected  to  exact  the  fees  due  to  the  state.  This  double 
privilege  of  patrician  landholders  was  a  twofold  injustice  to  the 
yeoman -farmer. 


AGRARIAN  LAWS  57 

Agrarian  Laws. — As  might  be  expected,  the  tribunes  were  con- 
stantly protesting  against  this  misuse  of  the  pubHc  land,  and  pro- 
posing "  agrarian  laws  "  designed  to  distribute  some  portion  of  the 
soil  among  the  Roman  poor.  Before  dealing  with  particulars,  it 
is  necessary  to  restate  the  truism,  that  agrarian  laws  at  Rome 
never  confiscated  private  land,  but  dealt  simply  and  solely  with 
the  state's  domains  won  in  war  by  the  sword  of  her  soldiers. 
Their  object  was  to  rescue  public  land  from  the  stock-farmers 
and  squatters  iposscssores)  who  absorbed  it,  and  distribute  it  in 
small  allotments  to  the  poor.  Sometimes  a  group  of  three  hundred 
or  more  citizens  were  planted — in  later  years  far  larger  numbers — 
together  on  the  land  in  a  single  settlement  or  "  colony,"  which,  like 
an  Athenian  cleruchy,  sen-ed  indeed  as  an  outlet  for  surplus  popula- 
tion and  a  means  of  relieving  the  necessities  of  the  poor,  but  mainly 
as  a  centre  of  Roman  influence  in  peace  and  a  well-garrisoned  for- 
tress in  war.i  Sometimes  particular  portions  of  land  were  assigned 
to  indi\iduals  {assignatio  inritini).  But,  in  either  case,  to  make 
the  landless  man  a  peasant  proprietor  was  to  bestow  on  him  not 
only  a  livelihood,  but  also  political  rights,  which  were,  in  early 
times,  confined  to  freeholders,  who  alone  could  be  enrolled  in  a 
tribe.  Thus  both  the  political  and  social  interests  of  the  plebeians 
were  bound  up  with  the  distribution  of  the  public  land  by  agrarian 
laws.  Tradition  has  associated  the  name  of  Spurius  Cassius,  the 
author  of  the  league  with  the  Latins  and  Hernicans,  with  the  first 
agrarian  law.  But  of  its  provisions  we  can  learn  nothing  from 
the  confused  and  contradictory  statements  of  Livy  and  Dionysius= 
Patrician  obstruction  appears,  legally  or  illegally,  to  have  thwarted 
the  operation  of  the  law  ;  patrician  vengeance  fell  upon  the  man 
who  had  dared  to  come  forward  as  the  friend  of  the  poor.  Spurius 
Cassius  was  accused  of  aiming  at  absolute  power,  and  sentenced 
to  death  by  the  assembly,  or,  according  to  another  account,  by 
his  own  father,  in  virtue  of  the  tremendous  powers  entrusted  by 
Roman  law  to  the  head  of  a  family.  Here,  as  in  two  later  cases, 
the  patricians  turned  the  hatred  felt  by  all  true  Romans  towards 
the  very  name  of  king  to  good  account,  in  discrediting  the  cham- 
pions of  the  lower  orders. 

Yet  the  agitation  begun  by  the  proposals  of  Cassius  was  not 
ended  by  his  death.     Again  and  again  the  tribunes  demanded  the 

1  The  colonies  founded  by  Rome  were  either  (i)  burgess-colonies,  or  (2), 
after  384  B.C.,  also  Latin  colonies,  i.e.,  communities  whose  members,  of  what- 
ever origin,  received  Latin  rights,  v.  infra  pp.  134,  135.  Previous  Latin  colonies 
were  joint  foundations  of  Rome  and  the  Latin  League. 


58  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

execution  of  his  measure,  or  at  least  some  distribution  of  lands  to 
the  poor.  Nor  were  they  intimidated  by  the  assassination  of  one 
of  the  most  energ^etic  among  them,  Cn.  Genucius.  At  length  their 
efforts  were  crowned  with  partial  success  ;  for  in  467  R.C.,  by  the 
foundation  of  a  Latin  colony  at  Antium,  a  number  of  the  poorer 
Romans  were  provided  with  lands,  and  in  456  I5.C.  the  Aventine 
was  portioned  out  in  building-lots  for  the  lower  classes.  In  the 
last  case,  if  not  in  both,  it  would  appeal  that  the  tribunes  compelled 
the  consuls  to  bring  the  petition  of  the  plebeians  before  the  Senate. 
Then  the  consuls,  with  the  assent  of  the  Senate,  carried  the  measure 
through  the  assemljly  of  the  whole  people  in  their  centuries. 

This  interesting  innovation  closes  for  a  while  the  agrarian 
question,  and  leads  us  back  to  the  constitutional  and  legal  reforms 
demanded  at  this  time  by  the  plebeians. 

Note. — Mommsen  holds  llial  llie  agrarian  law  of  Sp.  Cassius  is  a  late 
invention.  He  grants  that  his  consulships  and  alliance  with  the  Latins  rest 
on  good  evidence,  and  believes  that  the  record  of  his  condemnation  on  the 
charge  of  treason  was  to  be  found  in  the  earliest  chronicles.  But  he  points 
out  how  unlikely  it  is  that  such  documents  contained  an  account  of  a  law 
which  was  never  carried,  and  dwells  upon  the  confusions  and  contradictions 
in  the  account  of  its  contents,  and  of  the  trial  ofits  autlior.  He  concludes 
that  the  agrarian  law  of  Cassius  and  his  championship  of  the  Latins  are 
fictions  of  the  age  of  Sulla,  founded  upon  the  real  proposals  of  the  Gracchi 
and  Livius  Drusus.      {Rom.  Forsch.,  ii.  153^.) 


CHAPTER  VII 

EARLY    WARS    ANTi    ALLIANCES    OF    THE    RKPUHMC 
TRADITIONAL    DATES 

l',.C.        A,  LI.C. 

Alliance  with  Latins  and  Capture  of  Corioli  .  ,     493        261 

Disaster  at  the  Cremera 477        277 

Cincinnatus  Dictator 458        296 

The  new  Republic  hard  pressed  on  all  sides. — With  the  fall  of 
the  monarchy  came  a  great  loss  of  power  and  territory  for  the 
Roman  state.  While  the  later  kings  had  gained  a  miniature 
empire  over  the  neighbouring  tribes,  in  the  early  days  of  the 
Republic  Rome  has  to  fight  for  her  very  existence.  The  beautiful 
legends,  which  tell   us   of  the  patriotic  self-devotion  of  Horatius 


LEGENDS  OE  EAKLV  REPUBLTC  59 

Codes  cind  of  Sca^vola,  must  not  blind  us  to  the  fact  that  Rome 
had  failed  to  maintain  her  hold  on  Southern  Etruria,  nor  the 
glamour  of  the  heroic  combats  of  Lake  Regillus  conceal  the  loss 
of  her  suzerainty  in  Latium.  In  fine,  for  sixty  years  after  the 
foundation  of  the  Republic  the  Roman  armies  fought  for  the  most 
part  in  defence  of  their  homes,  almost  within  sight  of  the  city. 
Often  was  the  flag  on  Janiculum  struck,  and  the  burgher  summoned 
from  the  assembly  in  the  field  of  Mars,  to  repel  the  raids  of  the 
Veientine  on  the  north,  or  the  more  serious  assaults  of  the  ^tquian 
and  Volscian  on  the  south.  The  Sabines  pressed  across  the  Anio, 
the  yEquians  settled  like  a  thunder-cloud  on  Mount  Algidus, 
while  the  Volscians  overran  the  coast-land  as  far  as  Antium,  and 
even  gained  a  footing  at  Velitrfc  and  Corioli.  on  the  southern 
slopes  of  the  Alban  hills. 

Legendary  Victories.  —  Throughout  the  period  the  Roman 
annals  tell  us  of  many  splendid  triumphs,  but  as  we  hear  nothing 
of  the  fruits  of  victory,  we  may  safely  ascribe  their  glories  to  the 
imagination  of  patriotic  orators  and  chroniclers.  Each  of  the 
great  houses  had  its  own  fabled  exploits,  extolled  in  the  orations 
delivered  at  the  funerals  of  its  chief  members,  and  afterwards  in- 
corporated in  the  family  chronicles.  From  this  source  Fabius 
Pictor  (circ.  200  B.C.)  and  the  later  annalists  drew  those  stirring 
narratives  of  adventure,  and  graphic  portraits  of  individuals,  pre- 
served for  us  by  Livy  and  IMutarch.  But  we  can  put  no  trust 
in  these  legends,  which  owe  their  life  and  colour  to  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  chroniclers.  The  official  records  in  early  times  con- 
tained little  more  than  lists  of  names  ;  the  annals  of  the  priests 
noticed  only  subjects  of  religious  interest.  Even  these  scanty 
documents  perished  in  the  sack  of  Rome  by  the  Gauls  (390  B.C.), 
and  were  but  imperfectly  restored,  from  memory  or  by  conjecture. 
Yet  these  meagre  outlines  are  the  only  historical  evidence  we 
possess.  In  the  legends  we  must  not  hope  to  find  truth,  yet  they 
remain  a  part  of  history,  for  belief  in  them  has  influenced  later 
generations  more  than  many  facts.  As  typical  instances  we  may 
take  the  stories  of  Coriolanus,  of  Cincinnatus,  and  of  the  Fabii. 

Legend  of  Coriolanus. — Gnaeus  Marcius-  was  a  noble  of  the 
race  of  King  Ancus,  brought  up  by  his  mother,  Veturin,i  in  the 
strict  old  Roman  ways.  And  when  the  Romans  were  besieging 
Corioli,  the  men  of  the  city  broke  forth,  and  drove  them  back  even 
to  their  camp.     But  Marcius  rallied  the  runaways  and  turned  the 

1  The  names  in  Shakespeare's  play  are  derived  from  a  slightly  different 
version  given  bv  Plutarch. 


6o  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

pursuers  to  flight  ;  and,  as  they  fled  through  the  gates  of  the 
town,  Marcius  entered  with  them,  and  by  his  single  might  van- 
quished the  enemy  and  took  the  city.  So  men  called  him  Corio- 
lanus  because  he  had  "  fluttered  the  Volscians  in  Corioli." 

And  afterward  there  was  a  famine  in  Rome,  and  the  commons 
were  sore  distressed.  But  when  the  king  of  Syracuse  sent  corn 
to  the  Senate,  Coriolanus  counselled  it  not  to  sell  the  commons 
bread,  unless  they  would  give  up  their  tribunes.  For  which  cause 
the  people  was  much  angered,  and  the  tribunes  summoned  him 
to  appear  before  the  assembly  of  the  commons.  Then  Corio- 
lanus stayed  not  for  a  trial,  in  which  he  looked  for  neither  justice 
nor  mercy,  but  fled  to  the  Volscians  ;  and  Attius  Tullius,  their 
chief,  received  him  kindly  ;  but  he  could  not  persuade  the  Volscians 
to  make  war  with  Rome,  for  they  were  afraid. 

Now  at  that  time  Jupiter  had  bidden  the  Romans  to  celebrate 
the  great  games  anew,  and  many  of  the  Volscians  went  up  to  see 
the  sight.  But  Attius  Tullius,  going  by  stealth  to  the  consuls,  bade 
them  remember  the  mischief  wrought  in  Rome  by  a  tumult  of  the 
Sabines,  and  counselled  them  to  prevent  the  Volscians  doing  the 
like.  And  when  the  consuls  told  this  to  the  Senate,  they  made 
proclamation  that  before  sunset  every  Volscian  should  be  gone 
from  Rome.  So  they  went  homewards  full  of  wrath  at  the  dis- 
honour done  to  them.  And  as  they  passed  by  the  spring-  of 
Ferentina,  in  the  Alban  hills,  Attius  met  them  and  stirred  them  up 
to  make  war  with  the  Romans,  who  had  thus  put  them  to  shame. 
So  the  Volscians  gathered  a  great  host,  and  over  it  they  set  Attius 
and  Cn.  Marcius,  the  banished  Roman.  Then  the  two  generals 
took  all  the  towns  of  the  Latins,  and  encamped  at  length  by  the 
Cluilian  dyke.  And  the  Romans  went  not  out  to  meet  the  foe,  for 
within  the  city  the  strife  between  burghers  and  commons  waxed 
fierce.  But  the  poorer  sort  cried  to  the  Senate  to  send  an  em- 
bassy to  the  Volscians.  And  five  of  the  chief  senators  were  sent 
to  sue  for  peace  ;  but  Marcius  would  give  them  no  peace  which 
Romans  could  accept.  Next  the  Senate  sent  the  priests  and 
augurs  clothed  in  their  sacred  robes  ;  yet  would  not  Marcius 
hearken  to  them,  but  drove  them  back  to  the  city.  But  when  all 
men's  hearts  failed  them  for  fear,  Rome  was  delivered  by  the  help 
of  the  gods.  For  Jupiter  put  it  into  the  mind  of  the  noble  Lady 
Valeria  to  bid  Veturia,  the  mother  of  Coriolanus,  and  Volumnia, 
his  wife,  to  come  with  her  and  the  other  women  of  Rome  to  pray 
for  mercy.  So  the  whole  train  of  matrons  came  to  the  camp  of 
Coriolanus.     And  when  he  saw  his  mother,  and  his  wife  leading 


CORrOLANUS  AND   CINCINNATUS  6i 

his  two  boys  by  the  liand,  lie  would  have  kissed  them.  But  his 
mother  stopped  him  and  asked  whether  he  was  her  son  or  an 
enemy,  and  she  his  mother  or  a  prisoner.  And  when  he  could  not 
answer  she  cried  out,  "  Had  I  never  borne  a  son,  Rome  should 
never  have  been  besieged  !  Had  I  remained  childless,  I  might 
have  died  free  !  But  I  am  too  old  to  bear  for  long  thy  shame  or 
my  misery.  Look  rather  at  thy  wife  and  children,  whom  thou 
doomest  to  an  untimely  death  or  a  lifelong  slavery."  And  Marcius 
quailed  at  his  mother's  words,  and  melted  at  his  wife's  and  chil- 
dren's kisses.  So  he  cried  out  in  an  agony,  "  Mother,  thine  is 
the  victory  ;  thou  hast  saved  Rome,  but  destroyed  thy  son." 

So  Coriolanus  led  away  the  X'olscian  army,  and  troubled  Rome 
no  more,  but  li\-ed  many  years  among  the  Volscians,  and  in  his 
lonely  old  age  felt  the  full  bitterness  of  exile.  And  the  Romans 
built  a  temple  to  Woman's  Fortune,  to  do  honour  to  the  noble 
matrons  by  whose  prayer  the  city  was  saved,  and  made  Valeria 
its  first  priestess. 

Legend  of  Cincinnatus. — There  was  peace  between  Rome  and 
the  .f^quians,  but  Gracchus  Cloelius,  their  chief,  pitched  his  camp 
on  Mount  Algidus,  and  plundered  the  lands  of  Tusculum.  And 
when  the  Romans  sent  ambassadors  to  complain  of  the  wrong, 
Gracchus  mocked  them,  and  bade  them  tell  their  message  to  the 
oak  above  his  tent.  So  the  Romans  took  the  sacred  oak  to  witness 
that  Gracchus  had  treacherously  broken  the  peace,  and  made  them 
ready  for  war.  But  Lucius  Minucius,  the  consul,  led  his  army  into 
a  narrow  valley  near  Mount  Algidus,  and  there  was  he  compassed 
about  on  all  sides  by  the  ^quians.  Nevertheless  five  horsemen 
broke  through  the  enemy,  and  carried  the  sad  news  to  Rome. 
And  the  Senate  agreed  that  there  was  but  one  man  who  could 
deliver  the  army,  Lucius  Quinctius  Cincinnatus,  so  he  was  named 
dictator. 

This  L.  Quinctius,  called  for  his  crisp  curling  locks  {ci?icinni) 
Cincinnatus,  tilled  his  own  little  farm  beyond  the  Tiber.  The 
deputies  of  the  Senate  came  thither  early  in  the  morning,  and 
found  him  digging  in  his  field.  And  when  he  had  sent  to  fetch 
his  toga,  and  was  now  in  fit  guise  to  hear  the  message  of  the 
Senate,  they  hailed  him  dictator,  and  told  him  in  what  peril  the 
consul  and  his  army  lay.  So  he  went  with  four-and-twenty  lictors 
before  him  to  his  house  in  Rome,  and  chose  L.  Tarquitius,  a 
brave  man  but  poor,  to  be  master  of  the  horse.  On  that  day  the 
dictator  made  all  business  to  cease  in  the  I'orum,  and  summoned 
all  who  could  bear  arms  to  meet  in  the  P'ield  of  Mars  before  sunset, 


62  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

ordering  c;ich  man  to  Ijrinj^  witli  liim  victuals  for  live  days  and 
twelve  wooden  stakes.  So  at  nightfaJl,  when  everything  was  in 
readiness,  the  dictator  marched  with  all  speed  to  Mount  Algidiis. 
And  after  that  he  had  discovered  where  the  enemy  lay,  he  made 
his  soldiers  surround  them  on  every  side.  Wiien  this  was  done 
they  raised  a  great  shout,  and  began  digging  a  trench  and  driving 
in  their  stakes  right  round  the  yl-lquian  camp.  Then  the  consul's 
army,  that  was  in  the  valley,  heard  the  Roman  war-cry,  and  attacked 
the  foe  from  behind  so  fiercely  that  he  could  not  liinder  the  work 
of  the  dictator's  men.  And  in  the  morning  the  ^Ecjuians  saw  that 
there  was  no  escape,  for  they  were  hemmed  in  by  a  ditch  and 
palisade,  and  prayed  for  mercy.  Then  Cincinnatus  answered  that 
they  must  deliver  over  to  him  Gracchus  and  their  other  chiefs 
bound,  and  yield  up  all  their  goods,  even  their  arms  and  cloaks. 
And  he  set  up  two  spears,  and  bound  a  third  across  them  at  the 
top,  and  made  the  /Equians  pass  beneath  the  yoke,  and  sent  them 
away  full  of  shame.  Thus  did  Cincinnatus  deliver  the  consul  and 
his  army.  One  evening  he  marched  out  to  Mount  Algidus  ;  the 
next  he  returned  victorious.  And  the  Senate  decreed  that  the 
dictator  should  enter  the  city  in  triumph  riding  in  his  chariot, 
while  his  prisoners  were  led  bound  before  him,  and  his  soldiers 
with  their  spoil  followed  behind  him.  But  afterward  he  went 
home  c}uietly  to  his  wife  and  farm. 

Legend  of  the  Fabii. — The  Etruscans  had  not,  since  the  days 
of  King  Porsenna,  pressed  the  Romans  so  hard  as  the  yEquians  and 
the  Volscians.  But  the  men  of  Veii,  though  they  dared  not  meet 
the  Romans  in  battle,  harried  the  land  up  to  the  Tiber,  while  the 
consuls  were  fighting  with  the  ^quians  and  Volscians,  and  there 
was  none  to  hinder  them.  Wherefore  the  men  of  the  great  P^abian 
house  took  counsel  together,  and  bade  Ka:?so  Fabius  tell  the  Senate 
that  the  family  of  the  Fabii  would  take  upon  itself  the  war  with 
the  men  of  Veii.  And  when  they  had  gained  the  consent  of  the 
Senate,  all  the  Fabii,  to  the  number  of  three  hundred  and  six 
warriors,  gathered  together  at  the  house  of  Kasso  on  the  Quirinal 
Hill,  and  marched  out  of  the  city  by  the  right-hand  passage  of 
the  g-ate  Carmentalis.  And  they  made  them  a  stronghold  in  the 
country  of  the  Vcientines,  by  the  river  Cremera,  and  for  a  whole 
year  spoiled  the  men  of  Veii  of  their  cattle  and  goods.  But  there 
was  a  certain  day  on  which  the  house  of  the  Fabii  were  accustomed 
to  meet  together  for  a  sacrifice  at  the  home  of  their  fathers  on  the 
Quirinal.  And  as  they  went  joyfully  towards  Rome,  thinking  that 
none  would  attack  men  bound  on  a  sacred  errand,  the  Veientines 


LEGEND   OF  'J'HE   FABII  63 

laid  an  ambush  before  them,  and  pursued  with  a  great  host  bcliind 
them.  So  the  Fabii  were  compassed  about,  and  set  upon  on  all 
sides,  and  fell  beneath  a  shower  of  darts  and  arrows,  for  none  of 
the  Etruscans  dared  come  within  the  reach  of  their  spears  and 
swords.  So  the  whole  house  of  the  Fabii  was  cut  off,  for  there 
was  not  one  full-grown  man  left,  but  only  a  boy,  who,  on  account 
of  his  youth,  had  been  left  behind  in  Rome.  Him  the  gods  pre- 
served, that  in  after-ages  his  children  might  do  good  service  to 


ETRUSCAN    HELMKT. 

the   commonwealth,   mindful   of  the   glories   of  their  forefathers. 
And  there  was  peace  Ijctwcen  Rome  and  Veii  for  forty  years. 

The  Leagues  with  the  Latins  and  Hernici. — It  was  not,  how- 
ever, the  real  or  fabled  exploits  of  the  noble  houses  that  saved  Rome 
from  the  assaults  of  the  Sabellian  tribes,  but  the  masterly  policy 
of  a  far-sighted  statesman.  If  we  may  believe  an  inscription, 
cited  both  by  Cicero  and  Livy,  within  ten  years  of  the  battle  of 
Lake  Regillus,  Sp.  Cassius,  the  consul  (493  B.C.),  formed  that 
great  and  lasting  league  with  the  cities  of  Latium  which  proved 
Rome's  best  defence  in  the  days  of  adversity,  and  the  sure  founda- 
tion of  her  future  prosperity.     For,  whatever  be  the  exact  terms 


64  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

or  origin  of  the  league,  this  much  may  be  regarded  as  certain. 
It  was  at  first  an  equal  alliance  between  the  two  powers  of  the 
lowlands,  to  defend  their  borders  against  the  incursions  of  tlic  hill- 
tribes,  and  to  stay  the  rising  tide  of  y^Equian  and  Volscian  aggres- 
sion. At  the  same  time  Rome  had  the  inestimable  advantage  of 
comparative  immunity  from  invasion.  The  Latin  cities  stood  like 
a  bulwark  between  her  territories  and  the  Sabellian  hill-tribes, 
securing  her  safety  at  the  cost  of  their  own.  If  the  fortune  of  war 
was  adverse,  Latin  towns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  ^quians  and 
Volscians  ;  if  favourable,  Rome  claimed  her  share  of  the  fruits  of 
victory.  Thus  the  brunt  of  the  battle  fell  always  on  the  Latins, 
while  Rome  grew  strong  behind  the  barrier  formed  by  her  allies. 
In  this  way  the  old  equal  league  paved  the  way  for  the  dominion 
of  Rome  over  Latium.  Scarcely  less  important  was  the  adhesion 
of  the  Hernici  to  the  league.  These  mountaineers  held  the  rocky 
fastnesses  of  the  valley  of  the  Trerus,  bordered  on  one  side  by  the 
.(Equians,  on  the  other  by  the  Volscians.  Roman  historians,  misled 
by  national  pride,  tell  us  that  the  treaty  with  the  Hernici  (486  B.C.), 
concluded,  like  the  league  with  Latium,  by  Sp.  Cassius,  was  pre- 
ceded by  their  conquest.  But  no  doubt  the  Romans  and  Latins 
were  glad  to  admit  them  into  their  alliance  on  equal  terms,  for 
their  position  midway  between  the  yEquians  and  Volscians  rendered 
their  aid  most  valuable  in  any  attack  on  those  tribes.  This  triple 
league  served  for  fifty  years  to  protect  Rome  against  assaults  from 
the  south,  while  the  Etruscans  were  too  hard  pressed  by  the  Celts 
on  their  northern  frontiers  to  regain  their  dominion  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Tiber.  So  the  new  Republic,  though  unable  to 
maintain  the  position  won  by  the  later  kings,  succeeded  in  pre- 
serving the  Campagna  from  the  domination  of  Sabellians  and 
Etruscans. 

Note. — It  may  be  well  to  take  the  tale  of  Coriolanus  as  an  example, 
and,  by  analysing  its  composition,  to  prove  the  untrustworthiness  of  similar 
legends  which  space  forbids  us  to  treat  in  full.  Mommsen  has  shown  that, 
in  all  probability,  it  is  a  late  insertion  in  the  Roman  annals.  Evidently 
the  name  of  the  hero  was  not  to  be  found  in  the  official  lists  of  magistrates  ; 
on  no  occasion  is  he  at  the  head  of  the  home  government,  or  of  the  regular 
army  in  the  field.  In  its  original  form  the  story  was  entirely  free  from 
fixed  dates.  The  consuls  play  no  part  either  in  the  distribution  of  the 
corn,  or  at  the  trial  of  Coriolanus,  or  in  opposing  the  Volscian  march  on 
Rome.  The  assertion  that  Cominius  (consul  493  B.C.)  commanded  the 
army  that  took  Corioli  is,  as  Livy  naively  confesses,  a  mere  inference  from 
the  absence  of  his  name  on  the  brazen  pillar  which  recorded  the  treaty 


CRITICISM  OF  LEGENDS  6$ 

made  willi  ihe  Latins  by  liis  colleague,  Sp.  Cassius.  AVilh  more  flagrant 
disregard  of  ciironology,  the  old  tradition  made  Dionysius  of  Syracuse 
(circ.  400  li.c.)  the  benefactor  who  relieved  the  famine  at  Rome  (circ.  490) ; 
nor  was  the  error  corrected  till  a  Greek  antiquary  substituted  the  name 
of  Gelo  for  that  of  the  later  tyrant.  Consistency  was  as  little  respected 
as  chronology.  Elsewhere  in  the  chronicles  Corioli  is  a  Latin,  and  not 
a  Volscian  town,  just  as  the  spring  of  Ferentina  is  the  Latin,  not  the 
Volscian,  place  of  assembly.  A  trial  before  the  tribes  is  impossible  at  so 
early  a  date,  for,  before  the  Publilian  law,  the  plebeians  voted  by  curies. 
Indeed,  quite  apart  from  errors  of  detail,  the  whole  tone  and  character 
of  the  legend  is  utterly  opposed  to  the  dry,  official  character  of  the  earliest 
chronicles  of  Rome.  The  picture  of  the  hero,  forced  by  the  ingratitude 
of  his  countrymen  to  seek  refuge  with  his  bitterest  enemy,  who  yet  in  the 
hour  of  his  triumph  foregoes  his  revenge  at  the  bidding  of  his  mother,  is 
one  which  even  Greek  imagination  never  equalled.  The  moral  of  the 
tale,  that  Rome  was  saved  in  the  hour  of  need  by  the  patriotism  of  her 
women,  is  alien  from  the  spirit  of  primitive  times,  when  the  mission  of 
woman  was  confined  to  the  family.  In  fine,  the  legend  is  a  romance  in- 
tended to  glorify  the  great  plebeian  houses,  the  Marcii,  the  Veturii,  and 
the  Volumnii,  by  connecting  them  with  the  old  patriciate,  and,  in  the 
account  of  the  trial,  attempts  to  justify  the  claim  of  the  plebeian  assembly 
to  rule  the  state.  Its  origin  may  be  found  in  the  century  after  the  Licinian 
laws,  when  the  new  nobility  had  established  its  position. 

The  legend  of  Cincinnalus  bears  on  its  face  the  stamp  of  a  popular 
tale,  and  is  proved,  by  its  frequent  repetition  at  different  dates,  to  have  had 
no  place  in  the  earliest  chronicles.  In  the  story  of  the  Fabii,  Mommsen 
sees  a  condemnation  of  that  system  of  private  warfare  (coiiiitrafio)  which 
in  early  times  supplemented  the  summer  campaigns  of  the  citizen  army 
{militia  Icgitiiiia),  but  which,  after  its  disuse,  was  misumlerstood  by  the 
Roman  annalists.     {Roiii,  Forsch.,  ii.  1 13-152,  &c.) 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE      D  E  C  E  M  V I R  A  T  E 

TRADITIONAL    DATES 

Proposals  of  C.  Terentilius  Ars.-i 

Appointment  of  Decemviri  . 

Valerio-Horatian  Laws  ... 

Proposal  to  codify  the  Laws  of  Rome.— The  tribunate  no  doulit 
did  something  to  protect  the  interests  and  redress  the  injuries  of 
the  plebeians,  but,  so  long  as  the  Liws  of  Rome  remained  unwritten, 
it  was  impossible  to  secure  their  just  and  equitable  administration. 

E 


B.C. 

A.U.C. 

46Z 

292 

451 

303 

449 

30s 

66  II T STORY  OF  ROME 

Kom.'in  law  rested  on  a  Ixisis  of  custom  and  command,  and 
consisted  largely  of  semi-religious  usages  and  ceremonies,  clogged 
with  anticjue  forms,  and  closely  connected  with  gentile  worships. 
The  knowledge  of  the  law  was  to  the  orthodox  patrician,  as  to  the 
Brahman  of  India,  a  mysterious  science,  to  be  jealously  guarded 
from  the  vulgar  gaze,  and  handed  down  by  tradition  only  from 
generation  to  generation,  as  a  sacred  heritage  of  the  ruling  class, 
who  alone  had  part  or  lot  in  the  old  religion  of  Rome.  This 
exclusive  property  in  law  was  at  once  a  bulwark  of  patrician  power 
and  a  stumbling-block  in  the  path  of  the  plebeians,  and  as  such 
was  marked  out  for  tribunician  assault.  In  462  B.C.  a  tribune, 
C.  Terentilius  Arsa,  proposed  that  a  commission,  consisting  of  five 
plebeians,  should  be  appointed  to  codify  and  publish  the  laws  of 
Rome.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  proposal  in  its  original  shape 
sought  either  to  reform  the  civil  law,  or  to  alter  in  any  way  the 
constitution  of  the  state.  Its  effect  would  have  been  simply  to 
deprive  the  patricians  of  their  monopoly  of  the  knowledge  of  law, 
and  so  to  protect  the  plebeians  against  the  misuse  of  legal 
technicalities,  by  which  the  magistrates  perverted  the  course  of 
justice. 

Resistance  of  the  Senate  overcome. — But  though  the  proposed 
measure  was  at  once  just  and  moderate,  it  excited  the  most 
vehement  opposition.  For  ten  years  the  Senate  obstructed  its 
passage  into  law,  and  for  ten  years  the  commons  elected  tribunes 
pledged  to  support  it.  During  the  struggle  the  Senate  tried  in 
vain  to  appease  the  discontent,  and  divert  the  attention  of  the 
people  by  various  concessions,  by  assenting  to  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  tribunes  (457  B.C.),  to  the  distribution  of  the  Aventine  in 
allotments  to  plebeians  (456  B.C.),  and,  finally,  to  the  limitation  of 
the  maximum  fines  a  consul  might  impose  to  two  sheep  or  thirty 
bullocks.  The  concessions  failed  to  satisfy  the  people,  who  were 
bent  on  carrying  the  proposal  of  Terentilius.  At  last  the  Senate 
was  forced  to  yield,  and  accepted  the  measure,  though  in  a  modified 
form.  As  a  preliminary,  three  commissioners  were  despatched  to 
Greece,  to  report  on  the  laws  of  Solon,  and  other  Greek  codes  ;  and 
on  their  return,  two  years  later,  it  was  agreed  that  ten  men  should 
be  appointed  to  draw  up  a  code  of  law  {^dcceinvii't  consiilayi  imperio 
legiluis  scribendis\  and  to  act  for  the  year  as  sole  and  supreitie 
magistrates.  At  the  same  time,  the  tribunate  and  the  right  of 
appeal  were  suspended,  in  order  that  the  decemvirs  might  enjoy 
the  advantage  of  unfettered  arid  unlimited  authority. 

The  Rule  of  the  Decemvirs.  —  Clearly   the   purpose   of  these 


THE  DEC  EM  VI RATE  6j 

measures  was  to  substitute  for  the  uncertain  working  of  the 
tribune's  veto  the  fixed  barrier  of  written  law  as  a  permanent 
safeguard  of  plebeian  liberties.  They  were  probably  the  result  of 
a  compromise,  by  which  the  commons  on  their  part  sacrificed 
the  tribunate,  and  the  nobles  surrendered  the  monopoly  of  legal 
principles.  The  nobles  got  rid  of  a  hated  office,  while  the  people 
hoped  to  secure,  in  a  system  of  laws  whose  publicity  raised  them 
above  all  suspicion  of  patrician  manipulation,  an  effective  check  on 
the  power  of  the  consuls.  It  would  also  appear  that  the  decem- 
virate  was  legally  open  to  plebeians  as  well  as  to  patricians,  and 
was  intended  to  serve  as  an  impartial  board  of  arbitration  between 
the  orders.  But  all  hope  that  the  new  magistracy  might  reconcile 
old  dissensions,  and  weld  the  two  orders  at  once  into  an  united 
state,  was  frustrated  by  the  action  of  the  patricians,  who  contrived  to 
monopolise  all  ten  places  at  the  first  election.  Satisfied  with  this 
victory,  the  dominant  party  made  a  sensible  and  moderate  use  of 
its  power,  so  that  the  ten  tables  of  laws  issued  by  the  board  were 
at  once  approved  by  the  people,  and  engraved  on  brazen  tablets 
hung  on  the  rostra  in  the  Forum.  But  the  task  of  publication 
could  not  be  completed  within  a  single  year,  so  it  was  agreed  to 
choose  decemvirs  for  the  next  year  to  complete  the  code.  At  this 
election  Appius  Claudius,  of  the  proud  and  noble  house  of  the 
Claudii,  leagued  himself  with  the  plebeian  chiefs,  the  Icilii  and 
Duilii,  and  courted  the  favour  of  the  lower  orders  with  all  the  arts 
of  a  demagogue.  In  vain  the  rest  of  the  board  conferred  on  this 
dangerous  colleague  the  honour  of  presiding  at  the  Comitia. 
Appius,  perfectly  alive  to  their  meaning  and  thoroughly  careless  of 
precedent,  not  merely  accepted  votes  for  himself,  but  procured  his 
own  re-election  to  office  in  conjunction  with  men  of  inferior  weight 
and  position,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  leading  patricians.  Three  at 
least,  it  may  be  five,  of  the  new  decemvirs  were  plebeian. 

Once  their  election  was  secured,  the  decemvirs,  neglecting  the 
work  for  which  they  were  appointed,  abandoned  themselves  to 
the  enjoyment  of  absolute  power,  careless  alike  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  their  fellow-citizens.  On  the  pretext  that  their  duties 
were  not  accomplished — for  the  last  two  tables  had  not  even  then 
been  submitted  to  the  approval  of  the  people — they  refused  to 
abdicate  at  the  end  of  their  year  of  office,  in  violation  of  the  spirit 
if  not  of  the  letter  of  the  constitution.  Their  government  became 
an  open  tyranny,  whose  oppression  recalled  the  days  of  the  Tar- 
quins,  and  was  in  like  manner  commemorated  in  popular  legends. 
Whatever  be  the  historical   value   of  these    tales,  the   wrongs  of 


68  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Virginia,  like  those  of  Lucietia,  were  deeply  engraved  on  the 
hearts  of  the  people.  The  real  history  of  the  fall  of  the  decem- 
virate  is  hidden  in  mists  due  to  popular  animosity  or  the  partiality 
of  chroniclers.  It  is  impossible  to  do  more  than  repeat  the  oft- 
told  tale  of  Appius  Claudius,  and  suggest  a  prol)able  interpretation 
of  the  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  in  the  narratixes  of  Livy 
and  Dionysius. 

Legend  of  Virginia. — When  their  year  of  office  was  over,  the 
decemvirs  refused  to  lay  down  their  powers.  The  most  part  of 
them  led  forth  the  army  against  the  .(Equians  and  the  Sabines, 
but  they  were  driven  back,  for  their  soldiers  hated  them  and 
would  not  fight.  So  they  laid  a  plot  against  one  of  the  chief  of 
the  malcontents,  L.  Sicinius,  sometime  tribune  of  the  plebs,  and 
had  him  murdered  by  his  own  troops.  And  for  a  while  the  deed 
was  kept  secret  from  all  meti,  until,  in  the  general  uprising  of  all 
true  Romans  against  the  tyranny  of  the  ten,  it  was  brought  to 
light.  For  meanwhile  Appius  Claudius  stayed  in  Rome  to  watch 
over  the  city.  And  when  he  saw  a  young  maiden,  \'irginia, 
daughter  of  a  centurion,  Virginius,  pass  his  judgment-seat  in  the 
Forum  day  by  day  as  she  went  to  school,  he  lusted  after  her  in 
his  heart,  and  suborned  his  client,  M.  Claudius,  to  swear  that  the 
maiden's  real  mother  was  a  slave  of  his  own,  who  had  given  the 
child  to  the  childless  wife  of  Virginius.  And  Appius  would  have 
handed  her  over  forthwith  to  slavery,  but  L.  Icilius,  her  betrothed, 
and  P.  Numitorius,  her  uncle,  cried  out  that  by  law  all  were  to  be 
considered  free  till  they  were  proved  to  be  slaves.  At  length  Appius 
promised  to  stay  judgment  for  a  day,  so  that  Virginius  might  come 
from  the  camp  and  plead  his  cause.  So  Virginia's  friends  sent 
one  messenger  to  her  father,  praying  him  to  come  with  speed,  and 
Appius  another  to  his  colleagues,  bidding  them  not  to  let  him  go  ; 
but  his  message  did  not  come  till  Virginius  had  set  out  for  Rome. 

So  in  the  morning  Virginius  came  to  the  Forum  with  his  daughter 
and  his  friends,  and  prayed  the  people  to  stand  by  him.  Then 
Appius  would  not  hear  him,  but  as  soon  as  Claudius  had  spoken, 
adjudged  the  maiden  to  her  master's  custody  until  she  should  be 
proved  free.  And  he  overawed  the  people  with  a  band  of  armed 
men.  So  Virginius  asked  leave  to  speak  with  the  maiden  and 
her  nurse  aside,  that  he  might  learn  the  truth  of  Claudius'  story. 
And  when  leave  was  given  him,  he  snatched  up  a  knife  from  a 
butcher's  stall,  and  plunged  it  in  his  daughter's  heart,  that  so  he 
might  save  her  freedom  and  her  honour.  Then  he  called  down 
on  Appius  the  curse  of  blood,  and  so  went  forth  from  the  P  orum 


LEGEND   OF   VIRGINIA  69 

to  the  camp,  for  none  dared  obey  the  tyrant's  order  to  seize  him. 
And  Icihus  and  Numitorius  made  great  mourning  for  Virginia,  so 
that  the  people  rose  and  drove  Appius  and  his  satelHtes  to  flee 
for  their  lives,  and  broke  their  power  in  Rome.  Then  the  armies, 
too,  moved  by  the  story  of  Virginia's  wrongs,  marched  from  their 
camps  to  the  Aventine,  and  elected  tribunes  to  lead  them  instead 
of  the  decemvirs.  But  the  Senate  did  not  force  the  decemvirs  to 
resign  their  office,  until  the  armies  and  the  commons  had  gone 
once  more  to  the  sacred  mount,  and  again  threatened  to  build 
them  a  city  there. 

The  legend  goes  on  to  tell  how  two  popular  patricians,  L. 
Valerius  Potitus  and  M.  Horatius  Barbatus,  who  were  empowered 
to  negotiate  with  the  seceding  plebeians,  by  yielding  to  their 
demands  for  the  restoration  of  the  tribunate,  and  for  the  right  of 
appeal  from  the  decision  of  all  magistrates,  and  by  granting  an 
amnesty  to  the  promoters  of  the  secession,  won  them  back  to 
their  allegiance.  The  fate  of  the  Decemvirs  remains  uncertain. 
Tradition  declares  that  Appius  Claudius  and  Sp.  Oppius,  his  chief 
plebeian  supporter,  died  in  prison,  either  by  their  own  hands  or  by 
the  sentence  of  the  tribunes  ;  their  colleagues  were  punished  by 
the  confiscation  of  their  goods  and  banishment  from  Rome. 

Criticism  of  the  Tradition. — The  whole  account  of  the  decem- 
virate  is  vitiated  by  the  partisan  prejudice  which  discolours  the 
narratives  of  our  historians.  The  view  of  the  Claudii  found  in 
Livy,  which  represents  them  as  the  proudest  and  stiffest  of  the 
patrician  houses,  has  been  disproved  by  INIommsen.  Even  in 
Livy,  Appius  Claudius,  the  decemvir,  poses  as  the  friend  of  the 
people,  and  by  this  means  wins  his  commanding  influence  over 
his  colleagues,  and  his  re-election  in  conjunction  with  three 
plebeians.  Obviously  the  democratic  leanings  of  Appius  were 
too  clear  to  be  entirely  suppressed  even  by  a  partial  chronicler. 
The  true  position  of  Appius  is  that  of  the  noble  leader  of  the 
commons,  the  patrician  turned  demagogue.  The  later  transforma- 
tion of  the  demagogue  into  a  tyrant  may  possibly  be  the  invention 
of  patrician  hatred  ;  but  there  is  nothing  inconsistent  in  the  two 
characters,  and  as  the  story  of  Virginia  has  the  ring  of  genuine 
tradition,  it  is  safer  to  assume  the  truth  of  the  picture.  The 
haughty  decemvir  prostituting  justice  for  the  satisfaction  of  his 
desires,  and  the  lying  retainer  ready  to  do  any  service  for  his 
patron,  reproduce  so  faithfully  the  features  of  the  Greek  tyrannies, 
that  we  may  most  reasonably  believe  that  in  Appius  Claudius 
we  have  yet  another  instance  of  a  noble  obtaining  power  by  the 


70  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

pretence  of  poiJular  sympathies,  and  iisiny   it  for  personal  ends, 
to  the  dcj^radation  of  noljles  and  commons  alike. 

The  La'ws  of  the  Twelve  Tables.  —  But  if  the  decemvirs  perished 
with  ignominy,  their  work  lived,  and  was  regarded  by  after-ages 
as  the  source  and  foundation  of  all  law.  In  reality  it  was  little 
more  than  the  formulation  of  old  Roman  custom  ;  for,  though  we 
need  not  reject  the  story  of  the  embassy  to  Greece,  and  the  co- 
operation of  Hermodorus,  the  Ephesian,  doubtless  Greek  influence 
is  to  be  seen  rather  in  the  form  than  the  matter  of  the  decemviral 
legislation.  The  constitutional  innovations  contained  in  the  laws 
of  the  twelve  tables  are  of  less  interest  than  the  statutes  which 
regulate  the  relations  between  private  individuals,  and  thus  illus- 
trate the  social  condition  of  the  people.  The  immense  importance 
attached  to  the  forms  of  litigation,  and  the  inclusion  of  ceremonial 
rules,  such  as  those  which  regulate  the  place  and  method  of  burial, 
reveal  the  primitive  character  of  Roman  civilisation.  Everywhere 
we  can  trace  the  spirit  of  compromise,  which  softens,  while  it 
retains,  the  harsh  principles  of  the  older  law.  Thus  the  authority 
of  the  {:i.\\\&x  {pairia  potcstas)  is  maintained,  but  a  thrice-repeated 
sale  of  a  son  severs  the  bond  of  connection  between  him  and 
the  head  of  the  family.  Again,  by  the  side  of  the  old  patrician 
methods  of  making  wills  and  contracting  marriages,  the  law  now 
recognises  new  forms,  suitable  to  plebeians  as  well  as  patricians. 
For  the  religious  ceremony  of  marriage  {confarreatio)  it  allowed 
the  substitution  of  a  pretended  purchase  {co-einptio),  and,  in  place 
of  the  solemn  announcement  of  the  will  before  the  assembled 
burgesses  {calaia  comitid)^  the  decemvirs  authorised  a  fictitious 
sale  (j)er  as  et  libnuii).  Thus,  while  the  law  preserved  intact  the 
rights  of  relations  by  male  descent  {agnati)  to  succeed  to  property 
where  there  was  no  will,  it  also  facilitated  the  making  of  wills, 
just  as  it  ordained  that  a  civil  ceremony  {coe/iiptio),  and  even 
uninterrupted  cohabitation  {usits),  should  confer  the  same  rights 
on  a  husband  as  the  old  religious  marriage.  The  rights  of  pro- 
perty are  sternly  maintained  in  the  decemviral  code.  The  in- 
solvent debtor  is  liable  to  the  extremest  penalties  both  in  property 
and  in  person,  the  only  modification  of  the  older  law  being  the 
restriction  of  interest  to  lo  per  cent.  {iinciariu>n  fanus)^  and  the 
punishment  of  usury.  As  is  common  in  early  codes,  theft  is  more 
severely  dealt  with  than  violence  ;  while,  curiously  enough,  libel, 
false  witness,  and  judicial  corruption  are  among  the  offences  visited 
with  death.  Most  notable  is  the  fact  that,  whereas  in  the  eye  of 
the  law  patrician  and  plebeian  are  equal,  a  difference  is  recognised 


THE    TWELVE    TABLES  ?i 

between  the  landed  and  the  landless  man.  The  prohibition  of  the 
inter-marriage  of  patricians  and  plebeians,  long  enforced  by  custom, 
now  first  acquired  tlie  sanction  of  law  ;  but  against  this  unpopular 
statute  must  be  set  the  permission  given  to  voluntary  associations 
{collegia)  to  make  what  rules  they  chose  for  their  own  gover- 
nance, provided  they  did  not  transgress  the  law  of  the  land.  This 
statute,  taken,  it  is  said,  from  Solon's  legislation,  protected  plebeian 
associations  from  the  arbitrary  interference  of  the  magistrates. 
The  enactments  on  public  matters  define  and  confirm  the  existing 
law.  The  right  of  appeal,  given  already  by  the  Lex  Valeria,  is 
reasserted  and  guaranteed.  With  this  is  closely  connected  the 
prohibition  of  all  laws  directed  against  a  private  individual  {privi- 
lcgia\  and  the  reservation  of  all  capital  cases  for  the  decision  of 
the  assembly  of  the  centuries.  Taken  together  these  laws  pro- 
tected all  citizens,  on  the  one  hand  from  the  arbitrary  sentences 
of  patrician  magistrates,  and  on  the  other  from  the  irregular  pro- 
ceedings of  tribunes  backed  by  plebeian  assemblies,  and  secured 
them  a  trial  before  the  whole  body  of  their  fellow-citizens.  Lastly, 
capricious  selection  of  precedents  by  the  magistrate  was  prevented 
by  the  express  enactment,  that  the  latest  decision  of  the  people 
should  in  all  cases  be  preferred  to  the  earlier. 

The  Valeric- Horatian  Laws. — The  constitutional  reforms  which 
the  decemvirate  failed  to  initiate  were  achieved  by  the  second 
secession  of  the  plebeians,  and  embodied  in  the  Valerio- Horatian 
laws.  Even  these  laws  rather  vindicate  and  re-establish  the 
ancient  liberties  of  the  plebeians  than  introduce  new  principles. 
The  first  was  in  substance  only  a  reassertion  of  the  old  right 
of  appeal,  but  it  further  forbade  expressly  the  creation  of  any 
magistrate  whose  decisions  were  not  subject  to  such  appeal,^  and 
prescribed  the  penalty  of  death  for  the  transgression  of  this  pro- 
vision. The  second  guaranteed  the  inviolability  of  the  tribunes 
and  their  subordinates,  the  a^diles  and  ten  judges,  declaring  that 
he  who  lifted  his  hand  against  them  was  accursed.  The  old  oath 
of  the  plebeians  was  replaced  by  a  positive  law,  which  prescribed 
the  penalty  of  death  and  confiscation  against  offenders.  The 
third  contains  the  important  and  novel  principle  that  the  resolu- 
tions of  the  people,  assembled  in  their  tribes,  have  the  binding 
force  of  law.  The  subject  is  beset  with  difficulties,  but  the  most 
probable  explanation  is,  that  at  this  time  patricians  were  admitted 
to  the  assembly  of  tribes,  which  thus  developed  into  an  assembly 

1  This  was  held  to  apply  even  to  the  dictatorship. 


^4  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  the  whole  peojile  {coiintia  tributa)^  over  which  patrician  magis- 
trates presided,  while  the  tribunes  still  held  the  concilia plebis. 

In  this  new  assembly  were  henceforth  elected  the  quiestors,  who 
had  charge  of  the  treasury  {cf.  p.  48).  To  this  assembly,  in  all  pro- 
bability, the  right  of  legislation  was  given.  At  the  same  time,  the 
position  of  the  tribunes  was  raised.  Henceforth  they  are  entitled 
to  attend  the  debates  of  the  Senate,  though  not  yet  admitted 
within  the  doors  of  the  house.  Gradually  they  made  good  their 
claim  to  obstruct  the  action  of  the  Senate's  decrees  by  their 
"intercession."  Thus  the  attempt  of  the  patricians  to  get  rid  of 
the  tribunate  ended  in  the  exaltation  of  that  office,  and  the  en- 
largement of  its  functions  from  the  protection  of  individuals  to  a 
general  power  of  interference  in  all  affairs  of  state.  The  tribunate 
was  too  deeply  rooted  in  the  affections  of  the  people  to  be  lightly 
abolished,  nor  was  the  attempt  repeated  in  the  whole  course  of 
Roman  history. 


CHAPTER  IX 

PROGRESS    OF    THE    PLEBEIANS 
TRADITIONAL    DATES 

I),C,      A.U.C. 

Marriages    between    Patricians    and    Plebeians    legalised, 

and  Military  Tribunate  established    . 
Appointment  of  Censors       .  ■ 

Sp.  Maelius  killed  by  Ahala        ... 
Number    of    Quaestors    raised    to    Four,    and    Quaestorship 

opened  to  Plebeians       ...... 

First  Plebeian  Consular  Tribune       .... 

Position  of  the  Plebeians. — The  force  of  the  popular  movement 
was  not  exhausted  even  by  the  attainment  of  the  chief  demands  of 
the  lower  classes,  the  publication  of  written  laws,  and  the  restora- 
tion and  enlargement  of  the  powers  of  the  tribunes.  On  the  con- 
trary, success  inspired  the  leaders  of  the  plebeians  with  new  hopes, 
and  nerved  them  to  make  fresh  efforts.  Yet  there  is  a  change  in 
the  character  of  the  demands  of  the  plebeians,  and  in  the  nature 
of  the  opposition  they  offer  to  the  governing  order.  Hitherto  the 
commons  had  fought  to  secure  freedom — the  personal  liberties 
of  the  individual,  and  the  power  to  organise  themselves  as  a  cor- 
poration unhindered  by  patrician   interference  ;  now  they  aimed 


■  445 

309 

443 

3" 

439 

315 

421 

333 

400 

354 

PROGRESS  OF   THE  PLEBEIANS  73 

at  eciualily,  the  riglit  to  take  their  place  in  the  governnienjt  of  the 
state  by  the  side  of  the  old  nobles.  Obviously  the  earlier  reforms 
were  in  the  interest  of  the  poor,  whom  they  protected  against 
oppression,  while  the  removal  of  political  disabilities  interested 
the  wealthier  and  more  influential  plebeians.  But  for  the  moment 
both  classes  were  united  in  opposition  to  the  patrician  govern- 
ment. Together  they  had  secured  the  passing  of  the  twelve 
tables  and  the  Valerio-Horatian  laws,  and  together  they  assailed 
the  two  chief  bulwarks  of  patrician  exclusiveness. 

Inter-marriage  between  the  Orders. — In  445  B.C.  the  tribune 
C.  Canuleius  proposed  to  legalise  marriages  between  patricians 
and  plebeians.  Whereas  all  children  sprung  from  such  unions 
had  up  to  this  time  ranked  as  plebeians,  because  there  could  be 
no  legitimate  marriage  between  parents  of  different  orders,  after 
this  the  offspring  of  a  patrician  father  and  plebeian  mother  took 
the  rank  of  the  father.  By  this  change  the  very  corner-stone 
of  the  edifice  of  patrician  exclusiveness  was  undermined.  The 
sanctity  of  the  religion  of  Rome  had  been  the  pretence  for  ex- 
cluding the  plebeians  from  the  government  of  the  state.  The 
patricians  had  asserted  that  they  alone  could  take  the  auspices, 
and  fulfil  the  duties  of  the  state  towards  the  gods,  whose  worship 
must  not  be  profaned  by  the  intrusion  of  men  outside  the  conse- 
crated circle  of  the  old  families.  But  when  men  in  whose  veins 
was  plebeian  blood  were  admitted  to  the  patrician  order,  the 
attempt  to  maintain  a  caste-system  founded  on  purity  of  race  was 
doomed.  Thus  the  social  revolution  worked  by  the  motion  {plebi- 
scitum)  of  C.  Canuleius  necessarily  entailed  political  equalisation. 

Military  Tribunate. — The  first  step  in  that  direction  was  taken 
in  the  very  year  in  which  C.  Canuleius  passed  his  resolution.  The 
plebeian  demand  to  share  the  consulship  could  no  longer  be  met 
by  contemptuous  refusal  ;  it  was  evaded  by  a  partial  concession. 
Every  year  the  Senate  was  to  decide  whether  consuls  should  be 
elected,  or  military  tribunes,  as  a  rule  six  in  number,  with  consular 
power.  To  this  new  office  plebeians  were  eligible,  though  the  con- 
sulship was  still  denied  to  them.  We  may  wonder  that  patrician 
statesmen  cared  to  maintain  an  irritating  distinction,  while  they 
surrendered  the  substantial  object  in  dispute.  But  an  aristocracy 
is  apt  to  be  even  more  tenacious  of  the  badges  and  honours  which 
are  the  marks  of  power  than  of  the  power  they  signify.  The  con- 
sular tribune  was  never  allowed  the  honour  of  a  triumph,  nor  was 
his  image  placed  in  the  family  hall,  like  those  of  the  curule  magis- 
trates.    No  doubt  the  sacred  name  of  religion  was  invoked  by  the 


74  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

patricians  in  defence  of  their  exclusive  right  to  the  possession  of 
the  supreme  magistracy,  but  the  sincerity  of  the  appeal  may  well  be 
doubted.  Throughout  the  patricians  act  rather  in  the  spirit  of  petty 
hucksters  driving  a  keen  bargain  for  their  wares,  than  of  statesmen 
defending  a  great  principle.  There  is  no  grace  in  their  concessions, 
no  strength  in  their  refusals  ;  their  ideal  of  political  wisdom  is  the 
craft  which  neutralises  the  popular  measures  it  dare  not  resist. 

In  the  forty  years  before  the  siege  of  Veii,  the  Senate  more 
often  than  not  secured  the  election  of  consuls,  and  even  the  consular 
tribunate  was  in  practice,  up  to  the  year  400  B.C.,  confined  to  patri- 
cians, so  that  the  formal  ecjuality  conceded  to  the  plebeians  was  a 
fraudulent  pretence.  If  ever  the  patricians  felt  the  control  of  the 
assembly  of  the  centuries  slipping  from  their  grasp,  the  right  of 
the  presiding  officer  to  refuse  votes  for  a  candidate,  and  of  the 
patrician  part  of  the  Senate  to  withhold  its  sanction,  were  un- 
scrupulously employed  as  party  weapons  in  this  ignoble  struggle. 
In  the  last  resort  the  colleges  of  priests  could  declare  an  election 
null  and  void  for  some  real  or  pretended  religious  informality. 
Many  opportunities  for  electioneering  intrigues  were  afforded  by 
dissensions  among  the  plebeians  themselves.  The  rank  and  file  of 
yeomen-farmers  still  cared  only  for  social  and  economic  reforms, 
but  the  leaders  aimed  rather  at  the  removal  of  political  inequalities. 
A  disunited  party,  unversed  in  political  warfare,  was  naturally  un- 
able to  cope  with  the  organised  obstruction  of  the  patricians. 

Censorship. — But  the  men  who  swayed  the  counsels  of  the 
patricians  recognised  from  the  first  that  obstruction  could  not  for 
ever  thwart  the  wishes  of  the  people.  So  they  set  themselves  to 
diminish  the  value  of  the  prize  for  which  the  plebeians  were  striving, 
by  severing  from  the  consulship  some  of  its  most  cherished  privi- 
leges. Within  a  year  or  two  (443  B.C.)  of  the  time  of  the  establish- 
ment of  the  consular  tribunate,  they  devised  a  new  office,  the  censor- 
ship, conferred,  indeed,  by  the  votes  of  the  centuries,  but  confined  to 
patricians.  No  doubt  the  financial  importance  and  moral  dignity 
of  this  office  are  of  later  growth,  but  even  its  original  powers  made 
it  a  worthy  object  of  ambition.  The  right  to  fill  up  vacancies  in 
the  ranks  of  the  Senate  and  the  knights  most  probably  was  given 
to  the  censors  a  century  later,  but  the  solemn  numbering  and 
assessment  {census)  of  the  citizens  at  intervals  of  four  or  five  years 
{lustruni)^  from  the  first  invested  the  new  mag'istracy  with  peculiar 
dignity.  So  fearful  were  the  Romans  that  this  high  function  might 
be  perverted  to  personal  ends,  that  from  an  early  period  (435  B.C.) 
the  tenure  of  the  censorship  was  limited  to  eighteen  months,  and 


THE    CENSORSHIP 


7S 


(1^ 


<     fe/J 


o      S; 


•■^ 


76  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

it  was  later  (390  B.C.)  provided  that  if  one  censor  died  in  office,  the 
other  should  at  once  resign  his  powers.  Even  in  this  exceptional 
case  the  Romans  clung  firmly  to  their  two  cardinal  principles,  the 
short  tenure  and  collegiate  character  of  the  magistracy. 

A  second  attempt  to  diminish  the  powers  of  the  consuls  was 
turned  to  the  confusion  of  its  authors.  In  421  B.C.  the  patricians 
proposed  to  relieve  the  consuls  of  the  direct  management  of  the 
military  chest,  and  confer  it  on  two  new  ciu;ustors  of  patrician  rank. 
In  this  way  the  practical  control  of  all  finance  was  to  be  kept  in 
the  hands  of  patrician  censors  and  queestors  {cf.  p.  72).  But  the 
commons  insisted  that  plebeians  should  be  eligible  for  the  quiEstor- 
ship,  and,  twelve  years  after  (409  B.C.),  the  assembly  of  the  tribes 
actually  filled  three  out  of  the  four  quccstorships  with  plebeians. 
Encouraged  by  this  success,  the  plebeians,  ten  years  later  (400  and 
399  B.C.),  at  last  carried  their  candidates  in  the  assembly  of  the 
centuries,  and  elected  a  plebeian  majority  on  the  board  of  consular 
tribunes. 

Spurius  Maelius. — The  patricians  did  not  fail  to  employ  the 
last  resource  of  an  incompetent  government,  intimidation.  In  the 
year  439  B.C.  a  terrible  famine  spread  misery  among  the  Roman 
poor,  which  all  the  edicts  of  L.  Minucius,  who  was  commissioned  to 
meet  the  scarcity,  could  not  relieve.  Whereupon  a  rich  plebeian 
knight,  Sp.  Marlins,  bought  corn  in  Etruria,  and  distributed  it  to 
the  starving  commons  at  nominal  prices.  The  consulship,  we  are 
told,  was  the  reward  he  asked  in  return  for  his  magnificent  gene- 
rosity. Minucius,  envious  of  the  man  whose  success  had  made 
his  own  failure  conspicuous,  persuaded  the  Senate  that  he  was 
conspiring  to  overthrow  the  Republic  and  make  himself  a  king. 
The  Senate  proclaimed  him  a  traitor,  and  a  young  patrician,  C. 
Servilius  Ahala,  undertook  to  carry  out  its  sentence.  Under  some 
pretence,  he  drew  Mailius  aside  in  the  Forum  and  stabbed  him 
with  a  dagger,  which  he  had  hidden  under  his  arm  for  the  purpose. 
He  then  justified  his  deed  to  the  indignant  commons,  by  declaring 
to  them  the  treason  of  Maslius  to  the  Republic.  The  house  of  the 
traitor,  and  with  it  the  evidence  of  his  guilt,  or  of  his  innocence, 
was  destroyed,  and  the  corn  he  had  collected  distributed  by  his 
enemy,  Minucius.  Yet  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  real  offence 
of  Maelius  was  his  popularity  with  the  commons,  which  would 
have  secured  his  election  to  the  consular  tribunate,  not  a  treason- 
able conspiracy  to  win  himself  a  kingdom.  His  assassination  was 
not  the  act  of  a  patriot,  but  of  a  partisan  blinded  by  prejudice. 

Another  instance  of  the  bitterness  of  faction  may  fitly  conclude 


SPUR! us  MAU.IUS  77 

this  discreditable  chapter  in  Roman  history.  After  the  conquest 
of  Labici  from  the  yEquians  a  settlement  was  made  there,  two 
acres  of  land  being  given  to  each  settler  ;  but  when  Bol?e,  in 
the  same  district,  was  taken,  the  patricians  stoutly  resisted  the 
tribunes'  proposal  to  distribute  its  land  in  allotments.  At  their 
head  was  the  stern  and  unbending  consular  tribune,  M.  Postumius 
Regillensis.  He  withheld  the  booty  won  at  Bolte  from  his  troops, 
and  threatened  to  punish  any  political  manifestations  with  merci- 
less severity.  At  this  his  soldiers  rose  in  open  revolt,  and  stoned 
to  death  the  general  to  whom  they  were  bound  by  the  solemn  oath 
of  military  obedience  {sacravientuiii)^  an  unparalleled  crime  as  yef 
in  Roman  annals. 

Note. — We  have  given  the  earlier  version  of  the  fate  of  Melius,  pre- 
served fi)r  us  by  Dionysius.  The  introduction  of  Cincinnatus  as  dictator, 
and  the  elevation  of  Ahala  into  a  master  of  the  horse  are  later  fictions, 
intended  to  soften  our  horror  of  the  murder.  But  the  story  is  evidently 
intended  to  glorify  tyrannicide,  and  in  its  earlier  form  did  so  without  com- 
promise or  evasion.  Again,  tlie  etymological  point  of  the  tale  (the  deriva- 
tion of  the  name  Ahala,  from  ala,  the  arm-pit,  in  which  the  dagger  was 
concealed)  is  lost  if  Servilius  is  not  a  secret  assassin,  but  a  lawful  magis- 
trate. Yet  the  absence  of  the  names  of  ordinary  magistrates  from  the 
original  tradition  warns  us  that  it  is  a  family  history  inserted  in  the  annals 
at  a  later  date.  Indeed  in  early  times  even  a  romance  would  not  dare  to 
make  a  mere  plebeian  aspire  to  the  tlirone.  The  importance  of  the  legend 
lies,  not  in  its  truth  to  fact,  but  in  its  effect  in  after-ages.  Again  and  again 
it  is  cited  to  prove  that  the  murder  of  a  traitor  is  not  only  the  right  but 
the  duly  of  every  loyal  citizen.     (Mommsen,  R.  F.,  ii.  199^) 


CHAPTER   X 

WARS    FROM    THE    DECEMVIRATK    TO    THE    FALL    OF    VEII 
TRADITIONAL  DATES 


B.C. 

A.r.c. 

428 

326 

406 

348 

396 

3S8 

Capture  of  Fidenas        ..... 

War  with  Veii 

Conquest  of  Veii  by  M.   Fiiriiis  Camiilus 

Wars  with  the  JEqai  and  Volsci. — During  the  sixty  years 
between  the  fall  of  the  monarchy  and  the  decemvirate  Rome 
had  been  closely  beset  on  all  sides  ;  in  the  sixty  years  after  the 
degemvirate  the  tide  of  war  turns  slowly,  but  surely,  in  her  favour. 


78 


nrsTORv  OF  iwme 


The  great  reforms  carried  between  450  and  445  B.C.  inspire  her 
citizens  with  new  life  and  ardour,  and  at  the  same  time  tlie 
energies  of  her  enemies  are  distracted  and  divided.  The  /Equians 
feel  the  pressure  of  the  Sabellian  clans,  now  established  round  the 
Fucine  lake  ;  the  Volscians  are  attacked  in  rear  by  a  new  power, 
the  Samnites.  Consequently  the  yEquians,  who  had  wasted  the 
country  even  up  to  the  gates  of  Rome  in  446  B.C.,  are  driven  from 
Labici  in  418  B.C.,  and  ]5ol;is  in  414  B.C.,  the  first  of  which  at  least  is 
secured  and  garrisoned.  Both  towns  helped  to  protect  the  line  of 
communications  between  Rome  and  the  Hernican  country  in  the 


ETRUSCAN    HELMET    UEDICATEJ3    BY    UIERO    I.    AFTER    HIS 
VICTORY   IN  474   B.C. 


valley  of  the  Trerus  ;  nor  could  the  y4Lquians,  after  their  loss, 
maintain  their  hold  on  their  ancient  outpost,  Mount  Algidus. 
About  the  same  time,  the  Volscians  were  obliged  to  resign  their 
conquests  in  Latium,  such  as  Satricum  and  \"e]itr3e  ;  while,  if  we 
may  believe  Livy,  the  Roman  armies  pushed  on  as  far  south  as 
Circeii  and  Anxur  (Tarracina). 

Misfortunes  of  the  Etruscans. —  On  her  northern  frontier  also 
Rome  profited  by  the  misfortunes  of  her  adversaries.  The  power 
of  the  Etruscans  had  long  since  passed  its  zenith  ;  it  now  began 
to  decline  more  rapidly.     As  early  as  474  B.C.  Hiero  I.  of  .Syracuse 


DECLINE    OE   THE   ETRUSCANS  79 

had  annihilated  their  navy,  and  made  his  own  city  mistress  of  the 
Tyrrhene  Sea.  This  supremacy  the  Syracusans  maintained,  even 
after  the  fall  of  the  great  tyrants,  by  expeditions  to  Corsica  and  the 
coast  of  Tuscany  (453  B.C.).  These  reverses  may  help  to  account 
for  the  inaction  of  the  Etruscans  for  forty  years  ;  a  fresh  series  of 
disasters  opened  the  way  for  Roman  conciuest.  The  cities  of  the 
Rasenna  in  Campania,  whose  communications  with  the  mother 
country,  whether  by  land  or  sea,  were  now  cut  off,  surrendered 
one  after  another  to  the  assaults  of  roving  bands  of  Samnites. 
The  fall  of  Capua,  their  chief  town  (424  B.C.),  marks  the  destruction 
of  Etruscan  rule  in  that  district.  To  complete  the  tale  of  their  dis- 
asters, Dionysius  of  Syracuse  planted  colonies  in  their  dominions 
round  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  and  ruined  the  trade  of  Etruria 
by  the  storming  of  Pyrgi,  the  rich  seaport  of  Caere  (387-5  B.C.).  But 
the  heaviest  blows  which  fell  on  the  doomed  people  were  dealt  by 
the  Gauls,  who  were  pouring  over  the  Alps  into  the  plain  of  the  Po. 
The  most  northern  of  the  three  leagues  of  the  Rasenna  was  utterly 
swept  away  by  the  new  immigrants  ;  its  great  cities  became,  like 
Melpum,  dim  traditions,  or,  like  Felsina  (Bononia),  were  renamed 
by  the  Gallic  victors,  after  whom  the  whole  district  is  henceforth 
called. 

Conquest  of  Fidenae. — Greeks,  Samnites,  and  Gauls  each  in 
turn  did  their  part  in  smoothing  the  path  of  Rome.  But  it  was 
the  day  of  small  things.  Her  petty  successes  in  border  warfare 
gave  little  promise  of  future  greatness.  The  small  town  of  Fidena^ 
ventured  to  revolt  for  the  last  time,  and  transferred  its  allegiance 
to  Lars  Tolumnius,  king  of  V^eii.  It  sealed  its  fidelity  to  its  new 
master  by  murdering  the  Roman  settlers  and  the  envoys  sent  to 
demand  satisfaction.  But  Lars  Tolumnius  was  routed  in  battle, 
and  fell  himself  in  single  combat  with  A.  Cornelius  Cossus,  the 
leader  of  the  Roman  cavalry,  who  dedicated  the  arms  of  the 
Veientine  king  to  Jupiter  {xpolia  opinid).  Fidenae  submitted,  and, 
content  with  this  success,  the  Romans  concluded  an  armistice  with 
\"eii  for  200  months. 

Note. — The  spoils  dedicated  by  Cossus  to  Jupiter  Feretrius  enal)le 
us  to  correct  the  narrative  of  the  annalists  by  archaeological  evidence. 
Augustus,  when  he  restored  the  temple,  found  that  Cossus  was  called 
consul  in  an  inscription  on  the  arms.  Now  Cossus  was  consul  in  428  K.c. 
But  the  chroniclers  used  by  Livy  knew  of  no  war  in  that  year,  assigning 
the  revolt  of  Fidenae  and  the  death  of  Lars  Tolumnius  to  437  B.C.,  when 
Cossus  was  not  a  magistrate  at  all,  and  a  second  similar  revolt  to  426  B.C., 
when  he  was  consular  tribune.     Clearly  the  two  wars  are  mere  variations 


So  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  one  story.  Neither  is  rightly  dated,  for  the  evidence  of  the  inscription 
in  fa%'our  of  the  year  428  li.c.  is  confirmed  l)y  the  common  opinion  that 
only  a  general  could  \\\\\  the  spolia  opima.  Varro's  assertion  that  a 
common  soldier  could  do  so,  if  he  slew  the  leader  of  the  enemy,  is  an 
attempt  to  reconcile  the  acce]ited  tradition  about  Cossus  wilh  the  chrt)no- 
logy  of  the  annalists. 


War  with  Veil. — At  length  Rome  undertook  the  work  of  con- 
quering Southern  Etruria.  She  was  matched  with  no  unworthy 
foe,  for  V^eii  equalled  her  in  size  and  excelled  her  in  the  grandeur 
and  solidity  of  her  buildings.  But  whereas  Rome  could  rely  on 
the  firm  support  of  her  true  allies,  the  Latins  and  Hernicans,  Veil 
could  count  only  on  her  neighbours,  Capena,  Falerii,  and  Tarcjuinii. 
The  northern  Etruscans  were  fully  occupied  at  home  in  vain 
efforts  to  repel  the  raids  of  the  Gauls,  and  their  oligarchic  govern- 
ments viewed  with  dislike  the  monarchy  of  Veii. 

The  end  of  such  a  conflict  could  hardly  be  doubtful,  but  the 
siege  of  the  Roman  Troy  was  protracted  for  ten  long  years.  For 
tlie  first  time  the  Roman  army  was  obliged  to  keep  the  field  in 
winter  as  well  as  summer.  And  now  that  the  citizen  was  pre- 
vented from  returning  to  his  farm  after  a  short  summer  campaign, 
the  introduction  of  military  pay  became  a  necessity.  But  despite 
these  ineasures,  the  fortune  of  war  was  for  nine  years  unfavourable 
to  Rome.  The  fortified  camps  before  Veii  were  stormed  by  the 
men  of  Capena  and  Falerii,  and  only  recovered  by  a  great  effort. 
In  the  tenth  year  of  the  siege  the  plebeian  consular  tribunes, 
Genucius  and  Titinius,  wei'e  routed  in  the  field  by  the  same  enemies. 
Panic  reigned  in  the  lines  before  Veii,  and  even  at  Rome  itself, 
where  the  Senate  resolved  to  meet  the  danger  by  appointing  a 
dictator.  The  crisis  called  forth  the  needed  hero,  M.  Furius 
Camillus,  with  whose  advent  the  dry  annals  of  the  chroniclers 
are  transformed  into  a  romantic  legend  of  daring  achievements 
crowned  with  supernatural  success. 

Legend  of  Camillus. — In  the  summer  of  the  eighth  year  of  the 
siege  of  Veii  the  waters  of  the  Alban  lake  rose  mysteriously,  until 
at  length  they  reached  the  top  of  the  hills  around  the  lake,  and 
poured  down  into  the  plain  below  and  thence  into  the  sea.  And 
the  Romans,  since  they  might  not  trust  Etruscan  soothsayers  while 
they  were  at  war  with  their  nation,  sent  messengers  to  Delphi  to 
ask  counsel  of  Apollo.  But  the  meaning  of  the  portent  was  re- 
vealed to  them  before  their  messengers  returned.  For  an  old 
Veientine  cried  out  to  some  Roman  soldiers,  that  Veii  should  not 


LEGEND   OE  CAMILLUS  8i 

fall,  until  the  waters  of  the  Alban  lake  should  flow  into  the  sea 
no  more.  And  one  of  the  soldiers  persuaded  the  old  man  to  go 
apart  with  him  to  a  lonely  spot,  pretending  that  he  wished  to 
consult  him  about  a  matter  of  his  own.  And,  while  they  talked 
together,  the  Roman  seized  the  old  man  round  the  body  and  bore 
him  off  to  the  camp.  So  the  soothsayer  of  \'eii  was  sent  by  the 
generals  to  the  Senate,  and  prophesied  to  them  that  if  the  waters 
of  the  Alban  lake  should  run  into  the  sea  woe  should  fall  on 
Rome,  but  if  they  were  drawn  off  the  woe  should  be  turned  on  \'eii. 
But  the  Senate  would  not  hearken  to  his  words  until  they  were 
confirmed  by  the  answer  of  the  oracle  at  Delphi.  Then  the  Romans 
bored  a  tunnel  through  the  side  of  the  hills  to  make  a  passage  for 
the  water,  and  dug  many  channels  in  the  plain  below  to  receive  it ; 
and  the  tunnel  is  there  to  this  day.  And  when  the  whole  flood  was 
spent  in  watering  the  fields,  so  that  none  flowed  into  the  sea  any 
more,  the  Romans  felt  assured  that  they  should  take  \"eii,  as  the 
god  foretold.  Nor  could  they  be  turned  from  their  purpose  by  the 
prayers  of  an  embassy  from  Veii,  nor  by  their  prophecy  that  the 
destruction  of  Veii  should  be  soon  followed  by  the  fall  of  Rome. 

Capture  of  Veii.— So  Camillus  compassed  the  city  round  on 
every  side,  aided  by  the  Latins  and  Hernicans.  And  he  cut  a 
tunnel  underground  from  his  camp  even  to  the  temple  of  Juno  in 
the  citadel  of  Veii.  Then  the  whole  people  came  forth  from 
Rome  to  share  in  the  spoil.  And  while  the  men  of  Veii  were 
guarding  their  walls  against  the  main  army  of  the  Romans, 
Camillus  led  a  few  men  by  the  secret  passage  into  the  very  heart 
of  the  city.  And  even  as  the  high  priest  of  V^eii  prophesied  to  the 
king  that  he,  ♦ho  should  ofifer  on  the  altar  of  Juno  the  victim 
standing  by,  should  be  victorious  in  the  war,  Camillus  burst  forth, 
and  snatching  the  sacrifice  from  their  hands,  offered  it  himself 
Then  the  Romans  opened  the  gates  of  the  city  to  their  comrades, 
and  together  they  sacked  the  town.  And  as  Camillus  looked 
down  on  the  havoc  from  the  citadel,  his  heart  swelled  with  pride 
at  the  greatness  of  his  victory.  But  soon  he  bethought  him  of  the 
fickleness  of  fortune,  and  prayed  that,  if  some  ill  must  befall  him, 
to  balance  this  great  glory,  it  might  be  but  small.  And,  as  he 
prayed  with  veiled  head  and  turned  himself  to  the  right,  he 
tripped  and  fell  to  the  ground.  Then  was  he  comforted  in  his 
heart,  because  he  supposed  the  jealousy  of  the  gods  had  been  ap- 
peased by. this  small  mishap.  And  he  ordered  a  chosen  band  of 
youths,  washed  in  pure  water  and  clothed  in  white,  to  go  into  the 
temple  of  Juno,  and  ask  the  goddess  whether  she  would  be  pleased 

F 


82  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

to  come  with  them  to  Rome.  And  the  image  answered  and  said, 
"  I  will  go."  Thus  Juno  forsook  \'eii,  and  dwelt  ever  after  in  the 
temple  built  for  her  on  the  Aventine  in  Rome.  Never  had  Rome 
seen  so  splendid  a  triumph  as  when  Camillus  rode  up  the  sacred 
street  to  the  Capitol  in  a  chariot  drawn  by  white  horses.  And  men 
feared  that  his  pride  might  be  brought  low  by  the  hand  of  Heaven. 

Nevertheless  Rome  still  prevailed  over  her  enemies,  and  forced 
the  men  of  Capena  to  beg  for  peace,  and  them  of  Falerii  to  shut 
themselves  up  in  their  city.  But  a  certain  schoolmaster,  who  had 
the  charge  of  the  sons  of  the  chief  men  of  the  town,  led  the  boys 
to  the  Roman  camp.  Scorning  his  treachery,  Camillus  ordered 
the  boys  to  flog  their  master  back  into  the  town  ;  for  Romans,  he 
said,  fight  not  with  children.  And  the  Faliscans  were  touched 
by  his  noble  deed,  and  submitted  themselves  to  the  power  of  Rome. 
Lastly,  the  great  city  of  Volsinii,  which  took  up  arms  after  the  fall 
of  Veii,  consented  soon  after  to  an  inglorious  peace.  Thus  Rome 
became  mistress  of  Etruria  as  far  north  as  the  Ciminian  Hills, 
whose  gates  were  guarded  by  her  allies,  Sutrium  and  Nepete. 

Fall  of  Camillas. — The  story  goes  on  to  tell  of  domestic  dis- 
cords at  Rome.  Even  during  the  death-struggle  with  Veii,  the 
plebeians,  headed  by  their  tribunes,  had  complained  bitterly  of  the 
burden  of  the  land-tax  {tribi/tiaii)^  which  furnished  the  soldiers 
with  pay,  and  of  the  patrician  monopoly  of  the  consular  tribunate. 
After  its  fall  they  proposed  that  the  empty  town  of  Veii  should  be 
repeopled  by  the  migration  thither  of  half  the  citizens  of  Rome. 
This  division  of  the  one  commonwealth  into  two  cities,  which 
must  have  distracted  and  diminished  its  energy,  was  strenuously 
resisted  by  the  patricians.  First  they  persuaded  stwo  tribunes  to 
forbid  its  consideration  ;  later,  they  pleaded  in  person  against  so 
fatal  a  measure  to  such  purpose  that  it  was  rejected  by  the  tribes, 
though  only  by  a  bare  majority.  Content'  with  this  victory,  the 
Senate  agreed  to  the  division  of  the  Veientine  land  among  the 
commons,  in  allotments  of  the  unusual  size  of  seven  jugera. 

But  the  popularity  of  the  great  patrician  leader  had  passed 
away.  In  the  hour  of  victory  he  had  vowed  a  tenth  of  the  spoil  of 
Veii  to  Apollo,  but  the  soldiers  had  not  set  apart  any  portion  of 
their  plunder  for  the  god.  Camillus  now  called  on  them  to  pay  the 
promised  tithe,  and  thus  lost  the  favour  of  the  people  and  prepared 
the  way  for  his  own  fall.  When  he  was  accused  by  the  tribune 
Appuleius  of  embezzlement,  because  he  had  taken  for  himself  some 
doors  of  bronze,  which  were  a  part  of  the  booty  won  at  Veii,  even 
his  own  tribesmen   and  clients   said  they  could  not   acquit  him. 


ROME   AND    VEII 


S3 


84  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

though  they  would  pay  his  fine.  Then  Camillus  withdrew  in  wratli 
to  Ardea,  praying  that,  if  he  were  unjustly  condemned,  Heaven 
might  cause  his  ungrateful  country  to  rue  his  loss.  The  ministers 
of  vengeance  were  at  hand  :  the  Gauls,  who  had  taken  Melpiuii  on 
the  day  of  the  fall  of  Veii,  were  next  year  to  burn  Rome. 

Note. — The  legend  of  Camillus  is  obviously  mythical  in  its  details. 
We  can  trace  both  Greek  and  pure  Roman  elements  in  the  story.  The  ten 
years'  siege,  with  the  stratagem  by  which  the  town  was  captured,  seem 
reminiscences  of  Troy,  while  the  mission  and  offering  to  Apollo  of  Delphi 
may  well  be  Greek  inventions.  Purely  Italian,  on  the  other  hand,  are  the 
stories  of  the  Etruscan  soothsayer,  of  the  offering  in  the  temple  of  Juno, 
and  of  the  removal  of  her  image  from  Veii  to  Rome.  The  outlet  of  the 
Alban  lake,  a  tunnel  2O0O  yards  in  length,  7  feet  in  height  and  5  in  breadth, 
cut  through  the  solid  rock,  may  still  be  seen,  but  it  would  seem  to  belong 
to  the  days  when  Etruscan  kings  ruled  in  Rome  and  Latium.  It  is  hardly 
possible  that  the  Romans  should  have  undertaken  so  great  a  work,  in  the 
middle  of  a  war,  though  they  might  have  repaired  and  reopened  the  tunnel  if 
it  had  become  blocked. 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE    GAULS 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Rome  taken  and  burnt  by  the  Gauls 390       364 

War  with  the  Etruscans 3S6-i     398-403 

Last  Incursion  of  the  Gauls  into  Latium        ....     349        405 

Migrations  of  the  Gauls. — A  new  nation  now  makes  its  appear- 
ance in  Roman  history,  destined  in  the  end  to  adopt  the  language 
and  culture  of  the  Italians,  but  at  first  sharply  contrasted  with 
them  in  customs  and  character.  The  Gauls  or  Celts  had  long 
since  reached  the  lands  in  which  they  still  dwell  on  the  shores  of 
the  Atlantic  ;  but  their  wandering  tribes  had  not  as  yet  been  formed 
into  stable  communities,  nor  had  they  settled  down  to  till  the 
land  they  had  won.  They  still  preferred  a  nomad  pastoral  life, 
and  recognised  only  the  military  authority  of  the  chieftain.  Rest- 
less vanity  and  impetuous  bravery  fitted  them  for  the  life  of  roving 
soldiers  of  fortune  ;  want  of  discipline  and  order  prevented  them 
from  reaping  the  fruits  of  the  victories  won  by  their  chivalrous 
courage.  They  remind  us  of  the  knights-errant  of  the  Middle 
Ages  in  their  fondness  for  single  combats  and  deep  carousals,  of 
Italian  condottieri  in  their  insatiable  greed  for  gold.     Thus  they 


THE   GAU/.S  85 

fought,  conquered,   and   destroyed  in   every  land   in  Europe,  but 
never  created  a  national  civilisation,  or  founded  an  enduring  state. 

Tradition  affirms,  with  much  probability,  that  the  swarm  of  bar- 
barians who  poured  over  the  Alps  into  Italy  came  from  the  western 
home  of  the  Celts  in  Gaul.  We  are  told  that,  in  the  days  of  King 
Ambiatus,  those  Gallic  tribes,  which,  then  as  later,  acknowledged 
the  leadership  of  the  Bituriges,  sent  forth  two  great  conquering 
hordes,  headed  by  Sigovesus  and  Bellovesus,  nephews  of  the  king. 
The  former  sought  a  home  in  the  wilds  of  the  Hercynian  forest  ; 
the  latter,  more  favoured  by  Heaven,  took  froTii  the  Etiuscans  their 
ancient  heritage  in  the  valley  of  the  Po,  and  made  Mediolanum 
(Milan)  the  capital  of  the  canton  of  the  Insubres.  The  Cenomani 
passed  beyond  the  Adda,  and  settled  round  Brixia  and  Cremona. 
The  Boii  and  Lingones  followed  the  beaten  Etruscans  over  the 
Po.  Last  of  all  came  the  Senones,  who  spread  themselves  along 
the  coast  of  the  Adriatic  from  Ariminum  to  Ancona. 

But  the  Senones  soon  marched  forward  in  quest  of  plunder  and 
adventures.  Crossing  the  wall  of  the  Apennines,  they  attacked 
the  great  town  of  Clusium  ;  whereupon  the  Etruscans,  if  we  may 
believe  a  late  tradition,  sent  to  ask  the  aid  of  the  concjuerors  of 
Veii.  Accordingly  the  Senate  despatched  envoys  to  warn  the 
Gauls  not  to  molest  friends  and  allies  of  Rome.  The  Celts  scorned 
the  threats  of  the  strangers,  and  joined  battle  with  the  men  of 
Clusium.  In  this  skirmish  the  Roman  ambassadors  took  part,  one 
of  them  slaying  a  Gallic  chieftain  in  single  combat.  The  bar- 
barians demanded  the  surrender  of  the  men  who  had  thus  out- 
raged the  law  of  nations,  but  the  Roman  people  rejected  this 
reasonable  request.  Then  the  Gallic  leader  broke  up  the  siege 
of  Clusium  and  marched  direct  on  Rome. 

Battle  of  the  Allia.^ — The  Gauls  had  advanced  within  twelve 
miles  of  the  gates  of  the  city  before  a  Roman  army  was  ready  to 
bar  their  path.  By  the  rivulet  of  the  Allia  was  fought  a  battle, 
in  which  panic  fear  succeeded  to  foolish  arrogance  in  the  Roman 
ranks.  The  fierce  rush  of  the  Celts  was  strange  and  terrible  to 
the  Italians.  We  hear  nothing  as  yet  of  the  knightly  cavalry 
Ceesar  found  in  Gaul,  or  of  the  war-chariots  used  by  the  Britons. 
But  the  barbarians  were  big  men,  armed  with  long,  though  ill- 
tempered,  swords,  and  covered  with  huge  shields,  who  by  mere 
weight  and  strength  broke  through  the  Italian  phalanx.     Savage 

1  Monimsen  places  the  battle  on  the  Etruscan  bank  of  the  Tiber,  opposite 
tiie  inflow  of  the  Allia.  This  is  perhaps  the  meaning  of  Diodorus,  and  explains 
the  retreat  to  Veii,  but  it  makes  the  flight  of  the  Vestals  to  Caere  absurd, 
and  directly  contradicts  Livy's  narrative. 


86  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

cries  unci  shaggy  locks,  which  no  helmet  guarded,  added  fancied 
lerrors  to  the  furious  onset  of  the  clans,  whose  chieftain,  Brennus, 
shattered  the  Roman  right  at  the  first  shock,  and  so  rolled  up 
their  whole  line  of  battle  in  a  hideous  rout.  The  bulk  of  the 
fugitives  plunged  into  the  Tiber,  hoping  to  escape  the  swords  and 
javelins  of  the  Gauls,  and  make  good  their  retreat  to  Veil.  A 
scanty  remnant  fled  by  the  direct  road  to  Rome,  and  brought 
thither  tidings  of  a  calamity  never  forgotten  by  the  Roman  people. 
Even  after  centuries  of  victory,  the  Roman  legionary  needs  a 
Caesar  or  a  Marius  to  inspire  and  discipline  him  to  meet  the  fierce 
barbarian,  who  had  routed  his  forefathers  at  the  Allia. 

Sack  of  Rome. — At  Rome  all  was  confusion  and  dismay.  Long 
trains  of  fugitives  passed  over  the  Tiber  and  the  hill  of  Janiculum, 
leaving  the  doomed  city  to  its  fate.  With  them  fled  the  flamen 
of  Quirinus  and  the  Vestal  virgins,  who  buried  some  of  their 
sacred  things,  and  carried  off  with  them  the  eternal  fire  to  the 
friendly  town  of  Caere.  The  flower  of  the  patricians  resolved  to 
defend  to  the  last  the  hill  of  the  Capitol,  the  acropolis  of  Rome, 
the  true  home  of  its  citizens  and  its  gods.  Thus  when  the  Gauls 
at  length  appeared,  on  the  third  day  after  the  battle,  they  found 
the  walls  unguarded  and  the  gates  open.  Fearing-  an  ambush, 
they  hesitated  for  a  whole  day  to  enter  the  city,  and  so  gave  the 
Romans  time  to  garrison  and  provision  the  Capitol.  But  not  all 
the  citizens  of  Rome  had  fled  or  taken  refuge  in  the  citadel.  The 
men  who  had,  in  years  long  past,  swayed  the  counsels  and  led  the 
armies  of  the  state,  and  were  now  too  old  to  fight  in  its  defence, 
proudly  refused  to  escape  death  by  exile.  They  met  together  and 
devoted  themselves  to  the  gods  below,  for  the  deliverance  of  their 
country.  Then  they  arrayed  themselves  in  robes  of  state,  and  sat 
down,  each  on  his  ivory  chair,  in  the  gateway  of  his  house.  When 
the  Gauls  found  them,  sitting  unmoved  amidst  the  destruction  of 
the  city,  they  looked  on  them  as  more  than  mortal.  At  length 
one  of  them  ventured  to  draw  near  and  stroke  the  beard  of  M. 
Papirius,  but  the  old  man  resented  the  profane  touch  of  the  bar- 
barian, and  smote  him  on  the  head  with  his  ivory  staff.  The  Gaul, 
in  fury,  cut  down  Papirius  with  his  sword,  and  thus  aroused  in 
his  comrades  the  savage  thirst  for  blood.  The  old  Romans  were 
sacrificed  to  the  powers  of  death  by  the  swords  of  the  enemy. 
After  sacking  the  city  and  giving  its  buildings  to  the  flames,  the 
Gauls  made  an  open  assault  on  the  Capitol,  but  were  repulsed 
with  loss.  They  then  contented  themselves  with  a  blockade,  while 
roving  bands  plundered  the  country  round. 


THE  SACK  OF  ROME  87 

Defence  of  the  Capitol.  —  Meanwhile,  the  fugitives  at  \'eii  took 
heart  to  resist  some  marauding  Etruscans,  and  sent  to  Ardea  to 
ask  Camillus,  who  had  already  cut  to  pieces  a  party  of  plunderers, 
to  lead  them  against  the  Gauls.  But  the  exiled  general  must  first 
receive  authority  from  the  remnant  of  the  Roman  people  gathered 
on  the  Capitol.  A  young  man  named  Pontius  Cominius  under- 
took the  dangerous  errand.  He  swam  the  Tiber,  and  climbed  up 
the  cliff  by  a  precipitous,  and  therefore  unguarded,  path.  Re- 
turning, as  he  came,  unhurt,  he  bore  the  news  to  Veii  that  the 
Senate  recalled  Camillus,  and  appointed  him  dictator.  But  next 
morning  the  Gauls  observed  the  tracks  of  his  ascent,  and  resolved 
at  once  to  follow  the  same  path.  Silently  they  climbed  up  the 
cliff  in  the  darkness.  The  sentinels  were  asleep,  and  even  the 
watch-dogs  heard  them  not.  But  in  the  Capitoline  temple  the 
sacred  geese  of  Juno,  which  Roman  piety,  even  in  the  day  of 
need,  had  spared,  cackled  with  fear.  Roused  by  the  sound,  M. 
Manlius  seized  sword  and  shield,  and  rushed  to  the  top  of  the 
clifif,  just  in  time  to  dash  the  foremost  Gaul  down  the  rock.  The 
Gaul,  as  he  fell,  bore  down  those  behind  him  ;  the  other  Romans, 
coming  up,  slaughtered  them  easily.  Thus  the  cackling  of  the 
geese  and  the  courage  of  Manlius  saved  the  Capitol. 

Nevertheless,  despite  the  unhealthiness  of  a  Roman  autumn, 
the  Gauls  maintained  the  blockade  of  the  Capitol,  and  reduced  the 
garrison  to  the  last  extremity  of  hunger.  At  length  they  agreed 
to  ransom  themselves  by  the  payment  of  a  thousand  pounds  of 
gold,  a  sum  collected  with  difficulty  from  the  treasures  of  the 
Capitol.  The  gold  was  weighed  in  the  Forum,  but  Brennus  used 
unfair  weights,  and  answered  the  complaints  of  Quintus  Sulpicius 
by  throwing  his  broadsword  into  the  scale,  with  the  insulting 
words,  "  Vae  victis."  Suddenly  Camillus  appeared  with  his  troops 
and  declared  any  agreement  made  without  his  sanction  null  and 
void.  He  then  drove  the  Gauls  out  of  the  city,  and  defeated  them 
so  utterly  that  not  a  man  survived  to  carry  home  the  news  of  the 
disaster. 

Criticism  of  the  Legend. — Such  is  the  legend,  by  which  patriots, 
like  Livy,  concealed  the  humiliation  of  Rome.  But  of  its  falsehood 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  We  can  almost  trace  the  steps  by  which 
the  legend  was  fabricated.  In  Polybius  we  hear  that  the  Gauls 
retired  unmolested  with  their  booty,  having  come  to  terms  with 
the  Romans  because  they  heard  that  their  own  land  was  being 
harried  by  the  Veneti.  Suetonius  alleges  that  the  ransom  of  a 
thousand  pounds  was  indeed  paid,  but  brought  back  from  Cisal- 


88  HIS-J'ORY   OF  ROME 

pine  Gaul  by  tlie  piii'lor  I\l.  I/ulus  Drusus  a  century  later,  as  if 
barbarians  were  likely  to  hoard  treasure.  Finally,  Diodorus  de- 
clares that  Camillus  was  made  dictator  after  the  Gauls  had  left 
Rome,  but  defeated  them  on  their  return  from  a  raid  into  Apulia 
in  the  following  year,  and  then  recovered  the  ransom.  From  this 
to  the  patriotic  fiction  of  Livy  's  but  a  single  step.  But  the 
manifest  exaggerations  and  contradictions  of  the  legend  must  not 
lead  us  to  doubt  its  substance.  It  is  certain  at  least  that  a  wan- 
dering horde  of  Gauls  suddenly  invaded  the  territory  of  Rome, 
routed  the  army,  and  sacked  and  burnt  the  town.  It  is  almost 
certain  that  the  barbarians  besieged  the  Capitol  in  vain,  and 
by  selling  their  victory,  lost  it.  Doubtless  straggling  bands  of 
plunderers  were  cut  to  pieces,  as  they  retreated,  by  the  Romans 
and  Latins,  which  small  successes  orators  and  chroniclers  magni- 
fied into  the  heroic  exploits  of  Camillus. 

Re-establishment  of  Roman  Power. — But  the  o\erthr()w  of  Rome 
by  the  Gauls  had  no  permanent  effect  on  her  fortunes.  The  in- 
vaders departed  as  suddenly  as  they  had  come,  and  Rome  took 
up  again  the  interrupted  work  of  establishing  her  supremacy  on 
both  sides  the  Tiber.  Once  more  we  hear  of  a  proposition  to 
desert  the  now  ruined  city,  and  seek  a  new  home  in  Veii.  It  is 
defeated,  less  by  the  impassioned  eloquence  of  Camillus  than  by 
the  chance  saying  of  a  centurion  :  "  Standard-bearer,  plant  the 
standard  here  ;  here  we  had  best  remain,"  which  was  accepted  as 
an  omen  first  by  the  Senate  and  afterwards  by  the  people.  The 
city  rose  from  its  ruins,  but  the  narrow  and  crooked  streets  of  later 
Rome  bear  witness  to  the  haste  and  irregularity  of  the  work  of 
rebuilding.  Yet,  though  the  Romans  refused  to  migrate  to  Veii, 
they  took  care  to  secure  their  hold  on  the  conquered  territory. 
Sutrium  and  Nepete  are  said  to  have  been  recovered  from  the 
Etruscans  once  at  least  by  the  hero  Camillus  ;  they  are  finally 
garrisoned  by  "  Latin  "  colonists.  Four  new  tribes  are  formed  in 
the  territories  of  Veii,  Capena,  and  Falerii,  and  in  this  way  Etruria 
south  of  the  Ciminian  forest  was  united  to  Rome  by  common 
interests  and  sympathies.  The  settlement  of  Latium,  more  fully 
described  elsewhere,  occupied  the  Romans  during  the  next  thirty 
years  ;  when  that  task  was  accomplished  they  turned  again  to 
Etruria  (356  B.C.).  The  great  city  of  Tarquinii,  aided  by  volunteers 
from  Caere  and  Falerii,  tried  to  stem  the  tide  of  Roman  success. 
Inspired  by  religious  fury,  the  Etruscans  defeated  the  legions  in  a 
great  battle,  and  sacrificed  three  hundred  and  seven  prisoners  on 
the  altars  of  their  gods.     A  bloody  revenge  followed  the  victory  of 


RKSJVRAT/O.V  OF  ROME  89 

Rome  ;  three  hundred  and  fifty-eight  of  the  nobles  of  Tarquinii  were 
scourged  and  beheaded  (351  B.C.).     In  the  end  Tarquinii  concluded 


^ijfei  ft  » 


FALISCAN    VASE   IN    THE    BKITISII    MUSEUM. 


a  truce  for  forty  years,  while  Ca;re  and  Falerii  became  dependents 
of  Rome.  Falerii  was  compelled  to  enter  into  perpetual  alliance 
with  the  suzerain  state  ;  Cicre  surrendered  her  political  indepen- 


90  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

dence,  and  even  local  self-government.  The  inhabitants  received 
the  private,  but  not  the  public,  rights  of  Romans  {cii'itas  sine 
suffragid)  ;  they  shared  the  burdens  but  not  the  honours  of  citizen- 
ship.    A  Roman  pncfect  controlled  the  administration. 

Raids  of  the  Gauls. — Marauding  bands  of  Gauls  continued  to 
disturb  the  peace,  though  they  did  not  again  threaten  the  exist- 
ence of  Rome.  In  the  simple  and  credible  account  of  Polybius  two 
such  raids  arc  recorded  ;  on  the  first  occasion  (360  B.C.)  the  Romans 
were  taken  by  surprise,  and  did  not  venture  to  meet  the  enemy 
in  the  field  ;  on  the  second  (349  B.C.)  they  showed  a  firm  front, 
entirely  discomfiting  the  Gauls,  who  retreated  rapidly  and  in  dis- 
order. From  the  highly  coloured  narrative  of  Livy,  who  tells  of 
six  invasions  and  six  Roman  triumphs,  two  stories  of  single 
combat  may  be  given,  interesting  as  among  the  last  pure  legends 
in  Roman  history.  In  360  B.C.  the  Romans  were  encamped  over 
against  the  Gauls  on  the  Anio,  not  five  miles  from  Rome.  A 
gigantic  Gaul,  in  splendid  armour,  challenged  any  man  in  the 
Roman  ranks  to  single  combat,  and  was  encountered  by  young 
T.  Manlius.  The  Roman  champion  closed  at  once  ;  avoiding 
the  wild  sweep  of  the  Gallic  broadsword,  he  thrust  his  own  blade 
deep  into  his  enemy's  body,  and  so  ended  the  combat.  He  then 
took  the  golden  collar  (^torques)  from  the  Gallic  chieftain's  neck 
and  put  it  on  his  own,  thus  earning  for  himself  and  his  family  the 
name  of  Torquatus.  In  349  B.C.  the  Romans  were  commanded  by 
the  son  of  their  old  hero,  Camillus.  Again  a  young  Roman  is  per- 
mitted by  the  general  to  accept  the  challenge  of  a  Gallic  warrior. 
But  on  this  occasion  the  duel  is  decided  by  the  direct  intervention 
of  Heaven.  As  the  champions  closed  in  conflict,  a  raven  alighted 
on  the  Roman's  helmet,  and  during  the  fight  tore  the  face  and 
eyes  of  the  Gaul  with  beak  and  claw.  Thus  M.  Valerius  gained 
an  easy  victory  over  the  bewildered  barbarian,  and  ever  after  was 
known  by  the  name  of  "  Corvus." 

These  legends  fitly  close  the  story  of  the  Gallic  invasion. 
Though  they  may  be  nothing  more  than  attempts  to  account  for 
the  family  names  of  great  houses,  yet  the  pictures  they  give  us  of 
the  Gauls  are  true  and  interesting.  The  barbarians  fail  because 
they  are  inferior  in  arms  and  discipline  to  the  Italians.  Never 
again  were  Gauls  to  bring  the  Roman  state  to  the  brink  of  destruc- 
tion ;  rather  they  had  served  to  smooth  the  path  for  its  triumphal 
progress,  by  breaking  the  strength  of  the  Etruscan  nation.  Rome 
was  free  from  all  anxieties  on  her  northern  frontier  when  she  had 
to  face  a  new  and  stubborn  foe  in  the  mountains  of  the  south. 


Lie  I XI AX  LAWS  91 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE    LICINIAN    LAWS    AND    THE    EQUALISATION    OF 
THE    ORDERS 

ll.C.  A.U.C. 

Execution  of  Manlius 384  370 

The  Bills  of  Licinius  and  Sextius 377-367  377-387 

Popular  Laws  of  Publilius  Philo 339  415 

Censorship  of  Appius  Claudius 31Z  442 

Lex  Ogulnia 3°''  454 

Lex  Hortensia  287  467 

M.  Manlius. — The  exhausting  struggle  with  Veii  and  the  sack 
of  Rome  by  the  Gauls  for  a  time  distracted  the  attention  of  the 
plebeians  fi-om  constitutional  reform.  But  the  distress  caused  by 
these  wars  among  the  poorer  farmers  was  widespread  and  severe. 
The  introduction  of  pay  for  service  in  the  legions  was  but  a 
small  compensation  for  the  neglect  and  devastation  of  their  lands. 
The  impoverished  yeomen  found  a  champion  in  M.  Manlius,  the 
saviour  of  the  Capitol.  But  the  government  raised  again  the  old 
cry  of  treason,  and  procured  his  condemnation  and  execution. 

Note. — Mommsen  discredits  llie  received  story  of  Manlius,  and  be- 
lieves that  the  oldest  chronicles  contained  only  the  record  of  his  treason 
and  his  condemnation.  The  tale  of  the  saving  of  the  Capitol  was  invented 
to  explain  his  name  (Capitolinus),  which,  however,  can  be  proved  to  have 
existed  before  that  time  in  the  Manlian  gens,  and  was  doubtless  derived 
from  the  fact  that  their  house  stood  on  the  Capitol.  The  attempt  to 
cancel  debts  is  a  fiction  of  the  days  when  Cinna  made  their  abolition  part 
of  the  democratic  programme.  [Cf.  \).  58  for  his  treatment  of  the  story  of 
Sp.  Cassius.) 

Proposals  of  Licinius  and  Sextius. — The  failure  of  Manlius 
proved  the  powerlessness  of  the  poor  in  face  of  an  united  aristoc- 
racy, but,  by  enlisting  on  their  side  those  richer  plebeians  who 
resented  their  exclusion  from  political  power,  they  might  yet  hope 
to  obtain  relief  from  the  burden  of  debt  and  gain  a  share  in  the 
public  lands.  A  coalition  was  formed  under  the  able  leadership 
of  the  tribunes,  C.  Licinius  Stolo  and  L.  Sextius.  Their  pro- 
posals dealt  with  the  grievances  of  both  sections  of  the  plebeians. 
Debtors  were  relieved  by  the  deduction  of  the  interest  they  had 
already  paid  from  the  principal,  and  allowed  three  years  for  the 
payment  of  the  residue.       The  monopoly  of  the  conquered   ter- 


92  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

ritories  by  the  rich  was  nut  Ijv  jjioviclin^  that  no  citizen  should 
hold  more  than  500  jugera  of  the  public  land,  nor  keep  more  than 
100  head  of  cattle  and  500  sheep  on  the  common  pastnrc. 

A  clause  ordering  that  a  certain  proportion  of  the  labourers 
employed  on  an  estate  should  be  freemen  belongs,  in  all  jiroba- 
bility,  to  a  later  age,  when  slave-labour  was  cheaper  and  more 
plentiful,  but  is  usually  ascribed,  on  Appian's  authority,  to  Licinius. 

To  these  social  reforms  the  plebeian  leaders  tacked  a  political 
proposal  of  the  greatest  importance,  viz.,  that  consuls,  and  not 
consular  tribunes,  be  henceforth  elected,  and  that  one  at  least 
of  the  consuls  be  a  plebeian. 

A  subsequent  Bill  provided  that  the  number  of  the  priestly 
custodians  of  the  Sibylline  books  be  increased  from  two  to  ten, 
and  that  half  the  college  be  plebeian. 

Opposition  of  the  Patricians. — The  measures  of  Licinius  met 
with  the  most  pertinacious  opposition  from  the  patricians.  For 
ten  years  they  obstructed  their  ratification  by  procuring  the  inter- 
vention of  friendly  tribunes,  and  by  the  nomination  of  dictators 
to  overawe  the  agitation.  But  the  two  sections  of  the  plebeians 
held  firmly  together.  The  poor  farmers  cared  little  for  the  poli- 
tical privileges  offered  to  them  ;  the  rich  plebeians  were  not  in 
earnest  about  social  reforms,  for  their  author,  Licinius,  was  him- 
self condemned  for  transgressing  the  agrarian  provisions  of  his 
law  ;  but  both  perceived  that  union  was  an  absolute  necessity. 
At  length  their  pertinacity  triumphed  over  the  obstruction  of  the 
patricians,  and  secured  the  passage  of  the  measure  and  the  election 
of  the  late  tribune,  L.  Sextius  Lateranus,  as  consul.  The  patricians 
managed  to  mar  the  grace  of  this  great  concession  by  clipping 
and  paring  away  some  of  the  powers  of  the  consulate.  The  aci- 
ministration  of  justice  was  reserved  for  a  patrician  official,  known 
as  a  pnttor,  who  was  considered  a  colleague  of  the  consuls, 
though  inferior  to  them.  At  the  same  time  the  charge  of  the 
market,  the  organisation  of  festivals,  and  various  police  duties  were 
assigned  to  two  curule  pcdiles  of  patrician  birth. 

Admission  of  the  Plebeians  to  Magistracies, — AH  the  heart 
was  taken  out  of  the  patrician  opposition  by  the  surrender  of  the 
consulship.  The  wiser  aristocrats  saw  that  the  cause  of  political 
privilege  was  lost,  and  loyally  accepted  the  new  order  of  things. 
Camillus,  their  great  champion,  appears  for  the  last  time  on  the 
stage  of  history,  to  found  a  temple  of  Concord,  as  a  pledge  and 
sign  that  the  divisions  of  the  orders  were  now  at  an  end.  The 
more  stiff-necked  aristocrats  found  themselves  gradually  deprived 


LTCmiAN  LAWS 


93 


94  HIS  TO  A' Y  OP   ROME 

of  their  remaining  privileges.  The  curule  redileship  was  immedi- 
ately thrown  open  by  an  agreement  that  this  ofifice  should  be  held 
by  plebeians  and  patricians  in  alternate  years.  The  dictatorship 
was  first  held  by  a  plebeian,  C.  Marcius  Rutilus,  in  356  B.C.,  and  the 
censorship  in  351  B.C.  Though  the  patricians  succeeded,  in  open 
defiance  of  the  Licinian  laws,  in  monopolising  the  consulate  on 
several  occasions,  this  abuse  was  finally  put  down  in  342  B.C.  by 
a  resolution  of  the  people  which  declared  that  both  consulships 
might  be  held  by  plebeians.  At  the  same  time,  (or  perhaps  in 
330  B.C.),  the  tenure  of  two  ordinary  curule  offices  at  once,  or  of  the 
same  office  twice  within  ten  years,  was  forbidden.  These  restric- 
tions, by  increasing  the  number  of  individuals  who  had  held  magis- 
tracies, tended  to  strengthen  the  plebeian  nobility.  Finally,  in 
339  B.C.,  a  plebeian  dictator,  Publilius  Philo,  carried  a  law  which 
ordained  that  one  censor  must  be  plebeian,  and  in  337  B  C.  the 
same  statesman  was  elected  pra?tor,  and  thus  broke  down  the 
last  barrier  which  excluded  the  plebeians  from  offices  of  state. 

The  Popular  Assemblies. — Publilius  Philo  also  secured  freedom 
of  action  for  the  popular  assemblies.  Hitherto  the  resolutions  of 
the  people  in  the  comitia  of  the  centuries  had  required  the  subse- 
quent sanction  of  the  patrician  senators  {patres).  But  Publilius 
Philo  made  their  assent  a  mere  formality,  by  a  law  which  enacted 
that  it  should  be  given  beforehand.  By  a  later,  Mtenian,  law  this 
rule  was  extended  to  elections  held  in  that  assembly.  He  also 
won  ampler  legislative  powers  for  the  comitia  tributa,  in  which 
assembly  all  measures  brought  forward  by  a  praetor  are  henceforth 
put  to  the  vote.  The  emancipation  of  the  comitia  centuriata  from 
the  supervision  of  the  patres,  and  the  fuller  recognition  of  the 
competence  of  the  assembly  of  the  tribes,  are  a  fitting  crown  to 
the  career  of  this  great  plebeian  statesman. 

Appius  Claudius. — The  next  step  forward  was  accomplished  by 
an  imperious  but  enlightened  aristocrat.  Appius  Claudius  Caucus, 
censor  in  312  B.C.,  showed,  like  his  ancestor,  the  Decemvir,  a 
haughty  disdain  for  the  narrow  traditions  of  the  Roman  nobility. 
In  conjunction  with  his  colleague,  C.  Plautius,  he  conferred  the  full 
franchise  on  freedmen,  and  on  all  residents  possessed  of  the  private 
rights  of  citizenship  {civitas  sine  suffragio).  He  thus  enfranchised 
large  numbers  of  tradesmen  and  artisans,  and  made  the  town 
population  supreme  in  the  assembly.  At  the  same  time  he  admitted 
men  of  the  same  class  into  the  .Senate.  Eight  years  later  (304  B.C.) 
his  influence  procured  the  election  of  Cn.  Flavins,  the  son  of  a 
freedman,  and  a  clerk  in  the  public  service,  to  the  curule  tedile- 


APPIUS  CLAUDIUS  C.^CUS  95 

ship.  Together  the  proud  noble  and  the  clerk  published  a  legal 
calendar  and  a  list  of  the  formulas  of  the  law,  which  opened  to 
all  the  sealed  book  of  legal  knowledge.  But  the  reformer  was 
before  his  time.  By  a  judicious  compromise  the  succeeding 
censor,  Q.  ?\ibius  Rullianus,  confined  the  newly  enfranchised 
classes  to  the  four  city  tribes,  and  left  the  twenty-seven  country 
tribes  to  the  landed  proprietors  and  yeomen.  Nor  were  the  sons 
of  freedmen  again  admitted  to  offices  of  state  and  seats  in  the 
Senate. 

The  Appian  Road  and  Aqueduct. — The  censorship  of  Appius 
was  memorable  in  another  way.  During  his  term  of  office  he 
carried  out  two  great  public  works  which  were  models  for  all 
time.  He  built  a  great  aqueduct  to  carry  pure  water  from  the 
Sabine  mountains  to  the  most  crowded  part  of  Rome — a  work  of 
peculiar  necessity  owing  to  the  insanitary  state  of  the  town  and  the 
deficiency  of  water, — and  he  constructed  the  first  of  those  magni- 
ficent straight  level  roads  which  still  mark  the  lands  where  Rome 
has  ruled.  The  Appian  Road  crossed  the  Campagna  to  the  Alban 
hills,  and  then,  passing  through  the  Pomptine  marshes  to  Tarracina, 
threaded  its  way  by  Lautute,  where  the  Volscian  hills  come  down 
to  the  shore.  Thence  it  led  on,  across  the  Liris  and  Volturnus,  to 
Capua,  1 20  miles  from  Rome.  It  was  continued  later  to  Tarentum 
and  Brundisium.  To  give  himself  time  to  complete  these  great 
undertakings,  Appius  retained  his  office  for  the  full  term  of  five 
years,  instead  of  laying  it  down,  as  custom  prescribed,  after  eighteen 
months.  But  there  is  no  ground  for  supposing  that  he  meditated 
a  revolution  or  aimed  at  tyranny.  Such  fables  are  the  inventions 
of  chroniclers,  unable  or  unwilling  to  comprehend  the  genius  of  a 
statesman,  whose  schemes  resemble  those  of  Greek  reformers  in 
their  daring  disregard  of  custom  and  convention. 

Final  Equality  of  the  Orders. — In  300  B.C.  the  last  strongholds 
of  patrician  exclusiveness,  the  sacred  colleges  of  augurs  and  pontiffs, 
were  thrown  open  to  plebeians,  and  the  equality  of  plebeians  to 
patricians  before  the  gods  as  well  as  before  men  proclaimed.^ 
The  reservation  of  the  offices  of  the  flamens,  the  rex  sacrificulus 
{cf.  p.  47),  and  the  inter-rex  {^cf.  p.  42)  for  patricians  is  a  mere 
survival  of  no  historical  importance.  The  last  step  in  the  long 
process  of  emancipating  the  popular  assemblies  from  patrician 
control  was  taken  in  287  B.C.  An  agrarian  proposal  of  Manius 
Curius  had   occasioned  serious  dissensions,  and   even    a   formal 

1  The  significance  of  tliis  reform  will  be  pointed  out  later. 


96  IITSTORY  OF   ROME 

secession  to  Janiculuni.  Jiut  tlic  l)r('acli  was  healed,  and  the 
Hbertics  of  the  people  assured,  Ijy  a  1  loitensian  law,  which  declared 
the  resolutions  of  the  meeting  of  the  plebeians  {co7tcilium  plcbis) 
of  binding  force  witliout  ratification  by  any  other  authority. 

The  struggle  l^etwccn  the  orders  had  ended  in  political  equahty 
— Rome  had  cast  off  the  yoke  of  the  patrician  aristocracy,  and 
became  in  form  a  pure  democracy.  At  the  same  time,  the  con- 
cjuest  of  Italy  furnished  land  for  distribution  among  the  poor,  and 
attracted  wealth  to  the  growing  town.  The  harshness  of  the  old 
law  was  modified  by  the  measure  of  C.  Poetelius  (326  or  313  n.c), 
which  abolished  imprisonment  for  debt,  except  after  a  trial  by  jury, 
and  allowed  a  debtor  to  preserve  his  liberty  by  ceding  his  property, 
if  it  was  worth  as  much  as  the  debt.  The  policy  of  the  Licinian 
laws,  which  linked  together  political  and  social  reform,  was 
amply  vindicated  by  the  increasing  vigour  and  the  awakened 
patriotism  of  the  united  commonwealth.  The  reconciliation  of 
jarring  factions  made  the  armies  of  Rome  triumphant  throughout 
Italy. 

The  Rise  of  the  New  Nobility. — Nevertheless,  this  specious 
show  of  republican  equality  was  destined  to  prove  an  illusion. 
Hardly  had  the  old  aristocracy  of  birth  lost  its  privileges,  when 
a  new  nobility  rose  in  its  place.  The  plebeian  was  no  longer  de- 
barred from  office,  but  poverty  was  still  a  most  serious  hindrance  in 
a  political  career.  Though  for  a  time  poor  men,  like  Fabricius  and 
Manius  Curius,  force  their  way  to  the  front  as  popular  leaders,  yet 
the  wealthy  classes  gradually  monopolise  office,  and  establish  their 
ascendency  in  the  Senate.  The  sovereignty  of  the  people,  absolute 
in  theory,^  in  practice  recedes  into  the  background.  In  the  mean- 
time the  magistracy  is  weakened  by  the  subdivision  of  the  old 
powers  among  many  holders.  The  consuls  had  lost  the  right  to 
revise  the  rolls  of  citizens  and  senators,  the  management  of  finance, 
and  the  administration  of  justice.  No  other  magistrate  could  take 
their  place  at  the  head  of  the  government  ;  all  alike  tend  to  be- 
come officials  dependent  on  the  will  of  the  Senate. 

Ascendency  of  the  Senate, — That  great  council  directed  the 
destinies  of  Rome.  By  the  Ovinian  plebiscite,  carried  during  this 
period,  the  censors  were  ordered  to  inscribe  as  members  all  who 
had  held  curule  offices  of  state.     No  doubt   men  who  had    not 

1  If,  indeed,  a  constitution  like  tlie  Roman  can  be  said  to  possess  a  theory  at 
all,  and  if  the  theory  of  sovereignty  can  be  applied  to  an  ancient  state.  Theories 
are  apt  to  be  the  work  of  legists  and  scholars,  who  tend  to  over-systematise 
the  whole,  or  to  exaggerate  transitional  phases. 


rOWRR    OF   THE    SEAGATE  97 

held  office  were  still  admitted  to  fill  up  the  ranks  of  the  Senate, 
but  its  core  was  composed  of  statesmen  elected  magistrates  by  the 
free  choice  of  the  people,  but  retaining  their  seats  in  the  Senate 
for  life.  This  permanent  council  of  state  soon  reduced  the  annual 
magistrates  to  subordination,  and  used  them  as  its  ministers.  It 
regulated  their  provinces,  and  arbitrated  in  their  cjuarrels.  The 
tribunate,  which,  after  the  equalisation  of  the  orders,  seemed  a 
useless  anachronism,  was  transformed  into  a  regular  instrument 
of  government.  The  tribunes  were  given  the  right  of  convok- 
ing the  Senate  and  submitting  decrees  for  its  approval.  Their 
powers  were  used  to  curb  the  self-will  of  consuls  who  refused  com- 
pliance with  the  wishes  of  the  Senate,  or  to  manage  the  burgess 
assemblies  in  the  interest  of  the  government.  But  the  tribunate 
was  saved  from  extinction  by  its  popular  associations,  and,  dead 
as  it  was  to  all  appearance,  it  was  yet  to  play  a  conspicuous  part 
in  a  new  struggle  of  the  masses  against  the  classes  who  held  the 
reins  of  power. 

For  a  century  and  a  half,  however,  the  tide  ran  strong  in  an 
aristocratic  direction.  The  magistrates  and  people  bowed  to  the 
wisdom  of  the  great  council  which  made  Rome  the  mistress  of 
the  Mediterranean,  and  secured  for  her  citizens  prosperity  at  home 
and  honour  abroad. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    SUBJUGATION    OF    LATIUM    AND    CAMPANIA 


Renewed  Union  between  Rome  and  Latiuni 
Alliance  with  Samnites  .         . 

Treaty  with  Carthage   ... 

First  Samnite  War 

Mutiny  in  Campania 

Great  Latin  War 

Dissolution  of  Latin  League 


B.C. 

A.U.C. 

358 

396 

354 

400 

348 

406 

343-341 

411-413 

342 

412 

340 

414 

338 

416 

The  Latin  League. — The  ancient  league  between  Rome  and 
Latium,  ascribed  to  Spurius  Cassius  (p.  63),  had  been  based  on 
the  assumption  of  complete  equality  between  the  two  contracting 
powers — Rome  and  Latium  were  to  contribute  equal  contingents 

G 


93  HISTORY  OF  ROME. 

to  the  legions,  and  receive  equal  shares  of  the  booty  and  territory 
won  in  war.  Full  equality  was  likewise  secured  for  individual 
burgesses.  The  burgess  of  any  community  might  at  pleasure 
claim  in  any  other  city  of  the  league  the  privilege  of  contracting 
a  legal  marriage  {^ius  conubii),  and  the  right  to  buy  and  sell,  to 
hold  and  to  bequeath  land  and  other  property  {ius  comniercii). 
Further,  all  members  of  the  Latin  league  had  full  liberty  to 
migrate  and  settle  in  Rome,  as  passive  burgesses,  possessed  of 
all  the  private  rights  of  citizens,  though  debarred  from  office,  and 
from  the  suffrage,  except  in  the  comiiia  tributa,  where  these  settlers 
voted  in  a  tribe  fixed  on  each  occasion  by  lot. 

The  internal  constitutions  of  the  Latin  cities  resembled  as  a 
rule  that  of  Rome  in  its  most  remarkable  feature,  the  collegiate 
tenure  of  the  magistracy.  In  such  instances  the  supreme  magis- 
trates were  called  by  the  name  originally  given  at  Rome  to  the 
consuls,  prKtors,  while  another  Roman  title,  that  of  dictator,  is 
given  to  the  single  annual  magistrate  found  in  other  Latin  cities. 
We  may  therefore  suppose  that  the  substitution  of  aristocracy  for 
monarchy  at  Rome  was  accompanied  by  a  similar  remodelling  of 
the  constitutions  of  the  allied  cities,  and  that  political  sympathies 
as  well  as  common  interests  strengthened  the  bonds  of  union 
between  the  leading  state  and  the  Latin  league. 

Disaffection  in  Latium. — But  there  is  an  inevitable  tendency 
in  such  a  confederacy  for  the  chief  city  to  convert  her  leadership 
into  sovereignty.  Without  any  formal  alterations  in  the  treaty 
of  alliance,  the  Latins  lost  in  practice  their  right  to  name  the 
general  and  staff  of  the  amiy  in  alternate  years,  and  the  power  of 
making  separate  treaties.  Again,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  the 
burdens  and  dangers  of  the  yEquian  and  Volscian  wars  pressed 
most  severely  on  the  Latins,  while  the  fruits  of  victory  were  reaped 
by  Rome.  Hence,  when  the  flood  of  the  Celtic  invasion  receded, 
the  Latins  hastened  to  cut  themselves  adrift  from  the  wreck. 
The  strong  cities  of  Tibur  and  Prseneste  had  made  themselves 
mistresses  of  the  smaller  neighbouring  towns,  and  were  anxious 
to  assert  their  independence.  The  discontent  first  came  to  a  head 
at  Prseneste  (382-380  B.C.)  ;  next  it  showed  itself  in  secret  assist- 
ance to  the  Volscians,  who  were  struggling  desperately  to  main- 
tain their  separate  existence.  At  last  there  was  a  widespread 
revolt  against  the  suzerain  power.  Pra;neste  again  flew  to  arms  ; 
Tibur  leagued  herself  with  a  wandering  tribe  of  Gauls  ;  even  the 
faithful  Hernicans  were  for  four  years  the  open  enemies  of  Rome 
(362  B.C.).     But  the  disunited  malcontents  were  powerless  before 


LATIN  LEAGUE   CLOSED  99 

the  masterly  policy  of  the  Senate.  In  a  few  years  the  Gauls  were 
repulsed,  the  Hernicans  reduced  to  submission,  and  the  disaffected 
Latins  compelled  again  to  recognise  the  supremacy  of  Rome 
(358  r..c.),  and  so  set  her  free  to  defend  her  northern  frontiers  against 
Tarquinii.  At  the  same  time  the  Voiscians  were  punished  by  the 
loss  of  the  Pomptine  territory,  now  formed  into  two  new  tribes 
and  incorporated  with  Rome.  The  decline  of  the  Volscian  power 
was  doubtless  in  part  due  to  assaults  on  their  flank  and  rear  by 
the  Samnites,  a  people  who  were  already  pressing  over  the  upper 
Liris  on  to  the  Ausonian  plain,  and  with  whom  Rome  soon 
after  concluded  a  formal  alliance.  Tibur  and  Prajneste  were 
(354  B.C.)  the  last  to  acknowledge  the  re-establishment  of  the 
Roman  suzerainty. 

Closing  of  the  Latin  League. — The  towns  of  the  Latin  league 
were  now  more  obviously  dependent  on  Rome.  After  this  revolt, 
if  not  before/  the  list  of  confederate  cities  and  the  limits  of  Latium 
were  irrevocably  fixed.  Up  to  this  time,  every  colony  founded  by 
Rome  and  Latium  had  been  represented  at  the  festival  and  diet, 
though  of  the  forty-seven  members  of  the  league  only  thirty  had 
been  entitled  to  a  vote.  Later  Latin  colonies  were  excluded  from 
the  Alban  festival  and  the  list  of  the  confederacy,  while  old  mem- 
bers, such  as  Tusculum  and  Satricum,  were  retained  on  the  list, 
though  absorbed  in  the  Roman  state.  The  policy  of  separating 
the  allied  cities  from  each  other  and  linking  them  only  with  the 
sovereign  state  was  begun,  by  preventing  all  separate  alliances 
within  the  league,  and  by  completely  isolating  the  new  colonies, 
to  whom  no  rights  of  intermarriage  or  of  purchasing  or  inheriting 
land  were  granted  except  with  Rome.  We  can  hardly  wonder 
that  the  smouldering  embers  of  Latin  discontent  were  destined 
within  twenty  years  to  burst  again  into  flame.  But  for  the 
moment  the  predominance  of  Rome  was  unquestioned,  and  was 
even  recognised  by  the  great  naval  power  of  Carthage,  which, 
in  348  B.C.,  bound  itself  to  spare  the  maritime  cities  of  Latium, 
so  long  as  they  remained  true  to  Rome,  and,  further,  to  restore 
to  the  suzerain  power  any  revolted  city  that  might  fall  into  its 
hands. 

The  Samnites  and  Campanians. — Before  Rome  was  brought 
into  closer  contact  with  the  mistress  of  the  western  seas,  she  had 
to  make  good  her  claim  to  supremacy  in  Italy.  Nor  were  her 
antagonists  unworthy  of  her  high  destiny.      In  the  pastures  and 

1  Mommsen  prefers  an  earlier  date,  circa  384  B.C. 


lOO  inSTORY  OF  ROME 

valleys  which  skirt  the  snow-capped  peak  of  Mount  Matese  dwelt 
a  hardy  race  of  herdsmen,  whose  confederate  tribes  bore  the  com- 
mon name  of  Samnites.  These  bold  warriors  poured  down  from 
their  mountains  on  to  the  coast-lands,  which  Greeks  and  Etruscans 
had  enriched  with  cornfields  and  vineyards,  and  adorned  with 
stately  cities.  One  swarm  of  invaders  had  driven  the  Etruscans 
from  Capua  and  the  Greeks  from  Cumce  (424-420  B.C.) ;  another, 
turning  southward,  overran  Magna  Gra^cia  and  made  the  name  of 
the  Lucanians  terrible  to  the  Achaean  settlers.  But  these  invading 
hordes  broke  off  their  connection  with  the  parent  stock  in  Samnium. 
Thus  the  Samnite  dominion,  extensive  as  it  was,  lacked  the  solid 
foundation  on  which  Rome  built  her  power.  The  loose  confedera- 
cies of  independent  cantons,  maintained  by  the  Samnite  race  in 
its  old  mountain-home,  and  reproduced  in  its  new  possessions  in 
Lucania  and  Campania,  were  ill  fitted  to  meet  the  steady  advance 
of  a  single  centralised  power.  In  many  towns  the  conquerors  were 
absorbed  by  the  people  with  whom  they  mingled,  and  learnt  from 
them  the  culture  and  civic  institutions  which  were  the  heritage  of 
the  Greek.  In  Capua  they  adopted  from  the  conquered  Etrus- 
cans the  employment  of  mercenaries,  and  the  shows  of  gladi- 
ators, Rome's  direst  disgrace  in  later  days.  These  degenerate 
offshoots  of  the  Samnite  stock  trembled  before  the  rude  tribes 
which  later  followed  the  path  they  themselves  had  opened  from 
the  highlands.  The  townsmen  of  Campania  looked  round  for  a 
champion  of  civilisation  to  protect  them  from  their  own  brethren, 
who  still  preserved  the  savage  customs  of  their  forefathers. 

First  Samnite  War. — A  vain  attempt  of  the  Capuans  to  pro- 
tect the  Sidicini  of  Teanum  against  the  mountaineers  only  drew 
Samnite  vengeance  on  themselves.  A  garrison  posted  on  Mount 
Tifata,  right  above  the  town,  laid  waste  the  territories  and  defeated 
the  forces  of  Capua.  In  their  distress  the  Campanians  implored 
and  obtained  the  protection  of  Rome  (343  B.C.).  The  Samnites 
refused  to  acknowledge  the  claims  of  Rome  to  rule  in  Campania, 
and  war  ensued.  Of  the  details  of  this  first  Samnite  war  history 
says  nothing.  Neither  truth  nor  beauty  are  to  be  found  in  the 
panegyrics  pronounced  on  Valerius  Corvus  and  Decius  Mus.  It 
would  seem  that  the  Romans  and  their  allies  were  strong  enough 
to  drive  the  Samnites  from  the  plains,  though  unable  to  penetrate 
into  their  mountain-fastnesses.  Eventually  Capua  was  retained 
by  the  Romans,  and  Teanum  surrendered  to  the  Samnites.  Both 
combatants  needed  a  respite  before  girding  up  their  loins  for  the 
decisive  struggle.     The  Samnites  were  troubled  by  the  renewed 


MUTINY  IN   CAMPANIA  loi 

activity  of  Tarentum.  Rome,  which  had  but  hitely  suppressed  a 
serious  militaiy  revolt  aggravated  by  domestic  discontent,  had 
now  to  face  a  desperate  conflict  with  the  whole  strength  of 
Latium. 

The  Mutiny  in  Campania. — After  the  campaign  of  343  B.C. 
the  Roman  legions,  quartered  in  Capua  for  its  defence,  conspired 
together  to  seize  the  town  for  themselves.  To  frustrate  this 
treachery,  the  consul,  C.  Marcius  Rutilus,  discharged  the  principal 
malcontents.  But  they  gathered  together  at  the  pass  of  Lautulaj, 
near  Tarracina,  and  being  joined  by  the  mass  of  the  soldiery, 
marched  on  Rome.  At  the  same  time  the  commons  in  Rome 
rose  in  revolt  against  the  oppressions  of  their  creditors.  M. 
Valerius  Coi-vus,  who  had  been  appointed  dictator,  found  it 
necessary  to  grant  an  amnesty  to  the  insurgents,  and  to  pass  a 
solemn  law  and  covenant  embodying  their  demands.  In  future 
no  military  tribune  could  be  degraded,  and  no  soldier  discharged 
from  the  ranks,  at  the  caprice  of  the  consul.  Service  in  the  legion 
at  this  time  entitled  the  citizen  to  a  share  in  the  fruits  of  war,  pay, 
plunder,  and  an  allotment  of  land,  while  his  rank  in  the  legion 
determined  the  amount  of  his  share.  Hence  the  power  of  degrad- 
ing or  discharging  a  soldier  enabled  the  consul  to  deprive  obnoxious 
citizens  of  the  due  reward  of  their  service  to  the  state.  The 
soldiery  insisted  on  the  abolition  of  this  arbitrary  power,  but  did 
not  press  their  petition  for  the  reduction  of  the  pay  of  the  horse- 
men. To  allay  the  discontent  in  the  city  a  measure  was  passed 
for  the  relief  of  debtors,  though  we  can  hardly  believe  that  sober 
Romans  ever  sanctioned  the  proposal  of  the  tribune  Genucius  for 
the  total  prohibition  of  interest. 

Preparations  for  War. — These  concessions,  and  the  separate 
alliance  concluded  by  Rome  with  the  Samnites,  were  devised  to 
meet  the  threatened  defection  of  Latium  and  Campania.  The 
Latins  were  determined  not  to  sink  into  the  position  of  helpless 
dependents,  but  rather  to  maintain  their  equality  by  force  of  arms. 
Even  when  Rome  had  deserted  them  they  continued  the  Samnite 
war  with  vigour,  and  thus  won  the  support  of  the  Campanians. 
They  now  boldly  demanded  complete  union  with  Rome  on  an 
equal  footing-.  One  consul  and  half  the  Senate  were  to  be  of 
Latin  origin,  and  doubtless  this  equal  division  of  power  was  to 
be  carried  out  also  in  the  popular  assemblies.  The  Senate,  led 
by  Manllus  Torquatus,  indignantly  rejected  this  proposal  for  an 
equal  union,  and  appealed  at  once  to  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword. 
Rome  had  now  to  meet,  not  a  foreign  foe,  but  a  people  whose 


I02  HISTOR  V  OF  ROME 

institutions  were  similar  to  her  own,  and  whose  troops  had  long 
been  trained  to  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  wi;h  her  legionaries, 
and  had  learnt  under  the  same  discipline  to  use  the  same  arms. 
If  we  may  believe  tradition,  the  old  solid  phalanx  had  been  already 
superseded  by  a  more  open  order  of  battle.  The  legionaries  were 
now  drawn  up  in  three  divisions,  of  which  the  two  first  were  armed 
wiih  the  pilum,  a  wooden  javelin,  pointed  with  iron,  six  and  a  half  feet 
in  length,  while  the  third  still  bore  the  old  thrusting-spear  {liastd). 
At  the  same  time  the  sword  became  the  principal  weapon  of  the 
soldiers,  who  followed  up  their  volleys  of  javelins  by  an  attack 
sword  in  hand.  Thus  the  phalanx  of  spearmen  was  broken  up 
into  handfuls  {maniptili)  of  swordsmen,  who  fought  in  open  order, 
with  marked  intervals  between  the  various  divisions.  Most  pro- 
bably this  new  method  of  fighting  was  perfected  in  mountain 
warfare  against  the  Samnites  ;  it  is  fully  developed  at  least  by  the 
time  of  Pyrrhus.  The  weakness  of  the  Latin  league  was  not 
military  but  political.  Though  the  old  Latin  cities,  except  Lauren- 
tum,  declared  for  war,  the  colonies  founded  outside  Latium  remained, 
with  but  few  exceptions,  true  to  Rome.  In  Capua,  and  perhaps 
elsewhere  in  Campania,  the  aristocracy,  though  overpowered  for 
the  time  by  the  popular  party,  refused  to  forsake  her  cause.  The 
Hernicans  proved  their  fidelity,  and  the  Samnites  their  magna- 
nimity, by  rendering  loyal  aid  to  their  Roman  allies. 

The  Latin  War. — The  hostile  regions  of  Latium  and  Campania 
separated  Rome  from  her  chief  allies,  the  Samnites.  With  wise 
audacity,  the  consuls,  Manlius  Torquatus  and  Decius  Mus,  left 
Rome  to  be  defended  by  the  citizens,  and  marched  round  through 
the  country  of  the  Marsians  and  Pcelignians  to  form  a  junction  with 
the  Samnite  forces.  The  united  army  moved  forward  to  offer 
battle  in  the  plain  of  Capua,  with  their  retreat  into  the  Samnite 
mountains  secured  in  case  of  disaster.  vStrict  orders  were  issued 
by  Manlius  against  all  irregular  skirmishing  with  the  Latins,  but 
his  own  son  was  provoked  into  a  single  combat  with  Geminus 
Mettius  of  Tusculum.  The  young  man,  forgetting  the  commands 
and  remembering  only  the  exploit  of  his  father,  slew  the  Latin 
champion.  But  when  he  returned  triumphant  to  lay  his  spoils  at 
his  father's  feet,  the  consul  turned  gloomily  from  him,  and  ordered 
his  immediate  execution  before  the  assembled  army.  This  stern 
sacrifice  of  private  feeling  to  public  duty,  so  characteristic  of  a 
Roman  noble,  ensured  the  obedience,  though  it  alienated  the 
affections,  of  the  soldiery. 

The  Battle  of  Mount  Vesuvius.— The  battle  that  decided  the 


THE    GREAT  LATIN   WAR  103 

fate  of  Campania  was  fought  near  Mount  Vesuvius.*  The  consuls 
were  warned  by  a  dream  that  the  victory  of  the  army  must  be 
purchased  by  the  death  of  the  general,  and  agreed  that  he  whose 
legions  first  gave  ground  in  the  battle  should  devote  himself  to  the 
gods  of  death.  So,  when  the  left  wing-,  where  Decius  Mus  com- 
manded, fell  into  disorder,  he  called  for  the  chief  pontiff,  and  with 
veiled  head  repeated  after  him  the  solemn  formula  of  self-devotion. 
And  when  he  had  so  done  and  mounted  his  horse,  he  plunged  into 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  to  seek  death  for  himself  and  victory  for 
his  country.  The  day  was  saved  by  the  heroism  of  Decius  ;  it  was 
won  by  the  skill  of  Manlius.  Instead  of  his  reserve  of  veterans 
{friarii),  he  brought  up  the  supernumeraries  {accensi),  whom  he 
had  armed  for  the  purpose.  Deceived  by  this  manoeuvre,  the 
Latins  threw  their  last  reserves  into  the  battle,  and  so  had  none 
left  to  meet  the  decisive  charge  of  the  Roman  veterans.  The 
part  played  by  the  Samnites  and  Hernicans  in  this  victory  is 
ignored  or  misrepresented  by  the  chroniclers  of  Rome.  Fleeing 
in  confusion  from  Campania,  the  Latins  made  a  last  rally  in 
defence  of  their  liberties  at  Trifanum,  but  another  defeat  drove 
their  troops  from  the  field.  Their  fortified  towns  capitulated  one 
after  another,  and  the  whole  country  submitted  to  the  yoke  of 
Rome. 

Settlement  of  Latium  and  Campania. — The  victory  of  Rome 
entailed  the  destruction  of  the  Latin  league  as  a  political  federa- 
tion, though  it  survived  as  a  religious  association.  Those  Latin 
cities  which  were  not  absorbed  into  the  Roinan  state  were  com- 
pletely isolated  from  each  other,  and  connected  simply  by  their 
common  dependence  on  Rome.  Each  subject  community  was 
bound  to  the  suzerain  by  a  separate  treaty.  It  retained  the  right 
of  local  self-government,  but  lost  all  control  over  foreign  policy, 
in  which  henceforth  it  followed  the  lead  of  Rome.  Complete 
submission  was  ensured  by  a  policy  of  isolation.  The  old  rights 
of  conubium  (inter-marriage)  and  commercium  (commerce  and 
settlement  {cf.  p.  98)  were  retained  by  the  Latins  only  in  Rome  ; 
all  similar  intercourse  between  one  Latin  town  and  another  was 
prohibited. 

Further,  Rome  took  upon  herself  the  duties  of  the  old  federal 
council.  She  determined  the  amount  of  the  contingents  which 
the  subject  cities  were  bound  by  treaty  to  provide  and  pay,  and 

1  Mommsen  has  found  reason  to  suspect  the  truth  of  Livy's  narrative, 
summarised  above,  and  follows  Diodorus  in  omitting  all  but  the  final  battle 
of  Trifanum. 


I04  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

supervised  the  assessmciU  of  tlicir  property  and  the  levy  of  their 
troops. 

Even  the  strongest  Latin  towns,  Tibur  and  Praeneste,  had  to 
cede  their  domain  lands  to  Rome,  and  to  follow  her  leadership  in 
war.  Other  districts  of  Latium  were  granted  less  favourable  terms. 
Lanuvium,  Aricia,  Nomcntum,  and  Pedum  were  compelled  to  accept 
the  Ca:rite  franchise  (pp.  89,  90).  Velitrse  was  further  punished  by 
the  destruction  of  its  walls  and  the  exile  of  the  senatorial  aris- 
tocracy, who  had  headed  the  opposition  to  Rome.  The  Volscian 
port  of  Antium^  was  made  a  Roman  burgess  colony  ;  its  inhabitants 
had  to  provide  land  for  the  new  settlers,  but  were  permitted  to 
join  the  colony  (338  B.C.).  A  few  years  later  Anxur  shared  the 
same  fate  (329  B.C.).  The  memory  of  these  measures  was  preserved 
by  the  erection  of  equestrian  statues  in  the  Forum  to  the  consuls 
Ma^nius  and  Camillus,  and  the  decoration  of  the  orator's  platform 
{rostra)  with  the  beaks  of  the  Antiate  triremes.  Two  new  tribes 
were  formed  from  the  settlers  on  the  confiscated  lands  of  the  Latins, 
and  from  some  recently  enfranchised  communities.  The  organi- 
sation of  the  Volscian  and  Campanian  districts  followed.  Fundi, 
Formias,  Cumas,  and  Capua  where  the  fidelity  of  the  aristocracy 
was  richly  rewarded,  received  the  civifas  sine  suffragio,  without 
forfeiting  local  autonomy.  Privernum,  which  once  more  rebelled 
(329  B.C.),  escaped  with  the  loss  of  its  walls  ;  but  the  leader  of  the 
revolt,  Vitruvius  Vaccus  of  Fundi,  paid  for  his  boldness  with  his  life. 
The  strongholds  of  Cales  (334  B.C.),  which  dominated  the  entrance  to 
the  Campanian  plain,  and  Fregellae  (328  B.C.),  which  commanded 
the  passage  of  the  Liris,  were  occupied  by  Latin  colonies.  In  vain 
the  Samnites  protested  against  the  occupation  of  Fregellaeand  Sora, 
as  an  infringement  of  their  rights.  Rome,  at  whose  instance  they 
had  refrained  from  attacking  Luca  and  Fabrateria,  pursued  her 
course  without  regard  to  their  complaints.  In  fifteen  years  she 
had  conquered  Latium  and  Campania,  and  secured  the  newly  won 
territories  by  a  ring  of  fortresses,  but  this  was  the  least  part  of  her 
achievement.  With  far-sighted  policy,  the  sovereign  state,  while 
she  severed  every  link  which  united  the  subject  cities,  drew  them 
each  more  closely  to  herself  by  the  promotion  of  social  and 
commercial  intercourse.  Already  the  same  language  and  the 
same  customs  prevailed  throughout  Latium ;  Rome  introduced 
a  single  system  of  law.  Local  autonomy  satisfied  her  subjects  for 
the  present  ;  the  hope  of  full  citizenship  in  the  future  fired  their 

1  Antium,  which  had  recovered  its  freedom  in  459  B.C. ,  had  possibly  become 
once  more  a  Lr.tin  colony,  385-377  B.C.  {cf.  also  p.  58). 


TAKEXTUM  AXD    THE  SAMNITES  105 

ambition  and  ensured  their  fidelity.  The  union  thus  evoked  out  of 
discord,  a  union  too  strong  to  be  shaiven  even  by  a  Hannibal,  was 
a  proof  of  Rome's  title  to  the  dominion  of  Italy  and  a  prophecy  of 
her  imperial  mission. 


KOMA.NU-LAMIWMAN    COIN,    33S-317    B.C. 


CHAPTl^R  XIV 


THE    SECOND     SAMNITE     WAR 


Outbreak  of  Second  Samnite  War 327 

The  Capitulation  at  the  Caudine  Forks  . 

Rome  drives  the  Samnites  back  into  the  Mountains 

Etruscan  War 

Revolt  of  the  Hernicans 

End  of  the  War 


R.C. 

A.r.c. 

327 

427 

321 

433 

3H 

440 

311-308 

443-446 

306 

448 

304 

45° 

Alexander  the  Molossian. — The  Samnites  were  not  indifferent 
spectators  of  the  establishment  of  Roman  dominion  in  Latium  and 
Campania,  but  they  were  fully  occupied  in  Lower  Italy.  The 
wealthy  merchants  of  Tarentum,  the  leading  state  in  Greek  Italy, 
had  long  trembled  before  the  Samnites  and  Lucanians.  They 
now  called  to  their  aid  mercenaiy  leaders  from  the  mother  countr}'. 
The  Spartan  king  Archidamus  fell  in  battle  against  the  Lucanians 
(338  B.C.),  but  his  place  was  taken  by  an  abler  chieftain,  Alexander 
the  Molossian,  uncle  of  the  great  Alexander.  Under  his  banner  were 
arrayed  his  countrymien  of  Epirus,  the  Greeks  of  Italy,  and  even 
exiled  Lucanians.  He  captured  Consentia,  the  chief  town  of  the 
Lucanians,  and  after  defeating  the  combined  forces  of  the  Samnites 
and  Lucanians  near  Paistum,  made  himself  master  of  Lower  Italy 
from  sea  to  sea.  Rome,  which  now  feared  the  rivalry  of  the 
Samnites,  ungratefully  forgot  their  services  in  the  Latin  war,  and 
made  an  ally  of  their  enemy.     But  this  sudden  greatness,  which 


io6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

fired  the  Epirot  prince  with  the  hope  of  founding;  a  Hellenic 
Empire  in  the  west,  a  dream  which  not  even  his  great  successor, 
Pyrrhus,  could  realise,  proved  the  precursor  of  his  fall.  The  Taren- 
tines,  who  needed  not  a  master  but  a  mercenary,  withdrew  their 
support.  The  attempt  to  form  a  new  league  of  their  unwilling 
adherents,  the  degenerate  Greek  cities  of  Italy,  and  their  old 
enemies,  the  Oscan  tribes,  ended  in  the  assassination  of  the  prince 
by  a  Lucanian  exile.  The  death  of  Alexander  left  the  Greek  cities 
to  defend  themselves  as  best  they  could  against  the  Lucanians, 
and  set  the  Samnites  free  to  use  their  whole  force  against  Rome 
in  the  decisive  struggle  for  the  mastery  of  Italy. 

Outbreak  of  Second  Samnite  War. — The  supremacy  of  Rome 
was  now  undisputed  in  the  plains  of  Latium  and  Campania  as  far 
south  as  the  Volturnus.  Only  the  Greek  citizens  of  the  twin  towns 
Palaeopolis  and  Neapolis  (Naples)  were  still  independent.  Dis- 
putes arose  between  the  men  of  Palaeopolis  and  the  Roman 
settlers  in  Campania,  which  led  the  Greeks  to  appeal  for  aid  to 
the  Samnites,  the  only  power  in  Italy  strong  enough  to  protect 
them  against  the  encroachments  of  Rome.  The  Samnites  deter- 
mined to  make  a  stand  in  Campania,  and  despatched  a  strong 
garrison  to  Palaeopolis.  The  formal  demand  of  the  Roman 
ambassadors  for  its  evacuation  was  met  by  a  complaint  of  the 
colonisation  of  Fregellae.  Both  nations  were  firmly  convinced  of 
the  justice  of  their  cause  and  the  strength  of  their  armies,  and 
appealed  with  confidence  to  the  judgment  of  the  god  of  battle. 
For,  in  truth,  though  the  occupation  of  Palaeopolis  formed  the  pre- 
text for  the  war,  just  as  that  of  Messana  was  later  the  occasion 
of  the  first  Punic  war,  the  struggle  thus  begun  was  no  border  war 
for  the  possession  of  a  single  city  or  even  a  particular  district, 
but  a  mighty  duel  between  two  rival  races,  which  was  to  determine 
whether  Italy  should  be  Latin  or  Oscan,  and  her  civilisation  pro- 
gressive or  stationary. 

Diplomatic  and  Military  Successes  of  Rome. — The  Romans 
were  keenly  alive  to  the  gravity  of  the  issue,  and  strengthened 
themselves  by  alliances  with  the  neighbours  and  enemies  of  the 
Samnites.  The  inhabitants  of  the  plains  of  Apulia  suffered  from 
the  raids  of  the  Samnites,  iiiuch  as  in  Scotland  the  Lowlanders  did 
from  the  Highland  clans,  and  were  ready  to  welcome  the  legions, 
for  whose  operations  against  the  rear  and  flanks  of  the  enemy 
they  furnished  a  most  serviceable  base.  The  people  in  Lucania 
were  eager  to  join  their  kinsmen  in  Samnium,  to  whom  they  were 
bound  both  by  sentiment  and  interest,  but  the  governing  nobles 


SECOND  SAMNITE    WAR  107 

would  not  sanction  an  alliance  which  involved  peace  with  their  old 
enemies,  the  Greeks  of  Tarentum.  Roman  diplomacy  succeeded,  as 
so  often,  in  playing  off  one  race  against  another,  and  averted  the 
danger  of  an  Oscan  coalition.  The  Sabellian  tribes  of  Central 
Italy  were  from  the  first  not  unfriendly  to  Rome.  Only  the 
Vestini  attempted  an  independent  policy,  and  they  were  shortly 
reduced  by  the  legions  to  submission.  In  this  way  Rome  secured 
her  communications  with  Apulia,  a  point  of  the  utmost  strategic 
importance.  Meanwhile  Publilius  Philo,  the  most  trusted  of  her 
statesmen,  pushed  on  the  siege  of  Palceopolis  with  energy,  and 
received  the  unprecedented  honour  of  a  command  prolonged 
beyond  his  year  of  office.  The  triumph  of  the  first  proconsul  was 
gained  rather  by  diplomacy  than  by  arms.  The  Roman  party 
in  Palajopolis  opened  their  gates  to  the  legions,  and  forced  the 
Samnite  garrison  to  flee  in  disorder.  The  Greeks  of  the  twin 
cities,  old  and  new,  were  granted  the  most  favourable  terms,  a 
perpetual  alliance  with  full  equality  of  rights.  This  liberality  was 
rewarded  by  the  fidelity  of  Neapolis,  and  may  have  induced  the 
neighbouring  cities  of  Herculaneum  and  Pompeii,  Nola  and 
Nuceria,  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  Rome.  The  aristocratic  party 
was  in  all  these  Oscan  towns,  as  at  Capua,  the  chief  support 
of  Roman  supremacy.  In  the  meantime  the  two  consuls  had 
advanced  into  Samnium,  and  are  said  to  have  taken  several 
towns  ;  at  any  rate  they  covered  the  operations  in  Campania  and 
Central  Italy  by  keeping  the  Samnites  employed  nearer  home. 
Two  campaigns  sufficed  to  confine  the  Samnite  power  within  the 
narrow  bounds  of  their  native  mountains,  and  to  secure  for  Rome 
a  firm  base  in  the  cities  on  either  coast,  and  a  safe  line  of  com- 
munications between  them  through  the  cantons  of  Central  Italy. 

L.  Papirius  Cursor  and  Q.  Fabius  Rullianus. — At  this  point  the 
real  history  of  the  war  is  obscured  by  exaggerated  tales  of  the 
exploits  of  the  two  principal  heroes  of  the  day,  and  a  lively  account 
of  a  dispute  between  them.  L.  Papirius  Cursor,  a  disciplinarian  of 
the  old  school,  who  was  now  dictator,  was  recalled  from  the  camp 
to  Rome,  to  take  the  auspices  afresh.  He  left  his  master  of  the 
horse,  Q.  Fabius  Rullianus,  in  command,  but  charged  him  most 
strictly  to  avoid  a  battle.  Fabius  disobeyed  his  orders  and  won 
a  great  victory.  Papirius  hastened  back,  vowing  to  punish  his 
disobedience  with  death,  but  Fabius  was  saved  for  the  moment 
by  the  soldiery,  and  fled  to  Rome  to  implore  the  protection  of 
the  Senate  and  people.  The  dictator,  who  pursued  in  hot  haste, 
warned  the  tribunes  not  to  diminish  his  authority  by  bringing  his 


io8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

sentence  before  the  assembly,  but  was  softened  by  the  entreaties 
of  the  people  and  the  submission  of  the  offender  to  his  mercy. 
He  granted  Fabius  his  life,  but  deprived  him  of  his  command. 

Timely  concessions  averted  a  more  serious  danger  in  the  fol- 
lowing year.  While  the  two. consuls  were  engaged  far  away  in 
Apulia  and  Samnium,  discontent  was  rife  nearer  home.  Tusculum, 
Privernum,  and  Velitrai  flew  to  arms,  determined  to  assert  their 
independence,  or  extract  from  Rome,  as  the  price  of  their  support, 
full  citizenship.  At  dead  of  night  the  alarm  was  given  that  the 
enemy  were  at  the  gates  of  Rome.  Though  the  surprise  failed, 
the  attempt  revealed  to  the  Romans  the  danger  of  a  general  revolt, 
and  induced  them  to  grant  the  demands  of  the  insurgents.  At 
the  next  census  two  new  tribes  were  formed  which  included  the 
rebellious  cities,  and,  more  extraordinary  still,  L.  Fulvius  Flaccus, 
who  had  been  chief  magistrate  of  Tusculum  at  the  time  of  the 
revolt,  was,  in  the  following  year,  consul  of  Rome.  After  the 
settlement  of  these  difficulties  Rome  devoted  herself  to  the  war 
with  renewed  energy,  so  that  the  Samnites  in  despair  sued  for 
peace.  They  determined  to  surrender  all  their  prisoners  and 
plunder,  and  even  Brutulus  Papius,  their  bravest  general,  had  not 
the  patriot  leader  preferred  suicide  to  the  tender  mercies  of  Rome. 
But  when  they  found  that  nothing  but  unconditional  submission 
would  satisfy  Roman  pride,  the  Samnites  resolved  on  a  desperate 
defence  of  their  liberty,  and  chose  for  their  leader  the  hero  of  the 
war,  Gavius  Pontius. 

The  Caudine  Forks. — The  overweening  confidence  of  Rome 
was  to  be  severely  punished.  Black  as  were  the  days  of  the  Allia 
and  of  Cannse,  there  was  one  day  blacker  still  in  her  calendar,  the 
day  of  the  Caudine  Forks,  because  it  was  not  only  marked  by 
disaster  but  branded  with  shame.  The  two  consuls  of  the  year 
321  B.C.,  T.  Veturius  and  Sp.  Postumius,  men  untried  in  war,  were 
enticed  into  the  defiles  of  the  Apennines  by  the  news  that  the 
whole  Samnite  force  was  engaged  in  Apulia,  besieging  the  town 
of  Luceria.  But  as  the  legions  pressed  forward  with  all  haste  from 
Campania  to  the  relief  of  their  Apulian  allies,  they  found  the 
outlet  of  the  valley  of  Caudium  blocked  by  the  Samnites,  and,  on 
retreating  to  the  defile  by  which  they  had  entered  the  fatal  pass, 
found  that  also  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  surrounding  hills 
were  lined  with  troops  who  had  been  lying'  in  ambush  ;  the  Roman 
army  was  fairly  caught  in  a  trap,  where  it  was  hopeless  to  fight 
and  impossible  to  fly.  Their  desperate  attempts  to  break  out 
were  easily  repulsed,  and  no  resource  was  left  but  to  throw  them- 


THE   CAUDINE  FORK'S  109 

selves  on  the  mercy  of  the  conqueror.  I'ontius  was  not  deaf  to 
their  entreaties.  Instead  of  pressing  his  advantage,  he  aimed  at 
an  honourable  and  lasting  peace.  Rome  was  to  recognise  in  the 
Samnites  an  equal  and  independent  power,  to  restore  the  terri- 
tories {c.g.^  Campania)  taken  from  them,  and  demolish  the  fortresses 
of  Cales  and  P'regelkt,  which  she  had  constructed  in  defiance  of 
the  old  treaty.  These  terms  were  accepted  by  the  consuls,  who 
left  six  hundred  knights  in  the  hands  of  the  Samnites  as  hostages. 
Further,  the  consuls,  the  quaestors,  and  all  the  surviving  officers, 
together  with  two  tribunes  who  were  with  the  army,  swore  to 
procure  their  ratification  by  the  Senate  and  people.  By  this  con- 
vention the  Roman  soldiers  saved  their  lives,  but  they  had  to 
surrender  their  arms,  their  baggage,  and  even  their  clothes,  except 
a  single  garment,  and  pass  beneath  the  yoke  {cf.  p.  62).  This 
ceremony  was  no  peculiar  insult  devised  by  Pontius,  but  a  regu- 
lar Italian  usage,  like  that  of  piling  arms  in  a  modern  capitulation. 
After  this  humiliating  confession  that  they  owed  their  lives  to  the 
forbearance  of  the  enemy,  the  legionaries  were  not  retained  as 
prisoners  of  war,  but  suffered  to  depart  unharmed. 

Rejection  of  the  Compact  by  Rome. — Pontius  little  knew  the 
enemies  with  whom  he  had  to  deal.  He  trusted  to  the  honour  of 
the  Roman  people  to  redeem  the  plighted  faith  of  their  consuls  and 
their  tribunes  ;  he  hoped  that  the  moderation  of  his  demands  would 
ensure  the  acceptance  of  the  proffered  peace.  But  the  Roman 
people  knew  no  peace  save  the  submission  of  their  enemies,  and 
cared  nothing  for  the  spirit,  if  only  they  observed  the  letter,  of  their 
engagements.  In  shame  and  dejection  the  beaten  army  stole 
homeward  through  Campania,  and  entered  the  city  under  cover  of 
the  night.  A  general  mourning  was  proclaimed,  and  the  consuls 
shut  themselves  up  in  their  houses,  leaving  the  conduct  of  the 
election  of  their  successors,  of  which  they  were  deemed  unworthy, 
to  an  inter-rex.  But  when  the  Senate  met,  it  resolved  at  once  to 
cancel  the  convention.  Sp.  Postumius  was  the  first  to  urge  that 
honour  would  be  satisfied  by  the  surrender  of  its  authors  to  the 
enemy  ;  the  Roman  people  could  not  be  bound  by  the  a^cts  of 
magistrates  who  had  exceeded  their  powers,  but  those  who  had 
sworn  to  the  treaty  must  be  delivered  over  to  the  Samnites,  as 
men  whose  lives  were  forfeited  by  their  breach  of  faith.  Accord- 
ingly, all  the  officers  of  the  defeated  army,  and  even  the  tribunes, 
who  protested  in  vain  against  this  mockery  of  justice,  were  solemnly 
handed  over  in  chains  to  the  enemy,  and,  to  complete  the  farce, 
Postumius  kicked  the  Roman  herald  {Jctialis),  professing  thus  to 


no  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

give  Rome  a  just  cause  of  war  against  the  Samnite  nation,  to 
which  he  now  belonged.  Pontius  utterly  refused  to  allow  Rome  to 
release  herself  in  this  way  from  her  plighted  word.  He  justly 
demanded,  either  the  ratification  of  the  peace,  or  the  surrender  of 
the  army  into  his  power,  as  at  the  Caudine  Forks.  But,  with  noble 
generosity,  he  refused  to  wreak  his  vengeance  on  the  men  whose 
lives  even  Roman  casuistry  pronounced  forfeit,  the  six  hundred 
hostages  and  the  surrendered  officers.  It  is  easy  to  sneer  at  the 
simplicity  which  led  him  to  believe  that  a  great  nation  might  prefer 
honour  to  expediency,  and  surrender  at  the  bidding  of  justice  what 
might  have  been  extorted  at  the  sword's  point.  But  even  the  most 
prejudiced  historians  cannot  obscure  the  contrast  between  the 
double-dyed  dishonour  of  the  Romans,  who  evaded  by  ignoble 
trickery  the  consequences  of  their  cowardly  capitulation,  and  the 
stainless  magnanimity  of  the  Samnite  hero. 

Success  of  the  Samnites. — War  was  at  once  renewed.  The 
Roman  chroniclers  strive  to  efface  the  dishonour  of  the  Caudine 
Forks  by  fictitious  accounts  of  the  recovery  of  Luceria  and  the 
humiliation  of  Pontius.  But  in  reality  Rome  had  to  strain  every 
nerve  to  keep  her  hold  on  Latium  and  Campania.  Satricum,  in 
the  Volscian  country,  revolted,  and  though  within  a  year  the  town 
was  betrayed  to  the  Romans,  the  Samnite  garrison  expelled,  and 
the  authors  of  the  revolt  punished,  the  example  was  fraught  with 
danger.  Still  more  serious  was  the  loss  of  Fregelte,  because  it 
commanded  the  upper  road,  by  the  valleys  of  the  Trerus  and  Liris, 
from  Rome  to  Campania.  In  Apulia  fear  and  hatred  of  Samnium, 
not  the  arms  of  the  legions,  kept  the  country  true  to  the  Roman 
alliance.  The  fall  of  Luceria  was  balanced  by  the  adhesion  of  the 
cities  of  Teanum  and  Canusium,  and  of  the  neighbouring  tribe  of 
the  Frentani.  In  the  following  years  exhaustion  caused  both  the 
combatants  to  relax  their  efibrts.  Rome  employed  the  respite  thus 
given  her  in  binding  two  important  cities  more  closely  to  herself. 
The  colony  of  Antium  was  reorganised,  probably  in  the  interest 
of  the  old  Volscian  population,  and  Capua  was  made  a  prasfecture, 
at  which  justice  was  henceforth  administered  for  Roman  citizens, 
according  to  the  forms  of  Roman  law,  by  a  prasfect  sent  each  year 
from  Rome,  an  ominous  encroachment  on  local  liberty. 

The  Crisis  of  the  War. — In  315  i;.c.  war  was  renewed  with  fresh 
energy.  While  the  consuls  were  absent,  engaged  probably  in  re- 
covering Luceria,  Rome's  hold  on  Campania  was  all  but  lost. 
Nuceria,  Nola,  Atella,  and  Calatia  threw  in  their  lot  with  the 
Samnites  ;  Sora,  on  the  Upper  Liris,  expelled  its  Roman  colonists, 


SECOND  SAMNITE    WAR  III 

and  a  large  force  of  Samnites  poured  down  from  the  mountains 
into  Campania.  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  the  Roman  dictator,  who 
had  just  taken  Saticula,  was  compelled  to  fall  back  by  the  coast 
road  to  the  pass  of  Lautute,  near  Anxur.  Even  this  defensible 
post  was  stormed,  and  his  raw  levies  were  only  saved  from  destruc- 
tion by  the  heroism  of  his  master  of  the  horse,  Q.  Aulius  Cerretanus, 
who  fell  in  covering  their  retreat.  The  Ausonians  in  the  country 
round  were  ripe  for  rebellion,  and  Capua  showed  her  resent- 
ment at  the  recent  infringement  of  her  liberties.  Suddenly  the  tide 
turned;  possibly  at  this  crisis  the  consuls  returned  to  the  rescue  from 
Apulia,  or  compelled  the  Samnites  to  draw  off  to  defend  their  own 
homes  ;  at  any  rate  Campania  was  won  back  as  speedily  as  it  had 
been  lost.  An  incjuiry  into  the  conspiracy  at  Capua  was  con- 
ducted by  the  dictator  C.  Maenius,  whereupon  the  two  Calavii, 
the  heads  of  the  Samnite  party  in  Capua,  committed  suicide.  Sora 
was  recaptured  and  punished.  The  Ausonian  cities  were  delivered 
into  the  hands  of  the  Romans  by  aristocratic  traitors  within  their 
walls,  and  repaid  by  a  horrible  massacre  for  their  wavering  fidelity. 
In  Campania  the  Samnite  army  was  defeated  and  pursued  over 
the  mountains  to  Bovianum.  Nola  entered  the  Roman  alliance 
on  favourable  terms,  and  the  other  Campanian  towns  followed  its 
example.  Finally,  the  upper  road  to  Campania  was  reopened  by 
the  capture  of  Fregellas. 

Rome  secures  Apulia  and  Campania. — Rome  hastened  to  secure 
her  conquests  by  the  foundation  of  colonies  (3 1  ■>^-2y  1 2  B.C.),  which,  as 
has  been  explained  (p.  57),  were  fortresses  garrisoned  by  Roman 
citizens  or  Latin  allies,  whose  mission  it  was  to  protect  the  frontiers 
and  maintain  the  dominion  of  the  mother  city.  Saticula  ^  was  made 
the  outpost  on  the  Samnite  frontier,  the  islands  of  Pontiae  became 
Rome's  naval  station  in  the  Campanian  waters,  while  Suessa, 
Aurunca,  and  Interamna  served  to  guard  the  great  road  to  Capua, 
built  (312  B.C.)  by  the  censor  Appius  Claudius.  At  the  same  time 
the  care  of  Roman  interests  in  Apulia  was  entrusted  to  the  2500 
colonists  of  Luceria.  Thus  the  Samnites  were  hemmed  in  on  both 
sides  by  a  chain  of  fortresses,  whose  walls  were  an  impregnable 
barrier  for  men  unskilled  in  the  conduct  of  sieg-es.  They  must 
soon  have  been  reduced  to  submission,  if  they  had  not  found 
support  outside  their  own  borders. 

Tarentum. — The  natural  allies  of  Samnium,  the  men  of  Taren- 
tum,  remained  supine  in  Italy,  while  they  frittered  away  their 
strength  in  a  naval  war  with  Agathocles  of  Syracuse.     After  the 

'  These  are  all  Latin  colonies  {cf.  map). 


112  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

disaster  at  Caudium  they  liad  aspired  to  arbitrate  between  the 
contending  powers,  but  Rome  had  rejected  tlieir  niediation,  a 
rebuft"  which  the  government  of  Tarentum  had  not  tlie  spirit  to 
resent.  Even  when  the  Spartan  prince  Cleonymus,  at  the  head 
of  their  forces,  had  compelled  the  Lucanians  to  make  peace  with 
Tarentum,  in  return  for  the  surrender  of  Metapontum,  they  still 
busied  themselves  in  petty  quarrels  with  other  Greeks,  instead  of 
throwing  the  whole  weight  of  South  Italy  into  the  scale  against 
Rome.  After  suffering  the  Samnites  to  fall  unaided,  Tarentum 
was  fortunate  in  obtaining  a  renewal  of  her  treaty  with  Rome  on 
favourable  terms. 

Etruscan  War. — The  Etruscans,  whose  forty  years'  peace  with 
Rome  had  just  expired,  assailed  the  frontier  fortress  of  Sutrium 
with  energy.  After  defeating  the  Roman  force  sent  to  its  relief, 
they  besieged  the  town.  The  hero  of  this  war  is  Q.  Fabius 
Maximus  Rullianus.  How  much  of  his  glory  is  due  to  the  fancy 
of  his  kinsman,  Fabius  Pictor,  the  first  historian  of  Rome,  or 
to  the  family  legends,  which  found  in  Etruria  the  most  fitting 
scene  for  the  exploits  of  the  great  Fabian  house,  we  cannot  tell  ; 
but  his  campaigns  certainly  made  a  deep  impression  on  the 
imagination  of  the  people,  and  first  revealed  to  Rome  the  funda- 
mental weakness  of  the  stately  edifice  of  Etruscan  power.  Fabius 
found  the  Etruscan  lines  too  strong  to  be  carried,  so  he  resolved 
to  draw  off  their  forces  by  an  attack  on  their  own  homes.  Beyond 
the  Ciminian  hills  and  woods  no  Ronlan  army  had  ever  penetrated, 
but  into  this  unknown  land  Fabius  boldly  led  his  troops.  He  had 
sent  forward  his  brother  to  explore  the  country,  and  now,  disre- 
garding the  orders  of  the  Senate's  messengers,  he  dashed  into 
Central  Etruria.  A  series  of  brilliant  victories  justified  the  ad- 
venturous general.  At  Sutrium,  at  Lake  Vadimo,  and  at  Perusia 
he  routed  the  enemy,  and  brought  the  chief  cities  of  Etruria, 
Perusia,  Cortona,  Arretium,  and  Tarquinii  to  consent  to  peace  for 
forty  years.     (310-309  B.C.) 

Fabius. — The  conqueror  of  Etruria  made  the  yet  more  glo- 
rious conquest  of  himself.  While  he  was  pushing  his  successes 
in  Etruria,  his  colleague,  Marcius  Rutilus,  was  hard  pressed  in 
Samnium.  The  reserves  which  had  been  raised  to  cover  Rome 
must  be  sent  to  his  rescue,  and  only  one  man  could  be  entrusted 
with  such  a  command,  Fabius'  old  enemy,  Papirius  Cursor.  The 
consul,  in  the  hour  of  his  country's  need,  stifled  private  animosity, 
and  named  Papirius  Cursor  dictator.  The  old  general,  whose 
blunt  humour  reconciled  the  soldiery  to  his  stern  discipline,  led 


SECOND  SAMNITE    WAR 


"3 


the  legions  for  the  last  time  to  victory.  The  sacred  band  of  the 
Samnitcs,  who  had  sworn  to  conquer  or  to  die,  made  the  triumph 
of  the  dictator  gay  with  the  white  or  many-coloured  tunics,  stripped 
from  their  corpses,  while  their  gold  and  silver  shields,  which  were 
used  to  decorate  the  shops  of  the  Forum  on  festal-days,  preserved 
the  memory  of  this  decisive  battle.  In  the  following  year  Fabius 
reconquered  Nuceria,  the  last  stronghold  of  the  Samnites  in 
Campania.     He  then  marched  into  Central  Italy,  and  kept  the 


CHIM^-RA. 

(Efnisarn  Bronze  in  the  ArcJicrological  Museum  at  Florence. 


Marsians  and  Pa^lignians  firm  in  their  allegiance  to  Rome  by 
defeating  the  Samnite  troops  and  putting  down  their  partisans. 
Lastly,  he  marched  from  Samnium  to  meet  the  threatened  attack 
of  the  Umbrians,  and  dispersed  their  levies  at  the  great  battle  of 
Mevania.  The  Umbrians  retired  from  the  struggle,  and  Ocriculum 
entered  the  Roman  alliance  (308  B.C.). 

End  of  the  Samnite  War. — The  dyiiig  flames  of  war  were  re- 
vived by  the  rebellion  of  the  old  allies  of  Rome,  the  Hernicans. 
The   Samnites   made  a  last   attempt  to  break  through  the  iron 

H 


114  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

barrier  of  Roman  fortresses,  and  to  force  their  way  to  the  gates  of 
Rome  by  the  valleys  of  the  Liris  and  Trerus.  They  took  Sera, 
Calatia,  and  Arpinum,  but,  before  they  could  come  to  the  help  of 
their  new  allies,  Anagnia,  the  Hernican  capital,  succumbed  to  the 
consul  Marcius.  The  Hernicans,  three  of  whose  cities  had  never 
joined  the  insurrection,  abandoned  a  struggle  to  which  their  strength, 
if  not  their  resolution,  was  plainly  unequal,  and  submitted  to  the 
loss  of  their  independence.  One  more  campaign  ended  the  weary 
struggle  with  the  Samnites.  Though  the  mountaineers  fought  with 
unabated  courage,  and  even  poured  do\\'n  once  more  into  Campania, 
their  strength  was  now  exhausted.  The  consuls,  Ti.  Minucius 
and  L.  Postumius  Megellus,  penetrated  into  the  heart  of  the 
country,  defeated  and  captured  the  Samnite  general,  Statius  Gellius, 
and  stormed  Bovianum.  The  Samnites  sued  for  peace,  and  were 
granted  tolerable  terms.  They  had  to  resign  all  their  conquests, 
but  within  their  native  mountains,  to  which  they  were  henceforth 
confined,  they  retained  their  ancient  liberties.  Whether  they 
formally  acknowledged  the  supremacy  of  Rome  is  uncertain  ;  at 
any  rate  the  issue  of  the  war  had  placed  the  superiority  of  Rome 
beyond  dispute,  and  had  proved  that  no  single  nation  in  Italy 
could  hold  its  own  against  the  city  of  the  seven  hills.  The  Italians 
were  often  yet  to  fight  in  defence  of  their  liberties  ;  but  no  hope  of 
success  remained  except  in  wide-reaching  coalitions  or  in  the  aid 
of  the  foreigner,  the  Gaul,  the  Greek,  or  the  Carthaginian. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE    CONQUEST    OF    THE    ITALIANS 


K,V. 


Outbreak  of  the  Third  Samnite  War 298         456 

Battle  of  Sentinum 235         459 

The  Samnites  and  Sabines  submit  to  Rome  ....     zgo         464 

The  Organisation  of  Central  Italy. — Rome  had  granted  peace 
to  Samnium  that  she  might  have  leisure  to  strengthen  her  hold  on 
Central  Italy.  Campania  she  had  already  secured  by  a  chain  of 
fortresses  linked  to  the  capital  by  the  great  Appian  road  ;  she  now 
set  to  work  with  characteristic  energy  to  perfect  the  defences  and 
organisation  of  her  other  dependencies.  The  rebellious  Herni- 
can communities  were  compelled  to  accept  the  Casrite  franchise 


ETRURIA   AND   CENTRAL   ITALY  115 

(7'.  supra,  p.  90)  ;  but  the  three  faithful  towns,  Aletrium,  Verulae,  and 
Ferentinum,  declined  the  offer  of  the  full  citizenship,  and  Rome 
felt  bound  to  respect  the  rights  and  liberties  guaranteed  them  by 
the  old  equal  alliance.  In  the  Volscian  district  Arpinum  and 
Trcbula  had  the  burdens  of  citizenship  imposed  on  them  without 
its  political  privileges  {civi/as  sine  siiffragio)  \  Frusino  paid  for  its 
disaffection  with  a  third  of  its  territory,  and  Sora  was  garrisoned 
by  four  thousand  colonists.  The  central  hills  and  the  line  of  com- 
munication with  them  along  the  Anio  were,  from  a  military  point 
of  view,  of  vital  importance,  and  so  were  most  carefully  secured. 
A  new  tribe  was  formed  in  the  valley  of  the  Anio,  and  in  spite  of 
the  resistance  of  the  ^quians  and  Marsians,  two  strong  fortresses, 
the  Latin  colonies,  Alba  Fucens  and  Carsioli,  were  planted  in  their 
country,  and  connected  with  Rome  by  a  road  named  later  after 
the  Valerian  house.     (303-298  B.C.) 

One  more  vulnerable  point  in  the  armour  of  Rome,  the  valley 
of  the  Tiber,  was  guarded  by  the  establishment  of  a  colony,  called 
Narnia(299  B.C.),  at  the  old  Umbrian  town  of  Nequinum,  and  the 
construction  of  the  first  part  of  the  great  Flaminian  road  through 
Ocriculum  to  that  fortress.  About  the  same  time  the  Picentines 
joined  the  central  Italian  cantons  in  allying  themselves  with 
Rome,  and  thus  completed  the  strong  barrier  which  separated 
the  northern  and  southern  enemies  of  the  conquering  city. 

Etruria. — On  the  north,  Rome  was  content  to  maintain  her  old 
military  frontier,  the  Ciminian  Hills,  unchanged,  but  made  use  of 
the  weakness  and  divisions  of  the  Etruscans  to  extend  her  politi- 
cal influence.  At  this  period  the  Etruscans  were  in  great  straits 
between  their  terror  of  the  Gauls,  whose  tribes  were  now  once 
more  in  a  state  of  ferment,  and  their  fear  of  the  steady  advance 
of  Rome.  One  party  in  that  unhappy  country  wished  to  bribe 
the  Gallic  clans  to  use  their  swords  for  the  defence  of  Italian 
freedom  ;  another  invoked  the  protection  of  Rome  against  the 
barbarians.  Internal  dissension  increased  the  uncertainty  of  Etrus- 
can policy.  Rome,  as  her  custom  was,  befriended  the  nobility, 
and  gained  a  useful  ally  by  restoring  the  exiled  Cilnii  to  power  at 
Arretium. 

Outbreak  of  War. — The  Samnites  saw  that  such  a  peace  was 
more  fatal  to  the  liberties  of  Italy  than  the  most  disastrous  war. 
If  Rome  were  allowed  time  to  consolidate  her  power  in  Central 
Italy,  to  dominate  Etruria  and  overawe  the  Gauls,  their  last  hope 
of  independence  was  gone.  Only  a  coalition  of  all  these  jarring 
elements  could  make  head  against  the  growing  power  of  Rome. 


ii6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

But  the  Samnites  had  leainl  by  bitter  experience  the  danger  of 
leaving  an  enemy  in  their  rear.  Accordingly,  while  the  Romans 
were  engaged  in  watching  the  advance  of  a  plundering  horde  of 
Gauls,  the  Samnites  suddenly  threw  themselves  on  Lucania,  and 
placed  their  partisans  in  power  throughout  that  region.  Rome 
at  once  required  the  Samnites  to  withdraw  from  Lucania,  and 
answered  their  refusal  by  declaring  war  (298  B.C.). 

The  movements  of  the  contending  armies  in  the  first  years  of 
the  war  are  uncertain  or  unintelligible,  partly  perhaps  from  a  want 
of  combination  in  the  plans  of  the  confederates,  partly  from  the 
contradictions  in  our  records  of  the  war.  It  seems  certain  that  the 
Romans  won  no  great  victories,  for  though  L.  Cornelius  Scipio 
Barbatus,  the  first  of  a  famous  line,  is  glorified  both  by  Livy  and 
by  the  epitaph  on  his  tomb,  their  conflicting  stories  deserve  no 
credence.  The  victory  at  Volaterrae  over  the  Etruscans  described 
by  Livy,  and  the  conquest  of  Lucania  mentioned  on  the  tomb 
seem  to  be  equally  imaginary.  The  more  modest  portions  of  the 
epitaph  ^  which  record  the  capture  of  two  unknown  places  in 
Samnium  and  the  reception  of  hostages  from  Lucania,  taken  in 
connection  with  the  triumph  of  Fulvius  over  the  Samnites,  seem  to 
show  that  both  consuls  were  engaged  in  restoring  Roman  ascend- 
ency in  the  south.  In  the  following  year  the  Romans  expected  to 
be  assailed  on  all  sides,  and  pressed  the  consulship  on  their  tried 
and  trusted  general,  Q.  Fabius.  The  old  hero  insisted  that  the 
honour  should  be  shared  by  his  friend,  P.  Decius  Mus.  But  the 
expected  storm  passed  ofif  for  the  moment  ;  the  Gauls  had  not 
come,  and  the  Etruscans  would  not  move,  so  that  the  Samnites  had 
to  bear  the  whole  brunt  of  the  battle.  Their  armies  were  defeated 
and  their  country  laid  waste  by  both  the  consuls  (297  B.C.). 

Gellius  Egnatius. — Next  year  the  storm  broke.  Gellius  Egna- 
tius,  the  Samnite  general,  had  the  boldness  to  conceive  and  the 
ability  to  execute  a  daring  march  through  Central  Italy  to  Umbria. 
It  was  essential  to  bring  the  Gauls  and  Etruscans  to  strike  a  great 
blow  for  the  deliverance  of  Italy.  So  the  Samnite  leader  left  the 
ordinary  levies  to  oppose  the  legions  in  Samnium  and  to  make 
a  descent  on  Campania,  while  he  led  the  flower  of  his  troops  to 
his  chosen  battle-ground.  The  consul  Volumnius  was  obliged  to 
hasten  from  Samnium  to  the  aid  of  his  colleague,  Appius  Claudius, 
in  Etruria,  and  then  return  with  speed  to  preserve  Campania  from 
devastation.     Yet  the  year  closed  without  a  decisive  encounter; 

^  "  Taurasia  Cisauna  Saninio  cepit 

Subigit  omne  Loucanam  opsidesque  abdoucit." 


GELLIUS  EGNATTUS 


117 


each  side  was  bracing  its  energies  for  the   final  struggle  in  the 
succeeding"  spring-. 

The  Senate  was  dismayed  when  they  heard  that  Gellius  Egna- 
tius  had  frustrated  their  efforts  to  separate  the  south  from  the  north, 
and  was  gathering  to  his  standards  the  discontented  Etruscans  and 
the  restless  Gauls,  The  courts  of  law  were  closed,  and  all  citizens, 
old  and  young,  freedmen  as  well  as  free-born,  were  called  to  arms. 
The  chief  command  was  entrusted  to  old  Q.  Fabius,  who  again 


TOMB   OF    I..    CORNELIUS    SCIPIO    BARBATUS. 


Stipulated  that  Decius  Mus  should  be  his  colleague.  Besides  the 
main  army,  two  reserves  were  called  out,  one  of  which  was  posted 
at  Falerii  to  guard  the  line  of  communications,  and  the  other 
retained  for  the  immediate  protection  of  the  city.  L.  Scipio  was 
sent  forward  with  the  vanguard  towards  Clusium,  but  his  forces 
were  surprised  and  cut  to  pieces  by  the  Gauls.  A  movement  of 
the  reserve  from  Falerii  into  Central  Etruria  was  more  successful, 
as  it  recalled  the  Etruscans  from  Umbria  to  the  defence  of  their 
own  homes.     Etruria,  as  usual,  proved  a  broken  reed  in  the  hour 


Il8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  danger,  and  the  Gauls  and  Saninites  fell  back  sullenly  over 
the  Apennines. 

Battle  of  Sentinum. — The  consuls,  eager  to  give  battle  while 
the  Etruscans  were  away,  at  once  pursued  the  retreating  enemy. 
On  the  other  side,  Gellius  Egnatius  knew  that  the  Gauls  would 
soon  be  weary  of  war,  and  trembled  at  the  thought  that  the  coali- 
tion effected  by  his  skill  and  daring  might  dissolve  away  at  the 
very  moment  when  victory  was  in  his  grasp.  Both  armies  were 
eager  for  the  fray  when  they  met  on  a  fair  field  near  the  city  of 
Sentinum.  On  the  right  wing,  Fabius,  whose  troops  were  not 
shaken  by  the  first  rush  of  the  enemy,  drove  back  the  Samnites 
foot  by  foot  ;  but  on  the  left  the  Roman  horse  was  thrown  into 
disorder  by  the  charge  of  the  Gallic  war-chariots,  and  in  its  flight 
broke  the  line  of  the  infantry.  Decius  Mus,  remembering  his 
father's  example,  devoted  himself,  together  with  the  host  of  the 
enemy,  to  the  powers  of  the  grave,  and  found  the  death  he  sought 
in  the  serried  ranks  of  the  Gauls.  His  legions  rallied,  and,  sup- 
ported by  the  resei'ves  which  Fabius  sent  to  their  aid,  restored  the 
battle.  The  fortune  of  the  day  was  decided  by  the  repeated 
charges  of  the  fine  Campanian  cavalry,  which  first  turned  the 
Samnites  to  flight,  and  then  fell  on  the  uncovered  flanks  and 
rear  of  the  still  unbroken  masses  of  Gallic  swordsmen.  Gellius 
Egnatius  fell  at  the'  gate  of  the  camp  in  a  last  attempt  to  rally 
the  beaten  troops  ;  his  followers,  disdaining  to  surrender,  fought 
their  way  back  to  their  native  mountains  ;  but  the  Gauls  dispersed, 
and  the  great  coalition,  by  which  Egnatius  had  hoped  to  save 
Italy,  was  shattered  at  one  blow  on  the  field  of  Sentinum 
(295  B.C.). 

The  Samnites  alone  hold  out. — Umbria  passed  at  once  into 
the  hands  of  the  Romans  ;  the  disaffected  cities  of  Etruria,  in 
particular  Volsinii  and  Perusia,  made  their  peace  in  the  following 
year ;  and  Campania  was  rescued  from  the  attacks  of  the  Samnite 
freebooters.  But  within  their  highland  fastnesses  that  uncon- 
querable people  still  defied  the  might  of  Rome.  The  sturdy  Swiss, 
who  scattered  the  chivalry  of  Burgundy  and  of  Austria,  and  made 
their  Alps  the  cradle  and  stronghold  of  liberty,  were  more  fortunate 
but  not  more  heroic  than  the  shepherds  and  herdsmen  of  the 
Apennines.  The  consuls  of  the  next  year,  L.  Postumius  Megellus 
and  M.  Atilius  Regulus,  were  repulsed  with  loss,  and  obliged  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  both  in  Apulia  and  Campania.  All  they 
could  boast  of  was  the  preser\'ation  of  Luceria  and  the  rescue  of 
Interamna,  on  the  Liris,  from  the  enemy.    In  293  B.C.  the  Romans, 


THE  SAMNITES  SUBDUED  119 

who  seem  to  have  relaxed  their  efforts  for  a  while  after  the  great 
deliverance  at  Sentinum,  returned  to  the  fray  with  renewed  vigour. 
L.  Papirius  Cursor,  son  of  the  hero  of  the  second  Samnite  war, 
invaded  Samnium  itself,  supported  by  his  colleague,  Sp.  Carvilius. 
The  Samnites  on  their  part  are  said  again  to  have  raised  a  sacred 
band,  marked  by  white  tunics  and  nodding"  plumes,  and  bound  by 
the  most  horrible  oaths  to  concjuer  or  to  die.  Their  gloomy  resolu- 
tion was  no  match  for  the  cheerful  courage  inspired  in  the  Romans 
by  the  homely  bluntness  of  Papirius,  who  at  the  crisis  of  the  battle 
promised  Jupiter,  not  a  splendid  temple,  but  a  cup  of  honeyed  wine 
before  a  drop  touched  his  own  lips.  The  surrender  of  Cominium 
and  other  Samnite  strongholds  crowned  the  victory  of  Aquilonia, 
and  splendid  spoils  graced  the  triumph  of  the  conqueror.  The 
last  gleams  of  success  whi  ch  shone  on  the  arms  of  the  Samnites 
brightened  a  name  already  glorious,  that  of  Gavius  Pontius.  The 
old  general  (unless,  indeed,  it  be  his  son)  chastised  the  rashness 
of  the  consul  Q.  Fabius  Gurges,  as  he  pressed  in  hot  haste  into  the 
mountains  after  the  retreating  Samnites.  Another  veteran,  Fabius 
Maximus,  took  the  field  to  save  the  honour  and  retrieve  the  errors 
of  his  son.  At  length  the  victor  of  the  Caudine  Forks  was  defeated 
and  captured,  and  the  bitter  and  shameful  memories  of  that  day 
were  yet  more  shamefully  avenged  by  the  death  of  the  Samnite 
hero.  The  triumphs  of  Roman  conquerors  were  constantly  stained 
by  the  unjust  execution  of  vanquished  opponents,  but  no  more 
odious  instance  of  a  heartless  custom  can  be  given  than  the  cruel 
fate  of  Pontius.  The  task  of  completing  the  subjugation  of  the 
Samnites  fell  to  Manius  Curius,  who  appears  to  have  granted  them 
an  honourable  peace  (290  B.C.). 

Roman  Colonies. — The  Romans  at  once  devoted  themselves  to 
the  work  of  securing  the  ground  they  had  gained  in  the  late  war. 
On  the  coast  of  Campania  they  had  already  (296  B.C.)  established 
fortresses  at  Minturnse  and  Sinuessa,  whose  inhabitants  received 
the  full  citizenship,  as  was  the  rule  in  maritime  colonies.  In  290  B.C. 
Manius  Curius  conquered  the  Sabines,  and  compelled  them  to 
accept  Roman  citizenship  without  the  franchise  ;  in  the  following 
years  Rome  strengthened  her  hold  on  the  eastern  coast  by  the 
foundation  of  colonies  at  Hatria,  289  B.C.  (Latin),  and  Castrum 
Novum,  283  B.C.  (burgess).  But  the  chief  settlement  of  the  time 
was  Venusia,  on  the  confines  of  Samnium,  Apulia,  and  Lucania,  to 
which  place  as  many  as  twenty  thousand  Latin  colonists  were 
sent  (291  B.C.).  This  important  fortress,  connected  with  Rome 
by  an  extension  of  the  Appian  road,  was  designed  to  block  the 


i20  IIISrORY  OF  JWAfE 

communications  of  the  Samnites  with  Tarentum.  For,  though 
Tarentum  had  suffered  her  fears  of  Agathocles  and  her  troubles 
with  the  Lucanians  to  blind  her  eyes  to  the  pressing  needs  of  the 
Samnites,  she  was  the  one  city  left  in  Italy  strong  enough  to 
rouse  the  suspicions  of  Rome  ;  and  by  calling  on  Greece  to  redress 
the  balance  in  Italy,  she  was  yet  to  give  the  vanquished  one  more 
chance  of  striking  at  the  heart  of  Rome,  under  the  banner  of  the 
greatest  captain  of  the  age. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  WAR  WITH  TARENTUM  AND  PYRRHUS 

B.C.  A.I'.C. 

War  with  the  Lucanians  breaks  out 289  465 

Battle  of  Lake  Vadimo 283  471 

Declaration   of  War   against   Tarentum,    which   summons 

Pyrrhus  from  Epirus •        ■  281  473 

Battle  of  Heraclea— Embassy  of  Cineas.        .        .  .  280  474 

Battle  of  Ausculum— Alliance  of  Rome  and  Carthage  .  279  475 

Pyrrhus  goes  to  Sicily •        .  278  476 

Pyrrhus  defeated  by  M.  Curius  at  Beneventum   .         .        .  275  479 

Milo  surrenders  Tarentum— Submission  of  South  Italy       .  272  482 

Rhegium  taken      ...        - 271  483 

War  with  the  Lucanians. — The  submission  of  the  Samnites 
did  not  secure  for  Italy  the  promised  respite  from  trouble.  In  the 
late  war  the  Lucanians  had  been  most  useful  to  Rome  by  oc- 
cupying the  attention  of  Tarentum  ;  they  now  expected  to  reap 
their  reward  in  the  plunder  of  the  rich  cities  of  Magna  Graecia. 
With  this  object  Sthenius  Statilius,  the  Lucanian  general,  laid 
siege  to  Thurii,  which,  in  despair  of  all  other  help,  threw  itself  on 
the  mercy  of  Rome.  That  power,  which,  since  the  subjugation 
of  Samnium  and  the  foundation  of  Venusia,  no  longer  needed  the 
help  of  the  Lucanians,  lent  a  ready  ear  to  the  prayer  of  Thurii, 
and  ordered  Statilius  to  cease  his  assaults  on  the  beleaguered 
city.  The  Lucanians  replied  by  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
siege,  and  by  a  summons  to  all  South  Italy  to  unite  with  them  in 
resisting  the  new  pretensions  of  Rome. 

Etruria  and  the  Gauls. — A  more  pressing  danger  prevented 
Rome  throwing  all  her  energies  into  the  defence  of  Thurii.  The 
Gauls  and  Etruscans  had,  on  the  whole,  kept  the  peace  since  the 


ETRURIA    AND    THE    GAULS  121 

great  battle  of  Sentinum,  for  the  revolt  of  Falerii  (293  B.C.)  hardly 
disturbed  the  general  quiet,  but  they  were  now  encouraged  by 
the  war  in  the  south  to  tempt  fortune  again.  The  forces  raised 
by  the  Etruscan  malcontents,  which  were  composed  chiefly  of 
Senonian  mercenaries,  laid  siege  to  the  faithful  town  of  Arretium, 
and  annihilated  the  Roman  army  sent  to  its  relief.  An  embassy 
was  despatched  to  the  chiefs  of  the  Senones,  who  were  nominally 


FALISCAN    VASE    IN    THE    UKITISH    MUSEUM. 


at  peace  with  Rome,  to  complain  that  their  people  had  served  in 
the  armies  of  Rome's  enemies,  and  to  demand  the  release  of  the 
prisoners.  But  the  Gallic  chieftain,  Britomaris,  slew  the  sacred 
envoys  in  revenge  for  the  death  of  his  father  in  the  late  battle. 
The  outrage  was  signally  avenged.  The  consul,  P.  Cornelius 
Dolabella,  advanced  into  the  land  of  the  Senones,  while  the  flower 
of  their  warriors  was  in  Etruria,  and  destroyed  the  whole  tribe. 
The   men  were   slain   without   quarter,  the   women   and  children 


122  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

enslaved  ;  the  very  name  of  the  Senones  disappears  from  the 
muster-rolls  of  Italy.  The  neighbouring  clan  of  the  Boii,  in 
whom  rage  mastered  terror,  flew  to  arms  to  avenge  their 
slaughtered  countrymen.  They  poured  over  the  Apennines,  and 
were  joined  in  their  march  on  Rome  by  the  Etruscans  and 
their  Gallic  mercenaries.  But  their  combined  forces  were  utterly 
defeated  by  Dolabella,  while  they  were  attempting  to  cross  the 
Tiber  near  Lake  Vadimo  (283  B.C.).  In  the  following  year,  after 
a  second  defeat  near  Populonia,  the  Boii  concluded  a  separate 
peace.  The  land  of  the  Senones  was  given  to  the  burgesses 
settled  at  Sena  Gallica,  which  fortress  was  designed  to  serve  as 
a  check  on  the  Gauls  and  a  station  for  a  Roman  fleet  on  the 
Adriatic  (283  V,.Z.)} 

The  Breach  with  Tarentum. — After  the  submission  of  the  Gauls 
the  Roman  army  took  the  offensive  in  Lucania.  Hitherto  it  had 
been  content  to  defend  Thurii  ;  now  C.  Fabricius  raised  the  siege 
by  the  defeat  and  capture  of  the  Lucanian  general,  Statilius.  The 
neighbouring  cities  of  Croton,  Locri,  and  Rhegium,  following  the 
example  of  Thurii,  willingly  received  Roman  garrisons.  Taren- 
tum was  thus  hemmed  in  on  all  sides  by  the  outposts  of  Rome ; 
even  her  maritime  ascendency  was  threatened,  in  the  Adriatic  by 
the  colonies  of  H  atria  and  Sena,  and  in  the  home  waters  by  the 
Greek  cities  which  had  allied  themselves  with  the  barbarians. 
Though  she  had  not  drawn  the  sword  against  Rome,  she  was  sus- 
pected of  having  instigated  the  war  which  she  had  not  the  courage 
herself  to  undertake.  Suddenly  the  Roman  admiral,  Valerius,  ap- 
peared in  the  bay  of  Tarentum  at  the  head  of  a  squadron  of  ten 
ships  of  war.  Whether  Valerius  simply  intended  to  put  in  at  a 
friendly  port  on  his  way  to  the  Adriatic,  or  hoped  to  enable 
the  aristocratic  partisans  of  Rome  in  Tarentum  to  seize  the 
reins  of  government,  is  a  moot  point.  In  any  case  his  act  was 
contrary  to  Greek  international  law,  and  a  direct  violation  of 
an  existing  treaty,  which  forbade  the  ships  of  Rome  to  sail 
beyond  the  Lacinian  promontory  at  the  western  extremity  of 
the  Tarentine  gulf  The  people  of  Tarentum,  assembled  in  the 
theatre  overlookmg  their  harbour,  saw  the  Romans  advance,  and 
were  easily  persuaded  by  the  demagogue  Philocharis  to  avenge 
the  insult.  The  Roman  squadron  was  put  to  flight  by  their 
hastily  manned  galleys  ;   the   admiral  fell  ;   four  ships  were  sunk 

*  The  account  given  in  Polybius,  li.  19,  20,  and  preferred  by  Mommsen, 
is  different  in  many  points,  and  lays  more  stress  on  the  part  played  by  the 
Gauls. 


THE  BREACH   ]VITH   TARENTUM  123 

and  one  taken.  The  prisoners  were  either  put  to  death  or  sold 
into  slavery. 

The  die  was  now  cast.  The  democrats  of  Tarentuni,  who  had 
witnessed  unmoved  the  long  death-agonies  of  the  Samnite  nation, 
had  been  hurried  by  passion  into  the  conflict  which  they  had  so 
long  avoided.  They  resolved  to  follow  up  their  first  blow  with 
energy.  They  marched  to  Thurii,  compelled  the  Roman  garrison 
to  withdraw,  and  punished  the  principal  citizens  by  exile  and  con- 
fiscation for  preferring  the  assistance  of  barbarians  to  that  of  their 
own  neighbours  and  countrymen  (282  B.C.). 

Outbreak  of  War. — The  Romans,  who  were  afraid  of  driving 
Tarentum  into  the  arms  of  Pyrrhus,  king  of  Epirus,  behaved  with 
studied  moderation.  They  despatched,  not  an  army,  but  an  em- 
bassy to  Tarentum  to  demand  satisfaction.  The  terms  proposed 
were  moderate — the  release  of  the  captives,  the  surrender  of  the 
demagogues  who  had  instigated  the  assault  on  the  Roman  fleet, 
and  the  reversal  of  the  late  revolution  at  Thurii.  The  statesmen 
of  Rome  sought  to  place  her  partisans  in  power  in  both  the  Greek 
cities,  and  thus  secure  her  ascendency  without  recourse  to  arms. 
But  the  democrats  of  Tarentum  had  gone  too  far  to  retreat.  When 
the  Roman  ambassadors  reached  Tarentum,  their  foreign  dress 
and  broken  Greek  were  ridiculed  by  the  disorderly  rabble  gathered 
in  the  theatre  to  celebrate  the  Dionysia.  Gravely  and  simply  L. 
Postumius  delivered  his  message,  heedless  of  the  insults  showered 
upon  him.  But  at  last  a  drunken  wretch  bespattered  the  envoy's 
white  toga  with  dirt,  an  outrage  which  was  greeted  by  the  riotous 
mob  with  shouts  of  laughter  and  thunders  of  applause.  The 
Roman  held  up  the  sullied  toga  to  the  crowd,  and  solemnly 
warned  them  that  the  stains  upon  it  would  be  washed  out  in 
their  best  blood.  We  may  suspect  that  this  tale  has  been  in- 
vented or  exaggerated  to  exalt  the  Roman  by  depreciating  the 
Greek,  but  the  contrast  between  the  staid  dignity  of  the  ambas- 
sador and  the  insolent  levity  of  the  populace  points  a  true  moral, 
even  if  the  anecdote  itself  is  false.  Notwithstanding  this  insult 
the  Roman  Senate  was  unwilling  to  proceed  to  extreme  measures. 
They  were  conscious  that  the  capture  of  Tarentum  was  beyond 
their  powers,  for  its  walls  were  strong  enough  to  defy  their  rude 
siege-engines,  and  its  superior  fleet  made  an  effective  blockade 
impossible.  The  city  could  neither  be  forced  nor  starved  into 
a  surrender,  and  the  attempt  would  only  precipitate  what  Rome 
most  feared,  a  summons  to  Pyrrhus.  But  it  was  still  possible 
that  Tarentum  might  be  induced  to  prefer  the  peaceful  acknow- 


124  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

ledgment  of  Rome's  supremacy  to  the  hardships  of  war.  Accord- 
ingly the  consul  L.  yEmiHus  Barbula  was  instructed  still  to  offer 
the  same  terms,  but  to  begin  hostilities  at  once  if  satisfaction 
were  again  refused.  He  scattered  the  troops  and  laid  waste  the 
lands  of  Tarentum,  but  spared  the  lives  and  properties  of  the 
aristocrats.  Rome  still  hoped  by  wielding  the  sword  with  one 
hand,  while  with  the  other  she  offered  the  olive-branch,  to  bring 
moderate  men  in  Tarentum  to  listen  to  reason.  Nor  were  her 
hopes  unfounded.  While  the  principal  democrats  were  absent  on 
a  mission  to  Pyrrhus,  the  aristocrats  secured  the  election  of  their 
leader,  Agis,  as  commander-in-chief  But,  before  he  could  take 
office  and  come  to  terms  with  Rome,  the  envoys  returned  from 
the  Epirot  court,  accompanied  by  Cineas,  the  minister  of  Pyrrhus, 
who  promised  immediate  support  from  his  master.  The  demo- 
cratic party  used  their  restored  ascendency  to  depose  Agis,  and 
to  promise  the  king  pay  and  provisions  for  his  troops,  as  well  as 
the  command  of  all  the  recruits  they  could  raise  in  Italy.  The 
admission  of  his  most  trusted  general,  Milo,  with  3000  Epirots 
into  the  citadel  finally  committed  Tarentum  to  the  cause  of  the 
adventurous  prince,  who  hoped  to  rival  Alexander  by  spreading 
Hellenic  rule  and  civilisation  to  the  western  boundary  of  the 
known  world  (281  B.C.). 

The  Early  Career  of  Pyrrhus.  —  Pyrrhus  was  the  son  of 
yEacides — a  cousin  of  Alexander  the  Molossiaft,  and  his  successor 
on  the  throne.  ^Eacides  lost  his  kingdom  and  his  life  through 
the  intrigues  of  Cassander,  the  wily  regent  of  Macedon,  who 
thus  avenged  the  support  ^acides  had  given  to  the  ill-starred 
family  of  Alexander  the  Great.  Pyrrhus  was  protected,  and,  while 
yet  a  boy,  restored  to  the  throne  by  Glaucias,  an  Illyrian  chieftain. 
When  fresh  disturbances  drove  him  again  into  exile,  he  joined 
his  brother-in-law,  Demetrius  Poliorcetes,  and  fought  bravely  by 
his  side  on  the  field  of  Ipsus.  After  that  crushing  defeat  he 
was  sent  as  a  hostage  for  Demetrius  to  the  court  of  Alexandria. 
There  he  won  the  good  opinion  of  King  Ptolemy  by  his  soldierly 
spirit,  and  the  favour  of  Berenice  by  his  manly  beauty  and 
courteous  bearing.  With  the  help  of  the  Egyptian  king  he  re- 
established himself  on  the  throne  of  his  forefathers,  and,  in  the 
troubles  that  followed  the  death  of  Cassander,  won  for  the 
Epirots  a  much-needed  outlet  to  the  sea,  by  gaining  command 
over  the  Gulf  of  Ambracia  and  the  island  of  Corcyra.  After  some 
years  of  peace,  Pyrrhus  was  encouraged  by  Ptolemy  of  Egypt, 
Seleucus  of  Syria,  and   Lysimachus  of  Thrace,  who  were  again 


PVR  RHUS   THE   E  PI  ROT  125 

leagued  together  against  the  restless  and  ambitious  Demetrius, 
to  drive  that  prince  from  the  throne  of  Macedon.  But  after  a 
seven  months'  reign  the  discontent  of  the  Macedonians  and  the 
forces  of  Lysimachus  compelled  him  to  retire  once  more  to  his 
own  kingdom  of  Epirus.  In  the  petty  duties  of  a  tribal  chieftain 
Pyrrhus  could  find  no  scope  for  his  lofty  ambition  and  military 
genius,  and  through  six  long  years  looked  in  vain  for  employment 
abroad.  At  last  the  appeal  of  the  distressed  Hellenic  cities  of 
the  West  for  aid  came  as  a  message  of  release  for  the  caged 
eagle  of  Epirus. 

The  Schemes  of  Pyrrhus. — The  ideas  which  animated  the  Epirot 
were  not  less  bold  than  those  which  led  Alexander  across  the 
Hellespont  to  gain  the  empire  of  the  East.  As  the  Macedonian 
had  ended  by  his  victory  the  long  struggle  with  Persia,  so 
Pyrrhus  aspired  to  deliver  the  Greeks  of  the  West  from  the 
dominion  of  the  rude  Italian  and  the  hated  Canaanite.  Often  in 
the  ages  past  had  the  Carthaginian  been  driven  from  Eastern 
Sicily  by  the  captains-general  of  Western  Hellas.  In  older  days 
Sicily  had  found  leaders  in  the  great  tyrants,  Gelo  Hiero  and 
Dionysius  ;  more  recently  she  had  looked  for  deliverance  to  the 
mother  country,  and  found  a  saviour  in  the  hero,  Timoleon.  Pyrrhus 
believed  himself  destined  to  complete  and  unite  the  schemes  of  his 
kinsman,  Alexander  of  Epirus,  and  of  his  father-in-law,  Agathocles, 
to  humble  Rome  and  Carthage  to  the  dust,  and  found  on  the 
ruins  of  their  dominions  an  Hellenic  empire  of  the  West.  But  this 
empire  was  the  dream  of  a  great  adventurer,  not  the  reasoned 
project  of  a  statesman.  When  Alexander  set  out  for  the  East 
he  left  Macedon  securely  guarded  and  Greece  subject.  Pyrrhus 
relied  for  the  safety  of  Epirus  on  the  good  faith  of  neighbouring 
princes.  Alexander  led  a  sufficient  army  of  Macedonian  veterans 
to  scatter  the  ill-disciplined  hordes  of  Persia  ;  Pyrrhus  had  to  face 
the  national  levies  of  Italy  at  the  head  of  a  motley  army  of  allies 
and  mercenaries,  and  for  the  navy,  without  which  he  could  not 
hope  to  break  the  power  of  Carthage,  was  dependent  on  the  fickle 
democracies  of  Syracuse  and  Tarentum.  But  though  the  schemes 
of  Pyrrhus  were  doomed  to  failure,  their  surpassing  interest  sheds 
a  reflected  glory  on  their  author.  As  the  last  great  effort  to 
deliver  the  West  from  the  barbarian,  and  the  first  meeting  of  the 
phalanx  and  the  legion  in  battle,  the  expedition  of  Pyrrhus  is  a 
turning-point  in  history.  His  defeat  left  Sicily  the  helpless  prize 
in  a  mighty  struggle  between  the  rival  cities  of  the  West,  and 
showed  how  powerless  was  the  military  science  and  political  craft 


126  HISTORY   OF  ROME 

of  the  Greek  to  meet  the  unflinching  resolution  of  Roman  states- 
men and  the  patriotic  devotion  of  the  Roman  militia. 

The  Beginning-  of  the  War. — Pyrrhus  landed  in  Italy  at  the 
head  of  an  army  raised  for  the  most  part  in  Northern  and  Western 
Greece,  and  consisting  of  20,000  heavy-armed  footmen,  3000  horse, 
2500  archers  and  slingers,  and  20  elephants.  He  found  the  hopes 
and  promises  of  a  general  rising  in  Italy  utterly  vain.  Even  the 
men  of  Tarentum  would  not  join  heartily  in  the  war  which  they 
had  provoked.  They  had  expected  to  hire  a  mercenary'  to  fight 
their  battles  ;  they  found  the  king  a  stern  and  exacting  master. 
He  compelled  the  lazy  burghers  to  mount  gmard  on  the  wall  ;  he 
put  down  their  clubs  and  assemblies,  and  shut  up  their  theatre 
and  gymnasia  ;  in  fine,  he  treated  Tarentum  as  a  conquered  town. 
The  citizens  were  left  no  choice  in  the  matter  ;  their  resources 
were  employed  to  hire  Italian  mercenaries,  and  their  citadel  be- 
came the  base  of  the  operations  of  the  Epirot  army. 

Rome  was  not  behindhand  in  preparing  for  the  coming  con- 
flict. She  repressed  discontent  among  her  subjects  with  a  firm 
hand,  and  summoned  to  her  standards  full  contingents  both  of 
her  allies  and  her  own"  citizens.  A  force  advanced  into  Etruria 
to  compel  the  revolted  cities,  Volci  and  Volsinii,  to  lay  down  their 
arms  ;  a  second  was  held  in  reserve  at  Rome.  Garrisons  were 
placed  in  the  Greek  towns  of  Lower  Italy,  while  the  Lucanians 
and  Samnites  were  held  in  check  by  the  colonists  of  Venusia  and 
a  weak  corps  of  observation.  P.  Valerius  Laevinus,  with  the 
main  army,  hastened  to  meet  the  invader  before  he  could  effect 
a  junction  with  the  Samnites  or  foster  insurrections  in  Magna 
GrEecia.  He  found  the  Epirot  troops  occupying  a  position  which 
covered  the  Tarentine  colony  of  Heraclea. 

Battle  of  Heraclea. — Pyrrhus  allowed  the  Romans  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  Siris,  and  thus  compelled  them  to  fight  with  a  river 
in  their  rear.  Seven  times  the  legions  strove  to  pierce  the  serried 
ranks  of  the  Epirots,  and  but  for  the  prayers  and  entreaties  of 
the  king  the  phalanx  would  have  given  way.  At  length  each 
general  brought  up  his  last  reserves,  but  the  Roman  horse  would 
not  face  the  terrors  of  the  elephants.  Their  disordered  flight 
broke  the  ranks  of  the  infantry,  and  the  whole  army,  horse  and 
foot  together,  fled  in  confusion  over  the  Siris.  The  military 
skill  of  Pyrrhus  had  won  the  day  at  Heraclea.  By  enticing  the 
Roman  legions  into  the  plain,  where  his  phalanx  could  maintain 
unbroken  order  and  repel  with  ease  all  assaults  on  its  bristling 
rows   of  pikes,  he  had  gained   a  tactical    advantage,   which    the 


rVRKHUS  IN  ITALY  127 

terror  inspired  by  the  strange  and  monstrous  appearance  of  the 
elephants  had  enabled  him  to  turn  to  the  best  account.  But 
it  was  a  victory  which  could  not  be  often  repeated.  Many 
of  the  best  Epirot  officers  and  four  thousand  veterans  were 
left  dead  upon  the  field.  I'yrrhus  may  well  have  felt  that  such 
a  victory  resembled  a  defeat. 


TETRADRACHM    OF   PYRRHUS   STRUCIv    IN    ri'ALY — HEAD    OK   ZEUS 
OF   DODONA,    AND    THE   GODDESS    DIONE. 


But  the  successful  encounter  with  a  Roman  army  in  the  field 
encouraged  South  Italy  to  throw  in  its  lot  with  the  conqueror. 
When  Laevinus  retired  into  Apulia,  the  Samnites,  the  Lucanians, 
and  the  Bruttians  joined  Pyrrhus.  All  the  Greek  cities,  except 
Rhegium,  now  welcomed  their  deliverer.  Even  Rhegium  was 
lost  to  the  Romans,  for  its  Campanian  garrison  seized  the  tou-n, 
and  entered  into  a  close  alliance  with  their  kinsmen  and  neigh- 
bours, the  Mamertines,  who,  with  like  treachery,  had  deserted 
Agathocles,  and  taken  Messana  for  themselves.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Latins  remained  true  to  Rome.     (280  B.C.) 

Embassy  of  Cineas. — Pyrrhus  resolved  to  use  his  victory  to 
make  peace  with  Rome  and  devote  his  energies  to  the  conquest 
of  Punic  Sicily.  He  sent  his  most  trusted  minister,  Cineas  the 
Thessalian,  to  try  the  arts  of  diplomacy,  learnt  in  Hellenistic 
courts,  on  the  Roman  Senate.  The  concessions  demanded  were 
the  release  of  the  Greek  towns  in  Italy  from  their  allegiance  to 
Rome,  and  the  surrender  of  the  strongholds  of  Roman  power  in 
South  Italy,  Venusia,  and  Luccria.  The  flattery,  if  not  the  gifts, 
of  Cineas  all  but  cajoled  the  Roman  Senate  into  the  acceptance 
of  the  proffered  peace.     But  the  indomitable  resolution  of  Rome 


128  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

found  voice  in  the  greatest  man  of  her  proudest  house,  the  blind 
old  consular,  Appius  Claudius.  Lord  Chatham  protested  in  vain 
with  dying  voice  against  the  dishonour  of  yielding  to  the  coalition 
of  France  and  America  ;  Appius  inspired  his  countrymen  with  his 
own  burning-  patriotism,  and  first  enunciated  the  proud  maxim 
that  Rome  never  negotiated  while  foreign  troops  stood  on  Italian 
ground.  Cineas,  with  all  his  courtier's  arts,  had  failed  in  his 
mission,  and  returned  to  his  master  deeply  impressed  with  the 
majesty  of  the  Senate,  which  he  called  an  assembly  of  kings. 
Pyrrhus,  who  had  advanced  into  Campania  to  support  by  arms 
the  demands  of  his  envoy,  was  goaded  by  their  rejection  into 
a  march  on  Rome.  But  the  legions  recalled  from  Etruria  and 
the  reserve  in  the  capital  were  ready  to  repel  any  assault,  and 
Lasvinus,  reinforced  by  two  newly  levied  legions,  hung  upon  his 
rear.  Pyrrhus  could  only  plunder  the  rich  country  south  of 
Rome,  and  retire  with  his  booty,  first  to  Campania,  and  then  to 
winter  quarters  at  Tarentum.  The  arrival  of  a  Roman  embassy 
encouraged  him  to  renew  his  offer  of  peace.  But  the  consular, 
Fabricius,  could  not,  we  are  told,  be  bribed,  cajoled,  or  terrified 
into  compliance  with  the  king's  wishes.  Pyrrhus  was  obliged 
again  to  try  the  fortunes  of  war. 

Battle  of  Ausculum. — The  second  campaign  was  fought  in 
Apulia.  Pyrrhus,  whose  keen  eye  had  perceived  the  value  of  the 
open  order  of  battle  adopted  by  the  Romans,  interspersed  Italian 
cohorts  between  the  subdivisions  of  his  phalanx.  But  on  the 
first  day  of  the  hard-fought  battle  at  Ausculum  the  device  availed 
him  little.  On  the  broken  ground  by  th  steep  banks  of  a  river 
his  cavalry  and  elephants  could  not  act.  On  the  second  day, 
however,  he  managed  to  deploy  his  phalanx  on  the  plain  beyond, 
and  a  second  time  the  legionaries  with  their  short  swords  hewed 
in  vain  at  the  hedge  of  pikes,  till  the  arrival  of  the  elephants  was 
once  more  the  signal  for  a  general  flight.  The  Roman  army 
made  good  its  retreat  across  the  river  to  its  camp  with  the  loss 
of  six  thousand  men  ;  the  conquerors  admitted  that  three  thousand 
five  hundred  of  their  number  had  fallen.  Such  a  victory  was  not 
calculated  to  break  up  the  Roman  confederacy,  and  sadly  weakened 
the  Epirot  army.     (279  B.C.) 

Pyrrhus  goes  to  Sicily— Alliance  of  Rome  and  Carthage. — 
Pyrrhus  was  weary  of  fruitless  victories,  and  anxious  to  escape 
with  honour  from  an  impossible  position.  While  the  indomitable 
resistance  of  Rome  was  wearing  out  his  energies,  Syracuse  was 
anxiously  expecting  deliverance  at  his  hands  from  the  Cartha- 


PYRRHUS  IN  SICILY  12^ 

ginians.  The  king  readily  accepted  the  invitation,  but  the  im- 
mediate effect  of  his  new  policy  was  to  unite  his  enemies.  Rome 
and  Carthage  entered  into  a  league  against  him,  by  which  each 
bound  itself  to  render  assistance  to  the  other  if  its  territory  was 
attacked,  and  to  refuse  all  offers  of  a  separate  peace.  The  Romans 
thus  gained  the  assistance  of  the  Punic  navy  ;  the  Carthaginians 
hoped  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Sicily,  while  their  allies  de- 
tained the  king  in  Italy.  But  Pyrrhus  seized  the  first  chance 
offered  him  of  patching  up  an  armistice  with  the  Romans.  The 
consul  Fabricius  handed  over  to  the  king  a  traitor  who  proposed 
to  poison  him  for  money,  and  so  paved  the  way  for  an  interchange 
of  prisoners  and  a  cessation  of  hostilities.     (278  B.C.) 

Leaving  Milo  in  Tarentum,  and  his  own  son  Alexander  at 
Locri,  Pyrrhus  set  sail  for  Syracuse.  During  his  absence  the 
war  in  Italy  languished.  The  Lucanians  and  Bruttians  were 
punished  for  their  insurrection,  but  the  Samnites  once  again 
repulsed  the  Roman  armies.  The  Greek  cities  were  gradually 
subdued  ;  Heraclea  obtained  favourable  terms  ;  Croton  was  cap- 
tured by  a  stratagem  ;  Locri  massacred  its  Epirot  garrison,  and 
thus  atoned  for  its  earlier  treachery  to  Rome.  Only  Tarentum 
was  held  for  the  king. 

Pyrrhus  in  Sicily. — In  Sicily,  Pyrrhus  won  a  series  of  triumphs. 
City  after  city  was  taken,  until  the  Carthaginians  were  shut  up  in 
LilybtEum  and  the  Mamertines  in  Messana.  The  Carthaginians 
offered  as  the  price  of  peace  to  resign  all  claim  to  the  sovereignty 
of  Sicily  if  they  might  keep  Lilyb;ieum.  But  Pyrrhus  rejected 
the  insidious  proposal,  for  he  saw  that  if  Carthage  kept  a  foothold 
in  Sicily  she  could  at  once  regain  her  dominions  when  he  had 
gone.  He  preferred  to  continue  the  struggle,  and  called  on  his 
Sicilian  allies  to  build  a  fleet.  But  the  fickle  Sicilians  murmured 
at  the  burden  of  military  service,  and  resented  the  autocratic 
rule  of  the  king.  They  negotiated  with  their  enemies,  the  Mamer- 
tines and  Carthaginians,  and  treated  their  deliverer  as  a  tyrant. 
In  the  field  Pyrrhus  was  as  brilliant  as  ever  ;  he  drove  the  Car- 
thaginian army,  which  ventured  out  from  Lilybteum,  back  into 
its  stronghold  ;  but  he  felt  that  the  day  of  his  greatness  was  past. 
Sicily  had  shown  herself  unworthy  of  the  hero  to  whom  she  had 
called  for  aid.     (277-6  B.C.) 

Defeat  and  Departure  of  Pyrrhus. — Turning  his  back  on 
.Sicily,  Pyrrhus  returned  to  Tarentum  a  "  soured  and  disappointed" 
man.  On  his  way  he  had  to  fight  the  Carthaginian  fleet  off 
Syracuse  and  the  Mamertine  army  near  Rhegium.     He  succeeded 

1 


136  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

in  surprising  Locri,  and  replenislicd  liis  treasury  with  tlic  plunder 
of  the  temple  of  Persephone.  But  his  Sicilian  dominions  fell 
away  from  him  as  soon  as  he  left  the  island,  and  his  Italian  allies 
had  lost  faith  in  his  star.  His  brave  Epirots  had  fallen  on  many  a 
well-fought  field,  and  their  places  had  been  taken  by  forced  levies 
or  by  foreign  mercenaries.  Yet  the  Romans  took  the  field  for 
the  decisive  campaign  in  275  B.C.  with  reluctance  and  apprehen- 
sion. While  L.  Cornelius  Lentulus  maixhed  into  Lucania,  Manius 
Curius  faced  Pyrrhus  in  Samnium.  The  Romans  occupied  a 
strong  position  in  the  hills  near  Beneventum,  which  Pyrrhus  de- 
termined to  storm  before  Lentulus  could  come  to  his  colleague's 
assistance.  But  everything  went  wrong  with  the  attacking  force. 
A  whole  division  lost  its  way  in  the  forest,  and  came  up  too  late  ; 
neither  the  phalanx  nor  the  cavalry  could  act,  and  the  elephants, 
terrified  by  the  storm  of  burning  arrows  with  which  the  Romans 
received  them,  rushed  furiously  back  through  the  ranks  of  their 
own  friends.  Pyrrhus  could  not  keep  the  field  after  his  defeat. 
His  entreaties  to  his  allies,  the  kings  of  Macedon,  Syria,  and 
Egypt,  for  help  were  coldly  rejected.  With  a  heavy  heart  he  took 
leave  of  Italy,  and  returned  to  his  own  land.  There  he  grasped 
once  more  at  the  crown  of  Macedon,  but  his  vehement  and 
haughty  courage,  which  still  gained  him  victories,  was  no  match 
for  the  cool  and  cautious  policy  of  Antigonus  Gonatas.  At  length, 
he  fell  ingloriously  in  a  street  fight  at  Argos,  struck  down  by  a 
tile  thrown  by  a  woman's  hand. 

Surrender  of  Tarentum. — Milo  had  been  left  in  Italy  to  hold 
Tarentum.  So  long  as  his  master  lived,  he  withstood  boldly  the 
disaffection  of  the  citizens  and  the  attacks  of  Rome.  But  when 
news  came  of  his  death,  he  cared  only  to  secure  an  honourable 
retreat  for  the  Epirot  garrison.  A  Roman  army  was  outside  the 
walls,  a  Carthaginian  fleet  before  the  harbour.  Each  power  strained 
every  nerve  to  win  the  prize.  Milo  preferred  to  treat  with  the 
Roman  general,  L.  Papirius,  and  by  the  surrender  of  the  citadel 
purchased  a  free  departure  for  himself  and  his  troops.  The  Cartha- 
ginians, who  had  doubtless  hoped  to  secure  in  Tarentum  a  second 
Lilybaeum,  now  disavowed  all  selfish  intentions,  and  professed  to 
have  merely  offered  naval  assistance  to  the  Roman  army  in  con- 
formity with  the  treaty.  Tarentum,  deprived  of  her  army,  her  ships, 
and  her  walls,  lost  her  independence  and  prosperity,  but  retained 
the  right  of  local  self-government.     (272  B.C.) 

Submission  of  Italy  to  Rome. — In  the  same  year  the  Samnites, 
Lucanians,  and   Bruttians   submitted   to  the   inevitable   yoke   of 


ROME   MISTRESS   OF  ITALY  131 

Rome.  Bands  of  guerrillas  slill  haunted  the  mountains,  but  three 
years  later  sword  and  cord  established  peace  even  in  those  wild 
regions.  The  sternest  punishment  was  meted  out  to  the  mutineers 
who  had  seized  Rhegium.  These  freebooters  filled  up  the  cup  of 
their  iniquity  by  the  sack  of  Croton  and  the  massacre  of  its  Roman 
garrison.  A  strong  force  was  sent  against  them  ;  Hiero,  the  new 
master  of  Syracuse,  sent  help  to  the  Romans,  and  kept  their 
friends  and  compatriots,  the  Mamertines  of  Messana,  occupied 
at  home.  After  a  severe  struggle  the  town  was  stormed,  and 
its  defenders,  who  survived  the  assault,  executed.  The  city  was 
restored  to  its  ancient  inhabitants  and  retained  its  local  autonomy. 
Rome  now  ruled  supreme  from  the  straits  of  Messina  to  the  river 
Arno  and  the  headland  of  Ancona.  A  new  act  in  the  drama 
begins  when  the  mistress  of  Italy  comes  into  conflict  with  the 
great  naval  power  of  Carthage.  The  struggle  had  been  already 
foreseen  by  Pyrrhus,  who,  when  he  turned  his  back  on  Sicily, 
repined  at  leaving  so  fair  a  battlefield  to  the  Romans  and  Car- 
thaginians. The  issue  of  the  great  duel  secured  for  Rome  the 
empire  of  the  civilised  world. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE    POSITION    AND    RESOURCES    OF    ROME    AND    CARTHAGE 

Retrospect  and  Prospect- Organisation  of  Italy  -Roman  Army  and  Navy- 
Carthage,  Constitution,  Organisation  and  Resources. 

Rome  a  Great  Power. — The  battle  of  Beneventum  and  the 
subjugation  of  the  revolted  tribes  closes  the  chapter  of  Italian 
struggle  and  opens  the  period  of  external  conquest.  A  new 
power,  with  a  peculiar  organisation  and  a  national  army,  was 
revealed  to  the  civilised  world,  schooled  by  experience  to  deal 
with  the  new  and  grave  problems  presented  by  the  state  of  foreign 
affairs.  Rome,  mistress  of  Italy  from  the  yEsis  to  the  sea,  was 
recognised  in  273  B.C.  by  Egypt  as  a  great  power,  and  in  272  B.C. 
the  collision  with  Carthage  at  Tarentum  foreshadowed  the  course 
of  coming  events. 

Retrospect  and  Prospect. — We  have  traced  the  growth  of  the 
united  city  as  the  struggle  for  existence  became  a  struggle  for 
predominance  ;  we  have  watched  the  gradual  consolidation  of  her 


1^,2 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


orders  and  her  institutions.  Ilcr  people,  stron<^  in  its  c|ualitie.s 
and  in  its  defects,  without  j^enius,  culture,  or  elasticity,  endowed 
with  a  sense  of  order  and  discipline,  strictly  legal  and  endlessly 
tenacious,  secure  in  conquered  rights,  and  led  by  a  vigorous  and 
patriotic  nobility  as  yet  uncorrupted  by  the  plunder  of  provinces, 
had  proved  itself  more  than  a  match  for  even  the  picked  troops  of 
the  finest  soldier  of  the  day.  It  had  been  welded  by  constitu- 
tional conflict,  and  educated  by  political  action  ;  it  had  benefited 


KING    IN    CHARIOT. 

{Tcrra-cotta  of  Fiuiic  workmanship. 


equally  by  victory  and  defeat  in  civic  training  and  military  tactics. 
It  had  now  to  enter  on  a  new  path.  Ancient  policy  did  not 
recognise  the  balance  of  power.  Its  scientific  frontier  was  found 
in  a  belt  of  weakness  ;  it  tolerated  no  rival  on  its  borders  whose 
strength  was  a  possible  danger.  It  was  this,  and  the  necessities 
of  the  moment,  with  the  natural  appetite  for  expansion  and 
plunder,  which  urged  the  Government,  not  so  much  to  make  a  bold 
bid  for  empire,  as  to  enter  on  a  policy  of  piecemeal  annexation 


GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  SENATE  133 

and  half-reluctant  aggression,  for  which  the  character  neither  of 
the  people  nor  of  its  institutions  was  thoroughly  adecjuate.  We 
have  now  to  trace  the  beginnings  of  the  provincial  system,  the 
growth  of  the  professional  army  ;  the  reaction  of  both  on  the  city- 
state  and  its  finance^  on  morals  and  religion  ;  the  decay  of  the 
constitutional  factors,  the  break-down  of  the  military  organisation, 
the  gradual  growth  of  an  Italian  question,  the  rise  of  a  proletariate, 
the  extension  of  slavery,  the  intensification  of  the  old  social  and 
economic  difficulties.  Here,  too,  begins  with  the  career  of  Scipio 
Africanus  the  line  of  commanding  personalities,  whose  life  and 
action,  accustoming  men  to  the  idea  of  a  single  ruler,  set  the 
precedents  and  paved  the  way  for  Cassar. 

In  the  period  immediately  before  us  the  democratic  movement 
has  subsided.  The  comitia,  hampered  by  religious  and  constitu- 
tional restrictions,  weakened  by  war  and  the  diffusion  of  the  citizen 
Dody  throughout  Italy,  fall  under  the  control  of  the  magistrates. 
The  magistrates,  coming  out  of  and  returning  into  the  Senate,  with 
short  tenure  of  office,  saddled  with  the  intercession  of  colleague  or 
tribune,  fall  in  their  turn  under  the  control  of  the  Senate.  The 
Senate,  the  sole  deliberative  assembly,  permanent  in  power  and 
patronage,  becomes  the  de  facto  government  of  Rome.  It  directs 
militar)'  operations  ;  it  arranges  for  the  cumulation  or  prorogation 
of  office  ;  it  manages  the  departments  of  finance  and  foreign  policy, 
in  an  age  when  finance  and  foreign  policy  are  dominant.  The  day 
of  patrician  intrigue  and  reactionary  conservatism  is  over.  With 
the  admission  of  the  plebs  to  the  higher  honours,  the  passing  of 
the  Lex  Ovinia,  and  the  accession  of  plebeians  to  the  censorship 
(351  B.C.),  a  career  had  been  opened  to  ability,  the  emulation  of  the 
nobles,  stirred  ;  there  was  an  influx  into  the  Senate  of  younger, 
abler  men  of  moderate  views  and  tried  capacity.  The  House,  filled 
almost  automatically  with  ex-officers  of  state,  strengthened  with 
a  constant  supply  of  new  blood,  entered  on  a  new  course  with 
larger  ideas  and  a  broader  policy. 

But  in  this  period,  also,  the  decay  of  the  yeomanry  and  the 
growth  of  capitalism  coincides  with  the  extension  of  the  empire. 
A  new  political  order  —  the  Eqaites  —  forms  alongside  of  the 
official  nobility,  while  the  growing  contact  with  Greece  and  the 
East  tends  more  and  more  to  affect  the  simplicity  of  Roman 
manners. 

Italian  Organisation. — Rome's  territory  was  compact ;  her 
subjects  were  di\  idcd  by  no  deep  cleavage  of  race,  feeling,  or 
culture.     Step  by  step  her  steady,  ceaseless  advance  was  secured 


134  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

by  a  network  of  roads  and  fortresses.  The  peoples  she  annexed 
were  not  at  once,  as  in  modern  times,  levelled  with  their  con- 
querors by  allegiance  to  a  common  lord.  She  maintained  the 
distinction  of  subject  and  citizen.  The  Roman  franchise  was  at 
once  an  object  of  desire  and  a  privileged  position,  granted  at 
discretion  to  individuals  or  to  whole  states.  The  organisation  of 
Italy  was  peculiar,  and  differed  essentially  from  modern  methods. 
There  was  no  division  into  administrative  districts,  no  uniformity 
of  local  government,  law,  and  taxation.  Annexation,  colonisation, 
federation,  had  placed  Rome  at  the  head  of  a  species  of  con- 
federacy, whose  elements  formed  a  congeries  of  communities  with 
diverse  and  graduated  rights.  The  national  leagues  were  dis- 
solved, or  limited  to  religious  ceremonies  ;  joint  assemblies  and 
reciprocal  franchises  ^  were  abolished  ;  a  policy  of  subdivision  and 
isolation,  with  a  carefully  adjusted  distribution  of  privilege, 
paralysed  joint  action  and  drew  the  separated  units  closely  to 
Rome.  The  jealousy  of  states,  and  the  jealousy  of  orders  in  the 
states,  was  carefully  utilised  ;  the  constitutions  were  often  re- 
modelled in  an  aristocratic  sense.  This  system  combined  to 
some  extent  the  advantages  of  local  government  and  centralisa- 
tion. The  weightier  questions  of  internal  administration,  the 
whole  foreign  and  intercommunal  relations  of  the  several  states, 
were  controlled  by  the  paramount  power. 

Local  matters  were  settled  by  local  councils  and  magistrates 
in  accordance  with  the  law  or  treaty  which  regulated  the 
affairs  of  each  community.  The  prerogatives  of  sovereignty  ex- 
tended indeed  beyond  the  formal  rights  of  coinage,  peace,  and 
war,  but  the  relation  of  sovereign  and  subject  was  left  purposely 
indefinite,  and  there  was  no  technical  name  for  the  Roman 
hegemony.  The  burghers  of  Rome  of  the  thirty-three  tribes — 
finally  thirty-five — included,  besides  the  actual  inhabitants  of  the 
city  and  its  immediate  territory,  and  of  the  subject  or  allied  towns 
to  which  full  rights  had  been  granted  out  of  gratitude  or  policy, 
those  who  had  been  settled  on  confiscated  land  throughout  Italy, 
either  individually,  or  collectively  in  citizen  colonies.^  The  latter 
were  a  privileged  class,  with  undiminished  rights  as  citizens, 
rapidly  assimilating  in  each  town  the  subject  population  along- 
side them. 

Beneath  these,  in  various  stages  of  autonoinous  dependency, 

^  The  right  of  intermarriage  and  settlement,  i-'idc  p.  98. 
-  The   citizen-colonies  were   mainly  maritime  ;    the    Latin    colonies  com- 
manded the  great  roads,  vide  map. 


ITALIAN  ORGANISATION  135 

come  (i)  the  different  classes  of  imuncipia,  possessing  the  private 
rights  of  citizens,  the  civitas  sitie  sufft'agw  et  sine  hire  Iionoruin, 
with  the  his  privatum  of  Rome  administered  by  Roman  praefects, 
burdened  with  personal  service  in  the  legion  and  the  payment  of 
the  tribiiiiim,  retaining  or  not,  according  to  circumstances,  the 
full  or  partial  administration  of  local  business  ;^  (2)  the  ciintaies 
[(.sderatcr,  whose  dependence,  nominally  in  political  matters  only, 
was  actually  more  deeply  felt.  They  furnished  each  a  contingent 
to  the  army,  and  enjoyed  full  local  autonomy,  the  right  of  coin- 
age, of  jurisdiction,  and  the  itis  exilii.  Among  these  come  the 
Latin  colonies,  or  Colonies  of  Latin  Right,  the  outposts  and 
watch-towers  of  Rome,  dependent  on  Rome  for  life  and  land,  with 
smaller  franchise  and  larger  autonomy  than  the  colony  of  burgesses, 
with  fuller  rights  than  the  ordinary  ally;"  the  rest  are  strictly 
socii^  enjoying  various  immunities,  limited  only  in  foreign  policy, 
and  bound  to  render  aid  in  war  with  ships  or  men  ;  such  are 
Neapolis,  Heraclea,  or  Tarentum.  No  doubt  the  rights  so  granted 
were  gradually  curtailed  in  proportion  as  the  bestowal  of  the  fran- 
chise was  restricted,  and  the  policy  of  Rome  changed  from  one  of 
incorporation  and  extension  to  one  of  jealous  exclusion.  The  one 
thing  sure  was  the  gradual  equalisation  of  pressure  ;  the  one 
thing  definitely  fixed  was  the  contingent  of  men  or  ships— deter- 
mined in  the  end  only  by  the  necessities  or  the  power  of  Rome. 
But,  in  the  meantime,  policy  mitigated  despotism  ;  the  allies 
enjoyed  a  free  communal  constitution,  exemption  from  taxation, 
save  that  implied  in  the  equipment  and  payment  of  their  con- 
scripts, with  a  large  share  in  the  military  and  political  successes 
which  they  helped  to  achieve,  and  in  the  august  name  and  destinies 
of  Rome.  The  strength  of  the  growing  Italian  feeling,  the  solidity  of 
this  unique  organisation,  and  the  value  of  the  Latin  fortresses  were 
severely  tested  in  the  war  of  Hannibal  ;  and  the  failure  to  follow 
up  the  wise  policy  of  their  fathers  in  this  respect  brought  the 
Romans  of  the  next  period  into  deadly  peril.  In  contrast  with 
the  factious  Grecian  states,  with  the  loosely  organised  empire  of 
Carthage",  with  the  decrepit  kingdoms  of  the  East  and  the  restless 
tribes  of  the  North,  stands  the  compacted  Italian  republic,  with 
its  strong  national  spirit,  its  willing,  obedient  subjects. 

The  Army. — In   ancient   times  the  form  and  character  of  a 

1  The  term   "  municipium  "  comes  to  mean,  later  on,   a  country  town  of 
Roman  citizens. 

2  By  the  year  268  B.C.  they  were  twenty-two  in  number,  vide  map.     These, 
with  the  rehcs  of  the  Cassian  League,  make  up  the  Nonien  Latinum. 


136  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

government  was  largely  determined  by  the  character  of  the 
national  armaments.  The  army  is  a  fundamental  institution 
of  Rome,  with  whose  history  is  inseparably  bound  up  the  his- 
tory of  her  total  development.  She  was  essentially  a  fighting 
nation.  The  history  of  that  army  follows  a  general  law  of 
ancient  military  progress.  To  the  system  of  caste,  when  a 
ruling  aristocracy  retains  in  its  own  hands  the  science  of  war, 
succeeds  the  citizen  army  or  fleet,  whose  special  character  is 
dictated  by  the  local  characteristics  or  political  necessities  of  each 
state.  From  the  citizen-militia  is  developed  the  professional,  often 
the  mercenary,  army,  to  be  succeeded  by  the  standing  armies 
and  palace  guard  of  a  military  monarchy.  Power  passes  to  the 
trained  battalions.  The  Roman  army  exhibits  such  a  gradual 
change  in  its  tactics,  its  organisation,  its  recruiting  fields,  and 
each  change  is  reflected  in  the  face  of  current  politics.  As 
each  new  class  enters  the  service,  it  presses  against  the  limits  of 
the  franchise.  Extended  operations,  distant  fields  of  war,  the 
requirements  of  the  provinces,  the  development  of  tactics  and 
individual  drill  combine  with  moral  and  economic  causes  to 
transform  the  farmer  conscript  of  Camillus  into  the  professional 
veteran  of  Cassar.  At  this  period  the  backbone  of  the  legions 
was  still  formed  by  that  sound  yeomanry,  whose  conservative 
instincts  and  fighting  qualities  made  them  the  bulwark  alike  of 
Rome's  constitution  and  power.  From  the  same  class  came  the 
Italian  cohorts.  But  with  the  increasing  need  of  troops  and  the 
growing  distaste  of  the  wealthier  classes  for  their  military  duties, 
the  property  qualification  for  the  legion  is  gradually  lowered, 
the  proletariate  press  in,  and  the  effect  is  seen  in  the  remodelling 
{circ.  241  B.C.)  of  the  comitia  centuriata  :  there  is  a  marked  growth 
in  the  allied  contingents  ;  the  cavalry  service  passes  from  the 
burgesses  to  the  allies,  the  soldier  tends  to  separate  from  the 
citizen,  while  the  appointment  of  the  staff  by  the  people  drags 
the  army  into  the  sphere  of  party  politics. 

Service  was  at  once  a  duty  and  a  privilege  ;  every  citizen  was 
liable  to  serve,  and,  strictly  speaking,  only  a  citizen  could  serve. 
He  was  liable  from  the  seventeenth  to  the  forty-sixth  year,  and 
for  sixteen  to  twenty  campaigns  in  the  infantry,  ten  in  the  cavalry. 
A  certain  number  of  campaigns  was  the  condition  of  civil  pro- 
motion, and  the  military  tribuneship  the  first  step  in  the  career  of 
office  (311  B.C.).  The  capiie  ce/isi  and  freedmen,  except  in  a  crisis, 
were  relegated  to  the  fleet.  Owing  to  this  extension  of  service,  the 
total  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  Senate,  with  whom  rested  the 


THE  ARMY  137 

control  of  the  army,  may  be  estimated  for  this  period  at  over 
700,000  foot  and  70,000  horse,  exclusive  of  the  seniors  reserved 
for  garrison  duty,  but  inclusive  of  the  contingents  of  the  Latin 
name  and  allies.  Of  this  total,  the  citizens,  with  the  cives  sine 
siiff7-agi'o}  might  amount  to  over  273,000,  the  allies  to  over  497,000. 
A  first  summons  on  a  great  emergency  could  place  above  200,000 
soldiers  in  the  field.  The  proportion  of  allies  to  citizens  serving 
with  the  colours  was,  strictly  speaking,  determined  in  accordance 
with  the  original  arrangement  or  treaty,  on  a  scale  relative  to  the 
number  of  available  men  and  the  number  of  legions  on  foot. 
Theoretically  they  furnished  an  equal  force  of  infantry  and  thrice 
the  cavalry,  but  the  number  steadily  rose  till  two  allies  were 
summoned  for  every  citizen.  At  this  period,  of  the  nonnal  levy 
of  two  consular  armies  or  four  legions  annually  raised  and  annually 
discharged — 41,600  men — the  allies  contributed  20,000  foot  and 
3600  horse  to  the  16,800  foot  and  1200  horse  of  the  regular  army  ; 
/>.,  roughly,  about  4  to  3- — a  number  not  disproportioned  to  their 
population.  As,  however,  their  population  decreased,  while  that 
of  Rome  increased,  the  burden  of  the  growing  contingent,  equipped 
and  paid  as  it  was  by  the  various  communities,  and  only  main- 
tained in  the  field  by  Rome,  became  heavier.  In  the  Punic  wars 
the  pressure  was  often  severely  felt. 

Besides  the  allies  we  have  to  recognise  the  corps  of  auxilia — 
allies  or  mercenary — Cretan  archers,  Moorish  javelineers,  Spanish 
infantry,  Gallic  cavalry,  who  were  needed  to  meet  the  light  troops 
of  Hannibal. 

With  these  additions,  we  may  reckon  a  consular  army  at  from 
20,000  to  24,000  men,  consisting  of  two  legions,  each  containing 
4200  (rising  occasionally  to  5200)  legionaries  and  300  Roman 
horse,  with  5000  foot  and  900  horse  of  the  allies. 

The  number  of  legions  on  foot  rises  in  the  second  Punic  war 
to  as  many  as  from  eighteen  to  twenty-three — not,  of  course, 
acting  in  combination. 

Development  of  the  Legion.  —  The  Greek  phalanx  of  the 
Servian  army,  as  a  tactical  body,  lacked  mobility.  Against  a 
Gallic  charge  or  for  mountain  warfare  it  was  useless.  Only  as 
strong  as  any  one  of  its  sides,  its  dislocation  was  disastrous,  and 
it  had  no  reserve.     At  the  same  time,  the  heavy  burden  of  unpaid 

1  Numbering  about  50,000  and  furnishing  tlie  Legio  Campana,  so  named 
because  the  largest  number  came  from  Campania. 

-  In  case  of  necessity,  and  especially  where  a  district  was  liable  to  be  the 
seat  of  war,  the  proportion  naturally  rises. 


138  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

service  and  the  tributum  rendered  short  campaigns  a  necessity  to 
the  small  farmer.  Strategy  was  out  of  the  question.  A  series  of 
gradual  and  undated  changes  in  tactics  and  organisation  leads  us 
to  the  manipular  legion.  With  the  introduction  of  pay  in  406  B.C., 
the  burden  of  payment  was  shifted  from  the  tribe  to  the  treasury  ; 
the  gradual  accession  of  plebeians  to  high  command  improved 
the  position  of  the  common  soldier.  War  ceased  to  be  ruinous, 
and  {cf.  law  of  342  B.c.^)  became  actually  attractive.  Recruits 
pressed  in  with  the  prospect  of  pay,  booty,  and  allotments  of  land. 
The  civic  system  of  classes  gave  w-ay  before  the  demand  for  men 
and  for  a  more  uniform  armament  required  by  the  change  of 
tactics.  Position  in  the  ranks  was  determined  by  age  and  expe- 
rience rather  than  by  wealth.  The  new  levies  were  formed  upcn 
a  reserve  of  professional,  disciplined,  experienced  soldiers. 

By  a  development  of  principles  often  attributed  to  Camillus, 
and  already  at  work  in  the  fourth  century,  open  order  was  sub- 
stituted for  close  formation.  The  new  system  was  worked  out 
in  the  Gallic  and  Samnite  wars.  The  brigade  was  drawn  up  in 
three  divisions.  In  front  stood  the  younger  men — Hastati — 1200 
strong  ;  in  the  second  line  the  Principes,  men  in  the  vigour  of  life, 
also  I2CXD.  A  veteran  corps  of  600  Triarii  acted  as  reserve  ;  1200 
light-armed  troops,  or  Velites,  organised  21 1  B.C.,  take  the  place  of 
the  old  Rorarii  and  Accensi.  The  heavy-armed  troops  were  broken 
up  into  maniples  or  companies,  ten  in  each  line — each  an  indepen- 
dent tactical  unit — consisting  of  120  men,  subdivided  for  mobility 
into  two  centuries  of  60  (in  the  Triarii,  60  and  30  respectively).  The 
maniples  were  arranged  with  distances  of  three  feet  between  each 
rank  and  file — occasionally  six  feet — and  with  intervals  of  equal  size 
between  the  companies,  each  interval  covered  by  its  rear  com- 
pany, like  squares  on  a  chess-board.  The  intervals  served  for  the 
skirmishers,  attached  to  the  maniples — twenty  to  each  century, — to 
advance  or  retire,  left  space  to  receive  a  broken  or  throw  forward  a 
reserve  division,  and  permitted  the  passage  of  cavaliy  when  the 
companies  covered  to  form  a  column  of  cohorts.  For  probably  as 
early  as  this,  certainly  by  the  time  of  Marius,  the  brigade  was 
broken,  as  to  its  depth,  into  ten  battalions  of  three  companies, 
larger  tactical  bodies,  called  cohorts. 

The  so-called  Quincunx  order  soon  gave  way  to  continuous 
lines.  The  names  of  the  three  ranks  lost  all  connection  with  their 
armament.     By  this  time  the  Triarii  had  temporarily  dropped  the 

1    Vide  supra,  p.  loi. 


THE  ARMY  139 

pilum,  and  received  the  hasta  or  pike  ;  the  two  first  hnes  were 
armed  with  the  hurling  pilum,  the  characteristic  Roman  arm,  a 
formidable  weapon  of  considerable  range  and  penetration.  The 
short,  straight,  stabbing  Spanish  sword  was  adopted  in  the  second 
Punic  war  ;  a  short  knife,  bronze  casque  with  plume,  the  oblong 
scutum,  greave,  and  cuirass  complete  the  ordinary  equipment. 

Each  legion  was  officered  by  six  tribunes,  of  whom  those 
appointed  to  the  regular  four  legions  were  chosen  by  the  people, 
the  rest  by  the  commander,  noble  youths  who  made  their  office 
the  first  step  in  civil  life,  and  served  their  preliminary  campaigns 
in  the  cavalry  or  on  the  general's  suite.  Promotion  in  the 
ranks  ceased  with  the  centurions,  sixty  in  number,  two  to  each 
maniple,  the  senior  commanding  the  company,  among  whom  a 
regular  order  tended  to  be  established  from  the  lowest  centurion 
of  the  first  division  to  the  primus  pilus,  or  senior  centurion  of  the 
Triarii. 

Cavalry — The  regular  cavalry,  300  strong,  was  divided  into 
ten  turniie  or  squadrons  of  thirty  men,  each  commanded  by 
the  senior  decurion,  with  two  decurions  and  three  optiones  under 
his  orders.  It  was,  strictly  speaking,  drawn  from  the  richest 
citizens,  and  enjoyed  triple  pay  and  other  privileges  ;  but  the  old 
eighteen  centuries  had  become  a  parade  corps,  and  the  ca\'alry 
was  chiefly  supplied,  first  by  volunteers,  and  then  by  allies  and 
auxiliaries.  It  had  been,  and  remained,  a  secondary  matter,  and 
proved  itself,  both  in  numbers  and  handling,  a  lasting  weakness  of 
the  Roman  service.  At  Capua  (21 1  B.C.)  it  required  to  be  strength- 
ened by  the  new  corps  of  Velites,  who  either  acted  as  a  sort  of 
mounted  infantry,  riding  en  croupe,  or  closed  the  intervals  of  the 
maniples,  or  skirmished  in  double  line  before  the  heavy-armed. 

Allies. — The  contingents  of  the  allies,  armed,  equipped,  and 
organised  in  the  Roman  fashion,  were  formed  into  two  alae, 
each  commanded  by  three  Roman  prjefecti  socium,  with  local 
officers  beneath  them.  These  were  divided  into  cohorts  420  strong, 
each  under  a  pra^fect — according  to  races — and  subdivided  into 
maniples  and  centuries.  1600  foot  and  600  horse  were  normally 
selected  to  form  a  special  corps  of  Extraordinarii.  The  cavalry 
was  divided  into  squadrons  300  strong,  with  five  turmie  of  sixty 
each. 

Tactics,  &c. — The  legions  were  levied  on  the  Capitol,  the 
allies  raised  by  the  several  communities.  The  military  oath  was 
taken  for  the  campaign  to  the  commanding  officer.  On  the  march 
the  army  moved  in  a  single  column,  unless  in  lace  of  an  enemy, 


I40 


IIISTOKY   OF  ROME 


with  the  legions  in  the  centre,  the  allies  in  the  van  and  rear,  the 
corps  d't^lite  acting  as  advanced  or  rear  guard  according  to  circum- 
stances. Each  night  a  regularly  constructed  camp  was  formed, 
serving  as  a  base  of  operations,  a  support  for  the  line  of  battle, 
a  refuge  in  case  of  defeat.       In  the  order  of  battle  the  legions 


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formed  the  centre,  the  allies  the  left  and  right  wings  ;  the  cavalry 
covered  the  flanks.  The  fight  opened  with  an  alternate  advance 
and  discharg'e  of  missiles,  followed  by  a  hand-to-hand  engage- 
ment with  the  sword,  the  lines  in  cases  of  pressure  retiring  in  turn 
through   the    intervals  behind.       But   these    simple    tactics   were. 


THE  NAVY  141 

especially  in  the  ensuing  wars,  developed  into  more  elaborate 
orders  of  attack. 

The  new  army  was  thus  flexible  and  mobile,  adapted  to  any 
ground,  except  for  its  weakness  in  cavalry,  and  not  easily  dis- 
located. Its  units  were  independent,  its  soldiers  well  trained, 
with  free  play  for  their  sword  and  shield.  Its  strict  discipline, 
its  remodelled  organisation,  its  splendid  physique  and  morale, 
made  it  the  unequalled  instrument  of  the  broader  offensive 
policy  of  the  reformed  Senate.  With  its  camp  and  third  division, 
its  pilum  and  sword,  it  combined  the  principle  of  a  reserve  with 
the  union  of  the  offensive  and  defensive,  and  of  the  close  and 
distant  methods  of  fighting. 

But  good  as  were  the  soldiers,  and  careful  as  were  the  field 
exercise  and  minor  tactics,  Roman  generals,  unaccustomed  to  the 
liandling  of  large  forces,  had  no  idea  of  larger  tactics  and  com- 
prehensive strategy.  They  could  ill  adapt  their  stiff  dispositions 
and  rigid  manoeuvring  to  new  circumstances.  They  were  in- 
capable of  even  understanding  a  well-conceived  campaign  and 
the  subtle  combinations  of  genius.  The  election  of  two  annual 
commanders  without  reference  to  military  capacity,  unfamiliar 
with  their  troops,  ill  instructed  in  the  art  of  war,  often  at  variance 
with  each  other,  was  a  certain  source  of  disaster.  The  absence 
of  a  permanent  army  and  regular  staff  added  to  the  peril,  though 
no  doubt  an  increasing  reserve  both  of  veterans  and  officers  was 
gradually  built  up,  and  men  of  experience  served  among  the  legates 
and  on  the  suite  of  the  consul.  However  great  the  civic  danger 
of  continuous  command  and  standing  armies,  militarily  speaking 
the  price  paid  was  dear. 

The  Navy. —By  the  destruction  of  the  Etruscan  naval  power, 
Syracuse  had  become  the  first  maritime  state,  next  to  Carthage, 
of  the  West,  and  as  such  her  subjugation  was  necessary  to  Car- 
thage. In  this  task  the  Phoenician  people  had  partially  succeeded, 
while  Rome  had  destroyed  the  power  of  Tarentum.  Massilia 
confined  herself  to  her  own  waters,  and  on  the  seas  Rome  and 
Carthage  were  left  face  to  face. 

Rome  had  been  long  accustomed  to  maritime  commerce.  We 
have  evidence  of  early  relations,  not  merely  with  Caere,  but  \vith 
Massilia,  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  Libya,  and  even  Greece  itself;  and, 
in  days  when  piracy  was  respectable  and  privateering  recognised 
in  treaties,  we  must  presuppose  armed  ships  and  some  species  of 
sea-police.  But  her  war-marine,  in  spite  of  fitful  outbursts  of 
energy,  as  in  338,  313,  and  31 1  L.C,  though  never  wholly  neglected, 


142  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  arrested  in  its  proj^ress  by  internal  crises  and  continental 
war.  Her  weakness  is  expressed  in  the  disastrous  treaties  of 
navij^ation  with  Carthage  and  Tarentum,  by  which  her  move- 
ments on  the  sea  were  seriously  restricted.'  The  protection  of  the 
coast  was  entrusted  to  a  chain  of  maritime  colonies,  and  to  the 
Greek  communities  of  Lower  Italy.  In  spite  of  the  appointment 
of  duoviri  navales  in  311,  and  of  four  cjuiestores  classici  in  267,  and 
in  spite  of  the  appearance  of  a  Roman  squadron  at  Tarentum  in 
282,  the  terms  of  the  Poeno-Roman  treaty  of  alliance  against 
Pyrrhus  in  279  B.C.,  and  the  events  of  the  first  years  of  the  Punic 
war  reveal  the  starved  condition  of  the  fleet.  Naval  tactics  and 
armament  had  made  but  slight  progress  in  the  ancient  world 
since  the  days  of  the  Athenian  navy,  and  Rome  especially  had 
never  realised  the  value  of  a  fleet  as  an  essential  arm  of  her 
service.  Her  commercial  marine  was  large  ;  she  had  abundant 
timber,  and  there  was  probably  no  lack  of  triremes  and  galleys. 
Of  quinqueremes,  or  ships  of  the  line,  she  had  perhaps  none.  Her 
crews  were  drawn  from  the  lowest  classes  or  from  the  allies.  Her 
admirals,  rash  and  headstrong,  applied  to  naval  warfare  the  maxims 
and  tactics  of  a  soldiers'  battle.  She  had  failed  to  organise  the 
resources  of  Etruria  and  the  cities  of  Magna  Grascia,  on  whom, 
with  Massilia  and  Syracuse,  Apollonia,  and  even  Rhodes,  she 
relied  for  the  nucleus  of  a  fleet.  From  these  sources  on  an 
emergency  she  might  indeed  equip  a  respectable  squadron,  but 
Carthage  remained  mistress  of  the  Western  waters  ;  without  her 
leave,  she  boasted,  no  Roman  could  wash  his  hands  in  the  sea. 
The  development  and  expansion  of  Rome  were  at  her  mercy. 
Commerce  alone,  therefore,  would  force  Rome's  attention  to  her 
natural  outlets  in  the  West.  Italy  was  in  a  double  danger  from 
the  commercial  and  naval  supremacy  and  monopoly  of  Carthage. 
While  her  geographical  position,  with  the  protection  of  a  fleet, 
rendered  her  the  political  and  strategical  centre  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, without  that  protection  her  long  coast-line,  so  favourable 

1  The  treaty  of  509  B.C.,  probably  renewed  in  348  B.C.,  and  the  still  more 
prohibitive  treaty  of  306  B.C.,  practically  exclude  Rome  from  the  Western 
waters,  and  from  free  trade  in  Libya  and  Sardinia,  while  opening  Carthage 
and  Sicily.  The  coasts  of  Latium  are  guaranteed  from  Punic  pirates.  The 
treaty  with  Tarentum  confined  Roman  vessels  within  the  Lacinian  promontory. 
However  disputed  in  date,  they  afford  evidence  of  Roman  commerce.  ( ]'ide 
Strachan-Davidson,  "  Polybius,"  Introd.,  Exc.  on  Carth.  Treaties.)  Inzjg  B.C. 
the  Carthaginians  undertake  to  provide  ships  for  transport  and  naval  warfare. 
Cf.  p.  129. 


CARTHAGE  143 

to  traffic,  exposed  her  to  attack  at  every  vital  point.  Mere  forti- 
fication was  idle.  Her  extended  sea-frontier,  as  with  the  Italy  of 
to-day,  demanded  a  powerful  marine  to  ensure  her  independence. 
This  necessity  was  not  yet  grasped,  and  to  that  error  in  concep- 
tion was  due  the  length  of  the  impending  struggle.  Willingly 
or  unwillingly,  Rome  must  enter  upon  a  Mediterranean  policy. 
Like  England  in  the  days  of  Elizabeth  or  Cromwell,  she  must 
refuse  to  submit  to  an  intolerable  position.  The  serious  problem 
of  her  policy  is  henceforth  how  to  check  the  advance  of  Carthage 
to  an  absolute  control  of  the  Western  Mediterranean.  As  Pyrrhus 
had  foreseen,  the  battle  of  the  elephant  and  whale  was  bound  to 
come  ;  and  the  natural  field  of  war  was  the  debatable  ground 
of  Sicily.  Rome  could  not  permit  the  extinction  of  Hellenism 
in  Sicily,  or  the  permanent  occupation  of  Italian  islands.  What- 
ever the  actual  occasion  or  immediate  motives  and  pretexts  of  the 
war,  in  this  fact,  seen  or  unseen,  lay  its  ultimate  necessity  and 
justification. 

Carthage. — (i)  People. — The  people  of  Kirjath-Hadeschath 
(Carthage,  the  "New  Town")  belonged  to  the  Phoenician  branch 
of  the  Semitic  stock,  to  a  nation  of  commercial  pioneers, 
mechanics,  artisans,  and  manufacturers.  The  Genoese  of  the 
old  world,  they  covered  the  seas  with  a  network  of  factories,  and 
the  lands  with  the  lines  of  their  caravan-routes,  from  the  coast 
of  Coromandel  to  the  mines  of  Cornwall.  Ingenious  and  self- 
reliant,  with  little  original  culture  and  slight  assimilating  power, 
lacking  also  many  of  the  higher  instincts  of  political  life,  they 
were  the  porters  of  civilisation,  the  carriers  of  the  world,  whose 
genius  for  utilising  the  discoveries  of  others,  whose  steady  power 
of  resistance  and  strong  local  attachments,  aided  a  shrewd  com- 
mercial policy  of  discreet  submission  and  masterly  inactivity  to 
preserve  their  individuality  as  a  nation,  and  even  their  status  as 
a  power.  Retiring  from  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  before  the 
developing  energy  of  Greece,  their  essentially  pacific  and  mer- 
cantile bias  drove  them  to  seek  outlets  for  their  colonisation  and 
commerce  in  the  West.  Their  settlements  were  not  garrisoned 
fortresses,  but  civic  factories  dotted  among  the  western  islands 
and  along  the  Spanish  and  African  coast.  Of  these,  not  the 
earliest,  originally  even  a  dependency  perhaps  of  Utica,  Carthage, 
by  her  favourable  situation  and  the  vigour  of  her  inhabitants, 
became  by  degrees  the  most  prominent,  and  concentrated  the 
PhcEnicians  of  the  West  into  a  single  powerful  state.  The  city 
was  founded,  about    100  years    before    Rome,  on   a   small  hilly 


CARTHAGE  145 

peninsula  jutting  out  into  the  Bay  of  Tunis,  not  far  from  the 
ancient  mouth  of  the  Ikii^radas.  It  consisted  later  of  a  citadel — 
Byrsa — of  the  Cothon  or  harbour-c[uarter,  and  the  Megara  or 
suburbs,  covering  an  area  of  twenty-three  miles,  with  a  popula- 
tion of  nearly  a  million.  The  fortifications  were  stupendous,  the 
harbour  well  situated,  the  territory  fertile.  To  these  advantages 
was  due  her  rapid  l)ut  unchronicled  commercial  and  political 
development.  Circumstances  made  her  the  natural  head  of  the 
Western  Phoenicians  against  the  Greeks  of  Sicily,  Cyrene,  and 
Massilia.  These  energetic  colonisers  had  already  monopolised 
Eastern  Sicily  and  Southern  Italy.  The  Phocaeans  had  penetrated 
to  Spain.  Massilia  was  founded  in  600  B.C.  ;  Selinus,  628  ;  Agri- 
gentum,  580.  The  Phoenician  was  now  in  danger  of  losing  the 
control  of  the  Western  waters  and  the  monopoly  of  the  carrying 
trade.  The  necessary  resistance  was  undertaken  by  Carthage. 
She  entered  into  relations  with  Etruria  and  the  natives  of  Sicily, 
and  established  an  early  intercourse  with  Latium.  Motye, 
Panormus,  and  Solus  "  riveted  her  hold  on  Western  Sicily; 
Sardinia  and  the  other  Italian  islands  were  annexed.  The 
Phoenician  settlements  in  Libya  were  brought  to  submission,  and 
the  Libyan  farmers  were  reduced  to  fellaheen.  Her  rule  ex- 
tended from  the  desert  to  the  Atlantic.  Her  revenue  was  swelled 
by  the  tribute  of  the  subject  Phoenician  and  African  communities, 
by  the  mines  of  Spain  and  the  commerce  of  the  ocean.  Her 
system  of  agriculture  and  plantation  was  the  model  of  the  ancient 


SICULO-PUNIC   TETRADK.\CHM  — HEAD    OF    PERSEPHONE,    WITH    DOLPHINS. 

world.  She  had  changed  from  a  commercial  to  a  conquering 
power  ;  her  fleet  had  made  the  Western  Mediterranean  a  Punic 
lake.  The  decline  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  left  her  the  first  Semitic 
state  and  the  commercial  capital  of  the  world. 

2.  Organisation  of  her  Dominions. — That  state  consisted  of  a 

K 


146  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Libyan  and  a  Colonial  Empire.  To  the  first  belonged,  beside  the 
actual  citizens,  the  native  Libyans,  the  Liby-Phoenicians,  the  con- 
federate cities,  and  the  dependent  Numidian,  or  Berber,  tribes. 
The  Libyans,  with  precarious  rights  under  an  arbitrary  government, 
were  a  standing  danger.  The  Liby-Phcenicians  were  partly  liaF- 
castes,  partly  a  legal  class  corresponding  to  the  "  Latin  name  "  in 
the  Roman  system.  The  confederate  cities,  except  Utica,  enjoyed  a 
strictly  limited  autonomy.  The  Numidians,  with  their  magnificent 
cavalry  and  uncertain  temper,  were  at  once  the  strength  and 
weakness  of  the  military  organisation.  The  Colonial  Empire  in- 
cluded the  North  African  settlements,  the  factories  and  mines  of 
Andalusia  (Cades,  1000  B.C.),  the  Raliaric  islands,  the  coast  of 
Sardinia,  Malta,  and  the  West  Sicilian  fortresses.  In  Sicily  the 
Greeks  and  Phoenicians  lived  side  by  side,  in  spite  of  the  crushing 
defeat  of  the  latter  at  Himera  in  480  B.C.,  till  the  fall  of  the  Etruscans 
left  Carthage  on  the  seas  face  to  face  with  Syracuse.  A  series  of 
devastating  wars,  with  many  changes  of  fortune,  ensued,  lasting 
two  centuries  and  a  half,  destroyed  the  most  flourishing  of  the 
intermediate  states,  and  ended  in  the  ruin  of  the  naval  power  of 
Syracuse,  which  had  been,  with  Tarentum  and  Rhegium,  the  objec- 
tive of  Punic  effort.  The  maritime  supremacy  and  commercial 
monopoly  so  gained  were  maintained  by  jealous  cruelty  and  pro- 
hibitive treaties.  The  organisation  of  the  foreign  empire,  how- 
ever adapted  to  the  purposes  of  commerce,  was  too  loose  for 
military  necessities,  especially  for  those  of  defensive  warfare.  Its 
maintenance  depended  on  the  effective  control  of  the  sea. 

Home  Government.  —  The  home  government,  originally  a 
monarchy,  had  become  a  republic.  Occidental  in  character,  it  pre- 
served its  municipal  institutions,  and,  in  spite  of  the  fickle  popu- 
lace, enjoyed  a  high  reputation  for  stability.  The  constitution  has 
been  described  as  "an  oligarchy  at  home,  a  monarchy  in  the 
field."  Its  general  spirit  was  highly  oligarchical.  A  few  noble  and 
wealthy  families  monopolised  office  and  controlled  the  machinery  of 
government.  A  steady  development  without  violent  reaction,  peace 
and  prosperity  at  home,  extension  of  empire  abroad,  bear  witness 
to  their  sagacity  and  success.  Of  the  elements  of  the  constitution 
little  is  clearly  known.  Up  to  the  fifth  century  the  chief  magis- 
trates seem  to  have  been  two  sufifetes  or  judges,  annually  elected, 
whose  prerogatives  had  dwindled  to  religious  and  judicial  functions 
and  the  presidency  of  the  Senate.  The  latter  was  a  numerous 
body,  with  inner  committees,  which  transacted  the  ordinary  business 
of  the  state.     In  case  of  disagreement  between  it  and  the  sufies, 


GOVERNMENT  OF  CARTHAGE 


147 


the  question  -was  referred  to  the  people  The  conduct  of  affairs 
in  the  field  passed  from  the  suffes  to  the  general,  who  exercised 
abroad  a  dictatorship  tempered  by  crucifixion.  The  indefinite 
term  and  undivided  command  contrast  favourabl)'  with  the  Roman 
system,  though  the  general  was  often  hampered  by  the  presence 
in  the  army  of  a  certain  number  of  senators.  The  office  be- 
came at  one  time  almost  hereditary  in  the  families  of  Mag^o  and 
Hamilcar,  but  never  grew  into  an  actual  despotism.  The  offices 
of  the  state  were  either  purchasable  or,  at  least,  so  expensive 
that  they  were  open  only  to  the  rich.  Both  the  Senate  and  officers 
were  largely  controlled  by  the  council  of  104  ("centum  indices"), 
the  keystone  of  the  oligarchical  constitution,  whose  original  func- 
tions expanded  into  a  general  supervision,  like  that  of  the  Spartan 
Ephors.  Whatever  its  origin,  it  absorbed  the  reality  of  power,  calling 
officials  to  account,  assigning  punishments,  and  interfering  in  every- 
department.  It  was,  in  fact,  an  oligarchic  board  constituted  by  co- 
optation.  The  people,  traders  and  seamen,  with  no  middle  class 
between  them  and  the  lords,  corrupt  and  ungovernable,  had  few 
definite  political  rights  and  small  political  influence.  In  later 
times  the  power  of  the  democracy  was  developed  by  the  patriotic 
opposition,  which  supported  the  Barcine  family.  This  constitution 
was  the  growth  of  circumstances  and  centuries,  and  in  its  best 
epoch  was  an  oligarchy,  clear-sighted,  consistent,  and  moderate, 
but  narrow,  suspicious,  and  exclusive. 

3.   Resources. — It  remains  to  estimate  the  resources  of  Carthage 
for  the  war.     She  was  the  centre  of  capital  ;  her  revenues  were 


SICULO-PCNIC    TKTKAIJKACIIM — HKAD   OF    PEKbEPHUNE,    WITH    DOLPHINS. 


immense  ;  she  had  highly  developed  the  means  and  methods  of 
agriculture  and  finance.  She  was  rich  in  tributes  and  customs,  and 
the  produce  of  her  colonies  and  mines.  Besides  her  citizen  militia, 
she  raised  for  foreign  service  in  her  transmarine  possessions  huge 


148  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

armies  of  mercenaries  and  conscripts.  In  these  motley  hosts, 
round  the  Phoenician  officers  and  the  small  nucleus  of  citizens 
who  supported  the  commander  and  acted  as  a  bodyguard  and 
last  reserve,  gathered  the  Libyan  light  or  heavy  foot,  Iberian  heavy 
cavalry  and  infantry  (the  best  in  her  pay),  hardy  active  Ligurians, 
the  splendid  slingers  of  the  Baliaric  Islands,  an  occasional  corps 
of  Campanians  or  Greeks,  and  rash,  ill-disciplined  hordes  of  huge 
half-naked  Gauls.  Her  Numidian  cavalry,  a  service  to  which 
Carthage  paid  especial  attention,  was  the  finest  light  horse  in  the 
world.  Her  magazines  were  full  of  stores,  her  stables  of  elephants. 
In  the  skill  and  daring  of  her  navig-ators,  in  the  build  and  size  of 
her  ships,  she  was  vastly  superior  to  Rome.  The  rich  plains  of 
Africa  were  free  from  the  scourge  of  war  and  safe  under  cover 
of  her  fleet.  A  defeat  cost  nothing  but  cash  ;  war  was  a  specula- 
tion waged  with  limited  liability.  On  the  other  hand,  her  tributes 
and  customs  were  liable  to  fail  her  at  a  crisis  ;  she  had  no  regular 
armYJ.  her  militia,  however  brave,  lacked  training  and  permanence ; 
her  people  as  a  whole  were  unequal  to  the  Roman  people  as  a 
whole  ;  her  subjects  less  faithful.  Her  mercenary  troops,  whose 
very  variety  was  dangerous  to  any  but  a  consummate  commander, 
and  a  delusive  security  against  revolt,  for  all  her  jealous  surveillance 
and  cruel  discipline,  were  costly,  dangerous,  and  untrustworthy. 
Her  infantry  was  weak,  her  cavalry  not  wholly  reliable  ;  she  pos- 
sessed no  fortresses  and  no  friends.  Taxation  and  conscription, 
ruthlessly  carried  out,  filled  her  subjects  with  a  deadly  hatred. 
The  expeditions  of  Agathocles  and  Regulus  showed  the  inner 
weakness  of  her  political  and  military  system.  With  the  same 
oligarchical  constitution  and  the  same  tendency  to  limit  her  execu- 
tive, Rome  possessed  a  Senate  more  open  and  representative,  less 
hampered  ma  crisis  by  internal  difficulties.  Her  subjects  were 
more  homogeneous  ;  geographically  and  politically  she  was  more 
compact.  She  was  strong  in  the  simplicity,  reverence,  earnest- 
ness of  her  people,  and  in  her  iron  resolution,  tenacity,  and  self- 
restraint.  Her  slow  constitutional  progress,  the  concentration  of 
practical  ability  in  the  Senate,  her  citizen-army,  her  fortresses, 
and,  above  all,  the  solidarity  of  her  people  enabled  her  to  meet 
successfully  the  navies,  the  capital,  the  genius  and  courage,  of 
Carthage. 

We  know  little  of  the  history,  the  constitution,  the  literature 
and  character,  of  the  Carthaginians.  What  we  learn  is  derived 
entirely  from  the  accounts  of  their  enemies.  But  we  know  enough 
to  see  that  the  charges  of  cruelty  and  faithlessness  have  been 


FIRST  PUNIC    WAR 


149 


exaggerated,  tliat  the  sneer  at  a  "nation  of  shopkeepers''  is  unjust. 
She  produced  the  greatest  statesmen  and  generals  of  this  age. 
The  combatants  in  the  struggle  were  not  ill  matched — a  struggle 
which  began  as  a  war  of  nations  and  ended  as  a  duel  between  a 
nation  and  a  man. 


SICULO-PUNIC    TKTRAIJRArUM — HEAD    OK    HKKAKI.ES      MELKARTH 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


THE    FIRST    PUNIC    WAR 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Rome  and  Me.ssana— Outbreak  of  First  Punic  War     .  264  490 

Hiero  makes  Peace  and  Alliance  with  Rome.  263  491 

Fall  of  Agrigentum        .....  262  492 

The  new  Fleet  and  the  Battle  of  Mylas  ...  260  494 

Regulus  in  Africa 256-255  498-499 

Victory  of  Panormus — Siege  of  Lilybaeum  begun  .        .  250  504 

Hamilcar  Barca  in  Sicily 247-241  507-513 

Victory  of  the  .iEgates  Insulae 241  513 

Peace  made 241  513 

Causes  of  War. — The  natural  battlefield  of  Rome  and  Carthage 
was,  geographically  and  politically,  Sicily,  which  had  already  been 
the  seat  of  the  struggle  of  Semite  and  Hellene.  The  result  of 
the  long  wars,  which  had  resolved  themselves  into  a  contest  be- 
tween Carthage  and  Syracuse,  had  been  to  leave  the  Halycus  the 
boundary  between  the  two  peoples.  On  the  expulsion  of  Pyrrhus 
the  south-eastern  corner  alone  remained  in  the  hands  of  Syracuse. 

The  relations  of  Rome  with  her  rival  up  to  the  Pyrrhic  war 
had  been  confined  mainly  to  maritime  and  commercial  affairs. 
The  treaties  already  mentioned  reveal,  only  with  increasing  clear- 
ness, the  naval  impotence  of  the  Latin  state.    The  alliance  of  279  B.C. 


Igo  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  due  to  tlie  pressure  of  a  common  fear,  and  led  to  small  results. 
The  collision  at  Tarentum  in  272  H.c.  was  followed  in  264  by  the 
affair  of  Messana,  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  war. 

Messana. — A  free  company  of  Campanian  mercenaries  who 
had  served  under  Agathocles,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  had,  after  his 
death,  captured  Messana  by  treason,  ejected  the  inhabitants, 
and  divided  their  property.  Under  the  name  of  Mamertines 
they  held  the  key  of  Sicily,  and,  in  concert  with  the  mutinous 
Campanian  legion  which  had  seized  Rhegium,  controlled  the 
passage  of  the  straits.  While  Rome  crushed  lier  rebel  troops, 
and  recalled  the  citizens  of  Rhegium,  the  Syracusans,  relieved 
from  the  evils  of  sedition  and  the  pressure  of  Carthage  by 
the  victories  of  Pyrrhus  and  the  skill  and  policy  of  Hiero  II., 
besieged  the  Mamertines  in  Messana.  By  his  successes  in  the 
field,  the  able  and  sagacious  Hiero,  whose  prudence,  moderation, 
and  firmness  had  already  restored  the  affairs  of  his  country,  paved 
at  once  his  own  way  to  monarchy,  and  compelled  the  Mamertines 
to  appeal  for  help  to  Rome  and  Carthage.  Anxious  to  prevent 
the  extension  of  Syracuse,  the  Punic  admiral,  Hannibal,  temporarily 
occupied  the  citadel.  Later  on,  joint  action  with  Syracuse  against 
the  Mamertines  seemed  advisable,  till  the  latter,  hard  pressed  by 
the  siege  and  divided  sharply  into  factions,  placed  themselves 
at  one  moment  under  the  protection  of  Rome,  and  shortly  after 
accepted  a  Punic  garrison  under  the  command  of  Hanno.  It  was 
natural  for  Carthage  to  treat  foreign  intervention  in  Sicily  as  a 
casus  belli.  The  cjuestion  for  Rome  was  more  difficult.  Honour, 
gratitude  to  Hiero,  and  her  own  procedure  at  Rhegium  forbade 
her  to  support  the  rebels  of  Messana.  It  meant,  besides,  war  with 
her  own  allies — a  transmarine  war.  It  would  be  the  first  step 
out  of  Italy,  the  end  of  a  definite  continental  policy,  the  beginning 
of  a  policy  of  adventure,  whose  issue  it  might  be  difficult  to  see. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  necessary  to  check  Carthage,  to  secure 
the  straits,  and  to  grasp  the  key  of  Sicily,  if  not  to  complete  Italy 
by  the  conquest  of  her  islands.  The  Senate  hesitated  to  decide  ; 
the  assembly,  "with  a  light  heart,"  assumed  the  protectorate  of 
the  Mamertines.  Interest  carried  the  day  against  the  claims  of 
public  morality. 

The  Carthaginians  met  the  demands  of  Rome  with  studied 
moderation.  War  was  not  formally  declared,  but  a  Roman  army 
and  transports  arrived  at  Rhegium,  while  a  Punic  fleet  lay  in 
the  harbour  of  Messana.  Gains  Claudius,  the  energetic  emissary 
of  the   consul,  took  advantage  of  the  difficult  situation,  amused 


§  i 


5 

^    inn 


-^■--fl 


JVAR  IN  SICILY  i$l 

the  deluded  admiral,  and  by  adroit  treachery  seized  the  city, 
which  was  besieged  by  Hiero  and  a  second  Hanno  in  concert. 
The  consul  Appius  Claudius  Caudex  crossed  the  straits  by 
night,  evading  the  Punic  fleet,  defeated  the  allies  in  detail,  and 
raised  the  siege.  The  first  campaign,  in  spite  of  the  subsequent 
disastrous  retreat  of  Claudius  from  Syracuse,  had  been  so  far 
successful. 

Rome  and  Hiero. — In  the  following  year,  however,  two  con- 
sular armies  entered  Sicily.  The  sufferings  of  Appius'  troops 
and  his  comparative  failure  had  shown  the  danger  of  throwing  an 
army  upon  an  island  unsupported  by  a  fleet.  In  the  meantime 
ships  had  been  rapidly  built  or  collected,  and  with  their  aid 
the  consul  M'.  Valerius  Maximus  was  able  to  achieve  a  consider- 
able victory  near  Messana  over  the  united  Carthaginians  and 
Syracusans,  earning  thereby  a  triumph  and  the  surname  Mes- 
salla.  Sixty-seven  cities  passed  over  to  Rome,  and  the  far-sighted 
Hiero,  already  distrustful  of  the  energy  and  loyalty  of  Carthage, 
gladly  threw  over  his  uncongenial  alliance,  surrendered  his  pri- 
soners, paid  a  war  indemnity,  and  secured  the  favour  of  Rome. 
He  remained  a  faithful  and  trusted  ally  whose  value  was  often 
felt,  as  the  Romans  in  Sicily,  in  face  of  the  Carthaginian  superi- 
ority at  sea,  had  largely  to  depend  on  Syracuse  for  supplies. 

Agrigentum. — Unreadiness,  negligence,  or  internal  troubles 
had  cost  Carthage  her  hold  on  Eastern  Sicily.  She  now  bestirred 
herself.  A  large  force  of  mercenaries  was  thrown  into  the  once 
populous  Agrigentum,  under  the  command  of  Hannibal,  son  of 
Gisgo.  It  was  still,  in  spite  of  its  losses  in  previous  wars,  the 
second  Greek  city  of  the  island,  and  by  its  strong  position,  and 
nearness  to  Syracuse,  offered  a  convenient  base  of  operations. 
Its  one  weakness  was  its  distance  from  the  sea  and  the  fleet,  from 
which  supplies  would  be  drawn.  Unable  to  storm,  the  consuls 
blockaded  the  town,  and  cut  its  communications  by  means  of 
two  fortified  camps  and  a  double  line  of  entrenchments.  In  spite 
of  the  capture  of  the  Roman  magazines  at  Erbessus,  Hanno,  who 
had  been  at  length  despatched  in  October  to  the  rescue,  was 
compelled  by  the  distress  of  the  besieged  to  risk  a  general  action. 
His  infantry  was  decisively  defeated  and  a  sortie  in  force  re- 
pelled. The  elephants,  employed  by  Carthage  for  the  first  time, 
did  themselves  no  credit.  Hannibal  escaped  by  night  through 
the  hostile  lines,  leaving  the  town  and  its  inhabitants  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  Romans  irritated  by  a  seven  months'  siege. 
Masters   of  Agrigentum,    Messana,    and    Syracuse,  the    Romans 


152  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

pushed  their  fortune  among  the  inland  towns  and  drove  the 
enemy  stoutly  back  upon  the  western  strongholds  Their  ideas 
extended  now  to  the  expulsion  of  Carthage  from  Sicily.  But  to 
bring  matters  to  a  decisive  issue  meant  carrying  the  war  into  the 
enemy's  country.  They  were  learning  their  lesson — a  lesson 
driven  home  by  the  activity  of  the  Punic  fleet,  which  relieved  or 
subdued  the  maritime  towns  of  Sicily,  harassed  the  Italian  coasts, 
and  scourged  Italian  commerce. 

The  New  Fleet. — Carthage  needed  a  trustworthy  infantry, 
Rome  an  effective  fleet.  We  must  not  exaggerate  the  naval 
weakness  of  Rome,  nor  can  we  accept  the  legend  of  the  building 
of  the  fleet.  Rome  had  docks  and  ships  and  allies,  and  though 
the  vessels  of  the  Greek  states  were  mainly  triremes  and  pente- 
conters,  it  is  incredible  that  no  city  in  Italy  should  have  possessed 
a  quinquereme.  The  Romans,  it  is  true,  were  no  sailors  ;  they 
disliked  the  service  and  neglected  the  fleet,  while  naval  tactics 
and  shipbuilding  were  certainly  at  a  low  ebb  ;  but  we  cannot 
believe  that  a  fleet  of  one  hundred  ships  of  the  line  and  twenty 
frigates,  modelled  on  a  stranded  Punic  quincjuereme,'  equipped  in 
sixty  days,  and  manned  by  land-lubbers  taught  to  row  on  shore, 
should  have  been  able  to  meet  and  defeat  the  well-built  ships  and 
trained  seamen  of  Carthage.  To  the  nucleus  of  ships  that  she 
possessed  already,  or  had  rapidly  collected  from  the  allies,  Rome 
added  a  large  number  of  new  vessels,  hastily  built  and  equipped 
at  the  various  ports.  The  officers  and  crews  were  largely  pro- 
vided by  the  allies,  supplemented  by  proletarians  and  slaves. 
The  practical  experiences,  however,  of  the  last  two  years  had  pro- 
bably convinced  the  Romans  that  new  methods  were  necessary. 
In  all  the  movements  of  ancient  naval  tactics — breaking  the  line, 
ramming,  crushing  through  and  disabling  the  oarage — everything 
depended,  as  the  sails  and  masts  were  cleared  for  action,  on  the 
strength  of  the  ship,  the  skill  of  the  steersman,  and,  above  all,  on 
the  combined  and  controlled  action  of  the  huge  body  of  rowers. 
In  the  number  and  manoeuvring  power  of  her  ships,  the  experi- 
ence of  her  officers,  and  the  precision  of  her  oarsmen  Rome  was 
vastly  inferior.  As  fighting-men,  however,  even  her  sailors  were 
superior,  man  for  man,  to  the  "  rabble  of  an  African  crew." 

The    Corvus. — The    inv^ention    of  the    corvus,^    or    swinging 

1  Wrecked  in  the  straits  of  Messina  four  years  before. 

2  A  mast  24  feet  high  was  fixed  on  the  prow  ;  round  it  swung  a  gangway 
4  feet  wide  x  36  feet  long,  with  parapets  on  each  side.  It  swung  in  a  hole  cut 
T2  feet  from  the  end  of  the  gangway,  and  was  so  made  that  it  could  be  drawn 


THE  NEW  ELEET 


153 


boardin.cr-bridgc,  and  a  large  increase  in  the  marines  enabled 
personal  qualities  to  compensate  for  tactical  deficiencies.  It 
utilised  the  superiority  of  the  Roman  soldier  by  substituting  close 
combat  for  clever  manoeuvres.     Ten  marines  were  enough  for  an 


THE    COLUMNA    ROSTRATA    {restored). 

Athenian   trireme  with   a  total   crew   of  nearly   200  ;   the  Roman 
man-of-war,  with  its  310  oarsmen,  carried  a  complement  of  120. 
Duilius. — The  fleet   sailed  for   Sicily  under  the   command   of 


up  close  to  the  mast.  It  was  suspended  from  a  pulley  on  the  mast-head  by 
a  rope  attached  to  a  hook  at  its  farther  end,  and  lo-.vered  with  a  rush.  A 
heavy  grappling-spike  was  fixed  at  the  same  extremity.  To  clear  the  bul- 
warks and  improve  the  blow,  it  was  fastened  to  the  mast  12  feet  above  the 
deck,  and  therefore  the  first  12  feet  must  have  been  connected  by  a  hinge  to 
make  it  accessible.  It  played  freely  round  the  mast  and  could  be  lowered  on 
either  side.  The  soldiers,  covered  by  their  shields  and  the  parapets,  boarded 
two  abreast.     It  also  served  to  break  the  force  of  the  enemy's  impact. 


154  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Gnrcus  Cornelius  Scipio,  who  succeeded  in  losing,'  his  advanced 
squadron  of  seventeen  sail,  and  earning  the  nickname  Asina,  by 
falling  into  a  Punic  trap  at  Lipara.  The  remainder  of  the  fleet, 
under  the  land-general  C.  Duilius,  gained  a  complete  and  sur- 
prising victory  over  the  fleet  of  Hannibal,  130  strong,  at  Mylae,  a 
promontory  to  the  north-west  of  Messana  (260  B.C.).  The  success 
was  due  as  much  to  the  contemptuous  carelessness  of  the  Car- 
thaginians as  to  the  novel  tactics  of  Duilius.  Hurrying  to  the 
attack  in  sanguine  disorder,  they  were  astonished,  puzzled,  and 
discomfited  by  the  swiftly  turning  Raven.  The  moral  effect  was 
immense.  Carthage  had  been  beaten  at  sea  with  a  loss  of  fifty 
ships  ;  the  siege  of  Segesta  was  promptly  raised.     Signal  honours 


CORA/EUOI.FSCIPIO 
DIIESCOSOKESOK 


H  oncoiaJOPI-yTRVAAECO/SEAITiONTR 
DVONpROOfTVMOfVlSEViko 
UClOMSCin/lOAJE  FIliaS-BARMTI 
^-^-^iSO^•CE^JS  OR  AID/US  HICFVITA 
C  CEriTQORSICAMERIACLVE\WE 
I'  .DETTEMtTESTATEByjAlg^^E^E  TX) 


EPITAPH    OF   LUCIUS    SCIPIO. 


awaited  the  plebeian  admiral  ;  the  Columna  Rostrata  commemo- 
rated the  event. 

In  the  following  years  the  skill  and  energy  of  the  earlier 
Hamilcar,  basing  on  Panormus,  improved  the  position  of  Car- 
thage, which  was  further  strengthened  by  the  fortification  of  Dre- 
pana.  The  severe  measures  taken  by  Rome  with  the  helpless 
Greek  states  at  once  impaired  her  hold  on  Sicily  and  damaged 
the  prize  of  victory.  Meanwhile  L.  Scipio,  the  grandfather  of 
Africanus,  had  beaten  Hanno  and  captured  Aleria,  in  Corsica,  the 
timber  depot  of  Carthage,  and  ravaged  the  rich  and  populous 
Sardinia,  whose  mines  of  silver,  lead,  and  iron,  and  wealth  of 
corn  made  her  a  valued  element  of  strength. 


MYLM  AND  ECNOMUS 


'55 


In  Sicily  towns  continued  to  be  taken  and  retaken,  the  land 
wasted  and  depopulated.  Nor  was  the  situation  changed  by 
the  indecisive  sea-fight  at  Tyndaris  (257  B.C.).  With  considerable 
losses  Rome  maintained,  on  the  whole,  her  superiority. 

Attack  on  Africa. — Tired  of  the  fluctuation  of  the  Sicilian 
war,  the  Senate  naw  detennined  by  a  bold  stroke  to  assume  a 
strong  offensive  and  transfer  the  war  to  Africa.  Trade  was  ruined, 
Italy  harassed  ;  Rome  was  draining  away  her  life-blood  ;  the  im- 
patience of  the  allies  at  the  naval  conscription  had  almost  broken 
into  actual  mutiny.     Carthage,  safe  at  home,  easily  renewed  her 


Sji/<=^ 

L 
L 
F 

'5» 

B 

D        E 
C       rf 

Position  during  the  Battle. 

Romans.  ^_ 
AB.  8z  Ships  under  Vanlius 
BC.  83  Ships  towing  Transports 
CO.  82  Ships  under  Regulus 

D.  Transports 

E.  Triarii 

ZY.    Admiral's  Vessels  (Hexeres) 

Carthaginians,  • — ■ 

F.  Han  no 
LL.  Hamilcar 

K.     Carthaginian  Left. 

iralkerG-Jioutallsc. 


PLAN   OF   ECNOMUS. 


fleet,  and  raised  fresh  armies  of  aliens.  The  attack  on  Africa 
may,  of  course,  have  been  intended  only  as  a  powerful  diversion  ; 
in  any  case,  had  Rome  concentrated  her  energy  upon  it,  the  internal 
weakness  of  Carthage  and  the  absence  of  fortresses  would  have  en- 
sured complete  success.  It  demanded  a  powerful  fleet  to  convoy 
a  strong  army  and  secure  its  communications,  and  accordingly 
vast  naval  preparations  were  made,  to  which  Carthage,  spurred 
by  memories  of  the  raid  of  Agathocles,  responded  with  equal 
vigour. 

Ecnomus. — Off  Ecnomus,  half-way  between  Gela  and  Agrigen- 


156  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

turn,  the  Roman  fleet  of  330  sliips,  carrying  40,000  picked  troops 
and  ioo,coo  seamen,  under  tlie  consulars  M.  Atilius  Regulus 
and  L.  Manlius  \'olso,  was  met  by  Hamilcar  and  Hanno  witli  350 
ships  and  i  50,000  men.  The  Punic  fleet  advanced  in  a  long  hne 
of  four  divisions  to  meet  the  Roman  wedge,  its  left  thrown  for- 
ward at  an  obtuse  angle,  resting  on  the  Sicilian  coast  ;  its  right 
outflanking  the  Romans,  who  moved  forward  in  a  hollow  triangle, 
led  by  the  consuls — a  defensive  formation,  in  which  each  prow, 
with  its  corvus,  covered  the  unprotected  stern  of  the  ship  in  front. 
The  base-division  towed  the  transports  ;  the  rear  was  covered  by 
the  fourth  division.  The  wedge,  intended  to  split  the  Punic  line, 
was  itself  broken  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  hostile  centre  and 
its  own  hasty  advance  ;  the  Punic  right  fell  on  the  rear-guard, 
their  left  on  the  third  division,  which  had  thrown  ofi"the  transports. 
Outmanoeuvred  and  outsailed,  the  Romans,  by  sheer  force  and 
the  corvus,  Avere  able  to  defeat  the  enemy's  centre  and  relieve 
their  hard-pressed  rear.  They  had  lost  twenty-four  ships  and  taken 
or  destroyed  ninety-four.  After  delay  for  repairs,  the  fleet  pro- 
ceeded to  Africa,  and  disembarked  the  troops  at  Clupea,  where 
an  entrenched  camp  secured  their  base  (256  B.C.). 

Regulus. — The  first  blunder  of  the  campaign  was  the  failure 
to  march  at  once  on  Carthage  ;  the  second  was  the  recall,  in  ac- 
cordance with  Roman  routine  and  red-tape,  of  one  of  the  consuls 
with  his  army.  The  recall  of  the  bulk  of  the  fleet  was  the 
worst  blunder  of  all.  But  the  whole  business,  whether  due  to  the 
limited  ideas  of  the  Senate,  or  to  constitutional  eccentricities,  or 
to  the  incapacity  and  self-esteem  of  Regulus,  was  a  hopeless 
bungle.  Regulus,  however,  with  his  "adequate  force"  of  40 
ships,  15,000  infantry,  and  500  cavalry — barely  a  consular  army — 
was  able  to  carry  on  the  devastation  of  the  rich  and  beautiful 
country,  with  its  villas  and  gardens,  its  vineyards  and  olive-groves, 
to  defeat  the  local  leaders,  capture  the  open  cities,  and  establish 
himself  for  the  winter  at  Tunes.  Hamilcar,  recalled  from  Sicily, 
joined  Hasdrubal  and  Bostar  with  a  strong  detachment  ;  but  the 
bulk  of  the  troops  were  absent,  the  country  was  unprepared,  the 
militia  inadequate,  and  the  ever-suspicious  oligarchy,  even  in  its 
hour  of  danger,  distrusted  its  leaders  and  divided  the  command. 
The  disunited  chiefs,  ignorant  of  their  real  strength,  mismanaged 
the  campaign.  But  what  Regulus  gained  by  the  difficulties  of 
Carthage  and  the  folly  of  her  leaders  he  lost  by  the  rash  and 
brutal  insolence  of  his  demands.  The  suffering  and  overcrowded 
city,  hemmed  in  by  the  Romans  and  distressed  by  Numidian  in- 


DEFEAT  OF  REGULUS  157 

cursions,  was  inclined  to  treat,  but  rejected  with  scorn  the  ultimatum 
of  the  consul  and  prepared  for  a  passionate  defence.  Recruits 
were  raised.  Xanthippus,  a  trained  Spartan  officer,  supported 
by  popular  feeling  in  his  outspoken  contempt  for  Punic  tactics, 
taught  them  the  value  and  use  of  cavalry  and  elephants,  drilled  a 
competent  infantry,  and  inspired  confidence  by  his  obvious  ability 
in  handling  the  troops.  His  organising  talent  and  tactical  skill 
decided  the  issue.  The  incapable  proconsul  had  neglected  his 
rear  and  wasted  his  resources  ;  his  strength  was  inadequate  to 
a  siege  ;  he  was  terribly  inferior  in  cavalry.  Forced  to  accept 
battle  on  a  plain,  he  was  thoroughly  beaten  and  ftimself  taken 
prisoner.  The  remnant  of  his  army — the  rest  had  been  stamped 
out  under  the  feet  of  the  elephants — was  rescued  by  a  Roman 
fleet,  whose  commanders  lost  all  the  credit  gained  in  a  battle 
off  the  Hermican  Cape'  by  the  obstinacy  which  sacrificed  an 
immense  number  of  their  ships  in  a  storm  off  the  south  coast  of 
Sicily  (255  B.C.). 

The  fate  of  Regulus  is  uncertain.  He  lived  some  time  at 
Carthage  ;  but  the  story  of  his  mission  to  Rome,  his  refusal  to 
see  his  family,  his  return  to  Carthage,  and  death  there  under  cruel 
tortures,  is  a  highly  coloured  legend  that  possibly  covers  a  true 
tale  of  a  bloody  Roman  vengeance. 

Africa  had  been  evacuated,  but  with  a  new  fleet  -  rapidly 
equipped  Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio  surprised  the  rich  and  populous 
Panormus,  and  acquired  a  new  and  important  base.  The 
north  coast  of  Sicily  was  now  practically  Roman.  Carthage, 
occupied  at  home,  made  little  resistance.  In  253  B.C.  a  further 
disaster  due  to  bad  seamanship  cost  the  Romans  150  ships  and 
reduced  the  fleet  to  convoy-duty  and  coast  defence.  In  252 
the  Romans  took  Himera,  Therma;,  and  Lipara.  Meanwhile 
Hasdrubal  had  reinforced  Carthalo  at  Libybieum  with  30,000 
men  and  140  elephants.  The  hostile  armies  treated  each  other 
with  distant  respect.  The  Romans  had  not  forgotten  their  fear  of 
elephants  ;  Hasdrubal  distrusted  his  in''antry. 

Panormus. — Next  year  the  brilliant  victory  of  L.  Ccccilius 
Metellus  at  Panormus  (250  B.C.),  restored  confidence  and  demon- 
strated the  danger  of  elephants  as  an  arm  of  war.  Drawn  by 
every  art  under  the  walls  of  the  town,  assailed  from  battlements 
and  trenches  by  a  storm  of  missiles,  the  maddened  brutes  turned 

1  K  victory  grossly  exaggerated  or  turned  to  very  little  account. 

-  Two  hundred  and  twenty  ships,  said  to  have  been  built  in  three  months. 


158  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  trampled  down  the  following-  infantry.  The  rout  was  com- 
pleted by  a  successful  sortie.  One  hundred  and  four  elephants 
graced  the  triumph  of  Metellus. 


^*l/      ?5fis'')2' 


DENARIUS    STRUCK   CIRCA    I33    B.C.,    TO    COMMEMORATE    VICTORY    OF 

PANORMUS. 


Terms  offered  by  Carthage  were  rejected.  With  this  embassy 
is  connected  the  mission  of  Regulus  {vide  supra),  but  the  whole 
story  is  doubtful.  It  was  customary  to  ransom  prisoners,  and 
Rome  especially  had  no  reason  to  refuse.  A  new  fleet  of  200 
sail  and  a  double  consular  army  besieged  Lilybceum  (the  modern 
Marsala). 

Siege  of  Lilybaeum, — This  siege  brings  us  to  the  crisis  of  the 
war.  Here  had  Carthage  concentrated  her  resources  in  a  strongly 
fortified  position,  on  a  promontory,  the  extreme  west  point  of 
Sicily,  commanding  communications  with  Africa.  Its  magnificent 
lines  and  difficult  harbour,  the  genius  of  Himilco,  and  the 
tenacity  of  Semites  preserved  the  virgin  fortress  through  a  siege 
of  unparalleled  length,  in  which  every  means  of  attack  and 
defence  was  exhausted.  The  Roman  force  may  have  reached, 
with  crews  and  allies,  a  total  of  100,000  ;  to  meet  which  Himilco 
disposed  of  10,000  infantry,  7000  cavalry,  and  a  large  population. 
Regular  siege-works  were  pushed  forward — trenches,  approaches, 
and  mines.  Greek  skill  provided  machines  and  engines  of  attack. 
They  were  met  by  inner  walls  and  counter-mines  and  endless 
bloody  sallies.  Brilliant  incidents  diversified  the  record  of  hard 
work  and  hard  fighting.  Hannibal,  son  of  Hamilcar,  with  fifty 
ships  and  10,000  men,  steered  by  clever  pilots,  audaciously  burst 
through  the  blockading  line,  borne  on  a  rising  wind  and  swelling 
sea,  relieved  the  garrison,  and  removed  the  useless  cavalry  to 
prey  effectively  on  the  Roman  rear.  A  namesake  of  his,  surnamed 
the  Rhodian,  several  times  ran  the  gauntlet  of  the  whole  fleet  with 
a  single  swift  ship  to  bring  supplies.  Finally  Himilco  burnt  the 
Roman  works  and  converted  the    siege   into  a  dogged  but  in- 


LILYB^UM  AND  DKEPANA 


159 


effective  blockade,  rendered  possible  to  the  wretched  and  starving 
Romans  only  by  the  aid  of  Hiero.  In  249  B.C.  P.  Claudius  Pulcher, 
a  haughty  aristocrat,  arrived  witii  fresh  crews  and  orders. 


IK 


%:     ^>  I     D    I      I      ^  i        I 


MILESTONE   OF   P.    CLAUDIUS    PULCHER    AND   OF   C.    FURIUS    (.-EDILES).! 


Drepana. — Weary  of  the  fruitless  assault  of  this  Sicilian 
Sebastopol,  he  attempted,  with  the  best  of  the  decaying  ships  and 
a  picked  force,  to  carry  Drepana  by  a  coup-de-main.  Adherbal, 
taken  by  surprise  in  the  early  morning,  availed  himself  of  the 
curving  conformation  of  the  harbour  and  the  cover  of  an  islanci 
to  stand  out  to  sea  along  the  northern,  as  the  consul  coasted  in, 
ship  by  ship,  along  the  southern,  shore.  Having  thus  outflanked 
the  enemy,  he  was  able  to  crush  the  clumsily  turning  Roman 
ships  against  a  hostile  coast.  Claudius  escaped  with  a  shameful 
loss  of  ninety-three  ships.  The  sceptical  consul,  who  had  flung 
the  sacred  chickens  into  the  sea  that  "  they  might  drink  if  they 
would  not  eat,"  and  had  contemptuously  nominated  a  servant  as 
dictator,  was  fined  if  not  exiled.  Aulus  Atilius  Calatinus  was 
created  dictator,  the  first  appointed  for  command  outside  Italy. 
The  disaster  of  Drepana  was  completed  by  the  utter  destruction, 

1  This  milestone  from  the  Appian  Way  is  the  earliest  extant. 


l6o  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

on  the  south  coast  of  Sicily,  of  the  iinnicnsc  Koinan  transport-fleet 
under  L.  Junius  I'ulkis.  Carthaj^c,  l)y  her  one  naval  victory, 
had  regained  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  and  her  admirals  followed 
up  their  success  with  judj^ment  and  encr.^y.  But  owing  to  ex- 
haustion, indolence,  or  economy,  possibly  to  internal  troubles 
caused  by  the  cruel  severity  of  her  taxation,  she  failed  to  push 
her  advantage  by  land  against  the  besieging  army.  Calatinus 
maintained  his  position.  She  neither  hindered  nor  helped  her  only 
general,  the  kingly  statesman  and  soldier,  Hamilcar  Barca,  who, 
by  strict  discipline  and  a  policy  of  patience,  by  a  war  of  outposts, 
incursions,  and  privateering,  was  creating  a  trustworthy  and  at- 
tached infantry  out  of  his  mutinous  and  fickle  mercenaries.  Rome 
was  also  exhausted.  Her  loss  in  men  and  material,  the  damage  to 
trade  and  agriculture,  had  been  enormous.  Her  burgess  roll  fell  by 
a  sixth  between  252  B.C.  and  247  ;  the  coinage  had  been  debased  ; 
taxation  heavily  increased.  She  had  no  fleet  and  no  generals,  and 
contented  herself  with  founding  new  citizen  colonies  to  protect 
the  coast.  The  only  relief  in  Sicily  was  the  capture  of  Eryx  by 
Pullus  with  the  remnant  of  his  shipwrecked  crews. 

Hamilcar  Barca. — The  last  years  of  the  war  were  uneventful, 
and  resolved  themselves  into  a  display  of  accomplished  "military 
pugilism."  From  his  impregnable  post  on  Mount  Ercte  (Monte 
Pellegrino),  an  isolated  rock  rising  sharply  from  the  sea,  severed 
from  the  other  hills,  with  a  little  haven  at  its  base,  Hamilcar 
threatened  Panormus  and  harassed  the  Romans  in  Sicily  and  at 
home,  hampering  their  communications  and  cutting  off  iheir 
supplies.  In  244.  B.C.  he  transferred  himself  to  Mount  Eryx,  close 
to  Drepana,  and  in  this  difficult  position,  between  the  Roman 
garrison  on  the  summit  and  the  Roman  camp  at  the  base,  he  fought 
his  drawn  battle  to  the  end,  schooling  his  attached  troops  and 
teaching  a  succession  of  consuls  the  art  of  war.  At  length  Rome 
roused  herself  to  a  supreme  elTort.  A  compulsory  loan  repayable 
by  the  state,  or  a  voluntary  contribution  in  the  Athenian  manner, 
created  a  fleet  at  private  cost  of  200  ships  of  the  line,  of  ligdit  build 
and  good  construction,  either  newly  modelled  on  a  captured  ship 
or  taken  from  the  swarm  of  privateers  which  had  recently,  com- 
bining patriotism  and  profit,  taken  the  place  of  a  Roman  navy 
and  ravaged  the  African  coast. 

./Egates  Insulae.— With  these,  in  the  twenty-third  year  of  the 
war,  C.  Lutatius  Catulus  occupied  the  harbours  of  Lilybieum 
and  Drepana,  trained  and  practised  his  sailors  unceasingly,  and 
in  the  spring  of  241  B.C.,  brought  the  war  to  a  close  by  the  de- 


END   OF  FIRST  PUNIC    WAR 


i6i 


struction  of  the  hastily  equipped  fleet  of  250  sail,  with  transports, 
sent  under  Hanno  to  relieve  the  fortress.  The  Carthaginians, 
with  their  heavy  overladen  ships,  forced  to  engage,  like  the 
Spanish  Armada,  before  they  could  embark  their  real  commander, 
Hamilcar,  were  outsailed  and  tactically  beaten  by  the  patriotic 
fleet,  temporarily  commanded  by  P.  Valerius  Falto,  in  spite  of 
the  high  sea  and  favoural)le  wind  (March  10,  241  B.C.).  This 
defeat  at  the  /Egatian  Islands  broke  the  spirit  of  Carthage.  Her 
reserve  was  exhausted.     The  fortresses  must  fall. 


KEMAINS   OF   THE    TOWN    OK    ERYX. 


Peace — Hamilcar  received  full  powers  to  treat.  Refusing  to 
lay  down  his  arms  and  evacuate  as  a  preliminary,  he  induced 
Lutatius,  anxious  to  conclude  the  war  himself,  to  accede  to  more 
favourable  conditions.  The  provisional  treaty  was  rejected  by  the 
people,  but  a  commission  of  ten  appointed  by  the  Senate  con- 
cluded a  definitive  peace  upon  the  spot.  They  raised  the  amount 
of  the  indemnity  and  shortened  the  term  for  payment.  Carthage 
was  to  pay  3200  Euboic  talents  (^790,000)  in  ten  years,  to  surrender 
Sicily  and  the  islands  between  Sicily  and  Italy,  and  to  give  up  all 
prisoners  without  ransom.    The  integrity  of  the  Carthaginian  state 

L 


i62  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  guaranteed,  and  Hamilcar  departed  with  the  honours  of  war. 
To  compensate  her  immense  losses,  Rome  had  gained  her  first 
province  and  the  control  of  her  own  seas. 

Carthage,  hard  hit  in  mercenaries,  revenues,  and  trade,  had 
lost  her  naval  prestige  and  commercial  monopoly.  In  spite  of 
her  seamanship  she  had  been  constantly  defeated  on  her  own 
element.  Sicily,  the  object  of  the  efforts  and  sacrifices  of  centuries, 
had  been  lost.  From  LilybcCum,  her  foe  controlled  the  passage 
between  the  eastern  and  western  basins  of  the  Mediterranean 
and  threatened  the  defences  of  the  capital.  Her  resources  were, 
however,  as  elastic  as  her  spirit.  She  soon  recovered  from  her 
prostration,  and  her  losses  in  Sicily  were  soon  redressed  by  the 
Barcid  conquest  of  Spain. 

The  conduct  of  the  war  on  both  sides  had  been  weak  and 
vacillating,  without  clear  objective  or  definite  policy,  a  fact  due 
to  novel  conditions  and  divided  counsels.  It  had  brought  out 
the  essential  defects  of  both  systems.  An  organisation  adapted  to 
short  campaigns,  resting  on  the  capital  and  the  Italian  fortresses, 
was  unsuited  to  wide  combinations  and  distant  regions,  to  maritime 
war  and  protracted  sieges.  With  equal  distinctness  was  revealed 
the  rottenness  of  an  organisation  which  rested  on  a  mercenary 
infantry.  The  struggle  had  ended  in  a  suspension  of  hostilities. 
It  was  but  the  tedious  prologue  to  the  deadly  duel.  Carthage 
retained  the  Western  Mediterranean  ;  Rome  was  launched  on  her 
career  of  conquest.^ 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE    EXTENSION    OF    ITALY    TO    ITS    NATURAL    BOUNDARIES 

B.C.  A.U.C, 

The  Mercenary  War  at  Carthage    .    241-237  513-517 

Gallic  Wars 238-236    226-222        516-518    528-532 

Illyrian  Wars 230-229    219  524-525    535 

Revolt  of  the  Mercenaries  at  Carthage. — Before  passing  to  the 
next  stage  in  the  story  of  Roman  expansion  abroad,  and  of  the 
grave  social  and  political  changes  which  that  expansion  involved, 
we  have  to  describe  the  extension  of  Roman  Italy  to  its  natural 

1  Tiie  internal  history  will  be  reserved  till  ihe  close  of  the  period. 


SARDINIA    OCCUPIED  163 

boundaries.  One  series  of  events  in  foreign  history,  however  — 
the  so-called  "Truceless  War,"  the  struggle  of  Carthage  with 
her  revolted  mercenaries  and  subjects — is  of  importance  for  us 
as  throwing  light  upon  the  internal  weakness  of  that  state  and 
her  relation  to  her  African  subjects.  Its  importance  for  Rome  lies 
in  the  delay  it  imposed  upon  the  far-reaching  plans  of  Hamilcar. 
The  details  of  the  war  belong  to  Carthaginian  history.  Disaffec- 
tion had  broken  out  among  the  unpaid  and  not  yet  disbanded 
veterans  of  Sicily,  who  had  been  allowed,  on  the  evacuation  of 
the  island,  to  gather  in  force  at  Carthage,  and  had  been  alternately 
cheated  and  coaxed  by  a  weak  and  impecunious  government.  It 
swelled  to  a  mutiny  under  the  leadership  of  Spendius,  a  Campanian 
deserter,  Matho,  a  Libyan,  and  Autaritus,  a  Gaul.  The  mis- 
cellaneous rabble  of  mercenaries  was  joined  by  the  Libyan  sub- 
jects, who  rose  eti  masse  to  avenge  the  conscriptions,  extortions, 
and  evictions  under  which  they  w-rithed. 

After  a  desperate  and  ferocious  struggle,  prolonged  by  the 
dissensions  and  incapacity  of  the  Punic  leaders,  the  mutiny  was 
stamped  out  in  blood  by  Hamilcar  Barca. 

Sardinia. — To  complete  the  troubles  of  Carthage,  Rome,  who, 
with  a  loyalty  due  possibly  to  exhaustion,  had  permitted  the  waiy 
Hiero  to  assist  with  supplies  and  men  the  tottering  state,  and,  by 
prolonging  the  life  of  Carthage,  to  secure  the  existence  of  Syracuse  ; 
who  had  rejected  the  overtures  of  the  rebels  in  Utica  and  Sardinia  ; 
who  had  shown  an  unwonted  courtesy  and  sense  of  treaty  obliga- 
tion when  it  was  in  her  power  to  complete  the  ruin  of  her  rival, 
Rome  succumbed  to  temptation,  and  in  response  to  an  appeal 
from  the  Sardinian  mutineers,  occupied  the  rich  and  valuable 
island.  The  mercenaries  were  hard  pressed  by  the  natives,  and  the 
Romans,  in  accepting  their  invitation,  with  characteristic  sophistry 


COIN    STRUCK    AT    CARTHAGE — HEAD    OF    PERSEPHONE. 

treatM  Sardinia   as   a   masterless    land.     A    remonstrance    from 
Carthage  was  met  with  a  blank  menace  of  war  (238  B.c  ).     She  was 


i64  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

forced  to  resign  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  and  to  pay  an  indemnity 
of  1 200  talents  (^292,000).  Rome  had  gained  a  province — organised 
in  231  B.C. — and  secured  the  control  of  her  own  waters.  By  this 
act  of  simple  brigandage,  and  by  her  high-handed  support  of  her 
blockade-running  subjects,  she  kindled,  to  her  cost,  the  undying 
hatred  of  Hamiicar  and  prepared  the  just  and  terrible  vengeance 
of  the  Hannibalic  war. 

Sicily. — In  Sicily,  Hiero  had  been  left  an  independent  prince  ; 
the  remainder  of  the  ruined  and  depopulated  island  was  organised 
under  a  temporary  arrangement  till  the  establishment  of  a  regular 
provincial  government  in  227  B.C.  The  old  policy  of  isolation  broke 
up  the  existing  groups  of  states  and  shattered  existing  ties  and 
relations.  Messana  became  a  federated  state  ;  some  few  were  left 
free  and  untaxed  ;  a  large  number  retained  their  autonomy  on  pay- 
ment of  a  tithe  of  their  produce  {deciima)  ;  a  large  number  again 
saw  their  land  converted  to  ager  ptibiicus,  leased  by  the  Roman 
censor.^  The  removal  of  the  tus  commerct'z  between  states  threw 
large  masses  of  land  into  the  possession  of  the  Romans  and  the  few 
privileged  Sicilians.  Prices  fell,  agriculture  declined,  big  estates, 
plantations,  and  the  slave  system  spread  in  all  directions. 

Italy. — In  Italy  proper,  except  the  absurd  revolt  of  Falerii, 
crushed  after  six  days'  war,  and  the  formation  of  colonies,- 
there  is  no  matter  of  military  importance.  The  predatory  incur- 
sions of  the  Ligurians  gave  trouble  for  some  years,  while  the 
stubborn  inhabitants  of  Sardinia  and  Corsica  offered  a  steady 
resistance  to  the  conquerors.  In  238  B.C.  Ti.  Sempronius  Gracchus 
defeated  the  Ligurians  and  was  active  in  the  islands,  in  236-235 
the  Carthaginians  fomented  disturbances  in  all  three  regions, 
and  T.  Manlius  Torquatus  defeated  the  Sardinians.  The  dis- 
turbances continued  without  decisive  action  down  to  230.  Turning 
to  the  Adriatic,  we  find  that  the  line  of  colonies  guarding  the 
coast  had  been  completed  by  the  foundation  of  Brundisium. 

The  Illyrians. — The  Adriatic  had  become  a  Roman  sea, 
covered  with  Roman  ships.  Occupied  hitherto  with  the  Punic 
war,  Roman  policy  in  the  East  had  confined  itself  to  watching 
r^Iacedonia  and  Syria  and  maintaining  relations  with  Egypt, 
which  had  treated  Rome  with  respectful  attention  since  the  em- 

^  This  organisation  was  not  completed  till  210  B.C.     C/.  pp.  211,  212. 

-  Viz.,  besides  the  burgess-colonies  at  .iEsium  and  Alsium  (247  B.C.),  and 
Fregenae  (245  B.C.),  the  Latin  colonies  at  Posstum,  and  Cosa  (on  Lucanian 
coast?)  (273  B.C.),  Beneventum  and  Ariminum  (268  B.C.),  Firmum  (264  B.C.), 
.^sernia  (263  B.C.),  Brundisium  (244  B.C.),  and  Spoletium  (241  B.C.). 


THE   ILLYRIAN   WAR  165 

bassy  of  Plolemy  Philadelphus  in  273  li.C.  In  Greece  the  constant 
jars  of  the  Achiean  and  /EtoHan  leagues,  of  Sparta  and  of  Macedon, 
spared  her  the  trouble  of  interference.  On  the  sea,  however,  the 
decay  of  the  Greek  fleets,  the  naval  weakness  of  Rome,  and  her 
innate  aversion  from  salt  water,  left  a  free  hand  to  the  pirates  who 
flourished  under  the  favour  of  Macedonia.  The  difficult  waters 
and  dangerous  coast,  avoided  by  Greek  colonisation,  formed  an 
excellent  school  of  hardy  sailors  and  a  safe  retreat  for  the  light 
Liburnian  cutters.  Here  piracy  had  been  ever  at  home,  fitfull)- 
restrained  by  the  sea-police  of  Corcyra  or  Syracuse.  By  this 
time  the  Illyrian  buccaneers  mustered  powerful  squadrons,  which 
harried  the  coasts  and  swept  the  seas  as  far  as  Messene.  The 
forces  of  Xing'  Agron  and  his  widow  Teuta  made  themselves  felt 
in  continental  affairs.  At  length  the  complaints  of  the  Greek 
commercial  towns,  Issa,  Pharos,  Epidamnus,  and  Apollonia,  and 
the  losses  sustained  by  Roman  trade,  drew  an  embassy  from  the 
Senate  to  the  rulers  of  Scodra  (Scutari).  Queen  Teuta  declared 
herself  ready  to  observe  a  correct  attitude  towards  Rome  in  her 
public  capacity,  but  was  unable,  she  said,  to  restrict  the  private 
undertakings  of  her  subjects  on  the  high  seas.  Coruncanius 
retorted,  with  proper  but  ill-timed  spirit,  that  the  Romans  would 
make  it  their  business  to  improve  the  relations  of  sovereign  and 
subject  in  Illyria.  A  murderous  outrage  upon  the  embassy  was 
followed  by  Mar.  A  powerful  fleet  and  army  under  the  command 
of  Cn.  Fulvius  Centumalus  and  L.  Postumius  Albinus,  in  a  single 
campaign,  relieved  the  Greek  cities,  captured  Corcyra,  which 
had  been  occupied  by  the  Illyrians,  and  reduced  the  Queen  to 
submission  (229  B.C.).  Her  conquests  were  restored,  her  land-made 
tributary,  her  armed  ships  forbidden  to  sail  south  of  Lissus.  The 
Greek  states,  Corcyra,  Epidamnus,  and  Apollonia,  entered  the 
Roman  alliance,  and  Demetrius  of  Pharos  was  rewarded  for  his 
well-timed  help  by  territory  in  Dalmatia.  The  new  possessions 
were  placed  under  the  general  consular  authority,  with  special 
subordinate  officers  in  Corcyra  and  elsewhere.  Rome  had 
secured  good  harbours  on  the  Adriatic,  and  a  first  foothold  in 
Greece.  She  was  recognised  by  the  Greeks  as  a  civilised  state, 
welcomed  as  a  liberator,  and  admitted  to  the  mysteries  of  Eleusis 
and  to  the  Isthmian  games.  The  keys  of  the  East  were  in  her 
hand.     Macedon  did  not  stir. 

Ten  years  later,  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  more  shrewd  than 
wise,  relying  on  his  connection  with  Antigonus  Doson,  the  victor 
of  Sellasia,  and  on  Rome's  actual  and  expected  difiiculties  with 


1 66  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Gauls  and  Carthaginians,  treated  the  conditions  of  peace  with 
open  contempt  and  extended  his  rule  in  Illyria.  Prompt  action 
was  demanded  to  secure  Rome's  flank  in  the  obviously  impending 
war  with  Carthage.  L.  yEmilius  Paullus  and  M.  Livius  Salinator 
captured  Pharos,  drove  Demetrius  into  exile,  and  settled  the 
affairs  of  Illyria.  Demetrius  took  refuge  with  Philip  of  Macedon. 
The  two  consuls  were  accused,  and  Livius  condemned,  for  mal- 
administration of  the  booty. 

Cisalpine  Gaul. — We  have  now  to  trace  the  extension  of  Rome 
to  her  natural  boundary  on  the  north.  Political  and  military  con- 
siderations pointed  to  the  Alps  as  the  scientific  frontier  of  Italy. 
The  plain  of  the  Po  and  the  passes  of  the  mountains  were  held 
by  Celtic  tribes,  her  ancient  and  hereditary  enemies.  At  the 
foot  of  the  Alps,  the  Salassi  and  Taurini  occupied  the  head- 
waters of  the  Po  ;  the  Insubres  round  Mediolanum,  the  Cenomani 
round  Brixia  and  Cremona,  and  the  Veneti,  a  non-Gallic  clan, 
filled  the  space  in  order  between  the  Po,  the  Alps,  and  the  Gulf 
of  Venice.  To  the  south,  the  Ligures  held  the  slopes  of  the 
Apennines  from  the  Maritime  Alps  to  Arretium  and  Pisae.  The 
right  bank  of  the  Po  was  held  by  the  smaller  tribes  of  the  Anares 
and  Lingones,  below  whom  the  strong  Boii  extended  from  Parma 
to  Bologna.  The  Senones  had  once  dwelt  between  the  Apennines 
and  the  sea  as  far  as  Ancona.  Of  these,  the  Insubres,  the  Ceno- 
mani, and  the  Veneti  remained  neutral  ;  the  Senones  were  extinct. 

Forty-five  years  had  elapsed  since  the  last  Gallic  war  and  the 
battle  of  the  Vadimonian  Lake.  During  the  Pyrrhic  and  Punic 
wars  the  Gauls  had  fortunately  kept  the  peace,  but  the  younger 
generation  was  now  in  a  state  of  ferment,  and  entered  into  com- 
munication with  the  Transalpine  Celts.  The  first  outbreak  was  not 
serious.  In  238  and  237  B.C.  the  Gauls  suffered  some  defeats,  and 
in  236  a  powerful  Boian  army  reinforced  by  Transalpine  Gauls, 
appeared  before  Ariminum,  Rome's  northern  outpost,  but  was 
compelled  by  internal  dissension  to  break  up  and  to  accept  the 
moderate  terms  imposed. 

Flaminius. — A  second  more  serious  outbreak  was  precipitated 
by  the  popular  policy  of  C.  Flaminius,  tribune  of  the  plebs. 
It  was  clearly  necessary  to  strengthen  the  north-eastern  frontier. 
It  was  possible  to  secure  this  end,  and  at  the  same  time  to  relieve 
the  peasantry,  suffering  imder  the  effects  of  the  long  wars  and 
the  scarcity  of  money,  to  deplete  the  overcrowded  capital  and 
reward  the  veterans  by  allotting  to  colonists  the  ager  publicus 
in    Picenum   and   the   land    forfeited    by    the    Senonian    Gauls. 


BATTLE   OF  TELA  MOM  167 

In  232  B.C.  the  popular  leader  carried  his  agrarian  law  in  the 
teeth  of  the  nobles  and  the  financial  class,  who  maintained  their 
own  interests  in  the  system  of  pasturage  and  occupation  and  the 
accumulation  of  large  slave-worked  estates.  The  measure  was 
excellent,  the  means  dubious.  The  folly  of  the  Senate  compelled 
an  appeal  to  the  constitutional  powers  of  the  tribes,  and  Flami- 
nius,  by  his  victory,  set  a  precedent  to  his  successors  which  they 
were  not  slow  to  follow.^ 

It  was  a  loss  to  the  Senate  of  moral  weight,  and  the  statesmen 
of  later  ages  found  in  Flaminius  the  herald  of  the  Roman  revolu- 
tion. The  law  was  vigorously  carried  out  in  spite  of  the  intrigues 
of  the  nobles,  and  one  of  its  results  was  the  irritation  of  the  already 
impatient  Gallic  tribes.  In  225  B.C.  a  combined  force  of  Italian 
Celts  and  Gallic  adventurers  from  the  Rhone  (Gtesatae),  amounting 
to  50,000  foot  and  20,000  horse,  moving  by  the  west  coast  route, 
eluded  the  Roman  posts  and  marched  on  Clusium,  within  three 
days  of  Rome.  A  detachment  had  been  left  to  watch  the 
Cenomani  and  Veneti,  who  were  acting  with  Rome.  The  terror 
of  a  common  danger,  stimulated  by  the  usual  prodigies,  caused  an 
outburst  of  superstition,  in  which  two  Gauls  and  two  Greeks  were 
buried  alive  in  the  Forum  Boarium,  followed  by  a  general  levy  of 
the  Italian  peoples.  The  dispositions  for  defence  were  as  follows  : — 
L.  ^milius  Papus  held  the  passage  at  Ariminum  with  a  consu- 
lar army  ;  the  western  roads  were  blocked  by  55,000  Etruscans 
and  Sabines  at  Faesulas  and  Arretium,  pending  the  arrival  of  C. 
Atilius  Regulus  with  the  amiy  of  Sardinia  ;  the  Umbrian  militia, 
in  the  centre,  were  ready  to  fall  on  the  enemy's  flank ;  a  reserve 
of  50,000  was  posted  at  Rome.  The  Etruscan  troops  had  been 
already  entrapped  and  defeated  when  ^milius  appeared  on  the 
Gallic  flank. 

Battle  of  Telamon. — Turning  homeward  by  the  coast  to 
secure  their  booty,  their  steps  dogged  by  the  consul,  the  Gauls  fell 
in  at  Telamon  with  the  Sardinian  army,  which  had  landed  at 
Pisae.  Caught  between  two  armies,  they  protected  their  wings 
with  barricades  and  fought  on  a  double  front.  A  flank  attack 
of  the  victorious  Roman  cavalry  helped  superior  discipline  and 
armament  to  decide  this  strange  and  desperate  battle.  The 
value  of  the  pilum  for  distant  fighting  was  amply  demonstrated 
on  the  naked  bodies  of  the  close-ranked  Gauls.  Forty  thousand 
of  the  enemy  were  killed,  ten  thousand  captured.     The  defeat  was 

1  On  the  land  question  vide  i>ifra,  on  Ti.  Gracchus  and  the  agrarian  laws 


1 68 


HISTORY  OF  KOME 


followed  up  by  the  invasion  of  Cisalpine  Gaul,  whose  conciuest 
was  completed  more  by  the  valour  of  the  Roman  soldier  than 
by  the  tactics  of  the  politician  P'laminius,  who  succeeded  to  the 
command. 

Conquest  of  Cisalpine  Gaul.  —  With  the  help  of  the  Ccnomani, 
he  ravaged  the  land  of  the  Insubres,  and  refused  peace  except 
on  the  hardest  terms.  The  Boii  and  Lingones  had  already  sub- 
mitted. In  222  i;.C.  the  Insubres  called  in  once  more  the  Gtcsata^, 
but  their  final  efforts  were  crushed  by  M.  Marcellus,  who  with  his 
own  hand  won  the  spolia  opima^  from  Viridomarus,  and  by  Cn. 
Scipio,  who  captured  Mediolanum   and   Comum.     The  power  of 


DENARIUS   OF   CIRCA    45    B.C.— MARCELLUS    AND    SPOLIA    UI'l.MA. 

the  Gauls  was  broken.  Rome  had  secured  her  tlank  and  extended 
her  boundary  to  the  Alps,  while  her  true  strength  had  been  seen 
in  the  common  front  presented  to  a  common  danger.  It  remained 
to  Romanise  the  conquered  land.  The  great  northern  road  was 
extended  from  Narnia  and  Spoletium  to  Ariminum  as  the  "via 
Flaminia."  Colonies  were  laid  out  (B.C.  218)  at  Placentia  and 
Cremona  (Latin),  and  Mutina  (burgess).  Communication  with 
Illyricum  was  assured  by  the  expedition  to  I  stria.  The  allied 
tribes  remained  in  nominal  independence  ;  the  western  clans  were 
on  the  whole  undisturbed. 

The  Senate  hoped  to  bring  the  impending  Punic  struggle  to 
an  issue  in  Spain.  Upon  their  unfinished  work  and  half-founded 
colonies,  sweeping  with  rapid  march  from  the  storm  of  Saguntum 
to  the  passes  of  the  Alps,  Hannibal  descended  like  a  thunder-cloud 
in  a  clear  sky,  to  wage  war  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  Italy, 
and  to  march  his  troops  to  the  gates  of  Rome. 

1    Vide  supra  pp.  79  and  80. 


CARTHAGE  AFTER    THE    WAR  169 

CHAPTER  XX 

HAMILCAR    AND    HANNII'.AL 

R.C.  A.VX. 

Hamilcar  in  Spain 236-228        518  526 

Hasdrubal 228-221        526-533 

Hannibal  takes  Saguntum 219  S3S 

State  of  Carthage. — While  Rome  thus  secured  her  position 
Carthage  had  not  been  idle.  The  Celtic  troubles  and  wavering 
policy  of  her  foe  had  given  a  chance  that  she  was  not  slow  to 
seize.  She  had  doubtless  lost  her  commercial  supremacy,  her 
command  of  the  seas,  and  the  Sicilian  tribute  ;  she  retained  Africa, 
the  Spanish  factories,  and  the  gates  of  the  ocean.  But  the  sur- 
render of  Sardinia  and  the  bullying  attitude  of  Rome  proved 
the  precariousness  of  a  tenure  which  hung  upon  the  moods  of  the 
masters  of  Lilybasum.  Carthage  existed  by  the  grace  of  Rome. 
To  all  but  the  cowardly  and  incapable  opportunists  of  the  peace- 
party,  whose  sole  idea  was  a  policy  of  "scuttle"  abroad,  and 
taxation  and  crucifixion  at  home,  the  position  was  clearly  intoler- 
able, and  war,  sooner  or  later,  a  necessity.  The  distinction  between 
the  reactionaries  and  reformers,  the  capitalists  and  the  democracy, 
was  thus  merged  in  the  distinction  between  the  parties  of  war  and 
peace.  Hanno  "  the  great"  led  the  governing  aristocracy.  At  the 
head  of  the  opposition  stood  Hamilcar  Barca.  Checked  by  the 
disasters  in  Sicily,  and  hampered  by  the  weakness  of  the  govern- 
ment, the  democratic  leader,  with  all  the  energy  and  tenacity  of 
his  character,  educated  a  party,  and  pushed  his  plans  alternately  by 
military  success  and  political  adroitness.  Sicily  was  lost  and  Africa 
drained  of  men  and  money,  but  to  the  statesman  and  soldier 
Spain  offered  a  wider  and  a  safer  field,  in  which,  with  larger  ideas 
and  resources,  at  a  convenient  distance  from  Rome,  to  build  up 
again  the  military  and  material  power  of  his  country.  Precious 
time  had  been  lost  in  the  Mercenary  war  ;  his  popularity  had  been 
sacrificed  ;  his  attached  veterans  had  perished  in  battle  or  on  the 
cross.  At  the  same  time  the  folly  and  incompetence  of  Hanno 
had  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  "  Barcine  faction."  Hamilcar 
had  saved  his  country  by  his  generalship,  self-control,  and  diplo- 
macy, and  his  reward  had  been  an  impeachment  ;  but  the  disas- 
ters of  a  government  are  the  opportunity  of  its  opponents.  He 
was  appointed  generalissimo  by  popular  vote.     The  Romanising 


I70  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

nobility  accepted  the  situation,  which  liad  its  advantages  even  for 
them,  and  his  actions,  however  little  the  Punic  Senate  grasped 
or  approved  his  larger  projects,  were  not  without  its  knowledge 
and  sanction.  To  it  Spain  offered  a  new  source  of  revenue,  and 
removed  a  dangerous  man  ;  to  him,  as  a  recruiting  ground  and 
base  of  operations,  with  its  fruitful  soil,  rich  mines,  and  gallant 
tribes,  it  afforded  "a  new  world  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  old," 
the  one  means  for  saving  Carthage  and  revenging  her  wrongs. 

Hamilcar  in  Spain. — The  constitution  remained  unaltered,  but 
the  democrats  ("  eraipia  tCjv  TrovqpoTaTUP  avdpuirui'  "),  without  being  in 
office,  were  in  power.  They  controlled  the  government  and  directed 
its  policy.  The  commander-in-chief,  at  once  dreaded,  detested, 
and  adored  by  his  countrymen,  with  a  personal  and  national 
hatred  in  his  heart,  crossed  to  Spain  in  the  summer  of  236  B.C.  to 
organise  the  '•''revanche^'' — a  virtual  dictator,  removable  only  by 
the  people,  who  had  appointed  him.  With  him  went  his  young 
son  Hannibal,  who  by  the  altar  of  Carthage  had  sworn  an  oath 
of  undying  enmity  to  Rome.  Hasdrubal,  too,  his  son-in-law,  com- 
manded the  fleet.  He  had  to  form  an  army,  create  material,  supply 
his  friends,  bribe  his  enemies,  win  Spain,  and  Avatch  Carthage. 
The  war  must  support  the  war,  and  the  party  as  well.  He  must 
conceal,  deceive,  and  defy  on  both  sides  at  once,  forging  a  sword 
he  was  destined  never  to  use.  Spain  had  long  been  connected 
with  the  Phoenicians,  whose  private  factories  anciently  established 
on  the  west  formed  the  starting-point  of  his  enterprise.  Tartessus 
(Tarshish)  was  the  El  Dorado  of  antiquity,  and  Gades  (founded 
circ.  loco  B.C.)  the  centre  of  western  commerce.  But  hitherto  the 
settlements  had  been  as  purely  commercial  as  the  original  factories 
of  the  English  in  India.  The  time  had  come  for  conquest.  For 
nine  years,  by  arms,  diplomacy,  and  personal  influence,  he  attracted, 
quelled,  organised  Spain — an  uncrowned  "  king  of  men,"  possessing 
his  soul  in  patience  with  one  end  before  his  eyes,  creating  an 
empire,  preparing  victory.  A  new  army  was  raised  and  trained  ; 
trade  followed  the  flag  ;  the  state-chest  shared  with  his  troops  and 
his  party  in  the  proceeds.  The  Romans  were  secretly  harassed,  the 
Gallic  tribes  conciliated,  the  Numidian  insurgents  crushed  ;  and 
yet  Rome,  arrogant  or  ignorant,  spoke  no  word. 

Hasdrubal. — In  228  B.C.  Hamilcar  died,  but  his  work  throve  in 
the  hands  of  the  astute  statesman  and  successful  soldier,  Hasdrubal, 
who  gained  the  command  by  the  right  of  merit,  by  the  favour 
of  the  army,  and  by  his  personal  popularity.  Shrewd,  versatile, 
and  eloquent,  more  at  home  in  diplomacy  than  on  the  field,  he 


HAMILCAR  AND  HASDRUBAL  171 

pushed,  with  the  aid  of  Hannibal  and  of  reinforcements  from  home, 
the  Punic  province  to  the  Ebro.  He  founded  Nova  Carthago, 
opened  up  the  mines,  and  developed  commerce.  The  party  of 
Hanno  was  silenced  by  success.  From  Spain,  Carthage  could  draw- 
revenue,  conscripts,  and  mercenaries  ;  in  Spain  she  was  acquiring 
an  infantry  that  would  meet  the  legions  on  equal  terms.  Rome, 
underrating  the  elasticity  of  Carthage,  blind  to  the  strategic 
value  of  this  new  dominion,  contented  herself  (228  B.C.)  with  the 
"paper  boundary"  of  the  Ebro,  a  limit  as  valuable  as  a  Central 
Asian  frontier.  Besides  this  convention,  she  secured  herself  a  base 
of  action  by  alliances  with  Saguntum  and  Emporite,  in  the  fixed 
and  fatal  idea  that  the  decisive  struggle  would  be  fought  at  her 
convenience  and  on  the  field  of  her  choice.  If  the  policy  of 
Hasdrubal  and  the  energy  of  his  lieutenant  did  at  last  arouse 
suspicion  and  alarm,  her  hands  were  full  at  home.  Nor  did  she 
realise  till  the  eleventh  hour  the  rapidity  of  mobilisation,  the  swift 
movement,  the  audacious  genius,  of  her  great  opponent.  In  limit- 
ing Hasdrubal  by  the  Ebro,  and  giving  him  a  free  hand  beyond 
that  boundary,  the  Romans  may  have  stipulated  for  the  neutrality 
of  Saguntum,  and  possibly  of  the  other  Greek  towns,  but  they  dealt 
only  with  Hasdrubal  personally,  whose  action  could  be  easily 
disavowed  by  the  Punic  government.  Hasdrubal  on  his  part  was 
content  to  buy  a  respite  and  consolidate  his  power ;  he'  even 
neglected  the  opportunity  afforded  by  the  Gallic  war.  In  221  B.C. 
an  act  of  private  vengeance  closed  his  eight  years'  rule  in  the 
peninsula. 

Character  of  Hannibal. — The  voice  of  the  army,  confirmed  by 
the  Carthaginian  people,  called  to  the  command  Hasdrubal's  right 
arm,  Hannibal,  a  young  man  in  his  twenty-sixth  or  twenty-ninth 
year,  a  trained  athlete  and  soldier,  a  brilliant  cavalry  officer,  a  fair 
linguist,  not  destitute  of  culture.  The  "  inheritor  of  the  unfulfilled 
renown"  of  Hamilcar,  the  heir  of  his  hate  and  of  his  genius,  the 
embodiment  of  the  national  revenge,  he  concentrated  the  spirit 
of  his  house  and  country  in  one  long  deadly  struggle  with  her 
detested  rival  and  oppressor.  Rome  was  now  to  reap  the  fruits 
of  her  policy  of  "  plunder  and  blunder."  She  had  irritated  without 
destroying  ;  she  had  imposed  limits  without  effective  safeguards  ; 
she  had  allowed  her  enemy  twenty  years  to  recuperate  her  strength  ; 
and  now  the  ideas  of  Hamilcar  were  ripe.  A  trustworthy  infantry 
was  there  to  support  the  finest  cavalry  in  the  world  ;  the  finances 
were  restored,  and  all  was  ready.  The  war-party  controlled  the 
state.     For,  in  spite  of  Hanno  and  the  Senate,  whose  treasonable 


172  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tendencies  liavc  l)ccn  exaggerated,  and  wliatcver  the  lies  of  Roman 
historians  and  the  excuses  of  Punic  ambassadors,  Carthage  sup- 
ported lier  leader  and  his  actions.  It  was  no  mere  policy  of  drift, 
venality,  or  partisanship  that  accepted  the  siege  of  Saguntum, 
and  maintained  for  seventeen  years  the  waste  and  wear  of  the 
Hannibalic  war.  It  was  clear  that  war  was  inevitable,  and  that 
Hannibal  was  the  man  to  wage  it.  To  this  he  had  been  con- 
secrated from  his  boyhood.  The  great  son  of  a  great  father,  a 
master  of  the  art  of  war,  a  crafty  strategist,  patient  and  audacious, 
warily  cautious  and  daringly  indiscreet,  able  to  read  as  well  as 
to  lead  men,  he  united  policy  and  soldiership,  subtle  tactics  and 
broad  combinations.  He  was  accused  of  perfidy,  irreligion,  cruelty, 
and  avarice.  The  charges  are  questionable,  their  source  suspected. 
If  the  strength  and  tenacity  of  a  great  people,  well  supplied  with 
ordinary  ability,  triumphed  in  the  end  over  her  own  disasters 
and  the  character  and  genius  of  an  extraordinary  man,  we  cannot 
accept  the  calumnies  with  which  the  ungenerous  victors — victors 
alike  in  the  field  of  war  and  the  pag-es  of  history — have  blackened 
the  fair  fame  of  "  dirus  Hannibal."  He  was  less  barbarous  than 
his  nation  or  his  times  ;  his  avarice  was  only  public,  to  support  the 
charges  of  the  war  ;  yet  Carthage  thought  him  covetous  and  Rome 
cruel.  He  had  a  tinge  of  superstition  in  his  character  ;  at  times 
he  showed  a  certain  grim  humour.  He  was  not  incapable  of  love  ; 
he  married  a  Spanish  maiden,  and  solaced  the  toils  of  war  with 
the  charms  of  a  Salapian  lady.  Such  was  the  man  whose  spirit, 
moving  in  all  the  complications  of  the  times,  the  soul  of  all  that 
happened  in  Spain,  Italy,  Africa,  and  Macedon,  gave  to  this  pro- 
1;  nged  death-grapple  the  well-earned  title  of  the  Hannibalic  war. 
It  was  to  him  a  necessary  and  a  national  work  ;  it  was  no  mere 
war  of  ambition  or  aggrandisement  ;  there  was  no  thought  of  a 
personal  despotism. 

Siege  of  Saguntum. — The  immediate  occasion  of  war  was 
found  in  the  ambignious  position  of  Saguntum,  which  plays  the 
part  of  Messana  in  the  first  struggle.  Lying  within  the  Punic 
sphere  of  influence,  it  was  protected  by  a  treaty  with  Rome. 
Hannibal,  disregarding  alike  this  treaty  and  the  doubtful  pro- 
visions of  the  peace  of  Catulus,  turned  from  the  subjugation  of  the 
tribes  of  the  central  plateau — Olcades,  Vacc^ei,  and  Carpetani — 
and  created  a  casus  belli  by  an  attack  on  Saguntum.  He  had 
spent  two  years  in  securing  his  base,  training  his  troops,  and 
inspiring  confidence  at  home  and  in  the  camp,  and  now  took  ad- 
vantage of  Rome's  interference  in  the  party  contests  of  Saguntum 


HANNIBAL  AND  SAGUNTUM 


173 


to  declare  its  neutrality  violated  and  the  convention  a  dead  letter. 
Such  was  his  answer  to  the  Roman  embassy  which  came  at  the 
appeal  of  the  threatened  city.  Its  protest  was  ineffectual.  He 
could  not  afford  to  leave  tlie  citv  in  his  rear — this  Roman  Calais, 


ROMAN    IN    TOGA. 


the  key  to  Spain.  Defended  for  eight  months  with  the  courage 
of  despair,  and  sacrificed  by  the  culpable  negligence  of  Rome,  it 
fell  before  the  vigorous  assaults  of  Maharbal  and  Hannibal.  The 
siege  became  a  blockade,  and  at  the  final  storm  the  Spanish  chiefs 


174  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

perished  in  the  Hiunes  of  the  houses  whicli  their  own  hands  had 
kindled.  Hannibal  by  this  success — whose  difficulty  was  an  omen 
of  his  future  failure  in  Italian  sieges — had  defied  Rome,  secured 
Spain,  and  committed  Carthage.  The  agents  of  Rome  found  a 
contemptuous  reception  among  the  Spanish  tribes,  while  an  em- 
bassy, headed  by  Q.  Fabius,  proceeded  to  Carthage  and  demanded 
pro  form d  the  surrender  of  Hannibal.  The  ultimatum  was  met 
by  an  attempt  to  discuss  the  question  of  formal  right.  The  time 
for  this  was  past.  The  causes  of  the  war  lay,  not  in  the  breach  of 
treaties  nor  in  the  attack  on  Saguntum  ;  they  lay  in  the  action  and 
relation  of  two  peoples.  It  was  a  duel  to  the  death  between  east 
and  west,  a  struggle  for  life  embittered  by  cruel  memories,  which 
could  be  settled  only  by  the  sword.  Fabius  put  the  sharp  alter- 
native to  the  Punic  Senate.  He  gathered  his  toga  in  two  folds — 
"  War  or  peace,"  he  cried  ;  "  which  will  you  have  ? "  "  Which 
you  will,"  was  the  answer.  He  shook  out  the  fold  of  war,  and 
war  was  accepted  by  Carthage  with  a  light  lieart. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE    SECOND    PUNIC    WAR    UP    TO    THE    BATTLE    OF    CANN.B 

r,.c.  A.u.c. 
Second  Punic  War  begins— Battles  of  the  Ticinus  and  the 

Trebia 218  536 

Battle  of  Lake  Trasimene 217  537 

Battle  of  Cannae 216  538 

Strength  of  Rome  and  Carthage  compared. — The  strength  of  the 
combatants  must  now  be  differently  estimated.  In  the  interval  be- 
tween the  wars  Rome  had  gained  by  the  consolidation  of  Italy  and 
the  growth  of  national  feeling.  The  tribes  that  had  fallen  before 
her  were  bound  to  her  now  by  ties  of  kinship,  fought  under  her 
flag,  and  shared  in  the  glories  and  profits  of  the  empire.  They 
enjoyed  the  Pax  Romana  ;  their  burdens  were  as  yet  moderate, 
their  allegiance  secured  by  their  interest  and  their  affection,  and, 
last  but  not  least,  by  the  network  of  roads  and  fortresses,  the 
centres  and  pathways  of  Roman  force  and  of  Roman  feeling. 
Rome's  true  strength  lay  in  the  /oyalty  of  her  colonies  and  allies. 
She  had  gained  the  control  of  the  sea,  and  held  the  chief  harbours 


Sow  Je letch's  'Ranv.Sist. 


LoTiffnums .  Gr«&V' 


THE 

AGINIAN  EMPIRE 

tnd  Dependencies 

arthagtnian  Domuvums 
.wtliaoinian  Dependencies 

uuidom  or  Bier o  

CtznLertint 

amahali  nuirclvihoTTt,  CarOuxgoNma  to  Cannae 

ontan  ten'ixorv  or  aihes , 


London,,  New  Yirr-k  JoBonvbo}: 


PLANS  OF  HANNIBAL  175 

of  the  Western  Mediterranean,  except  those  of  Spain.  She  was 
strong  in  the  temper  and  numbers  of  her  citizen  army,  but  she 
retained  all  the  weakness  of  changing  chiefs  and  divided  counsels  ; 
in  cavalry  she  was  deficient ;  her  generals  lacked  the  tactics  and 
strategy  to  meet  the  inventive  and  original  genius  of  Hannibal. 
Carthage  remained  a  loosely  organised  state,  weak  where  Rome 
was  strong.  If  she  had  partially  restored  her  shattered  finances, 
yet  her  naval  monopoly  was  a  thing  of  the  past  ;  she  retained 
her  commercial  ideas  and  unmilitary  instincts,  her  untrustworthy 
population,  and  tendency  to  fight  her  battles  with  purchased 
mercenaries  or  reluctant  conscripts.  She  was  not  untrue  to  her 
great  leader,  however  inadequate  her  support  may  seem,  but  it 
was  in  Spain  that  Hannibal  found  his  true  base,  and  from  Spain 
that  he  drew  his  reinforcements.  He  was  strong  in  himself 
and  in  his  army,  especially  strong  in  his  magnificent  cavalry, 
with  its  gallant  leaders,  Mago  and  Maharbal.  He  was  weak  in 
his  siege-train  and  engineers,  in  the  distance  of  his  base  and 
the  difficulty  of  communication  by  sea.  Above  all  was  he  weak 
in  the  spirit  and  energy  of  his  country,  at  least  as  contrasted  with 
the  iron  constancy  of  Rome. 

Plans  of  Hannibal. — Hannibal's  plan  of  campaign  reveals  at 
once  a  genius  for  wide  combinations  and  a  careful  provision  for 
possible  contingencies.  The  year  219  B.C.  he  spent  in  assiduous 
preparations  and  such  reconnaissance  of  the  future  field  of  war 
as  was  yet  possible.  His  central  idea  was  to  strike  at  Rome  in 
Italy  itself,  and,  while  securing  his  remoter  bases  in  Spain  and 
Africa,  and  his  communications  with  those  bases,  to  find  a  nearer 
point  d'appui  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  from  whence,  if  opportunity 
served,  he  might  transfer  his  operations  to  Central  and  Southern 
Italy,  recovering  contact  with  Carthage.  He  could  not,  like 
Wellington,  base  himself  upon  a  fleet,  but  his  negotiations  had 
provided  powerful  allies  in  the  plains  of  the  Po.  Irritated  by 
the  colonies,  the  roads,  and  the  land-distributions,  the  Boii  and 
Insubres  would  furnish  guides,  supplies,  and  recruits  whose  numbers 
and  enthusiasm  would  render  them  a  formidable  addition  to  the 
veteran  nucleus  of  the  Spanish  army.  He  expected  that  Macedon, 
strengthened  by  the  victory  of  Sellasia,  and  annoyed  by  Roman 
interference  in  Greek  politics,  would  actively  support  him  ;  he 
might  hope  that  the  appearance  of  his  army  in  the  north  would 
raise  the  South  Italians  in  the  Roman  rear.  All  strategical 
considerations  therefore  pointed  to  the  valley  of  the  Po.  The  com- 
bined assault  on  Rome  from  north  and  south  at  once  remained 


176  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  dominant  idea  of  Carthaginian  warfare.  In  pursuance  of  this 
scheme,  Hannil)al,  wliile  he  arranged  for  naval  demonstrations  in 
South  Italy  and  at  Lilybi^^um,  devoted  the  bulk  of  his  forces  to 
the  army  of  the  north.  His  dispositions  and  designs  show  a 
complete  control  of  the  national  resources  and  security  in  the 
national  support.  His  available  strength  may  have  reached 
i20,roo  foot,  16,000  cavalry,  58  elephants,  and  50  ships  of  war — 
not  all  manned.  The  troops  were  mostly  trained  conscripts  or 
allied  contingents,  no  longer  mercenaries.  Of  these,  20,000,  mainly 
Spaniards,  secured  Africa  and  the  route  to  Spain  and  held  the 
passage  of  the  straits,  while  the  western  garrisons  were  moved  to 
Carthage.  His  brother  Hasdrubal  occupied  Spain  with  12,000 
infantry,  2500  horse,  half  the  elephants,  and  the  fleet — a  force 
mainly  African. 

Hannibal  marches  into  Gaul. — Having  thus  guaranteed  the 
discipline  and  loyalty  of  his  troops,  and  assured  the  safety  of  the 
capital  and  the  vital  points  of  connection,  Hannibal,  with  90,000 
foot,  12,000  horse,  and  37  elephants,  his  troops  refreshed  by  rest 
and  stimulated  to  enthusiasm,  marched  from  Carthagena  about 
the  beginning  of  May  B.C.  218,  carrying  with  him  "  the  desolation  of 
Italy."  He  had  chosen  a  difficult  and  dangerous  route.  Before  him 
lay  the  Ebro,  the  Rhone,  the  Pyrenees,  and  the  Alps,  the  strength 
of  Rome,  and  the  uncertain  temper  of  the  Gauls.  Yet  the  coloured 
reports  of  his  guides,  geographical  ignorance,  the  perils  of  the  sea, 
swept  by  the  Roman  fleet,  and  the  advantage  of  joining  his  allies 
precisely  at  the  point  chosen,  combined  to  draw  the  leader  of  a 
maritime  people  by  a  land-route,  often  before  traversed  by  maraud- 
ing Gallic  hordes  descending  upon  Italy.  The  difficulties  of  the 
route  appeared  at  once.  It  cost  him  20,000  men  to  force  his 
passage  to  the  Pyrenees.  Hanno  was  left  behind  with  10,000  men 
in  the  newly  conquered  province  ;  a  second  10,000  was  dismissed 
to  purge  the  army  and  create  a  good  impression  in  the  country 
he  was  leaving.  With  50,000  foot  and  9000  horse  he  pressed  his 
march  to  the  Rhone  by  the  coast  route,  touching  the  river  opposite 
Avignon  late  in  the  summer  of  21 8  B.C.  Delay  in  Spain  made  haste 
essential  to  forestall  the  closing  of  the  Alpine  passes.  Previous 
negotiations  had  paved  his  way.  From  Avignon  the  valley  of  the 
Durance  afforded  an  easy  access  to  the  lowest,  least  difficult,  and 
probably  most  familiar  gates  of  the  mountain  barrier  between  the 
valleys  of  the  Rhone  and  Po— the  Col  de  I'Argentiere  and  Mont 
(jenevre.  Hither  he  was  directing  his  march,  avoiding  the  more 
difficult  passages  to  the  north,  and  the  dangers  of  the  Ligurian 


PREPARATIONS  FOR    J  TAR  177 

coast  road,  doubtless  beset  by  Roman  posts  and  hostile  tribes,  when 
he  was  met  on  the  Rhone  by  a  strong  Gallic  force  to  dispute  his 
crossing,  and  shed  the  first  Italian  blood  in  a  cavalry  skirmish  on 
the  left  bank. 

Preparations  of  the  Romans. — The  Romans  were  aghast,  like 
the  Austrian  generals  who  fought  the  young  Napoleon,  at  the 
deliberate  audacity  of  this  brilliant  offensive  idea.  Unaccustomed 
to  the  strokes  of  genius  and  secure  in  the  strength  of  Rome,  they 
leisurely  proceeded  with  ordinary  preparations.  Repeated  warn- 
ings were  in  vain.  With  over  half  a  million  troops  available,  with 
a  fleet  of  220  quinqueremes,  apparently  superior  in  all  but  the 
quality  and  numerical  proportion  of  their  cavalry,  they  should  have 
followed  up  the  declaration  of  war  with  a  rapid  and  crushing  blow 
in  Africa,  combined  with  a  descent  in  force  on  Spain.  Both 
objects  were  certainly  embraced  in  their  plan,  but  they  under- 
rated the  strength  and  speed  of  Hannibal,  as  they  misunder- 
stood his  character  and  ideas.  Of  the  consuls  for  218  B.C.,  Ti. 
Sempronius  Longus  was  destined  for  Sicily  and  Africa,  with 
two  legions,  16,000  allies,  2400  horse,  and  160  quinqueremes; 
while  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  received  the  Spanish  command  with 
22,000  infantry,  2200  horse,  and  60  men-of-war.  Including  a 
smaller  force  under  L.  Manlius  Volso  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  Livy 
estimates  the  force  under  arms  at  70,000  men,  with  220  ships.  The 
levies  were  late,  and  the  expedition  to  Spain,  vitally  important  as 
that  was,  to  save  the  allies  of  Rome  and  threaten  Hannibal's  com- 
munications if  it  could  not  check  his  advance,  was  further  delayed 
by  an  outbreak  of  the  Gauls  in  North  Italy,  partly  fomented  by 
Punic  agents,  partly  due  to  anger  at  the  foundation  of  the  fortress- 
colonies  of  Placentia  and  Cremona.  The  colonists — six  thousand 
had  been  allotted  to  each — were  expelled,  their  leaders  imprisoned, 
and  the  praetor  driven  disgracefully  into  Tannetum.  Scipio's  troops 
were  diverted  to  the  north,  and  new  regiments  raised  for  the 
Spanish  service.  Saguntum  had  already  fallen,  and  Scipio,  coast- 
ing leisurely  to  Massilia,  now  learned  with  incredulous  horror 
that  Hannibal  had  crushed  the  tribes,  passed  the  Pyrenees,  and 
was  in  full  march  to  the  Rhone.  The  presence  of  the  enemy 
on  the  Rhone- confirmed  the  unwelcome  news.  A  cavalry  recon- 
naissance on  the  left  bank  drove  in  a  Numidian  squadron,  only 
to  learn  that  while  the  Romans  had  dawdled  on  the  route  and  dallied 
at  the  mouth,  neglecting  the  farther  bank,  Hannibal  had  scattered 
their  allies  and  crossed  the  river.  A  tardy  advance  in  force  made 
it  at  length  clear  that  his  real  objective  was  Italy.     The  Rhone 

u 


178  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  lost,  and  Scipio,  returning  from  an  idle  pursuit,  in  obedience 
to  orders  or  to  a  true  military  instinct,  despatched  his  brother 
(inacus  with  the  bulk  of  the  troops  to  Spain,  and  hastened  in 
person  to  meet  the  enemy,  debouching  from  the  Alps,  with  the 
division  of  Cisalpine  Gaul.  Considering  the  large  forces  available 
in  Italy  and  the  value  of  Spain  to  Carthage  and  Hannibal,  this 
conduct  deserves  the  highest  praise,  and  the  Senate,  with  wise 
tenacity,  maintained  their  Spanish  army  through  the  darkest  years 
of  the  war,  till  the  leader  of  that  army  closed  the  struggle  on  the 
field  of  Zama. 

Passage  of  the  Rhone. ^ — Hannibal,  on  arriving  at  the  Rhone, 
perceived  his  passage  blocked  at  Roquemaure,  four  days'  march 
from  the  sea,  by  a  Gallic  levy  raised  by  Massiliot  influence. 
Accordingly,  while  he  rapidly  accumulated  the  means  of  transport, 
he  sent  a  strong  division  under  Hanno,  son  of  Bomilcar,  to  cross 
the  river  at  a  shallower  point  above  and  take  the  Gauls  in  the  rear. 
When  the  signal-column  of  smoke  arose,  he  pushed  across  with 
a  select  force  in  face  of  the  enemy,  who  broke  and  fled  as  Hanno's 
men  fired  their  camp  and  fell  upon  them  from  behind.  The  re- 
mainder followed  at  leisure  ;  the  snow-fed  stream  was  broken  by 
a  line  of  heavy  ships  moored  athwart  the  current  ;  the  elephants 
passed  on  rafts  cunningly  prepared.  In  six  days,  or  possibly  more, 
he  had  crossed  a  swift,  broad,  and  dangerous  river  almost  under  the 
eyes  of  the  Roman  consul,  of  whose  presence  his  cavalry  made  him 
aware.  To  run  the  gauntlet  of  a  Roman  army  before  he  joined 
his  allies  offered  no  advantage.  He  determined  to  free  his  flank 
by  an  inland  march,  and,  encouraging  his  dispirited  troops  by  the 
promises  of  the  Boian  envoys  and  his  own  enthusiasm,  marched 
four  days  upstream  to  the  so-called  "  Island,"  the  angle  of  the 
Rhone  and  the  Is^re.  Here  he  decided  by  arbitration  or  the 
sword  the  disputed  succession  to  the  chieftainship  of  the  Allo- 
broges,  and  received  in  return  ample  supplies  of  food  and  clothing. 

The  Passes  of  the  Alps. — By  what  route  Hannibal  crossed  the 
Alps  is  still  disputed.  It  is  a  question  of  mountain  geography,  as 
well  as  a  question  of  military,  and  to  some  extent  of  political, 
expediency.  The  decision,  if  at  all  possible,  rests  with  the  expert 
and  the  soldier,  not  with  the  historian.  His  military  object  was 
to  find  the  shortest  and  safest  route  not  so  much  to  Italy  as  to  his 
allies  on  the  Po,  and  a  route  covered  from  flank  attacks  from  the 
sea,  to  be  traversed  by  a  regular  army  with  baggage-train  and 
elephants.  His  choice  was  conditioned,  besides,  by  the  late  season 
— it  was  October,  or  possibly  November,  before  he  reached  the 


THE  PASSES  OF  THE  ALPS  179 

summit,  and  he  had  meant  to  be  earher — by  the  movements  of 
Scipio,  which  had  thrown  him  farther  inland,  and  by  the  posi- 
tion of  friendly  and  hostile  tribes  on  either  side.  In  spite  of  his 
careful  inquiries  his  information  was  certainly  inaccurate  ;  nor  can 
we  read  into  the  argument  our  owri  more  intimate  knowledge. 
In  any  case  he  had  probably  under-estimated  the  difficulties  of 
what  he  knew  to  be  a  daring  and  a  difficult  project  ;  but  he  judged 
it  not  impossible.  We  need  not  exaggerate  the  risk  of  an  under- 
taking planned  and  executed  with  the  deliberate  rashness  of  genius. 
Excluding  at  once  the  Cornice  road  and  the  passes  to  the  north 
and  east  as  obviously  dangerous  or  impracticable,  two  main 
avenues  are  left  diverging  into  four  possible  passes — the  valleys 
of  (i)  the  Isere,  leading  to  the  Little  St.  Bernard  (7076  ft.) 
through  the  Graian  Alps  ;  (2)  its  tributary,  the  Arc,  leading  up 
to  Mont  Cenis  (6859  ft.)  ;  (3)  the  Durance,  ascending  to  Mont 
Genevre  (6101  ft.)  over  the  Cottian  Alps  ;  and  (4)  the  Ubaye, 
which  leads  from  the  Durance  to  the  Col  de  I'Argentiere  (653S  ft.). 
By  several  of  these  gorges  armies  had  crossed  ;  all  had  been  used  as 
pathways  of  intercourse.  The  appearance  of  Scipio  on  Hannibal's 
flank,  as  we  have  seen,  diverted  his  march  from  the  Durance  to 
the  Isere.  His  route  thence  would  be  determined  by  the  direction 
of  the  valleys  and  the  relative  easiness  of  the  passes  at  that  season 
of  the  year.  Military  considerations  being  equal,  the  best  moun- 
taineering authority  would  point  to  the  southerly  routes  ;  that  is, 
either  to  Mont  Genevre  or  the  Col  de  I'Argentiere.  In  any  case, 
we  must  remember  that  the  seasons,  and  therefore  the  difficulties,  of 
the  Alps  vary  with  different  years  ;  bridges  or  roads,  such  as  Rome 
constructed  later,  there  were  none.  They  were  traversed  by  moun- 
tain tracks,  skirting  the  torrents  and  precipices  by  which  the  chain 
was  cloven,  broken  continually  by  the  storm  and  the  avalanche. 

Statements  of  Polybius  and  Livy. — Turning  to  our  authorities, 
we  find  in  the  general  vagueness  and  uncertainty  of  geographical 
knowledge,  in  the  absence  of  maps,  and  of  any  close  attention  to 
nature,  nothing  but  rough  outlines  and  ine.xact  details.  Polybius 
shows  an  ignorance  not  merely  of  larger  physical  formations,  but 
even  of  the  points  of  the  compass.  He  is  obscure  as  to  North  Italy, 
wrong  as  to  the  course  of  the  Rhone  ;  he  indulges  in  colourless 
and  self-complacent  generalities,  and  mentions  few  names.  He 
made  a  personal,  if  limited,  acquaintance  with  the  Alps,  but  he  had 
no  eye  for  the  general  course  or  minor  features  of  the  range.  An 
excellent  military  and  political  historian,  he  is  also  the  older  and 
more  original  writer,  but  we  must  as  little  press  his  stock  touches 


l8o  HISTORY   OF  ROME 

and  approximate  distances  as  the  picturesque  details  which  adorn 
the  clear  and  consistent  narrative  of  Livy.  The  descriptions  given 
can  be  adapted  to  every  Alpine  pass  and  its  approaches,  and  even 
the  names  of  tribes  may  be  due  to  later  inquiries.  The  same 
sources  were  before  both,  and,  in  spite  of  the  discrepancies  between 
them  as  to  the  course  of  the  stream  followed  or  the  names  of  the 
opposing  clans,  they  agree  in  many  of  their  details,  in  the  starting- 
point,  and,  possibly,  in  the  terminus,  of  the  march.  Nor  need  we 
emphasise  their  disagreement.  The  account  of  Polybius  points  pro- 
bably to  Mont  Cenis,  if  not  to  the  Little  St.  Bernard.  The  latter, 
though  the  generally  accepted  route,  debouching  upon  the  Salassi 
and  the  vale  of  Aosta-Ivrea  (the  Dora  Baltea),  a  familiar  road 
for  Gallic  hordes,  seems  scarcely  probable.  In  this  case  Hannibal 
would  ascend  not  directly  by  the  Isere,  but  by  the  Rhone  to  Vienne, 
across  the  country  of  the  Allobroges  to  the  Mont  du  Chat  and 
Chambcry,  and  thence  by  the  river-valleys  to  the  foot  of  the  pass. 
Thus  he  would  march  along  two  sides  of  a  triangle  to  reach  a 
higher,  longer,  and  steeper  passage.  The  top  does  not  command 
a  view  of  Italy,  but  of  the  glaciers  of  Mont  Blanc.  It  ends  in  a 
long  and  perilous  defile,  and  leads  not  to  the  Taurini,  but  to  the 
Salassi,  contrary  to  our  authorities,  while  to  move  thence  on  Turin 
with  Scipio  at  Placentia  would  be  obviously  idle.  Climatic  con- 
ditions alone  make  the  Little  St.  Bernard  incredible.  We  may 
conclude,  then,  that  Hannibal  followed  the  line  of  march  described 
by  Livy,  whose  account  is  based  upon  the  history  of  L.  Cincius 
Alimentus,  then  a  captive  in  the  Punic  army.  Of  the  two  passes  to 
which  his  narrative  might  point,  both  lower  and  more  southern 
and  both  offering  a  more  direct  descent,  Mont  Genevre  is  the 
more  generally  favoured,  but  the  Col  de  I'Argentiere  is  supported 
by  a  fragment  of  Varro  ^  and  by  high  Alpine  authority. 

Hannibal  crosses  the  Alps. — Hannibal,  then,  who  had  not 
crossed  the  Iscre,  followed  its  valley  to  the  left,  av-oiding  the  direct 
route  by  tl^  Col  de  Cabres.  Skirting  the  Vocontii,  he  turned  south- 
east from  Grenoble,  and  countermarching  along  the  Drac,  reached 
his  original  objective,  the  upper  valley  of  the  Durance,  by  the  Col 
Bayard,  whence  he  either  followed  the  stream  to  Mont  Genevre  or 
struck  across  by  Embrun  to  the'  upper  waters  of  the  Ubaye  and 
the  Col  de  I'Argentifere.  The  ascent  cost  him  nine  days,  fighting 
his  way  along  the  swollen  torrent  through  the  hostile  clans.  Twice 
he  owed  his  escape  from  imminent  destruction  as  much  to  good 
fortune  as  to  good  tactics.  In  the  first  encounter  with  the  hill- 
^  Preserved  by  Servius  on  Virgil's  ^ncid,  x.  13. 


HANNIBAL    CROSSES   THE  ALPS  i8i 

tribes  they  beset  the  defiles  and  crowned  the  heights.  Hannibal 
amused  them  with  a  feigned  attack,  occupied  by  a  night-surprise 
their  ill-secured  position,  and  after  desperate  fighting  in  the  narrow 
gorge,  with  great  loss  of  beasts  and  baggage,  finally  stormed  their 
forts  and  revictualled  his  army.  In  the  second  struggle  higher  up 
he  was  treacherously  surrounded  ;  great  blocks  were  tumbled  down 
the  mountain-side  upon  the  broken  and  disordered  column.  He 
spent  the  night  in  arms  at  the  "White  Rock,"  to  which  he  had 
drawn  back,  but  in  the  morning  succeeded  in  restoring  order.  The 
attacks  fell  off,  and  he  arrived  at  length  with  a  worn  and  weakened 
host  at  the  small  plain  on  the  summit,  where  he  indulged  his  men 
with  two  days  of  such  rest  as  the  autumn  nights  would  allow.  The 
despondent  and  disheartened  troops  were  cheered  by  the  enthu- 
siasm of  their  chief,  who  felt  that  he  had  stonned  the  ramparts  of 
Italy,  and  pointed  their  gaze  in  imagination  to  the  walls  of  Rome. 
Storms  of  snow  added  to  their  discomfort  and  to  the  dangers  of 
the  descent.  The  steeper  slope,  coated  with  fresh-fallen  flakes,  was 
far  more  difficult,  especially  for  the  beasts  of  burden  ;  at  one  point 
the  path  had  been  broken  by  an  avalanche,  and  in  attempting  to 
turn  it  men  and  elephants  slid  and  slipped  upon  the  treacherous 
surface  of  the  trampled  and  frozen  bed  of  older  snow  beneath.  The 
attempt  was  renounced  and  a  camp  pitched,  while  the  road  was 
reconstructed.  In  cutting  the  rocks  it  is  said  that  the  sour  soldiers' 
wir.e  was  used  to  soften  the  stone  calcined  first  by  fire.  From 
that  point  the  army  rapidly  reached  without  opposition  the  lower 
valleys,  and  there  recruited  its  shattered  strength.  The  long  march 
had  reached  its  end  ;  with  20,000  infantry  and  6000  cavalry,  "  un- 
kempt, emaciated  scarecrows,"  Hannibal  stood  on  the  soil  of  Italy. 
Cold  and  hunger,  the  precipices  and  the  sword,  had  cost  him  over 
30,003  men,  of  whom  two-thirds  marked  with  their  bones  the 
passage  of  the  Alps.  With  this  handful  of  heroic  "  shadows," 
trusting  to  Italy  for  recruits,  commissariat,  and  immediate  base, 
he  flung  himself  upon  the  gigantic  power  of  Rome.  We  are 
not  in  a  position  to  criticise  ;  we  do  not  know  the  nature  of 
his  alternatives,  his  difficulties,  and  original  calculations.  Its 
hazardous  character  does  not  impair  the  grandeur  of  an  idea 
whose  moral  effect  was  worth  a  victory.  Tremendous  as  were 
the  sacrifices,  whether  foreseen  or  unforeseen,  they  were  justified 
by  success,  and  by  success  alone. 

Note. — The  absence  of  nccurate  indications  and  definite  distances,  the 
utter  confusion  of  the  actual  Roman  Calendar,  and  erroneous  geographi- 


l82  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

cal  ideas  render  it  difficult  to  fix  precisely  the  distances,  topography,  or 
chronology  of  this  march  and  the  following  campaign.  The  length  of  the 
march  from  Carthagena  to  Italy,  excliisi%'e  of  deviations  and  fighting,  may 
have  been  from  900  to  1000  miles,  equal  at  the  rate  of  fifteen  miles  a  day  to, 
roughly,  ten  weeks'  pure  marcliing.  The  passage  of  the  Rhone  cost  at  least 
six  days,  the  Alps  fifteen.  The  total  time  allowed  may  be  estimated  at  from 
five  to  six  months  at  the  least.  Hannibal  was  later  than  he  expected,  and 
starting  in  May,  reached  the  summit  sometime  between  October  26  and 
November  7,  the  Trcbia  being  fought  near  December  21.  He  was  at  the 
Rhone  probably  about  the  middle  of  August.  Scipio,  delayed  also,  may  have 
left  T\ome  in  July,  and  arrived  at  Marseilles  in  August,  moving  leisurely. 
The  despatch  leading  to  the  recall  of  Sempronius  must  have  been  sent  to  the 
Senate  from  the  Rhone  not  later  than  the  beginning  of  September.  All 
dating  depends  on  the  time  assumed  respectively  for  Hannibal's  arrival  at 
the  Rhone  and  on  the  summit.  For  the  passage  of  the  Rhone  and  the 
ascent,  &c.,  a  more  liberal  allowance  must  be  made  than  is  usual.  The 
places  of  tiie  encounters  with  the  tribes  vary,  of  course,  according  to  the 
route  given,  and  are  purely  conjectural. 

Scipio  in  Cisalpine  Gaul. — Hannibal  had  arrived  unexpected 
and  with  unexpected  celerity  ;  he  had  a  good  start,  and  used  it  well. 
The  Roman  armies  that  should  have  met  him  were  in  Spain  and 
Sicily.  There  was  nothing  at  the  front  but  the  relics  of  the  legion 
of  Manlius  and  the  division  of  C.  Atilius,  the  praetor,  that  had 
not  yet  sufficed  to  quell  the  Celtic  outbreak,  to  which  alone  was 
due  the  presence  of  any  considerable  force  in  the  valley  of  the  Po. 
In  sending  his  army  to  Spain,  Scipio  had  naturally  trusted  to  the 
Senate  for  reinforcements  in  Italy,  and  the  Senate  at  once  re- 
called Sempronius.  But  they  exaggerated  the  mountain  obstacle  ; 
they  were  ignorant  of  the  genius  of  Hannibal  and  the  altered 
character  of  Punic  troops.  Had  Scipio  landed  at  Genoa,  moved 
along  the  chord  of  the  arc  and  flung  his  whole  force  upon  Turin, 
he  might  have  choked  the  war  in  its  birth.  But  a  mountain  range 
is  a  notoriously  dubious  barrier,  to  close  its  issues  a  complex 
problem.  A  difficult  country  and  doubtful  information  A\'ould 
increase  the  risk.  With  uncertain  allies  and  certain  foes  on  flank 
and  rear,  Scipio  might,  if  scattered,  have  been  defeated  in  detail, 
if  concentrated  at  Turin, ^  turned  by  the  St.  Bernard,  and  rolled  up 
against  the  very  mountains  he  was  watching.  As  it  was  he  arrived 
at  Pisa  with  a  small  division  in  September,  crossed  the  Apennines, 
and  picking  up  the  corps  of  North  Italy,  marched  with  a  force  of 
20,000  men  to   intercept  and  destroy  a  wearied  and  broken  army, 

^  Cf.  the  campaign  of  Marengo. 


BATTLE    OF   THE    TICTNUS  1S3 

if  the  mountains  had  not  ah'eady  spared  liim  the  trouble.  In  two 
months  he  had  restored  order  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Po,  and 
crossing  to  the  left,  from  which  the  Romans  had  been  expelled,  was 
menacing  the  Insubres,  when  he  became  aware  of  the  presence  of 
Hannibal.  A  few  days'  rest  had  sufficed  to  recruit  the  Punic  army, 
a  few  more  to  afford  the  Taurini,  in  the  bloody  storm  of  Taurasia, 
a  convincing  argument  for  friendship  ;  the  troops  were  stimulated 
by  a  tournament  a  outrance  among  their  Celtic  prisoners  to  strike 
for  the  prize  of  victor}'  or  death. 

Battle  on  the  Ticinus  :  Retreat  of  Scipio. — Moving  down  the 
left  bank  to  relieve  his  Insubrian  allies,  Hannibal  suddenly  gained 
touch  with  the  army  of  Scipio.  The  surprise  was  mutual.  At  the 
head  of  a  strong  reconnaissance  of  cavalry  and  light  troops,  Scipio, 
who,  with  rebels  in  his  rear,  had  crossed,  instead  of  disputing,  the 
line  of  the  Ticinus,  met  a  similar  party  under  Hannibal  in  person. 
In  the  vigorous  skirmish  that  followed  his  foot  were  routed  ;  his 
horse,  outflanked  and  taken  in  rear  by  the  Numidians,  after 
severe  fighting  fled  with  the  wounded  consul,  whose  life  was  sa\ed 
by  his  son,  the  future  Africanus.  Scipio  had  advanced  with  inferior 
numbers  and  a  weak  ca\alry.  His  confidence  was  disabused  ;  he 
saw  the  weakness  of  his  force  in  the  plains  of  the  Po,  and  ex- 
tricating himself  fi-om  his  dangerous  position,  fell  back  to  the  main 
stream  by  a  rapid  and  almost  precipitate  march,  broke  down  the 
bridges  at  some  sacrifice,  evacuated  the  left  bank,  and  sat  down 
under  the  walls  of  Placentia.  Here  he  determined  to  maintain 
the  defensive  till  his  colleague  arrived.  Placentia  and  Cremona 
furnished  him  with  a  strong  support,  commanded  the  passage  and 
navigation  of  the  Po,  and  curbed  the  unquiet  clans.  Hannibal, 
unable  to  prevent  this  unexpected  retreat  or  to  pass  the  stream  in 
face  of  the  enemy,  effected  his  crossing  at  a  higher  point,  opened 
negotiations  with  the  local  tribes,  and  moving  along  the  right 
bank,  encamped  in  front  of  Scipio.  Policy  and  strategy  alike 
made  him  anxious  for  a  general  action  to  confirm  the  wavering 
Gauls,  and  to  secure  his  commissariat  and  quarters.  Scipio, 
wounded  and  waiting,  refused  battle — the  tactics  of  patience  were 
clearly  wisest.  But,  alarmed  by  the  treachery  of  a  Gallic  contin- 
gent, and  thinking  his  position  on  the  level  insecure  in  face  of 
superior  cavalry,  he  retired  across  the  Trebia  in  the  silence  of 
night,  pursued  by  the  Numidian  horse,  whose  attention  was  luckih- 
called  ofT  by  the  plunder  of  the  camp,  and  took  up  a  stronger 
position  on  a  spur  of  the  Apennines,  covered  by  the  mountain 
torrent. 


iS4 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


TOMBSTONE    OF    ROMAN    HORSE-SOLDIER    FROM    HEXHAM. 

[Of  later  date.) 


THE    TREBIA  185 

Position  of  the  Two  Armies. — The  key  to  these  and  the  subse- 
quent operations  lies  in  the  position  of  the  Trebia,  a  stream  which, 
descending  rapidly  from  the  hills,  spreads  in  the  plain  a  broad  and 
pebbly  bed,  widening  considerably  to  its  mouth  above  Placentia. 
Nearly  dry  in  summer,  its  course  is  rapidly  filled  by  rain,  and  runs 
in  winter  with  a  strong  and  turbulent  flood.  The  plain,  at  this 
point  narrowed  to  a  width  of  seven  miles,  presents  an  apparently 
level  surface,  seamed  by  similar  streams  with  deep  deceptive 
courses  clad  with  bush.  All  strategical  considerations  go  to  prove 
that  the  first  position  of  Scipio  would  be  in  front  of  the  Trebia  (left 
bank),  connected  with  Placentia,  probably  by  a  bridge  of  boats  ;  that 
he  then  crossed  the  stream,  and,  protected  by  it,  rested  his  right  on 
the  fortress,  his  left  on  the  Apennines,  covering  his  junction  with 
Sempronius  and  his  communications  with  Rome,  while  he  checked 
the  movements  of  the  Celts,  already  hampered  by  the  hostile 
attitude  of  the  Cenomani.  The  weight  of  authority  and  the 
description  given  by  Livy  would  certainly  point  to  the  opposite 
supposition,  namely,  that  Scipio  encamped  immediately  under 
Placentia,  crossed  the  Trebia  to  the  left  bank,  and  there  rested 
upon  the  Apennines  and  the  magazines  of  Clastidium  and  Vic- 
tumvite,  while  Hannibal  flung  himself  across  his  communica- 
tions. The  first  view  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  language  of 
Livy,  who  was  scarcely  ignorant  of  the  position  of  Placentia,  and 
with  the  movements  of  the  defeated  Romans,  while  the  successful 
junction  of  Sempronius  and  the  capture  of  Clastidium  by  the  Punic 
general  conflict  with  the  second.^ 

Sempronius. — Meanwhile,  in  pursuance  of  Hannibal's  schemes, 
descents  were  made  on  the  Italian  coast.  The  Liparian  islands  had 
already  been  seized,  when  a  lucky  accident  put  Hiero  in  possession 
of  the  Carthaginian  plans  ;  the  praetor  ^Emilius  was  warned,  and  the 
attempt  to  surprise  Lilybaeum  was  defeated  with  loss.  Sempronius 
Longus,  who  arrived  immediately  after  in  Sicily  with  160  ships  and 
a  consular  army,  successfully  frittered  his  time  away  over  the  cap- 
ture of  Melita  and  such  minor  operations,  till,  to  his  chagrin,  he  was 
recalled  by  the  Senate.  After  providing  for  the  naval  defence  of  the 
southern  coasts,  he  despatched  his  troops,  whether  by  land  or  sea 
is  uncertain,  to  Ariminum,  and  from  that  point  effected  his  junction 
with  his  colleague  unopposed.  Rash  and  ambitious — if  the  friend  ^ 
of  the  Scipios  may  be  trusted — he  was  as  anxious  to  crown  his 

'  Polybius'  account  leaves  the  real  point  undecided,  but  agrees  with  Livy's  in 
the  main.  -  Polybius. 


l86  HISTORY   OF  NOME 

consulship  as  Hannibal  his  first  campaign  with  an  exploit.  The 
loss  of  Clastidium,  betrayed  by  its  Latin  commandant,  his  at  least 
equal  forces — 40,000  men,  without  reckoning  the  Cenomani — the 
ravages  of  Hannibal,  and  the  dubious  attitude  of  the  Gauls  were 
powerful  arguments  for  action.  Scipio's  masterly  inactivity  was 
probably  the  wisest  tactics,  but  not  easy  to  follow.  Sempronius  had 
yet  to  buy  his  experience  of  Hannibal,  and  that  general  habitually 
sold  it  dear.  A  cavalry  action,  brought  on  by  the  Carthaginian 
raids,  elated  the  impetuous  spirit  of  the  Roman  with  a  victory  con- 
ceded by  the  cautious  generalship  of  an  experienced  leader.  It 
was  Hannibal's  policy  to  tempt  his  man  from  a  strong  position  to 
a  field  of  his  own  choosing,  under  the  worst  conditions. 

Battle  of  the  Trebia. — The  design  succeeded.  In  one  of  the 
river-bed:;,  in  the  rear  of  his  chosen  ground,  concealed  by  the 
bushes  and  the  banks,  he  placed  an  ambush  of  2000  picked  men, 
horse  and  foot,  under  his  young  and  able  adjutant  and  brother, 
Mago.  On  a  day  of  mingled  rain  and  snow,  driven  "by  a  nipping 
and  an  eager"  wind,  the  well-instructed  Numidians,  in  the  early 
morning,  drew  the  irritated  Romans,  cold  and  hungry,  horse  and 
man— first  the  cavalry,  then  the  light-armed,  finally  the  infantry ^ — to 
wade  breast-high  across  the  swollen  ice-cold  stream.  The  famished 
and  shivering  soldiers  were  confronted  with  a  warmed  and  well-fed 
host.  They  fought  with  a  river  in  their  rear,  outflanked  on  level 
ground  by  a  superior  cavalry.  The  fight  was  lost,  before  it  was 
begun,  by  a  bad  tactical  blunder.  The  Punic  foot  stood  in  one 
long  line,  with  8000  skirmishers  in  front  and  10,000  cavalry  and 
the  elephants  on  their  flanks.  The  Romans  took  their  usual  order. 
The  light  troops  in  front  of  their  battle  were  scattered  at  once,  and 
the  strong  Punic  cavalry  with  the  elephants,  aided  by  the  Baliaric 
skirmishers,  soon  drove  ofif  the  Roman  horse  in  headlong  flight. 
Then,  outflanked  and  taken  in  rear  by  the  victorious  cavalry, 
the  Roman  infantry  maintained  a  gallant  soldiers'  battle  till  the 
outbreak  of  Mago's  ambush — a  brilliant  stratagem  brilliantly 
developed — and  the  dispersal  of  the  Gallic  auxiliaries  gave  the 
coup-de-qrdce.  One  corps,  10,000  strong,  cut  its  way  with  splendid 
courage  through  the  Punic  line,  and  picking  up  the  stragglers, 
forced  its  way  to  Placentia.  Of  the  rest,  many  were  cut  down  at 
the  passage  of  the  river,  some  found  their  way  through  the  waters 
to  the  camp  ;  the  rest  were  dispersed.  The  pursuit  was  stayed  by 
the  increasing  fierceness  of  the  storm  ;  the  remnant  of  the  army, 
with  the  wounded,  were  conveyed  by  Scipio,  under  cover  of  night 
and  foul  weather,  to  Placentia.     The  Romans  had  lost  at  least 


AFTER    THE    TREBIA  187 

20,000  men  ;  Hannibal  sufifered  mainly  in  auxiliaries.  But  the  cruel 
weather  of  the  winter  and  the  spring  was  fatal  to  his  elephants, 
which  ceased  henceforth  in  Italy  to  play  their  dubious  part.  By 
this  splendid  victory  he  crowned  and  justified  his  march  ;  he  could 
now  secure  recruits  and  supplies  ;  he  could  organise  the  insurrec- 
tion in  Gaul.  The  enemy  were  shut  up  in  their  strongholds,  and 
the  consul,  hurrying  to  the  elections,  barely  escaped  the  squadrons 
which  scoured  the  country. 

Flaminius  elected  Consul. — As  the  truth  leaked  out,  the  alarm 
at  Rome  was  as  great  as  hope  had  been  sure.  The  situation 
was  aggravated  by  a  political  crisis.  Popular  gratitude  had  raised 
to  a  second  consulship  C.  Flaminius,  a  brave  and  blundering 
soldier  of  the  Roman  type,  hero  of  hard  escapes  from  his  own  bad 
strategy,  statesman  and  friend  of  the  people,  whose  attempt  to 
limit  the  power  of  the  oligarchy  and  stem  the  tide  of  capitalism 
made  him  the  precursor  of  the  Gracchi  in  their  aims,  and  partially 
in  their  fate.  The  superstitious  machinery  of  the  Senate  he  met 
with  sceptical  defiance.  In  the  teeth  of  the  auspices  he  had  main- 
tained his  earlier  ofifice  (223  B.C.),  and  sealed  his  resistance  by 
victory.  He  had  triumphed  by  popular  vote,  and  if  the  omen  of  a 
squeaking  mouse  had  cost  him  the  mastership  of  the  horse,  it  only 
taught  him  now  to  anticipate  such  manoeuvres,  to  shirk  the  formali- 
ties of  inauguration,  and  to  turn  his  back  on  the  storm  of  portents 
and  prodigies  rained  by  the  complacent  heavens  upon  the  unbe- 
lieving and  inconvenient  demagogue. 

Roman  Preparations. — Tlie  preparations  of  Rome  were  vigorous 
but  not  extraordinary.  The  coast  garrisons  were  increased,  Spain 
reinforced,  the  fleet  and  cavalry  alike  strengthened,  while  Hiero 
despatched  a  large  body  of  auxiliaries.  With  four  new  legions  and 
the  remnants  of  the  army  of  the  Po,  the  consuls  occupied  Arretium 
and  Ariminum.  Resting  on  their  magazines  and  covering-  the 
main  roads  to  Rome,  their  outposts  extending  on  the  east  to 
Cremona  and  Placentia,  and  on  the  west  from  the  fortress  of  Pisae 
to  Luca  and  Luna,  they  intended  primarily  to  block  the  issues  of 
the  Apennines,  and  then  developing  the  offensive,  to  hold  Hannibal 
in  front,  threaten  his  right  flank,  and  roll  him  back  on  the  Po. 
The  position,  much  the  same  as  in  225  B.C.,  was  turned  as  then 
by  a  rapid  ad\-ance  on  the  western  flank. 

Passage  of  the  Apennines  and  the  Arno. — Hannibal,  in  his  winter 
quarters,  had  contented  himself  with  minor  operations  ;  he  had 
neither  time  nor  means  for  a  war  of  sieges.  The  inconstant  Gauls, 
impatient  of  billeting,  eager  for  plunder,  had  little  stomach  for  a 


i88  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

serious  campaign.  By  means  of  disguises  he  eluded  assassins  and 
gained  information.  (laul  offered  no  permanent  base,  nor  had 
he  meant  to  find  one  there.  By  favourable  treatment  of  Italian 
prisoners  he  attempted  to  sap  the  Roman  alliance,  and  was  pre- 
paring a  new  base  in  Italy  itself.  Weak  as  he  was  in  the  weak- 
ness of  his  country,  in  his  isolation,  in  his  home  support  and  the 
number  of  his  troops,  he  fought  a  political  as  much  as  a  mili- 
tary campaign.  The  steady,  methodical  warfare  of  a  Wellington, 
securing  a  patient  advance,  was  not  the  game  of  genius.  It  was 
his  idea  rather,  by  puzzling,  discomfiting,  and  discrediting  Roman 
generals,  to  break  up  and  destroy  the  Roman  system.  As  the 
champion  of  the  Italian  subjects  he  could  alone  hope  for  ultimate 
success.  Accordingly  in  the  spring,  after  a  reconnaissance  re- 
pelled by  tempest,  he  started  from  some  point  between  Parma  and 
Bologna,  with  an  army  largely  swelled  by  Gallic  recruits,  and  passed 
the  chain  of  the  Apennines,  in  the  direction  of  Lucca  and  Pistoja. 
Thence,  careless  of  communications  and  commissariat,  he  de- 
scended to  the  valley  of  the  Arno,  and  pushed  on  by  a  short  cut 
through  the  marshes  and  floods  that  covered  the  lowlands  of  the 
Serchio  and  Arno  towards  Fsesulae.  This  march,  probably  from 
Pescia  to  Empoli,  took  him  four  days  of  incredible  suffering  from 
fatigue,  cold,  and  sleeplessness.^  His  trusted  troops  formed  the 
van,  while  Mago  with  the  cavalry  drove  on  the  floundering  and 
disheartened  Gauls.  He  emerged  with  severe  loss  in  men  and 
horses,  and  at  the  cost  of  one  of  his  eyes,  destroyed  by  ophthalmia. 
But  his  object  was  gained.  He  had  slipped  through  the  chain  of 
posts,  and,  after  recruiting  his  strength  and  informing  himself  of 
the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  character  of  his  opponent,  he 
took  the  inner  road,  passed  Flaminius  on  the  left,  and  striking  for 
Cortona,  cut  his  communications  with  Rome.  By  thus  menacing 
the  city  and  by  systematic  plunder  he  meant  to  rouse  public  feeling 
and  force  the  popular  general  to  action.  At  the  same  time,  to  have 
left  60,000  men  in  his  rear  was  a  piece  of  strategy  that  needed 
justification.  The  Roman  position  had  now  been  turned.  It  was 
the  duty  of  the  consuls  to  secure  the  Flaminian  Way  and  save  the 
capital.  Their  plan  appears  to  have  been,  either  to  repeat  the 
tactics  of  the  campaign  of  Telamon,  taking  Hannibal  between  two 
armies,  or  to  form  a  junction  at  Perusia,  and  to  crush  him  with 
their  united  force.     Accordingly,  Flaminius,  tracking  Hannibal  by 

1  The  country  was  more  marshy  and  exposed  to  floods,  also  nearer  the 
sea,  than  now.  Even  on  the  higher  ground  by  Ftesulas  and  in  the  valley  of 
the  Ombrone  floods  were  frequent. 


BATTLE    OF  LAKE    TKASLMEiYE  189 

his  devastations,  hung  upon  his  rear,  at  a  distance  justified  by  the 
Roman  habit  of  entrenchment.  If  he  fell  into  the  trap  laid  for 
him,  the  disaster  was  due  not  so  much  to  self-confidence,  jealousy 
of  his  colleague,  or  the  necessities  of  a  politician,  as  to  ignorance 
of  his  enemy  and  a  thoroughly  Roman  neglect  of  the  elementary 
duty  of  scouting.  He  did  not  force  on,  he  had  not  even  the 
option  of  battle. 

Battle  of  Lake  Trasimene. — The  lake  of  Trasimene  is  a  large 


Walker  (~£outaU  sc. 


Roads 

A.  Gauls  and  Caoalry  in  ambush 

B.  Baliares  and  tight-anned 
C    Heavy  Infantry 


PLAN    OK    BATTLE    OF   L.\KE    TRASIMENE. 


sheet  of  water,  girdled  by  considerable  hills,  in  the  east  of  Etruria, 
between  the  Clanis  and  the  Tiber.  The  road  from  Cortona  to 
Perugia,  turning  to  the  left  at  the  north-west  corner,  near  Borghetto, 
is  caught  between  Monte  Gualandro  and  the  marshy  margin  of 
the  lake.  After  a  narrow  passage  the  mountains  recede,  leaving  a 
small  plain,  divided  into  two  bays  by  the  projecting  spur  of  Tuoro. 
At  Passignano  the  hills  close  in  again  and  form  a  long  defile 
(2^  to  4  miles)  to  the  north-east  and  east,  from  the  end  of  which 


I90  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  road  turns  abruptly  up  the  lullsidc  to  Magione.  This  latter 
ascent  is  closed  by  a  hill  in  front,  and  by  the  lake  in  the  rear,  and 
opens  slightly  at  the  lake-end  by  La  TorriccUa.  For  the  battle- 
field two  sites  are  offered.  Polybius  seems  to  place  it  on  the 
Torricella-Magione  line,  in  a  spot  whose  natural  features  scarcely 
fit  his  topography  ;  while  Livy,  whose  clear  and  consistent  account 
we  follow,  places  it  on  the  northern  shore.  The  African  and 
Spanish  infantry  were  posted  in  the  plain  at  the  end,  the  Baliares 
and  light  troops  in  extended  order  on  the  northern  hills,  while  the 
cavalry  and  the  Gauls  were  concealed  under  Monte  Gualandro,  ready 
to  close  the  entrance.  Flaminius,  in  the  mist  of  an  early  morning 
towards  the  end  of  April,  entered  the  pass.  From  the  clearer 
hill-tops  the  enemy  listened  to  the  tramp  of  the  invisible  legions 
marching  into  the  jaws  of  death.  When  the  head  of  the  column 
gained  touch  with  the  Punic  infantry  and  the  rear-guard  was 
already  entangled  in  the  defile,  Hannibal  gave  the  word,  and  his 
troops  began  the  attack  from  all  sides.  It  was  a  melee  and  a 
massacre.  Caught  in  column  of  route,  rolled  in  a  niist,  plunged 
suddenly  from  confidence  to  despair,  the  Romans  were  unable 
even  to  ami,  much  less  to  form  order  of  battle.  Commands  could 
neither  be  giv^en  nor  obeyed.  Powerless  to  estimate  the  nature 
and  direction  of  the  attack  or  to  restore  order  in  the  hubbub,  the 
consul  toiled  like  a  common  soldier,  and  redeemed  his  errors  by 
death,  the  victim  of  a  Gallic  lance.  P"or  three  hours  the  carnage 
lasted  ;  some  were  cut  down  where  they  stood,  fightiiig  in  chance 
groups  ;  some  were  speared,  some  drowned  in  the  lake ;  6000  nien 
alone,  the  head  of  the  column,  cut  their  way  to  the  eastern  hills,  and 
halted  till  the  mist  rose  over  the  shambles  beneath.  Thence  they 
broke  out,  only  to  surrender  to  Maharbal  next  day  ;  but  Hannibal 
repudiated  his  lieutenant's  terms,  and  they  swelled  the  number  of 
the  15,000  prisoners  of  war.  As  many  more  had  fallen,  and  the 
army  of  Flaminius  had  ceased  to  exist.  The  Punic  loss  amounted 
to  1 500  men.  During  the  battle  an  earthquake  shock  rolled  away 
unfelt.  To  complete  the  disaster,  the  cavalry  corps,  4000  strong, 
sent  forward  by  Servilius  to  help  his  colleague,  was  cut  to  pieces 
or  captured  by  Maharbal  as  it  fell  back  on  the  main  body,  a  loss 
which  crippled  his  whole  army. 

Fabius  Maximus. — "  We  have  been  beaten  in  a  great  battle," 
said  the  preetor  Pomponius  to  the  panic-stricken  crowd,  whose 
belief  in  Flaminius  is  attested  by  the  crowd  of  non-combatants 
which  had  thronged  his  camp.  The  Senate  acted  with  energ-y. 
In  the  absence  of  the  consul,  the  Assembly  elected  Q.  Fabius 


HANNIBAL  AND  FAB  I  US  191 

Maximus  dictator,'  with  M.  Minucius  as  Master  of  the  Horse. 
He  was  a  patrician  of  the  highest  house,  stiff  in  opinion,  proud 
and  self-conscious,  with  a  firmness  that  was  ahnost  obstinacy 
and  a  dehberation  which  was  sometimes  excessive.  Reverent  of 
authority,  tradition,  and  rehgion,  he  despised  pubhc  opinion  and 
the  popular  leaders,  an  opposition  which  intensified  the  peculiar 
traits  of  his  character.  Rome  was  hastily  put  in  a  state  of  defence, 
and  the  claims  of  offended  religion  satisfied.  The  army  of  Servi- 
lius  was  recalled  and  strengthened  with  two  new  legions.  Orders 
were  given  to  devastate  the  country  and  retire  to  the  fortresses 
wherever  Hannibal  was  likely  to  appear.  Men  of  the  lower  class 
and  freedmen  were  utilised  for  the  city-garrison,  and  for  the  fleet 
which  Servilius  went  to  organise  at  Ostia,  to  meet  the  Cartha- 
ginian squadron,  now  cruising  off  Etruria  in  support  of  Hannibal. 

Hannibal  Marches  into  Apulia. — That  general,  however,  destitute 
of  a  proper  train  and  taught  by  Saguntum,  had  no  idea  of  exhaust- 
ing his  force  on  a  desperate  siege  in  a  wasted  land  where  each 
man  was  a  soldier  and  an  enemy.  Cool  head  and  daring  spirit,  he 
combined  the  audacity  of  a  Murat  with  the  forethought  of  a  Moltke. 
He  had  still  to  wait  for  Italian  support  ;  Gaul  was  a  broken  reed, 
and,  even  after  Trasimene,  Etruria  gave  no  sign.  He  turned  with 
hope  to  the  warlike  Sabellian  tribes,  his  real  objective,  and  moving 
west,  after  a  fruitless  assault  on  the  colony  of  Spoletium,  marched 
through  Umbria  to  Picenum,  marking  his  path  by  plunder  and 
massacre.  In  ten  days  he  reached  the  Adriatic.  The  time  gained 
by  this  unexpected  movement  he  employed  in  recruiting  his  way- 
worn troops  and  horses,  and  in  reorganising  and  rearming  the 
African  infantry  with  the  spoils  of  victory — a  dangerous  manoeuvre 
in  a  hostile  country.  Hence  he  sent  by  sea  his  first  official  despatch 
to  Carthage  ;  its  news  stirred  his  people  to  enthusiastic  support. 
From  Picenum  he  passed  along  the  coast  into  Apulia,  maintaining 
his  connection  with  Carthage  and  Macedon.  The  sympathy  of 
the  Samnites  was  not  yet  forthcoming.  Local  autonomy,  national 
feeling,  and  the  prestige  of  Rome  kept  her  allies  faithful — a  gain 
worth  many  victories.  Tantce  iiiolis  crat  Ronianain  Tperdere ^c/i/c/n. 
As  he  marched  into  Apulia,  Fabius  appeared  on  his  rigdit  flank 
at  ALcse,  on  the  edge  of  the  Daunian  plain.  Alasterly  inaction  sums 
up  the  tactics  of  Fabius — to  worry,  weaken,  and  starve  an  enemy 
whose  necessity  was  victory,  opposing  a  passive  resistance  to  the 

1  That  he  was  only  pro-dictator  is  probably  a  mere  subtlety  of  the  Augustan 
lawyers. 


iq2  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

provoc.'ilinns  of  Hannibal  and  the  murmurs  of  the  camp.  The  war 
must  mark  time  while  recruits  were  trained,  confidence  revived, 
and  a  new  staff  created  by  a  campaign  of  skirmishes.  Keeping 
his  men  together,  carefully  reconnoitring  the  ground,  dogging  the 
footsteps  of  his  leader,  making  his  enemy's  eagerness  the  measure 
of  his  own  caution,  "Hannibal's  lackey"  kept  his  army  intact, 
overawed  the  allies,  and  forced  the  enemy  into  a  system  of  de- 
vastation, which,  if  it  harassed  Rome,  endangered  the  keystone  of 
his  own  policy.  He  was  scarcely  likely  to  intimidate  Rome  by 
plundering  her  confederates. 

The  War  in  Campania.— Impatient  of  delay,  Hannibal,  who  had 
already  tampered  with  the  faith  of  Capua,  the  powerful,  ambitious 
and  suspected  capital  of  Campania,  broke  out  from  Arpi,  and, 
closely  observed  by  Fabius,  passed  Beneventum,  ravaging  as  he 
went,  and  struck  by  Telesia  for  Casilinum.  Casilinum  was  the 
bridge-head  of  Capua,  holding  the  passage  of  the  \'ulturnus,  the 
point  of  junction  of  the  Appian  and  Latin  ways,  the  key  to  the 
Roman  communications  w-ith  the  garden  of  Italy.  Taken  by  error 
as  far  as  Allifae  on  the  road  to  Casinum,  he  returned  and  wasted  the 
Falernian  plain  under  the  eyes  of  the  Roman  army.  Fabius,  inferior 
in  cavalry,  watched  with  contentment  his  opportunity  from  the 
Massic  mount.  Securing  the  Appian  road  and  the  passes  of  Lau- 
tulae  and  Suessa,  he  drew  the  net  tighter,  as  the  enemy  looked  for 
retreat  from  the  wasted  land  where  no  gates  opened  to  him.  Sup- 
ports were  thrown  into  Casilinum  ;  the  dictator,  moving  along  the 
heights,  covered  from  his  central  position,  by  Cales  and  Teanum,  the 
broad  exit  of  the  Latin  road  and  the  hills  beyond  ;  while  to  the  east- 
ward 4000  men  beset  the  remaining  road,  the  entering  defile  be- 
tween the  Mons  Callicula  and  the  river-barrier.  But  the  meshes 
were  too  wide,  the  weaver  too  timid.  Hannibal,  building  on  the 
caution  of  Fabius,  as  he  had  on  the  rashness  of  Flaminius,  by  a 
famous  stratagem  drove  2000  oxen  with  lighted  faggots  on  their 
horns  up  the  hills  to  the  left  of  the  defile,  drew  off  the  puzzled  guard 
by  this  semblance  of  a  torchlight  march,  and  passed  at  leisure 
through  the  gap,  disengaging  his  light  troops,  with  heavy  loss  to 
the  Romans,  next  day.  Fabius  was  too  far  off,  or  too  suspicious,  to 
impede  the  manoeuvre  ;  nor  could  he  prevent  the  plunder  of  the 
Pcelignian  land,  or  the  settlement  in  winter  quarters  at  Gereonium, 
on  the  edge  of  the  Apulian  plain,  within  equal  reach  of  the  broad 
cornfields  and  the  upland  pastures.  Here,  by  the  modern  Capriola 
or  Casa  Calenda,  close  to  Larino.  Hannibal  encamped  outside  the 
town,  whose  empty  houses  were  stocked  with  the  produce  of  syste- 


FABIUS   AND  HANNIBAL  193 

matic  foraging.  If  he  was  disappointed  with  the  results  of  the  year, 
at  Rome  and  in  the  camp  the  feeling  was  strong  against  Fabius,  the 
value  of  whose  system,  temporary  at  best,  was  scarcely  as  apparent 
as  its  defects.  The  discontent  was  exasperated  by  the  stiff  attitude 
of  the  dictator,  and  by  the  real  success  of  his  lieutenant,  Minucius, 
who,  by  a  judicious  but  unauthorised  movement,  had  reaped  the 
fruits  of  Fabius'  tactics,  cut  up  Hannibal's  foragers,  and  forced  him 
to  fall  back  and  concentrate  in  his  old  camp.  Now,  on  the  proposal 
of  Metilius,  backed  by  Terentius  Varro  and  the  popular  party,  in 
defiance  of  political  and  military  precedent,  a  premium  was  set 
upon  insubordination,  and  the  majesty  of  the  office  and  the  value  of 
a  single  command  was  destroyed  by  the  appointment  of  Minucius 
as  co-dictator.  But  the  Fabian  system  was  justified  and  disci- 
pline restored  when,  entrapped  in  a  second  version  of  the  Trebia, 
Minucius  was  only  saved  from  total  ruin  by  his  outraged  but 
loyal  colleague. 

The  consul  suffectus,  M.  Atilius  Regulus,  with  Servilius,  who  had 
returned  from  a  futile  expedition  to  Africa,  took  over  the  legions 
and  tactics  of  Fabius,  as  consuls  and  proconsuls,  till  the  arrival 
of  their  successors  in  the  following  year  (216  B.C.).  The  close  of 
the  campaign  left  Hannibal  master  of  the  ground  scoured  by  his 
famous  horse,  unconquered  in  the  field,  politically  no  further  ad- 
vanced. A  still  stronger  blow  was  required  yet  to  loosen  the  joints 
of  the  confederacy  whose  compact  structure  supplied  the  place 
of  genius.  The  reinforcements  he  required  were  not  substantially 
forthcoming.  The  resolute  spirit  of  Rome  in  face  of  her  wasted 
territory  and  vanished  legions  is  shown  by  her  refusal  of  help  from 
Neapolis  and  Paestum,  by  the  summons  to  Philip  to  surrender  the 
rebel  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  and  by  the  despatch  of  P.  Scipio  with 
thirty  ships  and  8000  men  to  Spain,  to  close  the  overland  route  to 
Italy. 

Parties  at  Rome. — In  the  elections  for  the  consulate  a  severe 
party  struggle  came  to  a  head.  Impatient  of  the  burdens  of  the 
war,  with  whose  prolongation  they  charged  the  aristocracy,  the 
popular  faction  saddled  the  Senate  with  the  odium  of  the  Fabian 
system — equally  unpalatable  as  it  was  to  the  majority  of  that  body. 
Gradually,  in  opposition  to  the  new  nobility,  the  masses  had  con- 
solidated themselves  into  a  new  democratic  party,  whose  natural 
growth  was  favoured  by  the  excitement  of  a  disastrous  war.  and 
now,  as  if  the  soldier-politician  had  not  done  mischief  enough 
already,  they  claimed  and  carried  a  genuine  plebeian  consul,  a  true 
son   of  the  people,   an   active    and  eloquent   anti-aristocrat,   in   a 

N 


194  HISTORY  OF   ROME 

purely  military  crisis.  In  this  election  and  its  consequences,  as  in 
the  previous  conduct  of  the  war,  we  find  the  clearest  proofs  of  the 
inadequacy  of  Roman  municipal  institutions  for  an  imperial  and 
military  policy.  Annual  election  and  dual  leadership,  the  manage- 
ment of  the  war  in  a  partisan  sense  by  a  Flaminius  or  a  Fabius, 
the  change  of  front  in  face  of  the  enemy,  the  strategy  of  the 
Forum  or  the  Curia,  the  disunion  of  government  and  governed, 
and  the  formal  weakness  of  the  real  government — these  things, 
more  than  the  genius  of  Hannibal,  account  for  the  disasters  of 
Rome. 

Varro. — C.  Terentius  Varro,  a  military  ignoramus,  to  whose  re- 
spectable civil  talents  and  personal  qualities  his  regular  career  of 
ofifice  and  constant  subsequent  employment  sufficiently  testify,  of 
bourgeois  family  and  average  education,  eloquent  partisan  and 
wretched  tactician,  came  out  alone  at  the  head  of  the  poll,  a  result 
due  to  irritation  at  the  electoral  manoeuvres  of  the  aristocracy. 
L.  ^milius  Paullus,  an  able  soldier  of  Illyrian  fame  and  unpopu- 
larity (p.  1 66),  accepted  unwillingly  the  second  place  as  Senatorian 
nominee.  The  day  of  the  Cunctator  was  over  ;  policy  and  finance 
alike  demanded  a  striking  blow  to  confirm  the  allies  and  maintain 
the  credit  of  Rome.  All  parties  were  at  one  ;  and  the  consuls 
received  definite  orders  and  an  overwhelming  force.  With  eight 
strong  legions  of  5000  foot  and  300  horse,  and  a  correspondingly 
large  contingent  of  Italians — equal  infantry  and  double  horse — 
i.e.,  with  80,000  foot  and  6000  cavalr\',  they  were  to  envelop  and 
destroy  the  40,000  infantry  and  10,000  cavalry  of  Hannibal.  To 
effect  a  diversion,  L.  Postumius  Albinus  and  M.  Claudius  Mar- 
cellus,  consulars  of  tried  ability,  were  despatched  respectively  to 
Gaul  and  Sicily,  while  Otacilius  was  directed  to  Africa. 

Hannibal,  who,  by  his  personal  influence  and  care  for  their 
comfort,  had  kept  together  his  motley  host  through  the  tedium  of 
winter  quarters,  with  troops  grown  restive  in  the  increasing  dearth 
of  pay  and  provisions,  unable  to  draw  the  proconsuls  to  the  field, 
remained  at  Gereonium  till  May.  Once  already  he  had  tried  and 
failed  to  lure  them  to  destruction  by  the  bait  of  an  apparently 
deserted  and  plunder-laden  camp,  and  now,  under  cover  of  a 
similar  suspicious  trap,  trading  on  their  wariness,  he  broke  up  in 
earnest,  gained  a  day's  march,  and  surprised  the  Roman  maga- 
zines at  CannDe.  At  what  point  of  time  the  consuls  arrived  is  not 
clear,  but  their  arrival  precipitated  a  struggle. 

Battle  of  Cannae. — By  his  march  to  Canna;,  Hannibal  had  cut 
off  their  supplies,  and  himself  commanded  the  ripening  harvest. 


BEFORE   CANNM 


195 


In  the  now  exhausted  land  provisions  must  be  drawn  from  a  dis- 
tance, and  the  huge  army  had  the  option  of  a  dangerous  retreat 
or  a  pitched  battle  on  the  unfavourable  ground  to  which  their 
skilful  enemy  had  drawn  them.  In  two  days  the  Romans  reached, 
without  crossing,  the  Autidus,  at  a  point  six  miles  from  Hannibal's 
camp,  which  was  pitched  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  on  a  slope 
of  the  projecting  ridge  of  Cannae.  The  course  of  the  Aufidus 
(Ofanto)  is,  roughly  speaking,  south-west  to  north-east.  Eight  miles 
from  the  sea  it  issues  from  a  distinct  valley,  a  mile  wide,  confined 


THE    AUFIDUS   NEAR    CANN/E. 


by  moderate  hills.  On  the  left  these  hills  terminate  in  a  wide  and 
waterless  plain  stretching  to  the  sea  ;  on  the  right  they  break  down 
in  a  series  of  undulations  to  a  wide  and  fairly  level  upper  plain, 
whose  edge  towards  the  river,  continuing  the  ridge  of  Canna?,  forms 
a  bank  from  sixty  to  seventy  feet  high,  which  confines  the  vagaries 
of  the  stream  and  forms  the  boundary  between  the  upper  and 
lower  level.  Close  at  its  foot  may  then  have  flowed  the  Aufidus, 
whose  shrunken  summer-stream,  largest  as  it  is  of  the  eastern 
rivers,  presented  no  difficulties.      Its  course  for  the  direct  six  miles 


196  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

has  been,  and  remains,  erratic  ;  but  none  of  its  bends  aflfords  an 
adequate  battlefield,  nor  is  there  space  in  the  valley  above  to 
manoeuvre  an  army.  The  upper  plain  is,  if  not  so  obviously  good 
as  the  lower,  yet  "an  excellent  fighting-ground"  for  cavalry  ;  the 
contending  forces  would  rest  their  wings  on  the  bank,  which  was 
not  too  steep  for  horse  to  climb.  Here  Varro  was  more  ready 
to  risk  battle  than  on  the  left  bank  ;  nor  was  Hannibal  unwilling 
to  accept  it.  The  evils  of  alternate  command  made  themselves 
manifest  in  the  action  of  the  Romans.  Elated  by  a  successful 
skirmish,  Varro  had  pressed  his  advance  ;  it  only  remained  for  his 
colleague  to  secure  more  equal  terms  for  the  contest.  Fortifying 
a  large  camp  on  the  left  bank,  and  a  smaller  entrenchment  on  the 
right,  lower  down  the  stream,  he  hoped,  by  restricting  the  enemy's 
supplies,  to  force  his  retreat  to  a  ground  less  dangerous  for  infantry. 
Hannibal  transferred  his  camp  to  the  left,  and  offered  battle,  which 
^milius,  aware  of  his  situation,  refused  ;  but  on  the  sixth  day,  when 
his  turn  came,  Varro,  impatient  of  dilatory  tactics  and  stung  by 
the  annoyance  of  the  Numidian  horse,  who  harassed  his  watering- 
parties,  crossed  the  stream  and  drew  out  his  army  for  action.  The 
slight  advantage  of  the  eastern  bank  tempted  his  inexperience, 
and  here,  careless  of  retreat  when  all  was  staked  on  the  single 
hazard,  he  posted  his  troops  with  their  back  to  the  sea,  as  Hannibal, 
with  greater  reason,  neglected  the  Roman  strongholds  in  his  rear. 
The  wind  drove  the  dust  in  their  eyes  as  they  faced  the  south  ; 
their  right  was  crowded  on  the  stream,  their  left  exposed.  Leaving 
10,000  men  in  the  large  camp,  to  menace  the  Punic  entrenchments 
and  withdraw  a  division  from  their  weakened  army,  he  massed 
the  infantry  in  column  of  cohorts  in  the  centre,  and  flanked  them 
on  the  right  with  the  Roman  cavalry,  on  the  left  with  the  stronger 
allied  horse,  covering  the  front  with  the  usual  screen  of  skirmishers. 
The  maniples,  drawn  up  thus  directly  behind  each  other — not  in 
the  ordinary  quincunx  — their  depth  many  times  greater  than  their 
front,  increased  the  pressure  of  the  column,  but  offered  a  prolonged 
flank  to  the  enemy's  superior  cavalry.  This  extraordinary  forma- 
tion— for  the  intei-vals  between  the  maniples  were  at  the  same  time 
diminished — whether  due  to  the  number  of  recruits,  to  the  de- 
moralisation of  the  soldiery,  or  to  a  reminiscence  of  earlier  tactics 
against  elephants,  sacrificed  the  advantage  of  superior  numbers 
and  was  largely  responsible  for  the  disaster.  This  mistake  enabled 
Hannibal  not  merely  to  extend  an  equal  front,  but  to  adopt  a 
formation  recently  in  use  among  the  Zulus.  He  threw  forward 
the  Gallic  and  Spanish  infantry  in  echelon,  or  possibly  in  line  with 


BATTLE    OF   CANN.-E 


197 


retiring  flanks,  a  crescent-like  formation,  on  either  horn  of  which 
the  African  infantry,  armed  in  Roman  fashion,  were  drawn  up  in 
deep  column  with  a  narrow  front.  The  heavy  cavalry  under 
Ilasdrubal  was  posted  on  the  left,  while  Maharbal,  with  the  light 
brigade,  outflanked  the  allied  horse  ;  the  Baliares  skirmished  in 
front.  Hannibal  took  the  centre  in  person  ;  Hasdrubal  faced 
^•Emilius  ;  the  Roman  left  was  under  Varro  ;  Servilius  took  post 
in  the  centre.  The  battle,  opened  by  the  light  troops,  raged  with 
especial  iwxy  on  the  Roman  right  and  centre.     In  the  confined 


CANNAE 

and  surrounding 
Country 

(from  Italian  Ordnance 
Siineii  1859) 


Adriatic 
Sea 


Ifalker  &■  BoiUall  sc. 


PLAN    OF   CANNA:. 


space  cavalry  tactics  were  useless.  Locked  in  deadly  struggle, 
the  heavy  troopers,  tearing  each  other  from  their  horses,  fought 
man  to  man,  till  the  Romans  broke  and  fled.  Then  the  legions 
took  up  the  fight,  and  pushing  forward  with  converging  front, 
drove  in  the  convex  Celtic  line,  and  charging  on  with  irresistible 
weight,  shrouded  in  the  dust  of  battle,  buried  themselves  deeper 
and  deeper  in  the  living  cul-de-sac.  In  an  instant  the  Libyan 
columns  faced  right  and  left  ;  the  now  concave  line  of  Gauls 
blocked  the  advance,  while  in  tempestuous  charges  Hasdrubal 
with  the  heavy  cavalry  dashed  upon  their  rear.     He  was  in  the 


198 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


nick  of  time.  The  Numidian  horsemen  on  the  left  had  kept  the 
allies  in  play,  but  could  effect  little  against  regular  cavalry  in  a 
pitched  battle,  till  Ilasdrubal,  passing  round  the  Roman  rear, 
scattered  them  to  the  winds,  and  leaving  them,  with  sound  judg- 
ment, to  the  pursuit  of  the  Africans,  decided  the  day  by  his 
timely  attack  on  the  main  body.  Jammed  and  packed  by  their 
own  mass  and  momentum  between  the  hostile  columns,  helpless 
and  hopeless,  unable  to  fight  or  fly,  the  men  were  hewn  down 
where  they  stood.     It  was  a  carnival  of  cold  steel,  a  butchery,  not 


CARTHAGINIAN  HELMET  FOUND  AT  CANN.*:. 


a  battle.  vEmilius,  Servilius,  and  Minucius,  with  eighty  senators 
and  most  of  the  officers,  died  on  the  field.  Varro,  with  fifty  horse- 
men, escaped  to  Venusia.  The  army  of  Rome  had  been  wiped 
out,  and  the  victory  was  completed  by  the  capture  of  the  two 
camps.  At  least  50,000  fell.  The  captives  may  have  reached 
20,000.  At  the  utmost  10,000  escaped.  The  actual  figures  are 
difficult  to  establish.^  The  detachments  which  escaped  cut  their 
way  through  to  Canusium,  where  they  were  joined  by -the  braver 
spirits  from  the  two  camps  and  the  surviving  consul. 

1  The  existence  of  two  Icgiones  Carinenses  testifies  to  a  larger  number  of 
fugitives  than  Polybius  allows. 


AFTER    CANN^  I99 

CHAPTER  XXII 

THE    SECOND    PUNIC    WAR    FROM    CANN/E    TO    ZAMA 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Capua  and  most  of  South  Italy  joins  Hannibal  216  538 

War  in  Campania 216-214    538-540 

Death  of  Hiero-  Philip  of   Macedon   allies   himself  with 

Hannibal 215  539 

Marcellus  besieges  Syracuse 213  541 

Hannibal  seizes  Tarentum— Capua  besieged  and  Syracuse 
taken  by  the  Romans— The  Defeat  of  the  Scipios 
compels  the  Romans  to  give  up  Spain  south  of  the 

Ebro ■        .  212  542 

Capua  taken— Young  Publius  Scipio  appointed  to  com- 
mand in  Spain 211  543 

Scipio  surprises  New  Carthage 210  544 

Fabius  recovers  Tarentum 209  545 

Defeat  and  Death  of  Hasdrubal  at  the  Metaurus  .         .  207  547 

Philip  makes  Peace  with  Rome 205  549 

Scipio  lands  in  Africa,  but  fails  to  take  Utica  204  550 

Scipio's  Victories  lead  to  the  Recall  of  Hannibal  from  Italy  203  551 

Battle  of  Zama .202  552 

Peace  arranged 201  553 

After  Cannae. — With  the  battle  of  Cannae  the  dramatic  unity 
and  breathless  interest  of  the  war  ceases  ;  its  surging  mass,  broken 
on  the  walls  of  the  Roman  fortresses — no  bad  type  of  the  uncon- 
querable resolution  of  a  people  "most  dangerous  when  at  bay" — 
foams  away  in  ruin  and  devastation  through  the  South  Italian 
provinces — ever  victorious,  ever  receding.  Rome,  assailed  on  all 
sides  by  open  foe  and  forsworn  friend,  driven  to  her  last  man 
and  lowest  coin,  "ever  great  and  greater  grows"  in  the  strength 
of  her  strong  will  and  loyal  people,  widening  the  circle  around 
her  with  rapid  blows  in  Sicily,  Sardinia,  Spain,  and  Macedon, 
while  she  slowly  loosens  the  grip  fastened  on  her  throat  at  home, 
till  in  the  end,  when  the  hour  and  the  man  are  come,  the  final 
fight  on  the  African  sands  closes  at  one  moment  the  struggle  for 
life  and  seats  her  mistress  of  the  world. 

At  Rome,  as  the  day  of  battle  approached,  clamorous  piety 
besieged  the  altars.  An  agony  of  despair  followed.  There  was 
mourning  in  every  house.  Already  one- fifth  of  the  population 
had  been  killed  or  taken,  and,  to  complete  the  tale,  before  the 
military  year  was  out  (216-215  B.C.)  L.  Postumius  Albinus,  consul 
elect,  with  two  legions,  had  been  cut  to  pieces  in  a  Gallic  ambush 


200  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

at  Silva  Lilana.  His  skull  set  in  metal  remained  a  j^hasliy  trophy, 
to  deck  the  banquet-table. 

Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  in  power  but  not  in  office,  led  the  Senate, 
whose  calm  energy  restored  order  and  confidence.  Its  unfaltering 
courage,  its  wisdom,  its  sacrifices,  its  splendid  tenacity,  vindicated 
its  claim  to  the  commanding  position  imposed  by  circumstances 
on  the  ruling  body.  Measures  were  taken  for  a  last  defence,  the 
streets  policed,  mourning  curtailed  ;  a  mission  under  Fabius  Pictor 
proceeded  to  Delphi  ;  recourse  was  even  had  to  human  sacrifice 
to  satisfy  the  offended  gods.  In  the  camp,  Varro  collected  the 
wreckage  of  his  army  ;  a  plot  of  faint-hearted  nobles  to  abandon 
Italy  was  stifled  by  the  young  officers  App.  Claudius  and  P. 
Scipio  ;  two  weak  legions  were  formed,  which  were  subsequently 
sent  as  punishment  battalions  to  Sicily.  The  consul,  who  had 
behaved  with  spirit,  returned,  a  defeated  fugitive  and  a  discredited 
leader,  to  face  his  judges  at  Rome.  But  in  the  common  resolu- 
tion born  of  common  suffering  the  voice  of  faction  was  silent  ;  the 
thanks  of  the  Senate  offered  to  the  man  who  had  not  despaired 
of  the  Republic  witness  at  once  to  his  merit  and  the  spirit  of  his 
country. 

Hannibal's  Plans. — Hannibal,  self-possessed,  refused  the  invita- 
tion of  IMaharltal  "to  dine  with  him  on  the  Capitol  in  five  days," 
and  tried  even  now  to  negotiate.  A  rush  on  Rome  was  the  idea  of 
a  cavalry  officer,  not  of  a  general.  A  surprise  would  be  impossible, 
a  demonstration  idle.  The  defeat  of  Regulus  had  shown  that  the 
results  of  an  entire  campaign  might  be  frittered  away  in  the  siege 
of  a  fortified  capital.  It  was  the  policy  of  Hannibal  to  storm, 
not  the  capital,  but  the  confederacy.  He  liberated  the  Italian 
prisoners,  and,  content  with  his  exploits  as  a  soldier,  meant  now 
to  reap  the  harvest  of  his  political  combinations.  He  expected  re- 
inforcements ;  his  agents  were  working  in  Sicily  and  Macedon  ;  the 
Gauls  were  moving  in  the  north  ;  in  the  south  the  Roman  alliance 
was  beginning  to  give.  Though  his  Spanish  succours  had  been 
intercepted  at  the  Ebro,  the  home  government,  in-  full  communica- 
tion at  last  and  justified  in  their  policy  by  victory,  was  able  to  ignore 
the  peace  party  and  give  a  more  than  naval  support.  Mago,  who 
had  already  organised  the  revolt  in  Bruttium,  carried  to  Carthage 
the  despatches  of  Hannibal  and  a  bushel  of  gold  rings  from  the 
fallen  nobles  of  Cann^  ;  4000  horse  and  forty  elephants  were 
ordered  to  Italy  ;  an  additional  army  was  to  be  raised  in  Spain. 
The  support  was  indeed  inadequate,  but  a  commercial  nation  ex- 
pected a  successful  war  to  pay.    The  indecision  of  Philip  delayed 


REVOLT  OF  CAPUA  20 1 

the  action  of  Macedon  ;  and  it  was  not  till  the  following^  year  that 
Sicily  was  ripe  for  revolution. 

Capua  and  South  Italy  join  Hannibal. — The  first-fruits  of  vic- 
tory were  plucked  in  South  Italy.  The  Lucanians  and  Bruttians, 
with  few  exceptions,  were  eager  to  resume  their  attacks  on  the 
Greek  cities  protected  by  Rome.  Arpi,  Salapia,  and  Herdonea,  in 
Apulia,  and  the  Samnite  tribes,  except  the  Pentrians,  with  the  Hir- 
pini,  joined  the  revolt.  Last  and  most  important  of  all  was  Capua. 
This  city,  the  second  in  Italy,  closely  connected  with  Rome,  pos- 
sessing lesser  Roman  rights,  and  the  privilege  of  service  in  the 
legion,  enjoying  autonomy  under  its  Senate  and  the  Meddix  Tuticus, 
with  an  army  of  30,000  foot  and  4000  excellent  cavalry,  was,  like 
all  the  Campanian  cities,  divided  between  two  factions,  a  Roman- 
ising aristocracy  and  an  anti-Roman  populace.  Jealous  and  am- 
bitious, irritated  by  the  Roman  government  on  some  question  of 
the  public  land,  the  people,  led  by  the  aspiring-  Pacuvius  Calavius, 
overbore  the  Senate,  and  sealed  the  terms  of  their  desertion  to 
Hannibal  by  the  murder  of  the  Roman  inhabitants.  They  stipu- 
lated for  independence  and  immunity  from  burdens  ;  they  looked 
to  the  future  sovereignty  of  Italy.  But  the  arrest  and  deportation 
of  Decius  Magius,  the  irreconcilable  leader  of  the  Roman  party, 
by  order  of  Hannibal,  furnished  an  inconvenient  commentary  on 
Punic  guarantees. 

Hannibal's  Difficulties. — Hannibal  was  thus  master  of  Italy  to  the 
Volturnus,  with  a  wealthy  city  as  a  base,  with  Carthage  behind  him, 
with  a  veteran  army,  a  magnificent  staff;  and  yet  from  this  moment 
his  warfare  is  mainly  defensive.  He  toiled,  fought,  organised,  sus- 
tained the  struggle  in  five  countries  at  once,  while  he  directed  the 
policy  of  the  State  at  home,  undefeated  in  the  field,  never  greater 
than  in  his  lowest  fortune — -"of  all  that  befell  the  Romans  and 
Carthaginians,  good  or  bad,  the  one  cause."  If  he  failed  in  his 
attempt  to  crush  and  pulverise  his  enemy,  the  main  cause  of  his 
failure  lies  not  so  much  in  the  sporadic  character  of  the  war — this 
.was  a  part  of  his  plan — nor  in  the  lukewarm  attitude  of  Carthage, 
whose  support  was  given  persistently,  if  not  wisely,  to  the  last, 
aor  in  the  character  or  organisation  of  his  victorious  anny,  as  in 
the  lack  of  subordination,  insight,  and  self-sacrifice  of  his  allies. 
The  Italians  showed  little  enthusiasm  ;  his  position  forbade  con- 
scription. He  possessed  a  base  that  he  must  maintain,  not  a  base 
from  which  to  advance.     He  was  cramped  by  the  Roman  fortresses,^ 

1  Such  as   Luceria,  Venusia,  /Esernia,   Beneventum,    Brundisium,   Cales, 
Paestum,  Cosa. 


202  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

which,  holding  the  best  positions,  standinjj^  menaces  in  his 
rear  and  flanks,  hampered  his  movements  and  occupied  his 
friends.  Dependinj,-^  on  Rome  for  their  very  life,  they  were  open 
neither  to  threats  nor  cajolery.  His  artillery  and  engineers  were 
deficient ;  in  a  war  of  sieges  and  hill-fighting  his  strong  arm — 
the  cavalry — became  comparatively  useless.  His  effective  force, 
weakened  by  the  garrisons,  which  the  existence  of  the  colonies 
and  of  a  Roman  party  in  the  towns  themselves  demanded,  was 
insufficient  to  mask  the  fortresses,  defend  his  frontier,  and  resume 
the  offensive.  All  depended  now  on  the  auxiliary  operations  in 
Spain,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Macedon,  and  chiefly  on  the  part 
played  by  Philip  of  Macedon  and  the  armies  of  Spain.  It  was  the 
folly  of  Philip  and  the  defeat  of  Hasdrubal  which  finally  shattered 
the  vast  combinations  of  Hannibal. 

Marcellus  in  Campania. — Meanwhile  Marcellus,  who  was  or- 
ganising the  fleet  at  Ostia,  sent  forward  a  legion  of  marines  to 
Teanum,  and  picking  up  the  relics  of  Canna?,  followed  the  enemy 
to  Campania.  Too  late  for  Capua,  he  threw  a  garrison  into 
Neapolis  and  occupied  Nola,  where  Hannibal's  failure  was  mag- 
nified into  a  victory.  Repulsed  at  Neapolis  and  Cumic,  Hannibal 
reduced  Nuceria  and  AcerrjE.  Casilinum,  heroically  defended  by 
M.  Anicius  of  PrEeneste,  capitulated  in  the  spring  of  215  B.C.  He 
had  secured  the  key  of  the  Latin  road,  but  failed  to  master  a  port, 
and  now  retired  for  the  winter  to  Capua.  The  Senate  refused  his 
terms  and  expelled  his  envoys.  The  prisoners  of  Canute,  ""^ pour 
eucourager  les  autrcs"  and  to  save  money,  were  left  unransomed.^ 
Extraordinary  measures  were  taken  to  meet  the  deficiency  of  men 
and  means.  Already  120,000  men  had  been  lost  to  the  State, 
and  the  disorganisation  of  finance,  agriculture,  and  society  was 
making  itself  felt.  The  dictator  M.  Junius  Pera  called  out  four 
new  legions  and  icoo  horse,  and  with  a  motley  mass  of  avail- 
able troops,  ransomed  slaves,  debtors,  criminals,  and  boys — 25,000 
strong — hurried  to  Teanum,  to  cover  the  capital  and  co-operate 
with  Marcellus.  To  such  desperate  resorts  was  the  city  reduced  ! 
When  the  levies  were  completed  over  30,000  men  had  taken  the  field, 
with  another  30,000  in  reserve.  The  war  received  a  new  character  ; 
the  lesson  of  experience  had  been  learned.  Henceforth  capable 
officers  are  elected  and  continued  in  command,  Fabius,  Fulvius, 
Manlius,  Gracchus,  above  all  the  veteran  M.  Claudius  Marcellus, 

'  The  atrocities  attributed  to  Hannibal  on  this  and  other  occasions  are  of 
doubtful  authority,  and  sort  ill  with  his  character  and  position. 


THE    WAR   IN   CAMPANIA  203 

the  hero  of  the  Gallic  war,  whose  soldierly  qualities  and  dogged 
determination  need  none  of  the  spurious  adornment  with  which 
the  courtly  writers  of  a  later  age  have  decorated  the  Marcelline 
legend.  Resting  on  strong  positions,  accepting  action  with  retreat 
secured,  evading  the  redoubtable  cavalry,  they  pursued  the  subtle 
offensive  of  persistent  vigilance,  a  war  of  raids  and  entrenchments, 
cutting  supplies,  recovering  the  lost,  overawing  the  doubtful.  Rome 
still  retained  her  Latin  allies  and  her  own  citizens,  Etruria  and  Cen- 
tral Italy,  with  the  Greek  harbours  whose  dangerous  position  had 
attached  them  to  the  Philhellenic  city — Neapolis,  Thurii,  Rhegium, 
Tarentum.  The  feeling  of  Italian  unity,  of  western  civilisation, 
of  common  culture  and  interests,  w-as  strengthened  by  a  natural 
and  national  antipathy  to  Gaul  and  Semite,  and  by  fear  of  the 
possible  vengeance  of  vindictive  Rome.  The  forlorn  defence  of 
Petelia  and  Consentia  was  of  good  omen  for  her  cause. 

Extraordinary  Measures  at  Rome. — To  meet  the  monetary 
crisis  which  threatened  insolvency  and  revolution,  a  commission 
of  three,  triumviri  inensarii,  were  appointed,  whose  functions  re- 
main uncertain.  The  fearful  gaps  in  the  Senate  were  filled  up  by  an 
extraordinary  dictator,  M.  Fabius  Buteo,  appointed  <^z^ //(?r,  who,  in 
a  conservative  spirit,  selected  from  the  men  of  political  and  mili- 
tary services  177  new  members,  and  resigned  the  same  day.  The 
liberal  but  untimely  proposal  of  Spurius  Carvilius  to  call  up  repre- 
sentative Latins  was  indignantly  thrown  out. 

The  War  in  Campania. — In  the  following  spring  (215  R.c.)  over 
6o,oco  men  enveloped  Hannibal  in  Campania.  Fabius  at  Cales 
covered  the  Latin  road  ;  Gracchus,  with  slaves  and  allies,  occupied 
Liternum  and  protected  the  Greek  harbours  ;  while  Marcellus 
watched  Nola  from  the  lines  of  Suessula.  Tarentum  and  Brun- 
disium  were  strongly  garrisoned ;  and  in  Apulia,  M.  Valerius 
Lasvinus  disposed  of  two  legions.  These  forces,  with  the  troops 
abroad,  made  up  a  grand  total  of  fourteen  legions,  or  140,000  men,^ 
besides  marines  and  irregulars.  Squadrons  cruised  on  the  Latin 
and  Calabrian  coasts,  though  the  bulk  of  the  active  fleet  was  at 
Lilybteum.  The  legions  of  Cannae  had  been  transferred  to  Sicily. 
Hannibal  was  probably  stronger  than  any  of  the  three  opposing 
armies,  his  Italian  recruits,  in  spite  of  Capua's  independent 
attitude,  supplying  the  place  of  his  garrisons  and  detachments. 
From  Mons  Tifata  he  commanded  the  plain,  and,  with  nothing  to 

1  That  is,  if  the  allied  contingents  were,  after  the  loss  of  South  Italy,  at  all 
in  proportion  to  the  citizens. 


204  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

get  by  action  in  face  of  the  cautious  tactics  of  the  Roman  generals, 
waited  the  development  of  events.  He  waited  for  Mayo,  for  the 
action  of  Syracuse,  for  Sardinia,  for  IVIacedon,  but  above  all  he 
waited  for  the  decay  of  the  Roman  confederacy.  Luxurious  Capua, 
that  cherished  Nemesis  of  Roman  legend,  was  not  Hannibal's 
Cannae :  Avith  his  old  tactical  caution,  he  was  preparing  for  Rome 
a  political  Trasimene. 

The  campaign  opened  in  Italy  with  the  S4.:rprise  and  massacre 
by  Gracchus  of  2000  Capuans  at  the  Campanian  feast  at  Kama;. 
Too  late  to  avenge  a  treachery  which  Gracchus  covered  by  a 
counter-charge  of  treason,  Hannibal  besieged  Cumse,  but  was 
repulsed  with  some  loss.  Meanwhile  Fabius  had  marched  round 
Capua  to  Suessula,  and  moved  Marcellus  to  Nola,  whither  Hannibal 
also  proceeded,  to  effect  a  junction  with  his  reinforcements  brought 
over  by  Bomilcar,  and  to  check  the  ravages  of  Marcellus  in  the 
Caudine  valleys.  In  the  three  days'  fighting  before  Nola,  Marcellus, 
by  a  successful  sortie,  broke  the  spell  of  victory  with  a  decided 
check,  whose  moral  effect  was  seen  in  the  desertion  of  some  Punic 
troops.  The  defeat  of  Hanno  at  (irumentum  and  the  raids  of 
Lsvinus  from  Luceria,  with  the  Punic  capture  of  Locri  and  Croton, 
are  the  only  other  incidents  of  a  dull  year.  The  Gauls,  by  their 
suicidal  inaction  after  the  disaster  of  Postumius,  enabled  Rome  to 
utilise  the  resources  of  Umbria  and  Etruria,  and  to  organise  a 
corps  of  observation  at  Ariminum,  with  a  small  reserve  under 
Vano  in  Picenum.     Punishment  was  postponed,  not  forgotten. 

Death  of  Hiero  :  Revolt  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia. — Abroad  events 
were  maturing.  In  216-215  ]'..C.  died  the  sage  and  politic  Hiero, 
over  ninety  years  old.  For  fifty-four  years  his  firm  and  conciliatory 
rule  had  secured  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  Syracuse.  A  patron 
of  science,  agriculture,  and  the  arts,  a  far-sighted  and  sagacious 
statesman,  a  consistent  and  generous  ally,  he  had  won  the  approval 
of  Greece,  and  maintained  his  friendship  with  Rome  without 
forfeiting  his  interest  at  Carthage.  To  preserve  the  balance  of 
power,  on  which  the  existence  of  his  state  depended,  or,  if  this 
was  impossible,  to  cling  to  the  safer  Roman  alliance,  was  the  wise 
policy  which  his  young  and  flighty  grandson  Hieronymus  now 
flung  to  the  winds.  Egged  on  by  an  ambitious  court,  encouraged 
by  the  emissaries  of  Hannibal, — the  soldier-politicians  of  mixed 
Punic  and  Syracusan  blood  and  interests,  Hippocrates  and  Epi- 
cydes,  pupils  of  the  tactics  and  policy  of  their  master,— in  face  of 
the  protests  of  the  Roman  praetor  and  his  own  wiser  counsellors, 
he  denounced  the  Roman  alliance  and  made  terms  with  Carthage, 


REVOLT  OF  SICILY 


205 


whose  easy  liberality  granted  extravagant  demands.  There  was 
sufficient  irritation  in  the  Roman  province,  and  ferment  in  the 
turbulent  and  vacillating  Paris  of  antiquity,  to  support  him.      In 


COIN    OF    HIERO    II.    OF    SYRACUSE. 


Sardinia  smouldering  discontent,  enhanced  by  the  exactions  of  the 
starving  troops  and  fleet,  left  by  Rome  to  forage  for  themselves, 
broke  out  in  open  rebellion.  A  strong  force  despatched  by  Carthage 
under  Hasdrubal  Calvus  was  delayed  by  tempests,  and  T.  Manlius 
Torquatus  massed  in  the  interval  sufficient  strength  to  crush  the 
insurrection,  destroy  the  reinforcements,  and  secure  the  island. 

Hannibal's  Reinforcements  diverted. — To  increase  Rome's  diffi- 
culties, the  young  and  restless  Philip,  annoyed  by  Roman  interfer- 
ence in  Illyria  and  instigated  by  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  adopted  a 
policy  sound  in  itself  and  dictated  by  his  position,  but  carried  out 
with  fatal  hesitation.  He  concluded  with  Hannibal  an  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance,  whose  price  would  be  the  Roman  possessions 
in  Illyria  and  the  help  of  Carthage  in  his  Grecian  wars.  The  in- 
terception of  his  first  embassy  delayed  action  for  a  year,  and  gave 
Rome  time  not  merely  to  increase  her  eastern  fleet,  but  to  prepare, 
if  necessary,  for  the  offensive  in  Macedon.  Meanwhile  the  news 
from  Spain  had  diverted  thither  the  reinforcements  destined  by 
Carthage  for  the  army  of  Italy.  Had  the  Spanish  and  Sardinian 
armies,  supported  by  Macedon,  joined  Hannibal  in  the  spring  the 
issue  of  the  war  had  been  different.  At  Rome  the  payment  of  her 
huge  armies  necessitated  exceptional  measures.  Doubled  taxes, 
which  merely  paralysed  the  paying  power,  were  followed  at  the 
end  of  the  year  by  a  system  of  voluntary  contribution  towards  the 


2o6  IITSTORY  OF  ROME 

navy,  amountin<,'  to  a  graduated  property-tax.  All  classes,  officers, 
contractors,  slave-owners,  sacrificed  pay  or  profit.  To  supply  the 
Spanish  forces,  three  companies  of  contractors  accepted  deferred 
payment  (the  State  guaranteeing  all  risks  and  exempting  them 
from  personal  service),  and  contrived  to  combine  patriotism  and 
jobbery  by  over-insuring-  their  scuttled  ships.  The  Lex  Oppia 
restricted  expenditure  l^y  limiting  the  ornaments  of  women. 

The  War  in  214-213  B.C. — The  change  for  the  better  was  main- 
tained (214  B.C.).  Twenty  legions  were  on  foot,  and  150  ships 
guarded  the  coast.  The  general  dispositions  remained  the  same. 
Eight  legions,  resting  upon  Luceria,  Beneventum,  Cales,  and 
Suessula,  operated  against  Hannibal ;  the  remainder  were  serv- 
ing abroad,  in  reserve  at  Rome,  or  watching  Gaul  or  Macedon. 
Fabius,  who  had  arbitrarily  prevented  the  election  of  incompetent 
officers,  was,  with  Marcellus,  in  chief  command.  The  attempts  of 
Hannibal  on  Puteoli  and  Tarentum  were  frustrated  ;  the  Punic 
garrison  of  Casilinum  surrendered  after  a  strenuous  defence,  but 
w-ere  cut  to  pieces  in  the  act  of  evacuation  by  the  truce-breaker 
Marcellus,  whose  chronicler  records  yet  another  victory  at  Nola. 

The  chief  exploit  of  the  campaign  was  the  defeat  of  Hanno's 
Bruttian  levies  by  the  slave-legions  of  Gracchus,  who  received  their 
liberty,  the  citizenship,  and  a  triumphal  reception  at  Beneventum. 
Hannibal  retired  to  Apulia,  and  the  combined  Roman  armies 
ravaged  Samnium.  During  the  year  the  theatre  of  war  had 
widened,  but  in  spite  of  Punic  successes  in  Sicily  the  balance  of 
advantage  lay  with  Rome.  Hannibal's  reinforcements  had  been 
frittered  away;  his  allies  were  inactive  ;  in  Spain  the  Scipios  more 
than  held  their  ground.  During  213  B.C.  there  was  little  progress. 
Hannibal  watched  Tarentum,  so  important  for  his  communica- 
tions with  Carthage  and  Macedon  ;  Fabius  surprised  Arpi,  and 
several  Bruttian  towns  surrendered.  The  block  in  the  war  was,  if 
unfavourable  to  the  Punic  leader,  discreditable  to  Rome.  There 
were  a  few  skirmishes,  and  Hanno  destroyed  a  number  of  Roman 
irregulars. 

Hannibal  takes  Tarentum. — To  this  inconceivable  inaction  with 
so  large  an  army  succeeded  the  military  and  political  blunders  of 
212  B.C.  The  execution  of  fugitive  Tarentine  and  Thurian  hostages, 
held  as  pledges  at  Rome,  was  a  crime  and  a  mistake.  Treason 
co-operated  with  negligence,  and  Tarentum,  except  its  citadel, 
was  captured  by  Hannibal.  Heraclea,  Thurii,  and  Metapontum 
followed  suit.  The  coast  was  in  his  hands,  and  the  way  open  for 
the  Macedonian  phalanx.     Only  on  the  fortified  hill  which  forms 


SIEGE   OF    CAPUA  207 

the  apex  of  the  water-washed  triangle  of  Tarentum  the   Roman 
garrison  maintained  itself  to  the  end. 

Siege  of  Capua. — As  the  war  went  on  its  effects  were  growing 
more  visible  in  the  decline  of  faith,  the  worship  of  strange  gods, 
and  the  demoralisation  of  society.  The  frauds  of  patriotic  con- 
tractors, such  as  Postumius  Pyrgensis,  came  to  light,  and  met 
with  tardy  if  severe  punishment.  The  Senate  dealt  with  the  new 
gods  and  the  danger  to  the  national  religion  ;  special  commis- 
sioners raised  the  reluctant  recruits,  and  sent  malingerers  to  join 
the  punishment  regiments  in  Sicily.  The  army  was  made  up  to 
twenty-four  legions  on  home  and  foreign  service  ;  a  new  post  was 
created  in  Etruria,  which  had  been  drained  by  requisitions  for 
supplies  ;  the  consuls  concentrated  at  Bovianum  for  the  siege  of 
Capua.  To  strengthen  the  garrison  Hannibal  threw  in  2000 
horse,  but  the  convoy  prepared  by  Hanno  to  revictual  the  town 
was  captured  and  the  covering  force  destroyed  by  Q.  Fulvius 
Flaccus  near  Beneventum.  In  spite  of  a  sudden  cavalry  onslaught, 
which  cost  them  1500  men,  Appius  Claudius  Pulcher  and  his 
colleague  Fulvius  had  closed  upon  the  city,  when  Hannibal  unex- 
pectedly arrived  and  scattered  them  to  the  winds.  He  followed 
the  retreating  Appius  into  Lucania,  till  that  general  threw  him  off 
and  swung  round  to  his  old  position.  He  then  retired  to  Tarentum, 
cutting  to  pieces  on  his  march  the  irregulars  of  M.  Centenius, 
a  promoted  centurion,  and  shortly  after  destroyed  at  Herdonea 
the  two  legions  of  the  lax  and  negligent  Gnteus  Fulvius.  Gracchus, 
who  covered  the  siege  on  the  Appian  Way,  fell  a  victim  to  the 
treachery  of  a  turncoat  Lucanian,  in  an  ambuscade.  His  slaves 
dispersed  ;  his  cavalry  joined  the  consuls.  Lucania  was  clear,  and, 
confident  in  the  strength  of  Capua,  after  a  failure  at  Brundisium, 
Hannibal  returned  to  Apulia  to  recruit  his  tired  army  and  watch 
for  Macedon.  As  he  departed  the  avenging  legions  gathered 
round  the  doomed  city.  Summoning  C.  Claudius  Nero  from 
Suessula,  the  consuls,  at  the  head  of  a  combined  force  of  60,000 
men,  surrounded  Capua  with  double  continuous  lines  connecting 
their  entrenched  camps — "  a  city  round  a  city,"  based  on  magazines 
at  Puteoli,  Casilinum,  and  the  neighbouring  posts.  The  works 
were  completed  late  in  the  winter,  in  the  teeth  of  the  enemy's 
active  cavalry.  The  democratic  party,  it  appears,  controlled  the 
government  of  the  town  ;  all  terms  were  refused,  nor  was  there  one 
word  of  surrender.  In  211  B.C.  the  same  officers,  as  proconsuls, 
pressed  the  siege,  strengthening  their  horse  with  light  troops  to 
meet  the  sallies  of  cavalry.     Hannibal,  warned  of  the  danger,  by 


2o8 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


forced  marches  hastened  to  the  relief  with  horse,  elephants,  and 
light-armed.  A  desperate  attack  on  the  Roman  lines  from  both 
sides  failetl. 

Hannibal  marches  on  Rome.  —  Unable  to  lure  the  enemy  out  or 
to  remain  himself,  he  lingeied  five  days,  and  then  tried  the  most 


Walker  (b-Bomailsc 


PLAN   OF   CAMPANIA. 


daring  expedient  of  a  daring  captain.  Under  cover  of  darkness  he 
disappeared  from  Tifata,  and  marched  on  Rome.  The  route  lie  took 
depends  on  what  he  conceived  as  his  main  object,  and  on  detailed 
information  from  his  scouts  as  to  the  enemy's  forces  and  the  state 
of  the  roads,  which  is  not  within  our  reach.  By  one  account,  he 
crossed  the  Volturnus  in  boats,  and  audaciously  taking  the  Latin 


777^  MARCH  ON  ROME  209 

road,  pushed  by  the  strongholds  of  Cales,  Teanum,  Fregelhe,  on- 
wards by  Gabii,  dawdhng  and  plundering  as  he  went,  extending 
his  flying  squadrons  right  and  left  as  far  as  Suessa  and  AUifie,  en- 
camping finally  unmolested  near  the  Anio,  three  miles  from  Rome. 
On  this  supposition,  it  was  his  design  to  draw  the  legions  from  Capua 
to  battle,  and  so  relieve  the  town.  According  to  the  other  account, 
which  is  generally  preferred,  he  pressed  by  a  circuitous  but  rapid 
march  through  Samnium,  and  having  thrown  the  enemy  off  the 
scent,  turned  suddenly  to  surprise  Rome,  across  the  Anio  from 
Reate,  by  Tibur  and  the  Valerian  Way.  Hannibal  was  at  the 
gates,  and  the  agony  of  Rome  was  intense.  But  the  urban  levy 
then  on  foot  and  the  mass  of  citizens  and  fugitives  were  enough 
to  secure  the  walls,  with  the  10,000  loyal  men  of  Alba  Fucens 
whom  legend  has  sent  to  Rome  to  rival  the  renown  of  the  gallant 
Plataeans.  If  he  had  meant  to  surprise  Rome,  Hannibal  had  failed, 
and  he  failed  equally  to  raise  the  siege  of  Capua.  The  mass  of 
the  Roman  troops  remained  ;  only  Fulvius,^  with  16,000  men, 
hastened  by  forced  marches  along  the  Appian  Way  to  the  defence 
of  Rome.  Hannibal  reconnoitred  leisurely  up  to  the  very  walls. 
He  stayed  a  while  to  plunder  the  virgin  soil  and  lure,  if  possible,  the 
garrison  to  battle,  while  he  gave  time  for  the  besieging  armies  to 
break  up,  then  turned  away  through  Samnium  to  Capua,  by  the 
Tibur  road,  followed  by  the  consular  legions.  On  these,  when 
he  learned  his  disappointed  hope,  he  turned,  beat  them  badly 
from  their  ground,  and  retiring  hastily  to  Bruttium,  attempted  to 
surprise  the  port  of  Rhegium.  He  had  seen  his  enemy  face  to 
"face,  and  driven  the  iron  deep  into  her  soul,  as  his  cavalry  wasted 
in  triumph  the  lands  of  the  Roman  tribes.  The  march  and  retreat 
are  framed  in  myths,  that  cover  with  bravado,  superstition,  and  lies 
at  once  the  danger,  the  terror,  and  the  unyielding  spirit  of  Rome. 
The  temple  of  Rediculus  Tutanus,  at  the  spot  where  Hannibal 
turned,  remained  as  monument  of  her  peril  and  her  gratitude. 

Fall  of  Capua. — Capua  fell,  surrendered  at  discretion  by  the 
starving  people,  and  f^ulvius  "  did  not  his  work  negligently."  The 
murder  of  Roman  citizens  and  political  necessity  exacted  an  ex- 
ample, allowed  by  the  bloody  rules  of  ancient  warfare.  The  lead- 
ing men  died  by  the  axe,  or  of  starvation  in  prison  ;  their  lands  and 
goods  were  confiscated,  the  population  sold  as  slaves,  transplanted, 
dispersed  ;  the  land  became  ager  pnblicus  of  the  Roman  people, 

1  This  is  denied.  According  to  Pulybius,  none  stirred.  There  was  a 
garrison  at  Rome  and  an  army  in  Etruria. 

O 


no  HISTORY  OF  ROM^ 

the  city,  deprived  of  its  corjioratc  existence,  a  rcceptaculuni 
araiorui>i  inhaljited  by  an  unorganised  mob  under  a  prafectiis 
iuri  diciindo  annually  sent  from  Rome.  The  agcr  Campatiiis  was 
later  a  mainstay  of  Roman  revenue  in  the  Tcciij^iil,  or  dues,  paid 
by  the  lessees.  A  few  colonies  were  founded  to  hold  the  country 
down.  The  second  city  of  Italy  ceased  to  exist.  Such  was  the 
stern  settlement  of  the  Senate,  empowered  by  the  Comitia  to  deal 
with  the  matter.  It  was  the  decisive  point  of  the  war.  The  fall  of 
Capua  after  two  years'  siege,  in  the  teeth  of  Hannibal,  shook  con- 
fidence in  his  cause.  Its  moral  effect,  followed  by  the  failure  at 
Rhegium  and  the  relief  of  Tarentum,  by  creating  disaffection  and 
breeding  suspicion,  more  than  counterbalanced  all  he  could  gain 
from  the  discontent  and  exhaustion  of  Roman  subjects.  His 
hopes  depended  now  on  Spain  and  Macedon. 

Marcellus  in  Sicily. — Syracuse  had  already  fallen.  The  childish 
tyranny  of  Hieronymus — a  typical  despot  in  embryo — led  to  his 
murder  in  the  narrow  street  of  Leontini.  Revolution  succeeded 
revolution  with  Parisian  mobility  and  ferocity,  watched  with 
interest  by  the  Roman  and  Carthaginian  fleets.  At  length,  for  all 
the  intrigues  of  Hippocrates  and  Epicydes,  who  had  fished  to  pur- 
pose in  the  troubled  waters  and  been  carried  by  the  reaction  to  high 
office,  the  Roman  party,  the  older  men,  heirs  of  Hiero's  policy  but 
not  his  temper,  supported  by  the  Roman  fleet,  forced  on  a  truce. 
But  when  Marcellus,  specially  despatched  from  Rome,  stormed 
Leontini,  where  the  Syracusan  malcontents  had  declared  their  inde- 
pendence of  both  Syracuse  and  Rome,  and  massacred  the  deserters 
there  captured,  the  highly  coloured  story  of  the  Roman  "  fury " ' 
roused  a  storm  of  indignation.  With  the  triumph  of  the  popular 
party,  Hippocrates  and  Epicydes  assumed  the  government  in  the 
name  of  liberty  and  Hannibal.  Mutiny  was  followed  by  massacre  ; 
the  worst  elements  were  set  loose  ;  the  mob,  the  mercenaries,  and 
the  Roman  deserters  dominated  the  town.  Marcellus  and  Appius 
early  in  213  B.C.  commenced  the  siege  by  sea  and  land.  Syracuse 
consisted  roughly  of  three  towns.  The  original  island  settlement  of 
Ortygia  had  expanded  into  the  new  city  of  Achradina,  on  the  main- 
land to  the  north,  and  had  become  itself  the  citadel,  arsenal,  palace, 
and  barrack.  Since  the  great  Athenian  siege,  beyond  the  walls  of 
Achradina,  two  suburbs — Tyche  and  Neapolis — had  grown  up  on 
the  west,  enclosed  later  by  the  great  triangular  lines  of  Dionysius 
the  elder,  eighteen  miles  in  length,  crowning  the  cliffs  of  Epipolae 
and  running  up  to  the  apex  fort  of  Euryalus.  The  lines,  too  long 
for  adequate  defence,  were  strong  by  site  and  art,  lavishly  supplied 


FALL    OF  SYRACUSE  211 

with  the  splendid  artillery  of  Archimedes.  The  scientific  appli- 
ances of  the  j^reat  mathematician,  the  "  geometrical  Briareus,"  his 
ballistse,  his  blocks,  hooks,  and  cranes,  which  raised  the  assailants' 
ships  and  dashed  them  beneath  the  waves,  baffled  and  discomfited 
Marcellus,  while  Bomilcar's  fleet  made  a  blockade  impossible. 
The  Punic  government,  inspired  by  Hannibal,  strongly  supported 
the  revolt.  Himilco,  with  a  powerful  army,  landed  at  Agrigentum, 
and  was  joined  by  Hippocrates.  A  treacherous  massacre  by  the 
Roman  garrison  at  Enna  and  the  cruelties  of  Marcellus  added  fuel 
to  fire.  If  the  legions  of  Cannae  secured  the  western  arsenals, 
Marcellus  and  Crispinus,  with  an  additional  division,  could  effect 
nothing. 

Marcellus  takes  Syracuse. — The  war  marked  time,  while  Mar- 
cellus waited  the  working  of  treason.  At  last,  during  the  careless 
jollity  of  the  Artemisia  of  212  B.C.,  the  wall  was  scaled  by  night  at  a 
favourable  point.  Led  by  the  traitor  Sosis,  a  party  seized  Hexa- 
pylon,  the  key  of  the  lines,  and  by  morning  Marcellus  was  master 
of  Epipolae.  The  timely  surrender  of  Euryalus  secured  his  difficult 
position  between  the  Punic  and  Syracusan  armies  and  the  city  walls. 
He  was  able,  as  well  as  his  lieutenant  Crispinus,  who  had  entrenched 
a  position  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Anapus,  to  beat  off  a  combined 
attack  of  the  besieged,  the  allied  armies,  and  the  marines  of  the 
strong  Punic  fleet.  As  summer  advanced  the  deadly  malaria,  the 
ancient  ally  of  Syracuse,  decimated  her  defenders  encamped  on 
the  marshes.  Himilco  and  Hippocrates  died  ;  the  Sicilians  dis- 
persed. Famine,  disease,  and  anarchy  raged  within  the  walls  ; 
the  relieving  fleet  of  Bomilcar,  detained  by  contrary  winds  and 
watched  by  a  Roman  squadron,  broke  up  ;  the  men-of-war  slipped 
away  to  Hannibal  at  Tarentum  ;  the  transports  returned  to  Car- 
thage. An  attempt  to  treat  called  forth  a  reign  of  terror  ;  the 
mutinous  mercenaries  and  deserters  controlled  the  city  ;  till  at 
length  the  treachery  of  a  Spanish  officer  admitted  a  detachment 
into  Ortygia  ;  a  larger  force  entered  under  cover  of  a  general 
attack,  and,  the  citadel  island  lost,  Achradina  surrendered  (autumn 
212  B.C.).  Forgetful  of  her  past  services  and  unhappy  circum- 
stances, Marcellus  gave  up  the  city  to  plunder  and  rapine,  the 
great  Archimedes  perishing  in  the  tumult.  Stripped  of  her  artistic 
glories,  merged  in  the  Roman  province,  a  helpless  tributary  of 
Rome,  Syracuse  was  reduced  to  extol  the  tender  mercies  of  the 
ruthless  conqueror.  The  misery  of  the  ruined  state  drew  com- 
passion even  from  the  Senate.  Leontini  en  bloc  became  Roman 
domain,  leased  out  by  the  Censors. 


212  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Submission  of  Sicily. — For  some  years  after,  the  flying  squadrons 
of  IVluttines,  a  brilliant  officer  of  Hannibal's  school,  aided  by  the 
anti-Roman  feeling,  carried  on  a  successful  guerrilla  warfare,  till 
the  folly  and  jealousy  of  Hanno  led  to  his  own  emphatic  defeat  by 
Marcellus  at  the  Mimera  (21 1  H.C.),  and  the  delivery  of  Agrigentum 
(210  B.C.)  by  the  superseded  and  indignant  Muttines  to  Marcellus' 
successor,  M.  Valerius  Lrevinus.  The  town  became  a  Roman 
colony  and  fortress  ;  Sicily  was  tranquillised,  agriculture  restored  ; 
the  praetor  L.  Cincius  Alimentus  regulated  the  island  as  a  com- 
pact province,  and  arranged  the  relations  of  the  different  allied 
or  subject  communities.  Gradually  it  recovered  from  the  waste  of 
the  war,  to  fall  beneath  the  cruel  scourge  of  Roman  business-men, 
Romanised  Sicilian  speculators,  and  annual  Roman  viceroys — its 
cities  isolated,  its  lands  exploited,  its  labour  crushed  by  slave- 
gangs.  The  seeds  of  the  Sicilian  slave-war  were  sown  by  the 
forfeitures  and  confiscations,  the  robberies  and  outrages,  that 
followed  the  Pax  Romana. 

First  War  with  Macedon. — Syracuse  had  fallen,  and  Macedon 
proved  a  broken  reed.  In  214  B.C.  Philip  opened  the  first  Mace- 
donian war  (214-205  B.C.)  with  a  wretched  fiasco  ;  Laevinus  relieved 
Apollonia,  and  for  three  years,  with  one  legion  and  a  small  fleet, 
paralysed  his  power  at  the  very  crisis  of  the  struggle.  Young, 
warlike,  and  popular,  marked  out  by  his  position  to  be  the  leader 
of  united  Greece,  Philip  failed  to  see  the  necessity  of  a  vigorous 
offensive  in  Italy  and  wasted  a  random  and  feverish  energy  on 
aimless  enterprises.  The  discordant  factions  into  which  Greece 
was  split  were  as  incapable  of  subordinating  their  jarring  interests 
to  a  common  good  as  Philip  of  looking  beyond  the  narrow  horizon 
of  the  Greek  hegemony.  Their  petty  nationalism  run  mad  had 
accepted  foreign  aid  to  crush  a  kindred  state  at  every  period  of 
their  history  ;  and  now,  whatever  a  larger  patriotism,  prescient  of 
the  future,  suggested  to  wiser  minds,  they  showed  themselves 
again  incapable  of  common  action  against  the  common  enemy,  at 
a  time  when  the  indolence  of  Egypt  and  the  embarrassments  of 
Syria  left  the  field  open  for  the  assertion  of  Hellenism  in  the  west. 

At  length,  in  211  B.C.,  Rome,  alarmed  by  the  fall  of  Tarentum, 
utilised  the  irritation  caused  by  Philip's  aggressive  policy  to  organise 
against  Macedon  a  coalition  of  Greek  states,  at  the  head  of  which 
stood  the  i4itolian  league,  supported  by  Athens,  Sparta,  Elis,  and 
Pergamum,  while  the  Acheeans  acted  for  Philip.  The  partners 
in  this  complot,  which,  ugly  as  it  looks,  is  in  accordance  with 
ancient   precedent,  agreed    to  divide    the    spoil.      The  /^Etolians 


FIRST  MACEDONIAN   WAR  213 

stipulated  for  Acarnania  and  the  conquered  towns,  the  Romans 
receiving,  in  consideration  of  naval  support,  the  movable  booty 
and  prisoners.  Philip,  occasionally  helped  by  the  Punic  fleet,  met 
the  savage  and  desultory  war  with  ubiquitous  activity.  In  spite 
of  repeated  attempts  at  mediation,  it  spread  into  each  corner  of 
Hellenic  sea  and  land,  bringing  debt  and  desolation  in  its  train. 
At  length  the  /Etolians,  distressed  and  harassed  by  the  struggle, 
weary  of  doing  Rome's  dirty  work  while  their  ally  complacently 
regarded  a  contest  which  occupied  her  enemy  and  cost  her  little, 
in  spite  of  Rome's  protests,  concluded  a  separate  treaty  with 
Macedon.  The  Senate  followed  suit  in  205  B.C.  One  solitary 
action  distinguished  the  wretched  record  of  the  ten  years'  war,  the 
defeat  of  the  Spartan  tyrant  Machanidas  by  the  brave  and  able 
Achaean  officer  Philopoimen  at  Mantinea  (207  B.C.).  The  .'Etolians 
had  ruined  themselves  and  earned  no  thanks  from  their  employers. 
Philip  had  made  a  dangerous  attack  and  a  still  more  dangerous 
peace  ;  he  now  went  on  to  irritate  all  his  possible  allies  in  the 
coming  contest  with  the  incensed  Romans.  He  had  gained  nothing 
but  a  pa'try  concession  in  Il'yria,  where  Rome  retained  her  chief 
possessions. 

The  War  in  Spain. — Of  the  Spanish  war  the  distance  of  the 
operations,  the  family  legends  of  the  .Scipios,  and  the  geographical 
ignorance  of  our  authorities  combine  to  present  us  with  a  confused 
and  uncertain  record.  Invention  and  e.\aggeration  are  rampant. 
The  character  of  the  country  and  its  inhabitants  have  through- 
out history  made  Spain  easy  to  grasp,  difficult  to  hold,  and  im- 
pressed on  military  operations  from  Hannibal  to  Napoleon  a 
character  of  strange  vicissitude.  The  same  reversals  of  fortune, 
the  same  persistent  guerrilla  warfare,  the  same  incapacity  for  sus- 
tained and  regular  combination,  the  same  desperate  sieges,  the 
same  massing  and  dispersion  of  brave  but  untrustworthy  hosts, 
mark  the  story  of  the  Roman  conquest.  At  the  outset  a  mere 
corollary  of  the  Italian  war — presenting  a  purely  defensive  problem, 
to  hold  the  barrier  of  the  Pyrenees  and  the  line  of  the  Ebro — 
it  ends,  by  a  necessary  consequence,  as  a  war  for  the  expulsion  of 
Carthage. 

Victories  of  the  Scipios.  —  The  unexpected  arrival  of  Cn. 
Scipio  at  Emporiae  in  218  B.C.  revived  the  Roman  connection  in  the 
north.  Thedefeat  of  Hanno  at  Cissis  (218  B.C.)  effaced  theeftects  of 
Hannibal's  brief  and  bloody  campaign.  From  his  base  at  Tarraco, 
Scipio  was  able  to  keep  the  activity  of  Hasdrubal  in  check.  Early  in 
217  B.C.  he  succeeded  in  cutting  out  a  Punic  squadron  at  the  mouth 


214  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  the  Ebro,  and  on  the  arrival  of  PubHus  with  a  fresh  legion,  the 
two  brothers,  able  generals  and  skilled  diplomatists,  crossed  the 
Ebro,  and  equally  by  force  and  policy  advanced  the  cause  of  Rome. 
The  treachery  of  the  Spaniard  Abeliix  and  the  unwonted  simplicity 
of  a  I'unic  officer  placed  in  their  hands  a  useful  weapon  in  the 
Spanish  hostages  collected  at  Saguntum.  Meanwhile  a  Punic 
fleet,  co-operating  with  Hannibal  off  Etruria,  which  had  intercepted 
their  transport  fleet  at  Cosa,  was  driven  from  the  waters  by  the 
consul  Servilius  with  120  sail.  In  the  following  year  Hasdrubal, 
who  had  been  occupied  in  stamping  out  a  desperate  insurrection 
on  the  Baetis,  in  the  south,  received  definite  orders  to  resume  the 
offensive  and  force  his  way  to  Italy.  In  the  actual  state  of  Spain 
this  was  only  possible  if  an  adequate  force  was  left  behind  ;  but 
though,  in  answer  to  Hasdrubal's  remonstrances,  Himilco  appeared 
with  reinforcements  to  take  over  the  command,  the  government 
under-estimated  the  strength  of  the  Scipios  and  the  weakness  of 
their  Spanish  empire.  The  troops  had  been  worth  more  in  Italy. 
Fully  awake  to  the  crisis,  the  Scipios  encountered  Hasdrubal's 
columns  at  the  Ebro.  The  spiritless  conduct  of  the  local  conscripts 
decided  the  issue,  and  the  victory  of  Ibera  (216  B.C.)  saved  the 
existence  of  Rome.  Hasdrubal  barely  escaped,  and  the  next  year 
the  masters  of  the  north  pushed  their  arms  to  the  Baetis.  The  vic- 
tories of  Iliturgi  and  Intibili,  however  grossly  exaggerated,  repre- 
sent an  advance  sufficient,  when  taken  with  the  rising  of  the  tribes, 
to  prevent  a  forward  movement  and  divert  to  Spain  the  reinforce- 
ments raised  by  Mago  for  Hannibal.  With  this  new  strength 
Hasdrubal  had  been  able  (214  B.C.)  to  crush  the  insurgents  and  push 
the  Romans  behind  the  Ebro,  where  they  maintained  themselves 
with  difficulty,  when  the  outbreak  of  a  near  and  dangerous  war  with 
Syphax,  the  Massa?sylian  king,  withdrew  a  strong  force  to  Africa 
and  reduced  the  remainder  to  the  defensive.  Sag^untum,  besieged 
by  Publius,  fell  in  214  B.C.  ;  Gna;us  extended  the  Roman  protecto- 
rate over  the  central  plateau.  In  213  B.C.  negotiations  were  opened 
with  Syphax,  and  an  attempt  made  to  organise  his  Numidian  in- 
fantry, while  the  legions  were  strengthened  with  the  ominous  aid 
of  20,000  Spanish  mercenaries,  of  whom  some  were  sent  to  Italy. 

Defeat  of  the  Romans. — But  the  defeats  of  Syphax  (213-212  B.C.) 
by  Carthage,  with  the  aid  of  Massinissa,  chief  of  the  Massylians, 
brought  the  Scipios  face  to  face  with  a  powerful  and  victorious 
army  under  Hasdrubal,  Mago,  and  Hasdrubal  Gisgo.  In  the 
campaign  that  followed,  the  brothers,  with  divided  forces,  aban- 
doned by  the  fickle  and  possibly  unpaid  mercenaries,  were  attacked 


THE  SCI  PI  OS  215 

and  destroyed  in  detail,  Publius  in  the  field,  Gnreus  in  his  ill-con- 
structed camp  (212-21 1  B.C.).  L.  Marcius  and  T.  Fonteius  collected 
the  remnants,  called  in  the  garrisons,  and  made  good  their  retreat 
to  the  Ebro.  Aided  by  the  jealousy  of  the  Punic  leaders  and  the 
rapacious  cruelty  of  Mago  and  Hasdrubal  Gisgo,  they  maintained 
a  gallant  stand  till  the  arrival  of  C.  Claudius  Nero  with  a  strong 
legion  and  1 100  horse,  released  at  a  critical  moment  by  the  fall  of 
Capua.  This  capable  leader  is  credited  with  a  victory  in  Andalusia 
over  Hasdrubal  ;  but  the  dangerous  state  of  affairs  led  at  the  end 
of  211  B.C.  to  the  appointment  of  an  extraordinary  officer  for  the 
Spanish  war.  The  miraculous  exploits  of  the  defeated  Roman 
armies  deserve  little  belief,  but  through  all  the  veil  of  fable  the 
inactivity  of  the  Punic  leaders  remains  surprising.  Thus  in  the 
eighth  year  of  the  war  the  tide  of  conquest  rolled  back  to  the 
Pyrenees  ;  with  untiring  patience  Hasdrubal  had  organised  victory 
out  of  defeat  ;  skilled  diplomatist  and  gallant  soldier,  his  personal 
influence  and  tactical  ability  had  reaped  at  length  their  reward. 

Character  of  Scipio. — At  Rome  the  Senate  had  been  for  some 
time  aware  of  the  danger  threatened  from  Spain  by  the  prepara- 
tions of  Carthage.  The  war  claimed  a  commander  of  no  common 
gifts  as  soldier  and  statesman,  to  meet  with  daring  initiative  and 
powerful  personality  the  gifted  and  magnetic  Barcid.  His  services 
at  the  Ticinus  and  Cannae,  his  kinship  with  the  dead,  his  peculiar 
qualities,  backed  by  the  interest  of  the  great  Cornelian  house, 
pointed  to  the  young  and  gallant  son  of  Publius,  P.  Cornelius 
Scipio,  the  future  conciueror  of  Zama.  It  is  difficult  to  disentangle 
from  our  party-coloured  authorities  either  the  character  or  exploits 
of  a  man  at  once  admired,  loved,  and  hated.  The  power  of  his 
family  is  seen  as  much  in  his  election  as  in  the  hereditary  character 
of  the  Spanish  war,  and  the  arbitrary  conduct  of  the  three  kinsmen 
alike  in  the  military  and  political  administration.  The  self-con- 
scious kingliness  of  his  demeanour,  the  half-superstitious,  half- 
politic  mysticism,  his  Greek  culture,  and  the  un-Roman  charm  and 
grace  of  his  manner  attracted  as  much  suspicion  as  homage.  A 
self-idealised  hero,  young,  handsome,  melancholy,  enthusiastic,  he 
united  pride  and  generosity,  piety  and  calculation.  By  his  keen 
intelligence  and  power  of  inspiration,  his  successful  soldiership  and 
refined  diplomacy,  he  was  marked  out  to  be  the  "  leader  in  these 
glorious  wars."  Saviour  of  his  country  as  he  was  by  his  good  fortune 
and  his  gifts,  at  the  same  time  by  his  personal  and  family  policy,  by 
his  impatience  of  equality  and  isolated  attitude  above  and  beyond 
republican  forms  and  restrictions,  he  set  the  first  unconscious  pre- 


2l6 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


cedents  of  monarchy.  The  irregularities  in  his  cliaracter  are  the 
contradictions  of  a  spirit  above  and  yet  limited  Ijy  his  age  and 
people  ;  nor  can  they  be  summed  up  in  a  single  narrow  formula, 
religious  or  political. 

The  romance  of  his  election  may  be  chsmissed  ;  with  a])undance 
of  able  officers,  the  Spanish  command  could  not  have  gone  begging. 
It  was  to  sa\e  friction  and  spare  feelings  that  the  Senate  left  to 


BUST   OF    SCIPIO    AKRICANUS. 


the  people  an  ostensibly  unpremeditated  choice  ;  and  at  the  age 
of  twenty-four  (or  twenty-seven)  a  young  man  of  merely  a^dilician 
rank  was  raised  by  his  strong  connections  and  popular  favour  to 
the  most  responsible  and  independent  command  in  the  war.  Con- 
fident in  divine  support,  sought  so  often  in  solitary  prayer,  the 
heaven-sent  hero  set  sail  as  proconsul  with  i  i,ooo  men,  with 
Gaius  Laslius  and  Junius  Silanus  as  adjutants  and  advisers. 

Capture  of  New  Carthage. — The  Carthaginians  were  occupied 


CAPTURE   OF  NEW  CARTHAGE  217 

in  completing  their  work  ;  their  divisions  operated  at  some  distance 
from  each  other,  while  the  nearest  was  ten  days'  march  from  their 
centre  and  military  capital,  the  key  of  their  communications.  Nova 
Carthago.  Here  were  their  magazines,  hostages,  and  war  mate- 
rial, defended  by  a  small  garrison,  whose  numbers,  as  well  as  the 
general  spiritless  conduct  of  the  war  by  the  Punic  leaders,  may  be 
explained  by  a  possible  recall  of  troops  to  Africa  or  Sicily.  During 
the  winter  Scipio  had  prepared  his  forces,  and  now,  in  the  spring 
of  210  B.C.,  he  secretly  and  swiftly  crossed  the  Ebro  with 
28,000  men,  to  strike  with  happy  audacity  at  the  enemy's  heart. 
The  city,  whose  ancient  site  differs  somewhat  from  the  modern, 
lay  upon  hills  of  tolerable  height,  at  the  head  of  its  harbour,  on  a 
tongue  of  land  joined  on  the  east  by  an  isthmus  to  the  mainland, 
surrounded  on  the  south  and  west  by  the  waters  of  the  bay,  on  the 
north  by  a  lagoon  connected  artificially  with  the  sea,  whose  water- 
level  sank  at  the  ebb.  Drawing  his  lines  across  the  isthmus,  he 
beat  back  a  desperate  sally,  but  was  baffled  in  the  assault,  till, 
covering  the  movement  by  a  double  attack  in  front  and  from  the 
sea,  he  rushed  the  walls  across  the  lagoon  at  low  water.  Valuable 
prisoners,  hostages,  ships,  and  stores,  with  a  large  sum  of  money, 
fell  into  the  victor's  hands  ;  the  artificers  were  spared  to  re-arm 
his  troops  with  the  Spanish  sword,  and  to  equip  a  larger  force 
to  meet  the  rumoured  movements  from  Carthage  ;  the  city  was 
strengthened  and  garrisoned.  Traits  of  generosity  relieved  the 
customary  butchery  of  a  Roman  storm,  and  it  is  in  this  connection 
that  we  read  of  the  restoration  of  the  beauteous  captive  to  her 
Spanish  lover — the  story^  of  the  continence  of  Scipio.  Henceforth 
the  Punic  arniies  rest  on  the  ancient  arsenal  of  Gades. 

Hasdrubal  outmanoeuvres  Scipio. — A  pause  ensued,  spent  by 
Scipio  in  treating  with  the  tribes,  while  Hasdrubal  husbanded  his 
resources.  In  209  B.C.  Scipio  laid  up  his  fleet  to  swell  his  army, 
and  moved  out  in  search  of  Hasdrubal,  now  reinforced,  and  collect- 
ing men,  money,  and  supplies  for  the  long-planned  and  by  this 
time  indispensable  march  to  Italy.  He  found  him  in  the  strong 
position  of  Boecula  (Bailen),  on  the  Upper  Guadalquiver.  An 
affair  followed  in  which  Scipio  claimed  the  victory,  but  was  clearly 
outmanoeuvred  by  Hasdrubal,  who,  cleverly  masking  the  move- 
ment, gave  him  the  slip,  and  with  his  best  troops,  elephants,  and 
war-chest,  struck  unpursued  north,  and  penetrated  uninterrupted, 
either  in  the  same  or  the  following  year  (208  B.C.),  by  a  route 
which  ran  along  the  north  coast  and  through  the  western  passes 
into  Gaul.      It  looks  as  if  Scipio  had  been  designedly  drawn  from 


2i8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

his  post  by  feigned  inaction  and  rumoured  dissensions,  and  occupied 
by  the  army  of  Spain  or  a  rearguard  while  the  expeditionary 
column  escaped.  By  the  winter  of  208  B.C.  Hasdrubal  had  pierced 
to  the  Upper  Rhone,  and,  out  of  reach  of  the  coast,  was  recruiting 
himself  among  the  friendly  Arverni.  Scipio's  assumption  of  the 
offensive  and  neglect  to  secure  the  western  passes — a  route  he  had 
not  expected  and  may  not  have  known — were  responsible  for  the 
crisis  of  the  Metaurus,  where  the  victory  of  the  superseded  Claudius 
saved  the  laurels  of  his  fortunate  successor. 

Victory  of  Scipio. — He  had  retired  to  Tarraco,  to  close  the 
eastern  routes.  In  208  B.C.  little  of  note  occurred  ;  the  departure  of 
Hasdrubal,  the  withdrawal  of  his  namesake  to  Lusitania,  and  of 
Mago  to  the  Baliares,  left  Scipio  master  of  the  east.  His  personal 
prestige  and  charm  attracted  the  chivalrous  Spaniards  ;  at  Tarraco 
the  popular  "  Imperator"  kept  an  almost  royal  court,  and  by  his 
legates  carried  on  the  war.  Silanus  defeated  Hanno  and  Mago 
(207  B.C.)  and  drove  the  Carthaginians  into  the  fortresses  of  Bastica  ; 
Lucius  Scipio  stormed  Oringis  (Jaen).  It  was  in  the  following  year 
(206  B.C.) — so  far  as  facts  can  be  extracted  from  the  epic  of  Scipio 
— that  the  crowning  battle  was  fought  at  a  place  called  Ilipa, 
Silpia,  or  Bascula,  .on  the  right  bank  of  the  Bastis.  It  was  decided 
by  the  skilful  tactics  and  cool  handling  of  the  Roman  general. 
For  some  days  the  two  armies  manoeuvred  in  front  of  each  other, 
till  in  the  early  morning  Scipio  led  his  well-fed,  well-instructed 
troops  to  attack  the  enemy,  strongly  posted  with  superior  numbers 
on  the  skirts  of  a  hill  falling  to  a  plain.  Reversing,  under  cover  of 
a  screen  of  cavalry  and  skirmishers,  the  familiar  arrangement  of 
his  troops,  he  drew  his  unsteady  Spaniards  to  the  centre,  to  con- 
tain the  corps  of  African  veterans,  and  moved  the  Romans  to  the 
flank  in  face  of  the  enemy's  Spanish  recruits.  Then,  to  prevent 
outflanking,  as  he  rapidly  advanced  he  withdrew  the  screen  and 
wheeled  his  wings  from  line  to  column,  simultaneously  extending  his 
front  by  a  diagonal  march,  and  bringing  his  cavalry  from  rear  to 
flank.  His  centre  thus  refused,  he  charged  the  wavering  wings, 
and  by  the  ingenious  if  dangerous  combination  decided  the  cam- 
paign. The  victory,  prosecuted  vigorously  by  Silanus,  was  followed 
by  large  adhesions  of  the  native  tribes. 

Scipio  returns  to  Rome. — Scipio  had  already  contemplated 
an  attack  on  Africa.  With  Quixotic  hardihood,  he  is  said  to  have 
clinched  his  relations  with  Syphax  by  a  personal  visit.  The 
story  of  his  hairbreadth  escape,  of  his  meeting  with  Hasdrubal 
Gisgo  at  the  king's   table,  of  Sophonisba  and  the   Libyan   king, 


VICTORIES  OF  SCIPIO  219 

belongs  to  the  annals  of  adventure,  though  we  need  not  reject  as 
fictitious  all  the  exploits  ascribed  by  tradition  and  poetry  to  an 
extraordinary  character  in  history.  Little  in  any  case  was  gained 
by  the  escapade.  The  charms  of  Hasdrubal's  daughter  Sophonisba 
carried  the  day  for  Carthage.  The  Senate  was  not  yet  disposed 
to  sanction  the  daring  enterprise.  With  Massinissa  he  had  formed 
a  more  useful  connection.  Finally,  in  206  B.C.,  after  storming-  the 
fortresses  of  the  south,  Iliturgi,  Castulo,  and  Astapa,  suppressing 
a  dangerous  mutiny  by  an  energetic  coup  de  f/u'dfre,  crushing  a 
native  insurrection,  and  accepting  the  surrender  of  Gades,  Scipio 
returned  to  Rome  for  the  elections,  to  strike  at  once  for  the  con- 
sulate and  Africa.  On  technical  grounds,  the  proconsul,  who 
had  not  yet  held  the  full  imperium,  was  refused  a  triumph  by  the 
pedantic  jealousy  of  the  cautious  Senate.  Meanwhile  Mago,  who 
had  evacuated  Gades  and  failed  to  surprise  Carthago  Nova,  win- 
tered in  the  Baliares,  whence,  in  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  laid  up 
at  Tarraco,  he  was  able  to  transfer  a  formidable  army,  by  order  of 
the  Punic  Senate,  to  co-operate  from  Liguria  with  Hannibal. 

In  Italy  (210  B.C.)  the  fall  of  Syracuse  and  Capua  permitted  a 
slight  reduction  in  the  active  army  ;  a  self-denying  ordinance  filled 
the  empty  chest  and  furnished  forth  the  fleet  when  additional  taxa- 
tion met  with  steady  passive  resistance  Marcellus,  in  spite  of  the 
bitter  charges  of  the  afflicted  Syracusans,  received  a  well-earned 
ovation  and  a  fourth  consulship,  but,  with  all  his  boasting  bulletins 
from  Lucania,  scored  a  very  moderate  success.  A  second  FuK'ius 
was  destroyed  at  a  second  battle  of  Herdonea  ;  yet  the  fall  of  Salapia 
and  the  loss  of  its  garrison  taught  Hannibal  to  draw  in  his  outlying 
detachments — a  process  not  unattended  with  cruel  excesses.  The 
defeat  of  their  squadron  at  Tarentum  left  the  Romans  still  masters 
of  the  citadel ;  while  the  fall  of  Carthagena,  the  inaction  of  Macedon, 
and  the  renewal  of  the  Egyptian  treaty  balanced  the  account  well 
in  their  favour. 

Fabius  recovers  Tarentum. — The  elections  of  209  B.C.  were  arbi- 
trarily decided  for  Fabius  and  Fulvius,  who  pursued  the  respectful 
policy  of  driving  Hannibal  by  inches  to  the  sea.  Covered  by  his 
colleague's  operations  in  Lucania  and  the  Hirpinian  country,  and 
the  dogged  watchfulness  of  Marcellus  in  Apulia,  Fabius  recaptured 
the  desperately  defended  Tarentum  more  by  treason  than  force, 
and  gave  a  second  bloody  warning  to  the  revolted  towns.  Three 
thousand  talents  and  30,000  slaves  were  the  relics  of  the  promis- 
cuous plunder  and  carnage.  Hannibal,  unable  to  save  the  city, 
handled  Marcellus  so  severelv  in  a  series  of  smaller  actions  that 


220  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

he  shut  himself  up  in  \'eniisia.  Then  huminj^^  to  the  relief  of 
Caulonia,  he  captured  the  band  of  Sicilian  banditti  transferred  by 
Laevinus  to  Rhegium,  who  from  that  centre  were  harr^'inj,'^  Uruttium. 
A  natural  feeling  of  disappointment  at  these  meagre  results,  backed 
by  the  impatience  felt  at  the  monopoly  of  power  by  an  able  bqt 
exclusive  clique,  found  vent  in  the  impeachment  of  the  "ever- 
victorious"  Marcellus. 

Discontent  among  the  Latin  Colonies  and  in  Etruria. — A  more 
seriuus  anxiety  harassed  Rome  in  the  blank  refusal  of  twelve  of 
the  Latin  colonies  to  furnish  their  quota  of  men  and  money  for 
the  war.  This  movement,  whether  prompted  by  actual  exhaustion 
or  smouldering  discontent,  threatened  the  existence  of  Rome.  It 
appeared  chiefly  among  the  oldest  and  nearest  colonies,  in  Latium, 
Etruria,  North  Campania,  and  among  the  Marsi.  In  her  hour  of 
bitterness  she  was  only  saved  by  the  equally  splendid  and  far- 
sighted  patriotism  of  the  remaining  eighteen,  headed  by  the  gallant 
and  ill-fated  Fregellae.  Picenum  and  the  north,  with  the  great  for- 
tresses in  South  Italy,  were  true  to  the  cause  of  Latin  influence 
and  Italian  independence.  While  public  gratitude  honoured  the 
faithful  delegates,  the  government,  with  wise  and  terrible  modera- 
tion, left  the  recalcitrants  severely  alone.  To  meet  the  want  of 
funds,  the  accumulated  reserve  from  the  "  vicesima  manu  mis- 
sionum,"— 5  per  cent,  tax  on  manumitted  slaves,  imposed  357  B.C., 
— was  appropriated. 

Not  unconnected  with  the  Latin  trouble,  the  agitation  in  Etruria, 
closely  watched  since  212  B.C.,  due  to  the  pressure  of  naval  and 
military  requisitions,  w^s  coming  to  a  head  in  secret  conspiracies, 
when  it  was  energetically  repressed,  Arretium  garrisoned,  hostages 
exacted,  and  the  countrj'  patrolled.  The  strength  of  Rome  was 
under-estimated  exactly  by  those  who  lay  nearest  the  grasping 
and  farthest  from  the  fighting  hand. 

Death  of  Marcellus. — Fabius  now  retired  from  active  service 
(208  B.C.).  The  campaign  opened  with  an  attack  on  Locri,  Hanni- 
bal's Bruttian  base,  but  not  only  was  Crispinus  forced  to  fall  back 
upon  his  colleague  Marcellus,  but  the  legion  of  Tarentum,  moving 
to  co-operate  with  a  Sicilian  fleet  in  carrying  on  the  siege  after 
his  retirement,  was  cut  to  pieces  on  the  march  near  Petelia  by  an 
unexpected  back-stroke  of  Hannibal,  who  now  proceeded  to  face 
the  combined  consular  armies  at  Venusia.  It  was  here,  while  re- 
connoitring a  wooded  height  between  the  hostile  camps,  that  the 
two  consuls,  with  their  cavalrj'  escort,  were  enveloped  by  the  cun- 
ning Numidian  horsemen.    Marcellus  fell  fighting,  as  he  had  lived  ; 


HASDRUBAL  221 

Crispinus  died  later  of  his  wounds  ;  their  armies  were  paralysed, 
while  Hannibal  by  a  rapid  onslaught  relieved  Locri  once  more, 
and  drove  the  besiegers  to  their  ships.  Rome  was  the  poorer  by 
the  brave  old  soldier,  a  true  Roman  of  the  blunt  type.  Strong 
heart  and  ready  hand,  spirit  but  half-humanised  by  culture,  his 
cruelty,  treachery,  and  greed,  the  vices  of  his  nation  and  his  time, 
are  something  condoned  by  the  unflinching  loyalty  and  dogged 
courage  which  thwarted,  if  they  could  not  conquer,  his  great  oppo- 
nent. Hannibal  honoured  himself  by  the  honourable  treatment  of 
Marcellus'  corpse. 

Hasdrubal  and  Hannibal. — Except  in  Spain,  with  twenty-one 
legions  on  foot,  nothing  had  been  effected.  With  failing  allies 
and  fainting  hearts,  with  her  land  exhausted,  her  population  sink- 
ing, with  famine  prices  and  ruined  prosperity,  her  armies  locked 
up,  her  trusted  leaders  old  or  dead,  Rome  was  now  to  face  the  last 
great  moment  of  the  war.  In  207  B.C.  Hasdrubal,  with  unexpected 
ease  and  speed,  passed  the  Alps,  and  calling  the  Gallic  and  Ligurian 
tribes  to  arms,  threatened  to  realise  at  the  eleventh  hour  the  gigan- 
tic scheme  of  Hannibal.  Not  in  vain  had  he  waited  ;  the  blunder 
of  Scipio  was  the  opportunity  of  Carthage.  .  Rome  put  forth  her 
utmost  energy.  With  solemn  sacrifice  and  inhuman  superstition, 
the  gods  were  summoned  to  bless  he'r  mighty  armaments.  Gains 
Claudius  Nero,  who  had  served  with  distinction  before  Capua 
and  in  Spain,  was  chosen  consul,  and  received  as  colleague  his 
personal  foe,  the  injured  and  embittered  conqueror  of  Illyria,  the 
stern  and  sullen  M.  Livius  Salinator,  reluctantly  dragged  to  Rome, 
reluctantly  reconciled.  Their  powers  and  forces  were  alike  excep- 
tional. To  contain  Hannibal,  Claudius  disposed  of  six  legions, 
two  under  his  personal  command  and  four  available  in  support 
at  Tarentum  and  in  Bruttium.  With  an  equal  force  Livius  was 
destined  to  hold  down  the  disaffected  communities  and  intercept 
the  invader;  150,000  men  were  in  arms  in  Italy  alone,  fifteen 
legions  made  up  by  strict  recruiting  and  exceptional  enlistments, 
of  whom  upwards  of  ico,ooo  were  disposable  in  the  field,  to  meet  a 
total  Punic  strength  of  80,000 — a  divided  and  inferior  force,  led,  how- 
ever, by  the  first  masters  of  the  art  of  war.  Hasdrubal  meanwhile 
was  his  own  messenger.  He  had  knocked  at  the  gates  of  Placentia, 
the  virgin  fortress,  but  effected  nothing,  and  now,  with  56,000  men 
and  fifteen  elephants,  was  in  full  march  on  Ariminum,  driving 
before  him  a  corps  of  observation  under  the  praetor  L.  Porcius. 
Livius,  with  a  strong  army,  joined  his  lieutenant,  and  fell  back  over 
the  Metaurus  to  Sena.     In  the  south,  Claudius,  with  a  similarly 


222  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

strengthened  force  of  over  40,000  men,  marched  to  check  the  ad- 
vance of  Hannibal,  who  effected  his  concentration  rapidly,  watched 
but  not  impeded  by  Nero,  as  he  moved  hither  and  thither  to  pick 
up  his  allies  and  garrisons.  Finally  Hannibal  re-entered  Apulia, 
advanced  to  Canusium,  and  there  halted  to  gather  supplies  and  in- 
formation. The  consul,  in  spite  of  a  reported  victory  at  Grumen- 
tum,  had  been  baffled,  beaten,  and  eluded.  But  Hannibal  was 
unable  to  advance,  and  unwilling  as  yet  to  risk  a  general  action 
without  more  definite  news.  He  could  not  abandon  his  allies  and 
depots,  and  leave  his  base  undefended.  The  army  of  the  north 
must  cut  its  own  \vay  first  before  he  could  reach  out  his  hand. 
But  the  adventurous  troopers  who  had  carried  the  despatches  of 
Hasdrubal  in  safety  to  the  south  were  captured  near  Tarentum  ; 
their  news  decided  the  consul's  action.  Hasdrubal  begged  his 
brother  to  meet  him  in  Umbria,  to  move  thence  by  Narnia  upon 
Rome. 

March  of  Nero. — Nero,  a  man  of  no  considerable  exploits  before 
or  after,  adopted  in  this  agony  of  his  country's  fate  an  original 
and  audacious  strategy.  It  was  open  to  him,  as  to  Grouchy  before 
Waterloo,  to  adhere  to  orders  ;  he  might  merely  have  detached  re- 
inforcements ;  he  did  not  so  conceive  the  problem.  Ordering  the 
urban  reserves  to  Narnia  and  the  Capuan  supports  to  Rome,  he  left 
the  bulk  of  his  force  to  front  Hannibal,  while  he  hurried  in  person, 
at  the  head  of  a  picked  corps  of  7000  men,  by  forced  marches  to 
join  his  colleague.  The  Senate  approved  a  step  they  could  not 
prevent.  Amid  immense  enthusiasm,  welcomed  by  the  blessings 
of  a  people,  his  way  prepared  by  cavalry,  veterans  flocking  to  his 
standard,  he  passed  with  the  speed  of  life  and  death  through  Italy, 
and  entered  Livius'  lines  in  the  silence  of  night.  He  had  thrown 
the  enemies'  spies  off  the  scent  by  a  pretended  foray  into  Lucania  ; 
six  or  seven  days  after  he  was  deciding  the  issue  of  a  battle  in  the 
north,  upon  which  hung  not  merely  the  vindication  of  his  bold 
stroke,  but  the  very  existence  of  Rome. 

Battle  of  the  Metaurus. — Criticism  was  silenced  by  success. 
Next  morning  the  enemy's  suspicions  were  roused  by  increased 
numbers  and  the  jaded  appearance  of  a  portion  of  the  Roman 
cavalry  ;  they  were  confirmed  by  the  twice-sounded  signal  from  the 
camp,  which  announced  two  consuls  in  the  field.  Fearing  for  his 
brother's  fate,  Hasdrubal  declined  battle,  and  broke  up  by  night, 
with  the  intention  of  falling  back  upon  Gaul,  there  to  await  tidings 
from  the  south.  Abandoned  by  his  guides  in  the  rough  and  un- 
known country,  he  missed  the  ford  of  the  Metaurus,  which  for  the 


Battle  of  the  metaurus  223 

last  part  of  its  course  flowed  in  a  kind  of  trough  enclosed  by  steep 
walls — a  sunken  valley  within  a  wider  valley  bounded  by  the  hills 
— with  a  deeper  bed  and  larger  volume  of  water  than  it  now 
possesses.  The  following  day,  as  his  weary  columns  wound  along 
the  wooded  cliffs  of  the  right  bank,  he  was  overtaken  by  the 
Roman  cavalry,  followed  closely  by  the  foot.  He  used  the  un- 
favourable conditions  with  tactical  skill.  The  drunken  and  un- 
manageable Gauls  were  posted  on  the  left,  protected  in  front  and 
flank  by  difficult  ground  ;  the  Ligurians  and  elephants  formed  the 
centre  ;  the  right  he  closed  himself  with  the  firm  African  and 
Spanish  battalions.  Thus,  with  left  refused,  with  deep  files  and 
narrow  front,  Hasdrubal  awaited  the  attack  of  the  stronger  Roman 
army.  A  doubtful  and  desperate  struggle  ensued  on  the  Punic 
right,  and  the  event  was  still  undecided,  when  Claudius  grasped 
the  situation,  abandoned  his  useless  attack  on  the  refused  flank, 
left  a  force  to  contain  the  equally  defended  and  impeded  Gauls, 
and  passing-  behind  the  Roman  line,  flung  himself  with  decisive 
weight  on  Hasdrubal's  flank  and  rear.  The  Spaniards  fell  where 
they  stood  ;  the  drunken  Celts  were  butchered  as  they  lay.  Has- 
drubal, unwilling  to  survive  the  disaster,  plunged  in  the  thick  of  the 
fight,  and  died  like  a  gallant  soldier  and  a  son  of  Hamiicar.  With 
him  fell  the  towering  schemes  of  Hannibal.  The  victory  of  the 
Metaurus  decided  for  a  time  the  secular  struggle  of  Semite  and 
Aryan,  of  east  and  west.  Claudius,  daring  strategist  and  cool 
tactician,  vanished  swiftly,  as  he  came,  from  the  well-fought  field, 
carrying  the  head  of  Hasdrubal.  The  ghastly  token  flung  with 
Claudian  cruelty  into  the  Punic  lines — an  ill  repayment  for  his  own 
generosity — told  Hannibal  at  once  his  brother's  and  his  country's 
fate.  He  evacuated  Metapontum,  abandoned  Lucania  and  Apulia, 
and  drew  back  to  Bruttium.  At  Rome  the  news  of  victory,  awaited 
with  feverish  eagerness,  received  with  incredulous  ears,  roused,  as 
credence  grew,  a  boundless  exultation.  The  consuls  enjoyed  the 
first  real  triumph  of  the  war  ;  but  the  services  of  the  unpopular 
chiefs,  whose  grim  tenacity  and  brilliant  ability  had  made  victory 
possible,  "paled  their  ineffectual  fires"  before  the  rising  sun  of 
Scipio. 

Hannibal  in  Bruttium. — The  dying  embers  of  the  war  smouldered 
away  in  Bruttium.  Forgetful  of  Hannibal,  the  Romans  gave  them- 
selves up  to  the  pursuits  of  peace.  What  they  had  gained  by  a 
skilful  use  of  superior  force,  the  inner  lines,  and  full  communica- 
tion with  a  central  base  was  flung  away  by  hide-bound  strategical 
pedantry.    No  attempt  was  made  to  pour  the  united  and  victorious 


224  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

armies  upon  Hannibal.  Undefeated  and  undismayed,  with  splendid 
if  useless  obstinacy,  he  clung  for  four  years  to  liis  untenable  corner, 
to  resign  it  at  his  own  convenience  and  the  call  of  duty.  Never  was 
his  generalship  and  control  of  men  through  good  and  evil  fortune 
more  magnificent.  The  reaction  at  Rome  continued  ;  the  need  of 
rest,  the  effects  of  moral  and  material  exhaustion,  made  themselves 
felt  in  the  absence  of  immediate  danger.  The  army  and  navy 
were  reduced,  and  the  large  forces  still  in  the  field  did  little  or 
nothing.  The  government  applied  itself  to  reorganising  the  ad- 
ministration, restoring  agriculture,  resettling  and  restocking  the 
waste  and  depopulated  districts.  Arrears  were  looked  up,  the 
refractory  colonies  visited,  and  a  beginning  made  of  paying  off 
the  loans. 

Schemes  of  Scipic  — Scipio,  on  his  return  in  206  B.C.,  was 
irregularly  but  unanimously  elected  consul,  and  received  the  pro- 
vince of  Sicily,  with  its  ordinary  fleet  and  army.  Clear  of  his  pur- 
pose and  his  powers,  and  backed  by  popular  feeling,  he  claimed 
the  conduct  of  an  African  expedition.  No  doubt  Hannibal  was  still 
in  Italy,  and  the  finances  low  ;  nor  could  reliance  be  placed  on 
the  Numidian  chiefs  ;  but  a  small  force  could  easily  hold  him 
in  check,  till  the  loss  of  his  communications  and  the  danger  to 
Carthage  from  foreign  war  and  native  mutiny  should  recall  him 
home.  There  alone  could  the  war  be  decided  and  an  end  put  to 
the  waste  and  wear  of  Italy.  A  methodical  defensive  was  now 
an  anachronism.  Scipio  was  opposed  by  the  devotees  of  red-tape 
and  the  old  school,  who  disliked  the  man,  with  his  modern  culture 
and  dominating  habits,  doubted  his  discipline  and  questioned  the 
opportuneness  of  the  enterprise.  Balked  by  the  majority  of  the 
Senate,  who  were  supported  by  the  tribunes,  the  popular  consul 
showed  a  dangerous  disposition  to  break  through  the  usage  of 
the  constitution  by  an  appeal  to  the  Comitia.  But  for  this  the 
time  was  not  ripe,  and  Scipio  finally  accepted  a  compromise.  The 
expedition  was  permitted,  the  state  forests  placed  at  his  disposal ; 
he  might  draw  on  the  liberality  of  Etruria  and  Umbria,  where  the 
suspected  communities,  notably  Arretium,  anxiously  established 
their  character  for  patriotism.  He  must  organise  his  own  force 
without  burdening  the  state-chest.  From  these  and  Sicilian 
sources  he  created  a  new  fleet  of  thirty  sail.  Two  of  the  four 
Sicilian  legions,  strengthened  by  drafts  from  the  legions  of  Cannae, 
and  a  body  of  7000  volunteers,  veterans  of  the  war  —  another 
symptom  of  growing  professionalism — formed  a  total  of  30,000 
or  35,000  men.     The  year  was  spent  in  drilling,  equipping,  and 


SCHEMES  OF  SCIPTO  225 

organising  the  army,  in  face  of  obstructive  economy,  with  wisdom 
and  forethought,  as  well  as  in  ordering  the  aftairs  of  the  province. 
Lu'lius,  who  was  despatched  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  and  pre- 
pare the  way  with  the  Numidian  chiefs,  met  with  small  encourage- 
ment. Carthage  had  taken  energetic  measures.  Though  the 
supplies  destined  for  Hannibal  were  intercepted  and  the  exhausted 
Philip  could  not  be  spurred  to  action,  Mago  was  reinforced  with 
men,  money,  and  ships,  and  ordered  to  Liguria  to  renew  the 
Italian  war.  At  the  same  time  Syphax  was  detached  from  the 
Roman  interest,  and  the  restless  and  adventurous  Massinissa,  at 
once  his  personal  enemy  and  rival  for  the  hand  of  the  fair, 
brilliant,  and  patriotic  Sophonisba,  was  expelled  from  his  kingdom. 
Romance  tells  of  his  thrilling  escapes,  his  restoration  and  revenue, 
his  capture  of  his  rival's  bride,  their  marriage,  and  her  tragic 
death.  Her  father,  Hasdrubal,  collected  a  powerful  army  and 
fleet,  strengthened  by  Spanish  mercenaries,  a  Macedonian  corps 
and  140  elephants. 

Meanwhile  Hannibal  had  e\acuated  Thurii ;  and  Locri  was 
recaptured  by  an  expedition  organised  by  Scipio,  aided  by  a 
detachment  from  Rhegium.  The  plunder  and  outrage  which 
stained  the  exploit,  and  the  scandalous  conduct  of  his  officer, 
IMeminius,  reflected  the  gravest  discredit  on  the  discipline  and 
even  the  personal  character  of  Scipio.  It  was  of  a  piece,  men 
said,  with  his  un-Roman  habits  and  the  culpable  laxness  of  his 
command.  Fabius  and  his  opponents  seized  the  handle  ;  lively 
debates  took  place,  but  the  commission  of  inquiry  which  arrived 
on  the  spot  with  powers  of  recall  and  arrest,  and  afterwards  pro- 
ceeded to  review  his  work  in  Sicily,  were  happily  able  to  exone- 
rate the  general,  of  whose  preparations  they  presented  a  glowing- 
account.  The  provincial  governors  made  up  what  \\'as  lacking  in 
official  support. 

Mago  in  Italy. — Mago  landed  at  Genua  with  14,000  men  (205 
R.C.).  His  army,  reinforced  from  home  and  strengthened  with  Gallic 
and  Ligurian  levies,  soon  reached  a  respectable  total.  It  was  "  one 
more  for  Hannibal,"  one  more  cub  of  the  lion's  brood  to  work  his 
father's  will.  Leevinus  and  Livius  took  up  the  old  defensive  posi- 
tions of  Arretium  and  Ariminum  ;  nor  could  Mago  venture  to  attack 
them,  still  less  could  he  divert  Scipio  from  the  dream  of  his  life. 
In  204  B.C.  Mago  crossed  into  Cisalpine  Gaul,  where  he  occupied 
himself  in  raising  recruits  and  tampering  with  the  Etrurian  mal- 
contents. The  conspiracy  was,  however,  stamped  out  ;  and  in  the 
next  year  (203  B.C.)  a  decisive  and  bloody  action  was  fought  in  the 

P 


226  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Milanese,  in  which  Varus  and  Cethegus  claimed  the  victory  ;  but 
the  wounded  Mago  was  able  to  make  good  his  long  retreat  un- 
opposed to  the  sea.  In  obedience  to  orders  he  embarked  for 
Carthage,  but  died  of  his  wounds  on  ship.  For  some  )ears  after, 
Punic  officers  kept  North  Italy  in  a  ferment. 

Scipio  lands  in  Africa. — A  noteworthy  incident  of  205  B.C.  was 
the  introduction  of  tlie  Phrygian  worship  of  Cybele,  utilised  if  not 
prepared  by  Scipio,  whose  expedition  the  coming  of  the  Magna 
mater  from  Pessinus  (in  Galatia)  crowned  with  a  gracious  omen 
of  victory.  Undaunted  by  the  warnings  of  Syphax,  Scipio  sailed 
from  Lilybasum  with  two  legions,  forty  ships,  400  transports, 
and  a  siege-train  (204  B.C.).  On  the  voyage,  whether  by  design 
or  misadventure,  he  shifted  his  objective  from  the  Emporia  to 
Utica,  where  he  disembarked  without  resistance.  But  his  force 
was  too  small  at  once  to  secure  a  base  at  Utica  and  assume  the 
offensive.  The  sequel  showed  that  the  point  of  attack  had  been  ill 
chosen  and  the  difficulties  of  the  campaign  undervalued.  Massinissa 
brought  little  but  himself;  the  subjects  and  allies  of  Carthage 
required  a  striking  success  to  efface  the  memories  of  the  mutiny. 
After  a  successful  skirmish  he  proceeded  to  lay  ^iege  to  Utica.  Its 
stubborn  resistance  enabled  Syphax  to  combine  with  Hasdrubal 
and  relieve  the  town.  The  war  was  not  to  be  ended  at  a  rush. 
Before  the  vastly  superior  force,  with  its  powerful  cavalry,  Scipio 
retired  to  his  strong  lines — called  afterwards  the  Cornelian  camp — 
on  a  small  peninsula  between  Utica  and  Carthage.  His  position 
was  sufficiently  precarious,  his  surprise  repulsed,  himself  hemmed 
in  if  not  surrounded,  dependent  on  the  sea  for  his  supplies,  with 
nothing  to  hope  from  the  home  government.  It  was  now  that 
Massinissa,  trained  in  the  Punic  service,  versed  in  Punic  politics, 
bold,  persistent,  and  crafty,  with  all  his  influence  among  the  fickle 
Berbers,  proved  his  value.  In  the  spring  of  203  B.C.  Scipio  amused 
the  Carthaginians  with  proposals  to  treat ;  Syphax  accepted  readily 
the  role  of  arbiter.  Under  cover  of  the  negotiations,  trusty  officers 
reconnoitred  the  hostile  lines.  The  terms  proposed,  a  reciprocal 
evacuation  of  Africa  and  Italy,  could  not  be  seriously  entertained. 
After  all  Rome's  sacrifices,  Carthage  could  not  so  cry  quits.  A 
fleet  was  preparing  to  co-operate  with  the  Punic  armies. 

Victories  of  Scipio. — Lulled  to  a  fatal  security,  the  Carthaginians 
had  no  expectation  of  attack,  a  carelessness  encouraged  by  Scipio, 
who,  breaking  off  the  preliminaries,  feigned  a  new  attack  on  Utica, 
while  he  prepared  to  surprise  the  enemy's  camps.  They  lay  at 
some  distance  apart  ;  their  inflammable  huts  were  thatched  with 


SCI  no  IX  AFRICA 


227 


reeds  and  straw,  their  outpost 
duty  neglected.  The  somewhat 
dubious  stratagem  succeeded 
admirably.  The  alarmed  Nu- 
midians  rushed  from  their  blaz- 
ing barracks  on  the  swords  cf 
the  column  of  L^lius  ;  roused 
by  the  glare  and  tumult,  Has- 
drubal  hurried  to  help  his  ally, 
but  was  intercepted  by  Scipio, 
who  had  flung  himself  between 
the  camps.  His  huts  burst  into 
fire  ;  the  bewildered  soldiers  fell 
in  heaps.  Thus  extricated  from 
the  toils,  Scipio,  in  the  begin- 
ning of  May,  scattered  in  a 
second  battle  on  the  great  plain 
the  hasty  Punic  levies,  strength- 
ened though  they  were  with 
a  Spanish  and  a  Macedonian 
corps.  Massinissa,  welcomed 
by  his  tribesmen,  followed,  at- 
tacked, and  captured  his  ri\al 
Syphax,  and  by  the  reduction 
of  Cirta  gained  only  to  lose  the 
loved  and  lovely  Sophonisba. 
Numidia  declared  for  Rome. 

Negotiations  for  Peace. — 
Meanwhile  Scipio  had  occu- 
pied Tunis,  and  was  receiving 
the  submission  of  some  subject 
communities,  when  he  was  sum- 
moned to  Utica  by  an  attack 
on  his  fleet,  which  he  succeeded 
at  length  in  beating  off"  at 
some  expense,  by  means  of  a 
boom  composed  of  transports 
moored  four  deep.  On  his  re- 
turn from  a  plundering  raid  to 
the  entrenched  camp  at  Tunis 
he  received  an  embassy  for 
peace.     The  democratic  party 


228  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

liad  by  this  time  yivcn  way  to  the  opposition,  to  whose  request 
Scipio  granted  an  armistice  of  forty-five  days,  during  which 
Carthage  was  to  pay  and  victual  the  troops.  Whatever  preUnii- 
naries  he  may  have  proposed,  he  liad  no  power  to  conclude  a 
treaty  ;  accordingly  the  envoys  proceeded  to  Rome,  where  they  met 
with  a  cool  and  contemptuous  reception.  Stormy  and  protracted 
debates  delayed  the  decision.  At  length  the  desire  for  peace,  a 
sense  of  the  danger  involved  in  the  return  of  the  Barcidae  to 
Carthage,  and  the  acknowledged  services  of  Scipio  procured  the 
despatch  of  a  commission  late  in  September  to  assist  the  general 
in  negotiation.  Scipio  wished  to  end  the  war  in  person,  and  was 
not  in  a  position  to  be  exorbitant.  To  this,  as  well  as  to  the 
name  of  Hannibal  and  the  strong  walls  of  Carthage,  was  due 
the  moderation  of  the  terms.  They  included  the  surrender  of 
deserters  and  captives,  the  evacuation  of  Italy,  the  renunciation 
of  Spain  and  the  islands,  a  large  war  indemnity,  the  restoration 
of  Massinissa,  and  the  permanent  reduction  of  the  fleet  to  thirty 
men-of-war. 

Recall  of  Hannibal. — During  these  events  the  war  in  Bruttium 
had  dragged  on  indecisively,  pushed  with  large  forces  and  little 
energy.  Punishment  was  exacted,  in  loss  of  privilege  and  addi- 
tional burdens,  from  the  Latin  offenders.  The  careful  census  of 
Livius  and  Nero  (204  B.C.)  revealed  the  ravages  of  war,  pestilence 
and  desolation.  The  Burgess-roll  had  sunk  from  270,213  in  220  B.C. 
to  214,000.  Hannibal  clung  to  his  last  stronghold  so  long^  as  his 
tenacity  could  prevent  the  reinforcement  of  Scipio's  ill-sustained 
expedition.  The  African  defeats  and  the  defection  of  Numidia 
now  demanded  his  presence.  The  Barcidas  were  summoned  home, 
whether  recalled  by  the  war  party  preparing  for  a  final  struggle, 
or  in  accordance  with  the  tenns  of  the  armistice,  or  because  the 
Senate,  true  to  its  traditions,  refused  to  negotiate  with  an  enemy 
still  on  Italian  soil.  Hannibal  alone  returned  to  measure  swords 
with  Scipio.  Leaving  in  the  temple  of  the  Lacinian  Juno  a  record 
of  his  exploits  engraved  on  tablets  of  bronze — seen  and  used  by 
Polybius — he  sailed  from  Croton  in  the  autumn  of  203  B.C.  If  the 
negotiations  should  prove  abortive,  as  the  patriots  probably  in- 
tended, a  winter  would  give  him  time  to  create  an  army  which 
could  extort  a  peace  less  dangerous  to  his  country's  independence. 
With  the  flower  of  his  army — the  rest  he  discharged  or  massacred 
in  Italy — he  landed  at  Hadrumetum,  where  he  was  joined  by 
the  troops  of  Mago.  On  his  departure  the  Senate  honoured 
the  veteran  Fabius  with  the  wreath  of  grass  as  the  saviour  of 


HANNIBAL   AND  SCIPIO  229 

the  state.  Shortly  after,  F'abius  died  (203  B.C.),  at  the  age  of  nearly 
ninety  years. 

Failure  of  the  Negotiations  for  Peace. — The  peace  prelimi- 
naries led  again  to  prolonged  debates.  The  provinces  for  202  B.C., 
including  Africa,  had  already  been  allotted,  and  strong  influences 
hindered  the  ratification  of  the  terms,  till  the  friends  of  Scipio  pro- 
cured the  approval  of  the  people,  and  the  final  confirmation  by  the 
Senate  about  April  202  B.C.  It  was  then  too  late.  The  arrival  of 
Hannibal  had  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  patriots  ;  a  strong 
reaction  carried  them  to  power,  aided  by  the  distress,  the  burden 
of  the  Roman  army,  and  the  delays  and  difficulties  connected 
with  the  peace.  By  one  or  other  party  the  able  and  moderate  Has- 
drubal  was  condemned  to  death  ;  his  fate  is  variously  recorded. 

A  shipwrecked  Roman  convoy  supplied  the  occasion  sought  ; 
the  hungry  and  angry  masses  forced  the  hand  of  government  ;  the 
plunder  of  the  distressed  fleet  during  truce  constituted  an  act  of  war. 
Whether  this  was  merely  a  spontaneous  outburst,  or  Scipio  had  been 
just  deluded  and  repaid  in  kind,  may  be  left  uncertain.  Anxious 
to  avoid  a  rupture,  he  demanded  satisfaction,  but  the  refusal  of 
his  request  and  a  treacherous  attack  on  his  returning  envoys 
clinched  the  business.  Unable  to  besiege  the  capital,  Scipio  wasted 
with  fire  and  sword  the  fertile  valley  of  the  Bagradas,  moving  to 
join  Massinissa,  whom  he  had  summoned  from  Numidia.  Numidia 
was  equally  the  objective  of  Hannibal.  He  could  view  with  stern 
contentment  a  movement  which  drew  the  enemy  farther  from  his 
base.  Thither  he  pressed  from  Hadrumetum  to  strike  at  their 
point  of  junction,  intercept  the  Numidians,  and  drive  the  Romans 
headlong  to  the  coast.  With  50,000  men  and  eighty  elephants  he 
appeared  at  Zama  Regia.  But  the  impatiently  expected  chieftain 
had  effected  his  junction  with  Scipio,  bringing  10,000  Africans, 
horse  and  foot,  and  the  allies,  aware  of  Hannibal's  design,  now 
pushed  on  to  Naraggara  (near  Sicca),  where  they  encamped.  Here 
Hannibal  met  them.  In  a  personal  interview  he  is  said  to  have 
offered  the  renunciation  of  all  non-African  possessions  as  the  con- 
dition of  peace.  Scipio,  though  defeat  meant  destruction,  in  face 
of  Hannibal,  far  from  the  sea,  with  no  support  but  the  restless 
Numidians,  reiterated  his  demands.  Rome's  sacrifices  and  her 
honour  demanded  indemnity  for  the  broken  truce  and  guarantees 
for  the  future. 

Battle  of  Zama. — At  an  uncertain  time  and  place,  whether  in 
the  spring  or  autumn  of  202  B.C.,  not  far  from  Sicca,  was  fought  the 
decisive  action  known  as  the  battle  of  Zama.     Hannibal  disposed 


230  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  elephants — a  formidable  line — in  front  ;  the  mercenaries  of 
Mage's  army,  12,000  strong,  formed  the  next  line  ;  in  support  were 
the  Libyan  and  national  militia  ;  at  some  distance,  in  reserve,  stood 
a  strong  corps  of  Italian  veterans,  with  the  Macedonian  auxiliaries. 
A  powerful  Numidian  contingent  did  not  appear  in  time  ;  nor  could 
he  wholly  depend  on  the  loyalty  of  the  troops,  some  of  whom  de- 
serted in  the  fight.  His  inferior  cavalry  covered  the  flanks.  To 
meet  the  elephants  Scipio  formed  his  maniples  in  column  of  cohorts, 
leaving  nine  broad  avenues  through  the  triple  line,  filling  the  inter- 
vals in  front  with  skirmishers  destined  to  harass  the  huge  beasts 
and  draw  or  drivx  them  harmless  through  the  gaps.  Laslius  and 
Massinissa,  with  the  heavy  and  light  cavalr>',  took  post  respectively 
on  the  left  and  right  wings.  Hannibal  commenced  the  attack  with 
a  charge  of  elephants.  Scared  by  the  blasts  of  horns  and  trumpets, 
vexed  by  a  shower  of  missiles  from  the  light  troops,  some  turned 
in  terror  on  the  Numidian  horse,  whose  rout  was  completed  by  the 
dashing  onset  of  Massinissa,  some  trampled  o\  er  the  light  troops, 
and  charged  down  the  open  gangways,  sped  on  their  path  with  blows, 
some  threw  the  Punic  cavalry  on  the  right  into  a  confusion  which 
Lcelius  promptly  turned  to  account.  Then  with  a  shout  the  front 
lines  closed  ;  in  bloody  conflict  hand  to  hand,  the  Hastati,  borne  on 
by  the  steady  pressure  of  the  supports,  thrust  back  the  mercenary 
van.  Then  in  the  Carthaginian  host  a  wild  melee  ensued  ;  with  cries 
of  treason,  in  mutual  distrust,  the  undisciplined  levies  and  their  sus- 
pected and  suspicious  hirelings  turned  their  arms  upon  each  other. 
Promptly  from  the  disordered  mass  of  hacking  soldiery  Hannibal 
withdrew  the  two  front  lines  to  the  flanks  and  pushed  forward  his 
strong  reserves  ;  while  Scipio  reformed  the  broken  divisions  where 
they  stood,  marched  up  the  steady  Principes  and  the  corps  of 
veterans  in  column  over  the  slippery  ground,  and  deployed  them 
outwards,  forming  continuous  line  on  the  new  centre.  Then  came 
the  final  desperate  shock  ;  the  furious  fight  was  only  decided  b\' 
the  charges  of  the  victorious  cavalry'  in  rear.  The  outnumbered 
remnant  fell  where  they  stood,  like  the  old  Guard  at  Waterloo. 
Hannibal,  when  all  was  lost,  fled  to  Hadrumetum,  while  Scipio 
followed  up  with  vigour  the  crushing  victory.  Roman  pride  dwelt 
complacently  on  the  part  played  in  the  defeat  of  Zama  by  the  fugitive 
relics  of  the  field  of  Cannae.  The  epic  of  Ennius  and  the  Scipionic 
legends  fill  in  the  shadowy  outlines  of  thp  African  campaign. 

While  Scipio  was  fighting  the  combined  armies  of  Carthage, 
whose  concentration  had  been  permitted  by  the  policy  or  dilatori- 
ness  of  the  Senate,  eleven  legions  were  in  arms  in  Italy.     Personal 


BATTLE   OF  ZAMA  231 

pique  wilfully  held  back  the  supports  doled  out  by  the  government 
on  the  news  of  the  rupture.  The  decisi\'e  battle  had  been  fought 
and  won  when  a  serviceable  flieet  and  convoy  arrived  under  the 
admiral,  P.  Lentulus. 

Terms  of  Peace. — Thus  strengthened,  Scipio  could  menace 
Carthage  by  sea  and  land  ;  the  thorough  defeat  of  Vermina's 
Numidian  reliefs  brought  her  finally  to  terms.  Hannibal,  trusted 
even  in  disaster,  took  the  helm  and  conducted  the  negotiations. 
Protected  by  an  armistice,  the  envoys  proceeded  to  Rome,  where, 
in  spite  of  protracted  discussion  and  the  secret  intrigues  of  the 
new  consul,  Cn.  Lentulus,  anxious  for  the  credit  of  ending  the 
war,  the  counsels  of  vengeance  and  personal  machinations  yielded 
to  the  will  of  the  people,  strong  for  peace  and  Scipio.  At  Carthage 
the  hand  of  Hannibal  dragged  from  his  perch  the  clamorous 
agitator  who  harangued  against  the  peace.  Motives  of  generosity,, 
humanity,  and  a  far-sighted  statesmanship  may  have  aided  mili- 
tary and  political  considerations  in  dictating  moderate  terms.  The 
strength  of  despair,  the  exhaustion  of  Rome,  the  designs  of  Scipio's 
enemies,  the  genius  of  Hannibal,  had  all  their  weight.  Rome  as 
yet  desired  no  province.  It  was  her  policy  to  cripple,  not  crush  ;  to 
balance  rival  and  ally.  An  elastic  clause  restored  the  posses- 
sions of  Massinissa,  to  be  a  thorn  in  the  flesh  of  Carthage  and  a 
convenient  weapon  of  aggression,  at  the  will  of  the  suzerain  power, 
but  Vermina  was  left  to  check  this  dangerous  friend.  The  surrender 
of  navy,  elephants,  prisoners,  and  deserters  ;  the  cession  of  Spain 
and  the  islands  ;  compensation  for  the  plundered  convoy  ;  a  war  in- 
demnity of  200  talents  (^48,000)  a  year  for  fifty  years,  guaranteed 
by  hostages  ;  the  permanent  reduction  of  her  fleet,  and  the  subor- 
dination of  her  foreign  policy  to  Rome  were  the  remaining  terms 
of  a  peace  that  left  Carthage  a  tributary  vassal  at  the  mercy 
of  her  conqueror.  They  were  accepted  with  bitter  tears,  and  an 
agitation  sternly  repressed  by  Hannibal.  A  defeated  nation  that 
demands  revenge  must  organise  its  resources  in  patience  and  wait 
the  progress  of  events  abroad. 

Scipio  returned  in  triumph.  Rome  could  now  dispense  punish- 
ments and  rewards.  The  reduction  of  the  Celts  necessarily  followed. 
Heavy  as  was  the  doom  of  Capua,  a  heavier  fate  befell  the  Bruttian 
people,  henceforth  the  serfs  and  Gibeonites  of  Rome.  Heavily 
the  allies  of  Hannibal  paid  in  loss  of  lands  and  privileges,  in  execu- 
tions and  confiscations,  for  their  defection — Sabellians,  Etruscans, 
Lucanians,  and  Greeks.  The  veterans  of  Africa  received  allot- 
ments, on  some  of  the  appropriated  land  new  colonies  were  settled, 


232  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

while  the  colonies  that  curbed  the  dangerous  districts  received 
additional  garrisons.  Large  tracts  fell  as  domain  land  to  the  occu- 
pation farms  and  slave-tended  pastures  of  the  grasping  nobility. 

Character  of  the  Hannibalic  War. — The  honours  of  the  war 
remained  with  Carthage  ;  the  profits,  chequered  with  past  losses  and 
new  perils,  fell  to  Rome.  The  Punic  armies,  splendidly  officered, 
had  surpassed  the  Roman  levies  alike  in  tactics,  strategy,  and 
steadiness.  From  them  was  learned  the  freer  handling  of  troops 
and  bolder  military  ideas  of  Nero  and  Scipio.  The  combinations 
of  Hann'bal  had  not  once  only  threatened  the  existence  of  Rome. 
But  the  failure  of  his  allies,  the  organisation  of  Italy,  the  unity  of 
feeling  and  superior  numbers  of  her  military  population,  with  her 
central  position,  enabled  Rome  to  hamper  his  movements,  harass  his 
supporters,  secure  her  own  territory,  while  she  checked  his  advance, 
and  holding  the  narrow  passages  of  the  peninsula,  to  cut  him  from 
his  communications  —  in  a  word,  to  wear  him  out.  In  the  last 
struggle  the  genius  of  Scipio  was  aided  by  the  absence  of  fortresses 
and  the  weakness  of  the  Punic  organisation  to  gain  a  victory  earned 
and  prepared  by  steadfast  will  and  stern  self-sacrifice.  The  nation 
conquered  the  man,  and  w^ith  that  conquest  began  an  imperial  system 
in  which  the  small  state  system  of  the  old  world  would  be  fused 
and  lost.  The  absence  of  large  naval  operations  is  a  remarkable 
feature  of  the  war.  Navies  and  transports  pass  to  and  fro  freely 
on  the  waters.  Descents  and  minor  actions  are  alone  recorded. 
Rome  kept,  on  the  whole,  her  command  of  the  sea,  a  fact  of  decisive 
importance,  while  the  energies  of  Carthage,  after  the  failures  of  the 
first  war,  seemed  chiefly  diverted  to  the  land  service.  Even  in 
Greece  the  war-marine  had  everywhere  declined. 

Results  of  the  War  in  Italy  and  Abroad. — In  Italy,  Rome's 
victor)-  welded  the  chains  of  the  non-Latin  allies.  More  and  more 
the  grades  of  autonomy  are  lost  in  the  uniformity  of  a  common 
subjection.  Abroad,  the  fall  of  Carthage  left  her  mistress  of  the 
West.  Two  new  provinces  were  formed  in  Spain  ;  Sicily  absorbed 
the  realm  of  H iero.  In  Africa,  Rome  exercised  a  protectorate ;  in  the 
East  she  had  relations  with  Egypt  and  Pergamum  ;  her  connection 
with  Greece  must  draw  her  farther  and  farther  from  her  cherished 
Italian  policy.  She  had  entered  on  the  path  from  which  there 
was  no  retreat  ;  the  consequences  of  her  action  and  the  chain  of 
events  carried  her  half  unwillingly  on  to  fulfil  her  imperial  mission 
— to  pulverise  and  assimilate  the  civilised  world.  To  that  empire, 
for  lack  of  genius  to  create  a  new  system  adapted  to  new  needs, 
she  was  to  sacrifice  her  liberty  and  her  constitution.      The  old 


EFFECTS   OF   THE    WAR  233 

forms  were  stretched  to  bursting  as  the  centre  of  Italy  became  the 
centre  of  the  world. 

Economic  and  Social  Effects  of  the  War.— But  the  effects  of 
the  war  were  felt  not  alone  in  external  dominion  or  political 
organisation,  but  in  the  inner  character  and  life  of  an  essentially 
military  people.  The  system  of  annual  reliefs  and  changing  com- 
mands, like  the  older  tactics,  had  broken  down  beneath  the  strain 
of  the  long  struggle  and  the  distant  fields  of  war.  Plunder  sup- 
plemented the  miserable  pay  ;  camp-life  ruined  the  simple  tastes 
of  the  yeoman,  whose  tone  was  further  deteriorated  by  the  slaves 
and  criminals  whom  the  state  was  forced  to  employ.  The  citizen 
soldier  ceased  to  exist,  and  the  affairs  of  Locri  and  Enna  are 
symptoms  of  degeneration.  In  fact,  the  yeoman  class  as  such 
was  rapidly  dying  out.  Its  decay,  due  in  the  first  instance  to  the 
waste  of  the  war,  was  hastened  by  the  growing  monopoly  of  land 
by  the  rich.  By  the  side  of  a  thriving  plutocracy  stood  an  im- 
poverished proletariate.  Wealth  based  on  plunder  and  speculation, 
on  war  prices  and  fraudulent  contracts,  and  on  the  exploitation  of 
the  state  domains,  contrasted  vividly  with  the  poverty  of  the  ruined 
fanners,  who  flocked  to  swell  the  mob  of  pauper  clients,  or  worked 
as  serfs  on  the  bloated  estates  of  the  great  proprietors.  The  com- 
petition of  foreign  corn,  the  growth  of  slave-labour,  and  the  attrac- 
tions of  the  capital  combined  with  the  effects  of  the  war  to  create 
that  swarm  of  dangerous  drones,  at  once  bribed  and  despised,  the 
tool  of  the  agitator,  the  lever  of  revolution,  useless  for  good,  powerful 
for  evil,  the  sovereign  mob.  This  growth  of  extremes,  and  the 
decay  of  the  old  equality  of  culture,  feeling,  and  possessions,  had 
its  political  counterpart  in  the  timid  exclusiveness  which  closed 
the  gates  of  office  equally  against  the  genius  of  a  noble  and  the 
aspiration  of  the  no^ncs  Jiomo. 

The  burgess  population  had  suffered  by  almost  a  fourth — the 
flower  of  the  citizens  ;  Italian  economy  had  been  shaken  to  its 
centre  ;  the  losses  in  men,  money,  and  material  were  untold  ;  the 
misery  unspeakable.  Trade  and  commerce  had  stagnated.  Great 
as  were  the  results  of  the  war  in  wealth  and  empire,  her  heroic 
struggle  and  splendid  victoiy  left  Rome  face  to  face  with  grave 
problems  of  policy.  A  wise  statesmanship  had  to  consider  the 
proper  government  of  the  provinces  and  the  modifications  in  her 
municipal  constitution  entailed  by  empire,  the  unification  of  Italy, 
the  reorganisation  of  the  army,  and  the  restoration  of  rural  economy 
and  sound  finance.  To  limit  the  love  of  pleasure,  expressed  in 
the  increase  of  festivals  and  games,  of  funeral  feasts  and  gladia- 


234 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


toiial  shows  ;  to  stem  the  tide  of  scepticism  and  make  a  genuine 
culture  of  the  fashionable  Hellenism  ;  to  meet  the  relaxation  born  of 
reaction  and  the  war  ;  to  breathe  an  imperial  spirit  into  the  ruling 
people — these  were  problems  of  a  deeper  order.  To  sharpen  the 
distinction  of  governors  and  governed  and  close  the  burgess  list ; 
to  sacrifice  Italian  culture  and  feeling  ;  to  plunder  the  provinces  and 
share  the  spoils  ;  to  crush  tlie  relics  of  the  yeomanry,  block  tlie 
paths  to  distinction,  and  bribe  the  populace  with  plunder  ;  to  govern 
at  home  in  the  interests  of  a  class,  abroad  to  accept  the  profits  and 
refuse  the  responsibilities  of  empire  ;  to  live  from  hand  to  mouth 
with  a  policy  of  makeshift, — would  be  to  sacrifice  the  noblest  fruits  of 
victory,  the  gratitude  of  the  conquered,  and  the  homage  of  history. 


CARTHAGINIAN    UOUECADRACHM  — HEAD   OF    PERSEPHONE. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


FIFTY    YEARS    OF    CONQUEST THE    WARS    IN    THE    WEST 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Extension  to  the  Alps— Cisalpine  Gaul  conquered      .     200-191  554-563 

Peace  restored  by  Gracchus  in  Spain    .  .         .179  575 

The  Spanish  Wars  renewed 149-133  605-621 

Viriathus •         •     149-140  605-614 

Numantia i44-i33  610-621 

Rome  not  Ag'gressive. — The  struggle  for  life  was  over.  With 
the  peace  of  201  B.C.  closes  the  heroic  period  of  Roman  historj',  the 
period  of  vigorous  effort  and  strong  national  life,  of  energy  in  the 


ROME'S  FOREIGN  POLICY  235 

government,  devotion  in  the  people,  of  manners  still  uncorrupted 
and  institutions  still  unimpaired.  The  story  of  the  next  fifty  years 
sounds  with  the  ceaseless  tramp  of  legions  marching,  as  by  a  resist- 
less ordinance  of  fate,  at  once  to  the  conquest  of  the  uorld  and 
the  ruin  of  the  Roman  Republic.  Yet  Rome  must  not  be  regarded 
merely  as  an  intriguing  and  covetous  power.  This  career  of  con- 
quest was  in  no  sense  the  result  of  a  deliberate  scheme  of  annexa- 
tion. It  was  the  outcome  of  existing  political  ideas,  grasped  and 
applied  under  peculiarly  favourable  circumstances  by  a  cool, 
consistent,  narrow-minded  statesmanship.  The  growth  of  Roman 
dominion  was  the  necessary  and  natural  advance  of  a  genuine 
governing  nation  in  a  world  politically  disordered,  like  the  advance 
of  the  English  in  India,  as  unlike  the  empire  of  an  Alexander 
or  Mohammed  as  it  is  unlike  the  expansion  of  a  colonising  and 
commercial  people.  Selfish  aggression  there  was  ;  but  the  aims 
of  Roman  statesmen  were  limited  at  first  to  the  maintenance  of 
Rome's  supremacy  in  Italy  against  actual  or  possible  enemies  at 
home  or  abroad  who  might  obstruct  or  nienace  her  peaceful  develop- 
ment. It  was  the  means  they  employed  and  the  drift  of  events 
that  led  directly  to  a  far  different  result.  To  understand  this 
thoroughly,  it  will  be  instructive  to  compare  for  a  moment  the 
different  issue  of  Greek  efforts  at  unity  and  dominion.  In  spite 
of  the  various  confederacies  and  hegemonies  formed  at  different 
epochs,  Hellas  failed  to  found  any  abiding  state  system.  This 
was  due  partly  to  geographical  reasons,  and  partly  to  racial 
antipathies,  as  well  as  to  the  reaction  against  the  Oriental 
empires,  but  it  was  mainly  caused  by  the  absence  of  political 
discipline,  the  incapacity  for  combination,  and  the  hopeless  sepa- 
ratism that  sacrificed  Hellas  to  the  city-state,  and  the  city-state  to 
the  party.  Rome  scarcely  developed  a  party-system  ;  in  her  best 
days  she  stamped  on  contending  factions  a  character  of  common 
loyalty  to  the  common  weal.  Better,  too,  than  any  people  of 
antiquity  the  Romans  knew  how  to  attract  and  assimilate  kindred 
or  even  alien  elements,  just  as  they  were  ready  to  borrow  useful 
institutions  and  adopt  a  higher  cultivation.  They  could  incorpo- 
rate a  people  without  destroying  its  individuality  or  its  self-respect. 
Their  settled  government  and  respect  for  law  gave  them  an  unique 
position  in  the  civilised  world,  and  made  their  city  the  natural 
refuge  of  the  weaker,  as  their  reputation  for  wisdom  and  good 
faith  rendered  them  the  arbitrators  of  distracted  Greece.  Ancient 
policy  did 'not  willingly  recognise  equal  states  living  in  armed 
peace.     The   European  concert,  the  balance  of  power,  and  the 


236  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

rights  of  nations  are  modern  ideas.  The  only  recognised  right 
was  the  right  of  self-preservation  and  the  might  of  the  stronger. 
Between  neighbours  the  alternatives  lay  between  predominance, 
however  veiled  under  the  forms  of  alliance,  and  extinction.  Inter- 
national politics  are  even  now  rarely  disinterested  ;  in  antiquity 
never.  Rome  differed  from  the  rest  merely  in  the  logical  thorough- 
ness with  which  she  worked  out  her  principles.  She  started  with 
the  advantages  of  a  country  physically  united,  in  a  strategically 
central  position,  severing  the  East  from  the  West,  and  enabled  by 
her  westward  aspect  to  escape  serious  disturbance  from  the  East. 
She  had  perfected  in  these  years  of  struggle  her  military  and  social 
organisation  ;  her  people,  apt  for  discipline,  had  been  severely 
drilled  and  trained  as  citizens  and  soldiers  ;  her  unflinching  policy, 
depending  on  no  individual,  rarely  touched  by  sentiment,  and  never 
diverted  by  disaster,  spared  no  sacrifices,  shrank  from  no  instru- 
ments, lost  no  chances  in  compassing  its  ends,  whether  "by  force 
or  persuasion  of  gods  or  men."  She  knew  how  to  isolate  her  foes, 
and  disintegrate  her  friends,  how  to  conquer  by  dividing  and 
crush  in  detail,  how  to  anticipate  a  danger  or  postpone  a  crisis. 
She  watched  a  strong  ally  more  jealously  than  a  beaten  enemy  ; 
she  could  stoop  at  times  to  the  lowest  resources  of  a  bullying  or 
temporising  diplomacy.  Rome  was  not  likely  to  fight  for  ideas. 
Finally,  for  a  force  so  favoured  and  so  wielded,  the  state  of  the 
Mediterranean  world  afforded  a  peculiarly  appropriate  field. 

Chang'e  for  the  Worse.  —  In  the  course  of  the  ensuing  wars  a 
distinct  deterioration  is  visible,  which  corresponds  closely  to  the 
change  for  the  worse  in  Rome's  relation  to  her  Italian  confederates. 
The  crooked  methods  of  a  new  school  supplant  the  honest  appeal 
to  brute  force.  The  old  frugality  and  laboriousness,  the  famous 
probity  and  fairness,  public  and  private,  give  way  before  the 
temptations  of  power.  Cruelty,  cynicism,  and  greed,  even  assassi- 
nation, stamp  the  new  methods.  Mutiny,  corruption,  and  cowardice 
rot  the  armies  and  stain  the  officers.  A  policy  of  plunder  and 
annexation  succeeds  to  the  old  theory  of  a  paternal  protectorate. 
Yet  the  indestructible  vitality  of  the  nation  and  the  weakness  of 
its  opponents  enabled  it  to  surmount  all  obstacles  and  survive 
all  disasters,  to  conquer  in  spite  of  its  generals  and  rule  in  spite 
of  itself.  Rome  had  reserves  morally  and  materially  ;  its  enemies 
fell  each  at  a  blow.  The  explosive  little  states  of  Greece,  vapouring 
and  corrupted  Asia,  enervated  Egypt,  and  the  e.xhausted  phalanx 
of  ?^Iacedon  could  oppose  no  effective  resistance  ;  and  if  the 
Hellenic  East  had  no  national  life,  the  barbarian  West  had  no 


FOREIGN  POLICY  237 

national  cohesion.  Above  all,  the  weakness  of  the  Eastern  states 
drew  Rome  inevitably  forward,  as  her  relations  became  more  and- 
more  complicated.  It  is  hard  for  an  imperial  power  to  distinguish 
between  its  rights  and  its  interests.  Rome  is  more  justified  by 
modern  practice  than  she  is  fairly  condemned  by  modern  morality. 
The  change  for  the  worse  was  gradual,  and  perceived  only  by  the 
best  men  ;  and  even  so,  her  reputation  remained  high  among  the 
nations.  Compared  with  the  Ptolemies,  Seleucids,  and  Antigonids, 
her  hands  were  clean,  her  motives  pure,  her  rule  bearable.  In  that 
intolerable  Eastern  hubbub,  men's  eyes  turned  still  with  envy  and 
wonder  to  the  stable  and  well-ordered  republic  of  the  West. 

General  Survey. — In  the  West  the  heirs  of  Carthage  were  bound 
to  organise  the  legacy  they  inherited.     Sicily,  the  necessary  appen- 
dage of  Italy,  had  received  definitive  form,  placed  under  a  single 
praetor  (210  and  201  P..C.)  ;  a  few  cohorts  secured  a  profound  peace 
till  the  slave-outbreaks  of  136  B.C.     From  her  the  capital  drew  corn, 
the  army  its  stores  and  clothing.     Sardinia  and  Corsica  were  yet 
to  be  pacified  ;  and  the  two  Spains,  with  their  four  standing  legions, 
presented  a  grave  military  and  financial  problem.     In  this  latter 
case  Rome  was  forced  to  break  with  her  traditional  policy.    Besides 
the  value  of  the  Spanish  mines  and  commerce,  there  was  the  danger 
of  a  second  Hamilcar,  and  the  absence  of  any  organised  govern- 
ment capable  of  acting  as  her  deputy  and  keeping  the  peace  in 
this  Roman  India.      The  retention  of  Spain  involved  the  control  of 
the  line  of  communication  along  the  southern  coast  of  Gaul.     In 
Northern  Italy  the  natural  process  of  expansion  took  its  course. 
It  is  in  Africa  and  the  East  that  a  change  of  principle  is  most 
clearly  marked.     Reluctantly  enough  in  the  first  instance  Rome 
drifted  into  conquest.     The  chastisement  of  the  Illyrian  pirates 
(229  B.C.)  had  cleared  the  Adriatic  ports  and  opened  up  relations 
with  the  Greek  maritime  states.     Then  the  alliance  of  Macedon  and 
Carthage,  kindling  a  deep  resentment  and  revealing  a  new  danger, 
led  to  the  war  with  Philip.     Subtle  statesmanship  and  sentiment 
were  perhaps  combined  in  the  creation  of  that  Roman  protectorate 
over  the  several  Greek  cities  which  was  ultimately  fatal  to  Hellenic 
independence.  The  position  so  acquired  or  so  thrust  upon  her,  source 
as  it  was  of  endless  intervention,  and  the  complex  relations  of  the 
Eastern  communities,  drew  her  Senate  further  and  further  into 
an  Eastern  policy,  whose  necessary  results  were  the  humiliation  of 
Macedon  and  the  shattering  of  Syria.     At  first  Rome  acted  with 
genuine  and  statesmanlike  moderation.     Content  with  the  dignity 
of  paramount  power,  she  took  from  the  spoils  of  war  nothing  but 


238  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

gold  and  glory.  But  the  position  was  untenable.  The  spread  of 
anarchy,  due  to  the  prostration  of  the  governments  and  her  own 
jealous  methods  of  dismemberment  as  much  as  to  the  natural 
decay  of  society  and  the  greed  of  despots,  broke  down  the  system 
of  protectorates,  while  her  own  appetite  came  with  the  eating. 
The  client-states  were  neither  one  thing  nor  the  other.  Actors 
in  a  burlesque  of  liberty  seriously  meant,  they  wasted  their  last 
energies  in  idle  debates  and  idler  struggles,  dynastic  feuds  and 
pigmy  politics.  Their  very  feebleness  made  a  tyrant  of  their  pro- 
tector, who  neither  suffered  freedom  nor  enforced  authority.  In- 
cessant commissions  reported  to  a  government  whose  utterances 
were  neither  consistent  nor  peremptory.  The  tribes  of  Lilliput 
could  venture  to  ignore  their  master,  neglect  his  orders,  and  pro- 
voke destruction.  Meanwhile  the  frontiers  of  civilisation  were 
exposed,  denuded  of  their  natural  guardians,  and  new  forces  were 
being  consolidated  beyond  the  Roman  horizon,  in  Parthia,  Pontus, 
and  Armenia,  against  which  Rome's  enfeebled  clients  would  prove 
but  sorry  "buffers."  The  position  was  not  realised,  and  this  was 
due  partly  to  a  conflict  of  ideas  at  Rome,  partly  to  a  natural  and 
laudable  hesitation  in  undertaking  such  vast  responsibilities,  partly 
to  lack  of  insight.  Such  problems  are  often  less  clear  to  con- 
temporaries than  to  philosophic  historians,  while  the  difficulties 
of  confronting  them  loom  larger  to  the  eyes  of  statesmen  who 
have  to  deal  with  them. 

Italy:  (i)  The  Gauls — In  Italy  the  Gauls  displayed  a  belated 
energy  when  the  work  of  punishment  and  frontier  extension  was 
resumed  as  the  natural  sequence  of  Hannibal's  failure.  The  Boii, 
who,  lying  between  Italy  and  the  Po,  behind  the  Roman  advanced 
posts,  were  the  first  to  be  menaced,  were  encouraged  by  a  slight 
success  to  break  out  in  open  rebellion  (200  B.C.)  under  Hamilcar,  an 
officerofMago,  and  were  supported  by  the  Insubres  and  Cenomani. 
They  sacked  Placentia  and  beset  Cremona,  thus  delaying  to  some 
extent  the  war  with  IMacedon  ;  but  ere  the  year  was  out  the  Cartha- 
ginian had  fallen  and  Cremona  was  relieved.  The  struggle  dragged 
on,  till  the  final  reduction  of  the  Boii  in  191  B.C.,  with  varying  fortune, 
severe  defeats  being  balanced  by  still  more  bloody  victories,  which 
witness  to  the  mendacity  of  Roman  consuls  and  the  "  multiplying 
eye"  of  family  chroniclers.  In  197  B.C.  the  Insubres,  victorious  in 
the  previous  year,  were  deserted  on  the  field  by  the  Cenomani,  and 
suffered  a  crushing  defeat  by  the  river  Mincius.  The  fall  of  Comum 
(196  B.C.),  captured  by  M.  Claudius  Marcellus,  sealed  their  sub- 
mission.    The  Insubres  and  Cenomani  were  left  free  from  triljute. 


ITALIAN  WARS  239 

in  the  enjoyment  of  their  cantonal  organisation,  but  for  ever 
excluded  from  the  Roman  franchise.  They  were  to  serve  as  bul- 
warks against  the  inroads  of  their  Transalpine  brethren.  The 
effect  of  these  successes  was  seen  in  the  humble  attitude  of  the 
Helvetii  beyond.  The  rapid  Latinisation  of  the  Transpadane 
district,  followed  by  increasing  population  and  prosperity,  carried 
Roman  influence  to  the  Alps.  The  isolated  Boii  offered,  however, 
a  desperate  resistance  to  the  obviously  impending  occupation 
of  their  territory,  but  after  the  disasters  incident  to  semi-savage 
warfare,  their  strength  was  broken  (191  B.C.),  the  almost  annihilated 
tribe  ceded  half  its  lands,  and  in  the  end  vanished  from  Italian 
soil.  The  existing  fortresses,  reorganised  in  198  B.C.,  were  supple- 
mented by  fresh  foundations,  as  the  municipal  system  was  gradu- 
ally carried  to  the  Po.  Potentia  and  Pisaurum  (184  B.C.),  Bononia 
(Latin)  (189  B.C.),  Mutina  and  Parma  (183  B.C.),  guarded  the  new 
settlements,  and  communications  were  secured  by  the  Via  Emilia 
(187  B.C.)  from  Ariminum  to  Placentia,  and  the  new  Via  Flaminia 
from  Arretium  to  Bononia. 

(2)  The  Ligurians,  Istrians,  &c. — To  clear  the  coast-route  to 
Spain  and  secure  the  lowland  towns,  Rome  had  now  to  reduce 
the  Ligurians,  who  had  been  driven  by  the  advancing  Celts  into 
the  heights  that  girdle  the  Gulf  of  Genoa  from  Marseilles  to  the 
Arno.  These  freebooting  shepherds  in  their  mountain  fastnesses, 
during  more  than  twenty  years  of  guerrilla  warfare,  read  some 
severe  lessons  to  the  incompetent  leaders  in  the  series  of  casual 
campaigns  (197-173,  166  B.C.,  &c.).  In  177  B.C.  the  burgess-colony 
of  Luna  (Spezzia)  was  founded  to  check  their  raids,  and  to  serve 
as  a  port  of  embarkation  for  the  West.  Several  thousands  of  the 
tribesmen  had  been  already  transplanted  to  repeople  Samnium.  By 
176  B.C.  the  land  was  clear  between  the  Arno  and  the  Po,  though 
the  western  clans  still  afforded  materials  for  fictitious  triumphs. 
In  154  B.C.  Opimius  was  able,  in  defence  of  Massilia,  to  win  the  first 
Roman  victory  in  Transalpine  Gaul.  Meanwhile  the  foundation 
of  Aquileia,  the  last  Latin  colony  in  Italy,  built  to  command  the 
eastern  passes  and  to  control  the  Northern  Adriatic,  had  led  to 
a  somewhat  inglorious  two  years'  campaign  against  the  Istrians 
(178-177  B.C.).  In  156  B.C.  the  reduction  of  the  predatory  Dal- 
matians completed  the  pacification  of  that  seaboard. 

In  Sardinia  and  Corsica  the  unconquered  highlanders  of  the 
interior  harassed  the  Roman  fringe  with  ceaseless  raids  till  the 
vigorous  action  of  Tiberius  Gracchus  made  "cheap  Sardinians" 
a  drug  in  the  market  (177  B.C.). 


240  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Spain. — The  two  Spains  were  as  yet  the  only  transmarine 
provinces  of  Rome.  Of  these,  tlie  Nortliern  or  Hitlier  .Sjjain — the 
north-eastern  corner — incUided  the  modern  Arragon  and  Catalonia, 
while  Farther  .Spain  covered  the  south  and  south-east,  Andalusia, 
Murcia,  and  Valencia  ;  i.e.,  the  old  territory  of  Carthage.  Here 
the  (ireek  and  Punic  towns  adhered  to  Rome,  and,  amid  the 
strange  mixture  of  peoples  and  crossing  of  civilisations,  some 
ground  had  been  prepared,  especially  among  the  more  cultured 
and  wealthy  Turdetani,  for  the  rapid  growth  of  Roman  feelings 
and  ideas.  And  this  was  already  prefigured  and  the  way  opened 
by  the  success  of  Scipio's  veteran  settlement  at  Italica,  on 
the  Bcetis.  Hitherto  just  the  narrow  and  unbroken  fringe  of 
coast-land  in  that  compact  and  little-known  peninsula  had  been 
dotted  by  the  factories  of  the  Phoenician  or  the  colonies  of  the 
Creek.  Only  the  arms  and  policy  of  the  Barcids  had  penetrated 
the  wild  and  dangerous  table-land.  West  and  north  and  centre 
alike  were  filled  with  hardy  barbarians,  hungry  for  plunder 
and  glory,  simple,  restless,  chivalrous.  These  freebooters  and 
guerrilleros  were  dangerous  enough  in  battle,  with  their  heavy 
column  and  short  sharp  swords,  and  died  heroically  behind  their 
strong  walls  ;  but  their  hasty  levies,  loose  in  combination  and 
lacking  in  discipline,  were  apt  to  melt  away  like  a  Highland  army 
of  Montrose.  The  Roman  government,  as  successor  to  Carthage, 
had  now  to  determine  its  wavering  frontier,  to  round  off  its  pos- 
sessions by  the  reduction  of  the  two  Castiles  (Celtiberia),  and  to 
repress  the  incursions  of  the  tribes  of  Portugal  and  of  the  yet 
unvisited  north. 

Character  of  the  Spanish  Wars. — Rome  had  retained  Spain,  for 
military  and  commercial  reasons,  in  spite  of  the  cost,  the  distance, 
and  the  dislike  to  the  sea  and  the  service,  which  rose  occasionally 
to  mutiny,  in  spite  even  of  the  fact  that  the  maintenance  of  a 
standing  garrison  of  experienced  troops  led  directly  to  a  state  of 
things  subversive  of  her  miHtary  and  political  system.  Prolonga- 
tion of  sei-vice,  and  the  use  of  volunteers,  veterans  and  mercenaries, 
favoured  the  rise  of  a  professional  army.  The  disastrous  and 
fatiguing  campaigns  were  a  constant  drain  on  Italy.  The  frequent 
prorogation  and  the  independence  of  the  commands  reacted  on 
the  character  of  the  officers.  The  uncertain  nature  of  the  warfare, 
the  scantiness  of  the  booty,  and  the  unsatisfied  greed  of  ever- 
changing  officers,  helped  to  give  a  stamp  of  treachery,  avarice,  and 
violence  to  the  Spanish  struggle ;  and  here,  too,  the  system  of  annual 
rehefs  was  especially  ruinous.     For  the  actual  fighting  we  have,  as 


IV A /^S  IN  SPAIN  241 

usual,  no  trustworthy  authorities.  The  vagueness  of  the  geography 
and  ethnography  assists  the  family  annalist  to  confuse  our  accounts. 
A  want  of  continuity  and  the  ever-capricious  character  of  irregular 
warfare  adds  to  the  already  abundant  difficulties  of  military  opera- 
tions in  this  country.  A  sudden  tide  of  war  as  suddenly  ebbs, 
leaving  nothing  behind  but  the  bones  of  a  defeated  legion.  Sur- 
prises, stratagems,  victories  and  defeats,  succeed  each  other.  In 
195  B.C.  M.  Porcius  Cato,  as  consul,  began  the  whole  task  of 
subjugation  afresh,  starting  from  the  port  of  Emporia;,  but  his 


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apparently  thorough  work  had  to  be  repeated  again  and  again. 
Fighting  went  on  in  both  provinces.  There  is  the  old  series  of 
defeats,  regularly  compensated  by  victories.  We  may  well  doubt 
the  numbers  of  the  towns  taken  and  the  men  slain,  but  in  the  end 
Rome  succeeded.  The  most  permanent  results  were  achieved  by 
L.  yEmilius  Paullus(i89  B.C.),  by  C.  Calpurnius  over  the  Lusitanians 
(185  B.C.),  by  Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus  over  the  Celtiberians  (181  B.C.),  and 
most  notably  by  Ti.  Sempronius  Gracchus  (179-178  B.C.),  who  by 
policy  more   than  arms   secured   the   fruits   of  conquest.     Rome's 

Q 


242  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

sovereignty  was  recognised  and  the  rights  of  the  communities 
secured  by  wise  and  equitable  treaties.  The  chieftains  were 
attracted  to  her  service ;  in  the  Spanish  contingents  she  gained 
vakiable  troops  ;  the  tribesmen  were  settled  in  new  towns.  The 
name  of  Gracchus  was  gratefully  remembered,  and  it  was  only 
the  greed  and  cruelty  of  his  successors  which  broke  up  a  peace 
of  thirty  years,  and  prevented  the  natural  extension  of  organised 
government  over  the  divided  tribes.  As  yet,  Spain  was  treated  with 
consideration  ;  the  tributary  communities  paid  fixed  and  moderate 
money  taxes.  Saguntum,  Gades,  and  Tarraco  became  allies  of  the 
Roman  people.  It  was  the  complaint  of  the  Spaniards  (171  B.C.) 
that  gave  the  first  impulse  to  the  commission  De  Repetundis,  and 
to  protect  them  special  decrees  were  passed.  The  intention  of  the 
government  was  good  ;  its  arm  was  weak. 

Celtiberian  War. — Trouble  broke  out  again  in  154  and  153 
B.C.,  when  the  Belli  and  Titthi,  refusing  acquiescence  in  certain 
demands — a  dispute  in  which  each  party  relied  on  their  version  of 
the  Gracchan  arrangements  and  recent  precedents — were  attacked 
by  the  consul  Q.  Fulvius  Nobilior.  He  allowed  himself  to  be 
surprised  among  the  mountains  (153  B.C.),  and  in  following  up  the 
victorious  but  retiring  enemy  towards  Numantia  was  again  de- 
feated. Ocilis  also,  with  its  magazines,  surrendered.  About  the 
same  time  the  Lusitanians  (154  B.C.),  under  Punicus,  severely  de- 
feated the  southern  army,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the  Vettones,  inflicted 
on  it  a  second  defeat  (153  B.C.)  by  the  banks  of  the  Tagus.  Their 
further  advance  was  checked  by  the  praetor  L.  Mummius. 

The  good  results  obtained  in  the  north  by  the  abler  strategy  and 
humaner  methods  of  M.  Marcellus  (152- 151  B.C.),  who  induced  the 
Arevaci,  the  Belli,  and  Titthi  to  submit,  confirming  a  peace  under 
the  walls  of  Numantia,  were  disturbed  by  the  grasping  greed  of 
L.  Lucullus.^  Having  treacherously  attacked  the  peaceful  and 
independent  Vaccasi,  by  the  massacre  of  the  inhabitants  of  Cauca 
(near  Segovia),  after  terms  accepted,  he  closed  the  gates  of  other 
cities  to  his  disappointed  avarice.  At  Intercatia  the  starving 
invaders  owed  their  supplies  and  a  safe  retreat  to  the  pledged 
word  of  the  military  tribune  y^milianus.  The  siege  of  Pallantia 
was  raised,  and  the  beaten  and  baffled  general  was  pursued  to 
the  Douro.  Thence  he  proceeded  south  to  support  his  worthy 
colleague,  Sulpicius  Galba,  who  had  been  defeated  by  the  Lusi- 

^  He  had  been  imprisoned  with  his  colleague  by  the  tribunes  for  severity 
in  conscription,  when  the  example  of  the  younger  Scipio  alone  produced  the 
necessary  supply  of  officers. 


VIRIA  THUS  243 

tanians.  Next  year  this  same  Galba  perfidiously  massacred  or 
enslaved  7000  surrendered  and  unsuspecting  tribesmen  (150  B.C.). 
Viriathus. — The  revolted  conscience  of  Rome  yielded,  in  spite 
of  Gate's  protests,  to  the  persuasions  of  rhetoric  and  the  purse. 
Cialba  evaded  conviction,  but  from  that  massacre  was  kindled  a 
"fiery  war."  Viriathus  had  escaped,  to  show  himself,  for  the  next 
ten  years,  a  master  of  irregular  fighting.  Wily  as  brave,  the  low- 
descended,  homely  prince,  with  his  fine  figure,  enduring  frame, 
and  temperate  habits,  fired  by  language  and  example  his  de- 
spondent countrymen,  and  beat,  bafifled,  and  broke  his  blind 
and  clumsy  opponents.  His  is  the  one  figure  that  attracts  our 
sympathy  in  these  sordid  and  squalid  campaigns.  In  149  B.C.  he 
saved  the  surrounded  and  despairing  Lusitanians  from  destruc- 
tion, held  an  army  in  check  for  two  days  with  1000  horse,  trapped, 
defeated,  and  killed  Vetilius,  and  scattered  the  allies  who  came 
to  the  Romans'  rescue.  In  the  three  succeeding  years  three 
Roman  generals  succumbed.  Legion  after  legion  vanished  in  the 
defiles  of  the  mountains,  whose  tops  were  crowned  with  trophies 
of  Roman  arms.  At  last  (146  B.C.)  the  Senate,  free  from  the 
pressure  of  the  African  and  Macedonian  wars,  despatched  Scipio's 
brother,  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  with  two  legions  to  the  Farther  pro- 
vince, supported  by  C.  Lselius  in  Hither  Spain.  The  raw  levies 
and  demoralised  veterans  distinctly  failed,  till  a  stricter  discipline 
enabled  Fabius  to  gain  the  upper  hand  (144  B.C.).  But  no  real 
impression  was  made.  His  successor,  Quinctius,  after  repeated 
disasters,  shut  himself  up  in  Corduba,  leaving  Viriathus  to  ravage 
the  southern  districts.  Fabius'  brother  by  adoption,  Servilianus, 
arriving  with  fresh  forces,  experienced  the  capricious  character  of 
Spanish  fighting.  He  penetrated  Lusitania,  but  after  some  hard- 
won  successes,  marked  by  extreme  cruelty,  he  was  defeated  (141 
B.C.)  before  Erisane,  cut  off,  and  compelled  to  treat.  The  barbarian 
hero  of  this  new  Caudine  Forks  made  no  reprisals.  Peace  was 
confirmed,  Rome  recognising  the  independence  of  Lusitania  under 
its  chosen  chief.  Viriathus  had  mistaken  his  enemies.  Secretly 
supported  by  the  indignant  Senate,  Servilianus'  brother  and  suc- 
cessor, Q.  Servilius  C^epio  (140  B.C.),  by  intrigue  and  perfidy  forced  on 
the  war.  Viriathus  evaded  a  conflict,  and  in  1 39  B.C.,  pressed  on  both 
sides,  Popillius  Lt^nas  co-operating  from  the  north,  sued  for  peace. 
A  series  of  harsh  orders  were  executed  by  the  natives,  till  finally 
their  arms  were  demanded.  The  fate  of  Carthage  was  still  fresh 
in  men's  minds,  but  the  refusal  it  prompted  came  too  late.  Cfepio 
had  suborned  the  chieftain's  nearest  friends,  and  Viriathus  was 


244  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

stabbed  in  his  bed.  His  successor,  Tautamus,  proved  unequal  to 
the  task,  and  Lusitania  was  disarmed.  The  pacification  of  the 
country  was  completed  by  D.  Junius  Brutus  (138  and  137  B.C.),  and 
the  iristc  cf  contiuncliosuDi  bclliim  came  to  a  close. 

Numantia. — A  yet  more  disgraceful  war  had  arisen  in  the 
Hither  province.  Viriathus'  success  had  roused  the  Celtiberian 
tribes,  especially  the  Arevaci,  in  their  chief  towns  of  Termantia  and 
Numantia.  The  latter  (Guarray,  on  the  Upper  Douro),  strong  both 
by  art  and  nature,  perched  on  its  fortified  precipices,  girdled  by  two 
rivers,  with  its  one  passage  to  the  plain  blocked  by  mounds  and 
trenches,  held  at  bay  for  twelve  years  the  gigantic  resources  of 
Rome.  It  was  strong  in  its  position  and  its  distance,  but  it  was 
stronger  still  in  the  incapacity  of  Roman  generals. 

By  142  B.C.,  indeed,  Q.  Cciscilius  Metellus  Macedonicus  had  re- 
duced the  Celtiberians  except  the  two  towns,  which  a  demand  for 
disarmament  had  at  the  last  moment  thrown  back  into  obstinate 
resistance.  But  his  successor,  Q.  Pompeius,  a  noviis  /loiiio,^  with 
an  army  four  times  the  fighting  population  of  the  city,  was  twice 
defeated  and  compelled  to  negotiate.  Termantia  then  came  in  ; 
but  the  Numantine  peace,  made  on  moderate  conditions,  was 
shamelessly  disowned  by  the  wretched  lawyer  on  his  successor's 
arrival,  and  the  Senate  adopted  his  action.  Leenas  resumed  the 
siege,  and  was  in  turn  routed  (138  B.C.).  But  the  crowning  disgrace 
befell  C.  Hostilius  Mancinus(i37  B.C.)  and  his  demoralised  mob  of 
insubordinate  "men  with  swords."  A  disgraceful  panic  ended  in 
a  shameful  capitulation.  That  even  this  was  permitted  was  due 
alone  to  respect  for  the  word  of  Ti.  Gracchus,  the  noble  son  of  an 
upright  father,  and  the  collective  oath  of  the  staff.  Numantia  un- 
wisely took  no  hostages,  and  the  ecjuitable  treaty  was  repudiated  by 
the  Senate.  Mancinus,  the  scapegoat  of  the  army,  was  delivered  to 
the  enemy,  stripped  and  chained,  and  shivered  a  whole  day  in  his 
shirt  before  the  closed  gates  of  the  indignant  town.  The  disaster 
and  the  farce  alike  was  a  still  more  shabby  version  of  the  affair 
of  Caudium.  Mancinus'  colleague,  Lepidus,  keeping  his  hand  in 
by  an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  Vaccaei,  was  half  destroyed  as  he 
retreated  from  Pallantia  (136  B.C.). 

Scipio  ^milianus. — At  last,  in  134  B.C.,  Rome's  only  general, 
y'Emilianus,  the  conqueror  of  Carthage,  was  elected  consul  for  the 
second  time,  for  this  special  service,  before  the  lapse  of  the  proper 
interval.     Stingily  supplied  by  the  Senate,  he  strengthened  his  army 

1  i.e.,  the  first  of  his  family  to  obtain  curule  office. 


NUMANTIA  245 

with  allied  troops,  and  protected  his  person  by  a  guard,  or  cohorspra- 
ioria  of  500  friends  and  clients.  Under  his  command  met  Jugurtha 
and  Gaius  Marius.  He  purged  the  camp  of  its  train  of  courtesans, 
sutlers,  and  soothsayers,  of  its  luxurious  furniture  and  baggage- 
train.  A  course  of  merciless  drilling,  marching,  and  trenching  was 
seasoned  with  bitter  contempt.  Finally,  with  60,000  men  against 
8000,  fighting  his  battles  with  the  spade  against  an  enemy  ready 
with  the  sword,  he  drew  a  double  line  of  circumvallation  more 
than  five  miles  long,  according  to  the  strictest  science,  round  the 
doomed  city.  The  Douro  was  blocked  by  a  boom,  and  a  gallant 
effort  at  relief  was  bloodily  thwarted.  Only  in  the  last  extremity 
the  gan-ison  surrendered  (133  B.C.),  as  "brave men  to  the  mercy  of 
the  brave.''  The  big  battalions  had  won  by  famine.  Those  who  had 
not  perished  by  their  own  hand  were  sold  as  slaves,  and  the  city  was 
razed.  All  resistance  was  now  broken,  and  this,  added  to  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  able  and  generous  Decimus  Brutus,  who  had  settled 
Lusitania,  founded  Valentia  (138  B.C.),  and  crushed  the  Gallasci  (136 
B.C.),  completed  the  subjugation  of  Spain.  No  doubt  in  the  Asturian 
mountains  work  was  left  for  Augustus  and  Agrippa,  while  brigand- 
age and  guerrilla  fighting  went  on,  but  there  was  no  more  national 
war  in  Spain.  In  its  i-eorganisation  by  Scipio  and  the  Senate's  com- 
mission the  lines  laid  down  by  Gracchus  were  followed.  The  grow- 
ing prosperity  of  the  land  was  further  secured  when  Q.  Metellus 
Baliaricus  suppressed  piracy  in  the  Baliaric  Islands  (123  B.C.). 
Roman  culture  took  deep  root  ;  commerce  and  agriculture  flour- 
ished in  the  best  administered  of  the  Roman  provinces. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

FIFTY    YEARS    OF    CONQUEST 
AFRICA 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Massinissa  and  Carthage— Siege  of  Carthage  .     149-146        605-608 

Scipio  ^milianus— Province  of  Africa    ....     146  608 

Carthag-e  and  Massinissa. — The  policy  of  Rome  in  Africa  was  to 
harass  Carthage,  while  maintaining  a  rough  balance  of  power.  The 
settlement  of  201  B.C.  had  left,  in  the  vagueness  of  the  clause  secur- 
ing the  territorial  rights  of  Numidia,  especially  as  interpreted  by  the 


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IS 

CARTHAGE   AND   AfASS/N/SSA  247 

nervous  partiality  of  the  Senate,  and  in  the  prohibition  of  war  with 
Rome's  alhes,  two  powerful  weapons  for  the  vindictive  and  am- 
bitious Massinissa.  Under  the  conduct  of  Hannibal  the  city  had 
rapidly  recovered.  The  finances  had  been  reorganised  and  the 
go\'ernment  reformed  in  a  democratic  sense  ;  the  indemnity  was 
being  discharged  as  fast  as  Rome  would  permit,  and  Hannibal 
himself  was  looking  hopefully  to  the  East,  when,  in  195  B.C.,  on  the 
eve  of  the  war  with  Antiochus,  he  was  denounced  by  the  oligarchs 
and  Roman  spies  and  his  surrender  demanded.  The  sufitete  fled  ; 
his  house  was  razed,  his  goods  confiscated,  and  in  the  ferment  of 
parties  the  Romanising  oligarchs  took  the  lead.  But  even  now  the 
unjust  judges  at  Rome  encouraged  the  Numidian  king's  encroach- 
ments. The  patient  Phrenicians,  loyal  to  their  engagements,  what- 
ever the  continual  rumours  to  the  contrary,  appealed  regularly  to 
the  suzerain,  only  to  receive  the  visits  of  commissions,  who  discussed, 
reported,  adjourned,  and  carried  back  stories  of  the  imperishable 
wealth  of  the  populous  and  prosperous  city.  The  fertile  districts  of 
the  Emporia,  on  the  Lesser  Syrtis,  were  already  gone,  and  Carthage 
had  actually  paid  a  large  indemnity  to  the  aggressor,  when,  after 
an  interval  of  apparent  peace,  fresh  robberies  produced  fresh  com- 
plaints, and  the  bitter  cry  for  justice  or  downright  subjection  drew 
some  little  succour.  For  the  times  were  still  critical,  and  Massi- 
nissa had  grown  too  strong.  On  the  ruins  of  Syphax's  nomad 
state  he  had  founded  a  real  kingdom.  With  the  favour  of  Rome, 
he  had  thrown  a  girdle  of  annexation  round  Carthage,  his  destined 
capital,  from  the  borders  of  Mauretania  to  the  sands  of  Cyrene. 
He  had  filled  his  treasury,  settled  his  people,  and  formed  an  army. 
He  was  a  true  king  and  tried  soldier,  tough  and  unscrupulous, 
as  temperate  and  enduring  as  he  was  supple  and  cunning,  who 
lived  strongly  every  hour  of  his  ninety  years.  He  had  created  a 
capital  at  Cirta,  had  fostered  a  mingled  Libyan  and  Punic  civilisa- 
tion destined  to  a  vigorous  life,  and  founded  a  nation.  He  had 
now  to  learn,  in  spite  of  all  his  help  in  the  Spanish  and  Eastern 
wars,  of  all  his  self-abasing  flattery,  that  the  day  of  vassal  king- 
doms was  over.  A  wiser  policy  would  have  kept  the  balance,  as 
Hiero  had  done  at  Syracuse,  between  the  rival  states  of  Rome 
and  Carthage. 

Cato  and  Carthage. — In  157  B.C.  the  commission  under  M.  Por- 
cius  Cato,  which,  after  long  delay,  came  to  deal  with  the  seizure  by 
Numidia  of  Tusca  and  the  plains  by  the  Bagradas,  left  the  question 
undecided,  but  brought  back  the  settled  conviction  that  closed  each 
speech  of  the   narrow-minded   censor  with   the   phrase,  "  Censeu 


248  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

clelendam  esse  Carthaginem."  Her  docks  and  shipping,  her  fair 
gardens  and  crowded  streets,  her  full  treasurj'  and  arsenals,  con- 
demned her.  In  vain  Scipio  Nasica  and  the  minority  protested. 
The  annexationists  prevailed,  supported  as  they  were  by  the  in- 
fluence of  commercial  jealousy,  of  the  old  natural  and  nervous 
hatred,  and  of  the  zeal,  eloquence,  and  enthusiasm  of  the  aged 
and  powerful  Cato.  Crippled,  insulted,  robbed,  Carthage  was  still  a 
terror  to  Rome,  an  eyesore  to  her  commerce.  The  casus  belli  was 
not  far  to  seek.  In  a  struggle  of  factions  the  national  democrats 
had  banished  some  partisans  of  Numidia,  and  refused  their  re- 
instatement at  the  cost  of  war  and  in  spite  of  the  persuasions  or 
commands  of  Rome. 

In  151  P..C.  the  vain  and  corpulent  Hasdrubal  had  been 
thoroughly  beaten  by  Massinissa  under  the  eyes  of  yEmilianus, 
sent  to  Africa  to  get  elephants  for  the  Spanish  amiy.  The  peace 
Scipio  mediated  broke  down.  The  Punic  troops  surrendered,  were 
disarmed  and  massacred.  Now  that  the  hard  work  was  done, 
Rome,  who  had  watched  with  secret  pleasure  her  allies  cut  each 
other's  throats,  pushed  aside  her  disappointed  agent  and  appeared 
as  principal. 

Breach  with  Carthage. — The  treaty  had  been  broken,  an  ally 
attacked,  Rome's  demand  for  disarmament  neglected,  her  legates 
even  roughly  handled — at  least  such  was  the  plea — and  the  enemy 
had  already  fallen.  She  prepared  for  war,  and  Utica,  at  odds 
with  Carthage,  at  once  surrendered,  affording  Rome  a  strong  and 
convenient  base.  In  vain  Carthage  condemned  her  leaders  to 
death  and  offered  every  satisfaction.  In  149  B.C.  Manilius  and 
Censorinus,  with  an  unusually  powerful  force,  left  Lilyb^eum  with 
secret  orders.  Before  they  left,  the  Punic  plenipotentiaries  had 
made  an  absolute  submission.  It  was  accepted,  and  they  were 
guaranteed,  on  condition  of  giving  up  300  hostages  and  "  obeying 
such  further  commands  as  should  be  imposed  by  the  consuls," 
their  liberty,  laws,  territory,  all  but  the  city  itself. 

The  ominous  conditions  and  equally  ominous  omission  were 
marked,  but  not  realised.  Though  the  hostages  were  sent,  the  army 
sailed,  and  on  its  arrival  at  Utica  the  master-stroke  of  perfidy 
was  played.  The  "further  orders"  were  issued  one  by  one.  At 
last,  when  walls  were  stripped,  arms  delivered,  ships  surrendered, 
came  the  fatal  command  to  destroy  the  city  and  settle  ten  miles 
from  the  beloved  sea.  It  was  a  sentence  of  death.  The  ancient 
feeling  for  hearth  and  home,  the  gods  and  the  dead,  for  the  sacred 
city  and  its  hallowed  soil,  for  their  harbours  and  their  seas,  fed  by 


CARTHAGE 

and  its  Nfighbourliood. 


^cjT^^fc^  H/^n  ill- 


Jow  <f  X«<fS,i  Rom  Mist 

l^OTi^mans .  Oreeru^  Ca^Londart-.N^eAyTbrh'ti^ Bombay: 


TIURD   PUNIC    WAR  249 

all  the  power  of  Punic  patience,  of  Semitic  hatred  and  passionate 
indignation  at  the  shameless  mockery  of  right,  blazed  out  in  a 
frenzy  of  despair. 

Material  and  hands  were  abundant.  The  whole  town  became 
a  workshop  of  war,  in  which  men  and  women  toiled  alike.  A  truce 
of  thirty  days,  granted  by  mistaken  policy  and  utilised  with  super- 
human energy,  concealed  by  a  still  more  marvellous  coolness,  pre- 
pared for  the  consuls  a  surprise  as  ugly  as  their  own.  The  city, 
armed  in  a  month,  twice  repelled  an  assault  ;  and  Hasdrubal,  with 
20,000  men  outside  the  walls,  prevented  a  formal  blockade. 

Site  of  Carthage. — The  city  proper  lay  on  the  southern  portion 
of  a  low  peninsula  jutting  into  the  Gulf  of  Tunis,  between  Capes 
Farina  and  Bon.  Except  on  the  west,  it  is  encompassed  by  water, 
and  the  isthmus  which  connects  it  with  the  mainland  is  about 
two  miles  broad,  expanding  towards  the  east,  and  running  up 
into  hills  at  the  seaward  extremity.  On  one  of  these  stood  the 
citadel  (Byrsa)  of  the  old  town,  which  was  covered  on  the  land- 
ward side  by  the  most  massive  fortifications  of  antiquity.  The 
wall,  forty-five  feet  in  height,  was  towered  and  battlemented  and 
furnished  with  vast  casemates,  sending  as  stables,  store-rooms,  and 
barracks,  the  whole  extending  to  a  breadth  of  thirty-three  feet. 
Slighter  lines  protected  the  rich  and  beautiful  suburb  (Megara  or 
JMagalia),  which,  with  the  necropolis,  filled  the  remainder  of  the 
peninsula  to  the  north  and  west.  At  the  south-east  corner  lay  the 
double  artificial  harbour — the  inner  circular  basin  (Cothon),  with 
the  port-admiral's  house  on  the  central  island,  strongly  fortified 
by  the  city  wall — and  the  outer  rectangular  commercial  harbour, 
with  its  broad  quays  and  weaker  walls,  and  an  extension  quay 
running  along  its  seaward  side.  From  this  point  a  long  narrow 
tongue  of  land  ran  out  south,  almost  wholly  shutting  off  the 
shallow  lake  of  Tunis,  which,  washing  the  south  side  of  the  city, 
formed  a  station  for  ships  of  lighter  draught. 

The  defence  was  conducted  by  Hasdrubal,  a  grandson  of  Mas- 
sinissa,  with  whom  co-operated  the  army  of  Numidian  rebels  and 
Punic  emigrants  under  Hasdrubal  the  Fat.  The  Numidian  cavalry 
of  Himilco  Phameas  were  especially  useful.  Manilius  lay  on  the 
isthmus,  while  Censorinus  operated  from  the  tongue  (Taenia)  and 
the  bay,  where  the  wall  was  weakest.  The  attack  was  repulsed. 
The  inactivity  and  death  of  Massinissa,  disease,  and  famine  crippled 
the  Roman  offensive.  An  expedition  against  Hasdrubal  ended  in 
disgrace,  and  the  year's  work  redounded  only  to  the  credit  of  the 
tribune  Scipio,  who  crowned  his  brilliant  exploits  as  a  soldier  by 


250  Iirr.TORV  OF  ROME 

the  skilful  diplomacy  with  which  he  settled  the  Berber  king's  in- 


Kew'  Onllet 


PLAN   OF   HARBOURS   AT  CARTHAGE. 


heritance  among  his  sons,  Micipsa,  (ailussa,  and  Mastanabal,  and 


SIEGE   OE  CARTHAGE  251 

induced  Himilco  to  bring  over  his  light  horse,  earning  by  his 
energy  the  praise  of  tlie  veteran  Cato,  as  the  one  man  among 
the  gliding  shades. 

Numidia  was  left,  by  a  precarious  arrangement,  to  the  common 
rule,  witli  divided  functions,  of  its  three  heirs.  The  next  year, 
148  B.C.,  was  spent  in  futile  attacks  on  the  coast-towns,  while 
Carthage  received  the  deserter  Bithyas,  with  800  Numidian  horse, 
and  negotiated  with  the  pseudo-Philip  of  Macedon. 

Appointment  of  Scipio.  —  In  147  B.C.  Publius  Scipio,  the  adopted 
grandson  of  the  hero  of  Zama,  son  of  L.  yEmilius  Paullus,  a  dis- 
tinguished officer  and  gifted  statesman,  by  popular  favour  and 
family  influence  was  elected  consul,  contrary  to  law,  at  the  age 
of  thirty-seven,  and  appointed  specially  to  the  African  command. 
He  was  thorough,  if  not  brilliant,  and  it  is  highly  probable  that 
his  services  have  been  overcoloured  by  the  partial  estimate  of  his 
friend  Polybius.  Purging  the  demoralised  camp,  he  tightened  up 
the  relaxed  discipline  and  restored  the  tone  of  the  army.  He  had 
simply  to  apply  overwhelming  resources  with  patience  and  persist- 
ence. Arriving  at  a  critical  moment,  he  rescued  Mancinus,  who 
had  contrived,  by  a  bold  stroke,  to  isolate  himself  on  a  cliff  on  the 
steep  seaward  side  of  Magalia,  whence  he  could  neither  advance 
nor  retreat. 

The  Siege. — The  siege  began  in  form.  Hasdrubal  and  Bithyas, 
who  had  drawn  close  to  Carthage,  were  forced  to  enter  the  city, 
abandoning  the  isthmus  and  the  suburb.  But  Scipio,  despairing 
of  a  storm,  neglected  the  advantage,  and  drew  a  double  line  across 
the  isthmus  from  sea  to  sea.  The  usual  struggle  of  fanatics  and 
moderates  ensued  in  the  beleaguered  city,  followed  by  a  cot/p  cPctaf 
and  the  murder  of  Roman  prisoners  and  partisans.  Hasdrubal 
received  dictatorial  power.  Carthage  had  numbered  700,000  souls 
at  the  beginning  of  the  siege,  and  in  the  narrow  compass  of  the 
old  city,  the  remnant,  crowded,  starved,  and  diseased,  depended 
for  supplies  on  the  brilliant  blockade-running  of  Bithyas  and  the 
daring  merchantmen.  To  complete  his  work,  Scipio  constructed  a 
mole,  ninety-six  feet  broad,  from  the  north  end  of  the  Taenia,  to 
close  the  harbour-mouth.  Its  approaching  success  silenced  the 
scoffs  of  the  besieged,  but  the  laugh  turned  once  more  when  out 
of  a  new  passage,  pierced  by  the  silent  and  secret  work  of  two 
months,  in  the  narrow  eastern  wall  of  the  Cothon,  a  new-built  fleet 
of  fifty  ships  put  out  to  sea.  Losing'  the  chance  of  a  sudden  attack 
on  Scipio's  dismantled  fleet,  they  returned  on  the  third  day,  to 
fight  an  indecisive  battle,  and  suffered  severe  damage  in  effecting 


252 


mSTOA'V  OF  ROME 


their  return  through  the  narrow 
entry.  Scipio  now  attacked  the 
outer  quay,  defended  for  the 
emergency  by  a  hasty  rampart. 
Once  the  assault  was  baffled 
with  splendid  courage,  but  a 
lodgment  was  at  length  effected, 
a  position  fortified  on  the  quays, 
and  the  blockade  completed. 
The  fall  of  Nepheris,  whence 
the  supplies  had  been  thrown 
in,  left  famine  and  pestilence  to 
do  the  rest,  and  yet  Hasdrubal 
rejected  terms  for  himself  and 
his  friends. 

Carthage  Taken  and  De- 
stroyed.— Inthespringof  146B.C., 
when  these  strong  allies  had 
reduced  the  starving  city  to  de- 
spair, Scipio  advanced  to  storm. 
The  outer  harbour  was  evacu- 
ated and  burned,  and,  unper- 
ceived  in  the  smoke  and  tumult, 
C.  Ltelius  scaled  the  wall  and 
pushed  into  the  Cothon.  From 
the  adjoining  market-place  the 
legions  forced  their  way  in  a 
prolonged  and  bloody  street- 
fight,  from  storey  to  storey,  from 
house  to  house,  up  the  three 
narrow  lanes  that  led  to  the 
citadel.  On  the  seventh  day  the 
remnant  on  the  Byrsa,  50,000 
men  and  women,  surrendered. 
Hasdrubal,  who,  with  the  Roman 
deserters,  had  fled  to  the  huge 
and  lofty  temple  of  Eshmun  on 
the  citadel  rock,  escaped  at  the 
last  moment  from  the  flames, 
in  which  his  comrades  and  his 
wife,  with  bitter  taunts  on  the 
dastard,  perished. 


FALL    OF  CARTHAGE  25.3 

By  special  orders  from  Rome  the  city  was  burned,  its  site 
ploughed  up  and  cursed.  With  vast  booty,  Scipio  returned  in 
triumph,  a  triumph  chastened  by  melancholy  forebodings  for  the 
future  of  Rome  herself.  As  lie  gazed  on  the  fire,  that  burned  for 
seventeen  days,  he  burst  into  tears,  and  the  line  escaped  his  lips — 

^aaerai  ^/n-ap  orav  ttot    6\il'\y  "IXios  ipr]. 

Of  the  captives,  Hasdrubal,  whose  services  have  deserved 
perhaps  better  terms  than  those  bestowed  by  Polybius  on  the 
"pot-bellied,  strutting,  and  incapable  coward,  glutton,  and  tyrant," 
remained  a  prisoner  in  Italy.     The  rest  died  in  chains  or  slavery. 

Africa  a  Province. — Africa  became  a  province  (stretching  along 
the  coast  from  the  Tusca  to  Thena;),  whose  capital  was  the  free 
city  of  Utica,  the  centre  of  Roman  trade.  It  paid  a  moderate 
stipendium,  or  definite  fixed  tribute,  raised  directly  from  the  subject 
communities,  who  kept  their  lands  and  liberties  on  sufiferance. 
The  allied  cities  were  declared  free  ;  the  territory  of  those  destroyed 
was  leased  as  domain  land  by  the  censors.  Numidia,  with  definite 
limits,  was  left  to  defend  the  frontier,  and  retained  its  possessions, 
surrounding  the  province  on  three  sides. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

FIFTY    YEARS    OF    CONQUEST 
THE   EASTERN    STATES   AND    THE   SECOND    MACEDONIAN    WAR 

B.C.      A.U.C. 

Rome  declares  war  on  Philip  200  554 

Flamininus  appointed  General 198  556 

Battle  of  Cynoscephalae 197  557 

Peace  made— Settlement  of  Greece 196  558 

The  Eastern  States.— The  story  of  the  nations  beyond  the 
Adriatic  concerns  us  only  so  far  as  they  enter  the  Roman  sphere 
of  influence.  Even  so,  it  is  difficult  enough  to  give  any  brief  and 
clear  account  of  the  internal  condition  of  the  several  communi- 
ties, or  of  their  constantly  changing  relations  to  each  other  at 
this  epoch.  The  powers  of  the  East  may  be  roughly  classified 
as  monarchies  and  free  republics,  from  which  standpoint  we  may 
say,  on  the  whole,  that  Rome  and  the  free  states  stood  together 


254  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

.igainst  tlie  kings  ;  or  they  may  be  di\icled  into  essentially  peace- 
ful and  essentially  aggressive  states,  when  Rome  may  be  said  to 
give  support  to  the  pacific  governments. 

Macedon.— Of  the  three  great  monarchies  carved  by  his  suc- 
cessors out  of  the  empire  of  Alexander,  which  maintained  at  this 
time  an  unstable  equilibrium,  Macedon,  under  the  personal  rule  of 
I'hilip  V.  (B.C.  220-179),  was  the  soundest  and  strongest.  The 
vigorous  peasantry,  although  wasted  by  war  and  by  the  recent 
incursions  of  the  Gauls,  retained  its  national  spirit  and  its  ancient 
fidehty  to  the  half-constitutional  despotism  of  its  kings.  Her 
compact  and  imposing  phalanx,  the  one  genuine  fighting-force 
of  the  East,  except  the  Parthian  cavalry,  with  her  hold  on  the 
"fetters  of  Greece,"  the  fortresses  of  Demetrias,  Chalcis,  and 
Corinth,  made  Macedon  the  dominant  power  in  Greece,  ^tolia 
had  been  humbled  in  the  "  Social  War,"  which  ended  with  the 
peace  of  Naupactus  (217  B.C.).  Macedon  controlled  Thessaly  ;  she 
held  the  keys  of  the  Peloponnese,  and,  since  Aratus,  dreading  the 
designs  and  jealous  of  the  talents  of  Cleomenes,  the  reformer-king 
of  Sparta,  had  flung  the  Achaean  league  into  her  hands,  Achaean 
policy  followed  her  lead.  Sparta  had  been  crushed  at  Sellasia 
(221  B.C.),  and  only  the  death  of  Antigonus  Doson  and  the  lack  of 
sea-power  had  prevented  the  organisation  of  Macedonian  hege- 
mony. But  neither  the  disposition  and  policy  of  Philip  nor  the 
character  of  his  people  and  their  form  of  government  were  calcu- 
lated to  render  Macedon  the  real  centre  of  Greek  political  life.  The 
meddling  of  the  kings  provoked  reaction  in  the  free  states  ;  the 
race  of  the  Antigonids  had  degenerated  ;  their  efiforts  were  directed 
to  mere  aggrandisement  ;  of  an  Hellenic  ideal  there  is  no  trace. 

Syria. — The  kingdom  of  "Asia,"  under  the  third  Antiochus 
(228-187  B.C.),  nominally  the  premier  state,  with  its  shallow  culture, 
corrupt  court,  and  lax  Oriental  methods,  was  rotten  to  the  core. 
Asiatic  in  its  pretensions  as  in  its  armaments,  it  was  European 
only  in  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  numerous  and  important 
cities.  The  empire  of  the  Seleucids,  supposed  to  extend  from  the 
.(Cgean  to  the  Indus,  was  fast  breaking  up.  Pressed  by  the  rising 
power  of  the  Parthians,  it  was  shedding  its  Eastern  satrapies. 
The  rising  tide  of  Oriental  reaction  was  steadily  thrusting  back  the 
intruders  from  the  West.  In  Asia  Minor  it  kept  a  wavering  grasp 
on  its  possessions  in  Caria,  Phrygia,  and  Lydia,  and  on  the  narrow 
line  of  communication  that  passed  inland  through  level  Cilicia  to 
Antioch.  From  the  sea  it  was  cut  off  in  almost  every  direction  by 
the  naval  power  of  Egypt.     Its  ever-active  kings,  pushing  their 


THE  EASTERN  STATES  255 

dynastic  interests,  and  engaged  in  constant  interference  abroad  and 
constant  struggle  at  home,  held  together  as  they  could  a  loose 
aggregate  of  half-independent  provinces,  autonomous  towns,  and 
restless  tribes,  a  Greek  caricature  of  the  empire  of  Darius. 

Egypt. — Egypt  in  the  hands  of  the  Lagidae  and  their  clever 
ministers,  with  a  centralised  administration,  squeezing  an  ample 
revenue  from  the  passive  fellaheen,  and  pursuing  an  unscrupulous, 
clear-sighted,  and  selfish  policy,  had  used  her  favourable  strategic 
position  to  extend  her  dominion  and  influence.  The  state  en- 
couraged art,  enterprise,  and  inquiry  with  a  business  eye,  and 
Alexandria  became  at  once  the  centre  of  learning  and  of  Eastern 
commerce.  The  first  financial  and  maritime  power  of  the  Levant, 
she  had  annexed  Cyrene  and  Cyprus,  Coelesyria  and  Phoenicia. 
Her  influence  was  predominant  along  the  southern  coast  of  Asia 
Minor — West  Cilicia,  Pamphylia,  Lycia.  She  had  stations  in  the 
^gean,  at  Ephesus,  Samos,  and  elsewhere  ;  she  enjoyed  good 
relations  with  Rhodes,  and  "  protected "  to  some  extent  most  of 
the  towns  and  islands  of  the  Asian  sea-board  up  to  the  Thracian 
shore.  But  this  expansion  demanded  a  strong  hand  and  a  strong 
navy,  and,  by  exposing  her  to  attack,  cost  her  the  privilege  of 
isolation.  Egypt  had  nothing  more  to  get  ;  her  policy  is  now 
directed  to  fostering  the  minor  powers  and  maintaining  the  status 
quo.  But  the  race  of  the  Ptolemies  rapidly  deteriorated.  To 
Ptolemy  II.,  Philadelphus,  the  statesman  who  had  recognised 
Rome  in  273  B.C.,  and  Ptolemy  III.,  Euergetes,  an  energetic  soldier, 
had  succeeded  the  fourth  of  that  name,  Philopator,  an  indolent 
and  vicious  debauchee  (224-204  B.C.).  His  young  son,  Epiphanes 
(204-181  B.C.),  was,  and  remained,  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  a  suc- 
cession of  ministers  whose  resignations  were  effected  by  riot  and 
murder.  The  native  element  asserted  itself  in  politics,  manners 
and  religion,  and  with  its  wild  mobs,  ceaseless  cabals,  and  corrupt 
kings,  the  land  of  the  Pharaohs  drifted  into  the  hands  of  Rome. 

Gauls:  Pergamum,  and  Rhodes. — Omitting  the  states  that  ac- 
knowledged a  nominal  allegiance  to  Syria,  or  those,  like  Pontus  or 
Parthia,  whose  important  but  obscure  development  lies  beyond  our 
present  scope,  there  remain  to  notice  in  Asia  the  Celts,  the  free 
republics,  and  Pergamum.  Bithynia,  indeed,  under  the  able  and 
vigorous  Prusias  I.  (228-185  B.C.),  and  his  son,  Prusias  II.  (c.  185 
to  c.  149  B.C.),  pursued  a  crafty,  and  often  contemptible,  policy 
with  undeserved  success.  But  neither  this  state  nor  Cappadocia 
(Ariarathes  IV.,  220-163  B.C.)  are  of  any  immediate  moment. 

The  Galatian  freebooters  and  mercenaries,  a  race  of  restless 


THE   EASTF.R.V  STATES  257 

intruders,  divided  into  three  tribes,  Tolistoboii,  Trocmi,  and 
Tectosages,  and  organised  in  cantons  under  tetrarchs,  plundered 
right  and  left,  and  were  an  especial  thorn  in  the  side  of  Pergamum 
and  the  Greek  cities.  Pergamum,  in  the  valley  of  the  Caicus,  a 
"miniature  Egypt,"  was  the  domain  of  the  rich  and  sagacious 
Attalids,  whose  power,  founded  on  wealth,  was  maintained  by 
subtle  statesmanship,  by  alliances,  and  the  use  of  mercenary 
troops.  They  had  no  people  behind  them  ;  their  strength  lay  in 
their  strong  citadel  and  in  the  power  of  the  purse,  and  they  acted 
as  champions  of  the  coast-towns  against  the  Celts.  They  played 
off  the  great  states  against  each  other,  and  directed  their  efforts 
to  weakening  their  dangerous  neighbours,  building  a  navy,  foster- 
ing commerce,  and  creating  a  new  school  of  art  and  literature. 
The  reigning  king  of  this  bourgeois  dynasty  was  Attains  I.  (241- 
197  B.C.),  who  inherited  the  possessions  of  his  cousin  Eumenes 
and  his  uncle  Philetasrus,  the  founder  of  the  house.  Last  and 
best  of  all  come  the  free  Greek  cities,  the  centres  of  Greek  culture 
and  civic  freedom,  such  as  Byzantium,  which  attempted  to  control 
the  important  Pontic  trade,  Cyzicus,  Abydos,  the  key  of  the 
Hellespont,  or  Rhodes,  the  great  peace-power  and  head  of  a 
sort  of  Hansa  league  of  the  commercial  coast- towns.  The  good 
position  of  Rhodes  secured  her  a  great  carrying-trade  ;  her 
strong  fleet  policed  the  sea  and  protected  her  allies  ;  her  impar- 
tial policy  and  noble  character  made  her  the  arbitrator  of  the 
yEgean.  For  the  rest,  their  actual  status  largely  depended  on  the 
ever-changing  circumstances  of  the  moment'and  the  presence  of 
strongrer  powers,  curtailing  though  not  destroying  their  theoretical 
freedom. 

Achaean  and  ^Etolian  Leagues. — In  Greece  itself  there  was 
Athens,  the  university  of  the  world,  starving  on  the  memories  of 
her  past,  wisely  if  somewhat  ignobly  neutral,  holding  aloof  from 
general  politics,  while  she  cultivated  good  relations  with  the  sea- 
powers  and  her  ally,  Rome.  In  Sparta,  the  standing  obstacle  to 
Greek  union,  whose  last  chance  perished  with  the  hero  Cleomenes, 
ruled  the  brigand  and  pirate  Nabis  (207-192  B.C.).  Setting  aside 
the  dependencies  of  Macedon,  and  the  petty  communities  of 
Boeotia,  Epirus,  and  Acarnania,  there  remain  but  two  powers  of 
importance,  the  /Etolian  and  Achaean  leagues.  The  constitution 
of  the  rival  leagues  was  in  essential  points  similar.  Each  had  a 
federal  executive,  at  the  head  of  which  stood  the  annual  strategus  ; 
each  apparently  had  a  council,  or  some  sort  of  permanent  com- 
mittee, a  common  centre,  and  general  assemblies,  which  met  for 


258  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  /Etolian  Lcaj,aie  at  Thermon,  for  the  Achaean  at  TEgium.  Tlie 
/Etolians  also  called  meetings  at  Delphi  for  the  benefit  of  their 
outside  members,  while  Philopoemen  later  enabled  the  Achrean 
assemblies  to  meet  in  other  places  than  the  ancestral  and  religious 
centre.  Both  represent  an  important  advance  on  the  old  Greek 
alternative  of  separatism  or  hegemony,  and  the  Achccans  in  par- 
ticular boasted  with  justice  of  the  generosity  and  liberalism  of 
their  institutions.  But  neither  constitution  was  completely  worked 
out,  and  neither  could  overcome  the  disunion  of  Greece.  The 
Etolian  League  was  a  combination  of  peasants,  reckless  and  rest- 
less, the  chartered  libertines  of  Greece,  ready  for  fighting  on  any 
side  and  in  any  land.  They  subsisted  on  plunder  and  their  pay  as 
mercenaries.  At  this  epoch  their  power  was  considerable,  both  in 
Central  Greece,  where  they  held  Delphi,  Thermopylae,  and  Nau- 
pactus  ;  in  the  Peloponnesus,  where  they  controlled  Elis  and  part 
of  Arcadia,  and  on  the  Hellespont,  where  several  important  cities 
were  allies  or  actual  members  of  the  league.  Their  dubious 
policy  was  largely  determined  by  the  rivalries  and  passions  of 
the  moment. 

The  Achffian  Federation  had  a  greater  moral  worth  and  more 
real  significance.  Revived  and  reconstructed  as  the  power  of 
Macedon  waned,  the  ancient  league  gained  political  importance 
by  the  gradual  accession  of  Sicyon,  Corinth,  Megalopolis,  Argos, 
and  other  considerable  towns  in  Peloponnesus,  a  growth  due  in 
the  main  to  the  wealth  and  tactics  of  the  politician  and  diplomatist, 
Aratus.^  To  him  also  was  due  in  part  the  weakness  of  its  military 
organisation,  and  to  his  fear  of  Spartan  hegemony  and  the  social 
revolution  Achasa  owed  her  unworthy  subservience  to  Macedon,  to 
whom  he  sacrificed  the  citadel  of  Corinth.  Under  the  guidance  of 
the  patriotic  soldier,  Philopoemen  (Strat.  208  B.C.,  &c.),  and  later  on 
of  Lycortas,  father  of  Polybius,  the  league  assumed  a  more  dignified 
and  independent  attitude  ;  and,  on  the  whole,  it  stands  out,  by  its 
attempt  at  political  fairness  and  its  genuine  effort  to  effect  the 
union  at  least  of  Peloponnesus,  if  not  of  all  Greece,  in  a  national 
democratic  confederacy  of  a  moderate  type.  The  expansion  of 
Rome  gave  it  no  chance  of  success,  nor  had  it  sufficient  force  to 
maintain  its  independence  of  Macedon  or  overpower  the  nagging 
resistance  of  Sparta,  Elis,  and  Messene.  But  the  real  rock  ahead 
was  the  impatience  of  restraint,  the  invincible  separatism,  the 
intense  party-feeling  which  made  larger  politics  impossible,  which 

^  Born  271  B.C.  ;  poisoned  by  Philip,  213  B.C. 


THE   STATES   OE  GREECE 


259 


preferred  treason  to  compromise,  and  readily  invoked  the  common 
enemy  to  win  a  triumpli  over  a  political  opponent.  To  draw  these 
jarring  atoms  to  a  cohesive  mass  the  league  lacked  both  attractive 
and  coercive  power. 

Philip  V. — Philip  had  the  force  but  not  the  ability.  In  his  con- 
tradictory character  we  trace  a  rapid  deterioration.  Corrupted 
by  power,  the  gifted  if  arrogant  autocrat  of  eighteen,  the  keen 
soldier  and  clever  speaker,  the  strenuous,  active,  and  skilful  king 
degenerated  into  a  bloodthirsty,  grasping,  and  obstinate  despot. 
Bent  on  being  king  indeed,  he  was  misled  by  ill-chosen  counsellors. 
He  mingled  refinement  and  vandalism,  cruelty  and  good-humour, 
indolence  and  restlessness.  His  cold  heart  and  inconstant  pur- 
pose, his  short-sighted  jealousy,  marred  at  the  critical  moment 
the  far-reaching  plans  of  Hannibal,  shattered  his  own  schemes, 
and  alienated  his  natural  allies.  He  lacked  grip  and  concentra- 
tion ;  he  was  incapable  of  conceiving  large  purposes,  and  disgraced 
his  crown  and  his  country  by  the  use  of  poison,  by  aimless 
barbarism  and  sheer  brutality.  To  sum  up  the  situation.  The 
disturbing  elements  in  the  Hellenic  world  were  the  kings  of  Syria 
and  Macedon,  and  the  half-piratic  yEtolian  League  ;  the  powers 
that  made  for  peace  were  Egypt,  Pergamum,  and  Rhodes,  and 
in    non-Peloponnesian    politics,  the   Achseans.      Rome,  on   good 


TETRADRACHM    OF    PHILIP    V. — ATHENA    ALKIS    HURLING   FULMEN. 


terms   with  the   peaceful   states,   was   irritated  with  the  /Etolians 
and  suspicious  of  Macedon. 

Philip  and  Antiochus — The  peace  of  Naupactus  (217  B.C.)  had 
been  made  under  the  impression  of  the  Hannibalic  struggle.  But 
the  warning  of  Agelaus  to  beware  of  "  the  thunder-cloud  from  the 


26o  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

West,"  bore  little  fruit.  Philip  turned  liyhtly  from  his  half-hearted 
attack  on  Rome  to  seek  compensation  for  failure,  in  the  East  and 
South.  On  the  death  of  Ptolemy  Philopator  (204  B.C.),  he  com- 
bined with  Antiochus  III.  against  his  successor,  a  boy  of  five, 
in  a  nefarious  partition  treaty.  Each  played  for  his  own  hand, 
without  regard  to  his  partner. 

Philip,  on  his  side,  in  alliance  with  Prusias,  invaded  Asia 
Minor,  attacking  towns  and  islands  which  were  under  Egyptian 
or  M\.V)\\-A.xi  protection,  and  captured  Chalcedon,  Lysimachia, 
Cius,  and  Thasos.  His  atrocities  only  sharpened  the  indignation 
of  the  Greek  communities,  who  saw  a  common  danger  in  the 
advance  of  the  Macedonian  tyrant.  Rhodes,  Pergamum,  and 
Byzantium  took  up  amis  ;  and  behind  them,  invisible  to  the  short- 
sighted schemer,  loomed  the  power  of  Rome.  Philip's  great  ships 
were  roughly  treated  near  Chios  by  the  lighter  and  well-handled 
fleet  of  the  allies,  but  his  defeat,  if  such  it  was,  did  not  prevent 
him  from  beating  Rhodes  at  Lade,  occupying  Miletus,  and 
ravaging  Caria.  The  campaign  was  suspended  by  the  natural 
hindrances  of  the  season  and  the  country,  and  leaving  garrisons 
to  secure  his  conquests,  Philip  slipped  through  the  combined  fleets 
and  returned  to  Macedon.  Already  Valerius  Lrevinus  had  entered 
the  yEgean  with  thirty-eight  sail  ;  yet,  blinded  by  his  adventurous 
advisers,  the  king  pursued  his  plans  (200  B.C.),  and  by  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  Thracian  coast-towns  and  the  bloody  butchery  of 
Abydos,  secured  the  passage  of  the  straits  and  his  communica- 
tions with  Antiochus  in  the  face  of  superior  fleets. 

Interference  of  Rome.  —Before  Abydos  he  received,  and  politely 
put  aside,  the  remonstrances  of  M.  ^Emilius  Lepidus,  who,  at  the 
request  of  Egypt,  had  been  appointed  guardian  of  Epiphanes. 
The  envoy,  whose  "impertinence  the  king  pardoned  because  he 
was  young,  handsome,  and  a  Roman,"  contrived,  however,  in  the 
course  of  this  mission  to  the  East,  to  secure  the  neutrality  of 
Antiochus  at  the  expense  of  Egypt,  and  negotiated  a  coalition  of 
the  minor  states  against  Philip.  The  kingdom  of  the  Ptolemies 
appears  henceforth  as  the  client  of  Rome,  though  its  actual 
cession  and  complete  reduction  were  long  deferred.  To  the 
Greek  republics  the  Roman  Senate  seemed  a  more  natural  and 
less  dangerous  friend  than  the  Greek  monarchs.  If  they  appealed 
to  the  foreigner  once  more,  it  was  in  the  cause  of  freedom  and 
culture.  For  Rome  the  position  was  difficult.  She  was  free  to 
act  since  Zama,  but  reluctant,  in  her  exhaustion,  to  undertake  fresh 
adventures  ;  yet  she  was  compelled  to  force  on  the  unpopular  war. 


ROME  AND  PHIL/r  261 

Apart  from  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  armistice  of  205  B.C., 
Philip  was  upsetting  the  equilibrium  in  the  East.  The  disappear- 
ance of  the  minor  states,  the  paralysis  of  Egypt,  and  the  growth 
of  Macedon  threatened  Roman  interests.  Hannibal  was  alive, 
and  Carthage  reviving.  If  Rome  had  no  fomial  ground  for  inter- 
ference, her  real  reasons  were  adequate.  But  her  action  was  not 
wholly  selfish  nor  her  aims  ambitious.  Sympathy  and  the  claims 
of  friendly  and  protected  states  strengthened  considerations  of 
policy.  A  casus  belli  was  soon  afforded  by  action  that  could  be 
construed  as  an  aggression  on  Rome's  ancient  ally,  Athens.  The 
object  of  the  war  was  not  to  conquer  but  to  weaken  Macedon,  and 
the  p!an  of  campaign  was  to  husband  the  strength  of  Rome  and 
utilise  her  Greek  allies. 

Second  Macedonian  War  (200-196  B.C.). — The  declaration  of 
war,  at  first  rejected  by  the  Comitia,  which  felt  only  the  exhaustion 
of  Italy,  blind  to  ulterior  reasons,  was  finally  granted  in  return  for 
concessions,  made  at  the  cost  of  the  overburdened  socii  ^  and  of 
military  efficiency.  The  veterans  of  the  Punic  war  were  dis- 
charged, the  Italian  garrisons  were  constituted  by  socii  alone,  and 
six  legions  of  so-called  volunteers  were  impressed  for  service  in 
the  city,  and  in  Etruria  and  Macedon.  Besides  his  garrisons  in 
Thrace  and  Asia,  his  small  fleet  and  coastguards,  Philip  could 
only  muster  20,000  foot  and  2000  horse.  The  year  200  B.C.  was 
mainly  spent  in  diplomatic  preliminaries,  in  which  Attains  played  a 
leading  part,  and  Philip's  enterprises  materially  assisted  Rome. 
He  had  angered  the  ^tolians,  alienated  the  free  cities,  attacked 
Egypt  ;  all  whose  interest  it  would  have  been  to  exclude  Western 
interference  were  now  leagued  against  him.  His  lukewarm  ally, 
Antiochus,  pushed  his  own  schemes.  He  could  only  count  on 
Acarnania,  Boeotia,  and  the  honest  neutrality  of  the  Achaean 
League,  led  by  the  patriot  Philopcemen,  which  had  failed,  by  its 
proffered  mediation  between  the  Greek  disputants,  to  avoid  an 
appeal  to  Rome. 

P.  Sulpicius  Galba,  with  two  legions,  arrived  at  Apollonia  too 
late  to  pierce  the  mountain  barrier,  but  a  detachment  from  the 
fleet  at  Corcyra,  under  Claudius  Cento,  relieved  Athens  and  burnt 
the  magazines  of  Chalcis.  For  the  second  campaign  Galba 
organised  a  combined  attack  by  the  Dardanians  from  the  north, 
the  allied  fleet  on  the  east,  and  by  the  Athamanes  and  ^-Etolians, 
whose  flattered  arrogance  finally  accepted  the  more  promising  of 

1  i.e.  Italian  allies. 


262  IirSTORY  OF  ROME 

their  two  suitors,  from  the  south,  while  he  himself  was  to  break 
through  by  the  defiles  of  the  Apsus,  reconnoitred  in  the  preced- 
ing year.  The  attack  failed  on  all  hands.  Galba  neither  entered 
Macedon  nor  formed  a  junction,  and  owed  his  safe  retreat,  after 
hard  fighting-  on  difficult  ground,  more  to  the  diversions  effected  by 
the  allies  than  to  his  own  soldiership.  The  king's  active  strategy, 
after  baffling  Galba,  drove  the  /Etolians  from  Thessaly,  scattered 
the  Dardani,  and  left  him  master  of  the  field.  The  fleet  wasted 
its  superiority  in  idle  plunder,  so  ignorant  was  ancient  warfare  of 
the  value  of  combined  naval  and  military  operations.  Antiochus 
retired  from  Pergamum  in  obedience  to  Rome,  and  maintained  his 
short-sighted  neutrality. 

Flamininus. — In  198  B.C.  Philip  was  encouraged  to  take  the 
offensi\e,  advancing  to  watch  the  Roman  movements  from  a 
strong  position  on  the  Aous.  Here  he  was  confronted  by  the 
consul  T.  Quinctius  Flamininus,  elected  by  powerful  influence  at 
the  age  of  thirty,  a  Roman  of  the  new  type,  a  respectable  officer 
and  skilful  diplomatist,  a  cool  and  clear-headed  statesman,  whose 
keen  sympathy  with  Hellenic  culture  and  knowledge  of  Hellenic 
affairs  was  henceforth  used  by  the  Senate,  in  its  half-subtle,  half- 
generous  policy  of  playing  off  the  Greek  communities  against 
Macedon.  After  the  fall  of  Macedon  the  subtlety  got  the  better 
of  the  sentiment,  as  Rome  turned  the  factions  of  Hellas  to  its  own 
profit.  And  even  now,  though  there  was  yet  room  for  generous 
idealism,  it  hardly  affected  the  main  lines  of  Roman  policy,  even 
as  interpreted  by  Flamininus,  the  unofficial  manager  of  Greek 
affairs  in  the  Senate.  Such  was  the  man  who,  now  succeeding  to 
the  command,  was  able  at  length,  after  a  vain  attempt  at  negotia- 
tion, by  the  treachery  of  the  Epirot  Charops,  to  turn  Philip's  flank, 
and  force  a  hasty  retreat  to  Tempe.  The  Epirots  at  once  deserted, 
while  the  ^Ctolians  overran  Thessaly,  whose  faithful  fortresses  alone 
remained  to  Philip  in  the  north.  The  advance  of  Flamininus  with 
the  army  to  Phocis  and  the  fleet  to  Cenchreaa  determined  the 
Achaeans,  under  the  guidance  of  Aristaenus,  to  abandon  an  unten- 
able neutrality.  The  price  of  this  inevitable  decision,  arrived  at  in 
a  stormy  congress  at  Sicyon,  was  the  reversion  of  the  powerful  city 
of  Corinth,  whither  their  forces  proceeded  to  support  the  siege. 
Corinth,  desperately  defended,  was  relieved  by  the  Macedonian 
Philocles  from  Chalcis,  who  also  succeeded  in  securing  Argos. 
To  buy  Spartan  support,  Philip  presented  Argos  to  Nabis,  who, 
with  equal  cynicism,  accepted  the  present  and  betrayed  the  donor. 
An  attempt  to  treat  broke  upon  the  stern  terms  of  the  Roman 


CYNOSCEPHALM  263 

ultimatum,  and  Flamininus,  whose  command  had  been  specially 
prolonged,  proceeded  in  the  spring  of  197  l!.c.  to  secure  his  com- 
munications by  the  capture  of  Thebes,  and  masking  Corinth  with 
the  allied  troops,  advanced  northward  by  the  direct  route  through 
Thennopylse  on  Tempe,  depending  for  supplies  on  his  accom- 
panying fleet. 

Battle  of  Cynoscephalae. — His  heterogeneous  army,  including 
a  strong  /Etolian  contingent,  was  superior  in  cavalry  alone  to  the 
Macedonian  army,  raised  by  strict  levies  to  nearly  26,000  men,  of 
whom  16,000  formed  the  trusted  phalanx.  With  this  force  Philip, 
eager  for  battle  and  fearing  for  his  fortresses,  advanced  by  Larissa 
on  Phenis,  close  to  which  the  Romans  had  encamped.  Here  the 
advanced  guards  met,  but  after  a  skirmish  of  reconnoitring  parties 
both  generals,  embarrassed  by  the  difficult  ground  and  anxious  to 
secure  supplies,  moved  by  parallel  lines  on  ScotuEsa,  separated  by 
a  range  of  hills,  and  groping  about  through  the  mist  and  rain  of 
autumn,  in  ignorance  of  each  other's  movements.  On  the  third 
day,  a  casual  encounter,  in  dark  and  dirty  weather,  between  the 
Macedonian  reserve,  posted  to  secure  the  flanking  heights,  and  a 
scouting'  party  of  Flamininus  brought  on  a  general  engagement. 
The  Romans  were  getting  the  worst  of  the  skirmish,  till  their 
supports  reinforced  the  attack,  when  the  tables  were  turned 
again  by  the  advent  of  the  Macedonian  cavalry  and  light  infantry. 
Their  victorious  charge  was  only  stemmed  by  the  gallantry  of  the 
/Etolian  horse,  inferior  as  skirmishers  to  the  Numidians  alone, 
who  gave  the  proconsul  time  to  draw  out  his  whole  force  for  action. 
Then  Philip  yielded,  against  his  better  judgment,  10  the  desire 
of  his  troops.  With  the  right  wing  of  the  phalanx  he  hastily 
climbed  the  hill,  formed  on  the  ridge,  received  his  retreating  troops 
on  the  right,  and  charging  at  once  in  dense,  deep  column,  with 
the  weight  of  the  phalanx  on  the  sloping  ground  drove  in  and 
shattered  the  Roman  left.  But  the  rapid  advance  had  dislocated 
his  line.  Flamininus,  passing  to  his  right,  hurled  his  maniples, 
with  the  elephants  in  front,  upon  the  unformed  Macedonian  left, 
disordered  by  haste  and  the  uneven  ground,  as  Nicanor  hurried  it 
up  to  support  his  king.  The  battle  was  decided  by  the  brilliant 
stroke  of  a  nameless  tribune,  who,  disengaging  some  companies 
from  the  victorious  right,  fell  with  disastrous  efi'ect  upon  Philip's 
defenceless  rear. 

The  Phalanx  and  the  Legion. — Cynoscephalae  was  a  soldiers' 
battle,  brought  on  by  chance,  and  won  by  superiority  of  formation. 
The  famous  phalanx,  with  its  close  order,  long  pikes,  and  crushing 


264  HI  STORY  OF  ROME 

weight  of  sixteen  files,'  irresistible  in  a  charge  and  impregnable 
to  a  front  attack,  could  not  be  handled  easily  in  the  field.  It  had  lost 
what  mobility  it  had  possessed  in  its  creator's  hands  ;  it  was  readily 
dislocated  by  movement  ;  it  was  useless  on  unfavourable  ground ; 
exposed  to  attack  on  flank  and  rear,  and  incapable  of  manoeuvring 
rapidly,  as  a  whole  or  in  detachments,  it  had  no  chance  against 
the  flexible  formation,  the  easy  movement,  and  individual  train- 
ing of  the  legionaries,  who,  once  within  the  enemy's  guard,  made 
short  work  of  their  stiffly  drilled  opponents. 

Settlement  of  Macedon  and  Greece. — The  reduction  of  Macedon 
cost  700  men.  With  a  loss  of  13,000,  coupled  with  serious  reverses 
elsewhere,  Philip  had  no  choice.  An  armistice  was  conceded,  and 
Flamininus,  severely  snubbing  the  yEtolian  "victors  of  Cynos- 
cephate,"  and  to  the  disappointment  of  the  spiteful  Greeks, 
arranged  a  peace  in  196  B.C.,  on  terms  whose  moderation  was 
due  as  well  to  a  chivalrous  feeling  as  to  the  need  of  maintaining 
the  equilibrium  in  the  East  and  of  providing  a  bulwark  against 
northern  incursions.  The  king  surrendered  his  foreign  posses- 
sions, his  ships,  and  the  province  of  Orestis,  reduced  his  forces, 
paid  an  indemnity  of  a  thousand  talents,  entered  into  alliance,  and 
subjected  his  foreign  policy  to  the  control  of  Rome.  Macedon, 
as  a  power,  ceased  to  exist,  but  Rome  neither  annexed  nor  per- 
mitted encroachment.  Scodra  was  indeed  strengthened  and 
Athens  enriched  ;  discontented  ^tolia  received  a  few  towns  and 
was  denied  more ;  the  Achaean  League  profited  by  the  incorporation 
of  the  surrendered  possessions  in  Peloponnesus  and  the  isthmusj 
Rhodes  and  Pergamum  by  the  maintenance  of  the  statics  quoj  while 
Thessaly  was  neutralised  and  divided  into  four  independent  con- 
federacies. Finally,  Rome,  unable  or  unwilling  to  settle  the  con- 
flicting claims  of  the  jarring  polities,  proclaimed  by  the  mouth  of 
Flamininus  to  the  assembled  Greeks  at  the  Isthmian  games  the 
freedom  of  Hellas.  If  Greece,  as  the  ^tolians  complained,  had 
only  changed  masters,  the  new  relation  was  carefully  concealed. 
In  the  following  year  Nabis  was  compelled  by  the  combined  forces 
to  disgorge  the  cruelly  oppressed  Argos,  Messene,  the  Cretan 
cities,  and  the  Spartan  coast  on  which  the  sufferers  by  his 
reign  of  terror  were  planted  as  free  Laconians  and  members  of 
the  League.  Thus  crippled  and  fined,  the  Spartan  "  Boar  of 
Ardennes"  was  left  independent,  his  other  acts  uncancelled,    to 

1  Five  spears  {sarisscc)  over  20  feet  in  length  projected  in  a  descending 
scale  from  15  to  3  feet  in  front  of  each  man,  so  that  every  Roman  soldier  in 
his  looser  order  confronted  two  phalangites  and  ten  spears. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  GREECE  265 

the    deep    discontent    of    Greece,   as    a   check    on    the   Achican 
League. 

State  of  Greece. — Flamininus,  with  some  fairness  and  much 
pohcy,  refrained  from  unnecessary  interference ;  the  factious  opposi- 
tion of  the  pig-headed  Boeotians  was  borne  with  patience.  Wherever 
possible,  the  ascendency  of  the  wealthier  and  Romanising  parly 
was  secured  in  the  various  communities.  For  the  rest,  they  were 
left  to  stew  in  their  own  juice.  However  tickled  by  Greek  flattery 
or  sensitive  to  Greek  satire,  however  strong  her  fashionable 
Hellenism,  Rome  showed  as  much  contempt  as  kindness,  and  still 
more  astuteness,  in  that  degrading  gift  of  freedom,  so  unwisely,  if 
generously,  confirmed  by  the  evacuation  of  the  Greek  fortresses  in 
194  B.C.  Rent  by  faction,  corrupt  in  morals,  decayed  in  population, 
permeated  by  socialism,  the  Greek  states  with  their  petty  politics 
were  overshadowed  by  the  power  and  proximity  of  Rome.  She  had 
destroyed  Macedon,  hampered  Achaia,  she  suffered  no  predomi- 
nance, and  instituted  no  control.  It  was  a  blunder,  almost  a  crime. 
At  the  same  time  direct  annexation  was  as  yet  unnecessary  to 
Rome.  Her  commercial  and  political  interests  were  secured  by 
the  existence  of  a  free  and  friendly  system  of  powers,  acting  as 
check  upon  one  another  and  upon  possible  enemies.  Annexation 
would  have  been  a  shock  to  sentiment  at  home  and  to  Roman 
influence  in  the  East,  no  less  than  a  breach  of  her  traditional 
policy. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

FIFTY    YEARS    OF     CONQUEST 
THE   WAR   WITH    ANTIOCHUS 

B.C.  ,A.U.C. 

Antiochus  lands  in  Greece 192  562 

Battle  of  Thermopylae 191  563 

Battle  of  Magnesia 190  564 

Settlement  of  Asia  and  Greece 189-188  565-566 

Deaths  of  Hannibal,  Scipio,  and  Philopoemen  183  571 

Antiochus. — We  have  seen  that  during  the  Macedonian  war 
Roman  diplomacy  had  kept  Antiochus  HI.  quiet.  The  short- 
sighted monarch,  whose  early  energy  had  earned  him  the  sur- 
name of  "  Great,"  and  whose  designs  on  Egypt,  checked  by  the 
bloody  defeat  of  Raphia  in  217  B.C.,  had  been  renewed  in  the  Par- 
tition Treaty  with  Philip,  had,  in  his  covetous  rivalry,  not  only 
failed  to  support  his  ally,  but  had  utilised  his  fall  and  earned  his 


266 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


deadly  hatred  for  the  future.  In  201  and  200  B.C.  he  had  attacked 
the  Syrian  coast,  and  in  ig8  ac.  reduced  Egypt  to  terms  by  the 
victory  of  Mount  Panium,  securing  his  conquests  in  the  Levant, 
the  reversion  of  Philip's  Egyptian  conc[uests  on  the  Asia  Minor 


GOLD   OCTADRACHM    OF    ANTIOCHUS    III. — APOLLO    SEATKD    ON    OMPHALOS. 


sea-board,  and  the  betrothal  of  the  boy-king,  Epiphanes,  to  his 
daughter  Cleopatra. 

Rome  and  Antiochus.  —  Nevertheless,  except  in  protecting  Per- 
gamum,  the  Senate  had  practised  a  "masterly  inactivity."  In 
197  B.C.  a  strong  Syrian  fleet  and  army  threatened  the  ceded  dis- 
tricts, and  even  the  free  states  of  the  ^gean  coasts,  whose  liberty 
Rome  had  demanded  from  Philip.  In  spite  of  the  resistance  of 
Rhodes,  by  196  B.C.  Antiochus  had  occupied  Ephesus  and  other 
positions,  whence  he  crossed  into  Europe,  restored  and  fortified 
Lysimachia,  meeting  the  protests  of  the  Romans  and  the  warnings 
of  Flamininus  with  a  curt  request  that  they  would  mind  their 
own  business.  Their  claim  to  a  protectoi-ate  was,  in  his  view, 
untenable.  He  had  now  a  footing  in  Europe  ;  Thrace  was  a 
satrapy  ;  Rome's  allies  had  been  attacked,  her  predominance 
threatened.  In  195  B.C.  Hannibal  was  received  at  Ephesus  with 
marked  honour.  Antiochus  avoided  a  direct  rupture,  and  Rome 
took  the  wind  out  of  her  diplornacy  by  withdrawing  her  Greek 
garrisons.  She  had  many  reasons  for  war,  but  no  casus  belli. 
This  hesitation  fostered  the  arrogance  of  Antiochus  and  the  dis- 
affection of  Greece.  Embassies  passed  to  and  fro  (193-192  B.C.), 
till  Rome,  disappointed  of  a  bloodless  victory  by  the  rejection  of 
her  ultimatum,  was  forced  to  meet  in  arms  an  enemy  to  whom 
her  own  sloth  had  given  the  choice  of  time,  place,  and  allies. 

Attitude  of  the  Minor  States. — Meanwhile  the   king,  by  con- 


ROME  AND  ANTIOCHUS  267 

cessions  to  the  leading  free  cities,  by  marriages  and  presents, 
attempted  to  conciliate  his  subjects  and  rivals,  Pergamum,  Cap- 
padocia,  Egypt,  Rhodes,  and  to  secure  his  rear  in  Asia  Minor. 
Greece,  already  impatient  of  the  new  order  and  given  over  to  the 
play  of  party,  was  fermenting  with  discontent.  His  chances  ap- 
peared good,  but  neither  did  his  combinations  succeed  nor  were 
his  ideas  consistently  carried  out.  The  scheme  of  Hannibal  for  a 
descent  on  Italy  served  only  to  alarm  Rome  and  endanger  Car- 
thage, and  Hannibal,  suspected  and  disliked,  was  left  to  "  cut  blocks 
with  a  razor"  among  the  petty  courtiers  of  the  "great"  king. 

Bithynia,  Pergamum,  Rhodes,  Byzantium,  and  Egypt  sided  with 
Rome,  when  the  restless  /Etohans,  discontented  with  their  share 
of  Macedonian  booty,  made  themselves  the  agents  of  Antiochus 
in  Greece,  and  precipitated  the  conflict. 

Antiochus  lands  in  Greece. — The  wavering  monarch,  landing  in 
192  B.C.  as  the  liberator  of  Greece,  at  once  deceiver  and  deceived, 
brought  inadequate  levies  to  meet  fictitious  allies.  The  vEtolians, 
indignant  at  peace,  dreaming,  in  their  ignorance  and  arrogance,  of 
a  campaign  on  the  Tiber,  declared  formal  war  with  Rome.  At  their 
instigation  Nabis  had  already  broken  out,  and  been  exemplarily 
punished  (192  B.C.)  by  Philopoemen  ;  and  now,  to  ^'g^  on  their  ally 
and  fire  anti-Roman  feeling  by  a  successful  stroke,  they  attempted 
to  surprise  Sparta,  Chalcis,  and  Demetrias.  At  Sparta  the  plot 
succeeded  only  in  joining  that  state  to  the  Achjean  league,  a  result 
hastened  by  the  appearance  of  the  Roman  fleet  under  Atilius  Ser- 
ranus  at  Gythium.  Chalcis  was  saved  ;  Demetrias  fell.  To  secure 
his  advantage,  in  the  autumn  of  192  B.C.  the  king  entered  Greece 
with  a  small  force,  intended  to  serve  as  a  nucleus  of  a  Greco- 
Asiatic  host.  But  Philip  preferred  an  open  conqueror  to  a  disloyal 
ally.  Epirus  was  doubtful,  and  the  Achsean  league,  solicited  by 
both,  with  wise  fidelity  adhered  to  Rome,  and  garrisoned  the 
Piraeus  and  Chalcis.  Except  the  /Etolians  and  Boeotians,  only 
a  few  insignificant  states,  impelled  more  by  party-feeling  than 
patriotism,  joined  the  liberator.  The  supineness  of  the  enemy 
enabled  him  to  secure  a  base  at  Chalcis,  in  Euboea.  Hence  he 
advanced  to  demonstrate  with  some  success  in  Thessaly,  and 
hither  retired  from  before  Larissa,  on  the  approach  of  Appius 
Claudius  from  Apollonia,  to  celebrate  a  marriage  with  a  Chal- 
cidian  dame  and  wage  a  war  of  pen  and  ink. 

Antiochus  expelled  from  Greece  (191  B.C.). — In  the  following 
spring  the  Romans,  who  had  neglected  a  vigorous  offensive,  from 
uncertainty  where  the   enemy's   blow  would   fall,  an    uncertainty 


268  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

encouraged  by  the  smallncss  of  his  force  in  Greece,  having  now 
provided  for  the  security  of  Italy  and  the  islands,  doubled  their  fleet 
and  took  up  the  war  in  earnest.  They  raised  the  army  of  the 
East,  whose  vanguard  was  already  in  Epirus,  to  40,000,  with  an 
increased  proportion  of  allies  and  auxiliaries,  including  African 
cavalry  and  elephants.  M'.  Acilius  Glabrio  was  in  command, 
assisted  by  the  consulars  Cato  and  Flaccus  serving  as  simple 
tribunes.  Swelled  by  the  Greek  contingents,  the  army  overran 
Athamania,  cleared  Thessaly  and  concentrated  at  Larissa.  The 
aimless  king,  whose  reinforcements  had  failed  him,  and  whose 
communications  were  cut  by  the  stronger  fleet,  instead  of  promptly 
evacuating,  drew  together  the  rotten  remnant  of  his  host  in  the 
entrenchments  of  Thermopylae,  there  to  await  his  main  force. 
Hence  he  was  quickly  driven  in  complete  rout,  when  Cato  sur- 
prised the  careless  yEtolians  on  the  heights  of  Callidromos,  and 
the  phalanx,  attacked  in  flank  and  front,  was  cut  to  pieces  in  the 
pass.  The  king  fled  to  Ephesus  ;  all  was  lost  but  Thrace  ;  only  the 
yEtolians,  driven  to  despair  by  the  contemptuous  harshness  of 
Glabrio,  stood  at  bay  in  Naupactus,  till  Flamininus,  with  wiser 
policy,  arranged  an  armistice  to  permit  an  embassy  to  Rome. 
Elis  and  Messene  reluctantly  entered  the  League,  and  Peloponnesus 
became,  with  some  reservations,  Achsean.  But  when  the  League 
desired  Zacynthus,  Flamininus  reminded  them  that  the  tortoise 
was  safest  in  its  shell. 

Naval  War. — The  allied  fleet,  which  had  broken  the  king's 
communications,  now  took  the  ofifensive.  To  prepare  for  the  pas- 
sage into  Asia,  C.  Livius  attacked  and  defeated  Polyxenidas  at 
Cyssus,  or  Corycus,  near  Chios,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  Rhodians 
shut  him  up  in  Ephesus.  Rome  held  the  seas  and  could  prepare 
for  a  home-blow,  an  adventure  more  dangerous  in  appearance 
than  reality.  While  many  of  the  Asiatic  small  states,  such  as 
Smyrna,  Samos,  and  Chios,  followed  the  lead  of  their  aristocracy 
and  went  over  to  Rome,  Antiochus  levied  a  huge  host,  increased  his 
fleet  at  Ephesus,  and  directed  Hannibal  to  raise  new  ships  in  Syria 
and  Phoenicia.  Rome  leisurely  strengthened  her  fleets  and  armies 
all  along  the  line  ;  and  in  March  190  B.C.  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Afri- 
canus,  as  legate,  with  his  incompetent  brother  Lucius,  consul  by 
family  influence,  as  nominal  superior,  and  5000  volunteer  veterans, 
took  up  the  command.  Pacifying  the  yEtolians,  once  more  exas- 
perated by  a  harsh  ultimatum,  with  a  six  months'  armistice,  he 
pushed  on  for  the  Hellespont,  selecting  the  long  and  arduous  land- 
route,  made  possible  only  by  the  loyalty  of  Philip  and  the  submission 


IFJ/a    WITH  AN'T/OCHUS 


269 


of  Bithynia,  in  preference  to  the  chances  of  the  sea,  where  Roman 
superiority  was  not  yet  absolute.  Meanwhile  Livius,  who  had  gone 
to  the  Hellespont  to  reduce  Sestos  and  Abydos,  the  fortresses 
commanding  the  passage,  had  been  recalled  by  the  defeat  of  the 


CIPPUS   OF    A    ROMAN    MARINE   OF    LATER    DATE. 


Rhodian  observing  squadron  at  .Samos,  and  had  once  more  shut 
up  the  Syrian  admiral  in  Ephesus.  He  was  presently  succeeded 
by  L.  y^milius  Regillus,  whose  task  was  threefold  — to  facilitate 
the  crossing,  to  watch  Polyxenidas,  and  to  prevent  the  junction  of 
Hannibal's  belated  fleet.    The  last  object  was  effected  by  the  well- 


270  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

built  and  well-handled  Rhodian  squadron,  who  defeated  off  Aspen- 
dus,  in  Pamphylia,  the  final  effort  of  the  Punic  hero.  About  the 
end  of  August  the  blockading  fleet,  whose  Pergamene  division 
had  sailed  to  the  Hellespont,  was  attacked  by  a  slightly  superior 
force.  At  Myonnesus,  near  Colophon,  Polyxenidas  was  swept 
from  the  seas,  with  a  loss  of  forty-two  sail,  a  result  mainly  due 
to  the  tactics  of  the  Rhodian  admiral,  Eudamus.  The  effect  was 
immediate.  Antiochus,  whose  Gallic  mercenaries  had  been  driven 
back  from  Pergamum  by  Eumenes,  was  stunned  by  the  blow.  As 
he  had  neglected  to  harass  the  march  through  Thrace,  so  now 
he  hastily  evacuated  the  Hellespont,  sacrificed  his  stores,  and  per- 
mitted the  enemy  to  land  unopposed,  instead  of  intimidating  Prusias 
and  forcing  Scipio  to  take  up  his  winter  quarters  in  his  distant  and 
dangerous  position. 

Battle  of  Magnesia. — These  errors  he  crowned  when,  having 
failed  to  bribe  the  legate  and  refused  his  demand  for  a  full  in- 
demnity and  the  cession  of  Asia  up  to  Mount  Taurus,  he  flung  his 
unwieldy,  undisciplined,  and  motley  mass  in  the  way  of  the 
Roman  legions,  whose  one  desire  was  decisive  action  before 
winter.  At  Magnesia,  under  Sipylus,  in  the  late  autumn  of  190  R.c, 
while  Scipio  was  still  sick  at  Eltea,  Cn.  Domitius  drew  the  irre- 
solute Antiochus  out  of  his  powerful  lines  beyond  the  Hermus  on 
the  mountain  slopes,  from  which  he  threatened  Smyrna  and  covered 
Ephesus,  Sardis,  and  the  great  eastern  road.  Never  had  the 
Roman  soldiers  so  despised  an  enemy.  The  army,  30,000  strong, 
including  5000  Achaeans  and  Pergamenes,  with  2000  Macedonians 
and  Thracians  to  guard  the  camp,  rested  its  left  on  the  river 
Phrygius,  scarcely  covered  by  a  few  squadrons  ;  the  cavalry  and 
light  infantry,  under  Eumenes,  were  massed  on  the  right  ;  the 
legions  took  post  in  the  centre.  The  armaments  of  the  East, 
12,000  horse  and  60,000  foot,  stretched  to  an  invisible  length, 
through  the  thick  mist  of  an  autumn  morning.  In  the  centre, 
dangerously  deepened  to  thirty-two  file,  broken  into  ten  divisions, 
each  with  a  front  of  fifty,  a  wall  of  steel  marked  as  with  battle- 
ments and  towers  by  the  huge  forms  of  elephants,  posted  two  and 
two  on  its  flanks  and  in  its  intervals,  stood  the  grand  but  cumbrous 
phalanx.  Its  deep  and  naked  flanks  were  covered  by  a  long  line 
of  peltasts  and  the  swarms  of  cavalry,  on  which  the  king  relied, 
heavy  dragoons,  cuirassiers,  and  light  horse,  with  archers  and 
slingers,  their  strings  and  slings  useless  in  the  damp  air.  Re- 
serves of  elephants  strengthened  the  fighting  line  ;  to  the  front 
skirmished  the  camel  corps,  the  mounted   archers,  and   the   idle 


BATTLE   OF  MAGNESIA  271 

menace  of  the  scythed  chariots.  It  was  the  Roman  cue  to  shatter 
the  wings,  to  drive  them  on  the  crowded  phalanx,  and  plough 
their  way  into  flanks  and  rear.  With  the  eye  of  a  soldier, 
flumenes,  drawing  out  his  skirmishers  from  the  right,  by  a  storm 
of  missiles  drove  the  infuriated  chariot  teams  on  the  camels,  hurl- 
ing both  back  on  the  left  front,  spreading  a  general  panic.  Then 
charging  with  his  whole  brigade,  he  routed  the  confused  and 
cowardly  masses  on  the  left,  baring  the  side  of  the  central  column, 
now  forced  to  halt  and  form  scjuare.  Meanwhile  Antiochus  had 
pressed  up  to  the  Roman  camp,  vigorously  resisted  by  the  garri- 
son. As  he  retired  victoriously  he  became  aware  of  the  whole 
disaster  and  fled.  For  the  phalanx,  stripped  of  its  supports,  taken 
in  front  and  rear,  decimated  by  the  showers  of  missiles,  had  retired 
at  first  in  good  order  and  grim  despair,  till  the  frightened  ele- 
phants tore  through  the  ranks.  Then  the  incredible  slaughter 
was  only  enhanced  by  a  futile  effort  to  hold  the  camp.  The 
legions,  unemployed,  watched  the  destruction  of  Syria  ;  the  con- 
trol of  Asia  had  cost  the  blood  of  a  handful  of  allies. 

Peace  and  Settlement  of  Asia. — The  effect  on  the  Oriental 
imagination  was  crushing.  Asia  Minor  yielded  to  the  fortune  of 
Rome.  Peace  was  concluded  by  a  commission  of  ten  under  Cn. 
Manlius  Volso,  and  its  ratification  secured  by  the  presence  of  the 
army  at  the  king's  expense.  The  terms  included  an  indemnity  of 
15,000  talents  and  the  surrender  of  all  possessions  west  of  Mount 
Taurus  and  the  Halys.  His  rights  of  levying  war  and  of  navigation 
in  the  West,  of  raising  troops  and  building  ships,  were  strictly 
limited.  Antiochus  as  a  great  king  stood  abolished.  He  retained 
Cilicia,  but  Cappadocia  became  frankly  independent  under  Aria- 
rathes,  the  Armenian  satrapies  became  principalities,  and  the 
Artaxiads  began  their  career  of  greatness.  For  the  rest,  Rome 
strove  to  keep  a  balance  among  the  jarring  claims  of  her  various 
clients.  She  made  no  province,  stood  aloof  from  purely  Asian 
affairs,  and  when  her  armies  evacuated  Asia  (188  B.C.)  she  took  away 
only  gold  and  honour.  Meanwhile  Volso  occupied  his  troops, 
and  served  his  own  pockets  and  the  Greek  states,  by  crushing 
the  Asiatic  Celts  and  levying  contributions  all  round.  His  action 
illustrates  once  more  the  dangerous  powers  of  the  imperium 
exercised  at  a  distance  from  control  by  annually  changing  officers. 
Prusias  kept  Bithynia.  In  the  West,  Eumenes,  the  victor  of 
Magnesia,  received  the  Chersonese  and  the  majority  of  the  ceded 
districts  in  Asia,  with  the  protectorate  of  such  Greek  cities  as  were 
not  declared  free.     Pergamum,  delivered  from  Celtic  incursions. 


272  irrSTORY  OF  ROME 

thus  became  a  powerful  wedge  between  Syria  and  Macedon  in 
the  interests  of  Rome.  The  free  cities  which  had  joined  Rome 
had  their  charters  confirmed.  Rhodes  was  gratified  with  Lycia 
and  most  of  Caria.  Roman  poHcy  left  in  Asia  no  dangerous  power 
behind,  but  it  left  also  no  permanent  security  against  formidable 
growths.     The  sea  remained  in  the  control  of  her  Rhodian  allies. 

Treatment  of  Macedon  and  Greece.  —  In  (Greece  the  /Ktolians, 
deluded  by  false  news,  had  risen  with  some  success  against  Philip. 
Magnesia  closed  the  day  of  truces,  and  in  189  B.C.  M.  P^ulvius 
Nobilior  captured  Ambracia,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  Achaeans  and 
Macedon,  stamped  out  the  gallant  resistance  of  these  wild-cats  of 
the  mountain.  Reasonable  terms  were  granted.  Rome  completed 
her  chain  of  Adriatic  posts  with  Cephallenia  and  Zacynthus,  secured 
the  cession  of  all  captured  lands  and  cities,  a  substantial  but  not 
crushing  indemnity,  and  the  control  of  foreign  relations,  leaving 
.<4£tolia,  now  an  ally,  as  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  Macedon.  Philip 
received  but  a  scanty  reward  for  his  loyal  and  useful  support.  He 
saw,  with  indignation,  the  growth  of  Pergamum.  Nor  was  he  alone 
aggrieved  by  the  policy  of  equilibrium.  The  Achaeans,  who  had, 
in  the  course  of  these  proceedings,  dragged  Sparta,  Elis,  and 
Messene  into  their  league,  were  annoyed  by  the  limits  set  by 
Rome  to  Hellenic  nationalism.  Apart  from  Rome's  open  policy 
of  Divide  et  inipeni,  the  very  existence  of  a  universal  referee,  only 
too  pleased  to  intervene,  was  fatal  to  the  growth  of  a  national  life. 
Even  within  the  Peloponnesus  the  League  failed  to  create  a  real 
unity  ;  to  create  a  power  was  impossible.  The  wisest  course  would 
have  been  to  bow  with  dignity  to  the  inevitable,  and,  accepting  a 
foreign  supremacy,  to  secure  internal  peace  and  prosperity.  It  is 
hard  no  doubt  to  acknowledge  political  nullity,  to  give  up  traditions 
and  ideals,  but  if  Philopoemen  deserves  our  sympathy,  the  policy 
of  Callicrates  was  expedient.  To  invoke  and  then  repudiate  inter- 
ference, to  indulge  in  "  tail-twisting,"  to  parody  the  life  of  a  free 
state  when  independence  was  impossible,  was  to  waste  power,  to 
caricature  patriotism. 

Deaths  of  Philopcemen  and  Hannibal. — Trouble  ensued  in  the 
Peloponnesus.  The  union  of  Messene  and  Sparta  with  the  League 
resulted  in  revolutions  and  counter-revolutions,  judicial  murders, 
intestine  strife,  appeals  and  counter-appeals.  Rome  neither 
abstained  from  intervention  nor  acted  with  consistency  and 
energy — a  huge  Gulliver  watching  with  contemptuous  amusement 
the  antics  of  her  Lilliputian  allies.  If  she  had  meant  the  freedom 
she  gave,  she  neither  acted  upon  the  declaration  nor  was  Greece 


DEATH  OF  HANNIBAL  AND  SCIPIO  273 

capable  of  using  it.  In  the  end  Sparta  remained  a  member  of 
the  League,  with  special  privileges  ;  Messene  was  repressed  by 
Lycortas,  the  worthy  successor  of  the  soldier  and  statesman, 
Philopoemen.  The  latter  was  poisoned  in  prison  by  the  rebel 
Messenians.  In  the  same  year  (183  B.C.)  the  same  means,  self- 
administered,  delivered  Hannibal  from  the  treachery  of  Prusias,  to 
whose  court  he  had  fled,  and  from  the  machinations  of  Flamininus, 
at  the  age  of  sixty-six  (.''),  fighting,  as  he  had  sworn,  to  the  last 
against  Rome  or  the  allies  of  Rome.  Hunted  down,  in  spite  of 
the  protests  of  the  noblest  Romans,  he  filled  up  the  failure  of  his 
life,  balked  by  fate  and  the  folly  of  his  colleagues  and  masters. 

End  of  Scipio. — Possibly  during  the  same  year,  still  in  the 
prime  of  life,  in  self-inflicted  exile,  died  his  proud  and  fortunate 
rival,  his  glories  and  his  titles  turned  to  bitterness  by  calumny 
and  disappointed  pride.  The  first  man  at  Rome,  the  earliest  pre- 
cursor of  the  Princeps,  with  all  his  fascinating  personality,  his 
brilliant  fortunes,  his  powerful  influence,  self-conscious  and  sensi- 
tive, a  little  more  than  a  Roman,  a  little  less  than  a  hero,  his 
achievements  and  ideals  ended  in  vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit. 
One  ray  of  light  gilded  the  setting,  when,  at  the  trial  of  Lucius 
for  alleged  embezzlement  and  corruption,  with  indignant  pride, 
he  seized  and  tore  before  the  court  the  account-books  put  in  as 
evidence,  and  led  the  people,  in  a  burst  of  enthusiasm,  to  celebrate 
in  the  Capitol  the  anniversary  of  Zama.  But  Lucius  was  fined, 
and  Publius  retired  to  eat  his  heart  in  exile. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

FIFTY    YEARS    OF    CONQUEST 

THE    FALL   OF    MACEDON   AND    GREECE 

B.C.  A.r.c. 

Third  Macedonian  War  breaks  out 171  583 

Battle  of  Pydna — Egypt  accepts  Roman  Protectorate  168  586 
Revolt  of  Andriscus  put  down  by  Metellus— Macedonia 

made  a  Province 149-148    560-606 

The  Achaeans  defeated  by   Metellus  and   Mumniius — 

Destruction  of  Corinth 146  608 

Philip. — Philip  of  Macedon  had  gained  little  by  the  war. 
Ve.xed  by  hostile  neighbours,  harried  by  Roman  commissions, 
put  continually  on  his  defence  before  the  Senate,  and  forced  to 

s 


274 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


surrender  his  conc|uests  in  'I'liChsaly,  /lUolia,  and  Thrace,  lie 
stifled  his  resentment,  and  cloaking  his  purpose  with  submission, 
resolutely  prepared  for  a  decisive  struggle.  He  reorganised  his 
revenue,  fostered  population,  founded  colonies  and  towns,  strength- 
ened his  frontier,  and  negotiated  with  the  tribes  beyond.  In  1 83  B.C. 
a  rupture  was  averted  by  the  mediation  of  his  son  Demetrius,  the 


-Corey ra^  ?         ,0 2 «/ '"^isanCynose?,?lmlae 


Zacijii 


ysi' 

>'Spaka 


^M"'"    -j::^^^  .  '"^^mre. 


\iCtithera 


'^ 
a 


GREECE 


20   40    60     80 100 


m 

'ikhodus 


P" 


H'aikey  Cr  BoittaU  sc 


hostage  and  favourite  of  Rome.  Throuyh  him  Flamininus  and  the 
Senate  worked  to  create  a  Roman  party  in  Macedon,  but  the 
favour  of  Rome  was  fatal  to  the  unconscious  victim.  He  fell  by 
the  intrigues  of  Perseus,  the  elder  son  by  an  unequal  marriage, 
and  destined  heir,  who  saw  in  him  a  dangerous  rival.  Unable 
to  recall  the  dead  or  retrieve  the  past,  defrauded  of  the  fruit  of 


PERSEUS 


275 


his  labours,  the  victim  of  his  own  schemes  and  passions,  the  king 
died  of  a  broken  heart  (179  B.C.),  leaving  to  the  detected  but  un- 
punished Perseus  the  inheritance  of  revenge. 

Perseus. — Perseus,  a  "  fine  figure  of  a  man,"  schooled  by 
adversity,  the  pride  of  a  loyal  and  warlike  nation,  the  hope  of 
Hellenic  patriots,  was  sober,  subtle,  and  persevering,  with  few 
passions  and  fewer  scruples,  with  many  kingly  qualities,  but,  like 
Conacher  in  the  "Fair  Maid  of  Perth,"  his  composition  was 
crossed  with  a  strain  of  weakness,  narrowness,  even  cowardice. 
Penny-wise  and  pound-foolish,  strong  in  preparation,  weak  in 
action,  he  was  incapable  of  wise  daring  and  generous  expenditure. 
He  lacked  that  rapid  decision  and  unfaltering  resolve  that  could 
alone  have  borne  his  enterprise  to  success.  The  resources  of 
Macedon  had  been  nursed  for  twenty-six  years  ;  his  treasury  and 
magazines  were  full  ;  his  army  might  amount,  all  told,  to  over 
40,000  trained  men.  The  administration  had  profited  by  the 
lessons  of  the  last  war.  His  policy  was  conciliatory,  his  rule  un- 
questioned. But  he  had  not  the  fortresses  and  influence  of  his 
father  ;  the  phalanx  had  lost  some  of  its  prestige  ;  Rome's  position 
in  Greece  was  stronger.  Abroad  it  was  more  difficult  to  win  sup- 
port. His  marriage  alliances  with  Syria  and  Bithynia  promised 
as  little  as  the  probably  fabulous  intrigues  of  Carthage  or  hopes 
from  Samnium.  Nothing  had  come  of  his  reported  attempt  to 
launch  a  horde  of  barbarians  on  Italy,  through  the  passes  of  the 


TKTKADKACUM   OF    PERSEUS. 


Eastern  Alps,  but  the  founding  of  the  fortress  of  Aquileia  and 
the  destruction  of  the  invading  Bastarna^  in  their  retreat  from 
Dardania.  The  chief  of  the  Odrysians,  the  "  brave  and  gentle 
Cotys,"  was  a  useful  ally  ;  in  Ualmatia  he  secured  the  drunkard 


276  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Genthius,  prince  of  Scodra.  Tlic  eyes  of  dieccc,  moreover,  were 
turning  to  Macedon.  A  native  at  least  was  better  than  a  bar- 
barian hegemony,  and  the  action  of  Roman  partisans  irritated 
popular  feeling.  Eumenes  was  boycotted  as  a  traitor,  his  gifts 
rejected,  and  his  statues  dishonoured.  Several  even  of  his  subject 
cities,  and  politic  Rhodes  itself,  recognised  by  striking  demonstra- 
tions the  growing  power  of  Perseus.  Except  Peloponnesus,  Greece 
was  ripe  for  revolution,  and  Perseus  made  his  market  of  the  pre- 
valent bankruptcy  and  socialism.  His  decrees  of  amnesty,  his 
ofifers  of  sympathy,  called  to  his  banner  the  debtors,  criminals, 
and  exiles  of  Hellas.  The  banner  of  Macedon  was  the  banner 
of  plunder  and  patriotism,  of  liberty  and  revolution. 

Rupture  with  Rome. — Rome  was  not  without  a  casus  belli,  the 
encroachment  on  an  ally  or  breach  of  treaty,  nor  was  she  slow  to 
see  the  danger  to  her  influence  in  Greece.  The  flame  was  fed  by 
the  assiduous  complaints  of  Eumenes,  who  in  172  B.C.  persuaded  the 
Senate,  in  spite  of  Perseus'  remonstrances,  to  prepare  secretly  for 
war.  Nor  was  its  temper  softened  by  the  firm  language  of  the  king's 
envoy.  The  rupture,  imminent  in  173  B.C.,  was  however  postponed. 
Senate  and  consul  were  still  wrangling  over  the  insubordinate 
action  of  M.  Popillius  Ltenas  in  the  Ligurian  war,  and  the  conflict 
of  powers  resulted  in  a  complete  deadlock.  The  struggle  between 
traditional  authority  and  the  ill-controlled  executive  ended  in 
the  submission  of  the  acting  consul  and  his  rebellious  brother. 
Perseus  took  no  advantage  of  this,  although  at  the  close  of  172  B.C., 
by  denouncing  the  treaty  of  Cynoscephalas  and  claiming  equal 
treatment,  in  answer  to  an  imperious  message  from  the  Senate, 
he  had  made  war  inevitable.  He  suffered  himself  to  be  hood- 
winked by  Q.  Marcius  Philippus  with  a  pretence  of  negotiation, 
while  Rome  prepared  her  forces  and  undermined  his  popularity 
in  the  East.  The  fruits  of  immediate  action  were  lost.  Lyciscus 
secured  ^tolia  for  Rome,  the  Achaean  League  garrisoned  Chal- 
cis,  while  advanced  corps  occupied  the  route  from  Apollonia  to 
Larissa. 

Success  of  Perseus. — The  king,  still  hoping  for  peace  or 
adhering  stubbornly  to  the  defensive,  shut  himself  up  within  his 
mountains.  The  day  for  which  he  had  sharpened  the  sword  so 
long  found  him  dallying  with  the  scabbard.  His  allies  proved 
a  broken  reed  ;  Rhodes,  Syria,  Bithynia,  Byzantium,  stood  neutral 
or  acted  for  Rome.  For  a  time  the  blunders  of  the  enemy  saved 
him.  In  171  B.C.  P.  Licinius  Crassus  landed  in  Greece.  Besides  the 
strong  allied  fleet  under  C.  Lucretius,  operating  from  Chalcis,  he 


THIRD  MACEDONIAN   WAR  277 

controlled  a  force  of  nearly  50,000  Italians  and  Greeks.  Leav- 
ing a  large  reserve  in  lUyria,  and  advancing,  undisturbed  by  the 
dispirited  Perseus,  to  Larissa,  he  was  able  to  isolate  the  king  and 
get  touch  with  his  fleet  and  his  Greek  supporters.  Here  he  re- 
mained inactive  till  Perseus,  having  fortified  the  passes  of  Tempe, 
moved  up  to  observe  him  from  the  slopes  of  Ossa.  The  consul 
was  provoked,  harassed,  drawn  out,  and  finally  beaten  with  loss 
in  a  brilliant  cavalry  engagement  at  Callicinus,  and  retired  behind 
the  Peneius.  But  instead  of  pressing  the  success  and  reaping 
the  fruits  of  Greek  enthusiasm,  Perseus  sue'd  for  peace,  which 
was  at  once  refused.  After  a  second  and  indecisive  encounter 
at  Phalanna  he  evacuated  Thessaly,  and  proceeded,  with  the  aid 
of  Cotys,  to  clear  his  northern  and  western  frontier,  while  the 
Romans  leisurely  secured  their  position  in  Thessaly  and  Boeotia, 
where  the  bungling  and  brutal  colleagues,  Lucretius  and  Crassus, 
by  lax  discipline  and  shameless  outrage  on  friend  and  foe  alike, 
demoralised  their  troops  and  kindled  an  outburst  of  fierce  indig- 
nation.    Epirus  went  over  to  Perseus. 

The  failures  of  Hostilius  in  restoring  discipline  and  penetrating 
Macedon,  and  the  scandalous  cruelty  and  incompetence  of  the 
admiral  Hortensius  in  the  following  year,  branded  on  the  Roman 
name  a  deeper  stamp  of  military  and  moral  corruption.  Licensed 
rubbery,  libertinage,  and  free  furlough  had  rotted  the  morale  of 
the  army — men  and  officers  alike.  The  chronicle  of  plunder  and 
blunder  was  crowned  by  the  repeated  disasters  of  Appius  Claudius 
and  the  army  of  communication  in  lllyria.  The  ill-informed 
Senate  attempted  to  interfere,  and  an  admiral  was  condemned, 
but  the  allies  gained  little,  and  Perseus  securely  repelled  attacks, 
and  continued  his  work  in  the  north  and  west.  A  lack  of  dash 
and  energy  marked  the  whole  war  on  both  sides  ;  it  was  a  war  of 
mistakes  and  worse.  Rome  had  lost  all,  even  honour ;  the  king 
had  failed  to  use  his  chance.  The  consul  of  169  B.C.,  Q.  Marcius 
Philippus,  hero  of  a  disaster  in  a  Ligurian  ambush,  shrewder 
diplomatist  than  soldier,  succeeded  by  sheer  luck  and  impudence, 
helped  by  the  negligence  of  an  outpost,  in  masking  the  strong 
forts  of  Tempe,  turning  the  fourfold  barrier  by  a  flank  march  over 
mountain  paths,  and  piercing  the  rocky  wall  of  Macedon,  only  to 
find  himself,  like  Cromwell  at  Dunbar,  jammed  in  on  a  narrow 
plain  between  the  enemy,  the  mountain,  and  the  sea,  and  depen- 
dent on  a  still  invisible  fleet.  The  easy  prey  was  rescued  by  the 
panic-stricken  retreat  of  Perseus  from  his  impregnable  lines  at 
Dium,  closing  the  coast- road,  along  which  alone  could  Macedon 


278  HrSTORY  OF  ROME 

be  safely  entered  with  the  co-operation  of  a  fleet,  and  within 
striking  distance  of  the  capital  and  Pella.  But  Philippus'  ad- 
vance was  checked  by  failing  supplies,  and  he  was  only  saved 
once  more  from  annihilation  in  his  retreat  by  the  timely  fall 
of  the  forts  and  magazines  of  Tempe  in  his  rear.  Perseus  still 
blocked  the  way  along  the  Elpius,  and  the  net  result  of  the 
year's  work  was  the  capture  of  the  gates  of  Macedon.  The 
king,  while  he  left  no  stone  vmturned  to  end  the  war,  used  his 
improved  position  to  influence  surrounding  states.  Genthius  he 
was  able  to  involve  in  strife  ;  he  negotiated  secretly  with  Syria, 
Bithynia,  and  Rhodes  ;  he  hoped  to  obtain  the  mediation,  or  at 
least  the  benevolent  neutrality,  of  Eumenes.  But  Syria  had  her 
Egyptian  policy  ;  mutual  distrust  and  personal  avarice  shattered 
his  dealings  with  Eumenes  ;  Rhodes  attempted  intervention  too 
late  for  her  own  safety.  The  services  of  a  Gallic  horde  he  de- 
clined as  dangerous  and  burdensome  ;  from  Greece  came  no 
efifectiv^e  help. 

.^milius  Paullus. — At  length,  in  168  B.C.,  public  feeling  rose. 
The  Western  army  had  been  reduced  to  inaction,  the  fleet  paralysed 
by  desertion  and  disease  ;  the  consul  was  marking  time  in  his  pre- 
carious position  ;  Macedon  was  intact.  L.  Aunilius  Paullus,  father 
of  .^milianus,  son  of  the  general  of  Cannae,  a  man  in  the  sixties, 
twice  consul,  a  strict  old-fashioned  officer,  with  a  creditable 
record  in  Spain  and  Liguria,  poor,  upright,  noble,  with  real  modern 
refinement  to  blend  with  his  old  Roman  virtues,  arrived  with 
strong  resolves  and  overwhelming  resources.  The  Illyrian  corsairs 
vanished  from  the  seas  ;  the  praetor  Anicius  defeated  Genthius  and 
took  his  capital  in  thirty  days.  The  army  was  rapidly  reorganised, 
and  the  hopes  and  proposed  mediation  of  the  Greek  states  discon- 
certed and  forestalled  by  the  still  more  rapid  collapse  of  Macedon. 
Occupying  attention  with  a  feint  in  front,  he  turned  the  line  of 
the  Elpius  by  a  flank  march  through  the  pass  of  Pythium  (or 
Gythium),  compelling  a  retreat  on  Pydna.  Here,  on  the  22nd  of 
June  168  B.C.,  after  a  night  marked  by  a  lunar  eclipse,  foretold,  as 
was  said,  by  a  Roman  officer,  a  skirmish  of  watering-parties  brought 
on  the  unexpected  battle  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  Greece, 
and  finally  settle  on  Rome  the  supremacy  of  the  world. 

Battle  of  Pydna  :  Fall  of  Perseus. — Scarcely  were  the  Romans 
formed  in  line  when,  out  of  the  confusion  of  the  fight  in  front,  the 
phalanx  burst  upon  them  with  its  bristling  forest  of  spears,  striking 
awe  into  the  heart  of  the  veteran  consul.  In  vain  the  brave 
Paelignian  cohort  impaled  their  bodies  on  the  pikes.     The  whole 


BATTLE   OF  FY  DMA  279 

line  shrank  from  that  iron  wall.  There  was  hesitation,  and  finally 
retreat.  The  impending  rout  was  changed  to  victory  by  the  skill 
of  the  general,  the  tactical  superiority  of  the  maniple,  and  the  cool 
head  and  brave  hand  of  the  Roman  soldier.  Renouncing  resist- 
ance front  to  front,  and  profiting  by  the  dislocation  in  the  phalanx 
caused  by  the  rapid  advance  and  rush  of  battle,  Paullus  broke  up 
his  fighting  line  and  thrust  his  maniples  and  cohorts  into  the  gaps 
and  intervals  of  its  flanks  and  rear,  avoiding  its  collective  force  and 
splitting  It  into  its  weaker  elements.  Well  in  hand  and  trained 
to  mdependent  action  in  open  order,  the  legionary  with  his  short 
sword  dealt  havoc  in  the  shattered  mass.  The  cavalry  that  should 
have  covered  the  flanks  fled,  with  their  king  to  lead  them.  The 
phalanx  as  a  fighting  machine  died,  as  it  was  born,  in  Macedon, 
whose  power  was  broken  with  the  force  that  made  it.  Macedon  sub- 
mitted within  two  days,  Perseus,  hunted  down  and  forsaken,  fell, 
with  his  treasures,  into  the  hands  of  Rome,  to  point  the  moralisings 
and  adorn  the  triumph  of  the  consul.  His  rapid  fall  startled  the 
Hellenic  East.  With  the  doubtful  stigma  of  cruelty  and  cowardice, 
and  the  sure  reproach  of  avarice  and  irresolution,  he  may  be  dis- 
missed to  end  his  days  at  Alba  Fucens,  where  his  son,  the  heir 
of  Macedon,  earned  his  living  as  a  clerk. 

Macedon  and  Greece. — The  land  was  settled  by  the  generous 
Roman,  aided  by  the  usual  commission  of  ten.  Rome  was 
once  more  in  a  dilemma.  Unwilling  to  overload  the  structure  of 
the  state,  anxious  to  keep  the  forms  and  spirit  of  the  Republic, 
warned  as  she  was  by  example  of  the  clangers  of  conceding  that 
free  hand  to  her  officers  which  it  was  almost  impossible  to  refuse, 
without  the  genius  or  the  impulse  to  create  new  forms  of  govern- 
ment to  meet  the  novel  situation,  she  was  even  more  unwilling  to 
leave  a  chance  of  the  restoration  of  a  dangerous  power.  She 
tried  to  evade  her  responsibility,  and  by  a  temporary  expedient 
to  stem  the  flowing  tide  of  annexation.  At  the  Congress  of  Amphi- 
polis  (167  B.C.)  Macedon  was  declared  free  ;  the  national  kingship 
and  national  army  were  abolished  ;  except  for  a  few  frontier  guards 
in  the  north,  the  country  was  disarmed.  The  compact  state  was 
split  into  four  republics,  isolated  by  restrictions  on  commerce,  on 
reciprocal  land-holding,  and  intermarriage  ;  local  government  was 
thrown  into  the  hands  of  the  nobles.  Otherwise  the  old  institutions 
were  retained  ;  a  tribute  was  imposed,  as  the  pricci-  of  the  pro 
tectorate — i.e.,  half  the  former  land-tax,  assessed  on  the  new 
commonwealths,  a  fixed  sum  of  100  talents.  For  a  time  the  gold 
and  silver  mines  were  closed,  and  the  royal  domains  were  kept 


28o  HrSTORY  OF  ROME 

by  Rome.  Tliis  insidious  constitution  was  guaranteed  by  the  de- 
portation of  the  civil  and  military  officers  of  the  crown  to  Italy. 

But  the  date  of  independence  was  out  for  more  than  Macedon. 
Not  only  was  Illyria  broken  up  by  a  similar  scheme,  its  fleet 
confiscated,  and  the  land  divided  into  three  "free"  states,  paying 
tribute — a  real  boon  to  commerce — but  the  subservience  of  the 
independent  states  was  everywhere,  by  fair  means  or  foul,  assured. 
In  each  the  Roman  partisans,  Lyciscus,  Callicrates,  Charops, 
and  their  like,  at  least  unpunished  by  Rome,  carried  on  a 
campaign  of  informations,  confiscations,  and  e.xecutions  against 
the  patriotic  party.  Those  were  more  fortunate  who  were  de- 
tained in  Italy,  escaping  the  reign  of  terror  in  Greece.  Above  looo 
Achasins,  among  whom  was  Polybius,  together  with  the  indepen- 
dent leaders  in  other  districts,  were  selected  for  this  purpose  by  a 
party  commission,  and  all  application  for  trial  or  release  disregarded 
during  at  least  sixteen  years.  It  was  a  poor  return  for  the  loyal 
support  of  the  Achaean  government,  whatever  had  been  the  out- 
bursts of  childish  irritation  on  the  part  of  the  people.  Callicrates, 
the  friend  of  Rome,  was  boycotted  in  the  public  baths  and  hissed 
by  schoolboys  in  the  street.  A  worse  fate  befell  Epirus.  By  the 
orders  of  the  Senate,  to  satisfy  an  ancient  grudge,  seventy  of 
its  towns  were  sacked  and  150,000  souls  enslaved.  ^Etolia  lost 
Amphipolis,  Acarnania,  and  Leucas  ;  while  Athens  received  Delos 
and  Lemnos. 

Rhodes  and  Pergamum.  —Rhodes,  the  old  and  favoured  ally, 
paid  the  penalty  for  its  independent  attitude,  and  for  the  one  mis- 
take in  that  consummate  statesmanship  which  had  hitherto  secured 
her  freedom  of  action  and  an  honourable  neutrality.  Suffering  in 
her  commerce  by  the  war  and  jealous  of  Pergamum,  the  pro-Mace- 
donian feeling  of  her  people  encouraged  by  Rome's  mistakes,  she 
had  allowed  herself  to  be  lured  by  her  own  vanity  and  the  artifices 
of  Philippus  into  proposing,  if  not  an  armed  intervention,  at  least 
a  somewhat  peremptory  mediation.  Rapidly  as  this  outburst  of 
Hellenism  oozed  away  when  Rome's  weakness  turned  to  strength, 
it  was  too  late  to  avert  the  consequences.  The  Senate  was  not 
sorry  for  the  chance,  and  the  patriotic  Rhodian  leaders  found  that 
the  civilised  world  was  but  the  prison  of  Rome.  Barely,  by  abject 
submission  and  the  banishment  orexecution  of  her  chiefs,  did  Rhodes 
evade  a  declaration  of  war ;  and  when  at  last  the  cup  of  bitterness 
was  full,  and  the  Senate,  to  her  humble  petition,  conceded  an 
alliance,  she  had  lost  her  valuable  possessions  on  the  mainland, 
while  her  commercial  pre-eminence  was  ruined  and  her  revenues 


ROME  AND    THE  EAST  281 

curtailed  by  trade  restrictions  and  the  establishment  of  the  free 
port  of  Dclos.  Similar  suspicions  of  intrigue  with  Macedon,  true  or 
fictitious,  had  rankled  in  the  Roman  mind  about  their  own  creature 
and  instrument,  Pergamum.  Eumenes  soon  found  himself  no 
longer  necessary,  was  bowed  out  of  Italy,  and  undermined  at  home. 
Pamphylia  and  Galatia  were  declared  independent,  the  attacks  of 
the  Celts  covertly  encouraged.  Of  the  spoil  he  received  no  share, 
while  Rome  listened  eagerly  to  complaints  of  the  hated  upstart. 
But  it  was  not  easy  to  destroy  the  astute  prince,  and  in  vain  Rome 
practised  on  theloyalty  of  his  brother  Attalus.  The  cringing  Prusias 
of  Bithynia,  "being  so  contemptible,  received  a  reward." 

Egypt  and  Syria — In  168  B.C.  Rome  practically  extended  her 
protectorate  over  Egypt  by  her  abrupt  intervention  in  the  Syro- 
Egyptian  war.  The  quarrel  had  risen  over  Coele-Syria  and 
Palestine,  which  had  been  charged  with  the  dowry  of  Cleopatra, 
the  daughter  of  Antiochus  the  Great.  On  her  death  (173  B.C.)  Egypt 
claimed  the  provinces,  but  Antiochus  Epiphanes  defeated  the 
aggressor  at  Pelusium  (171  B.C.).  With  his  nephew,  Ptolemy  \'I. 
Philometor,  in  his  hands,  he  renewed  his  project  of  conquest.  In 
spite  of  the  temporary  success  of  the  resistance  at  Alexandria  under 
Ptolemy's  younger  brother  Euergetes,  surnamed  Physcon  (the  pot- 
bellied), he  once  more  lay  before  the  town  (168  B.C.),  opposed  by 
both  brothers,  when  he  was  met  by  the  Roman  ambassador,  C. 
Popilius  Lasnas.  Drawing  with  his  vine  staff  a  circle  round  the  king, 
Lrenas  demanded  an  answer  to  his  ultimatum  before  Epiphanes 
stepped  from  the  circle.  The  king  obeyed  and  withdrew,  and  his 
obedience  set  the  seal  to  Rome's  mastery  of  the  East. 

Position  of  Rome. — Zama,  Cynoscephalte,  Magnesia, and  Pydna, 
left  the  Romans  nothing  to  do  but  organise,  pacify,  and  defend 
their  dominions,  to  convert  their  sphere  of  influence  into  adminis- 
trative divisions,  and  so  to  construct  a  stable  and  compact  empire. 
Amid  the  homage  of  kings  and  peoples,  Paullus,  the  general  of  the 
transition,  celebrated  in  solemn  triumph  the  last  great  victory  of 
the  citizen  army,  typically  due  to  the  staying  power  of  Rome  and 
the  sterling  qualities  of  her  troops. 

But  the  temper  of  those  troops,  surly  at  the  loss  of  Macedonian 
plunder,  reserved  for  the  state  by  the  honesty  of  Paullus,  and  the 
disgraceful  management  of  the  first  campaign,  were  full  of  omens 
for  the  future.  The  citizen  soldier  was  soon  to  become  as  rare  as 
the  citizen  general.  Nor  is  it  here  alone  that  the  transition  is  seen. 
Not  only  does  subtle  diplomacy  take  the  place  of  force,  but  there 
is  a  growing  tendency  abroad  and  at  home  to  reduce  friends  to 


282  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

dependents  and  dependents  to  subjects.  The  force  of  circum- 
stances, the  methods  of  the  conservatives  themselves,  played  into 
the  hands  of  the  annexationists.  It  was  the  plain  duty  of  Rome 
to  put  an  end  to  the  complicated  and  ruinous  system  of  protec- 
torates. It  was  the  plain  duty  of  the  Senate  to  set  up  where  she 
had  thrown  down,  to  substitute  standing  garrisons  for  enfeebled 
militias,  and  a  civil  organisation  for  a  chaos  of  authorities  worse 
confounded  by  her  own  position  as  referee.  She  must  recognise 
the  duties  as  well  as  the  rights  of  supremacy.  In  her  attempt  to 
secure  an  unassailable  position  she  had  been  drawn  on  from 
victory  to  victory.  There  was  no  stable  power  but  her  own  to 
maintain  peace,  keep  the  seas,  and  guard  the  frontier  of  civilisa- 
tion. Whatever  the  danger  to  her  own  form  of  go\ernment,  the 
heiress  of  Carthage  and  Alexander  must  take  up  her  inheritance,  the 
liabilities  as  well  as  the  assets. 

Revolt  of  Macedon  suppressed  — Some  steps  in  the  new  direc- 
tion we  have  already  traced.  Nor  was  it  long  before  the  unworkable 
arrangements  in  Greece  collapsed.  Nineteen  years  after  Pydna 
(149  B.C.)  a  pretender  appeared  in  Macedon.  His  name  was  Andris- 
cus,  the  son  of  a  fuller  of  Adramyttium,  and  he  personated  Philip, 
son  of  Perseus  and  the  Syrian  Laodice,  who  had  died  a  prisoner  in 
Italy.  His  pretended  uncle,  Demetrius  Soter,  king  of  Syria,  had 
sent  the  Mysian  Warbeck  in  chains  to  Rome.  He  had  escaped 
once  and  again  from  custody  by  the  contemptuous  negligence  of 
the  Senate,  and  now,  with  some  support  from  Teres  of  Thrace, 
and  even  the  Byzantines,  favoured  by  the  prevailing  confusion 
and  irritation,  he  invaded  Macedon,  routed  the  local  militia,  drew 
to  his  standard  the  malcontent  loyalists,  defeated  a  praetor,  and 
recovered  Thessaly.  The  rebellion,  for  which  Rome  and  her  com- 
missions were  directly  responsible,  was  suppressed  with  energy. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus,  with  a  strong  army  and  the  fleet  of  Per- 
gamum,  crushed  and  captured  the  impostor,  and  thereby  relieved 
a  critical  year  (148  B.C.)  of  one  source  of  anxiety.  The  blunder  was 
not  repeated  ;  Macedon  became  a  province,  including  Epirus,  the 
Ionian  Islands,  and  the  ports  of  Apollonia  and  Epidamnus,  with 
the  general  protectorate  of  Greece.  The  arrangements  of  Paullus 
were  otherwise  retained.  Local  institutions  remained,  as  usual, 
fairly  intact.  For  the  defence  of  the  North  and  East  Rome  had 
now  to  answer.  Her  work  was  inefficiently  done,  and  continued 
inadequate  till  the  era  of  Augustus  ;  but  to  secure  communications 
the  \'ia  Egnatia  was  constructed,  from  Dyrrhachium  and  Apol- 
lonia to  Thessalonica,  and  later  to  the  Hebrus.     There  was  one 


AFFJ/KS   OF  GKEECF  283 

last  struggle  in  142  B.C.,  when  the  pseudo- Alexander  was  crushed  by 
the  qu;Estor  Tremellius. 

Greece  and  Rome. — As  the  reign  of  terror  passed  and  the  tools 
of  Rome  vanished  one  by  one  from  the  stage  of  politics,  some 
measure  of  peace  had  returned  to  Hellas.  But  deeper  sores  re- 
mained ;  social  democracy,  the  fruit  of  wild  theory  and  wilder 
revolutions,  was  rampant  in  thought  and  act.  Public  and  private 
bankruptcy,  debt,  brigandage,  depopulation,  marked  the  ruin  of 
the  country.  There  was  war  between  rich  and  poor,  faction  and 
faction,  city  and  city.  Marriage  was  neglected,  property  insecure. 
Peloponnesus  had  become  the  recruiting  ground  of  the  mercenary 
soldier.  The  foul  story  of  the  plunder  of  Oropus  by  indigent 
Athens  (156  B.C.)  blots  the  page  of  historj'.  To  apologise  for  national 
burglary  and  avert  its  heavy  penalty  came  the  leaders  of  philo- 
sophy, Carneades,  Diogenes,  jmd  Critolaus,  tickling  with  sophistries 
the  unpractised  ears  of  Rome,  and  kindling  the  indignant  fears  of 
Cato  for  the  morality  of  his  countrymen. 

The  subservience  of  Callicrates  and  his  party  had  preserved  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  the  Acha?an  League.  Exhaustion 
and  the  lack  of  leaders  secured  a  seeming  acquiescence,  in  spite 
of  latent  discontent  exasperated  by  the  detention  of  the  exiles.  At 
length,  in  151-150B.C.,  the  Senate  conceded  this  point  to  the  prayer 
of  Polybius,  the  friend  and  instructor  of  the  Scipionic  circle,  and 
the  impatient  appeal  of  Cato  to  "  waste  no  more  time  in  debating 
whether  some  old  Greek  dotards  should  be  buried  by  Italian  or 
Achaean  undertakers."  In  answer  to  a  second  petition  for  the 
restoration  of  their  lost  rights,  Cato  advised  Ulysses  not  to  return 
to  the  Cyclops'  cave  to  get  his  cap  and  belt. 

Return  of  the  Greek  Exiles.— But  the  new  policy  was  as  little 
calculated  to  ensure  peace  and  a  union  of  hearts  as  the  old. 
Rome  understood  neither  the  qualities  nor  the  defects  of  her  Greek 
clients  ;  nor  did  she  even  attempt  patiently  to  master  the  problem 
— almost  insoluble  by  the  wit  of  man — of  reconciling  her  own  ends 
with  a  stable  Achaean  Home  Rule.  The  exiles  of  seventeen  years 
— a  wretched  remnant — with  their  unsatisfied  claims  and  their 
hatred  of  Rome,  were  a  danger  to  the  state.  One  of  these  restored 
hostages,  Dia^us,  a  violent  and  dishonest  man.  President  in  149  B.C., 
raised  a  storm  of  patriotism  to  conceal  his  share  in  a  dirty  job. 
His  attack  on  the  privileges  guaranteed  to  Sparta  as  a  member 
of  the  League  was  a  demonstration  against  Rome.  Sparta  appealed 
to  the  Senate  ;  its  ambiguous  answers  were  sedulously  perverted 
by  both  parties.    At  last  the  Acha?ans,  disregarding  express  protests, 


284 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


and  relying-  on  Rome's  embarrassment  in  Africa,  her  tried  com- 
plaisance, and  their  own  recent  services  in  Macedon,  urged  on  the 
struggle,  invaded  Sparta  (148  n.c),  and  gained  a  decisive  victory 
under  Damocritus. 

The  Achaean  League  force  on  War.  —  Next  year  L.  Aurelius 
Orestes  met  the  Diet  at  Corinth.  He  demanded  the  renunciation 
of  Corinth,  Argos,  Sparta,  and  the  most  recent  acquisitions  of  the 
League.     Its  extension  had  been  only  reluctantly  allowed.  .  It  had 


TEMPLE   AND    ACROPOLIS,    CORINTH. 


become  a  nuisance,  and  the  Romans  had  no  further  use  for  it.  The 
demand  was  a  sentence  of  extinction,  brutal,  but  not  wholly  unde- 
served, and  it  raised  a  tempest  of  indignation,  which  scarcely  spared 
the  persons  of  the  ambassadors,  and  fell  heavily  on  the  Spartan 
residents  in  Corinth.  The  Senate,  however,  whether  from  policy  or 
lingering  respect  for  the  last  relics  of  Greek  freedom,  was  content 
to  despatch  Sext.  Julius  C;esar  (147  B.C.)  to  remonstrate  with  the 
Diet  at  yEgium,     His  attempts  at  conciliation  were  baffled  by  the 


THE  FALL   OF  CORINTH  285 

folly  of  the  incapable  demagogue  Critolaus  {strategies,  147-146  B.C.), 
who,  inferring  Rome's  weakness  from  her  mildness,  frustrated  the 
conference  arranged  at  Tegea,  insulted  the  Roman  embassy,  and 
stumped  the  country  to  preach  a  sacred  war.  He  sought  supplies  by 
an  attack  on  capital  and  a  suspension  of  cash  payments.  The  envoys 
of  Metellus  were  hissed  from  the  theatre  at  Corinth  ;  the  mob  of 
the  capital,  controlling  the  assembly,  intimidated  the  moderates  and 
cheered  the  idle  vapourings  of  their  leader.  War  was  declared 
with  Sparta,  and  Rome  requested  to  keep  hands  off.  She  was 
friend,  not  mistress. 

Metellus  and  Critolaus. — With  some  support  from  Thebes  and 
Chalcis,  Critolaus  marched  upon  Heraclea  under  Oeta,  which  had 
seceded  in  obedience  to  Rome ;  but  on  the  advance  of  Metellus 
from  Macedon,  the  Achaeans  retreated  precipitately  into  Locris, 
abandoning  even  ThermopyljE.  They  were  routed  at  Scarpheia, 
their  supports  cut  to  pieces,  the  sorry  remnant  vanishing  over 
the  isthmus.  Metellus,  anxious  to  end  the  business,  acted  with 
moderation,  even  mercy,  but  the  criminal  obstinacy  of  Dijeus 
dragged  on  the  war.  By  sheer  terrorism,  by  the  liberation  of 
slaves  and  forced  contributions,  supported  by  the  infuriated  rabble, 
he  collected  forces,  stamped  out  opposition,  and  hurried  his  country 
to  ruin,  amid  mingled  madness  and  dismay. 

Mummius  and  the  Fall  of  Corinth. — The  Achaean  vanguard  had 
already  slunk  from  Megara  before  Metellus,  when  Mummius,  a 
7J0VIIS  /lo/iio,  an  upright,  good-natured  ignoramus,  of  little  wealth  or 
personal  distinction,  but  not  unpopular  with  the  conquered  Greeks, 
arri\ed,  and  greedily  accepting  battle,  scattered  their  feeble  forces 
to  the  wind. 

Deserted  Corinth,  left  open  to  the  incredulous  consul,  was  given 
over  to  plunder,  its  remaining  inhabitants  killed  or  sold,  its  buildings 
razed,  its  site  cursed  by  the  express  order  of  the  Senate.  Its  land 
was  confiscated,  together  with  some  tracts  in  Euboea  and  Boeotia, 
as  ager  publicits.  Its  place  was  taken  by  Argos,  the  Roman  com- 
mercial headquarters,  and  Delos,  the  centre  of  the  transport  traffic 
of  the  East.  Diaeus  fell  by  his  own  hand,  while  rude  legionaries 
played  dice  on  the  masterpieces  of  painting  preserved  to  adorn  the 
towns  of  Italy  and  the  temples  of  Greece.  To  ensure  their  safe 
transport,  Mummius  provided  that  any  lost  treasure  should  be 
replaced  by  one  of  equal  value  ! 

Settlement  of  Achaia :  Polybius. — Thebes  and  Chalcis  were 
reduced  to  villages  and  the  leaders  punished.  On  the  whole,  the 
conqueror  showed   striking   moderation   and   still   more   striking 


286  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

rectitude.  The  statesman  and  historian  I'olybius  was  actively 
employed  in  arranj^inj^  the  new  system,  and  was  able  to  improve 
materially  the  position  of  his  countrymen.  The  confederacies, 
though  they  regained  later  a  shadowy  recognition,  were  sup- 
pressed. The  communities  were  isolated,  and  restrictions  on 
land-holding  for  the  present  enforced.  Hut  Achaia  did  not  yet 
become  a  province.  The  states  remained  formally  free,  subject 
only,  with  some  exceptions,  to  the  payment  of  a  fixed  tribute, 

L-  AAVAA  AA 1-  b  f '  Co jOVd 
AVSPiao-IMPtKlO.Q^E 
eiVS-ACHAlACAri-CORlNTO 
r>EL£T^O-ROAAAM-RE  Dl  E  IT 

TRIVA^PHAMS-OB'HASCE 

R£S-BENE-CESTAS'avoD 

IN-BELLO-VOVERAT 

HANOAEDEMETsiCNV 

HEI^CVLIWICTORIS 

JAAPERATOR-DEDICAT 

DEDICATORY    INSCRIPTION    OF    L.    MUMMIUS. 


assessed  on  the  several  communities,  and  to  the  control  of  foreign 
relations  by  Rome.  Power  in  each  was  thrown  into  the  hands  of 
the  rich,  and  in  respect  of  their  mutual  relations  and  of  high 
judicial  and  administrative  questions  they  were  subject  to  the 
general  supervision  of  the  governor  of  Macedon.  Like  Massilia, 
in  Gaul,  and  the  "  free  towns "  generally,  they  were  formally  ex- 
cluded, virtually  included  in  the  province,  or  "command"  of  the 
Roman  officer. 

The  destruction  of  Corinth  was  a  dark  deed  due  to  commercial 


SETTLEMENT  Of  ACHAIA  287 

jealousy,  a  mark  of  the  growing  selfishness  of  Roman  policy.  But 
the  rapidity  of  her  ruin  saved  Greece  from  the  extremities  of  war 
and  the  furies  of  faction.  The  regime  of  fussy  confederacies,  of 
political  hysterics,  of  social  disorganisation  and  ceaseless  Roman 
commissions,  had  ended.  There  was  at  least  a  chance  of  peace, 
security,  and  progress.  Unfortunately,  the  confusions  of  the 
Mithridatic  and  civil  wars  cut  short  the  work  of  regeneration. 
No  doubt  Rome  had  sown  discord  and  reaped  rebellion,  but  the 
true  cause  of  the  ruin  of  Greece  is  to  be  found  in  her  political 
vices.  By  their  narrow  patriotism  and  incapacity  for  combination, 
by  their  lack  of  tolerance  and  their  quarrelsome  intrigues,  at  once 
invoking  and  despising  the  dreaded  barbarians,  her  leaders  pulled 
down  destruction  on  their  own  heads. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

INTERNAL    HISTORY    (266-I<6   B.C.). 

General  Characteristics— Actual  Changes  :  (i)  Religious  Regulations  ;  (2)  Reform 
of  Comitia  Centuriata  ;  (3)  Administrative  Changes-  Growth  of  Power  of 
Senate  and  Decay  of  Comitia— Growth  of  Oligarchy  and  the  Great  Houses. 

General  Characteristics. — The  Republic  had  received  its  final 
form  in  287  B.C.,  with  the  definite  recognition  of  the  Concilium 
plebis.  In  the  present  period  is  developed  that  glaring  contrast 
of  form  and  fact  which  stamps  so  strongly  the  political  institutions 
of  Rome.  The  germs  of  the  revolution,  which,  by  concentrating 
power  in  the  Senate,  resulted  in  the  creation  of  an  oligarchy,  were 
doubtless  contained  in  the  original  state-system.  They  only  needed 
favourable  circumstances  to  work  out  their  true  nature.  The 
movement  which  destroyed  the  patriciate  left  in  its  place  an  aris- 
tocracy of  office,  a  "  nobilitas,"  faced  by  a  growing  aristocracy  of 
wealth.  The  normal  development  of  the  ancient  city-state  was 
suspended,  the  orderly  succession  of  broadening  constitutions 
checked.  The  arrest  of  growth  was  due  to  the  defects  of  the  popular 
assemblies,  which  possessed  none  of  the  powers  or  the  spirit  of  the 
Ecclesia  or  the  House  of  Commons,  to  the  various  restrictions  on 
their  activity,  to  the  absence  of  an  organised  party-system,  to  the 
conservatism  of  the  people,  and,  above  all,  to  the  peculiar  excel- 
lences of  the  Senate,  favoured  by  the  demands  of  continuous  and 


288  HISTORY  OP   ROME 

desperate  war.  In  the  ])recediny^  period  change  had  succeeded 
change.  The  old  democratic  movement  had  swept  away  pohtical 
disabihties  and  patrician  privilege,  had  bridled  an  arbitrary  exe- 
cutive, had  dealt  after  a  fashion  with  economic  distress,  and  had 
secured  for  the  once  excluded  plebeian  a  commanding  position  in 
the  state.  There  was  now  a  formal  equality  of  rights  and  duties. 
Except  for  its  social  status  and  a  few  relics  of  privilege  soon  to 
disappear,  the  patriciate  had  ceased  to  exist.  But  here  the  growth 
of  free  institutions  stopped.  During  120  years  of  incessant  fighting 
the  government  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  practically  hereditary 
oligarchy,  ruling  under  the  forms  of  a  moderate  democracy.  And 
yet  there  was  no  recognised  order  of  nobles  ;  the  Senate  and  the 
offices  were  nominally  open,  the  formal  powers  of  the  sovereign 
Comitia  were  actually  increased,  and  the  burgesses,  enjoying  full 
rights  and  large  privileges,  bore  few  but  military  burdens.  New 
statutes  were  rare  ;  no  fresh  principles  were  invoked  ;  there  were 
indeed  few  who  perceived  the  drift  of  events,  and  for  active 
opposition  there  was  neither  time  nor  inclination.  A  state  cannot 
change  front  in  the  face  of  an  enemy. 

Beneath  the  surface,  indeed,  were  maturing  social  and  econo- 
mical problems,  which  were  destined  to  produce  a  fresh  and  more 
formidable  agitation,  while  the  rapid  extension  of  territory,  de- 
scribed above,  by  aggravating  the  difficulties  of  administration, 
led  to  the  final  revolution  of  all.  But  for  the  present  these  dangers 
v/ere  masked  by  the  rapid  rush  and  pressing  interest  of  foreign 
affairs,  and  though  we  can  detect  grave  symptoms  of  change, 
there  are  few  domestic  events  to  chronicle.  The  plebs  was  satis- 
fied with  its  victory  ;  the  poor  had  not  found  out  how  little  they 
had  gained;  all  parties  acquiesced  in  facts,  and  presented  a  united 
front  at  once  to  foreign  foes  and  Italian  outsiders.  In  the  few 
points  that  remained  the  equalisation  of  rights  was  completed 
without  difficulty,  and  the  strife  of  patres  and  plebs  became  an 
anachronism.     What  is  left  is  the  story  of  a  silent  change. 

Religion. — In  300  B.C.  the  Lex  Ogulnia  had  admitted  the 
plebs  to  the  augural  and  pontifical  colleges.  In  253  B.C.  a  plebeian 
became  chief  pontiff,  the  most  dignified  permanent  official  at 
Rome,  and  with  this  is  possibly  connected  a  change  in  the  method 
of  appointing  priests.  Hitherto  co-optation  had  been  the  rule  to 
preserve  the  consecrated  succession.  But  with  the  increasing 
influence  exerted  by  the  colleges  on  politics,  it  became  of  real 
importance  to  secure  some  form  of  control  by  the  community. 
Hence  about  this  time  the  selection  of  the  Pontifex    Maximus, 


ROMAN  RELIGION 


289 


and,  later  on,  by  the  Lex  Domitia  of  104  B.C.,  of  all  the  more  pro- 
minent priests,  was  transferred  from  the  colleges  to  the  minority 
of  the  tribes  (seventeen  out  of  thirty-five),  chosen  by  lot.  This 
compromise  avoided   a  direct  command  of  the  people,  and  the 


A    ROMAN    SACRIFICING. 


consequent  breach  of  divine   law,  while  it  gave   a   sort  of  veiled 
designation  or  conge  if clirc  which  could  not  be  disregarded. 

The  importance  of  these  questions  lay  in  the  relation  of  the 
Roman  state  to  its  religion. 

T 


290  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

This  religion  was  a  peculiar  one.  It  had  no  theological  dogma, 
no  moral  code  to  inculcate  ;  it  had  none  of  the  rich  poetry,  the 
abundant  originality,  of  Greek  mythology,  nothing  of  the  sombre 
gloom  of  the  Etruscan,  nothing  of  the  passion  and  mystic  emotion 
of  Asia.  The  iiumina  of  Rome,  shadowy  deities  indistinctly 
conceived,  were  represented  rather  by  symbols  than  by  images, 
manifestations  of  divine  power,  deriving  their  names  from  their 
functions,  indeed  with  no  distinct  names,  traits,  or  lives  of  their 
own,  save  those  borrowed  from  the  lively  fancy  of  the  Greek.  It 
was  a  faith  of  little  spiritual  value,  and  aftbrded  no  scope  for 
religious  movements  or  pious  fanaticism.  A  gentile,  or  family, 
or  political  rather  than  a  personal  matter,  it  had  always  a  formal 
and  ceremonial  character.  Closely  related  as  it  was  to  Roman 
civil  law — a  relation  natural  and  peculiar  to  early  times — there  was 
always  something  of  a  contract  about  it,  of  obligations  well  under- 
stood on  both  sides.  Religion  was  lost  in  worship  ;  the  Church 
was  merged  in  the  state.  There  was  no  priestly  caste  to  utilise, 
for  the  subjection  of  the  secular  power,  the  scrupulous  piety  and 
reverence  of  the  people  ;  the  priesthoods  were  filled  by  the  warriors 
and  lawyers  and  statesmen  of  the  Republic.  The  details  of  the 
ritual  were  elaborated  by  the  same  series  of  men  who  worked 
out  the  details  of  civil  jurisprudence.  Here  again  Roman  con- 
servatism adhered  closely  to  the  letter  of  the  law.  The  spirit  and 
character  of  institutions  might  change,  the  consecrated  word  or 
form  remained.  The  prosaic  literalism  of  the  Romans  made  piety 
consist  in  the  exact  performance  of  obligations  undertaken,  at  the 
altars  of  the  gods  as  in  the  prretor's  court.  With  the  gods  also  it 
was  necessary  to  be  strict  and  thrifty,  to  regulate  accounts,  to  be 
cautious  in  stipulation  and  exact  a  rigorous  return.  Nor  was  all 
this  without  its  value  for  conduct  and  character.  The  faith  ex- 
pressed the  man,  typified  his  grave  dignity,  his  self-respect  and 
power  of  discipline.  Its  minute  formalism  acted  as  a  restraint  on 
excess  ;  its  gods  were  moral  guardians  of  engagements,  of  treaties, 
of  hearth  and  home.  Its  very  vagueness  and  absence  of  dogma, 
its  attention  to  ritual  and  the  letter,  made  its  forms  expansive 
and  left  thought  free.  They  enabled  Roman  civilisation,  by 
bestowing  the  franchise  of  the  city  on  foreign  worships,  to  avoid 
shipwreck  on  the  rock  of  intolerance.  They  made  a  respectable 
conformity  possible.  They  left  abundant  loopholes  for  skilful  in- 
terpretation and  religious  fictions,  which  did  as  much  to  relieve 
conscience  and  expand  ideas  as  the  legal  fictions  and  equitable 
constructions  of  jurisconsults  did  to  enlarge  and  humanise  the 


ROMAN  RELIGIOX  29 1 

strict  letter  of  the  Roman  code.  But  Rome  had  to  tliank  its 
strong  poUtical  sense,  its  reverent  conservatism  and  power  of 
adapting  institutions,  for  the  fact  that  the  old  worship  of  nature, 
the  old  homage  to  the  dead  chief,  passed  into  a  serviceable 
political  instrument. 

Religion  and  Politics. — It  was  this  lay  aspect  of  the  Roman 
religion  that  made  the  question  of  the  auspices  and  the  religious 
colleges  important.  To  the  auspices  the  plebeian  gained  admis- 
sion when  he  entered  the  gates  of  office,  and  in  a  short  time 
only  a  few  priesthoods  remained  the  uncoveted  monopoly  of  the 
patrician.  The  relation  of  the  people  to  its  national  religion  had 
two  sides — ;the  state,  as  an  assemblage  o{  gentes  zxvA  fainilicE,  is 
a  religious  family,  which  owes  worship  to  its  protecting  deities, 
and  that  protection  is  ensured  by  the  exact  performance  of  rites 
and  ceremonies,  by  the  state  as  by  the  citizen.  The  Romans  set 
great  store  by  piety,  but  they  drove  hard  bargains  with  gods  as 
well  as  men.  The  other  side  consisted  in  the  attempt  to  find  out 
the  will  of  the  gods  as  to  some  definite  action — auspicia — and  this 
practice  of  divination,  exercised  at  the  will  of  the  government  in 
the  interest  of  the  state  and  restricted  to  experts,  passed  into  a 
cold  and  complicated  science. 

The  Senate  had  a  general  control  over  the  state  faith.  It  kept 
an  eye  on  foreign  gods  and  rites,  and  upon  unauthorised  divina- 
tion and  oracle-mongering.  In  i86  B.C.,  by  the  S.  C.  De  Baccha- 
nalibus,  it  suppressed  with  a  strong  hand  a  dangerous  secret 
society,  which  cloaked  murder  and  lust  with  the  garb  of  religion. 
After  long  investigations  the  licentious  cult  was  stamped  out  in 
blood.  Roman  faith  and  morality,  already  sapped  by  the  natu- 
ralisation of  Greek  and  Asiatic  worships,  especially  that  of  the 
Magna  Mater  oi  Pessinus  (205  B.C.),  was  threatened  by  this  uneasy 
craving  for  outlandish  superstitions.  Assisted  by  the  various 
colleges,  the  Senate  also  dealt  with  omens  of  danger,  with  cases 
of  sacrilege,  with  vows  and  thanksgivings. 

The  ius  auspiciorinn  belonged  to  the  magistrate,  originally  to 
the  patrician  magistrate,  who  consulted  the  divine  will  upon  all  im- 
portant public  acts.  His  power  of  reporting  evil  omens  was  used 
with  effect  to  impede  legislation.  Of  the  three  great  colleges,  the 
Pontifices  ^  were  the  interpreters  of  sacred  law.  They  arranged 
the  calendar,  whose  movable  feasts  and  general  confusion  were 

1  The  pontitices  [irobably  deiived  their  name  frum  the  special  ceremonies 
necessary  to  appease  the  river-god,  injured  by  the  erection  of  a  bridge. 


292 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


utilised  to  restrict  slill  further  tlie  scanty  time  available  for  the 
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decide  if  a  bill  were  in  order  or  a  magistrate  duly  created.     It  is 


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LETTER    OF   THE   CONSULS   TO   LOCAL   MAGISTRATES,    CONTAINING   THE 
SENATUS   CONSULTUM    DE    BACCHAN ALIBUS. 


thus  evident  how  necessary  it  was  for  the  plebeians  to  share  in 
the  control  of  the  religious  machinery  of  the  state.  On  the  other 
side,  it  became  equally  necessary  to  place  their  assembly  under 
those  religious  restrictions  from  which,  as  plebeian,  it  had  been 
free.     Secular  m  its  character,  it  stood  outside  the  old  religious 


RELIC, TOM  AND   POLITICS 


293 


system.  In  156  B.C.,  liy  the  I^ex  ALlia  Fujia,  a  stronghold  of  the 
aristocratic  party,  power  was  given  to  the  magistrates  to  apply 
to  the  Concilium  Plebis  the  device  of  obmintiatio ;  i.e.,  of  dispers- 
ing the  assembly  by  reporting  unfavourable  omens.  This  law 
was  specially  directed  against  tribunician  agitators,  and  hencefor- 
ward we  find  officials  not  merely  announcing  omens  on  the  spot, 
but  proclaiming  their  intention  of  observing  the  sky  on  every 
available  day.  The  auspices  thus  became  a  species  of  religious 
veto,  a  trusted  weapon  of  the  Senate. 


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EXTISPICIA. 


Centuriate  Assembly. — In  the  year  241  B.C.,  with  the  addition  of 
the  two  last  created,  the  number  of  the  tribes  was  definitely 
closed  at  thirty-five,  and  with  this  was  in  all  probability  connected 
the  reorganisation  of  the  Comitia  Centuriata.  There  was  also 
the  fact  that  the  government  had  been  compelled  for  want  of 
troops  to  reduce  the  minimum  census  required  for  service  in  the 
legions  to  4000  asses,  a  minimum  that  was  further  reduced  in 
the  naval  service,  and  in  case  of  need  even  for  the  army.  The 
change  could  not  fail  to  be  of  political  importance,  when  military 
service  rather  than  taxation  gave  a  claim  to  civil  rights  and 
privileges.      Hence  the  position  of  the  freedmen,  who  had  also 


294  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

been   recruited,   and   the    extension    of  popular    lil)erties    liecame 
prominent  questions. 

The  organisation  of  the  Centuriata  had  been  niihtary.  Its 
grades  and  centuries  had  immediate  reference  to  the  tactics  and 
armament  of  the  phalanx.  In  every  detail  it  pointed  to  the  time 
when  the  semi-feudal  royal  army  had  passed  into  the  citizen  in- 
fantry of  an  agricultural  and  commercial  state,  formed  as  a  phalanx 
in  which  the  best  armed  stood  in  the  front  ranks  or  acted  as 
cavalry  on  the  flank,  while  the  rearward  units,  with  their  slighter 
equipment,  increased  the  weight  of  the  wedge,  the  lightest  armed 
skirmishing  in  front  and  flank.  The  arrangement,  therefore,  has  a 
double  reference  to  the  results  of  the  census  and  the  needs  of  war. 
But  since  the  original  settlement,  or  rather  since  the  time  at  which 
the  amounts  valued  in  land  and  cattle  had  been  translated  into 
cash  (312  B.C.),  the  value  of  the  as  had  sunk  heavily.  Meanwhile 
the  phalanx  had  become  obsolete,  and  with  the  introduction  of  the 
manipular  army  the  old  machinery  was,  from  a  military  standpoint, 
useless.  With  the  introduction  of  pay  and  the  growth  of  booty, 
war  became  a  profitable  profession.  The  rich  shirked  service ;  the 
cavalry  of  the  public  horse  became  a  farce  ;  the  obligation  of  the 
census  was  meaningless  ;  tribunes  even  protected  the  shirkers  and 
arrested  the  conscribing  officer.  The  whole  system  would  have 
perished  but  for  the  importance  of  the  civil  functions  of  the  Comitia. 
But  even  for  this  secondary  purpose  the  exercitits  urbamis  gradually 
became  obsolete.  The  substantial  middle  class  which  had  formed 
the  bulk  of  the  first  division  gradually  disappeared.  The  census  was 
cooked  by  aristocratic  officials,  and  the  poorer  classes  [v.  note,  p.  296) 
were  swollen,  apart  from  the  natural  increase  in  population,  by  the 
influx  of  ruined  farmers  and  the  swarms  attracted  by  a  capital.  The 
lower  centuries  became  fuller  and  fuller,  the  higher  were  steadily 
thinned.  Increased  wealth  was  more  unequally  distributed.  Now 
the  method  of  group-voting  gave  but  one  voice  to  each  century, 
liowever  large.  The  eighteen  centuries  of  knights  voted  first,  then 
the  eighty  centuries  of  the  first  class,  and  if  these  were  unanimous 
the  matter  ended.  The  thirjl  class  rarely  voted,  the  fifth  never. 
Thus  the  whole  power  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  few.  Moreover,  the 
\\orking  of  the  assembly  was  hampered  by  its  cumbrous  machinery 
and  by  religious  obstruction.  Hence  political  life  and  judicial  busi- 
ness became  concentrated  in  the  more  manageable,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  more  democratic,  Comitia  Tributa.  Between  a  plebiscitum 
and  a  Lex  Populi  there  was  now  no  practical  difference  ;  nor  was 
the  formal  distinction  between  the  assemblyof  the  tribesand  the  Con- 


COMITIA    CEMTURIATA  2g$ 

cilium  Plebis  of  any  serious  value.  In  the  more  democratic  assembly 
the  intluence  and  ability  of  the  nobles,  even  of  the  few  remaining 
patricians,  could  make  itself  felt  ;  its  procedure  was  comparatively 
simple  and  rapid.  Each  tribe  possessed  a  single  suffrage,  and  within 
the  tribe  "one  man  had  one  vote."  The  mass  of  the  proletariate, 
the  landless  freemen,  and  freedmen,  were  confined  to  the  four 
urban  tribes,  a  judicious  restriction,  which  lost  its  effect  later 
owing  to  the  number  of  rural  tribesmen  who  came  to  settle  in 
Rome,  where  the  conservative  peasantry  rarely  appeared  to  vote. 
The  immigrants  apparently  retained  their  original  tribe. 

Nature  of  the  Reform. — The  development  of  the  republican 
constitution  had  been  due  to  the  action  of  this  assembly  and  its 
leaders,  and  it  became  more  and  more  the  working  organ  of 
the  Roman  people.  It  even  ventured,  though  rarely,  to  inter- 
fere in  the  conduct  of  war  and  finance.  Yet  it  was  too  demo- 
cratic entirely  to  supersede  the  military  Comitia.  Plebeian  nobles 
could  not  ignore  the  claims  of  age,  wealth,  and  rank,  nor  was 
it  in  the  spirit  of  Rome  ever  to  do  so.  It  became,  therefore,  a 
problem  of  statesmanship  to  remove  the  flagrant  anomaly  of 
a  scarcely  veiled  minority  controlling  the  sovereign  body,  and, 
while  retaining  the  conservative  principles,  to  give  them  the 
maximum  of  democratic  form.  The  change  was  managed  so 
carefully  and  with  so  little  friction  as  to  leave  but  scanty  traces 
of  its  character.  Probably  it  excited  little  interest.  It  was  ap- 
parently effected  by  running  the  lines  of  the  local  division  by 
tribes  across  the  lines  of  the  classes  distinguished  by  age  and 
property.  Thus  thirty-five  tribes,  divided  each  into  five  classes,  and 
again  into  two  ages,  produce  350  centuries,  which  with  the  eighteen 
centuries  of  Equites  and  that  of  the  capite  censi  make  up  a  total  of 
369  ;  the  centuries  of  engineers  and  trumpeters  henceforth  subsist- 
ing merely  as  guilds,  or,  if  retained,  swelling  the  total  to  373. 
The  application  of  the  census  and  classes  to  the  urban,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  rural,  tribes  was  made  easy  by  the  fact  that 
land  and  cattle  had  long  ceased  to  be  the  sole  standard  of  wealth 
and  basis  of  taxation.  The  census  had  been  extended  to  include 
capital  and  cash,  and  indeed,  with  the  disappearance  of  the  war-loan 
{tribiituiii)  and  the  strict  levy,  had  largely  lost  its  financial  and 
military  importance,  and  become  a  matter  of  voting  and  social  posi- 
tion. As  for  the  Equites  eqiio publico^  their  original  military  char- 
acter was  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  nobles,  especially  the  senators, 
had  kept  their  horse  when  their  days  of  service  had  long  been 
over,   and   the    censor's   periodic    review   was    a   mere    ceremony. 


296  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

They  had  become  a  close  noble  corps,  whose  i-aison  (fi.  re  lay  in  their 
riyht  of  voting  first.  In  the  eighteen  centuries  voted  the  majority 
of  the  Senators  ;  for  the  rest,  they  were  composed  of  young  nobles 
who  served  as  officers  in  the  general's  suite,  acting  occasionally 
as  a  sort  of  bodyguard.  Their  insubordination  and  special  privi- 
leges made  them  a  nuisance  to  a  business-like  commander. 

By  the  present  reform  this  body  was  deprived  of  the  prero- 
gative vote.  The  significance  of  this  change  was  due  to  the  weight 
of  the  first  vote  as  an  omen  ;  it  lessened  the  impression  made  on 
the  ignorant  rural  and  suburban  voters  by  the  solid  suffrag-es 
of  the  wealthier  classes.  The  prerogative  passed  to  a  century 
chosen  by  lot  out  of  the  first  class,  the  rest  following  by  classes. 
The  number  of  centuries  in  each  class  was  equalised  ;  so  that  the 
numerical  superiority  of  the  Equites  and  the  first  class  together 
disappeared,  while  an  absolute  majority  implied  a  larger  number 
of  votes.  Age  and  wealth  still  preponderated,  but  a  distinct  step 
had  been  taken  in  liberalising  the  old  assembly.  A  later  reform 
completed  the  equalising  process,  for  all  included  in  the  census,  by 
determining  the  order  of  voting  for  all  the  centuries  by  lot.  The 
freedmen,  in  recognition  of  their  services  in  war,  were  treated  as 
free-born,  a  privilege  cancelled  by  the  democrat  Flaminius,i  who, 
as  censor,  in  220  B.C.,  again  confined  them  to  the  four  urban  tribes. 
The  restriction  on  the  city  proletariate  remained.  The  whole  re- 
form, a  clever  stroke  of  the  nobility  to  "dish  the  Whigs,"  had  no 
practical  value.  It  formally  settled  the  equality  of  Roman  citizens, 
.except  the  cives  sine  sitfft'agio  and  the  paupers  of  the  capital,  and 
did  nothing  else.  No  tinkering  with  the  Comitia,  as  things  now 
stood,  could  impede  the  growth  of  political  privilege  and  the 
power  of  the  Senate.  It  meant  nothing  now  that  in  172  B.C.  and 
163  B.C.  both  consuls  were  plebeian.- 

1  In  this  year  he  also  built,  or  rather  extended,  the  Northern  road — via 
Flaminia—iroxn  Narnia  and  Spoletium  to  Ariminum. 

2  Mommsen  now  holds — (i)  that  the  350  centuries,  for  voting  purposes  at 
least,  were  grouped  so  as  to  maintain  the  primitive  number  of  193.  The  votes 
of  the  first  class,  indeed,  were  reduced  from  80  to  70,  two  centuries — senior 
and  junior— being  assigned  to  each  tribe.  But  the  votes  of  the  four  lower  classes 
were  restricted  to  100,  an  increase  of  10  only.  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  see 
how  these  composite  groups  could  be  distributed  among  the  thirty-five  tribes. 
(2)  That  the  term  "  classis"  only  now  began  to  be  applied  to  the  inferior  grades, 
which  were  before  "  infra  classem."  (3)  That  the  reform  was  the  work  of  the 
democratic  statesman  Flaminius  as  censor  (220  B.C.).  This  seems  scarcely 
probable.  (4)  That  the  fall  in  value  of  the  as  did  not  affect  the  rates  of  the 
census,  the  traditional  figures  representing  the  value  at  this  time  of  smaller 
sums  in  the  older  heavy  coin.     By  241  B.C.  the  as  had  sunk  to  two  ounces. 


/.A IF  A.\'D  ADMINT.'iTRATION  297 

Praetors  and  Quaestors. — -The  division  of  the  praHorship  between 
the  Praetor  I'lixinus  and  Peregrinus  in  243  B.C.  was  due  to  the  block 
in  the  courts  and  to  the  growth  of  cases  involving  a  knowledge  of 
non-Roman  legal  principles.  Although  their  main  function  was  to 
settle  the  law  of  the  case  and  the  proper  procedure,  while  indices 
appointed  by  them  decided  the  facts,  their  hands  were  full  of 
work,  without  reckoning  the  administrative  and  military  business 
which  fell  to  them  on  an  emergency  or  in  the  absence  of  the 
consuls.  In  227  B.C.  theirnumber  was  raised  to  four,  and  in  197  B.C. 
to  six,  to  provide  for  the  increase  in  the  provincial  commands  which 
could  not  be  governed  directly  from  the  capital.  In  267  B.C.  there 
were  eight  qua?stors,  and  their  number  also  was  probably  raised 
to  correspond  with  the  number  of  new  officers. 

Law  and  Equity. — If  there  was  little  fonnal  legislation,  the  sure 
and  silent  development  of  Roman  institutions  is  the  more  to  be 
marked.  The  transition  in  the  army  from  citizen  service  to  pro- 
fessionalism has  been  already  noted.  In  the  field  of  jurisprudence, 
the  special  Roman  science,  there  was  a  great  and  continuous 
advance.  The  lawyers,  by  their  official  edicts  as  praetors  or  by 
their  responses  to  applicants,  created  a  body  of  legal  doctrine, 
apart  from  statutes,  incessantly  revised,  expanded,  and  improved. 
Alongside  of  the  strictly  Roman  law,  moreover,  there  grew  with 
the  growth  of  commercial  and  international  relations  a  collection 
of  universal  principles,  common  to  all  civilised  nations,  Italian, 
Hellenic,  or  Phoenician,  which  was  embodied  in  the  edict  of 
the  Praetor  Peregrinus  and  applied  in  dealings  with  aliens.  The 
simplicity  and  universality  of  this  system  recommended  it  to  the 
great  jurisconsults  of  the  second  century  B.C.,  who  grafted  on  to 
it  the  Stoical  doctrines  of  the  Law  of  Nature  and  the  Equality  of 
Man.  Thus  was  created  the  famous  Iiis  ge/i/iui/i,  the  Roman 
Equity,  which,  disguised  as  Natural  Law,  played  a  momentous 
part  in  later  history. 

Administration — In  the  same  typically  Roman  manner,  the 
executive  officers  could,  with  the  advice  of  the  Senate,  merely 
by  their  edicts,  carry  through  far-reaching  measures,  opening  or 
closing  the  franchise,  reforming  Comitia,  manipulating  elections. 
From  hand-to-mouth  ordinances  sprang  up  the  provincial  system 
and  the  proconsular  power.  With  rare  interference  from  outside, 
the  Senate  arranged  at  will  for  the  necessary  prolongations  of 
command  and  the  requirements  of  finance  and  war.  Emergencies 
were  met  as  they  rose.  No  organic  statute  settled  the  govern- 
ment of  the  foreign  dominions.    The  old  dictatorship  again  gradu- 


298  Hf STORY  OF  ROME 

ally  lapsed.  Its  power  had  been  broken  in  217  li.c.  Junius  Pera 
(216  B.C.)  was  the  last  active  dictator  ;  the  last  of  the  old  sort  at  all 
just  held  the  elections  of  202  B.C.  It  had  been  an  unpopular  but 
useful  office,  which  gave  at  a  crisis  that  unity  of  command  so 
sadly  needed  by  the  Roman  executive.  No  doubt,  while  the 
Senate,  as  a  sort  of  dictatorship  in  commission,  could  nLUtralise 
by  its  authority  the  checks  and  balances  of  the  constitution, 
energetic  action  was  still  possible,  but,  when  that  authority  was 
once  sapped,  its  decretiini  tdtinnini,  which  armed  the  magistrates 
with  dictatorial  power,  became  a  weak,  and  therefore  dangerous, 
as  it  was  always  a  legally  dubious,  expedient. 

Senate,  Comitia,  and  Magistrates.  —  Most  striking  of  all  is  the 
growth  of  the  power  of  the  Senate.  The  logic  of  facts  and  Roman 
respect  for  government,  its  own  merits  and  the  feebleness  of  its 
competitors,  had  created  out  of  this  consulting  committee  and 
council  of  the  magistrate  a  supreme  and  independent  organ  of 
state.  Its  resolutions,  which  had  no  binding  power  except  by 
constitutional  custom,  became  omnipotent  decrees.  Its  name  in  the 
official  title  of  the  Republic  precedes  the  symbol  of  the  sovereign 
people  (S.P.Q.R  ).  It  alone  was  permanent  ;  it  alone  had  deli- 
berative power.  It  controlled  the  magistrate,  on  whose  summons 
it  depended,  by  sentiment,  by  interest,  and,  in  the  last  resort,  by 
the  interference  of  his  colleag^ues  or  the  veto  of  the  tribune.  The 
magistrates  came  of  senatorial  families,  passed  by  virtue  of  their 
offices  into  the  Senate,  and  depended  upon  it  for  their  provinces 
and  their  supplies.  Elected  on  no  common  platform,  they  had 
no  solidarity  as  a  body.  The  division  of  functions  and  restriction 
of  tenure  made  permanent  resistance  impossible.  The  various 
members  of  the  different  official  colleges  were  often  at  daggers 
drawn  ;  consul  cjuarrelled  with  consul,  and  censor  degraded 
censor.  A  refractory  officer  could  produce  a  deadlock  ;  of  re- 
volution as  yet  he  did  not  dream.  The  tribunate  itself  was  usually 
filled  by  young  nobles  in  due  course  after  the  cjuasstorship.  Having 
no  special  department,  its  wide  powers  could  be  used  to  coerce  the 
executi\e,  to  control  the  Comitia,  and  enforce  the  decrees  of  the 
Senate.  The  tribunes  acted  as  public  prosecutors,  and  enjoyed  a 
seat  in  the  Senate-house.  If  one  abused  his  power  or  broke  the 
understanding,  another  could  readily  be  got  to  act  or  obstruct  as 
the  Senate  pleased. 

The  Comitia  was  reduced  to  an  elective  and  legislative  machine, 
worked  by  its  presidents  in  the  interest  of  the  oligarchy.  It  was 
an  "atrophied  member"  of  the  body  politic,  whose  necessary  co- 


POWER   OF  THE  SENATE  299 

operation  in  government  became  daily  more  of  an  anachronism. 
Its  days  of  meeting,  casual  to  start  with,  were  abridged  by  religion 
and  amusement ;  it  had  no  delil)erative  or  executive  powers  ;  it 
was  open  to  every  form  of  obstruction.  Unattended  by  the  more 
solid  burgesses  scattered  throughout  Italy,  it  came  to  represent 
the  starving  bellies  and  clamorous  throats  of  the  city  mob.  It 
reigned,  but  did  not  govern.  To  rely  on  its  shifting  and  selfish 
majorities  was  to  court  destruction,  and  yet  its  sovereign  powers 
offered  a  ready  weapon  to  any  misguided  idealist,  plausible 
agitator,  or  bankrupt  noble  who  might  use  the  tribunate  for 
purposes  of  revolution. 

Strength  of  the  Senate. — The  .Senate  alone  could  deal  with 
the  grave  problems  of  war,  foreign  relations,  and  the  provincial 
empire.  The  management  of  finance  drifted  naturally  into  its 
hands,  for  the  untaxed  burghers  had  no  interest  in  controlling 
expenditure.  Nor  was  it  unworthy  of  its  high  position  ;  the 
Senate  was  the  author  of  Roman  greatness.  Superior  to  the 
House  of  Lords,  for  it  was  not,  in  theory,  hereditary  or  exclusive  ; 
superior  to  the  Athenian  Boulc  in  its  independence  and  authority, 
it  represented  at  first  no  one  class,  generation,  or  set  of  principles. 
As  it  consisted  mainly  of  ex-magistrates,  it  was  based  indirectly 
on  popular  choice.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  fine  flower  of  that  great 
aristocracy  which  resulted  from  the  fusion  of  the  orders,  and  con- 
centrated in  itself  the  experience,  the  traditions,  and  the  states- 
manship of  Rome.  Its  consistent  and  tenacious,  if  narrow-minded, 
patriotism  had  saved  the  state  and  built  up  the  fabric  of  empire. 
Its  members  had  served  an  apprenticeship  in  arms  and  politics, 
by  land  and  sea,  in  the  provinces  and  in  the  forum.  They 
were  called  to  their  places  by  the  selection  of  the  censors  from 
among  the  chosen  officers  of  the  Republic.  Debarred  from  com- 
mercial pursuits  (218  B.C.),  restricted  to  the  holding  of  land  and 
the  public  service,  they  formed  that  professional  governing  class 
demanded  at  once  by  ancient  political  thinkers  and  the  increasing 
complexity  of  national  business. 

Growth  of  Oligarchy. — But  the  aristocracy  inevitably  de- 
generated into  oligarchy.  The  rich  plebeians  soon  became  even 
more  exclusive  than  the  old  patricians.  It  was  no  longer  a  ques- 
tion of  religious  rights  and  antique  pri\ilege,  but  of  office,  wealth, 
and  clique.  The  new  nobility  took  over  the  existing  tokens  of 
honour,  and,  adding  fresh  badges  to  distinguish  themselves  from 
the  vulgar  citizens,  became  a  compact  body  aiming  at  exclusive 
power.     It  monopolised  office,  controlled  the  Senate,  filled  up  the 


300  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

eighteen  centuries.  It  enjoyed  the  ius  itnagiiiiun,  the  purple 
stripe,  and  the  gold  ring,  and  since  194  B.C.  the  special  seats  in  the 
theatre  assigned  by  Africanus.  Thus  imperceptibly  freedom  and 
equality  were  undermined,  the  alternation  of  civil  rule  and  obedience, 
true  mark  of  the  ancient  republic,  done  away,  and  a  new  object 
defined  for  the  attacks  of  the  democrat.  Popular  election  became 
a  delusion.  The  7iovus  homo,  the  man  whose  ancestors  had 
filled  no  curule  chair,  however  wealthy  or  able,  was  elbowed  out 
of  office  ;  the  mere  man  of  the  people  was  still  more  vigorously 
debarred.  The  honores  passed  in  rotation  among  the  members  of 
the  great  houses  by  birth  and  seniority,  and  few  new  families  could 
conquer  a  place  in  the  fast-narrowing  circle.  Custom,  formulated 
by  the  Lex  Villia  Annalis  oi  180  B.C.,  fixed  the  ages  necessary 
for  holding  the  different  offices  ;  there  arose  Sicertns  ordo  magistra- 
tinini,  every  noble  youth  expecting  to  succeed  suo  anno  to  each 
office  in  turn.  The  Senate,  carrying  out  in  its  own  interest  an  estab- 
lished principle  (342  B.C.),  first  limited  the  possibility  of  re-election, 
as  by  a  law  of  265  B.C.  affecting  the  censors,  and  by  a  later  measure 
{chr.  151  B.C.),  entirely  forbade  it,  in  the  case  of  the  consulship. 
Again,  by  refusing  to  increase  the  number  of  available  elected  officers, 
it  kept  in  its  own  gift  the  most  profitable  and  important  posts.  Even 
the  censorship,  whose  existence  gave  the  Senate  a  useful  certificate 
of  character,  found  its  freedom  of  action  checked  by  the  recognised 
claims  of  ex-magistrates,  by  the  need  of  publicly  specifying  the 
grounds  of  exclusion  from  the  lists  of  honour,  and  by  the  presence 
of  a  colleague. 

The  "  Cursus  Honorum,"' — The  public  service  was  unpaid,  and 
this,  with  the  methods  of  election,  led  to  a  vicious  circle  of  corrup- 
tion and  embezzlement.  The  long  series  of  Bribery  and  Ballot 
Acts  were  useless.  The  young  noble,  after  serving  his  time  in 
the  cavalry  or  on  the  staff,  canvassed  for  the  qutestorship.  As 
quaestor  he  replenished  his  purse  and  gained  an  insight  into 
financial  and  provincial  business,  generally  in  attendance  on  a 
magistrate.  Thence  he  passed  possibly  to  the  tribunate  of  the  plebs. 
In  the  military  service,  where  a  distinction  had  grown  up  between 
the  officer  and  the  common  soldier,  who  rarely  rose  beyond  first 
centurion  {pritnus  piius),  he  would  be  created  tribunus  ndlitiiin, 
by  nomination  or  popular  election,  and  this  important  office  be- 
came a  rung  of  the  political  ladder.  The  a^dileship,  with  its  shows 
and  care  of  corn  and  markets,  soon  became  a  sure  step  to  debt 
and  popularity.  As  prtetor  or  propraetor  he  drew  from  his  province 
the  means  to  pay  his  debts  and  the  cost  of  the  consulship.     From 


GROWTH  OF  OLIGARCHY  301 

the  same  source  the  proconsul  extracted  his  famous  triple  fortune 
{vide  p.  547).  Finally,  he  crowned  his  career  with  the  censorship, 
the  peculiar  glory  and  stronghold  of  the  oligarchy.  The  path 
to  power  lay  in  family  influence,  in  a  strong  cliciilcla,  in  the 
arts  of  the  advocate,  the  showman,  and  the  election-manager. 
The  outsider  must  trust  to  these  same  arts,  aided  by  noble 
patronage  or  popular  agitation. 

Extent  of  the  Evil — As  it  was  necessary  that  the  Senate 
should  usurp  authority,  so  no  doubt  the  new  conditions  of  life, 
public  and  private,  were  bound  to  create  a  race  of  consuls  and 
praetors  very  different  from  the  simple  farmers  of  old  Rome. 
Class  distinctions  were  bound  to  arise.  But  the  jealousy  of  indi- 
vidual eminence  inherent  in  an  oligarchy,  fatal  as  it  was  to  good 


[qvei  apicTinsicne-oiau     Taminisgesistei        ' 

y\AORSPERFEf     /l  VAVTESSENTOMM[a| 
BREVIA     HOI    pSFAMAVIRTVSaVE 
CLORIAATQV  yftCENIVAA  aviBV55EI 
INLONGALICV  SETTIBE  VTIERVITA 

FACILE-FACTEI  .WrERASES-CLORIAM 
MAIOR:VAA    G  VARE'LVBENS-TEINGRiAAiv 
SCirioREClPiF    TERRAPVBLL 
rROGNATVAVPVBLlO-COR.N£Ll 


EI'lTAPH    UF    P.    CORNELIUS   SCIPIO,    FLAMEN    DIALIS,    (?)    SON    OF 
AFRICANUS,    WHO    DIED   YOUNG. 


government,  was  equally  fatal  to  the  class.  Lack  of  new  blood  de- 
stroyed, as  the  infusion  of  new  blood  had  strengthened,  the  Senate. 
It  sank  from  an  assembly  of  kings  to  a  cabal  of  selfish  aristocrats, 
who  confounded  the  welfare  of  the  empire  with  the  miserable 
interests  of  their  own  misgovernment.  Yet  these  evils  were  only 
gradually  developed.  Though  the  Hannibalic  war  w-as  largely 
directed  by  a  small  set  of  nobles,  whose  policy,  favoured  by  the 
failure  of  the  popular  heroes,  was  justified  by  success,  room  was 
found  for  an  able  outsider  like  Marcellus,  good  generals  were  re- 
elected, and  Scipio  could  rely  on  public  feeling  to  back  him  in 
vigorous  action.  At  the  same  time  the  existence  of  a  virtual 
oligarchy  aided  Roman  discipline  and  patriotism  in  curbing  the 
ambition  of  individuals  and  the  excessive  power  of  a  single  family 


302  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

The  extraordinary  successes  and  brilliant  personality  of  Africanus 
raised  him  to  an  exceptional  position  and  enhanced  the  vast 
influence  of  his  house,  which  had  treated  Spain  ahnost  as  its 
private  property.  Flamininus  controlled  for  years  the  Eastern 
policy  of  the  Senate.  Metellus  succeeded  Metellus  on  the  curule 
chairs.  The  power  and  pride  of  the  Claudii  were  proverbial. 
But  Scipio  himself,  fifteen  years  princeps  Senatus  and  first  man 
in  Rome,  incapable  of  an  idea  of  treason,  as  he  was  ill  adapted 
for  political  manoeuvres,  frittered  away  his  strength  in  family 
feuds  and  personal  quarrels,  and  fell,  with  his  whole  house,  in  the 
great  Asiatic  trials  {%nde  supra,  p.  273,  infra,  p.  303),  a  victim  to  the 
dogged  enmity  of  Cato  and  the  rest,  who  attacked  in  him  and  his 
brother  the  predominance  of  an  overweening  house.  Yet  Scipio, 
apart  from  his  personal  claims,  had  no  party,  no  projects  of  re- 
form. He  was  a  noble,  and  supported  the  nobility.  The  rivalries 
of  the  Roman  houses  or  of  individual  senators  must  not  be  mis- 
interpreted as  the  struggles  of  genuine  parties. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 
INTERNAL  HISTORY  (266-146  B.C.) — Continued 

Cato  the  Censor  and  the  Conservative  Reaction-  Gains  Flaminius  and  the 
Popular  Movement— State  of  Italy  and  the  Provinces — The  Army  and 
Navy — Finance— The  Ordo  Equester. 

Misgovernment.  —  Had  the  pouer  thus  transferred  from  the 
nominal  sovereign  and  its  officers  to  the  governing  nobility  con- 
tinued to  be  exercised  for  the  public  good,  the  usurpation  would 
perhaps  have  been  justified.  But,  with  few  exceptions,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  oligarchy  aimed  merely  at  the  retention  of  their  privi- 
leges and  the  aggrandisement  of  the  family  or  the  individual. 
The  ill-protected  provinces  were  plundered  to  pay  the  cost  of 
games,  buildings,  and  festivals,  to  feed  the  mob  and  bribe  the 
electors.  Neighbouring  nations  were  harried  to  provide  triumphs 
and  titles.  Italy,  neglected  in  her  agriculture,  denied  the  franchise, 
and  drained  for  recruits,  was  sacrificed  to  the  prejudices  and  in- 
terests of  the  capital.  The  army,  and,  above  all,  the  fleet,  degene- 
rated ;  the  frontiers  were  undefended.  Already  the  passion  for 
distinction,  the  greed  of  big  estates,  the  necessities  of  debt,  leave 


C.4T0    THE   CENSOR  303 

burninj^  marks  behind  them  in  useless  wars,  savage  evictions,  em- 
bezzlement, and  extortion.  Already  protests  were  raised  against 
pride,  luxury,  and  effeminacy,  against  foreign  culture  and  strange 
worships,  against  monopoly  of  office  and  nepotism. 

Cato  the  Censor. — The  protest  did  not  come  solely  from  the 
excluded  classes  or  their  spokesmen.  Its  strongest  voice  was 
heard  in  the  tirades  of  the  great  censor,  M.  Porcius  Cato,  a  Sabine 
farmer  who  rose  from  the  plough  to  the  highest  honours  of  the  Re- 
public. Born  in  234  B.C.,  asoldierat  se\enteen, praetor  in  i98H.c.,and 
consul  in  195  B.C.,  a  veteran  in  the  fields  of  war  and  oratory,  he  was 
the  last  representative  of  old-fashioned,  middle-class  conservatism, 
a  bitter  foe  to  new  men  and  new  manners,  a  latter-day  Cincinnatus. 
He  had  served  from  the  Trasimene  to  Zama,  in  Sardinia,  Spain, 
Macedon,  with  skill,  courage,  and  success.  Accused  forty-four 
times,  accuser  as  often,  the  grey-eyed,  red-haired  man  had  literally 
fought  his  way  up  with  his  rough-and-ready  wit,  his  ner\'ous  ora- 
tory, his  practical  ability  and  business  habits.  For  thirty-five  years 
the  most  influential  man  in  Rome,  he  had  acted  in  every  capacity, 
as  general,  administrator,  and  envoy.  He  was  a  man  whose  virtues 
served  his  own  ends,  whose  real  but  well-trumpeted  austerity  was 
a  stalking-horse  for  his  personal  acrimony  and  ambition.  Narrow, 
reactionary,  and  self-righteous  as  he  was  honest,  active,  and  well- 
meaning,  a  good  hater  and  a  persistent  critic,  at  once  a  bully  and 
a  moralist,  he  took  up  his  text  daily  against  the  backslidings  and 
iniquities  of  the  time,  against  Hellenism,  luxury,  immorality,  and 
corruption,  especially  as  personified  in  the  Scipios  and  Flaminini 
of  his  day.  At  bottom  he  was  a  genuine  man,  but  it  was  unlucky 
that  the  strongest  reforming  force  should  have  taken  shape  in 
this  political  gladiator  and  typical  Roman,  this  hard-hitting,  sharp- 
witted,  keenly  commercial,  upright,  vulgar  Philistine. 

Work  of  Cato. — Cato  led  no  reform-party.  He  fought  for  his 
own  hand,  and  stalvvartly  defended  Roman  morality  and  husbandry, 
but  he  had  no  wide  aims  and  was  no  opponent  of  senatorial 
government.  Cato's  cjuarrel  with  the  spirit  of  his  age  was  a  quarrel 
within  the  senatorial  body.  His  attack  on  the  Scipios,  useful  as  it 
was  to  the  oligarchy,  was  largely  an  attack  on  personal  opponents. 
I  n  1 87  B.C.  he  succeeded  in  forcing  through  the  prosecution  of  Lucius 
Scipio  for  alleged  embezzlement;  he  obtained  a  special  inquiry, 
and  secured  the  condemnation  of  the  unfortunate  Asiaticus,  whose 
poverty  demonstrated  his  innocence.  Among  the  incidents  of  this 
obscure  campaign,  which  was  aimed  at  both  the  brothers,  are  recorded 
the  famous  speech  of  Scipio's  enemy,  Ti.  Sempronius  Gracchus  the 


304  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Elder,  for  the  defence,  and  the  yet  more  famous  appeal  of  Publius 
{7'ide  supra,  p.  273).  Whatever  may  have  happened,  the  power  of  the 
great  house  was  broken,  and  Cato  secured  his  coveted  censorship,  the 
prize  of  the  struggle,  in  184  B.C.  In  concert  with  Valerius  Flaccus, 
he  visited  the  sins  of  their  order  on  the  heads  of  the  nobles,  striking 
out  from  the  lists  of  senators  and  Equites  scions  of  the  proudest 
families  of  Rome.  The  stalwart  novus  homo  had  played  a  strong 
and  successful  game,  but  his  work  as  a  reformer  amounted  to  little. 
His  measures,  like  his  speeches  and  impeachments,  were  counter- 
blasts to  public  and  private  vices.  But  just  as  he  had  no  fruitful 
political  principles  to  champion,  so  his  narrow  and  boorish  ideals 
of  a  life  devoted  to  public  work  and  rural  economy  on  the  strictest 
lines  of  profit  and  loss,  were  powerless  to  touch  hearts  and  inspire 
conduct.  He  defended  the  Lusitanians  against  Galba,  and  pro- 
tested against  the  spoliation  of  Rhodes,  but  he  destroyed  Carthage. 
Yet  this  foe  to  culture  took  up  Greek  in  his  old  age  ;  and  credit  is 
due  to  him  for  his  repeated  efforts  to  secure  justice  and  economy, 
to  restrain  aggression,  and  to  protect  the  treasury  and  the  pro- 
vincials from  fraud  and  extortion. 

Symptoms  of  Opposition  and  Decay  of  People. — Here  and 
there,  however,  can  be  traced  the  beginnings  of  a  real  opposition 
to  the  government  on  the  part  of  the  poorer  classes,  a  resistance 
which  becomes  more  definite  as  the  new  oligarchy  makes  itself 
more  clearly  felt.  There  is  no  party-system  and  no  recognised 
programme  as  yet  ;  but  certain  questions  tend  to  recur  in  which 
opposite  interests  are  apparent  and  the  lines  of  the  coming  struggle 
are  being  marked  out.  The  occasional  attempts  to  interfere  with 
the  conduct  of  the  Hannibalic  war  had  ended  in  disaster,  and  the 
deadly  nature  of  the  struggle  prevented  further  and  more  serious 
developments.  Conscious  of  incompetence,  the  Assembly  rarely 
interfered  with  imperial  policy  or  finance.  The  Roman  Commons 
had  no  need  or  power  to  use  ttie  control  of  Supply  as  a  weapon  of 
opposition.  The  nobles  were  as  yet  too  loyal  to  manipulate  the 
Assembly  against  the  Senate.  The  Senate  knew  when  to  give  way 
to  public  opinion.  Already,  indeed,  the  Assembly  had  demurred 
to  the"  declaration  of  war  with  Macedon,  and  the  ill-paid  toils  and 
disgraces  of  the  Spanish  campaigns  had  produced  a  crop  of  discon- 
tent and  mutiny  ;  but  in  the  end  the  Senate  got  its  way.  For  the 
bulk  of  the  war-period  the  Comitia,  with  sober  deference  to  wiser 
judgments,  with  large-hearted  if  narrow-minded  loyalty,  Avorked 
for  the  saving  of  Rome.  But  if  there  had  been  a  danger  even  with 
the  older  body  of  solid,  sensible  farmers  when  the  needs  of  a  small 


DECAY  OF  COMITIA  305 

state  were  more  easily  judjj[ed,  tlie  defects  of  the  Comitia  came 
j^laringly  out  with  the  extension  of  the  franchise  over  Latium, 
Sabina,  and  Campania,  and  tlie  diffusion  of  settlers  and  colonists 
over  llie  whole  peninsula.  The  tribes  became  more  and  more 
bulky,  there  was  no  organisation  of  the  out-voters,  and  communi- 
cations were  slow.  The  sovereign  Assembly  tended  to  become  a 
purely  urban  gathering,  and  many  causes  combined  to  ruin  and 
corrupt  the  populace  of  the  capital.  The  steady  working  of  manu- 
mission, contempt  for  manual  labour,  the  institution  of  clientship, 
and  the  agricultural  depression,  aided  by  the  cheap  living,  largesses, 
and  games,  collected  in  the  city  an  ever-growing  mass  of  paupers 
and  parasites.  They  swelled  the  retinues  of  the  great,  who  held 
their  votes  in  their  pocket.  The  Forimi  began  to  swarm  with 
slaves  and  freedmen,  servile  Orientals,  and  "  starveling  Greeks,"' 
carelessly  registered  in  the  falsified  census,  "  stepchildren  of 
Italy,"  whose  shouts  drowned  the  voices  of  Rome's  genuine  sons. 
As  yet  the  forms  of  corruption  were  mainly  indirect.  Fed  at  the 
expense  of  allies  and  provincials,  amused  by  the  aediles,  flattered 
for  their  votes,  and  feared  for  their  riots,  at  once  corrupted  and 
corrupting,  these  modern  Romans  formed  the  germ  of  that  un- 
stable mob,  denounced  by  Cicero— in  private — as  the  "leech  of 
the  treasury,"  "  the  dregs  of  Romulus,"  which  with  its  clamorous 
wants  and  perilous  prerogatives  exhausted  the  empire,  dis- 
turbed the  streets,  and  baffled  the  statesmen  of  Rome.  Of  this 
great  mischief  there  were  at  present  but  signs  and  symptoms. 
When  Polybius  dates  the  beginning  of  evil  from  the  laws  of 
Flaminius,  he  is  giving  the  ideas  of  his  friends  rather  than 
historical  fact.  Such  symptoms  have  been  found  in  the  appoint- 
ments of  Flaminius,  Minucius,  and  Varro,  in  the  decay  of  the  dicta- 
torship, in  the  threatened  appeal  of  Scipio,  and  the  actual  appeal 
of  Flaminius,  from  .Senate  to  people,  and  in  the  reform  of  the 
priestly  elections.  But  these  are  merely  isolated  phenomena. 
They  are  indeed  signs  of  the  times  ;  nor  was  the  hour  far  distant 
when  tribune  and  soldier  alike  would  use  the  powers  of  a  casual 
crowd  to  push  their  policy  and  secure  their  ends.  As  yet  the 
changes  made  were  due  as  much  to  the  natural  growth  of  existing 
institutions,  to  the  conservative  Cato,  or  to  casual  excitement,  as  to 
any  "pernicious  radical  agitator.' 

Flaminius  and  the  Land. — Once  more  it  was  an  economic  ques- 
tion which  caused  a  serious,  even  passionate  contest.  There  was 
the  ordinary  attempt  to  check  usury  in  193  B.C. — Lex  Sevipronia  de 
pecunia  ircdita — but  the  real  struggle  t  ame  earlier  over  the  land- 

U 


3o6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

question.  In  232  B.C.  the  tribune  Gains  Flaminius  proposed  the 
allotment  of  the  Picenian  and  Senonian  ager  publicus^  south 
of  Ariniinum.  This  raised  again  the  question  stirred  by  Cassius 
and  Licinius,  the  question  of  the  growing  poverty  of  the  poor. 
Things  had  gone  from  bad  to  worse  during  the  long  agony  of 
the  Sicilian  war.  Capital  had  accumulated  in  the  hands  of  nobles 
and  contractors  ;  the  small  farmers  had  succumbed  under  the 
pressure  of  political  and  economical  causes  {vide  infra^  p.  316). 
The  population  of  rural  Italy  had  declined,  and  the  perilous  surplus 
of  landless  peasants,  paupers,  and  adventurers  was  mounting  up. 
The  ordinary  method  of  providing  an  outlet  for  labour,  of  re- 
peopling  the  wasted  districts  and  depleting  the  city,  had  been  by 
the  assignation  of  allotments,  and  the  creation  of  colonies.  These 
measures  tended  to  prevent  the  decay  of  husbandry  and  the 
monopoly  of  land  by  the  rich  and  noble,  while  they  helped  to 
secure  the  position,  extend  the  civilisation,  and  reward  the  veterans 
of  Rome.  Many  settlements  of  this  type  were  founded  during 
the  period,  especially  at  the  close  of  the  Hannibalic  war,  in  the 
Cispadane  conquests  and  on  the  confiscated  tracts  in  Italy.  Allot- 
ments were  distributed  in  173  B.C.  out  of  Gallic  and  Ligurian  land, 
and  in  165  B.C.  the  occupiers  who  had  squatted  on  the  Campanian 
domain  were  ejected  with  compensation,  and  the  soil  allotted  in 
heritable  leaseholds.  These  distributions,  due  partly  to  a  sense  of 
danger,  partly  to  the  conservative  reformer  Cato,  an.xious  for  the 
future  of  the  yeomanry,  owed  most  to  the  effect  produced  by  the 
agitation  of  the  detested  Flaminius. 

The  evil  Flaminius  had  to  meet  was  serious.  No  acre  of  the 
Sicilian  or  Sardinian  conquests  had  been  divided  ;  no  new  rural 
tribes,  necessitating  fresh  allotments,  could  now  be  formed.  The 
remnant  of  the  ager  publicus  was  still  enjoyed  by  the  rich  in 
usufruct  or  leased  out  by  the  censors.  Side  by  side  with  their 
vast  private  estates,  the  nobles  held  as  occupiers  large  slices  of 
the  state-land,  whose  legal  rent  they  neglected  to  pay.  The 
small  holder,  bought  out,  squeezed  out,  and  economically  ruined, 
found  no  outlet  in  migration  to  newly  annexed  districts.  With  the 
yeomanry  of  Italy  fell  Italian  agriculture  and  the  Italian  army  ; 
the  structure  of  the  state  was  being  sapped  at  its  foundation. 
Flaminius  and  his  supporters  saw  the  danger.  Their  remedy, 
which  met  but  a  portion  of  the  problem,  was  to  break  up  the  land 
monopoly  and  restore  the  farmer  to  the  soil,  by  the  creation  of 
small  holdings  on  a  large  scale.  The  moment  was  favourable. 
There  was   space  available  for   the  experiment  without  confisca- 


GAIL'S  FLAMINIUS 


507 


tion.  But  the  government  added  to  tlie  error  of  neglecting  to  do 
a  conservative  and  popular  thing  the  error  of  bitter  and  futile 
obstruction.      Flaminius  appealed  to  the    people.     There  was   a 


ROMAN    IN    TOGA. 


sharp  conflict  between  vested  interests  and  the  fair  claims  of  the 
veterans.  There  were  scenes  in  the  Assembly,  but  the  impassioned 
eloquence  of  the  tribune,  whom  his  indignant  father  attempted 
to  drag  from  the  platform,  and  public  feeling  for  popular  rights 


3o8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

carried  the  tla\'.  'I'lu'  Bill  was  passed  without  the  prc\ious 
approval  or  subsequent  sanction  of  the  Senate.  Nor  was  the 
excitement  soon  allayed.  The  execution  of  the  measure  was 
obstructed,  and  partisan  hatred  persecuted  in  life  and  death  the 
well-meaning  and  ill-fated  reformer.  Flaminius,  if  he  was  a  poor 
strategist,  was  a  brave  man  and  a  courageous  statesman.  But 
in  this  instance  his  impatience  set  a  precedent  that  could  not  fail 
,  to  be  abused.  The  danger,  no  doubt,  was  largely  due  to  the  folly 
of  the  Senate,  which  permitted  the  popular  leaders  to  discover 
their  own  power,  and  precipitated  the  first  great  revolt  against  its 
authority  since  the  fusion  of  the  orders.  For  hitherto  measures 
brought  before  the  Assembly  had,  by  the  spirit  and  custom  of  the 
constitution,  coine  from  the  Senate,  with  which  the  tribunes  had 
generally  worked  in  harmony.  Between  them  Flaminius  and  the 
Senate  allowed  a  casual  Assembly  to  tamper  with  high  matters 
of  state,  and  opened  the  door  to  future  disorders.  In  his  aims 
and  means  Flaminius  was  the  political  father  of  the  Gracchi. 

Result. — Thus,  though  we  find  no  definite  attempt  in  this 
period  to  alter  the  methods  and  traditions  of  government  or  to 
oust  the  Senate  from  its  place,  yet  the  old  struggle  of  poor  and 
rich,  debtor  and  creditor,  yeoman  and  capitalist,  disengaged  from 
the  artificial  distinction  between  patrician  and  plebeian,  is  be- 
commg  more  prominent.  The  tribune  is  returning-  with  added 
power  to  his  old  post  of  leader  of  a  new  type  of  "  people."  There 
are  signs  that  the  rift  between  form  and  fact  in  the  constitution 
is  widening  to  rupture,  that  the  friction  of  jarring  powers  may 
produce  fire.  The  questions  at  issue  are  not  in  themselves  fraught 
with  the  gravest  danger.  The  neglect  to  deal  with  them,  compli- 
cated with  the  effects  of  social  corruption,  economic  errors,  and 
weak  government,  might  prove  fatal. 

The  Administration. — And  there  were  signs  that  the  strong 
and  steady  go\'ernment  which  had  conquered  Italy,  worn  down 
Hannibal,  and  mastered  the  world,  which  had  compensated  loss 
of  liberty  with  empire,  was  itself  being  eaten  away  by  the  solvents 
of  wealth  and  luxury,  and  was  incapable  of  grasping  the  problem 
which  destiny  and  its  own  action  had  set  before  it.  It  was  now 
that  the  defects  of  a  narrow  oligarchy  resting  upon  sham  elections, 
hedged  round  by  jealous  restrictions,  and  working  by  a  system 
of  checks  and  balances  fatal  to  continuous  and  scientific  adminis- 
tration, began  to  appear. 

I.  Italy. — In  Italy  the  main  questions  were  the  state  of  agri- 
culture and  the  position  of  the  allies.     Of  the  first,  it  is  enough 


CONDITION  OF  ITALY  309 

at  present  to  say  that  the  same  causes  which  had  ruined  the 
Roman  farmer  were  aggravated  for  the  ItaHans  by  the  efTects  of 
war  and  the  confiscations  and  conscription  of  Rome.  Of  the  various 
classes  of  ItaUan  communities,  the  mitnicipia  sine  siiffragio  had 
either  received  the  full  franchise,  or  lost  their  status,  like  Capua,  as 
the  reward  of  rebellion.  The  Bruttians  and  degraded  Campanians 
appear  in  a  new  and  oppressive  position  as  a  sort  of  public  serfs, 
depri\ed  of  civic  freedom  and  the  right  of  canying  arms.  More 
independent,  but  fomially  excluded  from  the  Roman  franchise, 
stood  the  Celtic  communities  across  the  Po.  Of  the  non-Latin 
allies,  only  those  retained  their  old  status  absolutely  who,  like 
Neapolis,  Nola,  and  Heraclea,  had  adhered  to  Rome.  The  position 
of  the  others  steadily  deteriorated.  Even  the  Latins,  whose  loyalty 
had  saved  the  state — Tibur,  Praeneste,  and  the  colonies — sutfered 
in  increased  military  service,  especially  for  garrison  duty  and  the 
Spanish  wars,  and,  as  in  177  B.C.,  in  curtailed  allotments  and 
largesses.  Moreover,  there  was  a  tendency  to  diminish  their  rights 
and  liberties.  In  the  case  of  Ariminum  (268  B.C.)  and  all  Latin 
communities  founded  later,  the  right  of  acquiring  the  civitas  by 
migration  was  cancelled  and  in  the  case  of  the  older  states  it  was 
limited.  In  187  B.C.  and  177  B.C.  {Lex  C'Az//^//«)  large  numbers  of 
Latins  and  allies  were  ejected  from  Rome,  on  the  pretext  of  pre- 
venting the  depopulation  of  their  native  places.  The  last  Latin 
colony  in  Italy,  Aquileia,  was  founded  in  1 84  B.C.  The  new  colonies 
were  meant  for  Roman  citizens,  and  not  even  the  poorest  Roman 
nowadays  was  willing  to  surrender  the  privileges  of  that  franchise. 
For  the  same  reasons  the  bestowal  of  the  citizenship  was  the  more 
jealously  confined,  as  it  was  the  more  eagerly  coveted.  The  policy 
of  wholesale  incorporation,  dropped  when  Rome  was  strong  and  de- 
centralisation appeared  dangerous,  was  not  resumed  now  that  Rome 
was  co-extensive  with  Italy,  while  the  disappearance  of  the  passive 
franchise  and  the  limits  set  to  migration  closed  the  city  to  all  but 
favoured  individuals,  and  the  magistrates  of  Latin  towns  who 
became  citizens  ex-officio.  The  old  policy  of  graduated  privilege  and 
regular  promotion  fell  into  oblivion  ;  exclusion  was  the  order  of 
the  day.  At  home  the  oligarchy  masqueraded  as  a  republic  ;  in 
Italy  despotism  masqueraded  as  alliance.  Roman  liberalism  began 
and  ended  at  home,  and  meant  little  enough  even  there.  Hence 
the  struggle  against  privilege  passed  from  the  plebeian  to  the 
Italian,  as  it  passed  later  from  the  Italian  to  the  provincial. 

This  conduct  was  as  impolitic  as  it  was  ungenerous.     It  merged 
faithful  allies  with  conquered  subjects.      It  broke  up  the  unity  of 


3IO  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  Latin  race,  substituted  a  local  for  a  national  patriotism,  and 
destroyed  that  use  of  the  franchise  for  consolidating  power  which 
has  been  so  justly  praised.  The  proposal  of  Carvilius  in  the  crisis 
of  the  great  war,  to  give  representative  Latins  seats  in  the  Senate, 
was  premature,  but  a  wiser  policy  would  at  least  have  retained 
existing  privileges.  As  yet  the  rights  of  self-government  were 
respected  and  no  taxation  was  imposed,  but  the  expense  of  the 
contingents  grew  heavier,  especially  for  the  cavalry,  while  popula- 
tion steadily  decreased.  The  restrictions  on  marriage  and  com- 
merce hindered  the  circulation  of  capital,  and  impoverished  the 
allies  by  concentrating  business  in  Rome.  The  interference  of 
Senate  and  consuls  in  local  affairs  became  more  frequent,  and  the 
Italians  suffered  from  the  severity  of  martial  law,  from  the  unfair 
distribution  of  rewards,  and,  last  but  not  least,  from  the  illegal 
violence  of  Roman  troops  and  Roman  magistrates. 

2.  The  Provinces  :  {a.)  Organisation. — But  tyranny  was  worst 
where  there  was  least  restraint,  in  the  government  of  the  provinces. 
At  first  conservative  Rome  had  avoided  annexation,  but,  stimulated 
by  trade  and  speculation,  the  appetite  came  with  eating.  At  the 
close  of  this  period  she  possessed  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Corsica, 
the  Spains,  Macedonia  and  Achaia,  and  Africa.  Their  organisa- 
tion was  a  patchwork  of  existing  methods  and  Roman  additions.  It 
was  a  system  of  makeshifts.  As  the  provinces  were  acquired  piece- 
meal, so  no  complete  machinery  was  invented,  no  central  offices 
created.  The  old  Italian  state-ideas  were  applied  with  a  difference. 
The  subject  communities  were  neither  admitted  to  the  franchise 
nor  reduced  to  slavery.  With  few  exceptions  they  remained  sepa- 
rate states,  allies  or  dependents  of  Rome.  The  province,  in  fact, 
is  an  aggregate  of  different  conununities,  with  diverse  rank  and 
status,  constituted  as  a  department  {proviticia)  under  a  special 
magistrate.  Its  organisation,  laid  down  originally  by  a  commis- 
sion, and  modified  by  laws  and  decrees  from  time  to  time,  depended 
in  each  case  on  the  history  and  character  of  the  people,  on  the 
nature  of  its  previous  government,  and  on  its  earlier  relations 
with  Rome.  Existing  institutions  were  respected  and  municipal 
autonomy  retained,  but  in  the  hands  of  aristocratic  boards.  Some 
states  indeed,  were  technically  free  and  extra  pr(n'inciam^  enjoying 
by  treaty  or  decree  exemption  from  taxation  and  interference. 
The  rest  were  liable  to  the  payment  of  tribute  and  subject 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  governor.  As  in  Italy,  the  supremacy 
of  Rome  was  secured  by  division  and  isolation,  and  by  the 
graduation  of  rights  and  immunities  ;  but  in  Italy  there  was  no 


PROVINCIAL    GOVERNMENT  311 

governor,  no  garrison,  no  taxation,  and  no  disannament.  Taxation 
in  the  provinces  was  based  on  the  old  systems,  and  was  in  theory 
moderate.  Sometimes,  as  in  Sicily,  it  consisted  mainly  of  tithes  of 
produce  {dccu/iicr)  ;  in  others,  as  in  Spain,  of  fixed  money-payments 
{s/ipcndid).  The  tithes  were  farmed  out  to  the  highest  bidder,  on 
the  spot,  or,  in  later  days,  at  Rome  ;  the  money-taxes  were  paid 
in  by  the  communities.  In  Sicily  the  arrangements  of  Hiero  were 
substantially  adopted,  and  furnished  a  sort  of  model.  There  were, 
besides,  customs,  and  requisitions  for  military  purposes.  Often  the 
proceeds  only  covered,  or  even  failed  to  cover,  the  cost  of  govern- 
ment, to  provide  for  which  may  have  been  the  original  theory  of 
taxation,  but  the  revenue  from  Macedon  relieved  the  burgess  of  the 
tributum,  and  the  provinces  became  the  milch-cows  of  the  Roman 
nobles,  and  \\\t  prcrdia  populi  Romatii,  while  the  duties  of  defence 
and  administration  were  shamefully  neglected. 

(1^.)  The  Governor. — The  hinge  of  the  whole  system  was  the 
resident  governor,  who  at  first  was  one  of  the  magistrates, 
generally  one  of  the  praetors  of  the  year.  As  business  grew  at 
home  and  abroad,  the  home  and  foreign  commands  gradually 
came  to  be  separated,  and  the  imperium  was  exercised  in  the  pro- 
vinces by  proprjetors  and  proconsuls.  As  a  rule  there  was  no 
special  selection  made,  the  available  officials  dividing  the  depart- 
ments, as  determined  by  the  Senate,  which  filled  up  any  deficien- 
cies by  combining  or  proroguing  commands.  In  the  end  it  meant 
that  the  great  families  passed  the  appointments  round  from  hand 
to  hand.  To  manipulate  the  rotation  was  even  more  easy  than 
managing  elections  ;  the  sacred  lot  itself  could  be  worked  with  a 
little  ingenuity.  The  tenure  of  office,  limited  by  a  ruinous  principle 
to  one  year,  was  occasionally  extended,  while,  to  meet  a  special 
crisis,  wider  authority  could  be  conferred  by  Senate  or  people  on 
a  single  individual.  The  tendency  was  naturally  to  increase  the 
independence  of  the  governor,  whose  power,  in  spite  of  treaties, 
charters,  and  customs,  stretched  as  far  as  his  will.  He  possessed 
civil  jurisdiction  and  military  command  ;  he  controlled  finance 
through  his  quaestor  ;  his  staff  was  responsible  only  to  himself. 
Free  from  the  checks  that  operated  at  home  and  safe  of  the 
favourable  verdict  of  his  peers,  he  could  set  at  naught  paper  guar- 
antees, ineffective  laws,  and  appeals  to  the  distant  central  govern- 
ment. The  state  might  limit  exactions,  but  the  "great  unpaid," 
inadequately  furnished  for  ordinary  expenses,  with  hungrj'  credi- 
tors and  dependents,  and  still  hungrier  publicani  and  ncgotiatores, 
tax-farmers  and  business-men,   to  satisfy,  exhausted  his  province 


312  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

with  exactions.  The  province  filled  his  purse,  paid  his  debts, 
furnished  for  the  mob  its  corn  and  wild  beasts,  and  spent  its  last 
farthing  in  loading  its  tyrant  with  praises  and  presents.  It  was 
systematic  extortion,  rather  than  the  unsatisfied  aspirations  of 
the  provincials,  which  produced  the  occasional  outbursts  of 
smouldering  resentment  and  the  terrible  reprisals  of  the  oppressed 
Asiatics. 

((T.)  General  Result. — In  theory  Roman  rule  was  tolerant,  mode- 
rate, and  responsible  ;  in  practice  it  was  an  irresponsible^ajjtocracy 
aggravated  by  annual  changes.  Moreover,  the  whole  system  re- 
acted dangerously  on  national  character  and  the  home  government. 
Exceptional  power  and  the  license  of  plunder  spoiled  the  honest 
republican  and  destroyed  Roman  equality.  The  provincial  empire 
was  responsible  for  the  rise  of  the  formidable  imperium  procon- 
sulare  which  stood  outside  the  city-constitution,  for  the  standing 
armies  owing  allegiance  to  their  general,  for  the  extension  of 
slavery  and  the  corruption  of  manners.  Perilous,  again,  was  the 
evidence  it  afforded  of  wholesale  misgovernment.  Yet  in  the  age 
of  Cato  and  Paullus  the  subjects  were  better  off  than  they  had 
been  under  their  previous  rulers,  life  was  safe  and  commerce  pro- 
tected, the  publicafii  were  kept  in  order,  the  old  integrity  and 
discipline  were  not  yet  extinct. 

It  was  this  even  more  than  her  jealous  policy,  and  the  absence 
of  any  strong  national  feeling  or  military  organisation  among  the 
subjects,  that  made  Rome's  dominion  secure.  The  variety  of 
method  and  the  conservatism  of  the  system  had  its  merits.  Speci- 
ally marked  is  the  difference  of  East  and  West.  In  the  barbaric 
West  the  new  civilisation  had  a  free  field  ;  in  the  East  the  pro- 
tectors of  Hellas  shrank  from  imposing  a  strict  regime  on  the 
peoples  whose  culture  they  adopted.  On  the  other  hand,  the  lack 
of  unity  and  control  was  felt  in  every  direction.  It  gave  the  pro- 
consul a  free  hand,  an  army,  and  a  base.  It  made  a  scientific 
frontier  impossible.  It  left  each  province  as  a  single  unit  to  itself, 
and  sacrificed  efficient  rule  to  the  caprices  of  badly  chosen  officials. 
The  influx  of  provincial  wealth  into  the  cofters  of  the  state  and  the 
pockets  of  its  rulers  debauched  the  public  conscience,  created  an 
appetite  for  empire  as  a  source  of  profit,  and  ruined  the  sense  of 
imperial  responsibility. 

{d.)  Attempts  at  Control.  —  Individuals  were  sometimes  called 
to  account  ;  the  Senate  occasionally  interfered,  as  in  171  B.C.,  when 
it  regulated  the  price  of  supplies  in  Spain  ;  and  the  governor  after 
resignation  was  liable  to  prosecution.     But  the  courts  were  distant, 


PROVINCIAL    GOVERNMENT  313 

the  routes  difficult,  and  the  ahen  plaintitT  must  seek  justice  from 
the  defendant's  friends  and  accomplices.  Even  the  institution 
of  public  clientship,  which  protected  the  conquered  '  by  the  power 
of  the  conqueror's  house,  was  humiliating  to  the  protege  and 
dangerous  to  the  state.  The  rapine  and  outrage  described  by 
Cicero  belong  to  a  later  period,  but  corruption  spread  so  fast  that 
in  149  B.C.  a  standing"  court  {queestio  pe7-petua)  was  created  for  the 
trial  of  extortion  by  the  Lex  Calpurnia  de peciiniis  repetiindis.  In 
this,  the  type  of  subsequent  qucestiones,  the  people  exercised  juris- 
diction indirectly  through  a  delegated  body,  from  whose  sentence 
there  was  no  appeal.  The  offence  and  its  punishment  were  deter- 
mined by  law  ;  a  prastor  or  his  deputy  acted  as  president  {vide  iuftux, 
p.  352).  It  was  a  step  to  the  formation  of  a  criminal  code  ;  but  the 
composition  of  the  court  soon  became  a  political  question,  which 
impaired  its  judicial  value.  That  the  supervision  of  the  home 
government  was  equally  ineffectual  may  be  inferred  from  the  con- 
duct of  generals  in  Spain,  Asia,  and  Macedonia.  This  indepen- 
dence of  the  proconsul  was  fatal  alike  to  equality  within  the  ruling 
class  and  to  the  subordination  of  the  executive  to  the  Senate,  the 
two  foundations  of  oligarchy.  Hence  the  natural  aversion  of  the 
older  statesmen  from  annexation,  and  the  attempts  to  limit  the 
tenure  of  command  and  to  control  finance  at  least  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  qutestors. 

The  Army  and  Navy. — That  the  army  rapidly  deteriorated 
needs  no  proof.  The  greed,  cruelty,  and  incapacity  of  the  average 
commander  have  been  already  abundantly  illustrated.  The  de- 
moralisation of  the  soldiery  became  no  less  apparent.  There  was 
cowardice  in  the  field,  mutiny  in  the  camp  ;  at  the  end  of  the 
period  the  insubordination  and  corruption  of  the  Spanish  and 
African  legions  called  forth  the  stern  rebukes  and  chastisement  of 
yEmilianus.  In  truth,  the  Roman  army  had  ceased  to  be  a  civic 
militia,  without  receiving  the  organisation  and  discipline  of  a 
standing  army  of  regular  troops.  To  meet  the  evasion  of  service 
by  the  upper  and  middle  classes,  candidates  for  office  were  in  180 
B.C.  compelled  to  show  evidence  of  at  least  ten  years'  service.  In 
1 52  B.C.  selection  by  ballot  had  to  be  substituted  for  selection  by  the 
officers  in  levying  recruits.  The  ranks  were  filled  by  volunteers 
attracted  by  the  hope  of  plunder,  and  veterans  retained  with  the 
colours.  Men  were  enlisted  from  lower  and  lower  strata  of  society. 
The  civic  horse  especially  had  ceased  to  be  effective.     On  service 

^  E.g.,  Allobroges  and  Fabii,  Syracusans  and  Marcelli,  &c. 


314 


lUSrORY  OF  ROME 


tlie  cavalry  was  coin]K)scci  mainly  of  Italians,  supplemented  by 
Numidiansand  yI'Ltoiians.  The  drill,  tactics,  and  organisation  were 
all  becoming  obsolete.  The  art  of  war  liad  developed.  Long  service 
in  distant  fields,  garrison  duty,  pay  and  plunder,  had  produced  the 
professional  soldier.  The  staff,  too,  was  becoming  professional  ; 
veterans  form  the  core  of  the  legions,  and  veteran  settlements 
abroad,  c.g.^  Italica  and  Carteia,  begin  to  appear.  But  further 
disasters  were  needed  before  the  facts  were  recognised  and  Marius 


ROMAN    SOLDIERS   WITH    SCUTUM    (oF    A    LATER    I'ERIOD). 


began  what  the  Cfcsars  completed,  the  reorganisation  of  the  army 
on  a  purely  military  basis. 

Navy  there  was  none.  The  great  fleet,  mistress  of  the  seas, 
to  whose  silent  but  effective  action  the  defeat  of  Hannibal  was 
largely  due,  fell  into  decay  ;  the  navies  of  conquered  nations  were 
destroyed  ;  the  police  of  the  sea  was  left  to  the  maritime  allies. 
Pirates  infested  the  trade-routes,  and  soon  menaced  the  supplies  of 
Rome  and  the  safety  of  the  coast-towns. 

Revenue. — The  revenue  had  materially  increased.  Tribute  in 
kind  or  cash  and  huge  war  indemnities  supplemented  the  internal 


FINANCE  AND    THE   EQUITES  315 

resources  of  customs,  dues,  rents,  and  royalties,  together  witli  the 
proceeds  of  the  5  per  cent,  tax  on  manumissions.  The  tributuni  was 
not  exacted  after  167  B.C.  Against  this  income  were  to  be  set  the 
ornaiio  prpi'i'/icur,^  the  maintenance  of  the  armies,  and  of  pubHc 
roads  and  buildings,  the  repayment  of  forced  loans,  the  expenses 
of  the  corn  supply  and  the  salt  monopoly,  besides  the  cost  of  con- 
stant warfare.  Half  the  items  of  a  modern  Budget  were  absent. 
Public  service  was  unpaid  ;  the  administration  of  justice  cost  little  ; 
there  were  no  estimates  for  education,  local  government,  or  police, 
and  yet  the  financial  results  were  not  brilliant.  Public  honesty  at 
Rome  might  compare  favourably  with  the  notorious  dishonesty  of 
the  Greek,  but,  apart  from  actual  embezzlement  and  mismanage- 
ment by  the  magistrates,  they  at  least  permitted  state  dues  to 
remain  unpaid  and  state  property  to  be  plundered.  The  method 
of  collecting  revenue  through  tax-farmers  was  at  once  expensive 
and  oppressive.  While  expenditure  on  public  works  diminished, 
the  reserve  was  slender  in  proportion  to  the  receipts.  There  was 
no  attempt  to  extend  the  census  over  the  provinces,  to  balance 
expenditure  and  taxation,  and  to  base  the  latter  on  plain  and 
uniform  principles.  The  dependence  of  the  cjutestor  on  the  governor 
frustrated  attempts  at  control. 

Ordo  Equester. — A  new  class  had  grown  up.  The  eighteen 
Servian  centuries  of  knights  {equo  publico)  had  been  supple- 
mented in  the  field  by  squadrons  of  volunteers  of  the  necessary 
census  serving  with  their  own  horse.  As  first  the  one  and  then  the 
other  disappeared  from  active  service,  the  term  eques^  losing  its 
military  significance,  came  to  mean  primarily  any  person  possessing 
an  estate,  valued  later  at  a  minimum  of  400,000  sesterces,  and 
therefore  liable  to  the  conscription  as  a  cavalry  soldier.  For  a  time 
it  would  apply  to  the  whole  body  of  wealthy  nobles  in  the  Senate 
or  out  of  it.  Meanwhile  the  growth  of  speculation,  of  tax-farming 
and  contracting  gave  rise  to  a  moneyed  as  contrasted  with  a 
noble  class.  The  Claudian  law  of  2 1 8  E.C.,  which  excluded  senators 
from  the  shipping  trade,  and  the  social  taboo  on  commerce  began 
the  severance  between  the  landed  nobility  and  the  capitalist.  The 
severance  was  completed  by  a  later  ordinance  of  129  B.C.,  which 
compelled  an  eqtccs  cqico publico  to  surrender  his  horse  on  entering 
the  Senate.  These  enactments  created  a  plutocracy  whose  political 
influence  is  marked  by  the  destruction  of  Carthage  and  Corinth 
and  the  attack  on   Rhodes.      As  tax-collectors  and  business  men 

1  I.e. ,  money  disbursed  to  the  provincial  governor  for  payment  of  troops  and 
official  expenses. 


3i6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  Equites  pervaded  the  provinces,  to  be  restrained  or  connived 
at  by  the  various  governors  according  to  their  honesty.  As  a 
pohtical  body  they  ofYered  an  instrument  to  an  able  agitator.  The 
existence  of  this  class  and  the  resulting  division  of  interests  were 
an  additional  problem  for  the  government.  The  eighteen  centuries 
continued  to  exist  as  voting  di\isions  constituted  and  revised  by 
the  censors. 


CHAPTER   XXX 

INTERNAL    HISTORY    (266-I46    B.C.) — Continued.       .SOCIAL    AND 
ECONOMIC    PROBLEMS 

Slavery— Agriculture— Capitalism — Clientship— Society— Hellenism. 

Slavery. — \Vithout  slavery  the  ancient  state  was  impossible. 
It  was  the  necessary  condition  of  universal  soldiership,  of  unfettered 
political  activity,  and  of  literary  and  artistic  cultivation.  It  is  pre- 
supposed by  Plafo  and  defended  by  Aristotle.  But  developed  as 
it  was  at  Rome,  it  injured  every  department  of  civil  and  social 
life.  It  allowed  the  capitalist  to  accumulate  wealth  without  dis- 
tributing wages,  it  supplanted  free  labour  in  its  only  honourable 
form  (agriculture),  made  sound  husbandry  impossible,  and  vitiated 
the  perhaps  inevitable  system  of  large-farming.  In  the  lower 
forms  of  industry,  it  destroyed  competition  and  cast  a  slur  on  all 
manual  labour,  while  it  filled  up  the  minor  offices  and  employments. 
The  freedmen,  usurping  all  the  better  berths,  as  agents,  overseers, 
and  tutors,  transacted  the  bulk  of  commercial  and  domestic  busi- 
ness. Useful  as  political  dependents  and  bribery-managers,  they 
swamped  the  Comitia  and  corrupted  society.  The  slave-system, 
A\  hich  depopulated  the  East,  the  main  source  of  supply,  by  raids 
and  man-hunts,  helped  to  import  foreign  ideas  of  a  low  type,  to 
break  down  the  old  family-life  and  strict  morality.  It  filled  Rome 
with  intrigue,  ruined  the  minds  of  the  young,  fostered  despotism 
and  vice,  and  menaced  the  state  itself  with  dangerous  insurrec- 
tions. Its  poisonous  workings  are,  however,  peculiarly  traceable 
in  the  departments  of  agriculture  and  finance. 

Agriculture. — Landed  properties  in  Italy  at  this  time  were  either 
(i)  small  holdings  worked  by  the  owner  and  his  family  with  a  few 
slaves  ;  (2)  large  estates,  as  yet  comparatively  moderate  in  extent, 
whose  proprietor  commonly  managed  several  by  means  of  slave- 


DEC  A  Y  OF  A  GRICUL  TURK  3 1 7 

stewards  and  serfs,  boug-lit,  worked,  and  kept  on  the  least  humane 
and  most  strictly  commercial  principles  ;  or  (3)  large  cattle-ranches 
and  sheep-walks,  held  by  "  occupation  "  and  tended  by  armed  and 
mounted  slaves.  There  were  few  tenant  farmers,  and  free  labour 
was  rarely  called  in.  Rural  economy  had  been  rude  enough,  but 
frugality,  thrift,  and  energy  had  enabled  the  small  holder  for  a 
time  to  make  head  against  his  besetting  difficulties,  want  of  capital, 
the  high  rate  of  interest,  and  the  severity  of  the  law  of  debt.  The 
oppression  of  the  usurer  had  been  diminished  by  the  influx  of 
wealth  and  the  div^ersion  of  speculation  to  more  profitable  invest- 
ments. But  the  natural  tendency  of  small  holdings  to  disappear, 
owing  to  subdivision  among  children,  the  improvement  of  agricul- 
ture, and  the  application  of  capital  to  farming,  was  intensified  bv 
vicious  legislation  and  unfair  competition.  Corn  paid  as  tithe, 
or  supplied  as  a  gift,  or  bought  by  the  government  abroad  at  low 
prices,  fed  the  armies,  glutted  the  markets,  and  was  often  distri- 
buted at  cheap  rates  to  the  populace.  With  low  freights  and 
rapid  transit  Sicily  could  undersell  the  home-grower  at  any  time  ; 
\\hen  importation  was  favoured  and  the  price  artificially  lowered 
competition  became  impossible.  Yet  agriculture  was  the  staple 
industry  of  Italy.  The  flow  of  labour  to  the  armies  and  the  capital 
drained  the  country  districts.  At  the  same  time  the  Claudian  law 
drove  the  nobility  to  invest  in  land.  Apart  from  violent  evictions — 
a  comparatively  small  factor  in  this  problem— the  wealth  derived 
from  extortion,  speculation,  and  public  plunder  made  it  easy  for 
the  ruling  classes  to  force  the  prices  and  buy  up  the  small  owners. 
Their  holdings  combined  in  large  estates  and  worked  by  unmarried 
slaves,  free  from  conscription,  were  developed  into  vineyards  and 
olive-gardens,  or  fell,  more  often,  into  pastures,  preserves,  and  parks. 
The  natural  results  followed.  Not  only  was  the  yeoman  hea\ily 
handicapped  and  capital  unfairly  favoured,  but  the  margin  of  useful 
cultivation  receded,  as  the  freeman  was  replaced,  not  by  machines, 
but  by  the  slave  ;  the  area  of  pasturage  increased  ;  the  price  of  food 
rose,  and  was  only  checked  by  large  importations  at  the  cost  of  the 
exchequer,  a  remedy  worse  than  the  disease.  On  the  top  of  the  whole 
came  the  occupation-system  and  the  monopoly  of  the  public  lands 
by  the  rich.  A  landless  and  labourless  proletariate  threatened  the 
development  of  Italy.  "The  cost  of  Rome's  growth  fell  on  the 
people  ;  the  profits  went  to  a  class."  The  valley  of  the  Po  and  the 
central  Apennines  had  sufl"ered  least,  and  Campania  still  flourished  ; 
but  Etruria,  oppressed  by  its  ancient  lords  and  drained  by  requisi- 
tions, and  Southern  Italy,  barely  recovering  from  the  Samnite  wars 


3i8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  Hannibal,  were  slowly  ruined.  Malaria  invaded  the  lowlands  ; 
the  census  dropped  ;  towns  decayed  ;  recruits  fell  off;  the  riots  and 
risings  of  the  slaves  became  a  public  danger.  Rome  had  learned 
the  economic  methods  of  Carthage,  and  must  now  gather  the  fruits. 
Ignorance  and  neglect  wrought  more  evil  than  all  the  wars  and 
conscriptions,  than  all  the  usurpations  and  land-grabbing  of  the 
ruling  classes.  The  urban  assembly  had  no  interest  in  the  question  ; 
the  Senate  meant  well,  and  showed  its  appreciation  of  affairs  by 
publishing  a  translation  of  Magfo's  treatise  on  the  management  of 
slave-worked  plantations  ! 

Business. — The  same  tendencies  pervaded  business.  The 
Romans  had  been  always  a  commercial  people,  but  the  wealth 
of  the  great  families  rested  not  upon  productive  labour  and  legi- 
timate exchange,  but  rather  upon  speculation,  usury,  and  plunder. 
The  world  swarmed  with  Roman  bankers,  agents,  and  contractors, 
enjoying  special  privileges.  Capitalist  associations,  in  which  every- 
body, even  the  nobles,  shared  as  active  or  sleeping  partners,  con- 
tracted for  the  collection  of  taxes,  for  public  buildings,  for  army 
supplies  ;  and  the  system  favoured  by  the  state  prevailed  every- 
where. Its  basis,  also,  was  the  labour  of  slaves  and  freedmen.  It 
not  merely  expanded  with  the  empire,  it  preceded  the  flag.  Rome 
supplanted  Carthage  as  the  moneyed  centre  of  the  world.  The 
standard  of  wealth  rose  ;  luxury  and  extravagance  undermined  the 
strongest  houses ;  the  speculative  spirit  pervaded  morals  and  politics. 
As  yet  punctuality,  energy,  and  integrity  were  the  rule,  and  busi- 
ness was  comparatively  solid,  but  land  and  capital  were  becoming 
congested,  the  middle  and  lower  classes  were  slowly  squeezed  out, 
and  the  great  fabric  of  wealth,  resting  on  a  rotten  basis,  was  subject 
to  sudden  collapses.  Satire  and  invective  were  as  useless  as  the 
efforts  of  honest  governors  abroad  and  well-meaning  reformers 
at  home.  The  Senate  had  no  love  for  the  capitalist,  but  its  own 
members  were  thickly  tarred  with  the  same  brush,  and  the  evil  was 
too  deep  for  the  crude  economics  of  the  day. 

Clientship. — The  ancient  legal  and  half-religious  relation  of 
patron  and  client  had  suffered  a  natural  decay,  but  fresh  forms  of 
dependence  appeared.  The  connection  of  conquered  communities 
with  Roman  nobles  has  been  noticed.  Of  similar  type  were  the 
clientship  of  country  people  to  local  magnates,  of  suitors  to 
advocates.  Last  and  worst  of  all  was  the  crowd  of  parasites  and 
dependents  who  thronged  the  halls  and  formed  the  suites  of  their 
patrons.  This  new  relation  helped  to  destroy  equality  and  em- 
phasise class  distinctions. 


ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL   PROBLEMS 


319 


Society. — The  patrons,  too,  were  no  longer  the  simple  heroes  of 
the  Republic.     Eager  for  distinctions,  they  manufactured  triumphs, 


LAMP   WITH   CIRCUS   SCENE. 


paid  for  their  own  statues,  and  coined  titles  of  honour.     New  faiths 
and  new  ideas  were  the  mode  ;  the  serious  life  of  duty,  the  real  if  rude 


320  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

dignity  of  the  older  time,  were  out  of  date.  Celibacy  and  divorce 
increased,  moral  rules  were  relaxed;  women  began  to  emancipate 
themselves  from  the  strict  guardianship,  tiitela,  and  to  take  an  open 
part  in  public  and  private  life.  Sumptuary  laws  restricted  in  vain  the 
number  of  guests  and  courses  at  dinner.  Display  in  dress,  build- 
ings, feasts,  and  funerals  flourished  in  despite  of  Cato's  protests. 
Prices  and  rents  rose,  leading  in  a  vicious  circle  to  a  race  for 
wealth.  Expensive  games  and  festivals  were  introduced  for  re- 
ligious reasons,  or  more  often  to  cater  for  the  amusement  and 
buy  the  votes  of  the  mob.  Such  were  the  festival  of  Apollo  (212  B.C.), 
the  Megalesia  (204  B.C.),  the  feast  of  Ceres  (202  B.C.).  Gladiatorial 
shows  were  imported  from  Campania  and  Etruria  (264  B.C.),  and 
the  baiting  of  beasts  and  athletic  contests  in  186  B.C.  More  serious 
than  the  decay  of  Puritanism  cr  the  natural  love  of  amusement  was 
the  innate  vulgarity  and  depraved  taste  which  held  the  prize-ring 
better  than  the  drama  and  fastened  on  the  poorest  forms  of 
entertainment. 

Hellenism. — The  tirst  influence  of  Hellas  upon  Rome  had 
been  exercised  in  early  days  through  Massilia  and  the  Greek 
towns  of  South  Italy  To  South  Italy  again  belong  the  first  be- 
lated germs  of  Latin  literature.  So  far  it  was  the  ordinary  in- 
fluence of  a  higher  civilisation  upon  a  lower.  As  intercourse 
increased  with  Sicily  and  Greece  itself,  and  with  the  opening  of 
the  East,  a  new  fashion  of  Hellenism  arose.  The  upper  classes 
eagerly  adopted  the  philosophy,  art,  and  literature  of  Hellas.  The 
influence  of  Egypt  and  Asia  Minor  was  felt  in  the  inroads  of 
Eastern  luxury,  and  of  those  superstitions  which  filtered  through 
the  slave  population  into  the  life  of  its  masters.  In  this  time  of 
expansion  men  felt  the  need  of  a  wider  life  and  a  broader  range 
of  thought.  They  were  deeply  susceptible  to  the  penetrating  and 
subversive  influences  of  this  cosmopolitan  culture,  which  came 
to  them  as  a  revelation.  But  with  the  exception  of  a  few  choicer 
spirits,  such  as  the  Scipios,  Paullus,  or  the  Gracchi,  educated  by 
personal  contact  with  a  Polybius  or  a  Panatius,  its  power  was 
not  wholly  for  good.  Roman  vulgarity  veneered  itself  with  an 
imported  polish  that  ate  into  the  old  wood.  Literature,  oratory, 
and  jurisprudence  gained  vastly,  but  in  politics  Greek  sympathies 
confused  Roman  judgment,  and  the  attempt  to  apply  Greek  pre- 
cedents to  Roman  problems  was  a  disastrous  failure.  Even  in 
literature  the  new  learning  was  fatal  to  the  growth  of  a  national 
epic  or  national  drama.  In  faith  and  morality  it  was  an  active  sol- 
vent of  the  ruder  Roman  virtues.      From  the  character  of  Reman 


HELLENISM 


321 


religion  had  resulted  a  natural  indifference  verging  on  scepti- 
cism. A  Claudius  could  jeer  at  the  sacred  chickens  ;  a  notorious 
rake,  to  purify  his  life,  could  be  appointed  Flamen  Dialis,  and  the 
experiment  could  succeed  !  Meanwhile  a  crop  of  superstitions 
native  to  the  soil,  divination  of  all  kinds,  and  spiritualism,  had 
sprung  up,  and  both  products,  scepticism  and  superstition,  were 
reinforced  by  imports  from  the  East.  On  the  one  hand  we  find 
Chalditan  astrology,  the  sensual  rites  of  Cybele,  the  fouler  orgies 
of  the  Bacchanalia,  condemned  by  Hellenist  and  Roman  alike  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  rationalism  and  Euhemerism  {vide  supra, 
p.  35)  became  the  vogue,  infinitely  more  popular  than  the  grave 
doctrine  of  the  Stoics  which  influenced  so  deeply  for  their  good 
both  Roman  thought  and  Roman  jurisprudence. 


GLADIATORS. 

{From  a  Pompeian  wall-painting 


With  such  fashions  and  movements  government  cannot  deal.  It 
was  useless  to  expel  Epicurean  thinkers  (173  B.C.),  or  teachers  of 
rhetoric  and  philosophy  (161  B.C.),  or  even  the  ChakUeans  (139  B.C.). 
Only  a  healthy  nation  can  throw  off  m.oral  disease,  and  it  must  do 
so  spontaneously.  At  first  the  inevitable  outburst  and  emancipation 
of  thought  did  as  much  good  as  harm.  The  great  mischief  lay 
not  in  the  praiseworthy  docility  of  Rome,  but  in  the  corrupted 
state  of  Greece  and  the  intermixture  with  Hellenism  of  Oriental 
influences.  There  were  many  true  Hellenic  scholars  who  already 
went  to  the  older  and  purer  sources  ;  a  later  reaction  attempted 
to  develop  the  Latin  spirit,  while  retaining  the  forms  which  Hellas 
invented. 


322  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

CHAPTER  XXXI 

CAUSES    OF    THK    FALL    OF    'Jill-:    RICI'UHLIC 

Introductory  -Causes  of  the  Fall  of  the  Republic    Party  Government — 
Problems  of  Administration. 

Senate  and  Empire. — The  fall  of  the  Republic  dates  from  the 
ruthless  destruction  of  Carthage.  With  no  fear  to  curb  her  in- 
solence, no  centre  of  resistance  to  brace  her  energies,  Rome 
staggered,  with  energies  relaxed,  under  the  weight  of  empire. 
Four  centuries  had  been  needed  to  secure  the  hegemony  of 
Latium  ;  a  century  of  hard  fighting  had  carried  the  champion 
of  the  lowlands  to  the  headship  of  Italy  ;  from  the  deadly  wrestle 
with  Carthage  she  had  emerged  mistress  of  her  own  seas  and 
heiress  to  her  rival's  dominions,  and  thenceforward  the  logic  of 
events  and  the  lust  of  empire  had  carried  her  arms  East  and  West 
in  a  promenade  of  victory.  Fifty  years  from  Zama  nothing  re- 
mained for  the  civilised  world  but  to  bow  its  neck  to  the  decrees 
of  Rome.  The  "  thunder-cloud  from  the  West "  had  indeed  broken, 
and  overwhelmed  at  once  the  rotten  relics  of  the  Macedonian 
monarchies  and  the  jarring  polities  of  Hellas.  Rome  was  the 
centre  of  the  world.  To  the  capital  of  empire  and  civilisation 
were  attracted  the  commercial  riches,  the  artistic  glories,  the 
intellectual  ability  of  the  age.  But  the  vast  fabric  of  power  bore 
in  its  defective  structure  manifest  tokens  of  unpremeditated  exten- 
sion and  the  original  absence  of  design  {vide  supra,  p.  234).  To 
this  fact  as  much  as  to  any  original  flaws  in  the  constitution  or 
any  moral  decay  the  fall  of  the  Republic  was  due.  The  Senate, 
indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  was  dimly  aware  of  the  danger  to  a  city- 
state  involved  in  unlimited  expansion.  It  had  even  shirked  its  plain 
duties  as  a  predominant  power,  and  clung  to  the  narrow  idea  of  an 
Italian  hegemony,  protected  by  buffer  states.  But  its  hand  had 
been  forced,  and  the  destiny  which  had  created  the  empire  had 
made  the  Senate  its  supreme  head.  It  had  now,  if  we  may  repeat, 
to  deal  with  the  situation  created  by  its  own  success.  It  was  high 
time  to  recognise  accomplished  facts,  accept  responsibility  fully, 
and  to  extend  with  a  firm  hand  the  direct  sovereignty  of  Rome 
over  the  protected  territories,  restoring  and  reorganising  what  she 
had  destroyed.  Rome  must  expand  her  political  system  to  take 
in  the  new  elements  as  parts  and  members  of  herself,  and  prove 


FAILURE   OF    THE   REPUBLIC  323 

her  title  to  govern  by  securing  peace  and  prosperity,  by  combining 
i)iipcriu))i  ct  lihi-ftas. 

Growth  of  Monarchical  Ideas. — It  was  the  Republic,  and  not 
merely  the  Senate,  that  failed,  by  whatever  party  controlled  ;  failed 
even  to  grasp,  much  more  to  deal  with,  the  problem.  And  the 
failure  condemned  the  Republic  as  such,  and  led  directly  to  the 
Empire.  For  the  period  of  the  revolution  is  the  preparation  of 
Cassarism.  All  lines  converge  on  a  single  point,  the  necessity  of 
a  new  departure.  All  forces  work  inevitably  in  a  single  direction, 
the  centralisation  of  administrative  power.  There  is  the  pressure 
of  the  barbarian  from  without,  the  pressure  of  the  provincial 
from  within,  the  defects  of  the  constitution,  and  the  demands  of 
extended  dominion.  The  effects  of  these  causes  are  disastrously 
augmented  by  the  breathless  rapidity  with  which  Rome's  diffi- 
culties came  tumbling  on  her.  Coming  events  cast  their  shadows 
before.  From  Scipio  to  Pompeius  there  is  a  growing  tendency  to 
place  the  single  man  above  the  state  ;  monarchical  ideas  develop 
unconsciously,  and  the  trend  of  external  events  favours  the 
development.  The  discomfiture  of  successive  pretenders  does 
but  clear  the  way  and  set  the  precedents  for  the  C;esars,  while 
the  failure  of  each  republican  party  and  office  is  one  more  obstacle 
removed. 

Conservatism  a  Cause  of  Failure. — One  cause  of  this  great  failure 
lay  in  the  character  of  the  people  and  the  nature  of  its  polity. 
The  tenacity  of  forms,  the  legalism,  and  conservatism  of  the  Roman 
mind  became  a  stumbling-block  to  progress.  All  the  cleverness 
of  all  the  lawyers  and  statesmen,  in  changing  the  spirit  and  main- 
taining the  letter,  in  modifying  institutions  and  multiplying  fictions, 
was  here  inadequate.  There  is  a  lack  of  original  statesmanship, 
as  of  every  other  originality,  at  Rome.  Militarism  did  its  work 
on  congenial  temperaments.  Growth  was  arrested.  Rome  sacri- 
ficed to  her  empire  the  free  play  of  national  life  and  character  :— 

"  Tu  regere  imperio  populos,  Romane,  memento." 

Her  horizon  widened  faster  materially  than  it  did  intellectually  ; 
stability  became  rigidity  at  Rome,  as  movement  became  restless- 
ness at  Athens. 

Division  of  Classes. — Another  important  cause  is  to  be  found 
in  the  cleavage  of  classes  and  the  resulting  division  of  interest. 
For,  with  all  its  struggles,  the  old  Republic  had  been  strong  in 
common  feelings,  common  ideas,  and  a  fair  average  equality  of 
possessions.      All    this    was    gone,    and   the   social    contrast    was 


324  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

rendered  still  more  perilous  by  the  equally  startling  contrast 
between  the  actual  position  and  theoretical  powers  of  the  dis- 
contented masses.  The  remaining  causes  lie  in  the  political  and 
social  phenomena  described  in  the  previous  chapter,  which  all 
contributed  something  towards  the  final  result. 

Reform  and  the  Parties. — Reform  was  urgently  demanded  in 
every  direction,  and  that  reform  must  clearly  begin  at  home.  The 
need  was  already  obvious.  Accordingly  we  hear  henceforth  of 
government  and  opposition,  of  democratic  and  consei-vative  parties, 
of  optimates  and  populares.  .Such  phrases  and  analogies  drawn 
from  English  politics,  are  misleading.  Between  Rome  and  Eng- 
land there  is  all  the  difference  that  divides  a  city-state  from  a 
modern  nation.  Language  that  applies  to  representative  institu- 
tions and  cabinet  government  does  not  apply  to  totally  opposite 
conditions.  At  Rome  the  Assembly  is  primary,  the  legislative 
body  is  restricted,  the  deliberative  council  is  permanent,  the 
executive  is  an  executive  and  nothing  more,  and  finance  plays  a 
subordinate  part.  For  modern  party  methods  and  party  organisa- 
tion the  conditions  were  not  forthcoming.  Enough  has  been  said 
of  the  conduct  of  Roman  elections  and  the  character  of  the  Roman 
magistracy  to  make  this  clear.  The  see-saw  of  party  administra- 
tion would  have  been  unintelligible  to  the  average  Roman.  .A.U 
sections  were  agreed  as  to  the  main  forms  and  principles  of 
government.  No  one  dreamed  of  dispensing  with  Senate,  magis- 
trate, or  Assenibly.  Hence  so  often  an  attack  on  the  government 
appeared  and  was  resisted  as  an  attack  on  the  state  itself.  All 
citizens  being  nominally  equal,  the  main  questions  at  issue  were 
social  and  economic,  and  became  political  only  by  mismanage- 
ment ;  the  rest  affected  merely  allies  and  subjects.  Where  the 
wealthy  classes  devote  themselves  mainly  to  material  interests, 
where  there  is  no  strong  middle  class,  no  intelligent  industrial 
population,  no  permanent  and  powerful  organ  of  the  popular  will, 
the  politicians  have  it  all  their  own  way,  party  becomes  faction, 
and  popular  government  is  a  mere  delusion.  Hence  opposition 
at  Rome  remains  a  mere  opposition.  The  same  grievances,  the 
same  methods  recur,  but  there  is  no  clear  and  continuous  progress. 
Party  movements  mean  generally  changes  in  tactics,  displacement 
of  persons,  and  temporary  shiftings  of  the  centre  of  gravity  from 
one  constitutional  faction  to  another.  All  moves  in  a  narrow 
circle,  partly  because  the  reformers  of  all  shades  are  destitute  of 
fundamentally  new  ideas,  partly  because  there  is  no  possible  basis 
for  a  continuous  policy  of  reform  in  the  magistracy  or  the  Comitia. 


THE   PARTIES  AND   REFORM  325 

If  the  Senate  could  not  achieve  the  task  the  Republic  became 
impossible. 

Problems  of  Reform. — The  necessary  preliminary  to  any  salu- 
tary measures  was  the  reorganisation  of  the  government.  The 
Senate  had  owed  the  maintenance  of  its  power  to  the  loyalty  of 
its  officers,  the  acquiescence  of  the  people  ;  in  a  word,  to  its  own 
ability  and  success.  But  these  conditions  were  beginning  to  fail. 
Identified  with  a  clique,  the  Senate  lost  its  moral  authority,  the 
magistrates  became  restive,  the  people  mutinous,  or  at  best  in- 
different, while  the  opposition  of  the  Equites  and  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  proconsuls  menaced  it  with  new  dangers.  The 
obsolete  sovereignty  of  the  actual  Comitia  must  be  set  aside,  and 
if  it  was  impossible  to  reorganise  the  Assembly  with  larger  powers 
on  an  extended  franchise,  it  remained  possible  either  to  reform  the 
Senate  or  to  introduce  a  new  power  into  the  constitution.  In 
any  case  a  vigorous  central  executive  was  needed  which  could 
feel  and  impose  responsibility,  which  could  emancipate  itself  from 
a  narrow  and  purely  Roman  policy,  which  could  control  the  pro- 
consul and  the  army,  which  could  be  acceptable  to  the  masses, 
and  offer  to  the  Equites  a  position  and  career,  and  all  this  without 
wholly  breaking  with  the  traditions  and  feelings  of  the  past.  It 
would  be  its  duty  (i)  to  restore  the  basis  of  the  military  and  political 
system  by  reviving  agriculture  and  replacing  the  yeomanry  on  the 
land  ;  (2)  to  provide  for  the  relief  of  the  poor  and  the  police  of 
the  capital  ;  (3)  to  enfranchise  the  Italians  and  develop  local 
government ;  (4)  to  consolidate  the  provinces  by  upright  rule  and 
gradual  Romanisation  ;  (5)  to  reorganise  the  army  and  navy  on 
a  professional  basis,  with  adequate  checks  on  the  action  of  the 
officers  ;  and  (6),  lastly,  to  establish  a  defensible  frontier,  a  syste- 
matic budget,  and  easy  communication  within  the  empire. 

The  Empire  a  Necessity. — The  issue  of  the  long  and  bloody 
struggle  which  follows  was  a  compromise  which  veiled  a  despotism. 
The  Gracchi  demonstrated  the  futility  of  Tribune  and  Comitia  with- 
out an  army,  Marius  the  incapacity  of  the  mere  soldier  armed  with 
consular  power.  Sulla  failed  in  his  attempt  at  reaction,  and  with 
him  perished  the  chances  of  the  Senate,  for  Cicero's  coalition 
of  moderates  was  doomed  from  the  outset.  In  Pompeius  the 
power  of  that  army  which  Marius  created  and  Sulla  utilised  found 
clearer  expression  ;  he  laid  one  of  the  foundations  of  the  Prin- 
cipate  in  his  indefinite  Iiiiperiujii  Proconstdare.  Julius  Caesar  in 
his  administration  and  his  campaigns  worked  out  the  ideas  of 
Gracchus  and  the  lessons  of  Sulla  and  Pompeius.     Finally,  the 


326  II I  STORY   OF  ROME 

civil  wars  cleared  the  way  for  Augustus,  who  gathered  up  the  pre- 
cedents of  his  predecessors  in  the  masterly  mixture  of  new  and 
old,  which,  cloaking  military  autocracy  under  civil  forms,  com- 
bined in  one  person  the  necessary  powers  of  the  discordant 
magistracy,  gave  a  centre  to  the  system,  a  chief  to  the  civil 
service,  a  head  to  the  army,  a  sovereign  to  the  subjects,  a  pro- 
tector to  the  provinces,  and  peace  to  the  world.  The  Principate 
was  arrived  at  by  a  process  of  exhaustion  ;  it  was  a  military  and 
political  necessity.  It  solved  for  a  time  the  more  tangible  prob- 
lems of  material  organisation,  and  held  in  check  the  swordsmen 
of  the  North  and  the  cavalry  of  the  desert.  The  deeper  economic 
and  spiritual  problems  it  could  not  solve.  No  marriage  or  sump- 
tuary laws,  no  revivals  of  dead  sentiment  and  dying  faith,  could 
mend  these  evils.  Little  enough  could  be  done  even  for  the 
money-market  or  the  land.  It  was  to  other  sources,  or  even  to 
other  times,  that  the  world  owed  the  new  economic  principles,  the 
new  moral  ideas  and  religious  enthusiasm,  the  new  political  hopes, 
that  were  needed  to  give  a  fresh  impulse  to  human  life.  But  for 
some  of  these  things  the  empire  made  space  and  room. 


CHAPTER   XXXII 

FOREIGN    AND    PROVINCIAL    AFFAIRS    (146-I29  K.C.). 

i;.t.  A.f.c. 

Slave  War  in  Sicily 13S-132  619-622 

Attalus    of    Pergamutn    bequeaths    his    Kingdom    to 

Rome      ..........     133  621 

Rising  of  Aristonicus 132-130  622-624 

Province  of  Asia  organised 129  625 

Between  e.g.  146  and  133  there  is  little  external  history  to  claim 
attention  beyond  the  facts  already  mentioned.  The  Spanish  wars 
dragged  on  till  the  capture  of  Numantia  ( 1 33  B.C.).  A  Macedonian 
pretender  called  Alexander  was  crushed  by  a  quaestor  in  142  B.C.  ; 
a  Macedonian  proconsul  was  condemned  for  extortion  in  141  B.C. 
About  the  same  time  Appius  Claudius  conquered  the  Salassi, 
seized  the  gold-washings  of  the  Duria,  and  treated  himself  to  an 
illegal  triumph.  There  was  fighting  in  Illyria  in  135  B.C.  ;  the 
Vardcei  were  reduced  ;  the  Scordisci  chastised. 

Slave  War  in  Sicily. — In  this  year  too  the  slaves  of  Sicily  re- 


SIC/LIAiV  SLA  VE  WARS  327 

belled  to  the  number  of  70,000.  The  rising  bore  grim  witness  to 
the  watchfulness  of  the  government,  the  tender  mercies  of  the 
owners,  and  the  advantages  of  the  system.  Sicilian  slavery 
belonged  to  the  worst  type  of  agricultural  serfdom.  The  oldest 
and  most  organised  province  of  Rome,  the  chief  source  of  its  corn 
and  wool,  was  the  happy  hunting-ground  of  the  speculator.  Not 
merely  was  the  territory  of  Leontini  leased  to  a  few  Roman 
absentees,  but  they  and  their  Sicilian  imitators  covered  the  island 
with  their  estates,  arable  and  pasture,  worked  mainly  by  imported 
slaves.  It  was  not  the  kindlier  system  of  indigenous  and  heredi- 
tary serfdom.  The  plantations  were  tilled  on  Punic  principles 
by  gangs  of  shackled  and  branded  human  cattle  penned  in  under- 
ground barracks,  while  armed  and  mounted  herdsmen  guarded 
the  flocks  and  lived  by  sheer  brigandage.  Brutally  treated  as 
they  were,  left  to  feed  and  clothe  themselves  as  they  could,  flung 
aside  when  useless  through  age  or  sickness,  the  waste  of  life  was 
great.  The  supply  was  only  kept  up  by  slave-hunts  and  organised 
kidnapping  in  Western  Asia,  executed  not  only  by  Cilician  and 
Cretan  pirates,  but  by  the  Roman  publicani.  In  the  market  of 
Delos  10,000  slaves  were  bought  and  sold  in  one  day.  In  Sicily 
the  demand  had  been  stimulated  by  a  period  of  peace  ;  and  cruelty 
and  lust,  inefficient  surveillance,  and  a  fatal  sense  of  security, 
joined  to  the  exceptional  numbers,  prepared  a  dangerous  crisis. 
Troubles  of  the  same  kind  broke  out  in  Delos,  Attica,  and  Asia 
Minor,  even  in  Italy,  and  were  stamped  out  in  blood.  In  Italy, 
however,  the  worst  evils  of  the  plantation  system  had  only 
appeared  in  Etruria,  where  it  flourished  ;  the  condition  of  the 
ordinary  slave  was  better,  and  free  agriculture  existed.  Special 
peril  in  Sicily  lay  partly  in  the  mounted  slaves,  partly  in  the 
superior  qualities  of  many  of  the  Orientals,  who  seem  to  have 
formed  the  bulk  of  them,  but  chiefly  in  the  weakness  of  the  military 
force  and  the  utter  failure  of  the  government  to  control  either 
the  slaves  or  their  masters. 

In  135  B.C.  the  dire  distress  produced  an  outbreak.  The  rural 
serfs  of  a  brutal  proprietor  surprised  the  fortress  of  Enna  and 
massacred  the  owners.  This  was  followed  by  a  general  rising, 
stained  by  similar  atrocities.  The  insurgents  elected  as  king  a 
Syrian  juggler,  a  prophet  and  impostor  named  Eunus — the  self- 
styled  Antiochus,  king  of  the  Syrians,  whose  officer  Achjeus,  a 
Greek  of  genuine  ability,  roused  the  labourers  to  join  the  slaves, 
organised  an  army,  and  checked  pillage  and  bloodshed.  A 
Cilician    bandit,    Cleon,    took   Agrigentum  ;    even    Messana    fell 


328  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

The  leaders  coalesced,  and  practically  mastered  Sicily.  The  king 
formed  a  court,  and  some  sort  of  order  was  introduced.  More 
than  one  Roman  commander  was  defeated,  notably  Hypsa^us  the 
praetor  and  his  local  militia  (134  B.C.).  Aided  by  the  cowardice  of 
the  soldiers  and  the  incapacity  of  the  officers,  the  war  dragged  on 
dubiously  till  132  B.C.,  when  P.  Rupilius  drove  the  insurgents  from 
the  open  country,  captured  Tauromenium  and  Enna,  took  the  king 
(131  B.C.),  and  closed  the  war.  The  slaves  were  crucified  en  masse, 
to  the  indignation  of  the  masters.  The  country  was  reorganised, 
and  the  regulations  of  Rupilius  remained  the  basis  of  Sicilian 
government.  After  this  there  was  peace  for  thirty  years.  The 
material  loss  lit  most  heavily  on  the  landlords,  but  the  scandal  and 
shame  of  such  a  war  fell  on  the  government. 

The  Province  of  Asia. — In  the  East  there  were  fewer  disasters 
than  in  Spain  and  Portugal  because  there  was  less  fighting,  but  the 
state  of  things  reveals  that  weakness  and  indecision  in  dealing  with 
Orientals  which  had  come  over  the  foreign  policy  of  Rome.  The 
adroit  Attalids  had  kept  themselves  by  Roman  favour  on  the 
throne  of  Pergamum  in  spite  of  Bithynian  and  Celtic  aggressions 
and  the  intrigues  of  Greek  rivals,  had  lulled  the  jealousy  of  their 
suzerain,  and  had  interfered  with  effect  in  the  troubles  of  their 
neighbours.  But  with  Attalus  III.,  a  cruel  and  bloodthirsty  dilet- 
tante (whose  uncle  had  acted  for  twenty  years  as  king  or  regent 
for  life),  the  line  came  to  an  end  (133  B.C.).  His  testament  was 
alleged  to  have  left  his  kingdom  and  treasures,  in  default  of  heirs, 
to  the  Roman  Republic,  as  if  a  people  could  be  disposed  of  by 
will.  But  the  document,  whether  a  Roman  forgery  or  authentic, 
gave  effect  to  facts.  Certainly  the  gift  fell  at  an  opportune 
moment  like  ripe  fruit  into  a  thirsting  mouth.  The  inheritance 
was  disputed  by  Aristonicus,  a  natural  son  of  Eumenes  II.,  the 
father  of  Attalus,  who,  though  defeated  by  the  Ephesians  at  sea, 
called  to  arms  slaves  and  adventurers,  and  at  the  head  of  his 
band  of  socialist  "  Heliopolites,"  scattered  the  local  contingents, 
mastered  the  greater  part  of  Pergamum,  and  in  131  B.C.  defeated 
and  killed  the  consul,  P.  Crassus  Mucianus,  the  orator  and  jurist, 
who,  though  Pontifex  Maximus,  had  evaded  the  sacred  law  to  claim 
a  lucrative  command  abroad.  M.  Perperna  defeated  and  captured 
the  Pretender  in  130  B.C.,  and  the  following  year  M'.  Aquillius 
organised  the  new  province  as  Asia.  His  arrangements,  modified 
by  Sulla,  Lucullus,  and  Pompeius,  remained  the  basis  of  the  pro- 
vincial constitution.  A  regular  garrison  was  saved  by  entrusting 
the   defence   to    buffer  states.      The  subjects   were  treated  with 


EVENTS  IM  THE  EAST  329 

moderation,  but  the  mode  of  collectinjr  the  taxes  rendered  them 
oppressive,  and  the  wealth  of  Attahis  helped  to  corrupt  Roman 
manners. 

The  Client  Kingdoms  of  the  East — Bithynia  retained  its 
independence.  Cappadocia  kept  its  position  as  a  friend  and  ally, 
and  began  to  imbue  itself  with  the  vices  and  accomplishments 
of  Hellas.  Cappadocia  by  the  sea,  or  Pontus,  under  Mithra- 
dates  V.  (Euergetes)  received  Great  Phrygia  as  the  reward  of  her 
services  against  Aristonicus,  and  of  the  king-'s  judicious  bribery 
of  Aquillius.  Mithradates,  the  future  great  king,  succeeded 
his  murdered  father  in  121  B.C.,  under  the  regency  of  the 
queen-mother.  The  Romans  were  masters  of  Asia  Minor,  but 
their  careless  supervision  permitted  the  growth  of  dangerous 
enemies.  It  was  the  same  elsewhere.  .Syria,  which  had  evacuated 
Egypt  (168  B.C.)  in  obedience  to  Rome  and  allowed  Roman  diplo- 
macy to  decide  a  disputed  succession,  set  her  at  naught  by  the 
assassination  of  Cn.  Octavius,  the  guardian  appointed  for  the 
son  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes  (162  B.C.).  The  throne  was  seized  by 
Demetrius,  whom  the  Senate  had  set  aside,  and  the  usurper  was 
actually  recognised.  In  Egypt,  Ptolemy  Philometor,  expelled  by 
his  brother  Euergetes,  was  restored  by  Rome  (163  B.C.),  Euergetes 
receiving  Cyrene.  When  they  quarrelled  over  Cyprus,  the  .Senate 
acquiesced  in  the  retention  of  the  island  by  Egypt  in  defiance  of  its 
original  decision,  and  finally,  in  146  B.C.,  stultified  its  own  policy  by 
allowing  Euergetes  II.,  a  bloated  tyrant,  surnamed  Physcon,  to  re- 
unite the  two  kingdoms.  Anxious  to  avoid  a  forward  policy,  the 
Senate  left  the  East  to  stew  in  its  own  juice,  but  by  doing  so  the 
Romans  neglected  their  interests  and  responsibilities,  and  the 
Orientals  treated  them  with  contempt.  Moreover,  events  were 
preparing  in  Farther  Asia  which  needed  vigilance. 

Parthia. — After  Magnesia  Syria  rapidly  decayed,  torn  by  in- 
testine feuds,  disintegrated  by  ambitious  satraps  and  interfering 
neighbours,  and  pressed  by  the  growing  power  of  Parthia.  Cappa- 
docia and  Sophene  were  free  ;  the  Maccabees  had  asserted  the 
national  and  religious  independence  of  Judaea  against  Epiphanes, 
who  hoped  by  a  policy  of  persecution  and  plunder  to  reduce  to 
unity  and  conformity  the  various  religious  and  political  elements  of 
his  motley  monarchy.  Rome  gladly  recognised  Jewish  autonomy 
as  a  useful  check  on  Syria,  but  confined  her  help  to  paper.  Of 
far  greater  importance  was  the  rise  of  Parthia  under  the  alien 
Scythian  dynasty  of  the  Arsacidas.  The  sixth  Arsaces,  Mithra- 
dates  I.   (175-136  B.C.),   overpowered  the   weakened  kingdom  of 


330  HisrOKY  OF  ROME 

Bactria,  one  of  the  half-Heilenic  fragments  of  Alexander's  empire, 
took  advantage  of  the  dynastic  broils  and  rotten  organisation  of  Syria 
to  annex  its  eastern  provinces,  and  founded  a  national  monarchy 
of  the  old  Oriental  type.  The  new  state,  however  superficially 
Philhellenic,  reacted  distinctly  in  language,  religion,  warfare,  and 
politics  against  Western  ideas.  The  East  with  renewed  vigour 
flung  away  the  legacy  of  Alexander  and  pushed  back  retreating 
Hellas.  Only  internal  strife  in  Parthia  and  the  diversion  caused 
by  the  attacks  of  the  Scythians  rescued  the  remnants  of  Syria. 
Rome  neglected  to  support  her  vassal.  Ignorant  of  the  drift  of 
events,  she  preserved  a  "  masterly  inactivity  "  whose  bitter  harvest 
was  soon  reaped  in  full.  Behind  the  fringe  of  protectorates  which 
concealed  the  movements  of  Asia,  Armenia,  Pontus,  and  Parthia 
were  growing  up  from  weakness  to  strength. 

Piracy. — On  the  seas  things  were  rapidly  becoming  worse. 
The  fleets  of  Syria  and  Carthage  were  destroyed,  Rhodes  was 
exhausted,  Egypt  enervated.  Rome  ceased  to  maintain  a  regular 
navy,  and  relied  on  ships  requisitioned  from  the  allies  when  wanted. 
As  a  result,  the  pirates  swept  the  waters,  levied  blackmail  on  the 
coast-towns,  infested  the  trade-routes,  and  drove  a  brisk  trade  in 
kidnapped  slaves.  The  headquarters  of  the  buccaneers  were  in 
the  island  of  Crete,  the  home  of  civil  war,  the  recruiting-ground 
of  mercenaries,  filled  with  corrupt  and  quarrelsome  democracies, 
and  among  the  rocky  fastnesses  and  secret  inlets  of  Cilicia. 
Their  depredations  were  connived  at  and  even  encourag^ed  by 
Syrian  pretenders  and  Roman  slave-dealers.  The  Dalmatian  and 
Ligurian  waters  were  cleared  earlier,  and  in  123  B.C.  Q.  Metellus 
occupied  the  Baliaric  Islands  and  founded  Palma  and  Pollentia, 
but  in  the  ^gean  and  the  East  the  pirates  were  masters. 

Roman  commissioners  appeared  from  time  to  time  in  the 
Levant,  ^milianus  in  143  B.C.,  with  a  small  party  and  a  roving 
commission,  visited  Egypt  and  passed  through  Greece  and  the 
eastern  dependencies,  reporting,  arbitrating,  and  reconnoitring 
the  ground.  A  more  vigorous  action  might  have  anticipated 
the  inevitable.  A  strong  force  guarding  a  definite  frontier  would 
have  ensured  the  peaceful  development  of  the  East,  but  recruits 
were  scarce  and  the  service  expensive,  and  the  policy  of  the  Senate 
was  one  of  drift.  It  had  neither  relinquished  the  old  nor  embraced 
the  new  principles  earnestly.  To  leave  everything  to  the  caprice 
of  its  officers  and  the  courage  of  local  militias  was  to  court  failure 
and  encourage  attack.  In  Spain  mole-hills  were  made  mountains 
by  irresponsible  stupidity  and  treachery,  and  no  serious  penalties 


WEAKNESS  OF  ROME  331 

were  exacted.  The  interests  of  the  subjects  and  of  the  government 
itself  were  sacrificed  to  the  greed  of  the  governor  and  the  capitahst. 
The  conquest  of  a  Spanish  village,  of  a  Portuguese  shepherd,  or  of 
a  Syrian  slave,  these  were  the  triumphs  of  Roman  wars — triumphs 
stained  by  perfidy,  assassination,  and  cowardice. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

INTERNAL    AFFAIRS    AND    TIBERIUS    GRACCHUS    (133   B.C.). 

Decay  of  Rome.  —  In  internal  aft'airs,  the  tendencies  already 
noticed  went  on  unchecked.  The  Senate  continued  to  govern, 
as  being  the  only  possible  government,  and  custom,  precedent, 
and  necessity  sanctioned  its  rule.  Its  power  was  the  result  of  a 
true  and  genuine  constitutional  growth  ;  a  system  of  checks  and 
balances  can  only  be  worked  by  the  effective  preponderance  of  the 
strongest  element  in  the  state.  An  exact  balance  of  powers  and  a 
division  of  sovereignty  are  a  theoretical  delusion.  The  Magistrates 
remained  ministers  of  the  Senate.  The  people  had  practically  lost 
its  functions  one  by  one  to  more  competent  and  more  active  instru- 
ments. But  as  the  days  of  struggle  ended  and  the  external  restraint 
of  foreig^n  rivals  ceased  to  act,  as  the  antique  virtues  which  had 
justified  command  were  corrupted  by  the  influence  of  wealth  and 
power,  with  despotism  rampant  abroad  and  capitalism  at  home, 
it  was  time  for  a  new  and  internal  check  to  be  created  sufficient 
to  arrest  decay.  ^Emilianus  prayed  the  gods  to  save  the  state. 
The  need  of  some  centre  of  resistance  was  as  clear  to  Nasica,  who 
for  that  very  reason  opposed  the  destruction  of  Carthage,  as  it 
was  to  the  censor  Cato.  Where  was  it  to  be  found  ?  The  ideas 
of  Cato  were  obsolete.  To  put  back  the  hands  on  the  clock  was 
impossible.  Empire  cannot  be  surrendered  because  it  is  burden- 
some ;  morality  cannot  be  restored  by  sumptuary  laws.  It  is 
absurd  to  attempt  to  reduce  the  standard  of  corttfort  or  to  check 
the  march  of  intellect.  To  revive  the  Comitia  were  a  still  more 
dangerous  expedient  (the  more  so,  perhaps,  that  it  was  legally  and 
formally  possible),  unless  its  constitution  and  composition  could 
be  seriously  modified  in  the  interests  of  Italy  and  the  subjects. 
Such  an  attempt,  even  if  it  could  be  made,  would  seem  doomed  to 
failure  in   the   existing   conflict   of  interests   between   capital  and 


332  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

country,  the  burgess  and  the  Itahan,  the  Itahan  and  the  provincial. 
In  its  actual  state  the  Assembly  could  be  made  a  weapon  of  annoy- 
ance, but  not  of  serious  resistance.  The  causes  that  had  limited 
the  activity  of  the  magistrates  made  any  effectual  check  by  com- 
bination on  their  part  equally  impossible.  The  dictatorship  was 
extinct.  Hence,  unless  reformers  could  capture  the  Senate,  nothing 
short  of  revolution  could  bring  about  any  real  change.  Mean- 
while there  was  a  period  of  calm  and  prosperity,  unmarked  by 
political  agitation.  The  Republic  was  waiting  unconsciously  for 
its  malady  to  come  to  a  head.  So  rare  is  the  power  of  prescience 
in  statesmen  ;  so  slight  is  the  influence  of  politicians  on  the  course 
of  events  ;  so  difficult  was  it,  between  a  "  decaying  oligarchy  and 
a  democracy  cankered  in  the  bud,"  to  provide  a  remedy  which 
should  not  be  more  dangerous  than  the  disease.  No  help  could 
be  expected  from  the  equestrian  order  whose  whole  policy  as  a 
class  was  one  of  material  interests  ;  there  was  friction  enough 
between  the  aristocracies  of  birth  and  wealth  both  at  home  and 
abroad  ;  but  while  the  Ecjuites  would  join  the  reformers  to  bring 
down  Privilege  to  their  own  level,  they  were  more  likely  to  combine 
with  the  nobles  for  purposes  of  plunder.  The  peasantry  had  lost 
all  influence  and  showed  a  growing  indifference  to  urban  politics. 

No  True  Parties. —  Nor  indeed  was  there  any  distinct  party  of 
reform  or  genuine  leaders  of  a  popular  movement.  There  grew  up 
a  party  system  with  party  names,  but  it  had  all  the  dangers  and 
none  of  the  merits  of  its  modern  counterpart.  Individuals  came 
forward  to  redress  abuses,  and  even  the  Senate  occasionally  took 
up  the  work,  but  there  is  nowhere  any  definite  programme  ;  the 
ideas  and  methods  of  the  best  men  of  all  parties  are  at  bottom  the 
same,  however  different  the  aim  and  spirit  of  the  worker.  Speak- 
ing generally,  there  were  partisans  but  no  parties  ;  there  were  no 
large  political  principles  at  stake.  There  was,  too,  a  notable  absence 
of  great  men.  The  Senate  identified  the  maintenance  of  its 
privileges,  to  the  exclusion  of  outsiders,  with  the  true  interests  of 
the  country.  The  magistrates  plundered  and  blundered,  content 
with  the  duties  and  emoluments  of  office.  The  people  accepted 
their  share  of»the  spoils.  There  was  plenty  of  excitement  at 
the  elections,  but  the  contests  turned  on  purely  personal  issues, 
and  roused  no  interest  outside  Rome.  There  was  merely  an 
energetic  competition  among  qualified  candidates,  who  in  turn 
canvassed  and  bribed  their  way  to  office. 

Scipio  yEmilianus. — A  typical  figure  of  the  time  is  the  adopted 
grandson  of  the  great  Scipio,  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  /Emilianus  (184- 


PARTIES  AND   REFORMS  333 

129  B.C.).  He  was  an  honest  and  capable  administrator,  a  good 
officer,  a  vigorous  censor,  and  a  polished  diplomatist.  Himself  a 
man  of  taste  and  education,  he  was  the  friend  of  Greek  statesmen 
and  philosophers  and  the  centre  of  a  cultivated  circle.  An  enemy 
of  mob  violence,  a  friend  of  the  Italians,  a  moderate  constitu- 
tionalist, averse  from  extremes,  he  was  unfit  for  the  stress  and 
strain  of  angry  politics.  His  healthy  and  refined  life,  his  amiable 
and  ingenuous  character,  the  real  distinction  of  his  manners,  his 
liberal  ideas  and  dislike  of  sordid  speculation,  put  him  in  touch 
with  all  the  best  elements  of  the  time  and  marked  him  out  as  the 
leader  of  a  national  reform.  He  did  indeed  purge  the  army,  cleanse 
the  census,  convict  governors,  and  purify  justice.  His  liberalism 
earned  the  suspicion  of  the  oligarchs,  his  stern  rebukes  the  dis- 
like of  the  rabble,  but  he  had  neither  the  genius  nor  the  courage 
to  conceive  and  carry  through  a  radical  reorganisation.  He  de- 
plored evils  he  felt  unable  to  remedy. 

Futile  Reforms. — The  Senate  then, which  still  absorbed  the  avail- 
able brain  of  the  community,  continued  to  govern,  avoiding  trouble- 
some questions  at  home  and  complications  abroad.  The  resistance, 
too,  was  slight.  In  149  B.C.  the  law  of  L.  Calpurnius  Piso,  already 
mentioned,  superseded  the  action  of  the  popular  courts  and  the 
special  commissions  of  the  Senate  by  the  creation  of  a  standing  court 
to  deal  with  extortion  in  the  provinces.  The  jurymen,  however,  were 
selected  from  the  body  of  senators.  A  premature  attempt  to  trans- 
fer the  election  of  priests  from  the  colleges  to  the  people  by  a 
Rogatio  Liciiiia  de  Sacerdotiis  failed.  Yet  a  series  of  laws  intro- 
duced and  extended  the  use  of  the  ballot  ^  for  elections,  legislation, 
and  judicial  verdicts.  One  of  these,  the  Lex  Cassia,  was  supported 
by  /Emilianus  to  secure  the  administration  of  justice  from  the 
influence  of  intimidation  and  bribery.  Such  measures  were  resisted 
by  the  nobles,  who  preferred  open  voting  to  secret  ballot,  and 
a  popular  assembly  to  a  properly  constituted  court.  The  laws  were 
useless,  and  merely  developed  corruption  into  an  organised  busi- 
ness on  a  large  scale.  The  decree  of  129  B.C.  which  compelled 
a  senator  on  taking  his  seat  to  resign  his  horse  and  his  vote  as  an 
eques  failed  equally  to  emancipate  the  Assembly  from  undue  influ- 
ence. The  public  preferred  exemption  from  taxation  and  military 
service,  with  cheap  corn  and  games,  to  any  reform. 

Social  and  Economic  Crisis. — Political  changes  sprangonce  more 

1  LexGabinia  Tahellaria,  for  elections,  139  R.c;  lex  Cassia  Tahellaria,{ox 
law-courts,  137  B.C.  ;  Lex  Fapiria,  for  legislation,  131  B.C. 


334  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

from  economic  causes.  The  story  of  the  Roman  revolution  begins 
with  a  social  question,  and  social  questions  in  the  old  world  were 
as  regularly  connected  with  land  and  usury  as  those  of  a  modern 
nation  with  wages.  The  old  democratic  movement  had  begun 
with  the  assertion  of  personal  liberties  against  the  usurer  and  the 
landlord.  A  succession  of  agrarian  and  debt  laws  and  contemporary 
re-enactments  of  the  law  of  appeal  show  the  persistence  of  the 
difficulty  and  the  connection  of  economic  and  political  questions. 
Political  rights  are  primarily  sought  as  a  means  to  obtain  social 
and  economic  benefits.  Politically,  the  struggle  had  ended  with 
the  apparent  destruction  of  privilege,  but  the  essential  cjuestions 
of  free  labour  and  free  land  had  not  been  settled.  Only  capital 
and  landholding  had  received  new  and  more  fatal  developments. 
Hence  arose,  with  the  growth  of  the  new  governing  order,  that 
ill-defined  and  irregular  opposition  which  we  see  dimly  through 
the  dust  of  battlefields,  and  which  grows  in  vigour  with  the  decline 
of  the  oligarchy. 

Ruin  of  Agriculture. — The  strongest  feeling  had  been  shown 
over  the  agrarian  question  and  the  proposals  of  Flaminius.  In  the 
period  of  peace  that  followed  things  ripened  fast,  and  the  slackness 
of  the  government  combined  with  the  rash  enthusiasm  of  idealist 
democrats,  on  whom  its  failure  threw  the  burden  of  reform,  to 
precipitate  a  crisis.  The  shock  came  once  more  over  the  agri- 
cultural question.  The  causes  of  the  decay  of  agriculture  have 
been  already  described.  We  may  briefly  repeat  them  :  the  natural 
decay  of  small  holdings,  the  growth  of  capital  and  improved 
methods,  the  slave  system,  the  competition  of  artificially  cheapened 
corn,  the  constant  drain  of  war,  and  the  ill-judged  legislation 
which  stimulated  the  absorption  of  land  by  the  senatorial  nobility 
or  associations  of  capitalists.  Perhaps  the  least  important  part, 
as  we  see  in  the  case  of  France,  was  played  by  the  drain  of  war. 
No  campaign  does  so  much  harm  as  a  bad  law.  Moreover,  land- 
grabbing  was  carried  on  by  the  nobles  to  such  an  extent  that  a 
preetorian  edict  was  needed  to  restrain  illegal  evictions.  The 
natural  result  had  been  the  extinction  of  the  yeoman  farmer, 
especially  in  Etruria  and  South  Italy,  the  spread  of  plantations 
and  cattle-ranches,  the  immigration  of  the  labourers  into  the 
towns,  and  the  depopulation  of  the  rural  districts. 

Corn  was  giving  place  to  the  olive  and  vine,  cattle  and  game  ;  the 
laborious  yeoman  to  the  unproductive  slave  ;  the  true  basis  of  the 
Comitia  and  of  the  army  was  benig  destroyed,  industry  demoralised, 
and  civic  equality  annihilated.     The  veteran  was  left  with  no  career 


THE  AGRARIA.V  QUESTION  335 

before  him  but  that  of  brigand  or  beggar.  The  peasant,  without 
capital,  Hable  to  conscription,  with  his  family  dependent  upon  him, 
could  not  compete  with  the  imported  corn  which  supplied  the 
anny  and  the  capital,  or  with  the  big  estate  worked  by  cheap 
slaves,  exempt  from  service  and  without  family.  Even  Cato's 
model  estate  was  worked  by  serfs.  And  yet  no  economy  can  be 
lasting  that  is  not  firmly  based  on  the  internal  resources  of  a  land 
and  the  industry  of  its  people.  The  yeomanry  was  the  backbone 
of  Rome.  Her  military  and  political  system  had  been  founded  on 
a  fair  and  moderate  distribution  of  land,  and  this  foundation  had 
been  entirely  sapped.  The  freeholders  were  sinking  into  metayer 
tenants,  labourers  or  serfs,  or  drifting  into  the  proletariate  and  the 
army,  while  Italy  depended  upon  foreign  supplies.  Emigration, 
even  if  possible  to  Roman  sentiment,  would  be  no  remedy.  Redis- 
tribution of  the  soil  spelled  revolution.  Land  purchase  was  not 
feasible. 

The  Public  Land. — The  orthodox  remedy  had  been  to  allot 
land  in  newly  conquered  districts  to  the  poorer  citizens  and 
veterans.  If  such  land  were  wanting,  law  and  precedent  allowed 
the  government  to  reclaim  the  public  land  held  on  sufferance  by 
squatters,  and  divide  this  among  deserving  claimants.  Of  this 
public  land  Rome  possessed  a  large  amount,  confiscated  after 
victory  in  Italy  or  abroad,  arable,  pasture,  or  waste.  The  arable 
land  was  rarely  sold  ;  occasionally,  as  with  Capua  and  Leontini, 
it  was  let  on  lease,  but  the  traditional  method  was  to  allot  it  in 
small  freehold  plots  to  the  members  of  some  colony  or  settlement 
then  founded.  The  waste  land,  needing  capital  and  slaves  to 
turn  it  to  account,  was  handed  over  to  occupiers,  who  squatted  at 
will  on  condition  of  cultivating  the  soil,  and  paid  a  fixed  proportion 
as  a  rent  to  the  state.  They  held  their  lands  subject  to  resump- 
tion by  the  state,  but  were  protected  in  their  holdings  by  equit- 
able injunctions.  The  state  remained  owner  ;  the  occupier 
enjoyed  the  usufruct.  The  defects  of  the  system  lay  in  the  risk 
of  encroachment,  and  in  the  tendency  to  evade  legal  restrictions 
and  apply  it  to  arable  or  unauthorised  land.  The  government 
neglected  to  enforce  the  conditions,  and  allowed  a  sense  of  owner- 
ship to  spring  up  by  uninterrupted  tenure.  The  districts  suitable 
to  pasturage  in  Apulia  and  Bruttium  were  mainly  occupied  by 
syndicates,  who  bred  cattle  on  a  large  scale,  and  attempted  to 
eVade  their  dues,  which  in  this  case  were  more  carefully  exacted. 

Occupation  supersedes  Allotment. — This  simple  and  natural 
way  of  dealing  with  the  land  was  upset  when  the  allotment  system, 


336  IIISrORV  OF  ROME 

which  favoured  the  poor,  practically  ceased,  and  the  rich  man's 
occupations  and  pasture  lands  spread  unchecked.  The  same 
state  of  things  prevailed  among  the  allies,  partly  because  the 
wealthy  Italians  imitated  their  Roman  brethren,  partly  because 
the  restrictions  on  landholding  tavoured  the  transference  of  land 
to  Roman  citizens.  Hence  the  struggle,  which  lasted  till  iii  B.C., 
between  the  rich  and  the  poor  man's  method,  an  agitation  directed 
to  obtain  a  fair  share  of  the  land  for  those  who  had  won  it.  The 
Licinian  rogations  had  failed  for  want  of  machinery.  Their  regu- 
lations were  set  aside  or  evaded  by  putting  in  men  of  straw.  The 
plebeian  nobles  had  used  these  proposals  as  a  stalking-horse  for 
their  own  purposes.  They  were  indeed  a  solemn  imposture,  and 
had  sanctioned  the  evils  they  pretended  to  check.  For  some  time 
the  process  of  absorption  was  checked  by  the  formation  of  colonies 
and  the  distribution  of  allotments,  but  after  177  B.C.  the  assignations 
practically  stopped,  as  there  was  no  new  land  to  divide.  Occu- 
pation went  on  till  it  monopolised  the  bulk  of  the  public  land,  and 
thus  the  natural  outlet  for  the  impoverished  farmer  was  closed. 
Foreign  colonies  were  considered  to  endanger  the  position  of  Italy. 
The  nobles,  by  not  paying  the  dues,  increased  the  burdens  of  the 
state,  whose  land  they  plundered  and  converted  into  private  pro- 
perty. The  census  began  to  show  a  steady  decrease  during  a  quiet 
and  prosperous  period.  Ltelius,  the  friend  of  Scipio,  expressed  the 
ideas  of  his  circle  when  he  proposed  to  deal  with  the  question, 
but,  with  characteristic  timidity,  withdrew  his  bill  in  deference  to 
advice,  and  earned  the  title  of  "  Sapiens." 

The  Parents  and  Teachers  of  the  Gracchi. — So  matters  stood 
when  Ti.  Sempronius  Gracchus  took  up  the  question  in  133  B.C. 
The  Gracchi  were  the  sons  of  a  distinguished  plebeian  noble, 
great-grandsons  of  the  general  who  raised  a  slave-legion  in  the 
Punic  wars.  The  father,  a  Roman  of  the  old  school,  had  served 
as  a  soldier  and  diplomatist  throughout  the  world,  had  filled  every 
office  of  the  state,  had  enjoyed  two  triumphs,  and  had  won  the  affec- 
tion of  the  subjects  and  a  high  reputation  by  his  pacification  of 
Spain.  In  his  consulship  he  reduced  Sardinia  (177  B.C.),  as  censor 
(169  B.C.)  he  restricted  the  franchise  of  the  freedmen,  and  received  a 
second  consulship  in  163  B.C.  He  was  a  man  of  chivalrous  character 
and  some  cultivation.  His  wife,  to  whom  he  was  deeply  attached, 
Cornelia,  the  "  mother  of  the  Gracchi,"  a  daughter  of  Africanus, 
is  said  to  have  refused  the  throne  of  Egypt  for  the  sake  of  h6r 
children.  She  was  a  woman  of  real  culture  and  liberal  ideas, 
to  whom   her  sons   largely  owed   their   careful   education,   their 


THE   GRACCHI  33? 

eloquence,  their  skill  in  the  Latin  tongue,  and,  above  all,  their  power 
of  passionate  sympathy  with  suffering  and  indignation  with  wrong. 
These  tendencies  were  strengthened  and  stimulated  by  the  de- 
mocratic ideas  and  philosophic  politics  instilled  by  their  Greek 
teachers,  Blossius  of  Cumas  and  Diophanes  of  Mitylene,  and  by 
the  humanism  of  the  Scipionic  circle,  whose  dilettante  ideas  were 
translated  into  action  by  the  enthusiasm  of  Tiberius  and  the 
passionate  energy  of  Gaius.  For  the  first  time  in  Roman  history 
the  precedents  of  Greek  legislators  like  Solon  and  Lycurgus,  and 
the  precepts  of  political  theorists  like  Plato,  influenced  the  course 
of  politics,  as  they  had  already  at  Sparta  inspired  the  reforming 
efforts  of  Agis  and  Cleomenes. 

Tiberius  and  Gaius  Gracchus. — The  brothers  were  both  brave, 
temperate,  high-minded,  and  talented,  both  diligent  in  office  and 
generous  in  their  behaviour  to  the  subjects  and  allies  ;  but  while 
Tiberius  was  more  gentle  and  sedate,  the  younger  man  was  more 
animated  and  impetuous.  His  oratory  was  marked  by  excited 
movement  and  gesture,  his  style  was  impressive  and  impassioned, 
his  diction  exuberant  and  persuasive.  It  is  said  that  he  employed 
a  slave  to  sound  a  soft  note  when  excitement  was  carrying  him 
too  far.  The  style  of  Tiberius  was  sweeter  and  more  pathetic, 
his  diction  pure  and  exact,  his  reasoning  acute  and  sensible.  The 
same  contrast  pervaded  their  habits  and  character.  Tiberius, 
first  man  on  the  wall  at  the  storm  of  Carthage,  was  elected  augur  in 
early  youth,  married  the  daughter  of  the  consular  Appius  Claudius 
Pulcher,  and  served  as  quaestor  to  Mancinus  in  Spain.  The  repudia- 
tion of  the  treaty  {T.'ide  supra,  p.  244)  negotiated  on  his  personal 
honour,  however  little  it  explains  his  action,  sharpened  his  insight 
into  the  weakness  of  the  government.  It  was  the  spectacle  of  the 
misery  and  depopulation  of  Etruria  which  fired  a  heart  already 
penetrated  with  ideas  of  reform  and  indignant  at  the  inaction  of 
his  circle.  He  was  encouraged  to  proceed  by  the  support  of 
his  father-in-law,  a  political  opponent  of  the  Scipios,  and  ready, 
like  his  ancestors,  to  gird  at  his  own  caste  ;  by  the  great  jurist, 
Crassus  Mucianus,  his  brother's  father-in-law  ;  and  by  a  still 
greater  lawyer,  P.  Mucius  Scaevola,  the  consul  of  133  B.C.  ;  while 
the  aims  at  least  of  the  reformers  were  approved  by  that  pattern 
of  antique  virtue,  Q.  Metellus  Macedonicus. 

Agrarian  Law  of  Tiberius  Gracchus. — Elected  tribune  (133 
B.C.)  in  ordinary  course,  not  on  this  particular  platform,  he  could 
count  on  no  party  to  back  him.  Scipio  was  averse  from  an  open 
struggle  ;   his   supporters  in    the  Senate  were  lawyers  or  family 

V 


338  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

friends.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  nothing  revokitionary 
in  the  measures  he  proposed.  Agrarian  reform  was  not  a  party 
question.  The  class  he  would  benefit  had  been  always  conserva- 
tive ;  the  method  to  be  employed  was  traditional.  It  was  not  the 
end  but  the  means  he  adopted  which,  aided  by  llie  obstructive 
policy  of  the  Senate,  made  this  bill  the  turning-point  in  the  fall  of 
the  Republic.  Without  securing  the  previous  approbation  of  the 
Senate,  he  laid  his  proposal,  contrary  to  the  custom,  but  in  accord- 
ance with  the  letter  of  the  constitution,  before  the  assembly  of  the 
tribes.  The  general  aim  of  the  Agrarian  Law  was  to  reclaim  and 
redistribute  the  public  lands  now  occupied  by  the  wealthy  pos- 
sessors in  excess  of  the  limit  permitted  by  the  Licinian  Law.  He 
did  not  mean  to  resume  the  whole  of  the  land  of  which  the  state 
was  the  legal  owner,  but  (i)  all  occupations  beyond  the  legal  limit, 
(2)  all  common  land  enclosed  clam  vi  aiit  prccario,  and  (3)  avail- 
able pasture  lands.  By  way  of  compensation  for  disturbance,  the 
legal  holdings  were  confirmed  in  ownership,  i.e.^  500  iugera,  with 
the  addition  of  250  for  each  son  up  to  a  maximum  of  1000.  Further 
proposals  of  compensation  for  improvement  were  dropped  on 
account  of  the  hostility  shown  to  the  bill.  The  reclaimed  land 
was  to  be  allotted  to  poor  citizens  in  small  holdings,  which  were 
not  assigned  in  freehold,  but  as  heritable  leaseholds  at  a  small 
rent,  which  might  not  be  sold  or  disposed  of.  He  hoped  by  these 
means  to  prevent  absorption  and  to  reimburse  the  state.  The 
capital  required  for  starting  the  new  system  was  to  be  furnished  out 
of  the  treasures  of  Attalus.  The  necessary  machinery  was  pro- 
vided by  the  creation  of  a  commission  with  powers  to  determine 
the  available  land  and  to  carry  out  the  distribution.  The  allot- 
ments were  probably  limited  to  Roman  citizens.  For,  although 
the  Gracchi  were  favourable  to  the  Italian  claims,  public  opinion 
was  not  yet  ripe  for  such  an  extension  of  privilege.  These  pro- 
posals were  both  legal  and  constitutional.  They  asserted  an  ancient 
right  which  had  been  the  subject  of  constant  struggle  ;  they  enforced 
the  sound  legal  maxim  that  prescription  did  not  avail  against  the 
state — and  in  this  case  the  men  who  pleaded  prescription  had 
created  it  by  evading  payments.  The  end  proposed  was  the  resto- 
ration of  the  yeomanr>'  to  the  land.  The  only  new  features  were 
the  titles  granted  to  the  possessors,  the  inalienability  of  the  lots, 
the  imposition  of  a  rent,  and  the  attempt  to  secure  the  continuous 
execution  of  the  law  by  a  permanent  commission. 

Objections  to  the  Law. — Tiberius  was  no  common  demagogue, 
but  a  distinguished  soldier  and  orator  belonging  to  the  highest 


TIBERIUS  GRACCHUS  339 

society.  His  reform  was  well  meant,  and  the  moment  chosen  was 
not  unfa\ourabIe.  The  slave  war  and  the  Spanish  disasters  were 
making  the  failure  of  the  government  clear  to  the  meanest 
capacity.  But  it  was  impolitic  to  attack  the  Senate  single-handed, 
with  no  organised  party,  with  colleagues  he  could  not  trust,  with 
no  force  behind  him  but  a  fickle  and  corrupted  mob,  from  a 
position  which  lasted  only  for  a  year,  without  possibility  of  re- 
election.    His  action  ignored  the  real  nature  of  the  constitution 


VIAMFECEIAB-RECIO-  ADCaPVam-ET 
I  N-FAVlA-nONTEIS  OMNEISMILI ARIOS 
TABELARlOSoyEPOSElVElHINCE-SVNT 
NOVCERIAMMEIUAai-CAPVAM-XXCIIM 
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STATVAM-CCXXXIi-  REGIVAAtCCXXXVI' 
SVA^A•AF•CAnVA•REClVA^•MEILIACCC 

ETEIDE/APRAE  tor-in         ^^125 

SICILIA'FVCJTEIVOS-ITALICORVAA 
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FORVM-AEDISOyEPOPLlCASHElGFECtl 


MILESTONE    SET    UP    BY   P.    POPILLIUS    L.EN.\S,    IN   LUCANI.\,    AS 
CONSUL,    132    B.C.l 


by  its  appeal  to  the  formal  powers  of  the  Comitia  against  the 
authority  of  the  Senate.  Again,  if  it  was  proposed  to  confiscate 
land  occupied  by  allies  on  sufferance  or  by  treaty,  without  giving 
them  a  share  in  the  redivision,  the  gross  iniquity  of  the  proposal 
would  raise  dangerous  opposition.  Economically  the  objections 
were  also  serious.  In  its  disturbance  of  ancient  claims  and  vested 
interests,  the  bill,  in  its  final  shape,  took  no  sufficient  account  of 

1  This  illustrates  (<;)  roadmaking,  vide  infra,  p.  553 ;  (1^)  Sicilian  slave-war  ; 
(c)  Agrarian  Law  of  Gracchus. 


340  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  change  in  the  standard  of  landed  wcakh  and  in  the  methods 
of  industry  since  367  B.C.,  and  of  the  proper  compensation  for 
permanent  improvements,  for  bond  Jide  investments  and  the 
displacement  of  capital.  When  Cato  evicted  the  occupiers  in 
Campania  (165  B.C.),  though  the  encroachments  were  recent  and 
unauthorised,  there  had  been  at  least  compensation.  The  lapse  of 
time  made  the  resumption,  in  many  cases,  actual  confiscation. 
It  was  a  menace  to  all  uncertain  titles,  and  opened  a  ready  way 
to  vexatious  prosecutions,  a  difficulty  increased  by  the  absence 
of  exact  registers,  the  lapse  of  payments,  the  working  of  sale  and 
bequest.  It  would  be  hard  enough  even  to  get  sufficient  land, 
harder  still  to  make  farmers  out  of  city  loafers,  while  for  the 
pasture  land  the  system  of  allotment  was  unfitted.  The  clause 
prohibiting  alienation  was  unworkable.  The  measure  did  not 
touch  the  real  economic  causes  of  depression  in  agriculture — slave 
labour,  cheap  corn,  and  bad  laws.  There  is  a  curious  mixture  of 
legalism  and  youthful  impatience  in  this  impulsive  attack  on  the 
landlord  and  oligarch. 

Octavius  deposed  and  the  Law  carried. — A  storm  of  opposition 
followed,  not  merely  from  noble  lords,  who  clung  half  honestly, 
half  unscrupulously,  to  their  privileges,  but  from  the  moderates,  who 
feared  revolution  more  than  they  loved  reform,  and  later  on  from 
the  spokesman  of  the  exasperated  Italians.  There  were  crowded 
meetings,  eloquently  harangued  by  the  impassioned  tribune  ;  the 
rural  voters,  on  whom  he  depended,  poured  into  the  city.  The 
Senate,  the  organ  of  the  landowners,  resorted  to  obstruction. 
M.  Octavius,  a  friend  and  colleague  of  Gracchus,  interposed  his 
veto,  to  which  Tiberius,  equally  constitutionally,  replied  by  placing 
his  seal  on  the  treasury  and  blocking  every  executive  act.  He  did 
more.  Eager  to  avail  himself  of  the  presence  of  the  country  voters 
and  the  momentary  consternation  of  the  landlords,  he  declined  to 
wait  for  the  slow  pressure  of  time  and  opinion,  and  pushed  his 
proposal  while  the  iron  was  still  hot.  The  bill,  once  more  moved, 
was  again  vetoed  in  spite  of  personal  appeals  to  Octavius.  Finally, 
after  a  fruitless  negotiation  with  the  Senate  and  repeated  efforts 
to  appease  his  colleague,  he  reluctantly  proposed  and  carried  the 
deposition  of  the  refractory  tribune.  One  or  the  other  of  them 
must  go,  he  said  ;  and  when  Octavius  refused  to  allow  such  an 
alternative  to  be  put,  he  asked  the  people  to  declare  that  a  tribune 
who  acted  against  the  popular  will,  ipso  facto  forfeited  his  office. 
Octavius  was  deposed  and  dragged  away.  It  was  a  coup  d\'tat. 
A  magistrate  could  only  resign  ;  he  could  not  be  deposed.     In  an 


FALL    OF   TIBERIUS   GRACCHUS  341 

apology  which  he  felt  bound  to  offer  later,  Tiberius  descanted  on 
the  right  of  the  people  to  control  their  magistrate  :  it  was  mere 
sophistry.  Government  becomes  impossible  if  the  people  can 
cancel  their  mandate  for  every  passing  whim.  To  defy  the  right 
of  intercession  cut  the  ground  from  his  own  feet.  Moreover,  the 
tribunate  had  been  of  late  years  a  valuable  instrument  of  govern- 
ment ;  to  revive  its  earlier  use  as  a  weapon  of  opposition  was  a 
dangerous  anachronism.  A  successor  to  Octavius  was  appointed, 
and  the  law  carried  by  a  single  vote  of  the  people.  The  two  brothers 
and  Appius  Claudius  were  placed  on  the  commission — a  mere  family 
conclave.     The  Senate  amused  itself  by  docking  their  allowance. 

Fall  of  Tiberius  Gracchus. —But  Tiberius  had  to  prepare  him- 
self for  attack,  especially  for  infringing  the  sacred  rights  of  the 
tribunate.  He  must  buy  the  favour  of  the  urban  electors,  and 
ensure,  if  possible,  his  appointment  for  a  second  year,  if  he  was 
to  avoid  impeachment  and  the  ruin  of  his  work.  To  this  end  he 
entered  on  a  series  of  popular  proposals,  promising  to  extend  the 
right  of  appeal,  to  shorten  the  term  of  service,  &c.  He  meant 
perhaps  to  curtail  the  judicial  and  administrative  prerogatives  of 
the  Senate,  possibly  in  the  end  to  give  the  franchise  to  Italy. 

The  charge  of  aiming  at  the  kingship  was  a  fabrication  of  the 
nobles  to  justify  their  violence,  to  meet  which  he  had  provided 
himself  with  a  large  retinue,  but  personal  peril  and  the  logic  of 
necessity  pushed  him  further  than  he  meant.  Re-election  to  the 
tribunate  was  unconstitutional,  but  surely  the  people  might  make 
their  own  precedents.  On  this  issue  the  question  was  fought  out. 
The  elections  were  fixed  for  a  time  when  his  rural  supporters  were 
busy  with  harvest.  The  nobles  were  able  to  postpone  them  to  the 
following  day.  For  that  day  both  sides  prepared,  and  Gracchus 
appealed  alike  to  compassion,  gratitude,  and  force.  Strengthened 
by  popular  sympathy,  he  met  the  tribes  once  more  in  front  of  the 
Capitoline  Temple.  The  Assembly  was  tumultuous.  Obstruction 
was  followed  by  riot,  and  the  partisans  of  the  Senate  were  ex- 
pelled. The  wildest  rumours  circulated.  A  gesture  of  Gracchus 
was  taken  to  mean  a  demand  for  the  crown.  Rumours  reached  the 
Senate,  sitting  in  the  temple  of  Fides,  and  when  the  wise  consul 
Scasvola  refused  indignantly  to  slay  citizens  without  trial,  the 
optimates,  headed  by  the  younger  Nasica,  who  summoned  all 
patriots  to  take  the  place  of  a  consul  who  betrayed  the  state,  rushed 
forth  and,  followed  by  a  mass  of  knights,  clients,  and  gladiators,  flung 
themselves,  with  bludgeons  and  bench-legs  in  their  hands,  on  the 
o\erawed  and  cowardly  mob.     Tiberius,  as  he  turned  to  escape, 


342  in  STORY  OF  ROME 

was  felled  to  the  ground  with  300  of  his  associates  :  the  bodies  were 
thrown  into  the  Tiber.  Thus  on  this  first  day  of  wholesale  murder 
in  the  streets  of  Rome  the  series  of  civil  massacres  was  inaugu- 
rated by  the  party  of  order.  The  illegal  executions  were  confirmed, 
in  the  following  year,  by  the  judicial  execution  of  the  Gracchans,  of 
whom  a  large  number,  mainly  of  the  lower  classes,  were  condemned 
by  a  special  commission  under  the  consul  P.  Popillius.  Nasica 
was  rewarded  with  the  pontificate  in  130  B.C.  The  moderates  ac- 
quiesced in  the  proceedings,  and  ^milianus,  when  he  heard  the  news 
before  the  walls  of  Numantia,  cried  in  the  words  of  Homer — 

"  ws  ATToXoiTo  Ka\  ciWo?  oris  TOiaPra  ^e  pe^oi." 

Weakness  of  his  Position. — The  building  collapsed  with  its 
architect.  His  aim  was  good,  and  approved  itself  to  good  men — the 
regeneration  of  Italy  based  on  a  restored  yeomanry  and  an  extended 
franchise.  Thus  he  hoped  to  infuse  fresh  blood  into  the  Comitia 
and  army,  to  stem  the  tide  of  corruption  and  pauperism,  and  place 
an  invigorated  people  as  a  check  on  the  government.  The  measure 
he  proposed  as  a  first  step  was,  under  the  circumstances,  a  natural 
one.  If  it  was  oppressive  to  the  rich,  they  had  their  own  greed  and 
negligence  to  thank.  But  he  failed  because  he  tried  a  revolution 
without  understanding  that  it  was  a  revolution,  and  without  the 
means  to  carry  it  through.  A  rash  and  impetuous  idealist,  who 
failed  to  grasp  the  true  nature  of  the -constitution  and  the  de- 
generacy of  the  Comitia,  he  was  hurried  into  false  steps,  struck 
down  the  platform  on  which  he  himself  stood,  and  set  in  motion 
forces  which  would  make  a  republican  system  impossible.  He 
had  no  original  intention  of  changing  the  form  of  government, 
aimed  at  no  tyranny,  was  mainly  interested  in  social  questions. 
But  by  turning  the  tribunate  against  the  .Senate  and  ruling  Rome 
by  popular  meetings,  he  put  the  feet  above  the  head  and  pam- 
pered the  riotous  arrogance  of  the  sovereign  mob.  The  Comitia 
had  neither  the  morale  nor  the  organisation  necessary  to  make 
it  a  genuine  organ  of  popular  government.  Such  a  body  had  no 
right  to  control  provinces,  direct  administration,  and  vote  itself 
land  and  money.  The  precedent  set  by  Flaminius  and  copied 
by  Gracchus  was  a  caricature  and  not  a  revival  of  older  pro- 
cedure, and  its  sure  end  was  an  oligarchic  restoration  or  a  saviour 
of  society.  For  the  present  the  nobles  held  their  own  and  the 
storm  passed  by,  its  warnings  unheeded.  They  gave  their 
enemies'  cause  a  baptism  of  blood,  and  raised  by  murder  a  mis- 
taken enthusiast  to  the  rank  of  a  hero  and  martyr. 


TIBERIUS    GRACCHUS  AND  AFTER  343 

CHAPTER   XXXIV 

GAIUS   GRACCHUS 

U.C.  A.U.C. 

Death  of  Scipio  ^milianus        ......  129  625 

Fulvius       Flaccus      proposes      to      enfranchise       the 

Italians— Revolt  of  Fregellse 125  629 

Tribunate  of  C.  Gracchus 123-122  631-632 

Deaths  of  C.  Gracchus  and  Fulvius  .        .  121  633 

The  interval  between  the  tribunates  of  Tiberius  and  Gaius  is 
marked  on  the  whole  by  moderation.  The  violence  of  the  ultras 
strengthened  the  hands  of  the  more  liberal  members  of  the 
Senate,  men  like  Metellus,  Scasvola,  and  Scipio,  averse  to  either 
extreme  of  oligarchy  or  democracy.  The  optimates,  half  ashamed 
of  their  work,  were  not  unready  to  adopt  the  dead  man's  law, 
and  get  what  favour  they  could  by  its  execution.  The  opposition 
was  for  the  moment  powerless  ;  nor  did  the  personal  rivalries 
or  divergences  of  opinion  in  the  Senate  amount  to  any  real 
party  division.  But  credit  is  mainly  due  to  the  sound  sense  of 
yEmilianus,  whose  real  influence  with  all  sections  bears  witness 
to  his  political  honesty  and  independence. 

The  Agrarian  Commission. — The  commission  of  three  went 
to  work  with  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  P.  Crassus  receiving  the 
vacant  place.  After  his  death  in  130  B.C.,  and  that  of  Appius,  their 
places  were  taken  by  the  active  agitators  M.  Fulvius  Flaccus 
and  C.  Papirius  Carbo,  the  latter  of  whom,  a  distinguished  orator, 
passed  over  later  on  to  the  optimates.  Their  accession  gave 
energy  to  the  work.  As  to  its  extent  and  value  opinions  differ, 
but  there  is  evidence  of  distributions  in  South  Italy,  and  the 
rapid  increase  in  the  census,  said  to  amount  to  80,000,  may  be 
attributed  to  the  number  of  poor  citizens,  hitherto  carelessly 
enumerated,  who  passed  from  the  capite  censi  to  the  register 
of  men  able  to  bear  arms.  But  it  caused  great  and  natural 
irritation.  Exact  returns  could  not  be  secured  ;  recourse  was 
had  to  informations.  The  arbitrary  decisions  of  a  partisan  court, 
empowered  to  define  as  well  as  to  distribute  the  public  lands, 
and  acting  often  on  imperfect  evidence,  disturbed  not  only  recent 
and  obvious  occupiers,  but  bona  fide  possessors,  even  genuine 
owners  whose  titles  were  not  forthcoming.  The  feeling  of  in- 
security and  resentment  became  general  ;  and  when,  in  129  B.C.,  the 
commissioners  began  to  deal  with  those  lands  which  the  Latin 


344 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


or  allied  communities  had  occupied  by  express  or  implied  per- 
mission of  the  people  as  a  reward  for  their  services  or  in  default 
of  sufficient  citizens,  it  appeared  high  time  to  bring  operations  to 
a  close.  To  assert  in  these  cases  the  legal  ownership  of  Rome 
was  vexatious  and  impolitic. 

Action  of  Scipio. — Africanus  took  up  the  cause  of  his  old 
soldiers,  and  mainly  by  his  influence  the  judicial  powers  of  the 
comrriission  were  transferred  to  the  consuls.  .Sempronius  Tudi- 
tanus,  to  whom  they  passed,  avoided  the  inevitable  odium  by 
betaking  himself  promptly  to  the  army  of  Illyria.     It  was  not  the 


rAnfoD7i7:w^vvFVrcr?Ar 

C- J  E  /  vvP  RO  N I V5T  If  OR  A€ 

r.pArERivj--<:-F-c;AR&. 

E'AJA . 


l^ifM-PRONlVi'-Tl-F-. 

HjvmrivfKi 


TERMINI    SET   UP    BY   THE    LAND    COMMISSION    IN    THE    L.^ND   OF 
THE    HIRPINl,    130-129    B.C. 


first  time  that  Scipio  had  resisted  popular  feeling.  In  the  heads  of 
the  commission  the  party  of  progress  had  found  leaders  whose 
ideas  were  visibly  widening.  Carbo  in  131  B.C.  not  merely  passed  a 
Ballot  Act,  but  attempted  to  legalise  the  re-election  of  tribunes 
and  so  remove  the  obstacle  that  had  been  fatal  to  Gracchus. 
Scipio,  in  a  vehement  speech,  resisted  the  proposal,  justified  the 
execution  of  Tiberius,  and  silenced  the  bowlings  of  the  mob  with 
bitter  sarcasms.  He  at  least  was  not  afraid  of  the  "stepchildren 
of  Italy,  these  freedmen  whom  he  had  sent  in  chains  to  the  slave- 
market."  The  Bill,  rejected  for  the  present,  may  have  passed 
afterwards  in  a  modified  form. 


SCIPIO  yEMIlJANUS  345 

Death  of  Scipio. — In  125  B.C.  Flaccus,  now  consul,  proposed 
that  every  ally  should  be  allowed  to  petition  for  the  franchise 
or  for  the  right  of  appeal  only  if  he  so  preferred, — a  rather 
sweeping  proposal.  What  Scipio  would  have  said  to  this  mea- 
sure of  relief  on  behalf  of  his  proteges  we  cannot  tell.  Soon 
after  his  defence  of  their  claims  in  the  matter  of  the  land  law, 
when  on  the  point  of  delivering  a  further  speech  on  the  question, 
he  was  struck  down  by  a  sudden  and  mysterious  death,  at  the 
age  of  fifty-six,  in  the  fulness  of  his  vigour  and  influence  (129  B.C.). 
The  foulest  rumours  were  current,  and  suspicion  has  fallen  on  the 
democratic  leaders.  At  the  time  there  was  no  inquiry,  and  the 
evidence  is  conflicting.  The  assassination,  if  it  was  such,  was 
the  work  of  a  few  malcontents.  The  esteem  of  the  world 
followed  the  last  great  Scipio  to  the  tomb,  whither  he  was  borne 
by  the  four  sons  of  his  personal  enemy,  Metellus.  He  was  "the 
noblest  Roman  of  them  all,"  this  sober  student  of  the  simple 
wisdom  of  Xenophon,  the  friend  of  Polybius,  La^lius,  and  Panie- 
tius  ;  the  patron  of  Terence  and  Lucilius  ;  the  proud,  generous, 
and  unselfish  gentleman,  who  did  his  best  for  Rome,  and,  careless 
of  popularity,  steered  clear  of  all  her  factions. 

The  Italians  and  the  Franchise. — The  idea  of  e.xtending  the 
franchise,  already  mooted  by  Cai-vilius,  was  in  the  air  before 
Flaccus  proposed  his  Bill.  No  doubt  the  very  thought  of  it 
seemed  treason  at  Rome,  and  the  people  were  as  unwilling  as 
the  Senate  to  share  the  rapidly  increasing  benefits  enjoyed 
by  the  privileged  minority.  But  the  situation  was  becoming 
impossible  ;  the  allies  were  restless,  and  the  longer  heads  among 
the  reformers  saw  their  way  to  remove  the  stumbling-block 
to  the  Land  Act,  to  strengthen  their  party  and  counteract  the 
urban  voters  by  a  just  and  generous  stroke  of  policy.  They 
were  not  supported.  A  law  of  the  tribune  M.  Junius  Pennus 
(126  B.C.)  enabled  the  authorities  to  expel  non-citizens  from  Rome, 
and  so  prevent  an  influx  of  Italians  from  usurping  votes  or  in- 
timidating opinion,  and  when  Flaccus  brought  forward  his  Bill  he 
met  such  universal  resistance  that  he  was  as  glad  to  take  as  the 
Senate  was  eager  to  give  a  military  command  in  Gaul.  But  his 
proposal  had  brought  the  question  into  practical  politics,  and  its  re- 
jection was  followed  by  the  revolt  of  Fregella;,  the  loyal  and  pros- 
perous Latin  colony  which  commanded  the  passage  of  the  Liris. 
When  L.  Opimius  had  captured  it  by  treachery,  it  was  dismantled 
and  reduced  to  a  village,  and  a  Roman  colony,  Fabrateria,  was 
founded  on  its  confiscated  lands.     With  its  fall  collapsed  whatever 


346  If  IS  TO  KY  OF  ROME 

other  agitation  may  have  existed,  but  the  fate  of  Fregellae  sank 
deep  into  the  Itahan  heart,  as  its  revolt  was  the  forerunner  of  a 
more  terrible  rebelHon. 

C.  Gracchus. — C.  Gracchus  was  absent  for  the  time.  He  had 
supported  the  Bill  for  the  re-election  of  tribunes,  had  opposed  the 
Junian  Law,  and  had  worked  as  a  land  commissioner,  while  he 
cultivated  his  natural  gifts  for  rhetoric  and  business.  In  126  B.C.  he 
went,  with  the  consul  L.  Aurelius  Orestes,  as  quaistor  to  Sardinia, 
and  distinguished  himself  by  his  integrity,  humanity,  and  diligence. 
The  Senate  tried  to  keep  him  out  of  the  way  by  twice  prolonging 
his  superior's  command,  but  at  the  end  of  the  second  year  he  re- 
turned without  his  chief,  and  successfully  defended  his  actions  before 
the  censors  and  the  people.  He  had  served  in  the  army  twelve  years 
instead  of  the  legal  ten,  and  two  years  instead  of  one  as  quaestor. 
He  had  taken  a  full  purse  to  the  province,  and  had  brought  it  back 
empty.  Others  filled  with  their  plunder  the  empty  casks  which 
they  had  taken  out  filled  with  wine.  He  escaped  the  censor's 
brand,  and  when  charged  with  aiding  and  abetting  the  Fregellan 
outbreak,  once  more  foiled  the  attempt  to  discredit  his  candidature. 
In  I24P,.C.  he  was  elected  tribune  amid  great  enthusiasm,  though  the 
influx  of  country  voters  was  unable  to  secure  him  the  first  place. 
He  was  a  stronger  man  than  his  brother  in  gifts  and  character 
Equally  unselfish  and  idealistic,  equally  ardent  and  sympathetic, 
he  had  been  disciplined  by  suffering  and  self-repression  ;  with  a 
clear  eye  and  unfaltering  purpose,  aided  by  an  extraordinary  power 
of  work  and  an  attractive  personality,  he  took  up  his  brother's 
ideas  undaunted  by  his  brother's  fate,  with  an  almost  supersti- 
tious feeling  of  his  summons  to  serve  the  people,  avenge  his  cause, 
and  die. 

Before  coming  to  his  measures,  it  may  be  noticed  that  there 
were  two  plebeian  censors  in  131  B.C.,  of  whom  Q.  Metellus  Mace- 
donicus  delivered  a  curious  harangue  ag'ainst  celibacy,  just  as 
Scipio,  in  his  censorship,  had  attacked  the  fashion  of  dancing 
and  the  loose  education  of  Roman  children.  Another  sign  of  the 
times  was  the  acquittal  of  at  least  two  eminent  governors,  one 
of  whom  was  the  notoriously  guilty  Aquillius,  by  corrupted  jurors 
in  the  court  of  extortion. 

His  Programme. — The  usual  storm  of  prodigies  heralded  the 
reforms  of  C.  Gracchus.  His  active  work  extended  over  the  two 
years  123-122  B.C.  Of  its  drift  and  purpose  it  is  easy  to  form  a 
general  conception  ;  it  is  impossible  to  settle  the  details  or  de- 
termine the  order  of  the  several  laws.     Even  of  its  drift  divergent 


MEASURES  OF  C.    GRACCHUS  347 

views  are  possible  ;  it  may  be  wilfully  exaggerated  into  a  tyrant's 
progress,  and  blessed  or  cursed  as  such  ;  it  may  be  as  easily 
belittled  as  exaggerated.  It  will  be  best  to  group  his  measures 
and  proposals  without  regard  to  chronological  order,  and  consider 
their  general  meaning  afterwards.  But  this  too  is  difficult,  because 
to  carry  out  his  social  programme  and  avenge  his  brother's  death 
it  would  be  necessary  to  secure  a  basis  of  power  in  and  beyond 
the  Roman  populace,  and  to  reduce  the  Senate  to  impotence  by 
dividing  and  neutralising  the  strength  of  the  upper  classes.  Hence 
there  runs  throughout  a  perplexing  mixture  of  motives,  reform 
and  revenge,  and  the  means  he  took  must  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  end  desired. 

Agrarian  Law  revived.— To  take  first  the  measures  intended 
to  relieve  distress  and  to  confirm  his  hold  on  the  popular  vote. 
He  revived  the  dormant  Land  Law  and  restored  to  the  commis- 
sion its  indispensable  judicial  powers.  Sure  of  the  sympathy  of 
the  allies,  whose  cause  his  party  had  espoused,  he  could  include 
the  Italian  lands,  whose  wealthy  occupiers  would  hope  to  be  com- 
pensated by  the  franchise,  while  the  poor,  at  least  the  Latins, 
were  by  a  special  clause  to  share  as  citizens  in  the  colonial  dis- 
tributions. But  as  the  bulk  of  the  available  land  had  been  dis- 
tributed, his  real  gift  to  Italian  agriculture  lay  in  the  system  of 
roads,  whose  construction,  on  improved  methods,  he  personally 
superintended,  and  which  were  designed  for  the  service  of  in- 
dustry and  commerce. 

Scheme  of  Colonisation. — To  this  he  added  a  large  scheme  of 
colonisation,  but  few  of  his  foundations  survived  him.  The  proposed 
revival  of  Capua,  now  reduced  to  a  shelter  of  shepherds,  would 
have  meant  the  resumption  of  public  land,  let  by  a  new  system 
on  profitable  leases,  and  would  have  roused  bitter  memories  and 
jealousies.  Neptunia  was  designed  to  restore  Tarentum,  hard  hit 
by  the  competition  of  Brundisium,  and  to  give  an  outlet  to  the 
Apulian  allotments,  as  Minervia  (Scylacium)  would  to  those  in 
Bruttium.  The  new  colonies  were  no  longer  military'  outposts, 
but  served  to  deplete  the  capital  and  restore  the  trade  and  popula- 
tion of  the  ruined  south.  To  Gracchus  also  was  due  the  first 
attempt  at  foreign  colonisation,  the  first  Emigration  Act.  To 
revive  and  repeople  the  sites  of  Carthage  and  Corinth,  to  repair 
the  injury  done  to  the  world's  commerce  in  their  destruction,  to 
relieve  the  pressure  of  population,  and,  by  Romanising  the  pro- 
vinces, to  pave  the  way  to  a  unity  of  feeling  and  interest,  was,  if 
grasped  by  Gracchus  in  this  large  sense,  an  idea  as  imperial  and 


348 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


far-sighted  as  it  was  premature.  Possiljly  he  only  meant  to  utihse 
two  pieces  of  domain  favourably  situated  for  strong  and  compact 
settlements,  lying  waste  under  a  special  curse,  with  none  but 
divine  interests  to  disturb.  The  attempt  was  seriously  made  at 
Carthage,  where,  under  the  name  of  Junonia,  he  intended  to  form 
a  settlement  of  6000  Romans  and  allies,  with  large  allotments. 
These  allies  were  to  become  Roman  citizens,  exactly  reversing  the 
old  custom.  Its  fulfilment  was  frustrated  by  religious  prejudice 
and  the  fear  of  weakening  Rome  by  establishing  citizen  centres 


RUINS  OF  AQUEDUCT,  CAKTHAGE. 


abroad,  but  the  idea  bore  fruit  later  under  the  Ceesars.  Junonia 
was  of  a  different  type  from  the  ordinary  fortress  colonies  or  from 
the  later  colonies  of  veterans,  different  even  from  Narbo,  founded 
by  the  democrats  in  118  B.C.,  the  oldest  transmarine  colony  of 
burgesses,  guarding  the  communications  with  Spain  along  the 
Domitian  and  Aurelian  roads. 

Lex  Frumentaria. — As  he  had  won  the  rural  voters  by  the 
Land  Law,  and  the  artisans  by  his  great  works,  so  he  attached  the 
city  mob   to   himself  by  the  Lex  FruiiienUiria.     The   supply  of 


LEX  FRUMEXTARIA  349 

necessaries  like  corn  and  salt  at  moderate  prices  was  often  con- 
sidered the  duty  of  government.  Of  salt  the  Roman  state  held  a 
monopoly.  A  constant  flow  of  corn  from  Syracuse  to  Ostia  and 
the  markets  was  secured  by  the  arrangements  with  the  Sicilian 
tithe-collectors,  under  the  supervision  of  the  aediles  and  the 
Ostian  quaestor.  Later  on  Egyptian  and  African  corn  poured 
into  Puteoli.  Free  distribution  by  conquerors  and  candidates, 
or  by  the  state  in  case  of  need,  had  been  fairly  frequent.  On 
these  precedents  Gains  established  a  regular  system  by  which 
every  citizen  who  should  apply  personally  in  the  capital  would 
receive  5  modii  (ij  bushels)  of  corn  a  month,  at  6^  asses  (3d.)  a 
modhis,  or  not  quite  half  of  a  low  average  price.  The  loss  would 
fall  on  the  treasury  and  the  subjects  ;  recent  annexations  enabled 
Gracchus  and  his  successors  to  organise  the  supply,  and  large 
granaries  were  built.  One  hostile  senator  took  advantage  of  its 
general  terms  to  discredit  the  measure  by  applying  himself — 
he  wished  at  least  to  have  a  share  if  his  property  was  to  be 
plundered.  But  the  Bill  was  fatally  popular.  Gracchus,  who 
borrowed  the  idea  from  similar  Greek  enactments,  may  have 
justified  it  as  a  payment  of  the  citizens  for  their  work  in  govern- 
ment, which  gave  them  a  share  in  the  spoils  of  empire,  and 
was  some  compensation  for  the  land  they  had  lost.  He  hoped 
above  all  to  make  them  independent  of  the  nobles  and  their 
doles,  secure  a  firm  support  for  future  action,  and  buy  their 
consent  to  Italian  franchise  and  agricultural  reform.  His  hope 
was  vain.  The  prejudices  of  the  mob  could  be  excited  and  its 
votes  bought  as  easily  as  before.  The  additional  value  of  the 
franchise  tightened  the  voter's  grip  on  it.  Gracchus  had  just  taught 
him  to  use  his  power  for  his  own  benefit.  His  gigantic  system  of 
indiscriminate  outdoor  relief  fostered  pauperism,  drained  the  ex- 
chequer, stimulated  the  rush  to  Rome,  and  ruined  the  agriculture 
he  sought  to  develop.  The  Roman  plebs  henceforth  means  the 
pauper  members  of  the  thirty-five  tribes,  whether  rustic  or  urban, 
now  resident  in  the  capital,  fed  by  the  largesses  and  organised  for 
electoral  purposes.  The  country  voters  rarely  appeared,  and  could 
not  be  counted  upon. 

At  first  it  succeeded.  To  strengthen  his  hold  on  the  Comitia, 
he  carried  out  the  reform  of  the  Centuriata  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion by  directing  the  centuries  to  vote  throughout  in  an 
order  fixed  on  each  occasion  by  lot.  He  lightened  the  condition 
of  service  by  shortening  the  legal  term,  which  constant  warfare 
made   oppressive,  by  providing  for  the  free  supply  of  clothing 


350  HISTOHY  OF  ROME 

to  the  troops  without  stoppages,  and  by  extending  the  right  of 
appeal  to  citizens  under  martial  law.' 

The  Jury-Courts  transferred  to  the  Equites.  —  Having  thus 
secured  the  patronage  of  the  plebs,  he  tried  to  find  allies  in  the 
enemies'  camp.  Nowhere  is  the  mixture  of  motives  more  obvious 
and  more  embarrassing.  Hitherto  the  judices  in  all  important 
processes,  except  the  few  that  still  came  before  the  people,  were 
taken  from  the  body  of  senators,  a  course  which  tradition  and 
their  legal  knowledge  made  natural.  This  privilege,  when  political 
and  judicial  functions  were  closely  connected  and  party  considera- 
tions decided  legal  issues,  was  a  bulwark  of  senatorial  authority, 
but  collusion  and  corruption,  especially  in  the  court  of  extortion, 
in  the  interest  of  their  order,  had  roused  indignation  and  destroyed 
confidence.  To  transfer  the  courts  to  the  people  was  absurd. 
Another  class  was  available — that  class  of  moneyed  men  which 
had  gradually  consolidated  itself  under  the  name  of  equites,  i.e.^ 
the  rich  men  of  the  first  class  who  were  not  senators.  These, 
not  yet  formally  constituted  as  a  separate  order  by  a  distinct 
census,  were  separated  by  law  and  by  interest  from  the  ruling 
nobility.  Between  the  two  classes  there  was  mutual  antipathy 
for  social  reasons,  besides  the  constant  friction  in  the  provinces. 
This  division  of  feeling  was  utilised  by  Gracchus,  who  created 
out  of  these  elements  a  new  order,  an  intermediate  and  privileged 
class — indices,  publicani,  ordo  equester — with  honorary  distinc- 
tions and  probably  a  peculiar  census — 400,000  sesterces.  To  it 
he  transferred  the  right  of  sitting  as  judices,  registered  in  an 
official  list  or  album,  to  the  exclusion  of  senators,  and  thus  at 
one  blow  placed  it  on  the  neck  of  the  Senate  and  founded  that 
wavering"  alliance  of  capital  and  democracy  which  proved  so 
broken  a  reed  to  those  who  leaned  upon  it.  The  judices  were 
practically  identical  in  interest,  if  not  personally,  with  the  publi- 
cani, to  whom  the  control  of  the  courts  was  a  great  object.  Politi 
cally,  and  for  the  moment,  Gracchus  gained  his  object ;  as  a  re- 
former he  failed.  Corruption  and  collusion  went  on  as  merril> 
as  ever.  Honest  governors  suffered  ;  the  dishonest,  who  connived 
at  the  extortion  of  the  tax-farmers  and  business  men,  escaped. 
The  whole  Equestrian  body  strenuously  resisted  every  attempt  to 
make  judicial  bribery  penal. 

1  The  old  limit  for  active  service  was  seventeen  to  forty-five  inclusive. 
The  rule,  however,  arose  that  six  years'  continuous  service  gave  a  discharge, 
while  twenty  years  in  the  infantry  and  ten  in  the  cavalry  gave  e.xemption. 
Of  the  above  arrangements,  some,  if  passed,  were  not  permanent. 


ORDO  EQUESTER  35! 

The  Taxation  of  Asia  and  the  Equites He  strengthened  this 

alliance,  while  he  struck  at  the  administrative  monopoly  of  the 
Senate  by  his  arrangements  for  the  taxation  of  Asia.  Cancelling 
those  made  in  129  B.C.  by  which  the  communities  paid  moderate 
sums  and  the  middlemen  were  restricted  to  the  collection  of 
dues  and  customs,  he  reimposcd  on  the  province  the  old  Oriental 
system  of  tithes  {decutnce),  besides  large  indirect  taxes,  and  ordered 
the  right  of  collecting  the  revenue  to  be  put  up  for  auction  at 
Rome,  and  not,  as  in  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  locally,  thus  excluding 
the  wholesome  competition  of  the  provincials,  and  handing  over 
Rome's  richest  province  to  the  tender  mercies  of  a  gigantic  associa- 
tion, uncontrolled  by  the  governors  or  the  courts.  Further  to  re- 
strict the  discretion  of  the  Senate,  the  conditions  of  the  contracts 
were  minutely  fixed  by  law.  So  was  established,  at  the  expense 
of  the  nobles,  a  new  order,  a  power  to  be  reckoned  with  at  home 
and  abroad.  The  Republic  became  two-headed.  Money  and 
rank,  capital  and  land,  were  thrown  into  collision.  Under  a 
colourable  pretext  of  reform  that  imposed  upon  himself,  the  rash 
young  man  satisfied  his  political  interests  and  his  revenge.  He 
divided  to  conquer,  and  even  boasted  of  the  dagger  he  had 
thrown  down  into  the  Forum  with  which  his  foes  might  cut  each 
other's  throats.  But  he  sacrificed  the  prosperity  of  Asia  to  his  Corn 
Laws  and  his  Equestrian  alliance,  and  plunged  the  courts  deeper 
into  the  whirlpool  of  politics. 

The  Assignment  of  Provinces. — Setting  aside  the  docked  and 
curtailed  Senate,  the  tribune,  relying  on  the  support  of  the  people 
and  the  knights,  proceeded  to  utilise  to  the  full  the  rights  of  his 
office  and  the  prerogatives  of  the  Comitia,  with  the  apparent  acqui- 
escence of  his  colleagues.  He  monopolised  business  and  exercised 
an  almost  monarchical  power.  He  interfered  with  financial  and 
provincial  and  judicial  affairs,  distributed  grain,  selected  jurymen, 
made  roads,  conducted  settlements,  guided  the  Assembly,  led  the 
dumbfounded  Senate,  with  omnipresent  and  omnivorous  industry. 
He  limited  the  traditional  right  of  the  latter  body  to  determine 
\.\\Q.  provina'cF  of  the  consuls  for  the  ensuing  year.  Ordinarily  this 
was  done  after  the  election,  and  the  personal  distribution  was 
settled  by  the  lot  or  by  mutual  agreement.  This  led  to  intrigue 
and  jobbery,  for  the  foreign  command  was  the  road  to  riches  and 
triumphs.  The  disposal  of  this  patronage  was  a  stronghold  of  the 
Senate,  and  the  appointments  were  decided  largely  on  personal 
or  partisan  grounds.  A  Lex  Sempronia  directed  the  consular  pro- 
vinces to  be  settled  before  the  elections,  and,  to  prevent  obstruc- 


352  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tion  by  the  tribunes,  forbade  the  use  of  the  veto.  But  its  only 
effect  was  to  organise  more  perfectly  the  art  of  manipulating  the 
polls  ;  the  slight  check  on  jobbery  was  counterbalanced  by  the 
additional  element  of  chance  in  the  selection  of  men  for  im- 
portant positions.  Indeed,  as  the  custom  grew  of  detaining  the 
magistrates  of  the  year  to  do  business  in  Rome,  a  man's  pro- 
vince might  be  determined  a  year  and  a  half  before  he  became 
available. 

Law  of  Appeal. — Another  blow  at  the  Senate  was  struck  by  the 
Law  of  Appeal,  which,  reaffirming  and  fortifying  the  Leges  Valeria, 
the  XII.  Tables,  and  the  Porcian  Laws  (198-184  B.C.),  declared  the 
indefeasible  right  of  the  people  in  the  Comitia  Centuriata  to  try 
and  decide  capital  cases,  enacting  "  ne  de  capite  civimii  Rontaiiorum 
ijiiiissu populi  iudicare/tir"  Primarily  it  was  directed  against  the 
usurped  jurisdiction  of  the  Senate,  which  had  arbitrarily  and  by  decree 
appointed  extraordinary  commissions  of  treason,  &c.,  in  exceptional 
cases.  As  reasserting  existing  laws  it  applied  retrospectively  to 
Popillius,  who  went  into  exile.  In  the  case  of  Tiberius  Gracchus, 
the  Senate  had  not  merely  summoned  the  consul  to  take  the 
sword  against  citizens,  but  on  his  refusal  had  carried  out  a  coup 
d'etat,  which  it  attempted  to  legalise  by  declaring  the  tribune  a 
public  enemy  and  executing  his  adherents  without  appeal.  No 
doubt  in  a  crisis  demanding  immediate  action  the  executive  needed 
to  be  armed  with  exceptional  powers,  and  custom  both  before  and 
after  the  Gracchi  permitted  the  Senate  to  confer  such  powers  as 
against  subjects  and  allies,  and  in  extreme  danger  against  citizens, 
by  the  ultimiim  decrctinn,  "  videant  Considcs  ne  quid  Rcspublica 
detrijiienti  capiat."  But  its  employment  against  citizens  was  never 
legal,  and  the  asserted  right  of  the  Senate  to  declare  a  domestic 
foe  a  public  hostis  remained  a  matter  of  political  but  scarcely 
legal  dispute.  The  use  of  extraordinary  qticestiones  by  the  Senate 
stood  abolished. 

Permanent  Courts. — About  the  same  time  the  Qucestio  de  Repe- 
tiindis  was  reorganised  under  the  new  judicial  law,  to  be  a  scourge 
of  senatorial  governors,  and  possibly  a  new  qusstio  was  provided 
to  deal  with  miscarriages  of  justice  —  ";/^  quis  iudicio  circuin- 
veniretur."  This  type  of  court,  which  soon  took  over  the  mass  of 
criminal  business,  being  a  delegation  of  the  people,  admitted  of  no 
intercession  or  appeal.  Hence  its  sentence  did  not  go  beyond 
exile  or  outlawry,  and  the  accused  apparently  retained  as  a  rule 
his  power  of  avoiding  sentence  by  voluntary  exile.  Thus,  besides 
improving   the  administration   of  justice,   Gracchus   limited   the 


REFORMS  OF  C.    GRACCHUS  353 

action  of  the  popular  courts,  and  indirectly  the  infliction  of  the 
penalty  of  death. 

He  had  intended  to  punish  the  upright  Octavius  for  his  obsti- 
nacy by  excluding  from  further  promotion  any  official  deprived  of 
his  functions  by  the  people.  His  mother  induced  him  to  withdraw 
the  measure  dictated  by  personal  revenge. 

Proposed  Extension  of  the  Franchise. — So  far  his  energy,  elo- 
quence, and  honesty  had  carried  him  through.  With  bitter  invectives 
he  lashed  the  corruption  of  senators  and  diplomatists,  and  the  cruelty 
of  the  magistrates  to  the  allies  and  subjects.  His  passionate  laments 
for  his  murdered  brother  moved  the  hearts  of  his  opponents.  He 
secured  his  own  re-election  for  122  B.C.,  with  M.  Flaccus,  the  consul 
of  125  B.C.,  as  colleague,  and  the  election  of  C.  Fannius  as  consul. 
For  all  this  mass  of  work  a  second  year  at  least  was  indispensable, 
and  the  re-election  was  apparently  unopposed,  though  the  legality 
of  the  act  is  questioned.  So  far  he  had  been  able  to  combine 
various  interests  in  an  attack  on  an  unpopular  body  and  win 
support  for  his  own  schemes.  The  hardest  question  of  all  remained. 
The  plan  of  regeneration  and  reform  demanded  the  incorporation 
of  Italy  in  Rome.  Forgetting  Fregellae,  he  dreamed  himself  strong 
enough  to  propose  a  measure  whose  details  are  unknown,  but  which 
perhaps  offered  the  full  franchise  to  the  Latins,  and  to  the  Italians 
the  Ills  Latiiunii.  The  Bill,  if  carried,  would  swamp  the  electorate, 
assist  agrarian  reform,  strengthen  his  party,  but  it  was  also  just  and 
reasonable.  Yet,  in  spite  of  all  his  appeals  to  patriotism  and  pro- 
phecies of  peril,  of  all  his  startling  stories  of  Roman  tyranny,  of 
magistrates  flogged  for  a  dirty  bath  or  a  peasant  murdered  for  a 
harmless  jest,  the  meaner  instincts  of  the  mob  applauded  the  argu- 
ments of  Fannius,  and  refused  to  be  crowded  out  of  their  places 
at  the  games  or  share  their  cherished  doles. 

The  Senate  outbids  Gracchus  :  Livius  Drusus. — The  Senate 
posed  as  the  friend  of  the  people,  whose  champion  was  whittling 
away  the  value  of  his  own  gifts.  Nor  were  the  knights  prepared 
to  share  their  privileges  and  profits  with  Latins  and  Italians.  In 
defiance  of  the  tribune's  promised  protection,  all  non-Romans 
were  ejected  by  the  consul,  and  when  Livius  Drusus,  his  sena- 
torian  colleague,  threatened  intercession  Gracchus  had  to  with- 
draw. The  failure  of  the  Bill  opened  the  way  for  the  manoeuvres 
of  the  Senate,  who  set  up  Drusus  to  outbid  the  enemy  and  play 
the  Tory  demagogue.  The  Leges  Liviie  proposed  (i)  to  remit  the 
rent  of  lands  distributed  by  the  Gracchan  laws  ;  (2)  to  establish 
twelve    colonies   in    Italy   of   3000    settlers    each,    who    were    to 

z 


354  IT  I  STORY  OF  ROME 

pay  no  rent  and  enjoy  freedom  of  sale  ;  and  (3)  to  abolish  the 
flogging  of  Latin  soldiers  by  Roman  officers.  Drusus  ostenta- 
tiously refused  any  personal  share  in  their  execution.  It  was  a 
mere  game  of  bluff.  There  was  no  land  for  the  colonies,  which 
were,  in  fact,  not  founded  ;  the  flogging  law,  a  sop  to  the  allies, 
was,  if  carried,  repealed.  But  the  clumsy  dodge  succeeded.  The 
Bills  were  passed  while  Gaius  was  away  in  Africa  and  ill-repre- 
sented at  home  by  headstrong  P'laccus.  He  could  not  hold  together 
the  discordant  elements  of  his  party,  could  not  reconcile  their 
interests  in  a  common  policy  ;  least  of  all  could  he  trust  the  way- 
ward mob.  In  vain,  on  his  return,  he  tried  to  recover  popularity. 
He  failed  to  obtain  a  second  re-election,  and  his  determined  foe, 
Opimius,  was  elected  consul.  A  handle  against  him  was  found  in 
the  matter  of  the  colony  at  Carthage.  He  had  gone  to  Africa  as 
commissioner  to  arrange  the  settlement,  and,  after  a  short  absence, 
had  returned  to  select  colonists,  when  the  Senate  was  moved  by 
the  report  of  terrible  omens  to  counsel  the  repeal  of  the  Act 
which  established  it  {Lex  Riibria).  The  colony  was  not  popular  ; 
it  was  far  away  ;  the  land  was  accursed  ;  the  whole  thing  was 
new ;  the  settlers  were  to  be  partly  Italians.  But  it  was  a  test 
case,  and  Gracchus  was  bound  to  fight  it.  After  December  10, 
122  B.C.,  he  was  a  private  citizen  open  to  attack. 

Death  of  C.  Gracchus. — The  end  came  after  the  New  Year, 
but  the  story  of  his  death  is  confused.  Early  on  the  critical 
morning,  while  Fulvius  was  haranguing  the  Assembly  summoned 
on  the  Capitol,  Gracchus  with  his  armed  adherents,  himself  un- 
armed, came  to  secure  the  rejection  of  the  Senate's  Bill.  As  he 
awaited  the  issue  walking  apart  in  the  porch  of  the  temple,  he 
was  accosted  and  apparently  insulted  by  a  servant  of  the  consul, 
then  officiating  at  the  usual  sacrifice,  who,  bearing  the  sacred 
entrails  in  his  hands,  bade  evil  citizens  avaunt.  Antullius  fell, 
atabbed  by  a  Gracchan.  In  the  tumult  that  followed  apology  was 
vain.  Gracchus  only  succeeded  in  giving  a  fresh  handle  to  his 
enemies  by  interrupting  the  inviolable  tribune.  The  Assembly 
dispersed  in  disorder.  Opimius,  calling  on  the  senators  to  arm 
for  the  defence  of  the  constitution,  summoned  them  and  the 
loyal  knights  to  bring  their  slaves  armed,  and  occupied  the  Capitol, 
Senate-house,  and  Forum.  Next  morning,  by  a  stage-trick,  the 
corpse  was  solemnly  paraded  before  the  Senate,  and  Opimius 
was  duly  empowered  to  save  the  state.  Meanwhile  the  riotous 
Flaccus  had  armed  a  rabble  with  his  Gallic  spoils,  and  called  the 
slaves  to  aid.    Friends  guarded  the  house  of  his  saddened  comrade. 


FALL   OF  C.    GRACCHUS 


355 


When  morning  came  Fulviiis  occupied  the  old  popular  stronghold, 
the  Aventine,  whither  Gracchus  followed,  irresolute  and  without 
weapons.  The  Senate  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  negotiations  and 
demanded  unconditional  surrender.     .A.  proclamation  of  amnesty 


A   CAMILLUS,   OR   .\TTE\DANT   AT   SACRIFICE. 


thinned  the  rebel  ranks,  and,  offering  their  weight  in  gold  for 
the  leaders'  heads,  the  consul,  with  the  veteran  generals  Metellus 
and  Brutus,  stormed  the  half-held  height.  Flaccus  was  hunted 
out  and  killed.     Gaius  fled  reluctantly,  defended  by  the  heroism 


356  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  his  friends,  and  when  further  flight  was  vain,  within  the  sacred 
grove  of  Fiirina,  fell  on  the  sword  of  a  slave,  who  slew  himself 
on  his  master's  body.  One  Septumuleius,  a  nobleman,  earned 
the  price  of  blood,  doubled  by  the  weight  of  lead  with  which 
he  filled  the  skull.     The  body  was  flung  into  the  Tiber. 

The  murder  was  followed,  as  before,  by  a  special  commission, 
under  Opimius,  which  executed  3000  victims.  The  houses  of  the 
refornlers  were  plundered,  and  from  the  proceeds  of  their  estates 
the  consul  built  that  temple  and  basilica  of  Concord  beneath 
whose  dedicatory  inscription  the  wit  wrote,  "  The  work  of  discord 
makes  the  temple  of  Concord."  The  city  was  purified  of  blood, 
but  the  memory  of  the  murdered  brothers  was  dear  to  the  people 
they  sought  to  serve,  and  an  almost  religious  veneration  clung  to 
the  spots  where  they  fell. 

Criticism  of  C.  Gracchus. — The  Senate  was  right  to  crush  an 
amied  revolt,  and  the  conduct  of  Gains  shows  that  in  this  last 
scene  he  was  acting  with  men  whose  methods  he  could  not 
approve.  He  had  rather  die  than  fight  his  countrymen  or 
fall  into  their  hands.  For  this  dilemma  his  own  rashness  was 
partly  to  blame,  partly  the  Senate,  which  deliberately  utilised 
a  riot  to  crush  a  party.  The  ease  with  which  he  accom 
plished  his  work,  and  the  equal  ease  with  which  its  author 
was  beaten  down,  bear  witness  to  the  uncertainty  in  all  men's 
minds,  as  mach  as  to  the  lack  of  any  civic  force  behind  either 
government  or  reformers.  Gains  Gracchus  had  no  idea  of  a 
constitutional  /revolution.  We  have  no  evidence  that  he  meant  to 
establish  a  tyranny  based  on  plebiscites.  He  abolished  nothing 
and  introduced  nothing.  His  aim  was  to  reduce  the  Senate  to 
something  like  its  strictly  constitutional  position,  and  to  make 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people  a  reality,  while  he  gave  the 
Comitia  new  blood  by  the  restoration  of  the  yeomanry,  by  the 
inclusion  of  the  Italians,  and  by  making  the  masses  independent 
of  their  patrons.  He  meant  to  make  the  tribunate  once  more 
the  ministry  of  the  people,  and,  steeped  as  he  was  in  Greek  ideks, 
may  have  hoped  to  reproduce  in  his  own  person  the  go\'ern- , 
ment  of  Pericles,  Xoya  fiev  dnfioKparia  epyoa  Be  vtto  tov  npcoTov  dvBpus 
dpXV-  ■'^n  energetic  administrator,  with  an  insatiable  appetite  for 
work,  he  found  fresh  spheres  of  activity  continually  opening  out 
before  him,  and,  like  the  emperors  later,  he  concentrated  many 
offices  in  one  person.  In  this,  as  in  his  attitude  to  the  Senate, 
he  set  precedents  for  nionarchy,  while  he  handed  down  to  his 
successors   ideas  that  remained  the  common  stock  of  reformers, 


CRITICISM   OF   C.    GRACCHUS  •        357 

and  from  them  passed  to  the  Empire.  He  enforced  the  principle 
that  the  land  of  the  subjects  was  the  property  of  the  state,  to 
be  utilised  for  the  creation  of  colonies  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  Romans.  He  founded  the  democratic  alliance  with  the 
equites.  Administrative  reform,  Italian  franchise,  foreign  emigra- 
tion, and  possibly  Romanisation  of  the  provinces  were  Gracchan 
ideas.  But  his  work  was  largely  frustrated  by  his  own  vehemence 
and  by  his  passion  for  revenge.  If  his  end  was  patriotic,  the  means 
he  used  were  dangerous,  and  indeed  concealed  a  latent  revolution. 
His  Corn  Law  debauched  the  masses  and  ruined  the  farmer.  He 
plundered  Asia  to  buy  a  party.  In  raising  up  the  equites  against 
the  Senate,  he  drove  out  Satan  by  Beelzebub.  An  idealist  in 
a  hurry,  he  failed  to  see  facts  as  they  were,  and  succeeded,  in 
his  ignorance  of  the  true  character  of  the  constitution,  in  .weaken- 
ing the  only  possible  government  without  creating  a  permanent 
substitute.  The  time  was  not  ripe  for  monarchy  ;  to  a  republican  the 
idea  of  it  was  impossible.  For  his  Periclean  ideal  the  Comitia  and 
the  tribunate  offered  no  sufficient  instruments.  The  nett  result  of 
his  work  and  that  of  his  successors  was  to  demonstrate  the  hope- 
lessness of  any  genuine  democracy. 

The  two  Gracchi,  in  their  effort  to  bring  about  a  social  reform,  in 
their  hope  to  regenerate  Italy,  were  drawn  on  to  attempt  a  political 
revolution  whose  nature  they  did  not  realise,  whose  difficulties  they 
did  not  understand,  and  for  which  their  nieans  were  inadequate. 
They  pursued  a  chima^ra.  They  were  not  rtevolutionists,  but  they 
were  the  fathers  of  revolution.  They  aimed  at  no  tyranny  and 
were  the  precursors  of  the  principate. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

THE    RESTORED    OLIGARCHY    AND    THE    WAR    WITH    JUGURTHA 

M.C.  A.I'.C. 

Agrarian  Legislation 119-111  635  643 

Fall  of  Cirta  .        .        .         .        .  .112  642 

Jugurtha  at  Rome        .        .         .        ..        .        .         .111  643 

Metellus  in  Numidia 109-107  645-647 

Marius  conquers  Jugurtha 106-103  648-649 

The  restored  Oligarchy. — The  Senate,  having  stamped  out 
the  Gracchan  movement,  resumed  its  old  position  with  curtailed 
powers  and  a  chastened  spirit.  It  had  been  superseded,  not 
destroyed,    shaken   but    not    shattered.     The    opposition    leaders 


35S  n/STOKV  OF  ROME 

were  dead,  and  there  was  none  to  take  their  place.  After  all,  the 
only  solid  and  definite  party,  hammered  together  by  attack  and 
welded  by  common  interests,  was  the  party  of  privilege.  The 
Gracchi  and  some  few  of  their  successors  may  have  dreamed 
dreams  of  popular  regeneration,  but  they  failed  to  organise  a 
genuine  and  lasting  movement.  The  populares  of  the  future, 
aiming  vaguely  at  the  limitation  of  the  Senate  and  the  humiliation 
of  the  ruling  class,  have  at  bottom  no  ideas  of  value  to  realise 
beyond  their  personal  advancement.  Between  the  factions  there 
is  little  to  choose,  and  for  the  present  the  chances  are  in  favour  of 
the  more  solid  and  organised  party,  which  always  emerges  from 
the  revolutions  produced  by  its  own  incompetence  safe  if  not 
sound,  and  somewhat  the  worse  for  wear.  But  the  fabric  of  state 
was  weakened  by  these  continued  shocks.  Action  and  reaction 
destroyed  all  feeling  of  stability,  impaired  the  Roman  reverence 
for  law  and  constituted  authority,  and,  in  the  absence  of  any  civil 
force  to  maintain  order,  brought  about  a  growing  disregard  for 
constitutional  methods. 

The  restored  oligarchy  behaved  for  a  time  with  prudence,  but 
otherwise  had  learned  nothing  by  its  fall.  No  attempt  was  made 
to  reform  the  composition  or  change  the  policy  of  the  Senate,  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  limit  the  powers  of  the  tribunate  and  the 
Comitia,  which  still  remained  easy  weapons  for  the  popular  agitator. 
It  was  content  to  keep  the  peace,  humour  the  people,  and  out- 
manceuvre  its  opponents. 

Fate  of  Gracchus'  Measures. — The  colonies  of  Drusus  were 
dropped,  but  as  the  Senate  had  beaten  Gracchus  at  his  own  game,  it 
dared  not  repeal  the  Corn  Laws  or  reclaim  the  allotments.  The  Corn 
Law  particularly  could  be  used  to  buy  the  loyalty  of  the  mob,  which 
cared  for  the  gift  and  not  the  giver.  The  equites,  too  strong  to 
attack,  retained  their  control  of  the  courts,  their  new  insignia,  and 
the  Asian  taxes.  Popillius,  however,  was  recalled,  and  when 
Opimius  was  impeached  for  the  murder  of  citizens  without  trial,  he 
was  formally  acquitted.  The  accused  was  defended  by  the  renegade 
Carbo,  and  the  verdict  served  as  a  valuable  precedent  for  the  use 
of  the  supreme  decree  to  suspend  the  constitution  in  time  of 
danger,  Carbo,  impeached  on  the  same  charge,  committed  suicide. 
The  wider  and  wiser  ideas  of  the  Gracchi  were  thrown  aside — the 
Italian  franchise,  transmarine  colonisation,  and  Romanisation  of 
the  provinces.  The  assignments  made,  even  at  Carthage,  were 
ratified,  but  the  colony  at  Capua  was  cancelled,  and  the  formation 
of  new  communities  in  Italy  and  abroad  mostly  suspended.     Narbo, 


LATER  AGRARIAN  LAWS  359 

founaed  1 18  ac,  was  rather  a  garrison,  a  fortiess  of  the  old  type, 
and  a  centre  of  trade  for  the  Roman  business  men,  like  Utica, 
Delos,  and  Argos,  in  rivalry  to  Massilia.  For  settlements  at 
Carthage  and  Corinth  the  cquites  had  no  use. 

Agrarian  Laws. — As  to  the  Leges  Agrarice,  the  indemnity  to 
the  exchequer  imposed  by  Tiberius  had  been  abolished  by  Drusus, 
and  soon  after  Gaius's  death  the  clause  prohibiting  alienation  of 
the  new  allotments  was  repealed.  It  was  an  impossible  clause. 
It  tied  men,  however  unfit  in  means  or  talents,  to  the  soil.  But 
it  was  an  essential  provision  in  the  original  scheme,  and  its  repeal, 
if  it  relieved  the  peasantry,  favoured  the  reabsorption  of  the  land 
by  the  rich.  Purchase,  mortgage,  and  land-grabbing  went  on 
merrily.  Not  long  after,  a  moderate  statesman  could  assert 
that  there  were  only  2000  rich  burgesses  in  Italy.  In  Africa, 
in  later  years,  half-a-dozen  men  owned  half  the  province.  With 
regard  to  occupation,  a  law  of  119  B.C.  abolished  the  allotment 
commission,  stopped  all  further  distribution,  and  imposed  a  fixed 
rent  on  the  possessors  everywhere,  who  were  henceforth  to  hold 
their  land  undisturbed.  The  money  so  obtained  was  to  be  used 
for  the  purchase  of  corn  or  land,  or  simply  for  distribution  in 
cash,  for  the  citizens.  Finally,  in  1 1 1  B.C.,  by  what  is  probably  to 
be  called  the  Lex  Thoria,  the  agrarian  dispute  as  to  the  public 
land  was  temiinated.  By  it  all  occupations  became  private  pro- 
perty rent  free,  and  the  bulk  of  the  public  was  converted  into 
private  land.  There  were  excluded  only  certain  tracts,  e.g.^  the 
Ager  Campanus,  which  were  let  on  lease,  and  common  pastures, 
on  which  cattle  up  to  a  low  maximum  could  be  grazed.  The 
law  secured  the  titles  of  all  allotments  and  occupations  granted  in 
or  since  the  year  133  B.C.,  and  though  it  represents  the  final  triumph 
of  vested  interests  over  the  allotment  laws,  it  was,  on  the  whole, 
a  wise  statute.  It  removed  a  handle  for  agitation,  it  guaranteed 
the  rights  of  the  Latins  and  allies  to  their  usufructs,  it  recog- 
nised titles  acquired  by  recent  legislation,  and  did  away  with 
the  system  of  occupation  for  the  future.  Henceforward  agrarian 
laws  concern  not  the  rights  of  the  community  to  its  own  land, 
but  the  duty  of  the  state  to  provide  for  its  veterans  and  its  poor. 
It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  checking  the  growth  of  large  estates 
by  settling  individuals  on  state  domains,  but  of  using  public 
money  to  create  a  peasant  proprietorship  by  purchase.  The  same 
law  dealt  with  the  public  land  round  the  sites  of  Carthage  and 
Corinth,  where  similar  causes  produced  a  similar  monopoly  of  the 
soil  by  the  rich.     Thus  the  attempt  of  the  Gracchi  to  establish  an 


36o  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

independent  peasantry  failed,  but  tlic  failure  was  due  more  to 
natural  forces  than  to  adverse  let^islalion. 

In  115  B.C.  Scaurus  did  something  to  restrict  the  frecdmen  ;  in 
119  r..c.  the  tribune  C.  Marius,  as  yet  an  honest  soldier  from  the 
country,  the  client  of  the  Herennii,  who  owed  his  position  to  the 
support  of  the  Metelli,  showed  his  integrity  and  independence  by 
at  once  opposing  the  extension  of  the  corn-doles  and  forcing 
through  a  law,  against  the  earnest  resistance  of  the  Senate,  to 
secure  voters  from  corruption  and  intimidation  by  narrowing 
the  passages  which  led  to  the  polling-booths.  Later  on  (106  I3.c.) 
a  Lex  S.n'ilia  proposed  to  restore  the  judicia  to  the  senators 
with  dubious  success  {Tide  ifi/rir,  p.  384). 

Corruption  of  the  Government — Thus  of  the  Gracchan  con- 
stitution only  the  more  questionable  parts  remained.  Obliged 
to  share  its  power  with  two  uncertain  allies,  the  equites  and 
the  populace,  who  were  perfectly  ready  to  owe  their  perquisites 
to  any  other  donor,  the  Senate  was  as  unable  to  carry  out  its 
own  policy  as  it  was  unwilling  to  devise  new  methods.  Its 
government  is  marked  by  corruption  and  vacillation  at  home 
and  abroad.  It  had  learned  nothing  and  forgotten  nothing  ; 
it  had  been  alarmed  and  embittered,  but  not  reformed.  Its  ranks 
were  more  tightly  closed,  its  treatment  of  the  poorer  classes 
and  the  subjects  more  arrogant  than  ever.  Metellus  succeeded 
Metellus  as  by  destiny  in  the  consulship,  and  noble  officers 
primed  with  a  hasty  smattering  of  Greek  tactics  flung  away 
their  annies,  and  owed  their  triumphs  to  the  talents  of  some 
low-born  officer.  A  terrible  picture  has  been  drawn  of  the 
immorality  and  luxury  of  the  upper  classes,  of  the  decline  in 
faith  and  manners,  of  the  foul  and  sordid  crimes  which  defiled 
public  and  private  life.  The  story  of  the  foreign  wars,  the  state 
of  Italy  and  the  provinces,  the  prevalence  of  piracy  and  servile 
riots,  bear  witness  to  the  lack  of  statesmen  and  soldiers,  to  the 
weakness  alike  of  g;overnment  and  opposition. 

Numidia. — Among-  the  worst  fiascos  of  this  period  ma)-  be 
reckoned  the  Numidian  war,  which  owes  to  the  political  issues 
raised  and  to  the  genius  of  Sallust  its  utterly  factitious  import- 
ance. An  ordinary  frontier  war,  of  a  type  familiar  to  Englishmen, 
it  was  dragged  out  to  a  preposterous  length  by  blundering  and 
corruption. 

The  kingdom  of  Numidia  had  been  consolidated  by  Massi- 
nissa  during  his  long  reign,  and  it  now  stretched  from  the  Molo- 
chath,  on  the  border  of  Mauretania,  to   the  Syrtes  and  Gyrene, 


JUGUKTHA  361 

surrounding  with  a  girdle  the  Roman  province  of  Africa.  Its 
capital,  Cirta  (Constantine),  standing  in  an  almost  impregnable 
position  on  a  rocky  promontory,  round  which  the  river  Ampsaga 
flowed  in  a  deep  ravine,  was  a  populous  and  prosperous  centre 
of  commerce  and  civilisation.  There  were  several  considerable 
towns,  including  the  ports  of  Hippo  Regius  and  Great  Leptis. 
Massinissa  had  left  a  full  treasury  and  a  thriving  country.  The 
wilder  districts  supplied  a  good  and  numerous  cavalry.  At 
Massinissa's  death  yEmilianus  divided  the  kingdom  between  his 
sons,  but  the  convenient  decease  of  his  brothers  soon  left  Micipsa 
sole  ruler,  who  in  a  reign  of  thirty  years  was  able  to  develop  his 
countr)'  and  propitiate  Rome,  while  he  devoted  himself  to  the  society 
of  philosophic  Greeks.  In  1 18  B.C.  he  bequeathed  his  kingdom  to 
his  two  sons  Hiempsal  and  Adherbal,  but  joined  with  them  their 
elder  cousin  Jugurtha,  a  natural  son  of  his  brother  Mastanabal, 
whom  he  had  adopted. 

Jug-urtha. — Jugurtha  was  a  strong,  handsome,  active  man,  a 
keen  hunter,  a  brilliant  soldier,  a  clever  ruler,  greedy  of  power  and 
popular  with  his  countrymen.  He  had  served  with  distinction 
at  Numantia  (134  B.C.),  where  Marius  also  won  reputation,  and  had 
earned  Scipio's  favour  by  courage  and  dexterity.  This  opportunity 
he  had  used  to  gain  friends  among  the  Roman  nobles,  to  study 
their  character  and  learn  the  ways  of  Roman  politics,  a  lesson 
whose  value  far  outweighed  the  stern  rebukes  which  his  efforts 
drew  from  Scipio.  There  he  learned  Romcc  omnia  venalia  esse. 
On  his  return  he  became  a  trusted  agent  of  his  adoptive  father, 
but  when  the  heirs  succeeded  to  the  throne,  cjuarrels  broke 
out  which  made  their  joint  sovereignty  impossible.  An  attempt 
to  divide  the  heritage  led  to  a  rupture,  and  amid  the  disputes  the 
rash, high-spirited  Hiempsal  was  assassinated  byjugurtha(i  16  B.C.). 
Civil  war  ensued  between  the  remaining  competitors,  and  Jugurtha, 
with  his  fewer  but  finer  troops,  ousted  Adherbal,  an  easy-going, 
unwarlike  man,  who  carried  his  complaints  to  the  Senate.  At 
Rome,  which  had  hitherto  ignored  the  wrangling  princes,  feeling 
favoured  Adherbal,  but  Jugurtha,  by  a  liberal  use  of  gold,  effected 
a  rapid  and  even  scandalous  change  of  opinion.  M.  Scaurus, 
possibly  retained  by  Adherbal,  succeeded  so  far  in  his  resistance 
to  the  job  that  the  Senate,  while  it  condoned  the  past,  decided 
on  a  compromise  and  decreed  the  equal  division  of  the  kingdom 
(116  B.C.).  The  award  was  carried  out  by  L.  Opimius  and  a 
commission,  who  allotted  to  Adherbal  the  eastern  part,  including 
the  capital,  with    the   largest    towns   and   ports,   while   Jugurtha 


362  HISTOKY  OF  JWME 

received  the  more  fertile  and  populous  west,  with  its  warlike  tribes. 
Opimius  was  afterwards  condemned  for  bribery,  but  the  division 
was  not  unfair,  and  protected  Roman  interests  by  removing^  the 
more  dangerous  Jugurtha  from  the  frontier  of  the  province.  The 
award  was  accepted,  and  for  three  or  four  years  there  was  compara- 
tive peace,  while  Jugurtha  prepared  for  attack.  Whatever  were  the 
rights  and  wrongs  of  this  wretched  business,  Rome  could  scarcely 
interfere  in  every  disputed  succession  among  barbarians  ;  and  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Jugurtha  of  the  Roman  historian  is 
painted,  like  llannibal  and  Mithradates,  in  the  blackest  colours. 

Siege  of  Cirta. — At  last,  in  112  B.C.,  after  tamely  enduring  con- 
stant provocation  while  he  appealed  to  the  protecting  power,  Ad- 
herbal  was  forced  into  war,  defeated  between  Cirta  and  the  sea,  driven 
into  his  capital,  and  there  besieged.  During  the  siege  appeared 
a  Roman  embassy,  in  answer  to  the  earlier  appeals,  composed, 
as  often,  of  young  nobles  serving  their  political  apprenticeship. 
Politely  but  firmly  baffled  by  Jugurtha,  who  was  at  no  loss  for 
excuses,  refused  admission  to  Cirta,  and  confronted  by  an  un- 
expected situation,  the  young  men  returned. 

Scaurus. — In  the  fifth  month  of  the  blockade  an  escaped 
messenger  brought  an  urgent  prayer  for  help,  which  produced  yet 
another  mission,  headed  by  the  eminent  Scaurus,  the  son  of  an 
impoverished  patrician,  whose  talents  and  birth  had  won  him  the 
consulship  ( 1 15  B.C.).  As  consul  he  had  defeated  the  Kami,  an  Alpine 
tribe  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  and  was  now  princeps  Senatus, 
and  in  109  B.C.  became  censor.  Orator,  author,  and  builder,  he 
figured  as  the  pattern  aristocrat  and  leading  statesman  of  his  time, 
and^yet  has  been  painted  by  an  adversary  as  greedy,  ambitious, 
and  venal,  skilled  in  steering  near  the  wind,  a  man  who  knew 
and  waited  for  his  price.  Him  also  Jugurtha  amused  to  his  face 
at  Utica  with  protracted  discussions,  and  when  he  departed,  relied 
so  far  on  his  own  strength  in  the  Senate  that,  on  the  surrender 
of  Cirta,  he  tortured  and  murdered  his  cousin  with  all  and  sundry 
his  adherents.  Among  these  he  was  mad  enough,  if  our  reports 
can  be  trusted,  ta  massacre  a  number  of  Italian  merchants  who 
are  said  to  have  been  the  main  authors  of  the  defence.  The 
whole  story  sounds  suspicious. 

Roman  Intervention. — So  far,  whether  it  was  due  to  that  in- 
exhaustible gold  of  his  or  to  the  lack  of  interest  at  Rome,  Jugurtha 
had  been  left  to  work  his  will.  The  Senate  was  disinclined  for 
African  adventures,  nor  was  the  state  responsible  for  the  protection  of 
combative  traders.    Jugurtha  hoped  that  the  Senate  would  acquiesce 


ROMAN  INTER  VENTION 


VIEW   OF    CIRTA. 


364  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

in  accomplislied  facts.  But  the  massacre  of  Cirta  roused  the 
merchants  and  the  public  to  back  up  the  minority  in  the  Senate. 
Rome's  orders  had  been  defied,  her  flag  draj^getl  in  the  mire,  her 
blood  shed  through  the  base  intrigues  of  noble  senators.  A  strong 
and  united  Numidia,  under  an  active  soldier,  was  a  menace  to  the 
province.  Suspicion  was  fostered  by  the  obstructive  tactics  of  the 
Senate.  A  storm  broke  out.  Gaius  Memmius,  tribune-elect  (112 
n.c),  a  bitter  democrat,  fanned  the  flame.  The  Senate,  in  alarm, 
permitted  the  declaration  of  war,  Jugurtha's  envoys  were  dismissed 
the  country,  and  in  11 1  B.C.  the  consul  L.  Calpurnius  Piso  Bestia,  a 
capable  officer  spoiled  by  avarice,  with  Scaurus  as  legate,  and  a 
staff  of  nobles  chosen  to  screen  his  transactions,  entered  Numidia 
and  gained  some  successes.  The  offered  alliance  of  Bocchus,  king 
of  Mauretania,  one  of  Jugurtha's  fathers-in-law,  was  refused.  The 
wily  Numidian,  however,  who  had  apparently  offered  little  resist- 
ance, soon  secured,  by  liberal  bribes  to  Bestia  and  Scaurus — a 
point  neglected  by  the  inexperienced  Moor — not  merely  an  armis- 
tice, but  a  treaty  of  peace.  In  return  for  a  formal  submission,  a 
small  fine,  and  the  surrender  of  some  horses  and  elephants, 
repurchased  later  from  the  corrupted  army,  he  received  his 
kingdom  entire.  When  Bestia  came  back  the  storm  broke  out 
again.  The  war  was  popular,  and  it  offered  a  prospect  of  slight 
risk  and  heavy  booty  from  those  famous  treasures.  Political 
feelingr  ran  high.  And  yet,  apart  from  the  bribery,  the  treaty  was 
defensible.  There  had  been  terrible  disasters  in  Macedonia  and 
the  north  :  the  Cimbri  were  at  tlie  gates  of  Italy  ;  it  would  be 
something  to  be  well  out  of  this  troublesome  and  possibly  dangerous 
desert  warfare  against  tough  and  patriotic  tribesmen  ;  Jugurtha's 
cavalry  might  be  useful  once  more  as  allies.  But  Memmius,  with 
inflammatory  harangues,  denounced  the  nobility,  and  demanded 
instant  inquiry  into  the  scamped  and  irregular  negotiations. 

Jugurtha  at  Rome.— The  validity  of  the  treaty  was  impugned  in 
the  Senate.  It  is  said  that  Memmius  procured  the  presence  of  the 
king  himself  at  Rome,  to  be  questioned  publicly  as  a  witness  about 
the  nefarious  job  ;  that  the  king  appeared  in  suppliant  garb,  under 
safe  conduct,  before  the  maddened  populace ;  was  there  and  then 
indicted  by  Memmius,  and  advised  to  save  himself  by  acting  as  in- 
former ;  and,  finally,  that  a  hired  tribune  sealed  by  his  veto  the  royal 
lips,  and  baffled  alike  his  colleague  and  the  people.  Such  is  the 
effective  scene  depicted  by  the  pen  of  Sallust.  The  king  certainly 
came  to  Rome  on  business  connected  with  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty,  and  Memmius  may  have  tried  to  use  the  occasion  to  obtain 


IVAJi"    WITH  JUGURTHA  365 

startling  disclosures.  The  attempt  was  foiled,  but  the  discussion 
of  the  treaty  went  on.  Jugurtha,  who  remained  to  watch  events, 
might  yet  have  succeeded,  but  a  blundering  stroke  of  craft  and 
cruelty  ruined  his  chances.  He  procured  the  assassination  in 
Rome  itself  of  a  possible  rival,  Massiva,  son  of  Gulussa  and 
grandson  of  Massinissa,  the  candidate  held  in  reserve  by  the 
opposition,  through  his  confidant  Bomilcar,  whom  he  aided  to 
escape  from  justice.  It  was  the  last  straw.  He  was  expelled 
from  Italy,  the  peace  was  cancelled,  and  Sp.  Postumius  Albinus, 
the  consul,  who  had  attacked  the  treaty  in  the  hope  of  getting 
the  command,  passed  over  into  Africa  (no  B.C.).  The  election 
for  this  year  had  been  delayed  by  the  attempt  of  two  obscure 
tribunes  to  prolong  their  tenure  of  office. 

Capitulation  of  Albinus.— As  the  king  left  Rome  he  looked 
back  again  and  again,  and  at  last  broke  into  the  cry,  "  Crbem 
venaleiii,  et  mature  periiitram,  si  emptoreui  iiweneritP  Albinus 
found  a  demoralised  army,  corrupted  by  its  foes,  and  terrible 
only  to  its  friends,  an  enemy  inactive  and  ready  for  terms.  He 
could  do  nothing  ;  but  when,  fooled,  bribed,  or  merely  bafified,  he 
returned  for  the  elections,  his  brother  and  legate,  Aulus,  ambitious 
of  conquest  or  urged  by  avarice,  set  off  on  a  wild-goose  chase  in 
midwinter,  to  surprise  a  distant  depot  named  Suthul  or  Calama. 
The  attempt  failed  owing  to  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  and 
the  season,  and  Aulus,  lured  out  into  the  desert,  was  himself 
surprised  by  night,  his  camp  taken  by  treachery,  his  troops 
scattered.  Next  day  he  was  forced  to  surrender,  to  send  his 
army  beneath  the  yoke,  and  evacuate  Numidia  within  ten  days 
(beginning  of  109  B.C.).  The  disgraceful  treaty,  while  it  kindled 
Numidian  patriotism,  roused  to  fury  the  indignation  of  the  Roman 
public  against  the  misgovernment  of  the  nobility.  Senate  and  consul 
might  discuss  the  treaty,  but  the  tribune  C.  Mamilius  Limetanus, 
with  the  support  of  the  equites,  and  against  the  secret  resistance 
of  the  nobles,  carried  the  appointment  of  an  extraordinary  court 
of  inquiry  into  the  corruption,  collusion,  and  treason  connected  with 
the  African  business.  L.  Bestia,  C.  Cato,  Sp.  Albinus,  L.  Opimius, 
C.  Sulpicius  Galba,  among  others,  guilty  or  innocent,  unpopular  at 
any  rate  and  suspected,  were  swept  into  exile  by  the  hasty  sentences 
of  a  partisan  commission,  on  which  the  judicious  Scaurus  contrived 
to  find  a  place. 

Metellus. — The  Senate,  having  thrown  overboard  the  most 
responsible  men,  was  allowed  to  deal  with  what  was  now  a  serious 
scandal,  so  strong  and  so  indispensable  did  that  body  remain.     The 


366  ins  TORY  OF  ROME 

treaty  was  cancelled,  as  having  been  concluded  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  and  people.  The  rebel  king,  who,  deliberately 
refraining-  from  offensive  action,  had  left  Africa  unmolested,  did  not 
receive  even  the  person  of  the  repudiated  legate.  The  command 
was  given  to  the  haughty  aristocrat,  Q.  Ca^cilius  Metellus,  nephew 
of  Macedonicus,  an  honest  governor,  an  upright  man,  a  good 
disciplinarian,  and  a  fairly  capable  officer,  whose  treacherous  deal- 
ings with  a  mere  barbarian  are  more  shocking  to  modern  than 
ancient  notions.  As  chiefs  of  his  staff  he  selected  tried  soldiers 
of  lower  birth,  and,  above  all,  P.  Rutilius  Rufus,  the  author  of  an 
improved  drill,  and  Gaius  Marius,  the  farmei-'s  son  of  Arpinum, 
who  had  fought  his  way  from  the  ranks. 

Battle  on  the  Muthul. — Metellus,  with  his  new  levies,  ap- 
peared in  Africa  late  in  109  B.C.,  and  probably  spent  the  rest  of 
the  summer  in  reorganising  the  dissolute  bandits,  whom  Albinus 
had  found,  on  his  return  as  proconsul,  unfit  to  satisfy  his 
burning  desire  to  wipe  out  his  brother's  disgrace.  Jugurtha, 
genuinely  afraid,  proffered  a  real  surrender  to  the  man  he  could 
not  bribe.  The  consul,  covering  his  treachery  with  a  pretence 
of  negotiatioji,  tried  through  the  envoys  to  secure  the  person 
of  the  king  alive  or  dead,  as  a  murderer  liable  to  justice,  whose 
power  and  popularity  made  him  dangerous  to  Rome.  Meanwhile 
he  advanced  cautiously  into  Numidia  (close  of  109  or  beginning 
of  108  B.C.),  where  he  was  received  with  elaborate  submission, 
and  occupied  Vaga,  a  busy  and  populous  town,  frequented  by 
Italian  merchants,  not  far  from  the  frontier,  as  a  depot  and 
garrison.  At  last  Jugurtha  awoke,  and  prepared  for  resistance. 
On  the  line  of  march  to  the  enemy's  objective,  Cirta,  somewhere 
by  the  river  Muthul  {1  Rubricatus),  he  laid  a  skilful  trap,  a  half- 
completed  African  Trasimene.  As  the  Roman  issued  from  the 
mountain  pass,  and  debouched  on  the  river-plain,  his  retreat  was 
cut,  his  access  to  the  water  blocked,  and  as  he  advanced,  his 
infantry  was  harassed  by  swarms  of  horse  in  rear  and  flank.  The 
fight  for  the  Muthul  is  a  regular  African  desert  battle,  with  its  story 
of  broken  squares  and  thronging  natives,  the  heat,  the  dust,  the 
struggle  for  the  stream,  the  victory  snatched  from  disaster  by  the 
coolness  of  the  chief,  by  the  stability  of  the  men,  by  the  skill  and 
courage  of  Marius  and  Rufus.  Metellus  had  been  outmanceuvred. 
Only  the  weakness  of  the  Numidian  infantry  had  spoiled  the  calcu- 
lations of  Jugurtha.  Flying  columns  under  Metellus  and  Marius 
now  raided  the  country,  while  the  king  maintained  an  active  guer- 
rilla  warfare.     The  march  on  Cirta  was  clearly  abandoned,  and 


ME  TELL  us  /.V  AFRLCA  367 

Metellus,  with  small  results  for  his  labour,  apparently  retired  on  the 
province,  and  when  next  heard  of  is  besieging  the  neighbouring  town 
of  Zama  Regia,  in  the  valley  of  the  Bagradas,  on  the  old  Punic 
territory,  in  the  hope  of  compelling  a  decisive  action.  But  the 
besieged  were  so  vigorously  supported  by  the  king  that  Metellus, 
unable  to  capture  the  town  or  force  a  battle,  was  compelled  to  re- 
treat into  winter  cjuarters.  Thus  the  campaign  of  108  B.C.  (109),  in 
spite  of  triumphant  bulletins  and  state  thanksgivings,  afforded  some 
grounds  for  the  complaints  of  Roman  business  men  and  the  caustic 
if  insubordinate  criticisms  of  Marius.  The  general  had  again  re- 
course to  treachery.  Through  Bomilcar,  whom  he  contrived  to 
corrupt,  he  induced  the  king  to  capitulate,  and  then  employed  the 
old  device  of  a  gradually  widening  ultimatum  to  delude,  disarm, 
and  crush  his  enemy,  whose  person  he  intended  finally  to  entrap. 
Jugurtha  surrendered  his  elephants,  horses,  and  arms,  promised  an 
indemnity,  furnished  hostages,  and  handed  over  deserters,  but  when 
summoned  to  surrender  himself,  suspected  treason,  discovered  the 
plot,  and  executed  the  traitor  Bomilcar. 

Campaig-n  of  107  B.C. — In  the  following  winter  (108-107  K.c.) 
Vaga,  close  as  it  was  to  the  Roman  frontier,  revolted,  and  killed 
its  garrison.  The  commandant,  a  Latin  named  Turpilius,  who 
alone  escaped,  was  scourged  and  beheaded  by  Metellus,  and 
within  two  days  the  revolt  was  crushed.  But  the  national  feeling 
was  unbroken,  and  Jugurtha,  strong  in  his  loyal  tribesmen,  had 
every  means  for  irregular  war.  In  the  desultory  fighting  that 
ensued  (107  B.C.)  the  Romans  gained-  some  successes,  after  one  of 
which  Jugurtha  fled,  with  his  family  and  treasures,  to  the  strong- 
hold of  Thala,  situated  on  an  oasis  south  of  the  province.  Hither 
Metellus  pursued  him,  hoping  to  end  the  war  by  a  surprise  ;  but 
though  Thala  fell,  the  bird  was  flown.  The  war  extended  itself; 
the  Gietulians  of  the  desert  responded  to  the  king's  call  ;  and 
Bocchus,  the  rejected,  in  alarm  for  himself,  received  his  son-in-law, 
abandoned  his  neutrality,  and  took  up  the  cause.  With  a  swarm 
of  horsemen  the  princes  advanced  on  Cirta,  the  impregnable  city, 
which  had  apparently  fallen  into  Roman  hands. 

Marius.— In  the  meantime  Metellus  had  been  superseded.  His 
legate,  C.  Marius,  had  been  elected  consul,  and  appointed  general 
in  Africa  by  special  decree  of  the  people.  The  son  of  a  day- 
labourer,  born  at  Cereatas  (Casamare),  then  a  dependency  of 
Arpinum,  in  155  B.C.,  he  passed  from  the  plough-tail  to  the  camp. 
He  was  inured  to  fatigue  by  his  country  training,  and  schooled  in 
war  under  the  stern  command  of  Scipio,  whose  respect  he  earned 


368  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

by  his  soldierly  qualities.  By  soldiership  he  had  forced  his  way 
up,  assisted  by  lucky  speculations  and  the  connections  gained  by 
marriage.  In  115  r..c.  he  had  been  prretor,  and  as  propraetor  had 
done  good  work  in  Farther  Spain.  He  had  failed  to  obtain  the 
icdilcship,  and  hitherto  had  not  ventured  to  sue  for  the  consulship, 
which  the  nobles  defended  with  bitterness  from  the  "pollution"  of 
an  able  parvenu.  Yet  his  wife  Julia,  aunt  of  the  dictator,  belonged 
to  the  patrician  house  of  the  Julii.  At  length  the  consciousness  of 
merit  and  favourable  prophecies  pushed  the  ambitious  and  super- 
stitious man  to  make  good  his  claims.  He  was  indeed  peculiarly 
fitted,  by  his  integrity  and  industry,  by  his  powers  of  discipline 
and  organisation,  by  his  strict  but  sympathetic  attitude  to  the 
common  soldiers,  his  thorough  knowledge  of  their  needs,  and  of 
the  defects  of  the  system,  for  the  work  of  restoring  the  military 
prestige  of  Rome  and  asserting  her  superiority  to  African  and 
Gallic  barbarians.  He  was  a  popular  commander  and  a  leader  of 
the  first  rank  in  the  age  of  the  second-rate.  A  plain,  blunt  soldier, 
with  a  great  knowledge  of  war,  and  an  equal  ignorance  of  politics, 
as  free  from  the  vices  as  he  was  untouched  by  the  elegances  of 
his  time,  as  unfitted  for  the  Forum  and  the  courts  as  he  was  for 
the  salo73,  his  sound  qualities  were  marred  alone  by  a  fierce  and 
fatal  ambition.  It  was  his  misfortune  to  become  the  figure-head  and 
instrument  of  a  party  ;  it  was  the  fault  of  the  nobles  to  drive  into 
opposition  a  character  essentially  conservative  and  commonplace. 

Marius  made  Consul. — When  he  asked  Metellus  for  leave  of 
absence,  to  push  his  candidature,  his  patron,  indignant  at  the  pre- 
sumption, warned,  scolded,  and  finally  detained  him  to  the  last 
moment.  "  Safis  mafure  ilium  cum  filio  sua  consulatiini  peti- 
tiiruni^''  he  sneered.'  The  legate  retorted  by  bitter  criticisms  of 
his  superior's  generalship.  His  boasts  and  promises  were  trans- 
mitted to  Rome  by  his  partisans  in  Utica  and  the  camp,  and 
a  cry  was  raised  for  the  transference  of  the  command.  When 
at  last  permitted  to  leave,  twelve  days  before  the  elections,  in 
spite  of  his  shortened  canvrfss  he  was  elected  by  an  enormous 
majority,  and  received  the  appointment  by  exceptional  decree, 
107  B.C.  (108).  This  result  was  due  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
mercantile  class,  to  the  prostration  of  the  nobility  by  the  Mamilian 
commission,  and  to  the  combination  of  all  the  malcontents,  who  at 
last  had  a  soldier  to  lead  them.  Amid  popular  enthusiasm  Marius 
proceeded  to  levy  troops.      He  treated  his  consulship  as  the  spoils 

1  "  It  would  be  soon  enough  for  him  to  stand  with  Metellus'  son,"  i.e., 
Metellus  Pius,  cos.  80E.C. 


MARIUS  IN  AFRICA  369 

of  war,  and  inveighed  bitterly  against  tliese  "men  of  antique  race, 
witli  their  Greek  culture,  their  banquets,  play-actors,  and  cooks, 
with  many  iJiiagiiies  and  no  campaigns,  who,  as  soon  as  they 
became  consuls,  read  up  the  deeds  of  their  ancestors  and  the 
military  manuals  of  the  Greeks,  and  took  for  tutor  in  the  field 
some  soldier  from  the  ranks." 

In  selecting  troops  he  set  a  new  and  important  precedent.  He 
not  only  called  up  a  large  number  of  veterans,  but  to  avoid  the 
hated  conscription,  and  to  secure  men  on  whom  he  could  depend, 
he  enlisted  recruits  mainly  from  the  capite  censi,  i.e.,  from  those 
who  possessed  less  than  the  minimum  of  the  lowest  class,  and  who 
had  hitherto  been  drawn  only  on  an  emergency  or  for  service  as 
marines.  The  full  bearing  of  the  changes  which  he  effected  now, 
or  in  the  creation  of  the  army  of  the  North,  will  be  pointed  out  in 
connection  with  the  Cimbric  war  {vide  infra,  pp.  379,  380). 

Marius  in  Numidia. — Meanwhile  nothing  had  happened  in 
Africa.  Metellus,  with  almost  childish  annoyance,  refused  to  act. 
Bocchus,  who  held  the  key  of  the  situation,  would  not  commit  him- 
self. Marius  arrived,  106  B.C.  (107),  trained  his  army,  chastised  the 
Gaetulians,  proceeded  to  attack  such  cities  as  remained  untaken, 
and,  among  others,  captured  the  stronghold  of  Capsa,  situated 
on  an  oasis,  after  a  march  of  immense  difficulty,  undertaken  in 
the  hope  of  ecHpsing  the  exploit  of  Metellus  at  Thala.  Having 
thus  cleared  Eastern  Numidia,  he  entered  on  a  long  and  difficult 
expedition  to  the  Molochath,  and  took,  by  a  lucky  surprise,  a 
certain  treasure-hold  of  the  king.  Here  he  was  joined  by  the 
quaestor  L.  Cornelius  Sulla,  with  a  reinforcement  of  cavalry.  It 
was  Sulla's  first  campaign,  but  under  so  good  a  master  the  Roman 
dandy  rapidly  learned  the  elements  of  war.  From  his  advanced 
position  Marius  began  a  difficult  and  dangerous  retreat.  Possibly 
Bocchus  had  deluded  him  by  assurances  of  friendship.  Now  he 
joined  Jugurtha  in  force.  Twice  were  the  Romans  enveloped  ;  twice 
through  the  hostile  swarms  of  cavalry  the  way  was  opened  by 
a  pitched  battle.  On  the  first  occasion,  surprised  in  column  of 
route,  they  were  only  saved  by  the  military  instincts  of  the  soldiery 
and  the  negligence  of  the  foe.  On  the  second  their  safety  was 
due  to  the  brilliant  manoeuvres  of  Sulla. 

Jugurtha  betrayed  to  Sulla.  —  From  winter  quarters  at  Cirta 
negotiations  were  resumed  with  Bocchus,  without  whose  aid  the 
war  was  interminable.  Envoys  passed  secretly  between  Bocchus, 
Marius,  and  the  Senate.  Finally  the  Moor  sent  for  Sulla  to  seal 
the  treaty  and  take  over  the  prisoner.     He  accepted  the  perilous 

2  A 


370  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

commission,  and  Ijoldly  traversed  the  camp  of  Jii^urtha,  his  small 


PRF^FNT   Fl  riiir»    oc    | 


SECTION. 


30  Feet 


PLAN. 


%  r 


PLAN    AND    SECTION    OF   THE    MAMERTINE    PRISON. 

(From  Middleton  s  Rome. ) 

A.   Opening  in  flonr  over  ihe  Tnllianuin  ;  the  only  access. 
BB.  Solid  tufa  rocl<. 
CC.   Branch  of  Cloaca. 
DE.   Position  of  modern  stairs  and  door. 
FF.   Front  wall  of  prison. 

G.   Probable  original  top  of  Tullianum. 


escort  lost  in  a  Moorish  host.     Sulla's  firm  bcarinL;  decided  the 


DEATH  OF  JUGURTHA  371 

vvaverei".  Deluded  by  the  hope  of  conference,  Jugurtha  was  en- 
trapped by  his  kinsman  and  ally,  and  carried  in  chains  to  Rome, 
where  he  adorned  the  triumph  of  the  conqueror,  January  i,  104  B.C., 
and  was  starved  to  death  in  the  foul  dungeon  carved  in  the  Capi- 
tohne  rock.  "  How  cold  is  your  bath  ! "  he  cried  as  he  fell  into 
his  hving  grave.  He  had  been  caught  at  last,  after  the  long 
struggle.  He  had  furnished  two  generals  with  a  triumph,  and 
Metellus  with  the  title  Numidicus.  The  credit  of  his  capture 
belonged  largely  to  the  cool  and  resolute  Sulla  ;  the  people  lauded 
Marius,  the  Senate  praised  its  own  heroes,  and  the  African  war 
began  the  rivalry  that  ended  in  the  proscriptions. 

Results  of  the  War.— With  the  king's  death  the  war  closed. 
No  province  was  formed.  Bocchus  received,  as  the  price  of  blood, 
the  western  half  of  Numidia  ;  the  remainder  was  given  to  Cauda, 
a  grandson  of  Massinissa.  The  Qjetulians  were  declared  free  allies 
of  Rome.  The  Senate  was  reluctant  at  this  crisis  (105  B.C.)  to  main- 
tain a  standing  army  in  Africa. 

The  political  results  were  more  striking  than  the  military. 
Corruption  and  incapacity  had  given  the  democrats  their  chance. 
A  fairly  successful  commander  had  been  superseded  by  a  popular 
vote,  and  the  Senate's  control  of  the  military  command  infringed. 
There  had  been  bitter  war  between  the  equites  and  the  people  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  Senate  on  the  other.  The  ground  of  opposition  had 
shifted  from  home  to  foreign  policy,  and  the  military  power  had 
come  to  the  front.  On  January  i,  104  B.C.,  Rome's  only  general 
entered  on  a  second  successive  consulate  in  a  panic  caused  by  dis- 
asters in  the  North. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

THE    WARS    IN    THE    NORTH 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Defeat  of  AUobroges  and  Arverni— Province  of  Narbo  izi  633 

Wars  in  Macedonia 112-110  642  644 

The  Cimbri  defeat  the  Romans  in  Gaul  ....  109-107  645-647 

Battle  of  Arausio 105  649 

Marius  Consul 104-100  650-654 

Battle  of  Aquae  Sextiae 102  652 

Battle  on  the  Raudine  Plain loi  653 

Holding,  as  Rome  did,  Spain,  Italy  to  the  Alps,  and  Macedonia,  it 
was  her  plain  business  to  provide  for  the  defence  of  the  frontiers,  the 
protection  of  the  subjects,  and  the  security  of  her  communications. 
In  Spain  she  was  bound  to  chastise  the  Celtiberian  and  Lusitanian 


372  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tribes,  and  to  hold  tlic  passes  of  the  Western  Pyrenees  ;  in  (laul 
to  protect  Massiiia  and  the  coast  route  ;  in  North  Italy,  to  clear 
the  Alpine  passes  on  the  west  and  east  and  check  the  invaders 
from  the  north  ;  in  Macedonia  and  Illyria,  to  defend  the  ports 
of  the  western  coast,  and  act  as  warder  of  the  Balkans  and  of 
Rhodope.  No  doubt  the  effective  control  of  the  great  ranges  would 
precipitate  conflict  with  the  wandering  hordes  which  ebbed  and 
flowed  behind  the  barriers,  but  of  this  danger  Rome  was  scarcely 
aware,  and  nothing  was  gained  by  delay.    Of  all  this  little  was  done. 

Spain. — Of  Spain,  after  the  work  of  D.  Brutus  (136  B.C.)  and  the 
capture  of  Numantia,  there  is  nothing  to  record  except  Marius'  suc- 
cess in  checking  brigandage  (1 14  B.C.),  the  repulse  of  the  Cimbri  by 
the  warlike  Celtiberians  (103  B.C.),  and  the  insurrection  of  the 
Celtiberians  and  Lusitanians,  excited  by  the  shameful  defeats  in 
Gaul,  which  was  crushed  by  Didius  and  Crassus  between  97  and 
93  B.C.  Under  Didius  served  with  distinction  the  famous  Sertorius. 
There  was  hard  fighting  and  some  butchery,  and  Didius  occasion- 
ally removed  the  troublesome  highlanders  to  peaceful  settlements 
in  the  plain. 

North  Italy. — Here  Roman  ideas  and  habits  had  spread  to  the 
foot  of  the  Alps.  The  Ligurians  in  the  west  had  been  severely 
handled  and  the  coast  route  secured.  In  143  B.C.  Appius  Claudius 
reduced  the  Salassi  ;  in  100  B.C.  Eporedia  was  founded  as  a  citizen 
colony  to  control  the  entrance  of  the  north-western  passes.  No 
province  was  formed  as  yet  and  no  tribute  exacted,  the  communi- 
ties retaining  their  national  institutions  under  the  supervision  of 
the  consuls,  furnishing  contingents,  especially  the  light  Ligurians, 
and  providing  for  their  own  defence.  It  was  the  inroads  of  the 
barbarians  and  the  extension  of  the  franchise  to  Italy  which  first 
compelled  the  creation  of  a  distinct  command  in  North  Italy,  whose 
necessity  only  ceased  with  the  conquest  of  Gaul  and  Switzerland. 

Gaul.— Beyond  the  Alps,  the  route  to  Spain,  whether  by  land 
or  along  the  coast,  from  Piste,  Luna,  or  Massiiia  to  Tarraco,  had 
been  secured  partly  by  the  fleet,  and,  after  its  decay,  by  the  chas- 
tisement of  the  Lig^urians,  by  the  aid  of  friendly  tribes,  but  mainly 
by  the  ancient  alliance  with  the  faithful  Massiiia,  whose  naval 
stations  stretched  from  Nicfea  and  Antipolis  to  Agatha  and  Rhoda. 
In  return  for  her  help,  Rome  protected  Massiiia  against  the  bar- 
barians.     In   154  B.C.'    Opimius  defended  Antipolis  and  Nicaea 

1  About  this  time  occurred  the  attempt  to  protect  the  export  of  wine  and 
oil  from  Italy,  by  the  prohibition  to  cultivate  the  vine  and  olive  in  the  Massilian 
dependencies  (Cic. ,  De  Rep.  iii.  9). 


JFAJ^S  IN  GAUL  373 

against  the  Ligurians  of  the  Maritime  Alps,  the  first  Transalpine 
war.  In  125  B.C.  P'ulvius  Flaccus,  the  democratic  consul,  his  head 
full  of  Gracchan  ideas,  a  true  precursor  of  Caesar,  laid  the  founda- 
tion of  the  future  province  by  his  victories  over  the  Celto-Ligurian 
tribes — the  Salluvii  near  Aix,  and  the  Vocontii  by  Vaucluse. 

War  with  the  Allobroges  and  Arverni. — The  area  of  war 
rapidly  expanded.  The  chief  tribe  in  South  Gaul  was  the  Arverni 
(capital,  Nemossus,  near  Clermont),  who  had  risen  to  great  wealth 
and  power  and  a  fair  civilisation  under  the  magnificent  Luerius 
and  his  son  Betuitus.  Their  available  force  amounted  to  180,000 
men.  Their  rivals  for  the  hegemony  were  the  weaker  yEdui 
round  Bibracte  (Autun).  The  Belgic  league  of  the  north-east, 
with  their  leading  clan,  the  Suessiones,  just  enter  our  horizon.  In 
the  south-east,  however,  the  Romans  came  at  once  into  contact  with 
the  strong  clan  of  the  Allobroges,  in  the  valley  of  the  Isere,  who, 
coming  to  aid  the  Salluvii,  were  defeated  (123  B.C.)  by  C.  Sextius 
Calvinus,  near  the  modern  Aix.  In  122  B.C.  Cn.  Domitius  Aheno- 
barbus  entered  their  land,  and  the  attack  upon  them  brought  the 
Arverni  as  suzerains  into  the  sphere  of  action.  The  refusal  of  their 
mediation  led  to  war.  The  ^dui  at  once  embraced  the  Roman 
alliance,  a  useful  support  in  the  enemies'  rear.  Ahenobarbus  was 
reinforced  (121  B.C.)  by  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  grandson  of  Paullus, 
who  severely  defeated  the  united  armies  (August  S)  at  the  confluence 
of  the  Rhone  and  the  Isere,  earning  the  surname  Allobrogicus.  The 
Allobroges  submitted,  and  the  Arvernian  king,  Betuitus,  who  had 
thought  the  Roman  soldiers  too  few  to  feed  his  dogs,  was  entrapped 
by  Domitius,  figured  in  the  triumph  of  Fabius,  and  was  interned  at 
Alba  by  the  Senate,  which  censured  the  thief,  but  took  the  stolen 
goods.  At  some  date  before  or  after  this  battle  Domitius  gained 
a  victory  at  Vindalium,  above  Avignon,  due  in  part  to  the  awe 
created  b)'  African  elephants. 

Province  of  Narbo.— From  the  land  of  the  Allobroges,  who 
sank  into  a  mutinous,  heavily  indebted  tribe,  was  founded  (121 
B.C.)  the  province  of  Gallia  Braccata  or  Narbonensis  {the province^ 
Provence).  It  took  its  later  name  from  the  capital,  Narbo  Martius, 
an  old  Celtic  town  on  the  Atax,  not  far  from  the  sea,  henceforward 
the  rival  of  Massilia  for  the  inland  traffic  and  headquarters  of  the 
7ies;otiatores.  Aquas  Sextiae,  founded  1 22  B.C.,  famous  for  its  hot  and 
cold  springs,  was  the  standing  camp  of  the  west.  The  new  acquisi- 
tion, while  it  realised  to  some  extent  the  colonising  ideas  of  the 
Gracchi,  was  mainly  designed  to  protect  the  communications  with 
Spain  and  tap  the  trade  of  Gaul.     Between  the  Alps  and  the  Rhone 


374  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  tribes  paid  tribute  to  Rome  or  Massilia  ;  the  Arverni  ceded 
enough  land  between  the  Cevennes  and  the  coast  for  the  making 
of  the  great  Domitian  road  from  the  Rhone  to  the  Pyrenees  ;  the 
westward  Hmits  included  the  rich  and  ancient  city  of  Tolosa  and 
the  upper  waters  of  the  Garonne.  The  country  rapidly  assimilated 
the  language,  habits,  and  ideas  of  its  conquerors,  and  remained 
at  peace  till  the  Germanic  invasion. 

The  Balkan  Peninsula.  —  In  Illyria,  Rome  possessed  Istria, 
Scodra,  and  part  of  Epirus,  but  had  no  effective  control  over  the 
tribes  of  the  "  Hinterland,"  or  of  the  rugg^ed  coasts  and  rocky  isles 
between  Epirus  and  Istria.  In  consequence  of  bitter  complaints 
from  the  subjects  and  allies,  the  rude  and  insolent  pirates  of  Dal- 
matia  were  chastised  by  P.  Scipio  Nasica,  who  took  Delminium 
(155  B.C.),  and  taught  the  confederacy  "to  concern  itself  about  the 
Romans  "  for  the  future.  The  district  was  placed,  like  Cisalpine 
Gaul,  under  the  consular  control,  and  remained  so  even  after  the 
formation  of  the  Macedonian  province.  No  attempt  was  made  by 
a  regular  and  combined  attack  from  Italy  and  Macedon  on  the 
mountain  tribes  from  Gaul  to  Thrace  to  secure  the  line  of  the  Alps 
and  Balkans  or  push  the  frontier  to  the  Danube.  The  countr)' 
was  mainly  occupied  by  Celtic  clans,  remnants  of  the  great  wave 
that  spread  itself  from  Spain  to  Galatia,  passing  on  either  side  of 
the  Alps,  and  penetrating  alike  to  Rome  and  Delphi.  In  modern 
Switzerland,  and  beyond  into  Germany,  along*^  the  Upper  Rhine, 
dwelt  the  Helvetii,  who  had  not  yet  come  into  contact  with 
Rome  ;  next  to  these,  the  Boii  still  held  Bavaria  and  Bohemia  ;  in 
Styria  and  Carinthia  dwelt  the  Taurisci  or  Norici  ;  the  kindred 
Kami  inhabited  the  hill-country  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic.  In 
the  Tauriscan  country,  the  mines  of  iron  and  gold  about  Noreia 
(near  Klagenfurt)  attracted  Italian  capital  and  labour.  The  in- 
digenous Ra;ti  pushed  their  forays  and  levied  blackmail  from  the 
heights  of  Eastern  Switzerland  and  the  Tyrol,  whither  the  Celts 
had  driven  them  ;  the  Euganei  and  \'eneti  lived  peaceably  round 
the  modern  Padua  and  Venice,  a  wedge  between  the  Cenomanian 
and  Karnian  Celts.  Along  the  Balkans  and  in  the  basin  of  the 
Danube  dwelt,  first,  the  half-Illyrian  lapydes,  in  Croatia,  then  the 
restless  and  roving  Scordisci,  above  the  Illyrians  of  the  coast,  in 
Bosnia  and  Servia,  along  the  Save,  plundering  their  neighbours  from 
their  stronghold  of  Siscia.  The  Thracians  harried  Macedonia  on 
the  east.  Behind,  fermented  the  obscure  masses  of  the  ever-moving 
north. 

Fighting  can  be  dimly  discerned  going  on  round  the  Roman 


THE  BALKAN  PENINSULA  375 

territories,  whose  sole  frontiers  were  the  swords  of  the  legions. 
In  118  B.C.  the  Stoeni,  above  Verona,  were  reduced  by  Q.  Mar- 
cius  ;  constant  raids  paid  back  in  kind  the  inroads  of  the  moun- 
taineers. There  were  conflicts  in  Thrace  in  103  and  99  B.C. 
The  piratical  Vardjei  were  deported  from  Dalmatia  into  the  in- 
terior (135  B.C.),  and  the  Scordisci  attacked  and  defeated.  Tuditanus 
in  129  B.C.,  helped  by  the  Spanish  veteran  D.  Brutus,  repressed  the 
lapydes,  and  secured  a  temporary  peace  in  Illyria.  But  in  1 19  B.C. 
Cotta  had  to  move  on  Siscia,  and  L.  Metellus  cheaply  earned  the 
name  Dalmaticus  by  capturing  Salonas  (i  19  B.C.),  which  became  the 
Roman  headcjuarters  in  those  parts.  But  Metellus  was  shrewdly 
suspected  of  manufacturing  a  triumph  from  a  sliam  campaign. 
Froni  about  this  time  dates  the  commencement  of  the  Via 
Gabinia  from  Salonai  to  the  interior.  Scaurus  in  11^  B.C. 
defeated  the  Kami,  crossed  the  eastern  range,  and  opened  up 
commercial  relations  with  Noricum.  But  these  successes  in  the 
Illyrian  district  were  badly  balanced  by  the  extermination  of  the 
army  under  the  censor's  grandson,  C.  Porcius  Cato  (consul  114 
B.C.),  entrapped  by  the  Scordisci  among  the  mountains.  Cato  was 
condemned  later,  on  a  convenient  charge  of  extortion.  The  pnttor 
M.  Didius  was  able  to  check  the  victors'  raids  into  Macedon.  The 
war  was  continued  with  fair  success  till  109  B.C.  M.  Livius  Drusus, 
the  anti-Gracchan  tribune,  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  Roman 
general  who  reached  the  Danube,  in  1 12  B.C. ;  but  if  he  did  indeed 
drive  the  Scordisci  beyond  the  river,  it  was  left  for  M.  Minucius 
Rufus  (iio  B.C.)  to  complete  their  destruction.  Henceforth  the 
Dardani  take  their  place  as  leading  tribe. 

The  Cimbri. — These  new  connections  and  the  thinning  down 
of  the  barrier  clans  soon  brought  Rome  face  to  face  with  a  more 
terrible  enemy.  Beyond  the  mountains  had  been  wandering  to 
and  fro  for  some  years  a  tribe  of  unsettled  Germans,  driven  by  pres- 
sure from  behind,  by  natural  convulsions,  or  by  migratory  instinct 
from  their  homes  about  the  Baltic  and  the  North  Sea — a  people 
on  the  march,  women,  children,  and  waggon-houses.  Gathering 
fresh  forces  from  the  tribes  they  traversed,  especially  from  the 
powerful  Celtic  Ambrones,  the  Cimbri,  tall,  fair-haired,  blue- 
eyed  men,  with  women  as  strong  and  tall,  and  children  flaxen- 
haired,  poured  on  towards  the  sunny  South,  by  capricious  onsets, 
harbingers  of  the  final  floods  which  drowned  the  later  Empire, 
appalling  the  smaller-statured  Romans  with  their  huge  forms, 
their  long  swords,  and  their  terrific  cries.  They  were  rude  and 
rough,  brutal   e\-en   and   savage,  when  they  poured  the  blood   of 


376 


If  I  STORY  OF  NOME 


captives  for  their  white-clad  priestesses  to  prophesy  the  issues  of 
war  ;  yet  they  were  chivah-ous  after  a  sort,  fond  of  single  combats, 


KOMAN    SOLDIER. 


tourneying  with   the  foe  at   a  chosen   time   and  place.      In  their 
copper  helmets  and  coats-of-mail,  with  their  heavy  missiles,  narrow 


THE    CTMBRI  377 

shields,  and  Celtic  swords,  they  formed  in  a  deep  square  phalanx, 
the  front  ranks,  it  is  said,  tied  man  to  man  with  thongs  through 
their  girdles. 

Defeat  of  the  Romans.  —  On  they  came,  a  strange  and  motley 
host,  breaking  through  the  thin  barrier  whence  hitherto  the  Celts 
of  the  Danube  had  repelled  them.  In  1 13  B.C.  they  appeared  among 
the  Taurisci.  To  protect  the  clients  of  Rome  and  cover  the 
passes  of  the  Alps,  Cn.  Papirius  Carbo,  brother  of  the  renegade, 
who  was  then  in  Illyria,  marched  on  Noreia,  and  when  the 
Cimbri  offered  to  evacuate  and  leave  the  friends  of  Rome  alone, 
attempted  to  mislead  and  surprise  them,  but  was  defeated  with 
great  slaughter.  Leaving  Italy  unmolested  and  passing  peace- 
ably through  Helvetia,  they  entered  Gaul  by  the  land  of  the 
Sequani  and  harassed  it  with  devastating  raids.  In  109  B.C.  they 
reappeared  on  the  borders  of  the  Gallic  province,  and  being 
refused  settlements  and  employment  as  mercenaries,  they  de- 
stroyed the  army  of  the  consul  M.  Junius  Silanus,  who  had  taken 
the  offensive  to  protect  the  Allobroges  and  the  Roman  frontier. 
But  so  far  from  pursuing  their  advantage  and  pressing  the  Roman 
government,  embarrassed  as  it  was  with  the  African  war  and  at 
its  wits'-ends  for  recruits,  the  Cimbri  contented  themselves  with 
harrying  the  prosperous  Gallic  tribes.  Their  place  was  taken  by 
their  Celtic  imitators  and  allies,  the  Tougeni  and  Tigurini,  from 
Helvetia,  who  had  penetrated  into  the  valley  of  the  Garonne  as  far  as 
the  modern  Agen,  under  Divico,  and  in  107  B.C.  decoyed  and  annihi- 
lated the  army  of  the  consul  L.  Cassius  Longinus,  v/ho  fell  with  his 
legate  L.  Piso.  The  remnant  passed  ignominiously  beneath  the 
yoke,  but  C.  Popillius,  who  signed  the  capitulation,  was  subse- 
quently convicted  of  treason.  His  condemnation  was  ensured  by 
the  passing  of  a  Lex  Ccrlia  extending  the  ballot  to  trials  (or  pcr- 
diieUio. 

Disaster  at  Arausio. — This  series  of  disasters  shook  the  credit  of 
Rome,  and  the  rich  town  of  Tolosa,  on  the  western  frontier,  revolted 
and  seized  its  garrison.  Q.  Servilius  Caspio  (consul  106  B.C.)  re- 
covered the  city  by  a  night  surprise  and  sacked  the  treasures  of  its 
ancient  sanctuary.  What  became  of  these  famous  treasures  no  one 
knew.  On  the  way  to  Massilia  they  were  seized  by  robbers,  and 
the  consul  was  accused  of  connivance.  If  it  was  true,  he  had  indeed 
gained,  as  the  proverb  said,  "  the  gold  of  Tolosa."  Disaster  over- 
took the  sacrilegious  thief.  Remaining  on  the  defensive  during 
106  B.C.,  he  was  acting  next  year  with  a  half-independent  com- 
mand   on   the   right   bank   of  the    Rhone,  under   the   consul    Cn. 


378  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Mallius  Maximus,  when  the  Ciml)ri  and  llicir  allies  returned 
under  Boiorix.  Tlic  first  to  fail  was  M.  Aurelius  Scaurus,  with  a 
detachment  of  the  consular  army.  His  proud  warning  to  the 
king  to  keep  his  hands  off  Italy  cost  him  his  life.  Reluctantly 
Ca?pio  obeyed  his  superior's  orders  and  entreaties  and  crossed 
to  the  left  bank.  Here,  possibly  at  Arausio  (Orange),  not  far 
from  Avignon,  the  powerful  Roman  amiy  was  concentrated,  but 
its  leaders  were  at  discord,  immovable  by  remonstrance  even 
from  the  Senate.  C;t.>pio  declined  to  concert  action,  and  when 
Mallius  accepted  the  negotiations  offered  by  the  Cimbri,  ap- 
parently ordered  a  separate  attack.  Taken  in  detail,  with  the 
river  in  rear,  the  divided  armies  were  murderously  defeated  ; 
80,000  men  were  reported  dead,  and  the  infuriated  savag^es,  in 
obedience  to  a  vow,  hung  their  prisoners,  burned  their  booty, 
smashed  the  armour,  and  pitched  the  horses  into  the  river. 

The  6th  of  October  105  B.C.  recalled  the  deadly  day  of  Cannre. 
Five  armies  had  nowbeen  swept  successively  away  ;  the  passes  were 
open,  the  Gauls  at  the  gate.  In  the  panic  that  followed,  able-bodied 
men  were  bound  on  oath  to  remain  in  Italy.  All  exemptions 
were  suspended.  The  allies  gathered  in  alarm  round  Rome,  and 
at  the  elections,  in  spite  of  law  and  custom,  the  precedent  of  the 
Punic  wars  was  revived,  and  Marius,  the  victor  of  Africa,  was  re- 
elected in  absence,  and  appointed  to  Gaul,  to  be  continued  in  office, 
like  a  new  Valerius  Corvus,  four  years  in  succession.  Rome's  luck 
did  not  desert  her  :  again  the  capricious  hordes  failed  to  push 
their  victory,  and  passed  westward  to  attack  the  strongholds  of 
the  Arverni  and  break  their  teeth  on  the  warlike  tribes  and 
rocky  fastnesses  of  Spain.  There  was  breathing-time  for  re- 
organisation and  revenge.  Ctepio,  stripped  on  the  spot  of  his 
proconsular  command  by  decree  of  the  people,  was  in  104  B.C. 
driven  from  the  Senate  by  a  special  law,  providing  this  penalty 
for  those  deprived  of  imperium  by  the  people,  an  enactment  of 
doubtful  validity.  Probably  in  the  following  year  (103  B.C.),  in 
virtue  of  a  plebiscitum,  moved. by  the  tribune  C.  Norbanus  and 
supported  by  L.  Appuleius  Saturninus,  a  commission  was  ap- 
pointed to  try  the  treason  and  embezzlement  connected  with  the 
Gallic  command,  which  ended  in  the  condemnation,  among 
others,  of  Mallius,  and  of  Ca;pio,  whose  property  was  confiscated 
and  who  barely  escaped  death,  to  end  his  life  in  beggary 
and  exile. 

Marius  reorganises  the  Army. — Meanwhile  Marius,  who  had 
finished  his  work  in  Africa  in  105  B.C.,  to  which  year  must  be  as- 


MILITARY  MEASURES  OF  MAR  I  US  379 

signed  the  capture  of  Jugurtha,  had  returned  to  Rome.  He  busied 
himself  for  two  years  in  organising  a  new  army  in  North  Italy 
and  the  south  of  France,  where  he  remained  on  the  defensive. 
He  now  completed  the  military  reforms  begun  in  his  first  consul- 
ship and  made  doubly  necessary  by  the  dearth  of  troops  and  the 
demoralisation  that  follows  disaster. 

These  disasters  had  emphasised  all  the  tendencies  which  were 
irresistibly  creating  a  professional  army.  Political,  military,  and 
social  causes  had  produced  a  gradual  change  from  conscription 
based  on  property  to  enlistment  of  paid  volunteers,  supplemented 
by  contingents  from  Italy  and  abroad.  The  census  ceased  to  be 
the  basis  of  the  army,  and  there  was  no  need  to  enforce  an  un- 
popular senice  when  theie  was  a  sufficient  supply  of  eager  and 
willing  recruits.  Moreover,  the  old  tactical  division  into  three 
lines  was  becoming  as  obsolete  as  the  Servian  institutions  them- 
selves, and  the  loose  arrangements  of  the  maniples  clearly  needed 
revision  since  the  recent  failures.  As  to  the  cavalry,  it  was 
notoriously  formed  of  Italians,  Thracians,  and  Numidians,  while 
the  Ligurians  and  Baliares  supplied  the  light-armed  foot  and 
slingers.  The  refomis  connected  with  Marius  gave  full  expres- 
sion to  these  changes.  Whatever  might  remain  of  the  old  forms 
of  the  civic  militia,  its  methods  and  principles,  was  now  swept 
away.  Though  the  legal  obligation  of  ser\'ice  remains,  the  army 
henceforth  is  filled  by  veterans,  volunteers,  and  large  drafts  of 
allied  troops.  All  non-military  distinctions  in  equipment  and  in 
the  line  of  battle  disappear.  There  is  no  question  of  age  or  of 
property,  only  of  service  approved  by  the  commanding  officer. 
While  Marius  was  still  in  Africa,  Rutilius,  the  colleague  of  Mallius, 
had  brought  in  his  new  method  of  training,  derived  from  the 
masters  of  the  gladiatorial  schools.  The  excellence  of  the  re- 
modelled army  was  based  on  the  skill  and  coolness  of  the  indi- 
vidual swordsman.  The  care  of  Marius,  an  old  ranker  himself, 
improved  the  weapons,  the  kit,  and  comfort  of  the  rank  and  file. 
His  experience  also  decided  him  to  make  the  cohort,  which 
already  existed,  the  main  tactical  division  instead  of  the  maniple, 
though,  of  course,  the  maniple  was  retained.  Ten  strong  cohorts 
combined  the  advantages  of  solidity  and  independence  to  resist 
the  rush  of  the  Germans.  Company  ensigns  were  abolished  ;  the 
cohort,  with  its  six  sections  of  100,  had  its  battalion  colours  ;  the 
legion,  6000  strong,  received  the  famous  eagle.  The  three  lines 
no  longer  represented  separate  corps  ;  military  rank  went  by  the 
numerical  order  of  the  cohorts  and  centuries.     The  velites  dis- 


38o 


ITTSTOR  V  OF  ROME 


appeared  as  the  eqiiitos  liad  gone,  and  the  only  distinct  corps  was 
the  cohors  pnetoria,  originally  created  as  a  company  of  personal 
friends  by  /Emilianus  in  Spain,  now  a  select  and  privileged  guard, 
retained  at  headquarters  for  special  service.  The  rank  and  file  of 
the  army  was  thus  formed  mainly  of  proletarians  and  the  poorer 
classes,  who  rarely  rose  above  the  rank  of  centurion,  the  upper 
classes  acting  as  officers  or  serving  on  the  bodyguard.  The 
military  tribunes   are   gradually   superseded  in   the   command   cf 


COMBAT    OF    GLADIATOKS  :    THE   VANQUISHED   COMBATANT    APPEALING 
TO   THE    AUDIENCE. 

(^To  illi{strate  gladiatorial  swords7nansIiip,  p.  379). 


the  legion  by  legafi,  generally  men  of  senatorial!  rank,  serving  as 
generals  of  division. 

The  change  had  been  gradually  brought  about  by  military 
necessities.  It  created  a  soldier  class  because  the  conditions  of 
that  class  existed.  It  was  no  device  of  an  aspiring  soldier,  and 
yet  we  have  here  all  the  elements  of  the  imperial  army.  The 
basis  of  the  military  republic  was  gone  with  its  civic  militia. 
Attached  by  his  oath  to  the  general,  for  a  war,  not  for  a  cam- 
paign, rewarded  and  punished  by  the  general,  with  no  state  system 


MARIUS  IN  GAUr  381 

of  pension  or  even  poorhouse,  the  soldier,  Roman  or  allied,  owed 
his  allegiance  henceforth  to  the  colours,  the  comrade,  and  the 
chief. 

Marius  in  Gaul. — Marius  proceeded  to  Gaul  with  his  legate 
Sulla,  an  experienced  staff,  and  his  Syrian  prophetess  Martha, 
with  his  contingents  summoned  far  and  wide,  his  raw  levies 
and  African  veterans.  There,  by  strict  discipline  and  sturdy  im- 
partiality, he  got  his  masses  in  hand  and  attached  them  to  him- 
self During  the  months  of  waiting  he  kept  them  employed  by 
great  military  and  civil  works,  especially  by  cutting  a  transport 
canal  (Fossae  Marianas)  to  improve  the  navigation  of  the  Rhone. 
From  a  strong  camp  near  the  junction  of  the  Rhone  and  the 
I  sere  he  overawed  the  Tectosages  and  restored  confidence, 
while  he  guarded  the  passage  of  the  Rhone  and  covered  the 
routes  to  Italy.  To  secure  his  re-election  for  102  B.C.  he  was  com- 
pelled to  come  to  Rome  and  form  an  alliance  with  the  popular 
tribune  Saturninus,  who  forced  the  appointment  in  face  of  the 
growing  discontent  at  this  unconstitutional  continuation  of  power. 
But  the  country  needed  a  disciplinarian  and  a  soldier,  and  though 
there  were  other  officers  available,  the  government  was  too  un- 
popular to  resist,  and,  at  this  crisis,  acquiesced  in  the  breach  of 
a  fundamental  law  of  the  Republic.  Marius  went  through  the 
farce  of  a  pretended  reluctance.  The  full  peril  of  this  unlimited 
power  wielded  by  the  general  of  the  democracy  at  the  head 
of  a  popular  army  was  not  realised  till  the  danger  was  past. 
Public  opinion  enjoyed  the  defeat  of  the  Senate.  At  last,  in 
103  B.C.,  the  Germans  reappeared  on  their  way  to  Italy,  their 
ranks  swelled  by  adventurers  and  reinforced  by  the  Tougeni  and 
Tigurini,  and  by  the  Teutones  from  the  Baltic,  under  Teutoboduus, 
whom  they  had  met  somewhere  in  Gaul.  Their  Gallic  raids,  re- 
pulsed by  the  Belgfe  alone  (103  B.C.),  had  filled  their  hands  with 
plunder.  This  they  now  left  under  a  powerful  guard,  which  sub- 
secjuently  became  the  people  of  the  Aduatuci,  on  the  Sambre.  On 
their  way  south  they  divided  their  forces,  the  Teutones  Tougeni 
and  Ambrones  taking  the  road  by  Roman  Gaul  and  the  western 
passes,  while  the  Cimbri  and  the  Tigurini  were  to  cross  the  Rhine, 
skirt  the  Alps,  and  enter  by  the  eastern  defiles  which  they  had 
surveyed  in  113  B.C.  The  divisions  would  rejoin  in  the  valley  of 
the  Po. 

Battle  of  Aquae  Sextiae.  — In  the  summer  of  102  B.C.  the  Teutones 
crossed  the  Rhone  unresisted,  while  Marius,  still  uncertain  of  his 
troops,  watched  his  opportunity  from  his  camp.     For  three  days 


382  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

he  repelled  the  assaLiUs  of  tlic  iKubaririns,  and,  it  is  said,  refused  to 
attack,  though  the  enemy  for  six  days,  defiiinj^  past  in  long  column 
with  their  vast  baggage-train,  offered  an  extended  flank.  Unmoved 
by  their  bitter  taunts,  as  they  asked  if  the  Romans  had  messages 
for  their  wives  at  home,  he  waited  till  they  were  gone,  and  followed 
cautiously  in  their  rear.  At  last,  by  Aqu;c  Sextia;,  on  the  road  to 
Italy,  twelve  Roman  miles  from  Massilia,  Marius  encamped  on  a 
range  of  hills  destitute  of  water.  A  skirmish  among  the  watering- 
parties  brought  on  a  regular  engagement,  in  which  the  Ambrones 
were  defeated.  During  the  anxious  night  and  following  day, 
enveloped  by  the  yelling  barbarians,  the  Romans  strengthened 
their  lines  and  both  sides  prepared  for  action.  On  the  third  day 
Marius  offered  battle.  In  the  night  he  had  posted  a  small  force, 
with  the  grooms  and  camp-followers  mounted  on  baggage-horses, 
in  the  enemy's  rear,  invisible  among  the  hills  and  trees.  His  main 
body  was  drawn  up  on  the  crest.  The  Teutones  anticipated  the 
attack,  charging  up  the  slope.  The  charge  was  checked  at  close 
quarters  by  a  volley  of  javelins  ;  the  infantry  fell  at  the  sword's- 
point  on  the  blown  and  staggered  Germans,  while  Marcellus  burst 
from  the  ambuscade.  Alarmed  for  their  rear,  broken  by  the  severe 
struggle  in  the  unwonted  heat,  the  Teutones  gave  way,  the  king  was 
captured,  the  army  annihilated,  many  of  the  women  slew  themselves 
in  despair.  This  decisive  battle  was  fought  in  the  valley  of  the 
Arc,  on  a  range  of  hills  still  known  as  Mont  St.  Victoire.  Marius' 
idea  had  been  to  secure  the  most  favourable  conditions,  by  induc- 
ing the  enemy  to  take  the  long  and  difificult  coast  road,  wedged 
in  between  the  mountains  and  the  sea,  where  they  would  be  en- 
cumbered by  their  waggons  and  unable  to  utilise  their  numbers. 
Accordingly  he  had  hung  on  their  rear,  harassed  their  march,  and 
waited  for  a  convenient  position  on  ground  that  he  had  previously 
surveyed,  to  intercept  and  destroy  them.  The  names  in  the 
district  still  recall  the  famous  fight  which  saved  Rome. 

Battle  on  the  Raudine  Plain.— The  victor,  re-elected  consul  for 
a  fifth  time,  refusing  a  triumph,  sent  on  his  army  to  North  Italy, 
and  proceeded  from  Rome  against  the  Cimbri  in  loi  B.C.  They 
had  traversed  Helvetia,  and  descended  into  Italy  by  the  pass  of  the 
Brenner  and  the  valley  of  the  Adige.  On  the  Athesis,  Q.  Lutatius 
Catulus  (consul  lo3  B.C.)  had  posted  himself  to  stop  their  passage 
somewhere  near  Verona  (neglecting  the  upper  defiles  above  Tri- 
dentum),  but  was  forced  to  retire  by  the  cowardice  of  his  troops, 
whose  retreat  he  secured  with  difficulty.  To  do  this  he  sacrificed 
a  detachment,  which  was  only  saved  by  the  heroism  of  a  centurion 


AQU.^  SEXTL^  AND  CAM  PI  RAUDII 


3»- 


and  the  chivalry  of  the  Cinibri.  He  brought  his  army  with  difficuky 
across  the  Po,  and  left  the  enemy  to  make  themselves  comfortable 
in  the  prosperous  land  he  had  so  shamefully  evacuated.  Catulus, 
who  took  great  credit  to  himself  for  his  performance,  remained  in 
command  as  proconsul  (loi  B.C.),  and  on  the  arrival  of  Marius  the 
two  generals  crossed  the  Po  with  50,000  men.  They  met  the 
Cimbri,  who  had  marched  up-stream  to  find  a  crossing,  at  Vercellse, 
not  far  from  the  Sesia.  The  story  runs  that,  on  the  challenge  of 
Boiorix,  IMarius  consented  to  appoint  a  time  and  place  for  battle 
— 30th  July  loi  B.C.,  on  the  Campi  Raudii,  half-way  between  Turin 
and  Milan.  'I'he  plain  would  be  serviceable  for  the  superior  Roman 
cavalry,  an  arm  in  which  the  invaders  were  throughout  deficient. 

Marius,  placing  in  the  centre,  which  he  drew  back,  the  demo- 
ralised troops  of  Catulus,  distributed  his  veterans  on  the  flanks. 
The  Cimbric  infantry  is  said  to  have  formed  a  square  i\  miles 
each  side.  Their  horse,  surprised  in  a  morning  mist,  was  forced 
back  on  the  advancing  foot.  The  heat  of  summer  told  on  the 
Northerners  ;  the  wind,  dust,  and  sun  were  all  in  their  faces  ; 
but  the  victory  was  decided  by  the  trained  discipline  of  the 
Roman  infantry  and  the  ability  of  Marius.  Driven  back  to  their 
waggons,  where  the  women  fell  upon  the  fugitives  with  knives 
and  axes,  the  Cimbri  were  annihilated.  Their  wives  and  daughters 
preferred  death  by  the  enemy's  sword  or  self-destruction  to  the 
doom  of  Roman  slaves.  Catulus  claimed  the  chief  merit,  but  to 
the  consul  commanding  belonged  the  title  of  "  Saviour  of  Rome." 
With  his  victories  closed  the  first  act  of  the  struggle  of  the 
Roman  and  the  Teuton.  Marius  contented  himself  with  a 
single  triumph,  which  he  shared  with  Catulus,  but  the  rivalry  of 


DENARIUS   STRUCK.    lOI    B.C. — TRIUMPH    OK    M.\RIUS  ;    THE   GODDESS,    KOMp:. 


the  generals  became  a  political  antagonism  between  the  popular 
and  senatorial  champions.  Catulus,  a  convinced  aristocrat  and 
bitter  enemy  of  Marius,  an  elegant  and  accomplished  memoir- 


384  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

writer,  orator,  and  dilettante,  was  a  stron^^  foji  to  ^hc  rude  soldier, 
who  had  tlic  shocking  taste  to  step  from  his  chariot  to  the  Senate- 
house  without  changing  his  robe  of  triumph.  It  was  an  omen  of 
his  fate.  He  brought  to  the  field  of  politics  a  mind  and  character 
as  unfit  for  subtle  party  manoeuvres  as  it  was  incapable  of  the 
broad  strokes  of  policy  needed  at  this  moment. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

SATURNINUS,    MARIUS,    AND    THEIR    TIMES 

li.C.  A.U.C. 

Lex  Domitia 104  650 

Slave  War  in  Sicily 103-99      651-655 

Coalition  of  Marius  and  the  Demagogues  -  Laws  of 
Saturninus — Death  of  Saturninus  and  Glaucia — Fall 
of  Marius 100  654 

Party  Struggles. — During  the  wars  party  struggles  had  been 
bitter  at  Rome.  The  populares,  supported  by  public  wrath 
at  the  failures  of  the  government,  had  again  made  head,  and 
matters  were  fast  approaching  a  crisis.  We  have  mentioned  inci- 
dentally the  judicial  commissions  and  convictions  which  followed 
the  scandals  and  disasters  in  Africa  and  Gaul,  and  the  popular 
movement,  which,  with  a  wave  of  indignation,  swept  Marius  to 
the  top.  For  the  failures  in  Gaul,  as  in  Africa,  only  more  so, 
public  opinion  made  the  Senate  and  its  officers  responsible.  In 
each  case  the  storm  discharged  itself  upon  the  wretched  scape- 
goats, who  suffered  for  the  sins  of  their  order  as  much  as  for 
their  own  incompetence  and  treason.  The  system  was  left  un- 
reformed,  perhaps  because  there  was  no  way  to  reform  it,  and 
with  an  instinctive  certainty  men  turned  to  the  one  strong  man 
who,  they  hoped,  would  manage  better.  Party  power  oscillated  a 
good  deal.  In  106  B.C.  Q.  Servilius  Caepio,  "patron  of  the  Senate," 
and  possibly  leader  of  an  anti-democratic  movement,  proposed  a 
law  restoring  the  judicial  power  wholly  or  in  part  to  the  Senate, 
a  measure  which,  if  carried,  was  swept  away  on  his  fall  by  an- 
other Lex  Servilia  of  the  tribune  Glaucia.  The  same  year  saw 
the  birth  of  Cicero  and  the  great  Pompeius.  But  for  the  internal 
history  of  this  time  we  have  even  less  authority  than  for  the 
external.  The  abundant  literature  of  the  period  has  left  but  the 
merest  outline  and   most  meag-re  abridg-ment  behind  it.      Laws 


RELIGION  385 

were  passed  and  repealed,  but  no  man  of  mark  came  forward  on 
either  side  with  a  strong  policy.  There  was  a  growing  tendency 
towards  violence,  which  left  no  room  for  constitutional  growth. 

Lex  Domitia.— The  deposition  of  Cspio  by  popular  decree 
(though  not  illegal,  for  proconsular  power  was  not  a  definite 
office)  was  a  marked  interference  with  the  Senate's  prerogative. 
Equally  noticeable  is  the  tribunician  Lex  Domitia  of  104  B.C.  {vide 
supra,  p.  289),  which  transferred  to  the  people  the  right  of  nomi- 
nation to  the  religious  colleges.  A  proposal  to  this  effect  had  been 
defeated  in  145  B.C.,  when  it  formed  part  of  an  abortive  attempt  of 
the  tribune  C.  Licinius  Crassus  to  anticipate  the  democratic  re- 
forms of  the  Gracchi.  On  this  occasion  it  was  carried  by  a  noble 
ancestor  of  the  Emperor  Nero,  a  candidate  who  had  been  black- 
balled by  one  of  these  exclusive  clubs.  Co-optation,  which  placed 
the  ordination  of  priests,  under  the  protection  of  heaven,  in  the 
hands  of  its  ministers,  was  obsolete  now  that  these  ministers 
formed  part  and  parcel  of  a  go\ernment  machinery.  The  priest 
had  become  politician  ;  henceforth  the  politician  would  be  priest. 
This  new  development,  however,  swept  away  one  more  restraint 
upon  hasty  and  ill-considered  legislation,  carried  through  in  a 
single  chamber  of  the  most  unpromising  elements. 

Superstition  at  Rome. — Little  indeed  remained  of  the  old  faith 
now  but  its  form  and  the  superstitious  terrors  of  the  masses. 
During  the  Cimbric  alarms  there  occurred  a  hideous  scandal, 
followed  by  a  cruel  outburst  of  religious  panic,  not  unmixed  with 
meaner  political  intrigues,  to  which  the  sacred  and  high-born 
\estals  and  many  noble  Romans  fell  victims,  and  which  only 
ended  in  a  human  sacrifice  of  two  Greeks  and  two  Gauls,  to  pacify 
the  incensed  deities — a  relic  of  primeval  barbarism  forbidden  later 
on  by  a  Senaius  Consulium  of  97  B.C.  There  was  a  special  com- 
mission under  the  Peducasan  law,  presided  over  by  the  aged  and 
severe  Cassius.  Prosecutions  grew  in  this  ancient  version  of 
Titus  Dates'  plot  ;  the  meanest  evidence  was  raked  up.  The 
trial  of  the  noble  maidens  by  a  secular  court,  while  it  set  aside 
the  religious  jurisdiction  of  the  chief  pontiff,  was  also  an  in- 
direct attack  on  the  upper  classes.  The  sad  and  disgusting  story 
is  equally  symptomatic  of  inner  rottenness,  whether  the  gross 
charges  were  proved  indeed  or  were  merely  the  result  of  diseased 
imagination,  party  rancour,  and  vulgar  panic.  Such  things  at 
least  were  credible  of  the  highest  society  at  Rome. 

The  void  of  faith  was  filled  more  and  more  with  the  passionate 
rites  and  mystical  beliefs  of  the  East,  whose  frantic  ceremonies 

2  B 


386  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  self-deluded  impostors  and  fakirs  found  welcome  with  the 
gapmg  mob.  The  influx  of  dey^radinj,"'  superstitions  was  at  once 
a  cause  and  an  effect  of  the  declining  respect  for  the  old  religion. 
The    customary    remedies    of  strict    censorships    and    sumptuary 


PART  OF  A  STATUE  OF  A  VESTAL. 


legislation  were  applied  with  the  usual  result.  Cynical  semions 
on  the  duty  of  marriage  and  restrictions  on  the  price  of  dinners 
were  as  unavailing  to  mend  morals  and  hinder  extravagance  as 
the  condemnation  of  schools  of  rhetoric  and  modern  education 


APPULEIUS  SATURNINUS  387 

by  the  cultured  orator  L.  Crassus,  censor  92  B.C.,  was  to  prevent 
the  new  ideas  from  leavening  the  lump  of  Roman  rudeness.  The 
most  salutary  feature  in  the  new  movement  was  the  spread  of  the 
Stoic  doctrine  among  thoughtful  men. 

Saturninus. — The  main  incidents  in  the  political  struggle  were, 
after  all,  the  attacks  on  the  Senate  involved  in  the  appointment  of 
the  two  commissions  of  inquiry.  The  first  belonged  to  the  story 
of  the  Jugurthan  war  ;  the  second  is  connected  with  the  first 
tribunate  of  L.  Appuleius  Saturninus.  This  notorious  man,  a 
sensitive  and  aspiring  nature,  as  a  speaker  vehement  and  vigo- 
rous, who  had  been  superseded  by  the  Senate  in  the  office  of 
corn-qua;stor  at  Ostia,  in  favour  of  Scaurus,  the  Princeps  Senatus, 
had  in  his  mortification  reformed  his  careless  and  irregular  habits, 
and  flung  himself  into  political  life  as  leader  of  the  opposition. 
He  was  not  precisely  the  dangerous  and  turbulent  demagogue 
he  has  been  painted,  but  for  the  next  three  years  he  was  a  most 
troublesome  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Senate.  The  acts  of  his  two 
tribunates  are  not  easy  to  disentangle.  He  supported  the  fourth 
candidature  of  Marius  (103  B.C.),  and  apparently  proposed,  and 
possibly  carried  by  means  of  violence,  an  abortive  law  for  distri- 
buting land  in  Africa  in  large  allotments  to  Marius'  Roman  and 
Italian  veterans. 

Lex  de  Maiestate. — To  this  year  also  may  ha\e  belonged 
the  Lex  Appuleia  de  Maiestate,  which  was  largely  the  work  of 
his  colleague  Norbanus.  It  was  primarily  directed  against  the 
persons  responsible  for  the  fiascos  and  scandals  in  Gaul,  and  from 
it  arose  the  commission  which  condemned  the  generals  of  Arausio. 
Crepio,  contrary  to  precedent,  was  actually  arrested,  and  would 
have  suffered  death,  in  spite  of  the  stoutest  resistance  of  his  friends, 
but  for  the  self-sacrifice  of  a  loyal  tribune.  He,  indeed,  owed  his 
fall  as  much  perhaps  to  the  anger  of  the  equites,  who  afterwards 
acquitted  his  enemy  Norbanus,  as  to  his  misconduct  in  Gaul.  Nor- 
banus was  brought  under  its  provisions  by  a  reaction  in  94  B.C.  ;  for, 
though  not  intended  as  a  general  law,  its  loose  wording  could 
readily  be  stretched.  He  was  defended  by  the  great  orator 
Antonius  on  the  ground  that  his  violence  was  excused  by  the 
necessities  of  the  time.  The  expression  inaiestatem  niiniiere,  to 
impair  the  honour  or  diminish  the  power  of  Rome,  was  as  elastic 
as  the  modern  phrase,  "conduct  calculated  to  bring  the  government 
into  contempt."  Republished  by  the  Lex  Varia  of  91  B.C.,  and  ex- 
tended by  the  Lex  Cor/ielia  of  Sulla,  this  law  was  the  foundation 
of  the  imperial  statute  of  treason.     But  it  may  have  been  con- 


388  IHSTORY  OF  ROME 

nected,  not  with  the  Gallic  commission,  but  with  the  Appiileian 
Com  Law  of  uncertain  date  ;  and  the  Ca^pio  impeached  may  have 
been  the  urban  cjuiestor  who,  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  had 
opposed  the  measure  in  the  Senate,  and,  when  that  bod)'  resolved 
that  the  law  was  dangerous  to  the  state,  attempted  by  violence 
to  stop  the  voting  in  the  Comitia.  In  that  case  the  law  would  be 
designed  to  fortify  the  power  of  the  Iriljune  and  the  party  of  the 
populares. 

Glaucia. — In  the  interval  between  Appuleius'  two  tribunates  the 
censor  Metellus  Numidicus  (102  B.C.)  tried  to  remove  from  the 
Senate,  on  the  ground  of  immorality,  Saturninus  himself  and  the 
favourite  street-speaker,  C.  Servilius  Glaucia,  denounced  by  Cicero 
as  a  vulgar,  shameless,  and  witty  fellow,  a  sort  of  Roman  Hyper- 
bolus,  but  obviously  a  capable  orator  and  a  clever  politician.  His 
popular  gifts  had  brought  him  to  the  top,  with  the  support  of  the 
knights,  pleased  by  his  abrogation  of  the  law  of  Ca:pio.  But  the 
attempt  to  exclude  the  opposition  leaders,  frustrated  by  his  col- 
league, recoiled  on  the  head  of  its  author.  Set  upon  by  Satur- 
ninus in  his  house  and  besieged  on  the  Capitol,  Metellus  was 
only  rescued  by  the  aid  of  the  equites  of  the  eighteen  centuries. 
Another  scandal  arose  when  Appuleius  attacked  the  envoys  of 
Mithradates  for  bribery,  and  incurred  serious  danger  by  his  im- 
prudent revelations. 

Marius  as  a  Politician. — The  elections  for  100  B.C.  were  marked 
by  grave  disturbances.  Marius  had  discharged  the  army,  which 
he  had  no  idea  of  using  to  overthrow  the  constitution.  For  that 
the  time  was  not  ripe.  He  relied  on  his  popularity  and  the  votes 
of  his  veterans"  to  gain  his  ends.  Forced  into  opposition  by  the 
aristocracy,  circumstances  made  him  the  natural  leader  of  a  party. 
The  great  man  of  the  hour,  popular  as  much  by  his  defects  as 
by  his  virtues,  his  head  turned  by  his  success,  he  was  called  to 
a  part  for  which  he  was  unfit,  and  became  the  instrument  of  men 
whose  aims  he  scarcely  understood.  Accustomed  to  command, 
and  yet  incapable  of  civil  eminence,  he  clung  to  his  seven 
predicted  consulships,  when  there  was  no  longer  room  for  him 
in  the  state.  The  frugal  plebeian,  without  tact  or  taste,  was  out 
of  his  element  in  Roman  society  ;  the  plain  soldier  had  no  talent 
for  intrigue,  no  gift  for  oratory.  Hence,  like  Pompeius,  when  he 
took  the  constitutional  path  to  his  wishes  he  placed  himself  in 
the  hands  of  his  party  managers.  He  allied  himself  with  Satur- 
ninus and  Glaucia.  The  interests  and  aims  of  the  three  men 
coincided.      The   result   was  a  scjualid  version   of  the   Gracchan 


MARIUS  AND  SATURNINUS  389 

movement.  For  the  popular  party  had  fallen  to  pieces.  The 
bottom  had  been  knocked  out  of  many  ideals,  and  the  more 
moderate  men  were  afraid  of  revolution.  Apart  from  brilliant 
speakers  like  Memmius  and  Crassus,  who  won  their  spurs  in  oppo- 
sition and  passed  with  place  to  the  government,  the  only  leaders 
were  mortified  nobles  and  noisy  obstructionists.  Power  was  now 
in  their  grasp  and  public  feeling  behind  them,  but  the  coalition 
failed  ;  the  popular  idol  lost  his  self-possession  on  the  hustings. 
Like  Pompeius  again,  he  had  no  political  courage  ;  he  wanted 
to  secure  a  prominent  position  and  rewards  for  his  veterans  by 
constitutional  means,  a  loyal  dull  man,  led  astray  by  ambition  and 
his  associates.  Only  once,  on  the  field  of  Vercelke,  had  he  shown 
a  disposition  to  transgress  the  law,  when  he  promised  the  fran- 
chise to  some  brave  Italians,  saying  afterwards  that  in  the  din 
of  battle  he  could  not  hear  the  voice  of  the  laws.  He  was  in  a 
dilemma  between  his  honesty  and  his  ambition,  pushed  on  faster 
than  his  ideas  could  grow,  and  in  the  crisis  which  followed  he 
cannot  be  acquitted  of  a  duplicity  and  dishonesty  foreign  to  his 
nature.  His  associates,  again,  with  all  their  skill  in  party  intrigues 
and  mob  violence,  were  too  wild  and  impetuous  to  conceive  or 
carry  out  a  consistent  programme. 

The  Laws  of  Saturninus. —  By  canvass  and  bribery,  ISIarius 
secured  his  own  election,  thwarted  the  senatorial  candidate,  Metel- 
lus,  and  received  a  harmless  colleague  in  L.  Valerius  Flaccus. 
Glaucia  was  elected  praetor.  At  the  tribunician  elections  there  was 
an  uproar.  Saturninus  only  succeeded  in  getting  the  tenth  place  by 
the  murder  of  the  government  candidate,  Nonius.  The  coalition 
had  obtained  office  by  hook  or  by  crook.  Their  first  measure,  in 
itself  reasonable,  was  an  agrarian  law,  which  proposed  to  distribute 
all  the  land  conquered  by  the  Cimbri,  which,  on  Roman  principles, 
became  public  land  by  the  defeat  of  its  conquerors,  and  all  avail- 
able soil  in  Sicily,  Achaia,  and  ALacedon,  mainly  no  doubt  for  the 
benefit  of  the  veterans.  It  opened  a  side-door  to  the  franchise 
by  including  a  certain  number  of  Italians  in  each  of  the  burgess 
colonies  to  be  founded.  Rlarius  was  to  carry  out  the  assigna- 
tions and  the  necessary  military  work,  probably  by  means  of  con- 
tinuous consulships,  and  would  thus  enjoy  a  position  of  indefinite 
power.  Thus  the  Gracchan  ideas  of  trans-Alpine  extension  and 
colonisation,  of  the  limitation  of  the  Senate,  and  Italian  franchise 
were  resumed,  but  instead  of  successive  tribunates  we  have  suc- 
cessive consulates  and  the  rise  of  the  military  power.  The  equites 
were  at  first  inclined  to  favour  their  ancient  allies  and  to  support 


390  II/STO/n-    OF  A' CUE 

the  soldier  wlio  promised  to  secure  vigorous  yovcrnment  and 
commercial  expansion.  They  were  never  unwilling  to  curtail  the 
powers  of  the  Senate.  The  coalition  bid  for  the  favour  of  the  peo])!e 
by  lowering  the  price  of  corn  to  a  purely  nominal  sum.  a  measure 
whose  date  and  fate  are,  it  is  true,  a  little  uncertain,  but  the  people 
remained  indifferent  or  hostile.  Saturninus'  real  support  lay  in  the 
Marian  veterans,  for  whom  the  agrarian  law  provided,  and  who 
carried  it  by  violence  in  the  teeth  of  the  omens,  the  populace,  and 
the  nobles.  There  was  a  riot,  in  which  the  rustics  and  veterans 
dispersed  the  urban  mob,  and  even  the  obstructing  tribunes  were 
insulted.  To  the  announcement,  as  an  omen,  of  an  impending 
thunderstorm  Saturninus  replied  by  bidding  the  Senate  beware 
of  the  hailstones.  The  Bill  contained  a  clause  designed  to  enforce 
its  execution,  by  which  the  senators  must,  within  five  days,  swear 
to  obser\'e  it  on  pain  of  fine  and  forfeiture  of  their  seat — an  in- 
sulting provision,  which,  precisely  reversing  the  constitutional 
practice,  prevented  any  discussion  or  amendment.  Marius  be- 
haved in  a  strange  way.  At  first  he  refused  compliance,  and  was 
followed  by  the  Senate  ;  but  when  the  appointed  time  had  almost 
lapsed,  he  summoned  the  Senate,  declared  that  he  was  afraid 
of  the  people,  and  took  the  oath  to  respect  the  law  "  in  so  far 
as  it  was  legal,"  hoping  by  this  device  to  satisfy  the  veterans 
and  leave  himself  a  loophole  of  escape.  The  Senate  accepted 
the  oath  with  the  same  proviso,  with  the  solitary  exception  of 
Metellus,  who  alone  maintained  his  self-respect  and  left  Rome 
to  study  philosophy  in  exile.  The  action  of  the  Senate  in  taking 
the  oath  and  sacrificing-  their  leader  was  fatal  to  its  authority. 

Failure  and  Death  of  Saturninus.— To  carry  out  the  law  meant 
the  re-election  of  the  coalition.  Saturninus,  indeed,  was  elected  to 
a  third  tribunate,  and  with  him  a  pseudo-Gracchus,  an  impostor, 
who,  in  spite  of  Marius  himself,  was  released  from  prison  and 
raised  to  office  by  the  people.  But  the  consular  elections  ended 
in  confusion.  The  orator  Antonius  had  been  chosen  for  one  ;  for 
the  second  place,  C.  Memmius,  the  renegade,  was  illegally  opposed 
by  Glaucia,  who,  as  prtetor  of  the  year,  was  ineligible.  Memmius 
was  publicly  murdered  by  bravos,  and  the  next  day  there  was  an 
appeal  to  arms.  On  the  one  side  stood  the  rustics  and  veterans, 
whipped  up  from  the  country,  with  whose  aid  Saturninus  and 
Glaucia  seized  the  Capitol,  at  the  same  time  opening  the  prisons 
and  summoning  the  slaves.  On  the  other  were  the  optimates, 
with  their  clients,  and  the  equites  of  the  eighteen  centuries,  with 
their  armed  slaves.     The  Senate  summoned  Marius  to  interfere, 


FALL   OF  MA  K I  US  391 

and  eni]w\vercd  the  magistrates  to  use  force.  Reluctantly  he 
prepared  to  attack  his  friends.  They  had  gone  too  far,  and  the 
consul  must  either  stamp  out  riot  or  proclaim  revolution.  The 
Senate  turned  out  01  masse;  the  tottering  Scaurus,  the  aged 
augur  Scjevola,  donned  their  disused  ai-mour.  The  city  was 
guarded  within  and  without.  There  was  a  battle  in  the  Forum, 
the  first  fought  in  Rome  ;  the  rebels  were  driven  to  the  Capitol, 
and  when  Marius  cut  off  the  water,  finally  surrendered.  Hoping 
to  save  them,  he  placed  them  in  the  Curia  Hostilia,  but  when 
the  young  nobles  stormed  the  roof  and  pelted  the  prisoners  to 
death  he  was  forced  to  let  them  perish. 

Fall  of  Marius  (Dec.  10,  100). — In  the  massacre  fell  four  officers 
of  the  Roman  people,  with  other  men  of  note,  and  with  them  fell 
the  power  and  credit  of  Marius.  The  cause  of  the  disaster  lay 
partly  in  the  vacillation  and  incompetence  of  Marius,  who  could 
neither  control  nor  support  his  associates,  partly  in  the  reckless 
and  riotous  conduct  of  Saturninus  and  Glaucia,  which  alarmed 
the  wealthier  classes  and  consolidated  the  opposition.  Men  were 
ready  to  support  a  strong  and  upright  man  in  cleansing  the  ad- 
ministration, but  not  to  sacrifice  material  interests  to  military 
rowdyism  and  mob  rule.  Marius  himself  was  half  afraid  of  his 
allies,  and  wished  to  gain  his  own  ends  and  wash  his  hands  of 
the  consequences.  He  is  even  said,  on  one  occasion,  to  have 
passed  from  room  to  room  of  his  house,  like  a  man  in  a  comedy, 
negotiating  alternately  with  senators  and  conspirators.  In  the  end 
his  colleagues  went  on  without  him.  They  were  not  prepared 
to  work  without  wages.  For  them  to  resign  was  destruction.  But 
the  murder  of  Memmius  was  a  blunder  ;  it  forced  Marius'  hand. 
Outmanoeuvred  by  his  opponents,  and  compromised  by  his  friends, 
he  was  forced  to  cut  away  his  own  supports,  and  fell  at  once, 
unhonoured,  unregretted,  unattacked.  The  coalition  had  been 
smashed.  The  equites  drew  towards  the  Senate  as  the  sole  hope 
of  order  ;  Metellus  returned  in  triumph  ;  a  protesting  tribune  was 
murdered  by  the  crowd  ;  the  victor  of  Vercellas,  afraid  to  stand 
for  the  censorship,  withdrew  to  the  East,  and  came  back  to  find 
himself  a  nonentity,  to  nurse  ambition  and  meditate  revenge  in 
his  perverted  soul.  The  populares  were  scattered  ;  some  fled 
even  to  Pontus  to  join  Mithradates.  The  Appuleian  laws  were 
cancelled,  and  when  the  tribune  Titius,  a  paltry  ape  of  Saturninus, 
attempted  to  revive  the  Agrarian  Bill  in  99  B.C.,  not  only  was  it 
annulled  on  religious  pretexts,  but  the  tribune  and  other  demo- 
crats were  zealously  convicted  by  the  equestrian  courts,  Norbanus 


392  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

hinibclf  li.irely  escaping  because  he  bad  punished  ihe  hated 
Crcpio. 

Slave-rising  in  Sicily. — The  fall  of  Marius  left  the  government  in 
a  strong  position  at  home.  Abroad  there  was  little  to  do,  and  that 
little  was  more  efficiently  done.  A  rising  in  Spain  was  vigorously 
suppressed  (97-93  B.C.,  vide  supra.,  p.  372),  and  the  year  99  is.c. 
saw  the  end  of  a  dangerous  insurrection  in  Sicily.  It  had  resembled 
its  predecessor  in  all  its  incidents  except  its  immediate  cause. 
Once  more  there  had  been  a  general  ferment  among  the  slaves. 
Serious  riots  had  occurred  at  Nuceria  and  Capua,  and  at  Thurii 
an  enamoured  and  indebted  knight,  T.  Vettius,  to  gain  his  love 
and  escape  his  creditors,  raised  a  revolt,  called  himself  king,  and 
required  the  arts  and  arms  of  a  prietor  to  crush  his  mad  outbreak. 
In  Attica  the  slaves  and  convicts  who  worked  the  silver-mines 
mutinied,  and,  above  all,  in  Sicily  the  old  causes,  lax  police,  cruel 
masters,  and  the  excessive  numbers  of  the  slaves,  produced  the 
old  effects.  Feeling  first  found  vent  when  P.  Licinius  Nerva,  the 
governor,  in  obedience  to  a  decree  of  the  Senate  (B.C.  104),  took 
measures  to  release  free  men  kidnapped  and  sent  to  the  planta- 
tions by  pirates  or  publicani.  This  decree  was  due  to  a  statement 
of  Nicomedes  II.  of  Bithynia,  in  reply  to  a  demand  for  auxiliaries, 
that  his  able-bodied  men  had  been  mostly  kidnapped.  The 
Senate  directed  the  governor  to  see  to  the  matter,  and  Nerva 
had  in  consequence  set  at  liberty  800  men.  But,  frightened  by 
the  remonstrances  of  the  aggrieved  slave-holders  and  the  excite- 
ment among  the  slaves,  he  suspended  action,  with  the  result  that 
the  expectant  and  defrauded  suitors  fled  from  Syracuse  to  sanc- 
tuary. But  the  rising  was  nipped  in  the  bud  with  the  aid  of  an 
escaped  convict  and  popular  brigand  who  betrayed  the  runaways. 

Tryphon  and  Athenic— Suppressed  for  the  moment,  it  broke 
out  in  another  place.  The  defeat  of  a  detachment  from  Enna  gave 
the  insurgents  arms  and  encouragement.  Once  more  there  were  no 
etfective  troops,  and  the  wretched  and  ruined  labourers  supported 
the  slaves,  themiserable  instruments  of  their  own  decay.  Oncemore 
a  juggling  prophet  called  Salvius  was  declared  king  by  the  Syrians, 
and  took  the  name  of  Tryphon,  after  the  slave  who  had  usurped  the 
crown  of  Syria  (142  B.C.).  Order  and  discipline  were  introduced, 
and  with  a  powerful  force  the  king  took  the  offensive,  fell  upon 
Morgantia,  and  defeated  a  relieving  army,  dispersing  the  Greek 
militia,  who  flung  away  their  arms  to  save  their  skins.  The  town 
was  rescued  by  the  courage  of  the  domestic  slaves,  whose  promised 
freedom  was  afterwards  refused.     In  the  west,  Athenio,  a  Cilician 


SLAVE-IVAKS  393 

brigand  chief,  repeated  the  part  of  Cleon.  A  skilful  soldier,  a 
star-reader  and  dealer  in  the  supernatural,  he  headed  the  revolt, 
organised  an  army,  enforced  discipline,  and  by  his  ability  and 
clemency  earned  popularity  and  success.  To  the  disappointment 
of  the  Romans,  he  submitted  to  the  king.  The  rebels  fortified 
their  headquarters  in  a  strong  position  called  Triocala,  in  the 
centre  of  the  island,  where  Tryphon  paraded  his  royalty  as 
an  Eastern  despot  with  Roman  insignia.  They  failed  in  their 
attacks  on  the  towns,  notably  at  Lilybasum,  but  with  the  help  of 
the  free  labourers  they  controlled  the  plains  and  spread  famine 
and  misery  through  the  land.  Even  in  the  towns,  with  the  aid  of 
African  contingents,  the  masters,  cut  off  from  their  estates,  barely 
controlled  the  slaves  inside.  In  103  B.C.,  in  spite  of  the  Cimbric 
disasters,  the  government  scraped  together  a  mixed  force,  contain- 
ing few  Italian  troops,  under  L.  Lucullus,  who  gained  a  victory 
near  Scirthaea  over  an  enemy  40,000  strong.  But  his  negligence 
or  his  losses  prevented  his  following  it  up.  He  was  forced  to 
retire  from  Triocala,  and  was  afterwards  condemned  on  a  charge 
of  peculation.  He  was  succeeded  in  102  B.C.  by  Servilius,  who  did 
nothing,  and  received  the  reward  of  his  predecessor.  Tryphon 
appears  to  have  died  ;  but  Athenio,  who  had  been  left  for  dead  at 
Scirthcca,  revived,  and  ranged  the  island  unimpeded,  nearly  captur- 
ing Messana  by  surprise.  At  last,  in  loi  B.C.,  M'.  Aquillius,  the 
consul,  defeated  and  slew  Athenio  in  single  combat,  stormed  the 
strongholds,  and  after  two  years'  hard  fig"hting,  pacified  the  island. 

The  Pirates. — There  had  been  five  years  of  misery,  outrage, 
and  anarchy.  Sicily,  stripped  of  its  labourers,  desolated  by  ravage, 
slowly  recovered  under  a  short  spell  of  liberal  government ;  but 
the  old  evils  were  not  cured.  The  administration  of  the  provinces, 
with  rare  exceptions,  remained  what  it  had  been,  while  the  state 
of  the  seas  was  so  bad  that  even  this  government  was  obliged 
to  deal  with  it.  In  103  B.C.  M.  Antonius,  the  praetor,  was  sent  out 
with  proconsular  powers,  and  a  fleet  raked  together  from  the  allies, 
to  Cilicia,  where  he  destroyed  the  ships  and  castles  of  the  buc- 
caneers. By  the  occupation  of  certain  positions  in  the  rugged 
Western  Cilicia  along  the  coast,  a  beginning  was  made  of  a  pro- 
vince in  that  region  ;  but  the  solitary  effort  was  ill  sustained,  and 
the  pirates  reasserted  their  sovereignty  of  the  sea. 

The  East. — In  the  East,  as  in  Spain,  the  Senate  was  acting 
with  rather  more  vigour.  Ptolemy  Apion,  natural  son  of  Physcon 
(Ptolemy  Euergetes  II.),  who  had  received  Cyrene  in  117  B.C.,  on  the 
death  of  his  father,  as  a  separate  appanage,  died  in  96  B.C.  and  be- 


394  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

qucathed  his  kingdom  to  Rome.  The  Senate  accepted  the  lej^acy, 
but  while  exercising  a  nominal  supervision  from  Utica,  declared 
the  Greek  cities,  Gyrene,  Ptolemais,  and  lierenice  free,  and  did  not 
create  a  regular  province  till  75  l!.c.  This  curious  mixture  of  in- 
trigue and  negligence,  which  cvadedthe  responsibility  of  annexation, 
while  it  checked  the  aggrandisement  of  Egypt,  handed  over  the 
important  commercial  district  to  intestine  strife.  It  was  a  more 
vigorous  act  when,  in  92  B.C.,  Sulla,  the  rising  man  of  the  senatorial 
party,  was  sent,  as  governor  of  Cilicia,  to  check  the  pirates  and 
settle  the  affairs  of  the  East.  By  his  resource  and  audacity  he 
restrained  for  a  time  the  aggressions  of  Mithradates  and  imposed 
respect  on  Parthia. 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII 

THE    LAWS    OF    DRUSUS 


Lex  Caecilia  Didia  against  Tacking 
Lex  Licinia  Mucia  alienates  the  Italians 
Tribunate  and  Murder  of  Drusus 


B.C.      A.f.C. 


98 

656 

95 

659 

91 

663 

Lex  Caecilia  Didia. — The  failure  of  Saturninus  was  naturally 
followed  by  a  strong  reaction.  The  spectre  of  anarchy  had 
frightened  the  capitalists  and  broken  up  the  purely  political  alli- 
ance invented  by  the  vindictive  genius  of  G.  Gracchus.  In  98  B.C. 
the  government  was  strong  enough  to  carry  through  the  Lex  Ccecilia 
Didia,  proposed  by  the  consuls  Q.  Metellus  Nepos  and  a  iiovus 
homo,  T.  Didius,  designed  to  prevent  hasty  legislation  and  the 
combination  of  different  measures  in  a  single  Bill.  Itself  an 
example  of  the  abuse  it  aimed  at  checking,  it  provided  for  an 
interval  of  a  Roman  fortnight  between  the  introduction  and  passing 
of  a  Bill  {trinu7idinum  =  stv&x\t.&&n  days),  which,  however  inade- 
quate for  the  discussion  of  a  complicated  statute,  would  at  least 
prevent  the  scandalous  surprises  sprung  on  an  ignorant  assembly, 
while  it  forbade  the  so-called  practice  of  tacking — legem  per 
saturam  ferre — which  compelled  a  legislative  body  to  accept  what 
it  did  not  want,  under  pain  of  losing  what  it  did.  But  the  improve- 
ment came  too  late  and  was  indeed  too  slight  to  affect  the 
increasing  oscillation  of  power  and  contempt  for  law,  which  were 
the  results  of  weak  government,  of  the  degradation  of  the  Gomitia, 
and  of  the  statesmanship  of  party  manoeuvre. 


LEX  LICINIA   MUCIA  395 

In  the  same  year  Aquillius  was  acquitted  of  manifest  extor- 
tions in  Sicily,  saved  l)y  his  sei-vices  and  the  rhetoric  of  Antoniiis. 

The  Italians  and  the  Lex  Licinia  Mucia. — In  95  B.C.  the  consuls 
were  the  great  orator  L.  Crassus,  who  failed  to  scrape  a  coveted 
triumph  by  harrying  the  Alpine  glens,  and  the  great  lawyer  of 
a  fainily  of  lawyers,  Q.  Mucius  Scasvola,  Pontifex  Maximus,  an 
able,  upright,  legally  minded  man.  To  these  two  distinguished 
persons  was  due  the  blunder  of  a  mistimed  and  severe  re-enact- 
ment of  the  old  laws  against  aliens,  intended  to  prevent  the 
irregular  voting  and  undue  influence  of  Italians  in  the  Comitia. 
The  Lex  Licinia  Mucia  created  violent  irritation  among  the  allies 
by  prohibiting  non-citizens  from  claiming  or  exercising  the  fran- 
chise, by  inc^uiring  into  the  status  of  resident  aliens,  and  probably 
by  expelling  those  who  usurped  the  right.  Natural  as  it  may  have 
seemed,  useful  even  to  the  depopulated  townships  of  the  allies, 
legal  as  it  undoubtedly  was,  and  fa\ourabIe  as  the  moment  ap- 
peared, the  law  came  as  a  cruel  shock  after  the  patriotic  exertions 
of  the  Cimbric  war,  after  the  hopes  so  often  raised,  after  the  use 
made  of  the  Italians  by  both  parties  in  turn.  It  ended  every  expec- 
tation of  a  liberal  policy.  Its  explicit  provisions  reduced  Rome's 
faithful  allies,  without  distinction,  to  the  status  of  aliens,  and  strictly 
punished  all  transgressors. 

Crassus,  the  popular  accuser  of  Carbo,  the  supporter  of  the 
colony  at  Narbonne,  the  independent  and  moderate  optimate, 
the  ally  of  Drusus  in  his  attack  on  the  ecjuestrian  courts,  a  re- 
spected and  cautious  statesman,  and  Scasvola,  the  honest  governor, 
the  pattern  of  rectitude,  thoughtful  and  temperate  in  policy,  no 
doubt  hoped  to  purify  the  elections,  and,  as  constitutional  lawyers, 
saw  the  inevitable  results  of  civic  expansion,  and  meant  to  maintain 
existing  forms.  But  the  indignation  caused  by  this  law  was  one 
of  the  most  important  antecedents  of  the  Social  War.  As  yet  its 
effect  was  not  apparent. 

Quarrel  between  the  Senate  and  the  Equites. — Attention  was 
absorbed  by  the  imminent  struggle  between  the  Senate  and  equites, 
which  broke  the  nine  years'  interval  of  peace.  The  alliance  of 
equites  and  democrats  being  dissoh-ed,  and  the  mob,  if  duly 
humoured,  being  at  the  disposal  of  the  Senate,  it  only  required 
some  scandal  exciting  public  indignation  to  sweep  away  the 
judicial  privileges  of  the  knights,  who,  through  the  court  of  ex- 
tortions, controlled  the  governors  abroad  and  hampered  the 
Senate  at  home.  It  was  this  which  the  majority  of  that  body 
proposed  to  themselves  in  supporting   the  reforms  of  Drusus — 


396  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

freedom  from  l)Iackmail  and  vexalious  proceedings,  and  the  re- 
storation of  their  privileges.  The  opportunity  arose  from  the 
condemnation  (in  92  B.C.)  of  the  able  and  upright  administrator 
P.  Rutilius  Rufus,  adjutant  and  friend  of  the  lawyer  Q.  Mucius 
Scicvola,  the  exemplary  governor  of  Asia.  Both  had  earned  the 
deadly  hatred  of  the  publican!  and  the  approbation  of  the  .Senate 
by  their  defence  of  the  provincials  and  punishment  of  outrage  ; 
but  vengeance  fell  alone  on  the  less  well-friended  soldier,  the 
plain  Stoic,  who  despised  the  artifices  of  the  advocates,  and  died 
in  honoured  and  lettered  exile  at  Smyrna.  This  gross  miscarriage 
of  justice,  an  infamous  conviction  on  a  charge  preferred  by  an 
infamous  informer,  filled  the  cup  of  equestrian  misconduct.  All 
who  were  indignant  at  the  plunder  of  the  provinces  were  ready  to 
join  in  an  attack  which  promised  at  the  same  time  to  restore 
independence  to  their  order. 

Livius  Drusus.— The  assault  was  headed  by  M.  Livius  Drusus, 
tribune  of  91  B.C.,  an  enigmatical  character  whose  policy  and  actions 
remain  a  mystery.  Emphatically  a  noble  of  a  conservative  family, 
the  son  of  Gracchus'  opponent,  a  man  of  good  position  and  large 
fortune,  proud,  earnest,  ardent,  direct,  lavish  of  public  and  private 
resources,  respected  indeed  for  his  high  aims  and  strong  per- 
sonality, but  popular  neither  with  weak-kneed  senators  nor  lazy 
piiupers,  he  had  no  political  tact,  no  skill  in  party  manoeuvres, 
and  little  capacity  for  guiding  men  or  controlling  movements. 
Among  his  supporters  were  Scaurus,  the  orator  Crassus,  the  augur 
Scievola,  the  reformer  Sulpicius  Rufus,  and  generally  the  moderate 
conservatives  of  the  Senate.  He  was  bitterly  opposed  by  the- 
shifty  consul  L.  Marcius  Philippus,  once  spokesman  of  the  demo- 
crats, and  author  of  a  confiscatory  land  law,  now  the  voice  of 
the  equites,  destined  to  be  a  democratic  censor,  and  finally  a 
Sullan  renegade  ;  by  the  violent,  reactionary  Q.  Ca^pio,  son  of 
the  Tolosa  man,  and  by  all  the  ultra-Tories.  His  programme  of 
conservative  reform  on  Gracchan  lines  was  borrowed  from  both 
parties  ;  he  meant  to  trump  the  enemy's  cards  by  utilising  their 
measures  for  the  benefit  of  the  Senate.  His  main  ideas  were 
two — the  reconstitution  of  the  Senate  and  the  extension  of  the 
franchise  to  the  Italians.  To  carry  these  through,  and  possibly 
with  a  hope  of  checking  pauperism,  he  was  prepared  to  bribe 
the  populace  with  corn  and  land,  and,  while  steering  clear  of 
assassination  and  riot,  to  use,  if  necessary,  the  strong  hand. 

The    Leges   Liviae. — Therefore,  keeping  for  the  moment  the 
franchise  in  the  background,  he  brought  forward  a  Lex  Irunicn- 


ZJJFS  OF  DRUSUS  397 

taria,  probably  increasing  the  doles  (covering  the  expense  by 
depreciation  of  the  coinage),  and  an  Agrarian  Law,  perhaps  pro- 
viding for  the  establishment  of  the  colonies  promised  by  his 
father  in  122  B.C.  To  these  was  tacked  a.  Lex  mduiaria,  involving 
a  sort  of  compromise  between  the  Senate  and  the  equites.  He 
proposed  to  institute  a  new  Albinn  iudictivi  of  300  senators 
and  3CO  knights,  possibly  at  the  same  time  raising  the  selected 
knights  to  the  dignity  of  senators  to  recruit  the  now  emaciated 
ranks  of  the  order.  He  also  provided  a  court  for  the  investiga- 
tion of  judicial  corruption. 

This  law,  if  intended  to  conciliate  interests  l)y  the  creation  of 
senators  and  the  division  of  powers,  was  not  likely  to  succeed. 
The  equites  lost  at  least  half  their  privileges,  were  bitterly  opposed 
to  the  clause  that  made  jurors  amenable  to  justice,  and  were  not 
appeased  by  a  concession  which  they  regarded  as  a  snare.  The 
new  senators  would  be  popular  with  neither  order.  Contrary  to 
the  law  of  98  B.C.,  and  in  the  teeth  of  the  equites  and  their  agent 
Philippus,  the  laws  were  carried  en  bloc,  with  the  lukewarm  sup- 
port of  the  irresolute  Senate.  There  were  violent  scenes  in  the 
Forum  and  violent  discussions  in  the  House,  which  refused  at 
first  to  desert  its  leader  and  annul  the  laws.  Philippus,  who  had 
publicly  declared  that  with  such  a  Senate  government  was  impos- 
sible, and  that  "he  must  look  out  for  other  advisers,"  was  vehe- 
mently arraigned  by  Crassus,  who  died  with  suspicious  suddenness 
after  his  great  effort,  and  censured  by  a  formal  resolution.  In  the 
Assembly  both  he  and  C;tpio  met  with  rude  handling  from  the 
city  mob  and  the  poorer  Italians,  who  flocked  in  to  support  their 
known  friend  by  intimidation  and  irregular  votes. 

Failure  and  Death  of  Drusus. — But  Drusus,  with  his  tatters  of 
borrowed  policy,  had  no  force  behind  him,  and  when  he  tried  to 
carry  through  his  great  measure  of  Italian  franchise  his  allies 
failed  him.  Uneasiness  had  already  shown  itself;  his  power 
dwindled  as  the  year  went  on.  The  mob,  fickle  in  its  attach- 
ments, was  consistent  in  its  refusal  to  lower  the  money  value  of 
its  franchise.  In  the  Senate  the  majority  was  keen  for  privilege, 
ready  to  bribe,  readier  still,  in  the  tribune's  words,  to  leave  nothing 
for  an  agitator  to  divide  but  ca'luin  aiit  ccenum,  by  doing  his  work 
for  their  own  profit  ;  the  minority  was  not  unfavourable  to  enfran- 
chisement as  a  measure  of  safety,  which  brought  allies  and  evaded 
dangers  at  a  trifling  cost,  but  no  one  was  prepared  for  a  serious 
political  struggle  on  behalf  of  a  man  whom  they  suspected  perhaps 
as  much  as  they  respected.     Gradually  were  spread  about  sus- 


398  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

picious  rumours — possibly  canards — based  on  the  known  Italian 
sympathies  and  connections  of  Drusus,  rumours  of  a  far-reaching 
Italian  conspiracy,  whose  partisans  were  bound  to  the  Roman 
tribune  by  a  solemn  personal  oath.  The  cuckoo-cry  of  treason 
was  raised.  Only  the  honour  of  Drusus  had  prevented  the  murder 
of  the  consul  at  the  Latin  games.  An  armed  band,  marching  on 
Rome  to  coerce  the  Senate  and  co-operate  with  the  tribune,  had 
been  with  difficulty  turned  back.  The  form  of  oath  was  circulated. 
At  once  the  old  exclusiveness  was  up  in  arms  ;  the  timid  progres- 
sives ratted  ;  Senate  and  consul  were  reconciled.  With  stern  dis- 
dain Drusus  acquiesced  in  the  annulment  of  his  illegally  passed 
laws  by  the  body  he  sought  to  defend.  The  loss  and  the  danger 
were  theirs,  and  theirs  the  responsibility.  They  were  making  their 
own  beds.  In  the  same  spirit  he  cried,  when  he  fell  at  the  door 
of  his  house,  struck  by  an  assassin's  hand  in  the  dusk  of  evening, 
'''' Ecquandone  similem  mei  civein  habebit  respublica  ?  "  Indeed,  the 
failure  of  the  unpractical,  large-hearted  man  in  his  attack  on 
capitalism  and  civic  prejudice,  while  it  shattered  the  last  hopes  of 
the  foiled  and  frustrated  allies,  drove  one  more  nail  in  the  coffin 
of  senatorial  government.  The  weakness  of  his  friends  more 
than  the  strength  of  his  foes  was  too  much  for  him,  as  had  been 
the  case  with  the  Gracchi,  between  whom  and  their  conservative 
successor  there  is  little  to  choose  in  singleness  of  purpose,  in  poli- 
tical tactics,  and  reforming  ideas,  save  that  the  one  acted  as  the 
patron  of  a  decaying  Senate,  the  others  as  champions  of  a  decayed 
Comitia.  His  supporters  had  more  credit  than  power,  more  dis- 
cretion than  courage  ;  the  forces  of  selfishness  and  /at'sses-fai're  were 
against  him  ;  even  the  Italians  in  each  community  were  divided 
in  interests,  the  Romanising  aristocracy  of  landowners  against 
the  patriotic  but  needy  and  half-suppressed  populace.  As  to 
himself,  we  cannot  decide  if  his  ultimate  aim  was  the  reconstitution 
of  the  Senate,  or  if  he  bought  up  all  forces  to  support  his  Italian 
policy  ;  nor  can  we  reconcile  his  refusal  to  protect  his  laws  with 
his  apparent  readiness  to  use  physical  force,  and  even  civil  war. 
He  was  a  man  clearly  of  better  intentions  and  larger  ideas  than  he 
had  political  ability  or  good  fortune. 

The  mysterious  death  of  their  hero  was  felt  deeply  by  the 
Italians,  who  now  prepared  in  earnest  for  the  war  which  Drusus 
hoped  to  avert.  The  usual  reaction  followed  at  Rome.  A  tribune, 
Q.  Varius,  an  agent  of  the  equites,  carried  by  intimidation  a  Lex 
de  Maiestate,  from  which  issued  a  court  of  inquiry  into  the  alleged 
conspiracy.     Whether  the  moderates  had  or  had  not  been  tamper- 


FAILURE   OF  DRUSUS  399 

ing  with  the  Italians,  the  bare  suspicion  of  intrigue  afforded  an 
excellent  handle  for  removing  opponents  and  punishing  the  Senate. 
The  report  of  ferments  in  Italy  and  the  outbreak  of  the  revolt 
sharpened  the  edge  of  the  charge.  Trials  of  eminent  men  went  on 
through  91  and  90  B  c.  Bestia  and  C.  Cotta  were  exiled  ;  Antonius 
the  orator  and  Pompeius  Strabo  were  attacked  ;  old  Scaurus, 
impeached  once  more,  was  content  with  the  triumphant  sally— 
"  A  Spaniard  accuses  Scaurus,  Princeps  Senatus,  of  treason. 
Scaurus  denies  the  charge.     Romans,  which  do  you  believe?' 

By   a  not   uncommon   irony,   \'arius,   infomier  and    suspected 
assassin,  perished  later  by  his  own  law. 


CHAPTER    XXXIX 

THE    SOCIAL    WAR 

B.C.       A.U  C 

Outbreak  at  Asculum  .        .  .  .        .      91        663 

North :  Defeat  of  Rutilius  Lupus— Retirement  of  Marius— 
South :  L  Juhus  Csesar  driven  from  Campania — Lex 
Julia    .  ....       90        664 

Pompeius  Strabo  puts  down  the  Insurrection  in  the  North 
and  settles  Cisalpine  Gaul— Sulla  defeats  the  Samnites— 
Lex  Plautia  Papiria — The  Varian  Commission  restored — 
Economic  Crisis  and  Murder  of  the  Praetor  Asellio    -        .      89        665 

End  of  the  Social  War 88        666 

Importance  of  the  War. — The  Social  War  was  perhaps  the 
most  dangerous  conflict  in  which  Rome  had  as  yet  engaged.  No 
Gallic  tiimidhis,  not  even  "  dims  Hannibal"  himself,  brought  her 
power  so  low  or  forced  from  humbled  arrogance  a  recantation  of 
policy,  while  a  victorious  enemy  yet  held  the  field.  The  allies 
had  they  succeeded  finally,  would  scarcely  have  been  content  with 
the  exaction  of  their  just  claims.  The  separatist  spirit,  exas- 
perated by  an  obstinate  struggle,  would  have  undone  the  work 
of  centuries  and  broken  up  with  the  power  of  Rome  the  unity  of 
Italy.  At  best  it  would  have  substituted  a  loose  federation,  in- 
capable of  preserving  the  provincial  empire  and  the  widespread 
influence  of  Rome.  As  it  was,  its  effects  were  deeply  felt  in 
the  history  of  Italy  and  the  world,  and  in  this  lies  the  interest  of 
the  war,  of  whose  course  and  events  we  have  scanty  and  fragmen- 
tary information  utterly  disproportioned  to  its  deadly  nature  and 
real  importance.  To  the  statesmen  and  leaders  who  brought  it  to 
a  successful  close,  and  above  all  to  the  commanding  genius  of  the 


400  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

soldier  Sulla,  Rome  owes  a  debt  whose  magnitude  is  concealed 
by  the  veil  with  which  time  and  natural  feeling  have  shrouded  a 
calamitous  and  unnecessary  schism. 

Occasion  of  the  War. — The  immediate  causes  of  the  war  lay 
no  doubt  in  the  failure  of  the  plans  of  Drusus,  which  destroyed  the 
last  hope  of  constitutional  agitation,  in  well-founded  alarms  for  the 
future  due  to  the  \'arian  Commission  and  to  the  restoration  of  the 
equites  and  reactionaries  to  power,  in  the  negligence  of  the  unsus- 
pecting Senate  and  the  explosion  of  popular  feeling  at  Asculum 
in  Picenum.  Thither,  when  the  Senate,  vaguely  aware  of  restless 
movement  and  unwonted  intercourse  among  the  allies,  had  caused 
secret  inquiries  to  be  made  by  its  agents  in  the  various  com- 
munities, came  the  Roman  prastor  Servilius  with  proconsular 
power  and  attended  by  a  legate.  He  had  been  informed  that 
the  Asculans  were  exchanging  hostages,  and  now,  happening 
upon  a  meeting  of  the  people  in  the  theatre  to  celebrate  the 
games,  by  a  vehement  reprimand  he  so  kindled  the  passions  of 
his  audience  that  they  tore  him  and  his  suite  to  pieces,  and  sealed 
the  declaration  of  war  by  the  murder  of  resident  Romans.  The 
hands  of  the  leaders  were  forced  and  the  re\'olt  spread  like  wild- 
fire. Whatever  conspiracy  may  have  existed  in  the  name  of 
Drusus  and  the  franchise,  the  deep  disappointment  of  his  death 
at  any  rate  must  have  strengthened  everywhere  the  faction  of  the 
secessionists  against  the  moderates.  Mutual  understandings  be- 
came definite  treaties  ;  old  associations  were  revived  ;  old  tribal 
connections,  reduced  by  Roman  policy  to  religious  formalities, 
sprang  again  to  life.      Even  wider  alliances  were  contemplated  ; 


DENARIUS   OF   THE    CONFEDERATES— TAKING   THE    OATH  ;    AND 
HEAD   OF   ITALIA. 


armed  and  drilled  troops  the  allies  possessed  in  the  contingents 
liable  for  Roman  service.  The  movement,  some  time  in  progress, 
was  only  precipitated  by  the  revolt  of  Asculum. 


CAUSES  OF  THE  SOCIAL    WAR  401 

Causes  of  the  Social  War.  — For  the  real  causes  of  the  war  lay 
far  deeper.  The  strength  of  the  Roman  organisation  of  Italy  had 
been  in  its  skilful  combination  of  the  principle  of  autonomy  with 
the  ascendency  of  the  paramount  state.  The  commercial  and 
political  isolation  of  each  city  from  its  neighbours  was  compensated 
by  its  direct  connection  with  Rome,  as  an  immediate  ally.  By  a 
dexterous  use  of  the  franchise  and  a  wise  graduation  of  privileges 
she  had  secured  a  divergency  of  interest  between  communities  of 
different  status,  thus  creating  no  uniform  level  of  servitude,  but 
an  ascending  scale  of  subjection.  This  system  was  fortified  in  a 
political  sense  by  the  maintenance  of  aristocratical  governments 
in  each  city,  whose  members  were  attached  by  various  privileges 
to  Roman  interests,  and  in  a  military  sense  by  the  formation  of 
roads,  protected  at  strategical  points  by  powerful  fortresses,  whose 
citizens  possessed  Latin  rights  and  were  doubly  bound  to  allegiance 
by  the  ties  of  interest  and  personal  danger.  At  the  same  time  the 
enjoyment  of  national  languages  and  customs,  of  local  rights  and 
liberties,  was  ensured,  peace  maintained,  the  barbarian  repelled, 
and  commerce  protected,  while  Roman  conquest  opened  fresh 
fields  for  speculation  and  enterprise.  In  earlier  times  free  ad- 
mission to  a  foreign  franchise,  involving  the  loss  of  local  rights, 
could  be  no  object  to  any  community,  but  only  to  those  individuals 
who  should  migrate  to  Roman  townships.  But  when  the  value  of 
the  franchise  rose  with  the  rise  of  Rome  and  relative  decline  of 
the  allied  states,  and  there  came  a  growing  disinclination  to  admit 
new-comers,  friction  was  set  up.  It  was  not  so  much  the  civic  as 
the  material  advantages  that  were  in  question.  In  the  city-state, 
with  the  principle  of  direct  voting  in  collective  assemblies,  the 
extension  of  the  franchise  over  a  wide  area  was  useless  to  its 
recipients,  who  could  only  vote  on  the  rarest  occasions,  and  added 
to  the  difficulties  of  good  municipal  government.  The  gain  in  new 
blood  was  small.  But  the  decay  of  local  politics  inevitably  drove 
the  more  ambitious  spirits  in  Italy  to  covet  a  share  in  imperial 
business  ;  their  restricted  career  in  the  local  contingents  galled 
the  hearts  of  able  soldiers.  To  men  familiar  with  Rome  the 
closing  of  the  franchise  and  expulsion  from  the  capital  were  a  bitter 
grie\ance.  The  middle  and  lower  classes  resented  their  increas- 
ing burdens,  the  costly  cavalry  service,  the  enlarged  contingents  of 
infantry,  the  severity  of  martial  law,  the  unfair  distribution  of  land 
and  booty,  the  exclusion  from  cheap  corn,  salt,  and  allotments. 

The  Senate  and  people,  instead  of  carrying  on  the  work  of 
gradual  assimilation,  had  unwisely  obliterated  the  distinction  of 

2  C 


402  Iff  STORY  OF  ROME 

Latin,  ally,  and  subject,  had  closed  the  doors  of  the  franchise  and 
expelled  resident  aliens,  had  permitted  their  officers  to  lord  it  over 
the  Italians  in  defiance  of  law  and  right,  and  suppressed  all  protests 
with  contumely  and  violence.  Terrible  stories  of  outrage  circulated 
from  town  to  town.  The  claims  of  the  allies,  acknowledged  as  just 
by  the  best  men  of  all  parties,  had  been  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  each 
party  in  turn.  Every  scheme  of  reform  had  been  shattered  on  the 
short-sighted  selfishness  of  reactionary  nobles,  jealous  capitalists, 
and  grudging  paupers.  Hope  had  been  raised  to  the  highest  by 
the  conversion  of  the  majority  of  the  Senate.  The  failure  of  this 
hope  meant  insurrection. 

Division  of  Feeling. — But  among  the  subjects  there  were  divi- 
sions of  interest  and  feeling.  Those  districts  whose  position  made 
the  exercise  of  the  franchise  possible  would  be  satisfied  with 
this  concession  ;  the  wealthy  landowners  of  Etruria  and  Umbria, 
where  the  agricultural  depression  had  effectually  destroyed  the 
yeoman  farmer,  secure  in  their  lordship  by  the  favour  of  Rome, 
checked  the  first  movement  of  revolt  among  their  serfs.  In 
Samnium  and  Lucania,  less  penetrated  by  Latin  language  and 
ideas,  retaining  still  the  old  traditions  of  farmer  life  and  civic 
equality,  the  national  spirit,  enkindled  by  the  war,  turned  the 
demand  for  equal  rights  into  a  battle  for  national  independence. 
In  the  particular  states,  again,  even  where  there  was  most  unity 
of  feeling  and  action,  there  are  traces  of  party  struggles.  Here 
and  there  a  town  like  the  Vestinian  Pinna,  or  a  corps  like  that 
of  Magius  of  yEclanum,  did  yeoman  service  for  Rome.  The 
ruling  nobilities  must  often  have  nursed  pro-Roman  sympathies, 
and  divided  counsels  weakened  the  forces  of  insurrection.  The 
Latin  fortresses  remained,  in  the  first  instance,  loyal.  Cam- 
pania, with  Capua  as  a  magazine,  served  as  a  second  basis  and 
source  of  revenue  and  supplies.  Neapolis,  Rhegium,  and  the 
other  Greek  cities  would  not  sacrifice  their  favoured  position  to 
support  their  ancient  enemies.  They  provided  the  nucleus  of 
a  fleet,  and  secured  the  communications  by  sea  of  the  Southern 
armies. 

From  the  provinces  Rome  drew  light  infantry,  archers,  and 
cavalry,  ships  and  supplies.  She  had  the  advantage  of  a  central 
position,  an  organised  constitution,  and  the  tradition  of  victory. 
She  fought  on  inner  lines,  with  a  power  of  concentrated  action, 
against  a  hastily  improvised  confederacy,  without  coherence  or 
established  form.  It  was  only  the  sloth  of  her  government  and 
the  incapacity  of  her  generals  which  dissipated  her  strength  by 


ROME  AND  HER  NEIGHBOTTRS. 


Hew  &  Leigh  ',<:  Rom.  Hvst 


LongTTvans, 


(f  Co  LoTuLoTt  Ne/wTbrl:  &.  Boinbay 


TV  AA_g-Jn>ni«*"n  T.^-miti-.a  Efhuhur^ALcmdma- 


THE  ALLIES  403 

division  and  delay,  and  by  her  defeats  hammered  together  the 
loose  structure  of  the  federal  union. 

Organisation  of  the  Confederates. — Roughly  the  allies  fall  into 
two  divisions,  Northern  and  Southern.  In  the  north  the  smaller 
tribes — Picentes,  Pieligni,  Vestini,  Marrucini,  Frentani — centred 
round  the  Marsians,  who  ga\e  their  name  to  the  "  Marsic  war." 
In  the  south  the  Samnites  and  Lucanians,  with  closer  ranks  and 
sterner  purpose,  followed  a  deeper  policy.  As  their  headquarters 
they  selected  Corfinium,  a  town  strong  in  its  seclusion  on  the  river 
Aternus  (Pescara),  in.  the  Pcelignian  land,  and  a  convenient  centre 
for  the  northern  cantons.  Italia,  as  it  was  renamed,  became  the 
seat  of  the  federal  government,  an  artificial  creation,  existing 
merely  for  military  and  political  purposes.  The  central  executive 
was  closely  modelled  on  the  Roman  pattern.  There  was  a  Senate 
of  500,  two  consuls,  and  twelve  praetors  exercising  a  full  imperium. 
But  how  these  were  selected  we  cannot  say  ;  nor  do  we  know  what 
relations  precisely  the  communities  in  the  various  groups  bore  to 
each  other,  nor  how  the  central  government  was  constituted.  The 
Italian  stocks  were  not  politically  inventive  enough  to  develop 
at  once  a  full-fledged  federalism,  with  a  representative  Senate 
and  Assembly.  Nor  did  they  merely  mean  to  create  a  new 
and  fictitious  city-state,  with  an  Italian  franchise  and  direct 
assemblies,  reproducing  the  worst  vices  of  the  municipal  polity 
of  Rome.  They  just  improvised  a  war  organisation  on  the  most 
available  plan,  selected  a  place  of  cong^ress,  and  left  the  question 
of  Centralisation  I'ersus  Separation  for  later  settlement.  Their 
state  was  therefore  a  loose  federation.  A  coinage  was  necessarily 
established,  and  Latin  and  Samnite  were  no  doubt  used  indifi"e- 
rently  for  official  purposes.  Italia  never  appears  as  a  sovereign- 
state  ;  the  headquarters  are  shifted  as  occasion  arises,  and  the 
armies  of  the  league  acted  naturally  in  two  main  divisions. 

Strength  of  the  Combatants.  — In  the  number  of  their  troops  the 
opposing  forces  were  roughly  equal,  the  active  armies  amounting 
at  first  to  100,000  a  side.  Man  for  man,  the  hardy  mountaineers, 
drilled  in  the  Roman  wars,  were  better  than  the  Roman  levies  ; 
while  the  rebel  officers  showed  from  the  outset  superior  ability, 
audacity,  and  resource.  Geographically,  they  surrounded  Rome 
from  north-east  to  south-east  in  an  elongated  semicircle,  occupying 
the  range  of  the  Apennines  and  the  plains  of  the  Lower  Adriatic, 
the  bulk  of  Central  and  Southern  Italy.  A  few  successes  in 
Etruria  and  Campania  would  complete  the  circle  to  the  sea.  Rome 
could  be  alarmed  on  three  sides  at  once  bv  forces  issuing  at  will 


404 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


from  the  innumerable  defiles  of  their  well-defended  mountains. 
But  their  action  was  hampered  by  the  faithful  Latin  fortresses, 
judiciously  planted  in  commanding  situations,  whose  reduction  and 
relief  provided  for  each  side  respectively  the  first  object  in  this 
desultory  war.  In  the  north  or  Latin-speaking  districts,  from 
Picenum  to  Campania,  commanded  the  "consul"  Q.  ]'ompa-dius 
Silo,  a  Marsian.     His  colleague,  the  Samnite,  C.  Papius  Mutilus, 


DENARIUS    OF    MITII.US — SAMNITE    BULL   GORING    WOLF;    HEAD   OF 
BACCHANTF. 


acted  in  Samnium  and  Campania.  Each  had  six  praetors  as 
subordinate  leaders  of  divisions. 

Preparations  at  Rome. — At  Rome,  when  once  the  need  was 
realised,  desperate  preparations  were  made.  The  envoys  who 
came  at  the  last  in'Oment  from  the  insurgents  to  demand  the 
franchise  were  summarily  dismissed,  business  was  suspended, 
expenditure  curtailed,  contingents  summoned  from  abroad.  The 
consuls  L.  Julius  Caesar  and  P.  Rutilius  Lupus  divided  the  active 
forces.  Among  their  legati,  five  to  each  consul,  served  officers  of 
every  shade  of  politics.  With  Caesar  in  the  south  were  Didius, 
Crassus,  Catulus,  and  Sulla  ;  with  Lupus  in  the  north  the  veteran 
Marius  and  Pompeius  Strabo.  The  offensive  lay  with  Rome  ;  the 
allies,  secure  in  their  mountains,  would  naturally  keep  on  the 
defensive,  at  least  till  they  had  freed  their  flanks  and  rear  from 
the  pressure  of  the  Roman  strongholds.  But  as  she  had  been 
slow  to  prepare,  so  now  Rome  failed  to  act  with  decisive  force  in 
any  direction,  frittering  her  strength  away  in  inconclusive  isolated 
engagements. 

Roman  Fortresses. — The  more  important  of  the  fortresses  in 
question  were,  in  the  south,  Venusia,  watching  the  Apulian  plain  and 
the  road  to  the  southern  ports  ;  Beneventum,  guarding  the  com- 
munications between  Capua  and  Apulia,  by  the  Volturnus  and  Calor, 
or  by  the  Appian  road,  at  the  gate  of  the  Samnite  hills;  /^Esernia, 


THE  SOCIAL    WAR  405 

in  the  heart  of  Samnium,  holding  the  approach  by  the  main  stream 
of  the  Volturnus.  In  the  north,  Carsioli  and  Alba  Fucens  guarded 
the  cross-road  (Via  Valeria)  to  the  Adriatic,  holding  the  issues  of 
the  Marsian  heights  and  the  basin  of  the  Fucine  lake  ;  Narnia 
and  Spoletium,  on  the  Via  Flaminia,  secured  Umbria  ;  Nepete  and 
Sutrium  held  down  South  Etruria  and  protected  Rome  on  the  left. 
In  Picenum,  Firmum  supplied  a  check  on  Asculum,  the  author 
of  the  revolt.  Communications  with  Campania  were  guarded  by 
Fabrateria,  at  the  passage  of  the  Liris,  and  Cales,  where  the  Latin 
road  falls  to  the  plain,  and  by  the  Roman  colonies  and  Greek 
cities  of  the  coast.  Of  the  Campanian  praefectures  and  allied 
towns,  which  were  at  once  garrisoned  for  Rome,  Casilinum,  Nola, 
Acerrte,  and  Venafrum,  held  important  positions. 

Success  of  the  Insurgents  in  South  Italy.  —  Rome's  delay  en- 
abled the  allies  to  assail  the  more  immediately  dangerous  of  these 
posts.  Silo,  for  instance,  invested  Alba  ;  Mutilus  besieged  yEsernia. 
In  an  attempt  to  relieve  the  latter  by  the  old  Volturnus  route, 
Cccsar  was  defeated  by  P.  Vettius  Scato,  and  driven  back  with 
loss.  The  fall  of  Venafrum,  in  his  rear,  and  a  second  and  disastrous 
defeat  by  Marius  Egnatius  compelled  a  hasty  retreat  to  Teanum, 
where  the  consul  halted  to  recruit  his  shattered  forces.  yEsernia, 
after  a  stubborn  resistance,  relieved  for  a  moment  by  an  exploit  of 
the  bold  and  subtle  Sulla,  fell  by  the  end  of  the  year.  A  simi- 
lar fate  to  his  own  befell  Caesar's  lieutenants.  Crassus,  in  Lucania, 
was  shut  up  by  Lamponius  in  (jrumentum.  The  road  into  Cam- 
pania was  clear  for  Mutilus.  Nola  fell  by  treason  ;  and  one  by 
one,  except  Nuceria,  the  towns  of  South  Campania  went  over,  the 
prisoners  and  slaves  being  incorporated  in  the  insurgent  army. 
The  Samnite  was  already  besieging  Acerree,  when  Cssar,  alarmed 
at  this  sudden  collapse  and  threatened  loss  of  revenue  and  material, 
advanced  to  prevent  the  fall  of  Capua  and  the  completion  of  the 
circle  which  wQuId  cut  the  capital  from  the  south.  He  achieved 
some  success,  but  in  spite  of  a  seasonable  repulse  injlicted  on 
Mutilus,  which  the  Senate  used  as  a  pretext  for  discarding  the 
military  dress  and  dispelling  the  deep  despondency  at  Rome,  he 
could  only  maintain  his  ground  in  front  of  the  enemy  at  Acerrae. 
His  Numidian  horse  deserted  to  Oxyntas,  son  of  Jugurtha, 
a  state  prisoner  who  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  allies  at 
the  capture  of  Venusia.  He  could  not  prevent  the  surrender  of 
^Esernia  and  the  loss  of  Canusium  and  other  towns  in  the  south 
stormed  or  reduced  by  the  active  leader  Judacilius.  In  fear  for 
their  communications,  the  Romans  formed  a  fleet. and  levied  a 


406  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

larye  force  of  frccdmen  to  guard  tlic  line  of  the  Latin  and  North 
Cam|)anian  coast. 

Defeat  of  Lupus.— In  the  centre  and  norlli  the  natural  objective 
was  the  reUef  of  Alba  and  the  punishment  of  Asculum.  A  rapid 
and  decisive  advance  would  have  created  a  powerful  impression  and 
cleared  the  ground  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  capital.  Accord- 
ingly Rutilius  Lupus,  however  hampered  by  the  dilatory  counsels 
of  Marius,  whose  policy  of  patience  proposed  to  train  the  raw 
troops  and  exhaust  the  enemy's  strength,  had  taken  the  offensive 
and  marched  on  Alba  along  the  Valerian  road,  when  his  advance 
was  checked  by  the  bloody  defeat  of  his  legate  Perperna,  followed 
only  too  soon  by  his  own  disastrous  defeat  and  death  at  the  crossing 
of  the  Tolenus  (June  1 1,  90  B.C.).  Vettius  Scato,  aware  that  the 
enemy  was  about  to  pass  the  river  in  two  divisions,  dexterously 
masking  the  cautious  Marius  with  a  small  force,  fell  with  his 
main  army  fi^om  ambush  on  the  consul,  who  crossed  the  stream, 
confiding  in  his  legate's  support.     Eight  thousand  Romans  fell. 

Marius.  —  Marius,  enlightened  by  the  bodies  coming  down- 
stream, occupied  indeed  the  Marsian  camp,  but  despair  was  deep 
at  Rome  when  they  knew  the  consul  dead  and  Alba  not  re- 
lieved. A  victory  of  S.  Sulpicius  over  the  Pfeligni,  and  the  tactics 
of  Marius,  compelled  the  Marsi  to  draw  back  their  lines  ;  and 
after  Q.  Ca^pio,  Drusus'  opponent,  joined  with  Marius  in  the  com- 
mand by  the  Senate,  had  been  cut  to  pieces  in  a  trap  laid  by  the 
resourceful  Silo,  the  veteran,  now  sole  commander,  maintained  a 
victorious  defensive,  and  is  said  to  have  inflicted  severe  defeats  on 
the  Marsi  and  Marrucini.  In  one  of  these  Sulla,  we  are  told, 
with  a  detachment  of  the  southern  army  was  able  to  co-operate. 
Characteristic  stories  are  told  of  this  campaign.  When  Pompa."dius 
Silo  challenged  Marius,  "  If  you  are  a  great  general,  come  down 
and  fight,"  he  replied,  "  If  you  are  a  great  general.  Silo,  make  me 
come  down  and  fight."  On  another  occasion  we  hear  how  the 
troops,  ancient  comrades  in  arms,  fraternised  between  the  lines, 
while  the  Roman  and  the  Marsian  chiefs  walked  and  talked  to- 
gether on  the  field.  At  the  close  of  the  year  Marius,  old,  fat, 
and  heavy,  unecjual  or  deemed  unequal  to  the  work,  retired  from 
the  command  in  something  like  disgrace,  to  brood  once  more  on 
that  seventh  consulate  he  had  failed  to  achieve. 

Picenum. — In  Picenum,  Cn.  Pompeius  Strabo,  driven  by  the 
combined  forces  of  Scato,  Judacilius,  and  Lafrenius  from  Asculum 
— a  strong  city  desperately  defended — fell  back  on  Firmum,  where 
Lafrenius  held  him  besieged,  while  Judacilius  hurried  to  Apulia. 


THE  SOCIAL    WAR  407 

From  this  position  Strabo  was  released  by  the  victory  of  S.  Sulpicius, 
who  now  advanced  to  Firmum.  His  assailants,  taken  in  rear  and 
front,  were  driven  into  Asculum,  with  the  loss  of  their  leader,  and 
the  siege  began  in  earnest.  It  was  the  first  genuine  victory  of 
the  war,  and  helped  to  restore  a  little  confidence  at  Rome. 

Results  of  the  First  Campaign. — Thus  far  the  record  of  the 
war  had  been,  on  the  whole,  disastrous  for  the  city.  The  con- 
federates, welded  together  by  success,  had  organised  victory,  and 
were  taking  the  offensive.  The  consular  armies  had  been  "  beaten, 
bobbed,  and  thumped"  by  their  own  contingents.  The  south  was 
gone,  Campania  was  half  lost,  Rome  herself  was  threatened  in  the 
north,  her  communications  with  the  southern  division  endangered. 
Nola  and  Venusia  had  gone  over,  and  there  were  symptoms  of 
revolt  among  the  Latins.  In  Umbria  and  Etruria,  though  L.  Por- 
cius  Cato  and  A.  Plotius  repressed  rebellion,  it  was  necessary  to 
maintain  corps  of  observation.  The  circle  of  steel  was  becoming^ 
perilously  complete.  There  were  menacing  signs  abroad,  in  Gaul 
and  Spain,  and  above  all  in  Asia,  where  Mithradates  threatened 
the  eastern  frontier.  Supplies  of  men  and  money  were  exhausted. 
In  spite  of  the  victories  of  Firmum  and  Acerras,  the  spirit  of  Rome 
was  broken  ;  there  was  no  longer  the  power  of  resistance  in  Senate 
and  people  that  broke  the  conquering  swords  of  Pyrrhus  and 
Hannibal  ;  nor  was  the  stake  worth  the  struggle.  The  tide  of 
feeling  changed.  Forced  by  this  new  Secession  once  more  to 
abandon  her  obstinate  attitude  to  reasonable  reform,  Rome  sur- 
rendered the  whole  principle  of  the  war,  reversed  her  policy, 
and  took  her  annoyance  out  in  the  punishment  of  the  leaders  of 
the  war  party.     It  was  the  happy  moment  for  concession. 

Concession  of  the  Franchise  (i)  to  the  Italians. — The  Lex 
lulia  of  the  consul  Caesar,  passed  at  the  close  of  90  B.C.,  which  con- 
ferred the  full  franchise  on  the  Latins,  and  on  all  the  allies  not 
actually  in  arms,  checked  the  spread  of  rebellion,  secured  the 
Latins,  and  satisfied  the  wavering  Umbrians  and  Etrurians.  The 
Lex  Plautia  Papiria  of  89  B.C.,  passed  at  the  beginning  of  the  tribu- 
nician  year,  struck  at  the  root  of  trouble,  and  by  offering  the 
franchise  to  every  Italian  ally  domiciled  in  Italy  who  should 
apply  personally  to  a  Roman  magistrate  within  sixty  days,  gave 
the  moderates  and  Roman  partisans  a  pretext  for  returning  to 
allegiance,  sowed  sedition  in  the  enemy's  camps,  and  without 
entirely  sacrificing  the  dignity  of  Rome  by  capitulating  to  the 
separatists,  afforded  in  the  shape  of  a  free  gift  satisfaction  to  their 
original  demands.     As  to  the  authors  of  the  war,  the  enemies  of 


4o8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Drusus,  and  the  ciealors  of  the  Court  of  Treason,  they  were 
punished  l)y  the  reorganisation  of  the  Varian  Commission,  through 
the  tribune  M.  Plautius  Silvanus,  at  the  end  of  90  or  beginning 
of  89  B.C.  A  body  of  judices  was  selected  ad  hoc  by  the  tribes,  a 
solitary  example  of  this  mode  of  appointment.  The  power  of  the 
equites  was  for  the  moment  broken,  and  the  exiles  were  restored. 

(2)  In  Cisalpine  Gaul. — The  franchise  was  further  extended  in 
the  course  of  89  B.C.  by  a  Lex  Ponipeia  of  the  consul  Strabo, 
dealing  with  Cisalpine  Gaul,  which  was  now  practically  a  part  of 
Italy.  The  Latin  colonies  of  the  Cispadane  had  shared  of  course 
in  the  earlier  concession,  together  with  the  allied  towns  on  the 
right  bank.  Thus  the  Italian  municipal  system  extended  hence- 
forth to  the  Po,  though  the  later  administrative  province  of 
Cisalpine  Gaul  ran  down  to  the  Rubicon.  On  the  left  bank 
Pompeius  organised  civic  communities  on  the  Italian  model, 
making  adjacent  villages  depend  on  the  towns,  and  endowed 
them  with  Latin  rights,  a  step  to  the  full  franchise  given  by 
Cicsar  in  49  B.C.  The  Celtic  tribal  system,  which  still  subsisted 
along  with  the  Celtic  population,  was  rapidly  assimilated  to  the 
Roman  municipal  type. 

Asculum. — The  new  departure,  if  it  left  the  Samnites  and  the 
separatists  still  in  the  field,  prevented  the  consolidation  of  the 
revolt,  cut  the  supplies  of  the  insurgents,  and  poured  into  Rome 
fresh  and  eager  recruits.  The  effects  were  felt  at  once,  and,  sup- 
ported by  a  greater  display  of  skill  and  energy,  put  a  new  face  on 
the  war.  Early  in  the  )'ear  Strabo,  in  Picenum,  intercepted  and 
destroyed  a  Marsian  army  of  15,000  men  marching  to  raise 
Etruria  and  Umbria.  The  other  consul,  Cato,  who,  having  super- 
seded Marius,  co-operated  with  his  colleague  in  the  attack  on  the 
northern  positions,  fell,  it  is  true,  after  some  successes,  near  the 
Fucine  lake  ;  but  Pompeius  foiled  an  attempt  by  Judacilius  to  re- 
lieve Asculum,  defeating  the  concentrated  allies  in  a  great  and 
bloody  battle,  with  a  loss  of  21,000  killed  or  captured.  This,  the 
biggest  battle  and  perhaps  the  real  turning-point  of  the  war, 
decided  the  fate  of  Asculum.  The  siege  was  pressed  both  for 
strategical  reasons  and  for  the  sake  of  example.  At  length  the 
town  fell,  after  Judacilius,  who  had  forced  his  way  in  and  mas- 
sacred his  opponents,  had  died  by  his  own  hand  on  the  funeral 
pyre.  The  battle  and  fall  of  Asculum,  however,  were  possibly  later 
events. 

Meanwhile  the  Roman  generals  had  penetrated  the  Marsian, 
Pselignian,  Marrucinian,  and  Vestinian  territories  ;  the  resistance 


STRABO  AND  SULLA 


409 


of  the  northern  confederacies  gradually  collapsed,  and  Corfinium 
itself  surrendered. 

Success  of  Sulla  in  South  Italy.  —  In  the  south  Sulla's  energy 
soon  retrieved  the  situation.  Ciesar's  successor,  assisted  by  a  naval 
force  and  enjoying  a  free  hand,  overran  Campania ;  with  the  aid 
of  Didius  and  the  loyalist  Magius  he  recovered  Stabile,  Her- 
culaneum,  and  Pompeii,  inflicted  a  series  of  crushing  defeats  on  L. 
Cluentius,  who  tried  to  relieve  Pompeii,  and  drove  him  beneath  the 


SLING    BULLETS    FROM    ASCULUM. 


{After  Duricy. ) 


walls  of  Nola.  Pushing  his  success,  the  "  Imperator,"  as  his  troops 
had  hailed  him,  advanced  against  the  Hirpini,  sacked  yEclanum, 
surprised  and  defeated  Mutilus  in  the  passes  of  Samnium,  and 
stormed  Bovianum,  the  new  centre  of  the  league,  near  the  source 
of  the  Tifernus,  in  the  heart  of  the  Samnite  hills.  Cosconius,  in 
Apulia,  had  reduced  Salapia  and  Cannas,  had  after  a  serious 
struggle  conquered  and  killed  Marius  Egnatius,  and  was  now 
master  of  the  south-east.  The  advance  from  Campania  had  felt 
its  way  to  the  sea,  and  the  division  of  the  southern  insurrection 


•410  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

was  complete.  Only  in  Lucania,  Gabinius,  after  some  successes, 
perished  in  an  assault  on  the  enemy's  camj). 

The  Samnites  hold  out.— So  the  year  closed  favourably  for 
Rome.  The  war  in  the  north  was  ended.  The  coasts  were  clear; 
the  mountains  of  the  centre  and  the  mass  of  Apulia  and  Campania 
had  been  recovered,  and  the  rebellion  in  the  south  cut  in  two  by 
the  surrender  of  the  Hirpini  and  the  reduction  of  Bovianum.  The 
confederation  had  been  broken  up,  and  the  war  localised  in  Sam- 
niuni  ;  and  all  these  results  were  due,  in  the  main,  to  the  policy  of 
conciliation,  seconded  by  the  vigour  and  skill  of  Strabo  and  vSulla. 
The  Samnites,  humbled  but  persistent,  led  by  the  Marsian,  Silo, 
and  their  own  Mutilus,  maintained  the  struggle,  which  simmered 
also  in  Lucania  and  Bruttium,  raising  as  if  by  magic  from  the 
ground  51,000  free  soldiers  and  emancipated  slaves.  Henceforth 
the  revived  nationalism  of  Samnium,  centred  in  its  new  capital, 
^sernia,  stands  in  opposition  to  the  actual  government  of  Rome, 
and  plays  its  own  game  among  the  conflicting  parties. 

End  of  the  Social  War. — Sulla,  Rome's  ablest  general,  re- 
ceived the  consulship  for  88  B.C.,  and  was  destined  for  the  command 
against  Mithradates,  who,  though  he  had  neglected  the  invitations 
of  the  insurgents  to  co-operate  with  them,  was  nevertheless  pre- 
paring for  war.  Favoured  by  this  diversion,  hostilities  dragged  on. 
Strabo,  in  88  B.C.,  went  on  with  the  pacification  of  the  more  northern 
cantons,  while  Metellus  Pius,  successor  to  Cosconius,  recovered 
Venusia.  Silo  recaptured  Bovianum,  only  to  fall  shortly  after  in 
a  lost  battle.  Sulla  cleared  Campania  and  besieged  Nola.  The 
insurgent  Lamponius,  in  Lucania,  after  defeating  Gabinius,  effected 
nothing  further.  The  remnants  of  the  war  might  soon  have  been 
finished,  Nola  stormed,  and  the  Samnites  reduced  before  the  Asiatic 
campaign  began,  had  not  the  insane  struggles  of  the  parties,  re- 
commencing with  the  first  lull  in  the  storm,  given  a  new  turn  to 
affairs,  and  threatened  to  sacrifice  the  whole  results  of  the  year. 
But  henceforward  the  conflict  is  complicated  with  Roman  faction- 
fights  and  political  intrigues.     The  Social  War  as  such  is  at  end. 

Demoralisation  of  Rome  and  Italy. — Materially  it  cost  Italy, 
first  and  last,  the  wealth  and  prosperity  of  her  fairest  regions, 
(hough  Sulla  was  yet  to  complete  the  work  by  the  harrying  of 
Etruria  and  Samnium.  The  scarcity  of  money,  a  terrible  hindrance 
to  the  allies,  was  bitterly  felt  at  Rome,  where  the  old  strife  between 
rich  and  poor  revived  with  fiercer  feeling,  caused  by  deeper  cleavage 
and  greater  extremes.  In  8g  B.C.  a  financial  crisis,  enhanced  by  the 
declining   revenue  from  Asia  and  the  unsound  basis  of  Roman 


RESULTS  OF  SOCIAL   IVAR  411 

wealth,  led  up  to  a  desperate  conflict  of  debtor  and  creditor.  The 
chronic  cry  of  anarchic  socialism,  "  Novce  iabiilcr"  the  cancelling 
of  debts,  was  raised.  When,  under  the  stress  of  a  tightening 
market,  debts  were  called  in  with  interest,  the  urban  pnctor  A. 
Sempronius  Asellio,  an  injudicious  man,  tried  to  revive,  for  the 
protection  of  the  debtors,  the  laws  controlling  or  forbidding  inte- 
rest on  loans.  These  useless,  and  now  obsolete,  laws  had  been  as 
constant  a  feature  of  Roman  history  as  the  abuses  they  were 
designed  to  meet — exaggerated  usury  and  a  stringent  law  of 
debt.  The  debtors  now  claimed  as  penalty  fourfold  the  amount 
of  the  illegal  interest  already  paid.  The  highest  judicial  officer 
of  Rome  was  murdered  by  the  infuriated  creditors  as  he  sacrificed 
in  the  Forum,  and  no  one  was  called  to  account.  But  the  loss  of 
men  was  worst  of  all  ;  300,000  of  the  flower  of  Italy  fell  in  this 
useless  warfare.  To  the  scarcity  of  soldiers  the  enlistment  of 
freedmen  and  slaves  bears  witness.  Terrible  too  was  the  de- 
moralisation of  the  troops,  which  went  on  from  bad  to  worse  in 
the  wars  which  follow.  When  a  Roman  admiral  fell  by  the  hands 
of  his  mutinous  marines,  they  were  merely  warned  by  Sulla  to 
purge  the  offence  by  valour  in  battle. 

Reorganisation  of  Italy.  —  In  the  end,  when  Sulla  had  finished 
the  work  (82  B.C.),  the  whole  of  Italy  became  Roman  up  to  the  Po. 
Instead  of  a  series  of  more  or  less  autonomous  states  connected, 
in  various  degrees  of  dependence,  with  Rome,  we  find  a  number 
of  urban  communities  of  Roman  citizens,  gradually  approximating 
to  one  type  of  organisation,  under  various  names  due  to  their 
various  histories,  but  with  few  and  slight  differences  in  status 
and  privilege.  The  old  Latin  towns,  such  as  Tibur  and  Pneneste, 
the  Latin  colonies,  the  old  municipia,  the  allied  towns,  which 
accepted  the  offered  franchise,  and  the  old  pnefectures,  at  least 
for  the  most  part,  become  Roman  country  towns  or  municipalities, 
and  gradually  receive  a  definite  constitution.  The  system  took 
time  to  build  up.  Here  and  there  towns  like  Neapolis  and 
Ilcraclea  might  hesitate  to  surrender  their  favoured  position 
without  more  precise  conditions  and  advantages,  or  some  luckless 
places  paid  for  a  time  the  penalty  of  past  disloyalty.  But  by  the 
time  of  Caesar  nearly  all  the  towns  in  Italy  proper,  and  after 
49  B.C.  in  Transpadane  Gaul  also,  enjoyed  the  franchise,  and  all, 
in  fact  if  not  in  title,  were  practically  municipia,  with  local  self- 
government,  as  defined  by  the  series  of  municipal  laws.  This 
local  self-government,  no  doubt  variously  modified,  with  its  city 
council,  magistrates,  elections,  arrangements,  and  powers  settled 


412  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  regulated  by  law,  spread  over  the  Roman  world.  The  central 
authority  would  interfere  in  cases  of  difference  between  localities 
or  of  military  necessity,  as  the  central  jurisdiction  took  cognisance 
of  treason,  conspiracy,  and  crimes  of  special  gravity.  P'or  the  rest, 
Italy  remained  the  ordinary  consular  department,  the  only  special 
provincia  being  Cisalpine  Gaul,  constituted  by  Sulla,  after  whose 
legislation  military  commands  in  Italy  proper  were  irregular. 

Further  Results  of  the  War. — A  second  result  of  the  war  was,  that 
when  once  the  new  citizens  were  equalised  with  the  old — for  in  the 
first  laws,  in  fear  of  swamping  the  Comitia,  they  were  restricted  to 
eight  of  the  thirty-five  tribes — the  absurdity  of  the  Comitial  system 
became  glaring.  Only  those  near  Rome  could  be  serious  voters  ; 
except  on  special  occasions,  the  bulk  of  the  Italians  abstained, 
and  showed  a  total  indifference  to  urban  politics.  This  paved  the 
way  for  a  new  system  which  made  Italy,  not  Rome,  the  mistress  of 
the  world,  which  might  make  Italy  in  turn  a  province,  and  Rome, 
if  still  the  capital,  a  mere  municipality  among  the  rest. 

Again,  old  Italian  customs,  ideas,  and  dialects  decayed  under 
the  complete  Romanisation.  More  immediately,  the  inclusion  of 
the  Italians  furnished  in  its  restrictions  a  handle  for  agitation  to 
the  populares,  while  later  on  it  reinforced  the  class  of  moderate 
politicians,  bringing  into  activity  a  large  number  of  sqlid  men, 
who  form  a  new  section  of  the  so-called  equites. 


CHAPTER  XL 

SULPICIUS,    MARIUS,    AND    SULLA    (88  B.C.). 

State  of  Rome  and  Italy. — The  troubles  in  Italy,  which  had 
been  almost  extinguished  by  the  concessions  of  the  government 
and  the  ability  of  its  leaders,  assumed  a  new  and  still  more 
dangerous  character,  owing  to  the  outbreak  of  revolution  at  Rome, 
coinciding  with  the  alarming  attack  by  Mithradates  on  the  Roman 
power  in  the  East.  For  the  crisis  in  Italy  and  in  Asia  the  demo- 
crats were  immediately  responsible,  but  the  stupidity  of  the  opti- 
mates  was  even  more  to  blame.  The  folly  which  flung  the  new  citizens 
into  the  arms  of  their  opponents  by  the  galling  restrictions  attached 
by  jealousy  to  concessions  wrung  by  fear,  was  as  dangerous  to  the 
state  as  the  mortified  ambition  and  crazy  vindictiveness  of  Marius, 
who  hoped  to  retrieve  in  Asia  the  failure  of  the  Social  War.     The 


MARIUS  AND  SULPICIUS  413 

restriction  on  the  citizenship  destroyed  the  httle  value  it  still  pos- 
sessed in  politics,  and  placed  the  honest  Italian  on  a  level  with  the 
emancipated  slave.  Only  the  merest  perversity  or  pedantry  could 
care  at  this  time  of  day  for  the  purity  of  the  franchise  or  the  swamp- 
ing of  the  electorate.  It  would  have  been  wiser  to  give  with  a  full 
hand,  to  have  spread  the  Roman  rights  from  Lilybfeum  to  the  Alps, 
and  to  have  extended  the  benefits  of  the  Plautio-Papirian  law  at 
once  to  all  insurgents  who  had  laid  down  their  arms  after  the 
appointed  time,  and  as  dediticii  now  lived  on  sufferance  without 
the  status  of  ally  or  citizen. 

Plentiful  material  for  trouble  was  left.  There  were  the  friends 
of  the  exiles  under  the  last  commission,  plotting  to  procure  their 
recall  ;  the  capitalists,  exasperated  by  Asellio  and  their  losses  in 
Asia  ;  the  debtors,  broken  by  the  economic  crisis.  There  was  the 
army,  debauched  by  civil  war,  detached  from  civic  interests,  ready 
for  mutiny  and  murder,  its  discipline  sapped  by  personal  and  poli- 
tical intrigues.  There  was  a  spirit  of  bitterness  and  discontent 
abroad,  a  tendency  to  resort  to  extreme  measures  in  all  parties  ; 
nor  were  there  wanting  turbulent  spirits  to  use  these  troubles  for 
their  own  purposes. 

Marias  and  Sulpicius  Rufus. — Marius,  eager  for  command,  exer- 
cised his  unwieldy  carcass  with  the  younger  men  in  the  Campus 
Martius,  and  used  his  solid  fortune  to  buy  up  an  able  agent  in  the 
talented  and  indebted  tribune  Sulpicius.  P.  Sulpicius  Rufus  was 
a  politician  more  enigmatical  perhaps  than  Drusus,  a  distinguished 
soldier,  an  orator  warmly  praised  by  Cicero  for  his  powerful  voice, 
his  graceful  gesture,  his  tragic  style,  his  vehement  yet  not  unbridled 
eloquence.  His  birth  was  of  the  highest,  his  politics  hitherto 
moderate.  His  recorded  acts  betray  no  particular  partisanship. 
If  he  impeached  the  democrat  Norbanus  in  95  B.C.,  he  obstructed 
as  tribune  the  illegal  election  of  the  fedile  C.  CcEsar  to  the  consul- 
ship, and  vetoed  a  proposal  to  repeal  judicial  sentences  by  popular 
decree.  As  a  moderate  and  a  friend  of  Drusus,  he  meant  perhaps 
to  complete  the  latter's  programme  of  Italian  enfranchisement  and 
conservative  reform,  but  carried  too  far,  either  by  his  connection 
with  Marius,  by  the  difficulties  of  his  own  position,  or  by  his 
personal  feud  with  the  Julii  and  their  friends,  he  became  the 
representative  of  a  democratic  revolution  which  used  the  name 
and  played  the  cards  of  Gains  Marius.  Sulpicius  now  supported 
the  recall  of  the  Varian  exiles,  which  he  had  at  first  opposed, 
brought  forward  a  measure  to  distribute  the  new  citizens  and  freed- 
men  through  all  the  thirty-five  tribes,  and  is  said  to  have  proposed 


414  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

that  all  senators  owing  more  than  a  certain  amount  of  debt  should 
forfeit  their  seat,  an  unpractical  proposal,  and  inconsistent  with 
his  own  financial  position. 

The  Measures  of  Sulpicius. — The  consuls  Sulla  and  Pompeius 
Rufus,  to  suspend  the  voting,  proclaimed  an  extraordinary  festival ; 
but  Sulpicius,  who  had  surrounded  himself  with  a  guard  of  3000 
roughs  and  an  "anti-Senate"  of  600  knights,  raised  a  riot  in  which 
Rufus'  son  was  murdered,  and  Sulla  only  escaped,  it  is  said,  l)y 
Marius'  back-door.  The  feast  was  countermanded,  and  Sulla  went 
to  the  army  at  Capua.  The  laws  were  carried.  In  themselves 
they  were  not  revolutionary  ;  the  franchise  law  was,  as  regarded 
the  Italians,  necessary  ;  while  the  relief  to  the  freedmen  earned  by 
recent  military  service  could  not  be  dangerous  to  the  great  families 
on  which  they  depended.  The  law  of  insolvency,  honestly  carried 
out,  might  have  purged  the  Senate  of  venal  men  whose  votes  their 
creditors  carried  in  their  pockets.  The  recall  of  the  exiles  was  a 
measure  of  amnesty,  favourable  mainly  to  moderate  men.  But 
they  had  been  carried  by  violence,  and,  under  specious  pretexts, 
certainly  played  into  the  hands  of  the  opposition  leaders.  Hence 
the  strenuous  resistance  not  merely  of  the  Senate,  but  of  all  who 
disliked  the  extension  of  the  franchise,  and  of  all  who  disapproved 
of  legislation  by  an  armed  mob.  The  next  proposal,  however, 
brought  a  more  formidable  opponent  into  the  field.  Sulpicius,  by 
decree  of  the  people,  now  transferred  the  Asiatic  command,  with 
supreme  proconsular  power,  from  the  duly  appointed  consul  Sulla 
to  C.  Marius,  a  mQY&privafiis.  It  was  a  dangerous  and  unconstitu- 
tional proceeding.  Possibly  it  was  a  counsel  of  despair,  and  he 
may  have  hoped  to  gain  the  Campanian  army,  and  anticipate  a 
march  on  Rome,  by  the  use  of  the  still  popular  name.  More 
probably  it  was  a  part  of  the  original  programme.  The  party  of 
reform  was  powerless  without  an  army,  and  Marius  was  their  only 
leader.  He  was  still  capable  of  even  disastrous  energy,  and  those 
who  advised  the  fat  old  man,  with  a  sneer,  to  cure  his  rheumatism 
at  Baias  learned  too  late  the  dangers  of  sarcasm. 

Character  of  Sulla. — L.  Cornelius  Sulla  was  the  right  man  for 
the  work  in  every  sense.  The  impoverished  scion  of  a  noble  but 
latterly  somewhat  obscure  house,  a  man  of  genuine  cultivation, 
of  some  taste  and  scholarship,  a  worldly  spirit  addicted  as  well 
to  the  humours  and  pleasures  as  to  the  refinements  of  life,  he 
perhaps  as  reluctantly  gave  up  the  pursuit  of  amusement  for 
the  toils  of  active  life  as  he  readily  resigned  the  burden  of  affairs 
which  the  times  compelled  him  to  assume.     A  boon  companion, 


CHARACTER    OF  SULLA 


415 


passionately  fond  of  wine  and  women,  an  indulgent  friend,  a  lover 
of  Bohemian  life,  careless  of  conventions,  capable  of  vehement 
emotion  and  outbursts  of  passion,  with  his  choleric  and  sanguine 
temperament,  and  that  fair  face  that  flushed  so  readily,  he  brought, 
for  all  that,  to  political  life  a  mind  destitute  of  illusions  and  a  strong 
power  of  self-restraint.  On  every  side  he  contrasted  with  the  old- 
fashioned  and  boorish   aristocrat.     As    markedly    was   he    above 


TEMPLE   OF   FORTUNA    (?)    AT   ROME  ;    (sO-CALLED    FORTUNA    VIRILIS). 


the  ordinary  aimless  pleasure-seeker  of  the  day.  Though  he 
did  not  take  life  too  seriously,  he  could  be  terribly  in  earnest  ;  to 
him  life  was  a  supreme  ironic  game,  in  which  Fors  Forfuna  held 
trumps.  He  claimed,  indeed,  to  be  the  object  of  the  special  favour 
of  Aphrodite,  the  goddess  of  chance,  and,  in  the  spirit  of  his  time, 
paid  attention  to  dreams  and  prophecies.  His  strong  character 
was  quaintly  crossed  by  the  ^\■hims  and  freaks  of  a  truly  Roman 
vanity.     He  had  won  his  spurs  as  soldier  and  diplomatist  in  the 


4l6  IHSTORY  OF  ROME 

Jugurthan  campaign,  where  he  gained  the  useful  friendship  of  his 
future  client  and  paymaster,  Bocchus  ;  he  earned  favour  as  pra>tor 
(93  i!.c.)  by  the  magnificence  of  his  games,  and  credit  as  governor  by 
his  vigour  in  the  East  (92  n.c).  The  military  art  learned  under 
Marius  in  the  African  and  Cimbric  struggles  he  had  turned  to  the 
best  account  in  the  Social  War.  He  had  rivalled  and  effaced  his 
master;  and  now,  with  all  his  knowledge  of  the  field  of  war,  his  army 
trained  to  his  service  and  attached  to  a  leader  who  humoured  its 
instincts  and  handled  it  well,  he  was  called  on  to  give  up  the  prize 
of  valour  and  the  reward  of  his  labours  to  his  ancient  enemy,  the 
vengeful  and  unserviceable  democrat  C.  Marius. 

Sulla  marches  on  Rome. — The  two  military  tribunes  who 
claimed  the  troops  for  Marius  fell  victims  to  the  fury  of  the  mob. 
An  army  of  volunteers  serxing  for  pay  and  plunder,  drawn  from 
the  lowest  ranks,  caring  more  for  persons  than  principles,  had  even 
less  respect  for  political  authorities  than  it  was  apt  to  show  for 
unpopular  generals.  Sulla,  a  typical  Italian,  a  convinced  oligarch, 
with  a  profound  contempt  for  popular  assemljlies  and  radical 
shibboleths,  as  clear-headed,  hard-grained,  and  self-reliant  as  he 
was  ironical,  sceptical,  and  indifferent,  with  that  trust  in  his  star 
which  is  the  superstition  of  a  great  man,  that  attention  to  the 
needs  of  the  moment,  that  will  to  get  business  done,  that  clear 
grasp  of  the  end  and  reckless  use  of  the  means,  which  characterise 
the  strongest,  if  not  the  most  moral,  statesmen,  was  not  sorry  for 
the  opportunity  to  clear  the  stage  at  Rome  and  settle  accounts 
with  the  Sulpicians  before  he  started  on  the  Eastern  war.  He 
followed  the  lead  of  his  soldiers,  clamouring  for  Sulla  and  the  loot 
of  Asia,  on  the  road  that  led  a  Roman  army  for  the  first  time 
to  the  gates  of  Rome.  His  officers  held  back,  but  the  general, 
marching  from  Capua  with  35,000  men,  joined  his  colleague  Rufus, 
and  pushed  on,  setting  aside  the  prittors  who  tried  to  block  the 
road.  The  consuls  occupied  the  main  entrances  to  the  city,  and 
crossed  the  sacred  pomeriiim.  There  was  no  garrison  on  the 
neglected  walls,  no  plan  of  defence  against  this  novel  stroke.  But 
in  the  narrow  streets  a  severe  struggle  took  place  as  the  legions 
tried  to  force  their  way  up.  At  first  they  fell  back  beneath  the 
storm  of  missiles  from  the  lofty  roofs  and  windows,  till  a  turning 
movement  took  in  rear  and  scattered  the  ill-armed  force  of  freed- 
men  and  loafers.  In  vain  the  democrats  appealed  to  the  people, 
and  finally  to  the  slaves  ;  they  were  forced  to  flee. 

But  more  than  the  democrats  had  been  conquered.  It  was  the 
final  and  formal  \ictory  of  force  over  law.      The  army  and  its 


MARIUS  AND   SULPICIUS  417 

general  appear  as  the  decisive  factor  in  political  struggles.  The 
work  begun  by  Marius  was  unconsciously  completed  by  his  rival, 
and  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  conservative  party  set  a  precedent 
dangerous  for  itself  and  the  Republic.  The  march  of  Sulla  on 
Rome  is  the  turning-point  of  the  revolutionary  movement. 

Death  of  Sulpicius  :  Escape  of  Marius. — For  the  rest,  Sulla 
behaved  with  some  moderation,  and  maintained  the  stringent 
discipline  that  he  alone  in  these  days  could  keep.  The  Sulpician 
laws  were  of  course  annulled  ;  and  twelve  persons,  including  Marius 
and  Sulpicius,  were  formally  outlawed.  The  head  of  the  orator 
was  stuck,  in  ghasth'  mockery,  on  the  rostra.  Marius  was  more 
fortunate.  The  story  of  his  escape  has  grown  into  a  romance  : 
how  he  fled  to  Ostia,  found  a  ship,  and  was  landed  at  Circeii, 
baffled  by  adverse  winds  ;  how  he  wandered  by  the  shore  faint 
and  half-starved,  and  just  evaded  his  pursuers  by  wading  and 
swimming  towards  two  ships  that  hove  in  sight  along  the  coast  ; 
how  the  skippers  refused  to  obey  the  summons  of  the  horsemen  to 
surrender  him,  and  yet,  in  their  fear,  abandoned  him  in  his  sleep  on 
the  land  by  the  mouth  of  the  Liris  ;  how  he  hid  in  the  marshes  by 
Minturna;,  sunk  to  the  neck  in  mud,  was  discox'ered  and  dragged 
to  prison,  and  there  abashed  the  Cimbric  executioner  by  the  thun- 
dering demand,  "  Slave,  darest  thou  slay  Gains  Marius  ?"  how  the 
magistrates  set  him  on  ship  and  sent  him  away  ;  how  he  barely 
escaped  with  life  from  the  praHor  of  Sicily,  and  landed  in  Africa 
hoping  aid  from  the  Numidian  king  ;  how  the  outcast  hero  sent 
back  the  message  to  the  governor  who  bade  him  quit  the  province, 
"Tell  your  master  that  you  have  seen  Marius  an  exile,  sitting 
among  the  ruins  of  Carthage."  Finally,  he  found  refuge  in  the 
island  of  Cercina,  off  Tunis,  where  he  was  joined  by  his  son,  the 
younger  Marius,  who  owed  his  escape  from  the  doubtful  dealings 
of  Hiempsal  to  the  favour  of  a  royal  wife. 

Laws  of  Sulla.  —  Having  cleared  the  field,  Sulla  wanted  to 
restore  and  strengthen  the  government  of  the  Senate,  and  to 
restrain  the  powers  of  the  tribune  and  the  Tribal  Assembly  as  they 
had  been  developed  by  the  action  of  the  Gracchi  and  their  suc- 
cessors. He  proposed  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  the  Senate,  caused  by 
the  Social  War  and  the  strife  of  factions,  by  the  election  of  a  certain 
number  of  optimates,  though  it  is  doubtful  if  this  was  carried  out. 
He  took  away  the  initiative  of  the  tribunes  in  legislation,  enacting 
that  laws  proposed  by  them  must  receive  the  previous  sanction  of 
the  Senate.  Beyond  this,  he  is  also  said  to  have  abolished  the  legis- 
lative functions  of  the  Tribes,  which  had  since  the  Le.x  Hortensia 

2  D 


4i8  IIISTOKY  OF  ROME 

of  287  B.C.  superseded  the  Ccnturiata  as  the  working  organ  of 
government,  and  with  regard  to  tlie  latter  l^ody,  to  ha\e  abolished 
the  voting  arrangements  of  241  B.C.  {v.  j.,  p.  295-6)  and  more  recent 
reforms,  restoring'  the  older  so-called  Servian  method  which  assured 
the  absolute  predominance  of  the  highest  property-class.  Thus 
the  election  of  the  chief  magistrates  would  be  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  wealthy.  It  may  again  be  questioned  how  far  such  a  sweep- 
ing reaction  was,  under  the  circumstances,  possible  or  probable. 
The  Servian  arrangements  had  been  so  long  and  so  deeply  modified 
as  to  be  almost  objects  of  antiquarian  curiosity.  At  the  same  time 
he  carried  some  measures  for  the  relief  of  poverty  and  debt. 

Thus  Sulla  hoped  to  establish  on  a  formal  basis  at  last  the 
power  of  the  Senate  in  the  constitution,  and  of  the  upper  classes  in 
the  Senate  ;  to  curb  the  caprices  of  the  tribunes  and  the  Comitia, 
and  reduce  the  former  by  law  to  the  position  they  had  held  by 
custom  during  the  war-period  as  the  instruments  of  aristocratic 
government,  while  he  did  soniething  to  propitiate  the  needy  pro- 
letariate. His  proposals,  indeed,  appear  more  "thorough"  than 
they  really  were.  The  Senate  was  not  only  a  necessary,  but  in  fact 
the  leading,  element  in  the  constitution.  No  one  dreamt  of  abolish- 
ing it.  Without  its  control  the  jarring  powers  of  the  divided  magis- 
tracy and  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  degenerate  Assembly  would 
have  made  the  Republic  impossible.  Under  the  circumstances,  the 
only  alternatives  to  personal  rule  were  tribunician  anarchy  or  the 
formal  recognition  of  the  de  facto  power  of  the  Senate.  The  old 
understandings,  the  old  respect  for  atictoritas,  were  gone ;  the  checks 
imposed  by  the  veto  and  by  religion  were  disregarded  ;  it  remained 
to  put  things  down  in  black  and  white.  So,  too,  we  may  justify  the 
reactionary  attempt  to  reform  the  Centuriata.  The  standard  of 
wealth  had  risen,  and  the  practical  exclusion  of  the  poorer  classes 
from  the  electorate  might  place  some  check  on  corruption,  while 
this  body,  however  modifie-d,  had  never  been  genuinely  democratic. 
The  proscriptions  even,  which  were  probably  authorised  by  the 
people,  were  no  novelty,  and,  compared  with  the  Gracchan  execu- 
tions, both  formal  and  moderate.  But  Sulla  must  have  seen  how 
essentially  shallow  and  temporary  his  work  was.  The  decline  of 
the  Senate  had  been  due  as  much  to  the  vices  of  the  nobles  as  to 
the  acts  of  the  demagogue.  It  was  as  impossible  to  restore  political 
health  by  juggling  with  the  constitution  as  it  was  to  meet  economic 
evils  by  usury  laws  and  emigration.  It  was  to  mend  old  garments 
with  rags.  He  did  nothing'  for  the  equalisation  of  rights,  nothing 
to  remove  the  extremes  of  wealth  and  poverty,  or  to  reduce  the 


SULLA'S  FIRST  REFORMS  419 

bitterness  of  faction.  The  Senate,  the  equites,  and  the  rabble 
remained  as  they  were,  and  he  himself  had  shown  a  contempt  for 
constitutional  cant  and  a  belief  in  physical  force  which  were  likely 
to  influence  the  future  more  than  his  reactionary  legislation. 

Sulla  goes  to  the  East. — Nor  could  the  author  of  the  reform 
stay  to  watch  over  its  working.  Duty  called  him  to  the  East, 
\\'here  the  situation  had  been  aggravated  by  delay.  And  yet  there 
were  dangerous  symptoms  in  Italy.  The  Samnites  kept  the  field  ; 
Nola  held  out  ;  Lucania  and  Bruttium  were  still  unsubdued.  The 
new  citizens  were  exasperated  by  their  disabilities,  and  many  com- 
munities were  still  uncertain  of  their  fate.  Even  at  Rome  the 
restricted  electorate  had  placed  alongside  of  Cn.  Octavius,  a  brave 
and  upright  but  pedantic  aristocrat,  the  notorious  and  vulgar 
democrat,  L.  Cornelius  Cinna.  The  army  of  the  North  mutinied, 
and  killed  its  new  general,  Sulla's  trusted  colleague,  Pompeius 
Rufus.  Nor  did  Sulla  venture  to  remove  the  suspected  instigator 
of  the  mutiny,  Pompeius  Strabo,  who  resumed  the  command  and 
condoned  the  outrage.  Indeed  he  himself,  yielding  to  the  neces- 
sity of  the  time  rather  than  to  the  repeated  pressure  of  Cinna,  was 
content  with  exacting  a  public  oath  from  the  consuls  that  they 
would  be  loyal  to  the  constitution,  left  his  legate,  Q.  Metellus 
Pius,  with  proconsular  power  to  deal  with  the  Samnites,  while 
Appius  Claudius  was  to  carry  on  the  siege  of  Nola,  and  embarked 
for  the  East  in  the  beginning  of  87  B.C.  Cynic  or  patriot,  who  shall 
say  ?  he  left  the  factions  to  fight  it  out  while  he  marched  against 
the  public  enemy.  His  departure  was  followed  by  the  collapse 
of  his  work. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

THE    FIRST    MITHRADATIC    WAR 

B.C.  A.r.c. 

Aggressions  of  Mithradates  repelled  by  Sulla        .        .        -92  662 

Mithradates  occupies  Asia,  and  massacres  the  Italians  there    88  666 

Sulla  and  Archelaus  in  Greece 87  667 

Sulla  takes  Athens  -Battle  of  Chaeronea  .86  668 

Battle  of  Orchomenus 85  669 

Sulla  makes  Peace  with  Mithradates  and  crushes  Fimbria .     84  670 

State  of  the  East.- — For  some  time  Rome,  absorbed  in  domestic 
politics  or  more  immediate  dangers,  had  neglected  Eastern  affairs. 
The  fate  of  Cyrene  and  the  expedition  to  Cilicia  have  been  already 
mentioned.    Egypt,  after  the  death  of  Euergetes  II,  (117  B.C.),  was 


420  HISTORY   OP    ROME 

allowed  to  become  the  prey  of  dynastic  feuds.  Similar  factions 
convulsed  the  kingdom  of  Syria,  which  was  rapidly  falling  to 
pieces.  While  Rome  had  obtained  a  footing  in  Cilicia,  the 
Parthians  annexed  Mesopotamia,  and  every  town  and  tribe  that 
could,  Jew,  Arab,  Cireek,  or  pirate,  asserted  its  practical  inde- 
pendence. In  Asia  Minor  generally  there  had  been  little  change. 
It  remained  a  congeries  of  dependent  kingdoms,  principalities, 
leagues,  cities,  and  cantons,  in  more  or  less  intimate  relation  to 
Rome.  The  province  of  Asia,  organised  by  Aquillius  in  129  B.C.,  had 
been  handed  over  by  C.  Gracchus  to  the  publicani  in  123  H.c,  and 
its  condition,  between  their  exactions  and  those  of  the  officials, 
had  steadily  gone  from  bad  to  worse.  Occasionally  an  honest 
Scaevola  protected  the  subjects,  but  average  Roman  rule  had 
been  marked  by  cruelty,  confiscation,  and  plunder  ;  exactions  had 
induced  usury,  and  usury  bankruptcy  ;  freemen  were  kidnapped 
as  slaves,  and  the  land  exhausted.  These  benefits  of  Roman 
government  had  spread  over  the  adjacent  countries  till  the  name 
of  Rome  stank  in  the  nostrils  of  the  East.  And  yet  the  garrison 
was  slender  ;  there  was  no  fleet  to  keep  the  seas,  and  the  venality 
of  Roman  officials  was  so  notorious  that  when  Aquillius  had  sold 
Phrygia  Major  by  auction  to  the  father  of  Mithradates,  Gracchus 
divided  Roman  agents  and  senators  into  three  classes — those  who 
had  been  bribed  by  Nicomedes,  or  by  Mithradates  \^,  or  by  both. 
On  account  of  this  bribery  Phrygia  had  been  detached  from 
Pontus  and  loosely  connected  with  the  province. 

Parthia  and  Pontus. — But  the  most  salient  feature  in  Eastern 
politics  had  been  the  growth  of  three  kingdoms — of  Parthia, 
Armenia,  and  Pontus.  Parthia,  which  had  deposed  Syria  from 
the  hegemony  of  Asia,  and  stretched  from  the  Oxus  and  the 
Hindoo  Koosh  to  the  Euphrates,  lay  as  yet  beyond  the  poli- 
tical horizon  of  Rome,  save  so  far  as  its  relation  to  the  rising 
power  of  Armenia  inclined  it  to  maintain  a  friendship  with  the 
Western  Republic.  The  principality  of  Great  Armenia,  independent 
since  Magnesia  (190  B.C.),  sprang  into  importance  under  the  dynasty 
of  the  Artaxiads,  and  attained  its  zenith  under  its  present  ruler, 
Tigranes,  who  shook  off  the  Parthian  suzerainty  and  claimed  as 
Great  King  the  supremacy  of  Asia. 

Most  dangerous,  however,  to  Rome  was  the  de\elopment  of 
Pontus,  or  Cappadocia  by  the  sea.  This  district,  which,  owing  to 
its  remote  position  and  rugged  character,  had  been  conquered 
neither  by  Persian  nor  Macedonian,  had  maintained  its  indepen- 
dence against  the  successors  of  Alexander,  under  a  line  of  native 


MITHRADA  TES 


421 


princes,  who  boasted  their  descent  from  the  royal  house  of  ancient 
Persia,  from  Darius,  the  son  of  Hystaspes.  It  grew  unnoticed  till 
the  capture  of  Sinope  (end  of  second  century  B.C.)  gave  it  a 
capital  and  a  naval  basis  on  the  Euxine.  In  the  third  Punic  war 
Mithradates  V.  (Euergetes)  had  earned  by  his  support  the  title  of 
Roman  friend  and  ally.  In  131  B.C.  he  had  received  for  his  services 
against  the  pretender  Aristonicus,  and  for  cash  down  to  Aquillius, 
the  district  of  Phrygia  Major,  which  he  did  not,  however,  long 
retain.  Murdered  in  120  (121)  B.C.,  he  left  the  kingdom  to  the 
boy  Mithradates  VI.  (Eupator),  aged  from  eleven  to  thirteen  )-ears, 
under  the  regency  of  the  queen-mother. 

Mithradates. — A  halo  of  Eastern  legend  surrounds  the  childhood 
and  youth  of  the  great  king,  as  a  mist  of  Roman  slander  obscures 


TETKADKACHM  OF  MITHRADATES  VI. 


the  actions  and  death  of  Rome's  persistent  and  detested  enem\-. 
The  comets  at  his  birth,  the  treacherous  guardians  plotting  against 
his  life,  his  course  of  poisons  and  antidotes,  the  adventures  of  the 
homeless  hunter  in  his  seven  years'  wandering,  the  recovery  of 
the  stolen  throne,  the  sudden  disappearances  of  the  king,  and  his 
journeys  in  disguise  through  Asia  Minor  studying  the  manners 
of  men  and  the  ways  of  their  lands,  his  dramatic  return  to  punish 
the  treason  of  his  queen  and  ministers,  belong  to  the  romance  of 
history.  He  has  all  the  traits  of  the  Eastern  hero.  We  hear  of  him 
as  a  wearer  of  gigantic  armour,  as  a  swift  runner,  an  audacious 
horseman,  a  mighty  Nimrod,  a  hard  drinker,  a  vast  eater,  a  royal 
lover,  a  master  of  twenty-two  languages,  dealing  justice  to  the 
tribes  of  his  kingdom.     Born  at  Sinope,  he  received  a  Greek  educa- 


422  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tion,  which  gave  him  indeed  but  a  smattering  of  culture,  a  veneer 
of  accomphshment,  through  which  the  inner  barbarism  was  bound 
to  break  out,  yet  made  him  a  patron  of  literature  and  art,  and 
taught  him,  above  all,  the  value  of  (ireck  political  and  military 
science,  helped  him  to  organise  kingdom  and  army,  and  made  him 
select  as  his  agents  and  generals  the  ablest  and  most  instructed 
Greeks.  His  nature  and  training  made  him  cruel,  cunning,  and 
treacherous,  and  in  the  crisis  of  his  career  his  worst  qualities  were 
most  conspicuous.  He  lound  everywhere  what  he  expected  to 
find,  treason,  and  practised  freely  himself  what  he  most  suspected 
in  others.  In  his  passionate  fits  cruel  to  ferocity,  he  spared  neither 
friend  nor  kin,  and  was  capable  of  atrocious  outrage.  Yet  through 
the  darkest  shades  painted  by  his  foes  we  can  discern  the  linea- 
ments of  a  great  and  even  heroic  character,  however  defiled  by 
superstition,  vindictiveness,  perfidy,  and  lust.  He  was  a  strong^ 
king,  an  energetic  organiser,  a  brave  soldier,  who  could  devise 
large  schemes,  appreciate  good  service,  and  employ  able  ministers. 
At  times  he  could  even  show  generosity  and  moderation.  The 
heart  and  soul  henceforth  of  Eastern  resistance  to  Rome,  he  fought 
in  turn  with  her  ablest  generals,  and  sprang  with  fresh  strength 
from  defeat.  He  created  a  disciplined  army  and  a  numerous 
fleet,  collected  vast  treasures,  and  welded  into  a  strong  power  the 
discordant  elements  of  his  empire.  He  conquered  Asia  Minor, 
invaded  Europe,  allied  himself  with  every  element  of  discontent, 
rebels,  pirates,  democrats,  and  almost  united  the  Hellenic  and 
Oriental  world  against  his  enemies.  He  was  aided,  of  course,  by 
the  disintegration  of  the  Roman  state,  by  the  folly  of  Roman 
parties,  and  the  neglect  which  alone  permitted  his  rise  to  power  ; 
but  something  is  left  for  praise  to  the  ever-active,  never-despair- 
ing king  which  may  induce  us  largely  to  discount  the  malignity 
of  hostile  criticism. 

Historically,  whatever  parade  Mithradates  might  make  of 
Hellenic  sympathies  and  Hellenic  culture,  however  much  he 
might  pose  as  the  defender  of  the  liberties  of  Hellas,  he  stands 
out  as  in  every  respect  essentially  Eastern,  in  his  personal  char- 
acter as  much  as  in  the  military  and  political  organisation  of 
Pontus.  In  himself  he  represents  no  cause  but  his  own,  with  no 
aim  but  personal  aggrandisement  ;  historically  he  is  the  successor 
of  the  Persian,  the  precursor  of  the  Parthian  and  Arab  in  the 
struggle  between  East  and  West. 

The  Kingdom  of  Pontus. — The  kingdom  of  Pontus,  as  he  re- 
ceived it,  running  from  Colchis  to  beyond  the  Halys,  included  the 


MITHRADATES 
CASPIU/U  M  }      ^ 


423 


424  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

inipoiuint  towns  of  Sinope,  Amisus,  and  Trapezus  on  the  coast, 
lint  had  no  inland  towns  to  speak  of.  Scattered  forts  throughout 
the  land  guarded  the  royal  magazines  and  treasures,  and  served  as 
refuges  to  the  numerous  but  primitive  population,  little  affected  by 
Western  ideas.  Mithradates  began  by  enlarging  his  dominions  to 
the  east  and  north.  He  subdued  Colchis,  won  Dioscurias,  invaded 
the  Scythian  steppes,  annexed  the  Tauric  Chersonese  (Crimea), 
and  pushed  his  arms  almost  to  the  Ister,  within  touch  of  Thrace. 
The  warlike  nomads,  of  all  the  various  races  that  ringed  the  Euxine 
round,  Scythians,  Taurians,  Roxolani,  Bastarnians,  fled  before  his 
Greek  generals  and  conciuering  phalanx,  paid  him  liomage,  and 
furnished  him  recruits.  The  Greek  colonies  of  the  coast,  hard 
pushed  by  barbarians,  and  now  neglected  by  Greek  and  Roman 
alike,  hailed  him  as  the  protector  of  their  corn-markets  and 
fisheries,  their  lands  and  lives.  In  Chersonesus  (Sebastopol)  and 
Panticapaeum  (Kertch),  in  Theodosia  and  Phanagoria,  he  found 
the  basis  for  the  new  kingdom  of  the  Bosphorus.  Hence  he  ch-ew 
a  large  revenue,  huge  supplies  of  corn,  and  a  serviceable  Cossack 
cavalry.  By  sea  and  land  he  was  master  of  the  Euxine.  This,  of 
course,  was  the  work  of  time,  but  good  progress  had  been  made 
before  the  war  with  Rome  and  without  interference  from  her  ill- 
informed  and  preoccupied  government.  His  ideas  widened.  He 
annexed  Lesser  Armenia,  and  formed  with  Tigranes,  to  whom  he 
married  his  daughter  Cleopatra,  a  compact  of  mutual  support 
which  left  Tigranes  free  to  extend  his  conciuests  south  and  east, 
while  Mithradates  pushed  his  designs  in  Asia  Minor. 

Paphlagonia  and  Cappadocia.  —  His  first  enterprise  was  natu- 
rally directed  against  Paphlagonia,  which,  on  the  death  of  the  last 
Pylsemenes,  became  a  bone  of  contention  between  Pontus  and 
Bithynia.  Mithradates  claimed  it  by  right  of  an  alleged  bequest ; 
Nicomedes  put  up  a  pretender.  In  the  end,  as  a  result  of  the 
rivalry  or  by  a  concerted  partition,  Mithradates  kept  the  part  he 
had  occupied,  and  even  cut  off  a  slice  of  Galatia  in  defiance  of 
Roman  remonstrance.  Of  the  two  claimants  Rome  natural]}- 
favoured  her  client  Bithynia,  but  was  too  much  occupied  by  the 
Cimbric  war  to  act  with  effect.  The  rival  kings  next  intrigued  for 
the  possession  of  Cappadocia,  where  Ariarathes  VI.,  brother-in- 
law  of  Mithradates,  had  been  murdered  by  Gordius,  a  suspected 
agent  of  the  Pontic  king,  to  whom  the  assassin  fled  for  refuge. 
In  his  place  Mithradates  set  up  his  own  nephew,  Ariarathes  VII., 
with  Gordius  as  guardian,  an  arrangement  which  led  at  once  to 
quarrels,  and  then  to  war.     But  the  uncle  murdered  his  kinsman 


MITHRADATES  AND  ROME  425 

with  his  own  hand,  and  crowned  a  fresh  puppet,  opposed  by  Nico- 
medes,  who  married  the  widow  of  the  old  monarch,  and  pushed  a 
puppet  of  his  own.  Finally,  Tigranes  came  in  to  support  his  wife's 
father,  and  buy  his  aid  against  the  Parthians.  When  Sulla  came 
first  to  the  East  as  praetor  of  Cilicia  in  92  B.C.,  a  sham  Ariarathes 
was  governing  Cappadocia,  with  Gordius  as  minister,  in  the  in- 
terests of  Pontus.     The  ancient  royal  house  was  extinct. 

Sulla  as  Pro- Praetor. — Sulla  found  a  formidable  problem.  The 
Senate  had  permitted  a  strong  and  organised  state  to  grow  up 
on  the  Roman  frontier,  with  an  army  100,000  strong,  with  a  fleet 
that,  resting  on  Sinope  and  Chersonesus,  made  the  Euxine  a  Pontic 
lake,  strong  in  alliances,  stronger  in  the  absence  of  any  serious 
fleet  or  army  of  Rome,  pushing  its  aggressions  right  and  left  over 
countries  in  alliance  with  the  Roman  people.  It  had  been  warned 
already  by  Nicomedes  and  the  Tauric  princes,  and  now  that 
Cappadocia  had  fallen,  it  was  forced  to  act  with  some  show  of 
\  igour.  Luckily  the  Roman  name  was  still  terrible.  With  a  few 
regulars  and  auxiliaries,  backed  by  the  memories  of  Magnesia  and 
Pydna,  Sulla  drove  Gordius  and  his  Armenian  allies  headlong  from 
Cappadocia.  Mithradates  disowned  his  agents  and  withdrew  his 
pretenders,  promised  to  evacuate  Paphlagonia,  which  w^as  declared 
free,  and  to  reinstate  the  Scythian  chiefs.  The  Cappadocians,  by 
free  election,  summoned  Ariobarzanes  to  the  throne. 

Sulla  was  the  first  Roman  general  who  reached  the  Euphrates. 
Here  took  place  the  famous  interview,  when  he  assumed  the  place 
of  honour  between  the  newly  elected  prince  and  the  ambassador 
of  the  King  of  kings,  sent  by  the  Arsacid  to  knit  a  friendship  with 
Rome,  in  view  of  the  encroachments  of  Armenia. 

New  Aggression  of  Mithradates. — But  the  settlement  was  merely 
apparent.  The  events  of  91  B.C.  paralysed  Rome,  and  Mithradates, 
always  well  informed  in  Roman  politics,  instigated  Tigranes  to 
expel  Ariobarzanes,  omitted  to  evacuate  Paphlagonia,  and  con- 
tinued his  Crimean  wars.  This  might  have  been  borne  ;  but  when, 
on  the  death  of  Nicomedes  II.  of  Bithynia  (91  B.C.  ?),  the  younger 
son,  Socrates,  supported  by  Pontic  troops,  evicted  the  rightful  heir, 
Nicomedes  III.,  the  removal  of  this  important  buffer  state  brought 
the  danger  something  too  close  to  the  frontier  of  the  province. 
Mithradates  had,  however,  committed  no  o\ert  act  of  war  ;  nor, 
indeed,  could  an  army  have  been  spared  to  chastise  him.  In 
answer  to  the  appeals  of  the  expelled  kings,  M'.  Aquillius,  son, 
probably,  of  the  conqueror  of  Aristonicus,  colleague  of  Marius  in 
loi  B.C.,  and  distinguished  in  the  Servile  war,  but  bearing  a  name 


426  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

notorious  in  the  East,  was  sent  as  a  special  envoy  to  settle  affairs. 
Again  a  mere  demonstration  was  enough  ;  the  princes  were  re- 
stored (90  B.C.),  and  Mithradates,  though  he  evaded  the  call  for 
contingents,  offered  no  resistance,  disowned  and  executed  Socrates, 
and  sheltered  himself  behind  his  agents,  Gordius  and  Tigranes, 
A  true  Oriental,  persistent  as  pliant,  he  recoiled  before  an  earnest 
front,  waiting  his  time  to  pursue  his  projects  by  fraud,  force,  or 
corruption.  In  spite  of  the  chance  offered  by  the  Social  War, 
he  Mas  not  prepared  for  an  open  struggle,  and  the  Senate,  as 
he  knew,  was  bound  to  content  itself  with  this  demonstration  of 
Roman  supremacy.  Neither  could  make  up  their  minds  to  the 
inevitable. 

Aquillius  forces  on  War. — Aquillius,  true  t\pe  of  a  "  prancing 
proconsul,"  forced  the  hands  of  both,  at  the  worst  time  possible 
for  Rome.  He  pushed  on  the  young  Bithynian  king,  his  client  and 
debtor,  to  enforce  the  evacuation  of  Paphlagonia.  Nicoinedes 
closed  the  exit  of  the  Euxine,  threatened  Amastris,  and  advanced 
towards  the  Pontic  frontier.  When  Mithradates  modestly  de- 
manded his  recall,  or  liberty  of  action  for  defence,  Aquillius  sternly 
forbade  him  to  resist  the  aggressor,  and  collected  three  corps  under 
Cassius,  Oppius,  and  himself,  mainly  composed  of  Asian  auxiliaries, 
in  support  of  the  Bithynian  advance,  on  the  frontiers  of  Pontus 
and  Cappadocia.  The  only  possible  answer  was  the  mobilisation 
of  the  Pontic  fleet  and  anny.  Once  at  bay,  the  king  took  up  the 
work  with  thoroughness  and  energy.  He  had  the  prospect  of  the 
most  complete  revenge  and  the  expulsion  of  the  hated  Westerns  ; 
even  the  invasion  of  the  West  itself  seemed  not  impossible  at  this 
time  and  with  these  resources.  His  rear  and  flank  were  covered  by 
Armenia,  which  promised  active  co-operation  ;  he  disposed  by  now 
of  a  force  of  250,000  foot  and  40,000  horse  drawn  from  the  fight- 
ing tribes  of  Asia  Minor,  the  Caucasus,  and  the  steppes,  together 
with  a  powerful  fleet,  manned  and  officered  by  sailors  from  Eg>pt, 
Crete,  and  Syria.  His  generals,  Archelaus,  Neoptolemus,  and 
the  rest,  were  the  ablest  Greek  soldiers  of  fortune.  His  envoys 
were  seen  in  all  the  Eastern  courts  ;  they  penetrated  into  Thrace, 
Numidia,  and  Samnium.  The  bold  piratical  cruisers  acted  as 
privateers,  harassing  the  transports  and  cutting  the  communica- 
tions of  Rome.  To  strengthen  his  ill-assorted  and  motley  hosts, 
he  had  enlisted  a  legion  of  Roman  deserters  and  Italian  refugees  ; 
he  expected  contingents  from  the  Greek  cities  whose  protectorate 
he  assumed.  Above  all,  there  fought  for  him  at  first  the  deadly 
hate  of  Greek  and  native  alike  for  the  foreign  oppressor, — usurer, 


SUCCESSES   OF  MITHRADATES  427 

merchant,  governor,  collector, — whose  tyranny  seemed  worse  as 
yet  than  the  wildest  caprices  of  an  Oriental  despot. 

Mithradates  occupies  Asia. — When  a  last  mission  to  Acjuiliius 
failed,  Mithradates  took  the  offensive  in  the  spring  of  88  B.C.  The 
Roman  power  collapsed  at  once  under  the  rapid  succession  of 
disasters.  The  Bithynian  army  was  the  first  to  be  scattered  ;  its 
camp  was  stormed,  and  the  kingdom  fell  at  a  blow.  The  Asian 
militia  dispersed  in  panic  ;  the  small  corps  in  Cappadocia  was 
crushed  ;  Cassius,  the  governor  of  Asia,  was  forced  to  retreat  on 
Rhodes  ;  Oppius,  shut  up  in  Laodicea  (Phrygia),  was  surrendered, 
exhibited  in  derision  as  a  show,  and  only  later  given  up  to  Sulla. 
The  thunderstruck  Acjuillius  was  overtaken  in  his  retreat,  routed, 
and  driven  first  into  Pergamum,  and  thence  to  Mitylene,  where  he 
also  was  handed  over  by  the  people.  Chained  and  mounted  on  an 
ass,  or  tied  to  the  stirrup  of  a  horseman,  he  was  paraded  through 
the  towns  of  Asia  as  a  laughing-stock  ;  and  finally,  if  the  tale  be  true, 
"his  thirst  was  stilled"  for  ever  with  molten  gold  poured  down  his 
greedy  throat  by  order  of  the  king.  Mithradates,  like  Hannibal, 
dismissed  the  native  prisoners,  and  by  his  clemency  and  exploits  so 
roused  the  enthusiasm  of  Hellenes  and  Asiatics  alike  that  all  the 
towns,  with  few  exceptions,  hailed  him  as  a  conquering  god,  de- 
liverer and  friend,  and  placed  themselves  at  his  disposal.  Rhodes, 
generously  forgetful,  remained  a  refuge  and  asyluii ,  and  with  her 
stout  fleet  and  strong  walls  withstood  the  Pontic  po\A  ^r  by  land  and 
sea.  Magnesia,  with  the  Carian  and  Lycian  leagues,  and  the  princes 
of  Paphlagonia,  alone  besides  were  loyal.  Asia  was  lost  ;  what  fleet 
there  was  surrendered.  The  Romans  had  begun  the  war  with 
inadequate  forces,  and  were  compelled  from  the  first  to  act  on  the 
defensive.  Even  in  89  B.C.  there  was  scanty  hope  of  men  or  money 
from  exhausted  Italy  ;  and,  to  crown  all,  in  the  course  of  88  B.C.,  the 
Sulpician  revolution  had  diverted  the  army  of  Asia  from  Brun- 
disium  to  Rome. 

Massacre  of  Italians. — Mithradates  crowned  his  successes  by 
a  crime  and  a  blunder.  A  decree  from  Ephesus  (88  B.C.),  backed 
by  the  vengeful  malice  of  an  infuriated  population  and  executed 
with  Asiatic  atrocity,  threw  to  the  dogs  and  vultures  the  bodies  of 
80,000  to  150,000  Romans  and  Italians,  men,  women,  and  children, 
massacred  on  a  single  day.  No  sanctuary  was  sacred,  no  age 
or  sex  spared.  Debts  of  money  and  debts  of  vengeance  were 
washed  out  in  promiscuous  bloodshed.  The  goods  of  the  victims 
were  shared  between  the  assassins  and  the  king.  The  story  of  the 
Asian  fury,  like  the  story  of  Aauillius'   fate,  has  been  no  doubt 


428  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

over-coloured,  and  the  crime  was  possibly  due  as  much  to  popu- 
lar feeling  as  to  the  king's  order,  but  ghastly  crime  it  was,  and  if 
Mithradates  hoped  to  cement  by  blood  the  fickle  loyalty  of  the 
Asian  Greeks,  he  was  doomed  to  disappointment.  His  own  cruelty 
and  their  mutinous  cowardice  ruined  the  plan.  Moreover,  it 
was  the  one  thing  needed  to  stiffen  public  opinion  and  unite  all 
parties,  senatorian,  democrat,  Roman,  Italian,  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
murderer. 

Invasion  of  Europe. — Meanwhile  his  fleet,  in  the  winter  of  S8-87 
B.C.,  had  forced  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Hellespont,  and  entered  the 
/Egean  under  the  command  of  Archelaus,  and,  in  the  absence  of 
a  Roman  navy,  commanded  the  seas.  The  islands,  including  the 
great  port  of  Delos,  were  successively  occupied  and  the  scenes  of 
massacre  renewed.  From  his  new  capital,  Pergamum,  the  king 
organised  his  dominions,  created  satrapies,  and  distributed  the 
plunder.  The  confiscations  which  filled  his  treasury  enabled  him 
to  remit  the  taxes.  Master  of  Asia  Minor  and  inebriated  by  easy 
success,  he  now  contemplated  the  invasion  of  the  West.  Already, 
possibly  at  his  instigation,  the  Thracians  and  other  tribes  had  raided 
Macedon  and  Epirus  (90  and  89  B.C.),  which  had  been  defended 
by  .Sentius,  the  governor,  with  some  success.  Delos,  with  its  temple- 
treasures,  had  been  restored,  soaked  as  it  was  with  Roman  blood, 
as  an  act  of  grace  to  its  ancient  mistress,  Rome's  favoured  ally, 
Athens.  Euboea  fell,  and  Athens  herself,  her  fickle  mob  beguiled 
by  gifts  and  promises,  received  Aristion,  ex-slave,  courtier,  rheto- 
rician, and  Epicurean  professor,  with  his  Pontic  guard,  as  agent 
of  the  king  and  virtual  tyrant.  The  Roman  party  perished  or 
fled.  Athens  and  the  Pirteus  then  became  the  Pontic  basis  in 
Europe. 

Greece  joins  Mithradates.  —  Simmering  discontent  in  Greece 
found  a  last  outlet  in  this  revolt.  Even  a  barbarian  liberator 
was  welcomed  as  a  relief  from  monotonous  Roman  supremacy, 
which  weighed  like  a  nightmare  on  the  spirit  of  the  people.  But 
the  nation  was  too  rotten  to  the  core,  economically  as  well  as  spiri- 
tually, to  put  real  heart  into  any  movement.  The  best  men  held 
aloof.  When  Archelaus'  expedition  appeared  the  Achjeans,  Laco- 
nians,  and  Boeotians  went  over.  The  legate  of  Sentius,  Bruttius 
Sura,  with  his  small  Macedonian  garrison  and  a  few  ships,  saved 
Demetrias  and  Chalcis,  recovered  Sciathus,  and,  advancing  to  re- 
lieve loyal  Thespit-e,  fought  gallantly  but  indecisively  with  Archelaus 
for  three  days  in  Boeotia,  but  he  was  finally  forced  to  fall  back 
(88-87  B.C.).     The  king's  son,  Ariarathes,  occupied  Thrace,  entered 


SULLA   IM  GREECE  429 

Macedonia,  and  secured  Abdera  and  Philippi  as  naval  bases.  With 
the  army  now  approaching  by  land,  his  Greek  levies,  his  fleet,  and 
the  reinforcements  arriving  by  sea,  Archelaus  was  master  of  the 
situation.  Mithradates,  certain  of  his  Eastern  game,  saw  no  reason 
to  bring  the  aid  demanded  by  the  Italian  insurgents,  though  his 
control  of  the  sea  made  it  possible. 

Sulla  lands  in  Epirus. — When  Sulla  landed,  in  the  summer  of 
87  R.C.,  on  the  coast  of  Epirus,  it  was  to  find  Asia  and  Achaia  gone 
and  Macedon  half  lost.  He  brought  with  him  but  five  legions — 
in  the  absence  of  the  Italians  barely  30,000  men.  War-ships  he 
had  none,  and  never  did  Roman  general  feel  more  keenly  the 
value  of  sea-power  to  an  imperial  people.  He  had  no  money  in  his 
chest,  no  prospect  of  support  from  home  ;  he  was  risking  his  life, 
his  career,  and  the  fortunes  of  his  party  to  maintain  the  power  and 
authority  of  his  country.  Militarily  the  task  was  difficult  enough  ; 
for,  if  the  hug-e  armies  before  him  lacked  unity  of  organisation 
and  equipment,  they  were  drilled  and  led  by  experienced  soldiers, 
and  rested  on  the  resources  of  a  powerful  state.  But  when,  in 
the  course  of  the  next  year,  he  was  himself  deposed  and  outlawed, 
threatened  even  with  attack  by  an  army  of  Romans  led  by  his 
legal  successor,  it  may  well  have  seemed  impossible.  From  all 
these  difficulties  he  emerged  successful,  and  he  owed  his  success 
as  much  to  his  own  coohiess  and  self-possession,  his  own  strategy 
and  tactics,  his  own  courage  and  foresight,  as  to  the  devotion  and 
valour  of  his  veterans.  He  was  the  greatest  and  most  original 
general  that  Rome  had  yet  produced  ;  possibly,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Caesar,  the  greatest  in  the  history  of  the  Republic  ;  and 
his  services  as  a  soldier  in  maintaining  the  dominion  and  govern- 
ment of  Rome  far  outweigh  his  famous  work  as  a  constructive 
statesman. 

Sulla  takes  Athens. — His  appearance  rapidly  altered  the  ideas 
of  the  Greeks,  who  promptly  seceded  from  their  Pontic  alliance. 
His  demand  for  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo  being  rejected, 
he  advanced  into  Boeotia,  and  there  defeated  Archelaus  and 
Aristion  at  Mount  Tilphossium.  From  Thebes,  whither  he  sum- 
moned yEtolian  and  Thessalian  auxiliaries,  he  pushed  on  to  attack 
Athens  and  the  Piraeus,  held  respectively  by  Aristion  and  Arche- 
laus. His  communications  were  secured  by  camps  at  Megara 
and  Eleusis,  his  operations  covered  by  Hortensius  in  Thessaly 
and  Munatius  at  Chalcis,  while  the  Greek  cities  redeemed  their 
mutiny  with  men,  money,  and  stores.  Failing  to  carry  the  for- 
tresses with  a  rush,  he  settled  down  to  a  siege   in   form,  while 


430 


HrSTORY  OF  ROME 


Archelaus  conducted  the  defence  in  the  most  approved  style  and 
with  consideral)le  success.  There  was  fierce  and  ahiiost  desperate 
fighting  under  the  walls,  when  Sulla  and  Murena  defeated  the 
relieving  army  of  Dromichictes.  But,  without  ships,  to  blockade 
the  PinL'us  was  hopeless.  To  obtain  them,  in  the  winter  of  87- 
86  K.C.  he  sent  L.  Licinius  Lucullus  to  Rhodes,  Syria,  and  Egypt. 
Lucullus  ran  the  gauntlet  of  the  enemy's  cruisers  only  to  meet 
evasive  answers  from  governments  afraid  to  supply  the  oligarchic 
general,  or  made  contemptuous  by  the  failures  of  Rome.  Once 
more  .Sulla  tried  to  storm  the  Piraeus  (spring  of  86  B.C.).  Archelaus, 
building  wall  within  wall,  disputed  his  ground  with  desperation 
inch  by  inch.  In  the  end,  and  after  months  of  fighting,  when  he 
had  retired  on  the  impregnable  Munychia,  Sulla  was  compelled 
to  leave  him  there  masked  by  a  sufficient  force,  while  he  proceeded 
to  meet  the  invading  army  in  Boeotia.  Athens  itself,  not  so  easily 
supplied  or  so  well  defended,  yielded  finally  to  the  blockade 
(March  i,  86  B.C.).  Famine  and  disease  had  done  their  work  ;  the 
storming  party  sacked  and  massacred  unresisted.  Aristion  and 
the  leaders  of  revolt  were  caught  and  killed,  but  the  city,  saved  by 
its  past,  retained  its  full  rights  ;  nor  was  even  Delos  taken  away. 


TETKADRACHM  STRUCK  BY  SULLA  L\  ATHENS— ATHENA  AND  THE  OWL. 


Position  of  Sulla. — Meanwhile  Chalcis  had  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  Mithradates,  with  Amphipolis,  and  probably  Demetrias,  the 
keys  of  (Greece  :  Munatius  and  Hortensius  were  retiring  before  the 
enemy's  advance.  Sulla's  position  was  critical.  So  far  from  re- 
covering Asia,  he  had  lost  Macedonia  ;  he  had  not  yet  captured 
the  Piraeus,  he  had  sufifered  severe  losses,  and  a  valuable  year  was 
gone.    To  fill  his  exhausted  chest  he  had  "  borrowed  "  the  treasures 


BATTLE    OF  CH^RONEA  431 

of  the  gods,  with  a  promise  to  repay,  fulfilled  later  with  the  con- 
fiscated lands  of  Thebes,  and  cynically  interpreted  the  alleged  sign 
of  Apollo's  wrath  in  his  own  favour.  The  sound  of  the  lyre  from 
the  sanctuar}'  declared  the  god's  approval  of  the  loan.  At  Rome 
his  constitution  had  been  wrecked,  his  friends  massacred,  himself 
proscribed,  and  the  new  consul,  Valerius  Haccus  the  younger, 
Marius'  successor,  was  expected  every  day  to  supersede  him.  With- 
out a  fleet  he  was  tied  hand  and  foot. 

Battle  of  Chaeronea.  —  Luckily,  Mithradates,  unaware  of  his 
chance,  or  despising  a  waiting  game,  ordered  Taxiles,  now  in  com- 
mand of  the  land  amiy  of  100,000  foot  and  10,000  horse,  to  advance 
into  Boeotia,  where  he  was  joined  by  Archelaus,  who  had  evacuated 
Pirasus.  It  was  a  motley  crowd,  magnificently  set  up,  blazirg 
with  Oriental  pomp,  but  without  unity  or  cohesion.  Sulla,  glad  of 
the  opportunity,  broke  up  his  camp  in  Attica,  joined  Hortensius, 
and  with  a  strength  barely  one-third  of  the  enemy  endeavoured 
to  force  an  action.  Against  the  advice  of  Archelaus,  who  pre- 
ferred the  wiser  policy  of  patience,  Taxiles  pressed  on.  The  result 
was  the  crushing  defeat  of  Chaeronea,  in  the  swampy  valley  of  the 
Cephissus  (March  86  B.C.).  Sulla  had  occupied  the  town,  in  er- 
cepted  their  march,  and  cut  their  connections  with  the  sea,  and  now, 
before  the  long  columns  had  well  got  clear  of  the  hill-land,  com- 
pelled battle  on  a  ground  fairly  favourable  to  his  smaller  force.  To 
protect  his  flanks  from  the  superior  ca\alry  he  dug  deep  trenches 
and  threw  up  earthworks,  while  his  centre  was  fortified  with  pali- 
sades, fixed  between  the  first  and  second  lines.  The  rush  of  the  war- 
chariots  was  broken  on  the  stockade  ;  their  retreat  in  disorder  broke 
up  the  phalanx  of  Greek  recruits  and  the  foreign  legion,  a  confusion 
utilised  by  the  Roman  foot.  To  cover  a  reorganisation,  Archelaus 
threw  his  cavalry  in  masses  on  the  Roman  left  and  rear,  and  when 
.Sulla,  hurrying  to  the  relief  of  the  struggling  squares,  laid  bare  his 
right,  attempted  to  assault  the  weakened  flank.  Hastily  returning, 
Sulla  flung  himself  in  turn  upon  the  enemy's  left,  now  denuded  of 
its  protecting  cavalry.  The  battle  raged  along  the  whole  line,  till 
gradually  the  Pontic  infantry  gave  way.  As  the  legionaries  pushed 
their  advance,  the  retreat  became  a  rout,  the  rout  a  saiive-gta'-J.etef. 
The  gates  of  the  camp  were  shut  to  check  the  fugitives,  but  the 
Roman  infantry  poured  on  with  irresistible  force.  The  camp  was 
stormed,  and  the  scanty  relics  of  the  massacre — some  ic,ooo  men 
— found  safety  at  last  in  Chalcis.  With  mendacity  as  consummate 
as  his  skill,  Sulla  reported  his  loss  at  fifteen.  The  want  of  ships 
and  the  arrival  of  Flaccus  robbed  him  of  the  fruits  of  viciory. 


432  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Archelaus  coinniaiidcd  the  son,  and  could  even  venture  to  attack 
Zacynthus. 

Flaccus  had  arrived  in  Thessaly  with  two  legions  ;  but  when 
Sulla  marched  to  meet  him,  so  far  from  withdrawing  his  rival's 
troops  from  their  allegiance,  he  could  scarcely  restrain  his  own 
from  desertion.  Unimpeded  by  Sulla,  he  sheered  off  to  the  north, 
with  the  intention  of  taking  Mithradates  in  the  rear  by  way  of  the 
Hellespont,  and  gaining  credit  for  the  ended  war — a  happy  solu- 
tion of  the  problem. 

Battle  of  Orchomenus. — In  the  spring  of  85  B.C.  a  huge  army 
under  Dorylaus  crossed  to  Eubcea,  and  taking  up  Archelaus  as  com- 
mander-in-chief, entered  lioeotia.  Sulla,  eager  for  a  decision  and 
confident  of  victory,  dared  to  meet  them  in  the  plains  of  Orcho- 
menus, and  inflicted  a  second  disastrous  defeat  in  a  pitched  battle, 
marked  by  his  own  desperate  valour.  His  troops  were  wavering 
under  the  weight  of  the  cavalry,  when  Sulla  leapt  from  his  horse, 
grasped  a  standard,  and  rushed  into  the  throng,  bidding  his  soldiers 
tell  their  friends  that  they  left  their  general  at  Orchomenus. 

The  victory  of  Orchomenus  compelled  the  evacuation  of  Europe. 
Macedonia  and  Thrace  were  reoccupied,  and  the  Roman  com- 
mander had  leisure  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Greece  and  build  the 
necessary  ships. 

Mithradates  was  in  ditificulties.  He  had  lost  two  armies,  and 
was  threatened  on  two  sides.  In  Asia  his  exactions  and  conscrip- 
tions, and  his  appalling  acts  of  cruelty,  had  caused  a  strong  reaction. 
Each  community  feared  for  itself  the  fate  of  depopulated  and 
plundered  Chios,  or  of  the  murdered  Galatian  chiefs  ;  many  were 
actually  in  arms.  Suspicion  bred  conspiracy,  and  1 600  men  perished 
in  the  reign  of  terror  that  followed.  The  maddened  king  decreed 
the  abolition  of  debts,  the  division  of  lands,  the  enfranchisement  of 
slaves  and  metics.     Revolution  and  violence  were  rampant. 

Flaccus  and  Fimbria. — Moreover,  Lucullus,  aided  by  the  victory 
of  ChiEronea,  had  now  raised  a  small  fleet,  which  he  had  dexter- 
ously used  to  obtain  some  valuable  successes  at  Cnidos,  Colophon, 
and  Chios.  Flaccus,  indeed,  who  had  crossed  from  Byzantium  to 
Chalcedon,  had  been  murdered  by  his  mutinous  troops,  egged  on 
by  his  legatus,  the  Marian  assassin  and  mob-orator,  C.  Flavins 
Fimbria,  who  was  elected  general,  and  displayed,  for  all  his 
crimes,  distinct  capacity  as  a  leader.  The  mutineers  were  loyal  to 
their  chosen  chief,  and  Fimbria,  successful  in  several  encounters, 
managed  to  drive  the  half-ruined  despot  from  Pergamum,  and 
would  have  captured  his  person,  the  prize  of  the  war,  if  Lucullus, 


PEACE    WITH  MITHRADATES  433 

true  to  his  principles  and  his  party,  had  not  refused  the  aid  of  his 
ships  to  his  master's  enemy  while  that  master  was  treating  with 
the  king.  Leaving  the  disappointed  Fimbria  and  his  demoralised 
ruffians  to  mark  their  path  by  plunder,  murder,  and  outrage,  and 
vent  their  sacrilegious  spite  on  Ilium,  Rome's  reputed  mother, 
Lucullus  sailed  away  to  win  fresh  victories  at  Lectum  and  Tenedos, 
which  gave  him,  when  reinforced  by  Sulla's  fleet,  the  mastery  of 
the  Hellespont. 

Peace. — Meanwhile  negotiations  had  been  going  on,  whose 
slow  progress  gave  Sulla  time  to  reorganise  Macedonia  and 
chastise  the  frontier  tribes.  Both  parties  needed  peace,  and  were 
ready  to  treat ;  neither  wished  to  lose  the  advantages  of  their 
position.  With  wonted  sagacity,  Mithradates,  a  careful  student  of 
Roman  politics,  preferred  to  deal  with  the  outlawed  Sulla,  though 
he  tried  in  vain  to  use  Fimbria's  existence  to  beat  down  the 
terms  of  Sulla's  ultimatum.  As  idle  was  his  hope  to  bribe  the 
indignant  Roman  with  the  offer  of  his  help  against  the  democrats  ; 
Sulla,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  was  no  partisan,  but  a  patriot. 
At  length,  under  pressure  of  the  continued  march  to  Asia,  the 
king  was  induced  by  the  astute  but  incorruptible  Archelaus  to 
accept,  however  reluctantly,  the  proffered  conditions.  Proposed 
first  at  a  conference  at  Delium  after  Orchomenus,  and  ratified  at 
a  personal  interview  at  Dardanus,  on  the  Hellespont,  but  never 
reduced  to  writing,  they  amounted  to  the  original  demand  by 
Sulla  for  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo.  The  conquests  of 
Pontus,  and  especially  Cappadocia,  Bithynia,  and  Paphlagonia, 
with  all  prisoners,  deserters,  and  eighty  ships  of  war,  were  to  be 
surrendered  and  the  expelled  princes  recognised  ;  in  addition,  a 
considerable  indemnity  was  of  course  exacted.  Archelaus,  by  his 
conduct  of  the  negotiations,  won  the  peculiar,  and  perhaps  ostenta- 
tious, regard  of  the  Roman  general,  and  therewith  the  suspicion 
of  the  royal  court,  which  drove  at  last  the  man  whom  Sulla  had 
failed  to  corrupt,  as  an  honoured  guest,  into  the  Roman  camp. 

Fimbria  crushed  and  Asiatic  affairs  regulated. — The  terms 
were  moderate  enough,  but,  under  the  circumstances,  substan- 
tially secured  the  dignity  of  the  Republic.  The  general  of  the 
oligarchy  had  other  work  to  do  ;  he  had  no  time  to  dally  in 
Asia,  and  must  perforce  let  slip  the  favourable  hour  for  breaking 
the  power  of  Pontus  and  avenging  the  Ephesian  decrees.  The 
easy  task  remained  of  crushing  the  brigand  Fimbria.  As  Sulla 
approached,  the  Fimbrians  began  to  desert,  and  refused  to  attack 
when  ordered.      Their  desperate  leader,  disdaining  the  door   of 

2  E 


434  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

escape  opened  by  the  man  he  had  just  failed  to  assassinate,  fell 
on  his  sword.  With  the  reorganisation  of  Asia,  Sulla's  work  was 
ended.  The  anarchical  decrees  of  Mithradates  were  cancelled,  the 
agents  of  his  murders  executed.  The  arrears  of  taxation  were 
called  in,  and  a  fine  of  20,000  talents  (^5,000,000)  wrung  from  the 
wretched  and  guilty  communities,  a  burden  which  hung  round 
their  necks  for  years  a  millstone  of  debt.  The  few  faithful 
states  were  recompensed,  and  order  was  restored  in  Bitliynia 
and  Cappadocia.  The  provincial  system  was  remodelled,  and 
L.  Licinius  Murena,  with  the  Fimbrian  soldiers,  was  left  as  legate 
to  carry  out  the  settlement.  For  the  rest,  it  was  hard,  no  doubt, 
to  sacrifice  the  easy  triumph,  hard  to  balk  the  troops  of  well- 
earned  booty,  and  hardest  of  all  to  shake  hands  in  public  with 
this  colossal  murderer.  But  the  position  in  Italy  was  critical,  and 
Sulla  (84-83  B.C.)  conducted  his  rested  and  recruited  veterans  in  a 
powerful  fleet  from  Asia  to  Greece,  whence,  for  the  first  time,  he 
sent  a  report  of  his  actions  in  regular  form  to  the  Senate,  blandly 
ignoring  his  own  deposition.  Among  the  treasures  which  he  was 
bringing  with  him  were  the  original  writings  of  the  philosopher 
Aristotle,  which  formed  a  part  of  the  library  of  Apellicon,  a  wealthy 
disciple  of  the  Peripatetic  school,  seized  after  the  capture  of 
Athens.  The  army,  concentrated  at  Dyrrhachium,  was  trans- 
ported without  difficulty  to  Brundisium. 


CHAPTER  XLII 

THE    CINNAN    REVOLUTION    AND    THE    CIVIL    WAR 

l'..C.      . 

Cinnan  Revolution  and  Marius'  Reign  of  Terror 

Death  of  Marius — Government  of  Cinna 

Sulla's  Overtures  rejected — Cinna  killed  in  a  Mutiny 

Sulla  lands  at  Brundisium,  and  gets  the  better  of  Norbanus 

and  Scipio  in  Campania 83        671 

Battles  of  Sacriportus  and  the  Colline  Gate—Siege  of  Prae- 

neste— End  of  the  War  in  Italy 82        672 

Troubles  at  Rome.  —  Hardly  had  Sulla  turned  his  back  on  Italy 
when  trouble  broke  out  at  Rome.  The  elements  of  mischief  were 
numerous,  but  the  opposition  had  neither  cohesion  nor  policy.  It 
was  a  "  syndicate  of  the  discontented,"  whose  figurehead,  for  want 
of  a  better,  was  a  pinchbeck  saviour  of  society,  called  L.  Cornelius 


87 

667 

86 

668 

84 

670 

DEPOSITION  OF  CINNA  435 

Cinna,  a  man  without  aims  or  principles,  a  mere  soldier  of  moderate 
gifts,  pushed  forward  by  stronger  heads  and  fiercer  passions  than  his 
o\\  n.  The  death  of  Rufus  had  cost  the  Senate  its  strongest  army. 
Strabo  sat  carefully  on  the  fence,  a  man  whose  adhesion,  when 
bought,  was  of  doubtful  value  to  either  side.  The  fanatic  demo- 
crats thirsted  for  revenge,  while  a  powerful  clique  was  working  for 
the  recall  of  the  exiles.  The  equites  were  out  of  humour.  The 
effects  of  the  financial  crisis  were  still  felt  ;  there  was  a  sore  feeling 
among  the  defeated  insurgents,  and  the  stupidity  of  the  Senate,  by 
resisting  the  demands  of  the  new  citizens,  justified  at  once  the  action 
of  the  agitators  and  the  stubborn  attitude  of  the  armed  Samnites. 
The  strongest  forces  behind  the  new  consul  were  Cn.  Papirius 
Carbo,  orator,  organiser,  and  general,  and  Q.  Sertorius,  the  ablest 
soldier  and  most  attractive  personality  of  his  party.  Unfortunately 
for  all,  the  latter  was  kept  in  the  background  ;  among  these  aim- 
less and  ferocious  fanatics,  the  man  of  genius,  moderation,  and 
mercy  was  out  of  his  element. 

Cinna  deposed. — The  first  symptom  of  reaction  was  the  effort 
of  Cinna,  with  the  aid  of  the  majority  of  the  tribunes,  to  remove  the 
disabilities  of  the  new  citizens  and  freedmen  and  restore  the  exiled 
Marians.  To  meet  the  influx  of  Italians  and  the  attempt  to  intimi- 
date the  Comitia,  Octavius  armed  his  supporters  against  his  perjured 
colleague.  In  the  fighting  through  the  Forum  and  the  streets  on 
this  bloody  "day  of  Octavius,"  io,oo3  victims  are  said  to  have 
fallen.  Cinna  was  deposed,  contrary  to  the  law  of  the  constitution, 
and  he  and  all  his  associates  were  declared  public  enemies.  It 
was  a  bad  precedent  set  by  a  weak  government,  which  once 
more  put  itself  in  the  wrong.  For,  if  Cinna  broke  his  oath  and 
disregarded  the  veto  of  the  senatorian  tribunes,  the  conservatives 
anticipated  force  by  force,  and  illegally  deposed  a  duly  appointed 
magistrate.  Justifying  their  action  in  this  case  by  a  piece  of  the 
ordinary  religious  jugglery,  they  unwisely  elected  the  priest  Corne- 
lius Merula,  a  good,  weak  man,  unfit  for  stormy  times,  to  take  the 
vacant  place.  But  the  exiles,  far  from  quitting  the  country,  flung 
themselves  on  the  support  of  the  new  burgesses,  whose  rights  they 
had  championed,  and  to  whom  the  unwisdom  of  the  senatorians 
had  given  for  the  moment  a  keen  interest  in  Roman  party  politics. 
They  could  rely  on  the  Samnites  and  Lucanians  above  all  ;  old 
soldiers  and  fugitive  slaves  flocked  to  their  standards.  Cinna  could 
pose  as  the  victim  of  oligarchic  persecution,  the  defender  of  the 
rights  of  citizens.  As  such  he  presented  himself,  with  the  veteran 
Sertorius  and  the  younger  Marius,  to  the  army  at  Nola,  which, 


436  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

having  no  special  conservative  sympathies,  promptly  recognised  the 
deposed  consul,  and  as  promptly  marched  on  Rome,  strengthened 
by  contingents  of  new  citizens  and  allies. 

Return  of  Marius. — Meanwhile  Cinna  had  invited  Marius  to 
return,  and  the  \indictive  old  man  had  landed  at  Telamon,  in 
Etruria,  with  a  band  of  armed  slaves  and  Numidians,  which  the 
magic  of  his  name  and  a  feeling  of  shame  and  sympathy  for  the 
oppressed  hero  soon  raised  to  an  army.  He  inflamed  the  public 
emotion  by  a  parade  of  mourning  and  squalor,  and  swelled  his 
legions  by  loosing  the  slaves  chained  in  the  rural  ergastttla.  With 
this  force  and  the  ships  he  had  collected  he  blocked  the  Tiber, 
captured  Ostia  and  the  neighbouring  ports,  and  gradually  cut  the 
supplies  of  the  city  from  the  west  by  sea  and  land.  In  spite  of 
Sertorius'  protest,  Cinna  officially  recognised  him.  The  name  was 
indispensable  to  him,  though  Marius  at  Ostia  and  elsewhere  had 
given  a  foretaste  of  the  coming  butchery.  As  Metellus  was  occu- 
pied in  Samnium,  the  Senate  called  Strabo  to  Rome  ;  but  Strabo, 
for  his  own  ends,  permitted  the  investment  of  the  city,  which  he 
was  well  able  to  prevent,  by  the  combined  forces  of  the  re\olu- 
tion,  and  preserved  his  doubtful  attitude,  though,  when  attacked 
by  Marius,  he  defeated  him,  with  the  aid  of  Octavius,  severely  in 
a  bloody  street-fight. 

Rome  invested. — The  Senate  fortified  Rome,  raised  the  citizens, 
and  tried  to  recruit  troops  by  extending  the  benefits  of  the  franchise- 
law  of  8g  B.C.  to  those  who  had  submitted  after  the  appointed  date. 
The  tardy  concession  availed  it  little,  and  when  it  authorised  nego- 
tiations with  the  Samnites,  the  demands  of  the  latter  were  such  as 
no  patriot  could  accept.  In  spite  of  their  rejection,  Metellus  was 
summoned  to  Rome,  a  movement  which  evacuated  Apulia,  set  the 
insurgents  free,  and  drew  the  net  of  investment  closer  round  the 
doomed  city.  The  fall  of  Ariminum  cut  away  all  hope  of  help 
from  the  north  ;  four  armies  surrounded  Rome  ;  the  demands  of 
the  Samnites  were  conceded  in  full  by  the  democrats  as  the  price 
of  alliance.  In  this  juncture  it  is  said  that  the  Senate  swallowed 
its  obstinacy  and  granted  the  equalisation  of  the  franchise.  But 
it  was  a  war  no  longer  of  principles,  but  of  passions  and  persons  ; 
the  only  living  cause  was  that  of  the  independence  of  Samnium. 
There  was  severe  fighting  under  the  walls  ;  famine  and  disease 
decimated  the  crowded  defenders  ;  Strabo  himself,  whose  selfish 
policy  was  largely  to  blame  for  the  situation,  perished  by  the 
pestilence,  and  his  mutilated  corpse  was  dragged  in  fury  through 
the  streets.     The  efforts  of  Metellus,  the  only  soldier  left,  were 


THE  REIGN  OE  TERROR  437 

marred  by  the  pedantry  of  Octavius.  Merula  was  a  nonentity. 
The  despondent  and  demoralised  troops,  when  Metellus  refused  to 
supersede  the  consuls,  began  to  desert  in  crowds.  On  either  side, 
Octavius  and  Marius  stubbornly  obstructed  compromise  ;  a  con- 
ference with  Cinna  eftected  nothing,  and  Metellus  withdrew  in 
despair  to  Africa.  The  slaves  accepted  the  emancipation  promised 
by  Cinna,  the  populace  was  starving,  and  of  relief  there  was  no 
prospect.  Capitulation  became  inevitable,  Merula  resigned  his 
office,  some  legal  pedantries  were  raised  and  swallowed,  the  outlaw 
was  recognised  as  consul,  and  Rome  submitted  without  conditions. 

Massacre  of  the  Optimates.^ — The  verbal  promise  of  Cinna  that 
there  should  be  no  bloodshed  was  heard  by  Marius  in  gloomy 
and  sarcastic  silence.  He  too,  when  his  colleague  entered  the 
gates,  waited  with  bitter  irony  for  the  decree  of  outlawry  to  be 
solemnly  annulled,  and  then  rushed  to  enjoy  his  carnival  of  revenge. 
For  five  days  and  nights  the  butchery  of  the  optimates  went  on, 
and  the  example  of  Rome  was  followed  throughout  Italy.  Clad 
in  consular  robes,  Octavius  met  his  death  like  a  senator  of  the 
Gallic  days.  The  orator  Antonius,  L.  Caesar  and  his  brother  Gaius, 
P.  Crassus,  Catulus  the  consul  of  Vercellse,  and  the  poor  priest 
Merula  were  among  the  victims.  With  the  last  two,  by  way  of 
irony,  legal  forms  were  obser\ed,  and  they  avoided  sentence  by 
suicide.  The  bodies  were  left  unburied,  the  heads  fi.xed  on  the 
rosira;  the  whole  city  was  one  scene  of  plunder  and  outrage. 
Sulla's  wife  and  children  escaped,  but  his  houses  were  wrecked 
and  his  goods  confiscated. 

Death  and  Character  of  Marius. — Marius  and  Cinna  are  said  to 
have  declared  themselves  consuls  for  86  B.C.,  without  election — a 
curious  sample  of  democratic  practice  ;  but  scarcely  had  the  con- 
queror of  the  Cimbri  and  of  his  own  country  won  his  long- sought 
seventh  term  and  a\enged  him  of  his  adversaries  and  their  gibes, 
when  he  died  of  fe\-er,  brought  on,  we  are  told,  by  the  debauchery 
with  which  he  deadened  the  stings  of  conscience.  Poetic  justice 
was  complete  ;  but  it  hardly  required  this  to  bring  down  to  the 
grave  the  over-strained  nerves  and  worn-out  frame  of  the  hitherto 
temperate  old  man.  For  all  this  massacre,  over-coloured  beyond 
question  by  Sullan  annalists,  he  and  his  butchers  were  responsible. 
Cinna  dared  not,  Sertorius  could  not,  stop  him.  There  is  no  sadder 
picture  in  history  than  the  moral  downfall  of  Marius.  In  his  earlier 
days  an  upright,  simple-minded,  honourable  man,  who  had  saved 
the  state  by  his  soldiership,  he  had  fallen  into  the  snares  of  political 
life.    Devoured  by  ambition,  the  spoiled  child  of  fame  had  become 


438  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

a  tool  where  lie  meant  to  l)e  master.  Soured  by  failure,  irritated 
by  sneers,  sick  with  craving  for  a  place  he  had  not  the  capacity 
to  fill,  maddened  at  the  last  by  persecution  and  indignity,  he  wiped 
out  the  record  of  his  services  in  blood,  and  died  the  horror  of 
Rome,  of  which  he  had  been  in  turns  the  glory  and  the  jest 
(January  13,  86  V,.c). 

Equalisation  of  the  Suffrage.  —  His  place  was  taken  by  L. 
Valerius  Flaccus  ;  his  band  of  assassins  was  extirpated,  to  the 
number  of  4000,  by  Sertorius  ;  and  the  Terror  came  to  an  end. 
The  sole  persons  who  had  profited  were  the  slaves  who  had  won 
their  freedom,  and  the  equites  who  bought  at  auctions  the  pro- 
perty of  the  dead.  The  laws  of  Sulla  were  at  once  repealed,  but 
the  only  other  legislative  acts  of  the  new  government  were  a 
dangerous  law  for  the  relief  of  debtors,  which  cancelled  three- 
quarters  of  their  obligations,  and  an  Act  for  the  equalisation  of  the 
suffrage,  which  distributed  the  Italians  through  the  thirty-five 
tribes.  This  time  the  Act  was  duly  executed  by  the  censors,  of 
whom  one  was  the  same  shifty  Philippus  who  had  opposed  the 
measure  of  Drusus.  Their  proceedings  were  confirmed  by  the 
Senate  in  84  B.C.  Sulla  having  been  deposed  and  outlawed,  the 
insignificant  Flaccus  was  sent  to  take  over  his  army. 

Failure  and  Death  of  Cinna.  — For  the  next  three  years  Cinna 
remained  in  supreme  command.  They  were  years  of  peace,  for 
the  country  was  exhausted.  His  power  was  unresisted,  for  the 
SuUans  were  dead  or  fled,  and  the  democrats  and  new  burgesses 
supported  their  leader,  while  the  moderates  acquiesced,  dreading 
another  reaction  more  than  they  disliked  the  revolution.  The 
Samnites,  still  in  arms,  were  friendly,  and  the  majority  of  the  pro- 
vinces accepted  the  situation — Sicily,  Sardinia,  the  Gauls  and 
vSpain,  Africa  too,  secured  through  the  quarrels  of  the  oligarchs 
— and  Sulla's  hands  were  full.  Yet  Cinna  and  his  colleagues,  con- 
tent with  unquestioned  authority,  appear  to  have  governed  merely 
from  day  to  day,  without  thought  for  consolidating  their  position. 
Their  total  lack  of  political  plans,  of  any  effort  to  reorganise  the 
government  upon  democratic  lines,  is  the  final  proof  that  the 
democratic  party  so  called  had  no  genuine  programme  and  could 
provide  no  real  alternative  to  senatorial  misrule.  Their  failure 
exhausted  one  possibility  of  republican  reform,  as  Sulla  exhausted 
another  in  his  failure  to  restore  the  Senate.  In  their  security  they 
even  neglected  the  formation  of  a  proper  army  and  fleet  and  the 
defence  of  the  ports.  Even  the  discomfiture  of  Flaccus  and 
Fimbria  failed  to   rouse  them.      At  last,  early  in  84  B.C.,  came 


SULLA   RETURNS  439 

Sulla's  announcement  of  the  finished  war  and  his  proposed  return. 
He  promised  to  recognise  the  equalisation  of  the  suffrage,  and 
to  confine  his  vengeance  to  the  revolutionary  leaders.  The  elder 
Flaccus,  the  leader  of  the  Senate,  tried  to  effect  a  compromise. 
Sulla  was,  of  course,  to  disband  his  army  and  come  to  Rome,  ' 
under  a  safe-conduct  if  necessary,  and  all  levies  meanwhile  were 
to  be  stopped.  But  Cinna  and  Carbo,  roused  at  last,  scouting  the 
proposals  of  the  Senate,  pushed  on  their  preparations.  Cinna,  in 
fact,  had  already  transferred  to  Greece  some  of  the  troops  he  had 
collected  at  Ancona,  when  he  met  his  death  in  an  attempt  to  quell 
a  mutiny  among  the  rest,  who  feared  to  cross  the  stormy  seas. 
Carbo  brought  back  the  advanced  detachment,  and  retired  into 
winter  quarters  at  Ariminum,  abandoning  the  idea  of  meeting 
Sulla  in  Greece  (84  B.C.). 

Sulla  and  Carbo. — To  the  Senate,  Sulla  replied  that,  with  his 
loyal  arm)-,  he  needed  no  guarantees  ;  he  could  offer  them  to  the 
Senate  and  his  friends.  He  demanded  only  the  restoration  of  the 
exiles,  and  hinted  at  the  punishment  of  the  guilty.  The  Senate 
had  shown  some  firmness  and  independence  in  opening  negotia- 
tions at  all — indeed  the  crisis  was  its  opportunity  ;  but  the  efforts 
of  the  moderates  to  bring  about  an  understanding  and  a  general 
disarmament  were  shattered  by  the  \igour  of  Carbo  and  the 
firmness  of  Sulla.  The  indefatigable  consul,  by  hook  or  by  crook, 
prevented  the  election  of  a  successor  to  Cinna,  acted  as  sole  consul 
for  the  rest  of  the  year,  and  raised  a  large  force  mainly  of  new 
citizens,  amounting  in  the  first  instance  alone  to  100,000  men.  It 
is  clear  that  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of  a  small  and  discredited 
party  ;  Italy  as  a  whole,  and  the  majority  of  the  existing  Senate, 
a  Roman  Rump  Parliament,  purged  of  the  oligarchs,  was  hostile 
to  the  inevitable  reaction,  and,  in  default  of  a  peaceful  settlement, 
was  ready  for  war.  Men  dreaded,  and  with  reason,  a  second 
Terror.  None  of  the  regular  Marian  leaders  were  elected  consuls 
for  83  B.C.  ;  nor  did  Carbo  nominate  himself  once  more.  The  new 
officers  were  the  moderate  L.  Cornelius  Scipio,  a  feeble  creature, 
but  an  anti-oligarch,  and  the  uncompromising  C.  Norbanus,  abler 
demagogue  than  general. 

Sulla  and  his  Army. — Thus  Sulla  at  Brundisium,  with  his  five 
legions,  confronted  a  practically  united  Italy,  and  his  enemies 
wielded  the  authority  of  the  constitution  and  the  resources  of  the 
state.  The  tables  had  been  turned.  He  was  now  the  revolu- 
tionary outlaw  attacking  the  established  order.  He  had  on  his 
side  a  devoted  and  experienced  army,  strong  in  its  esprit  de  corps, 


44d  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

witliout  a  vestige  of  civic  feeling,  loyal  only  to  flag  and  chief,  a 
chief  who  condoned  all  vices  but  cowardice  and  indiscipline.  To 
fill  his  chest  the  veterans  gave  their  savings.  He  trusted  in  his 
army  and  his  star.  But  to  conquer  he  must  divide  ;  he  must 
conciliate  the  moderates,  disarm  suspicion,  attract  the  waverers, 
and  propitiate  the  Italians.  Accordingly  he  proclaimed  an  amnesty 
to  all  who  should  abandon  the  democrats,  guaranteed  the  rights 
of  the  new  citizens,  promised  to  observe  the  strictest  discipline, 
and  swore  his  troops  on  oath  to  treat  the  Italians  as  burgesses  of 
Rome.  As  a  fruit  of  his  moderation  Brundisium  received  him 
with  open  arms,  Messapia  and  Apulia  submitted.  The  main  army 
of  the  government  was  still  (spring  of  83  B.C.)  at  Ariminum,  and  the 
south-eas't  coast  was  unprotected.  Counsels  were  clearly  divided. 
Except  Sortorius,  who  had  no  influence,  and  was  soon  sent  off  to 
Spain,  the  onh-  strong  men  were  Carbo  and  the  younger  Marius. 

Sulla's  Adherents. — From  Brundisium,  Sulla  marched  unre- 
sisted into  Campania,  where  he  met  and  defeated  Norbanus  at 
Mons  Tifata,  and  drove  him  into  Capua.  He  had  been  joined 
already  by  Metellus  Pius  from  Liguria,  whither  he  had  fled,  driven 
from  Africa  by  the  pn-etor  Fabius  Hadrianus,  and  by  M.  Licinius 
Crassus,  who  had  escaped  from  Rome  to  Spain,  and  helped  Metellus 
to  fail  in  Africa.  L.  Philippus  turned  again  at  the  right  time, 
and  was  sent  by  Sulla  to  take  Sardinia.  But  of  all  the  recruits 
the  most  important  was  the  young  Cn.  Pompeius,  Strabo's  son, 
trained  in  a  good  school  at  once  of  military  science  and  political 
insincerity.  He  had  served  under  Cinna,  had  been  attacked  on 
account  of  his  father's  supposed  peculations  in  Picenum,  had  barely 
escaped  by  the  friendship  of  Carbo  and  the  eloquence  of  his 
advocates,  and  now,  with  rapid  decision,  chose  the  Sullan  side, 
raised  a  force  of  tenants,  comrades,  and  clients  in  Picenum,  soon 
amounting  to  three  legions,  with  which  the  general  of  twenty- 
three  beat  and  baffled  the  leaders  sent  against  him,  joined  his 
commander  in  the  south,  and  earned  from  him  the  st}-le  and  title 
of  Imperator. 

Scipio's  Army  deserts  to  Sulla.  —  Leaving  Norbanus  shut  up  in 
Capua,  Sulla  pushed  on  to  meet  Scipio,  now  advancing  by  the 
Appian  road,  too  late  to  aid  his  comrade.  He  encountered  him 
at  Teanum,  and  induced  him  to  conclude  an  armistice,  while 
Scipio  consulted  Norbanus,  whom  he  found  in  no  humour  to  treat. 
Apparently  by  the  fault  of  the  democrats,  the  truce  was  broken, 
but  Scipio's  troops,  who  in  the  interval  had  fraternised  with  the 
enemy,  refused  to  recognise  their  leader's  action,  and  passed  over 


THE   CIVIL    ]VAR  441 

e)i  viasse.  Sulla  dismissed  the  officers  unharmed.  Carbo,  indeed, 
said  of  him  that  he  was  made  up  of  a  lion  and  a  fox,  and  that  the 
latter  was  the  more  dangerous  animal  of  the  two  ;  and  it  may  well 
be  that  these  repeated  negotiations  were  the  snares  of  a  wily 
Italian.  However  that  may  be,  from  the  breach  of  the  truce  of 
Teanum  dates  the  implacability  of  the  oligarchic  general. 

Preparations  at  Rome. — Sulla  and  Metellus  now  took  up  their 
winter  quarters  in  Campania,  content  with  the  year's  results,  and 
preparing  for  a  dash  on  Rome  It  was  to  be  no  easy  task.  The 
new  consuls,  illegally  elected,  Carbo  and  Marius,  raised  large 
levies  in  Etruria  and  Cisalpine  Gaul,  especially  among  the  Marian 
veterans.  The  Samnites  and  Lucanians  promised  energetic  sup- 
port, and  amply  redeemed  their  word  At  Rome  the  war  party 
got  the  upper  hand,  directed  throughout  by  the  violent  and  vigo- 
rous Carbo.  Sulla's  partisans  were  outlawed  by  decree  of  the  people, 
and  the  war  entered  on  a  new  and  deadlier  phase,  which  gave  no 
hope  of  quarter  or  compromise.  So  far  as  it  was  not  a  mere 
struggle  of  persons,  it  was  a  battle  between  the  Latin  and  the 
Etruscan  and  Samnite  nationalities.  On  July  6,  83  B.C.,  the  great 
temple  of  Jupiter  Capitolinus,  the  patron  of  the  Roman  people, 
was  burnt  to  the  ground. 

Battle  of  Sacriportus. — When  the  campaign  of  82  B.C.  opened, 
Sulla,  moving  upon  Rome,  was  opposed  by  the  younger  Marius,  a 
true  son  of  his  father,  brave,  persistent,  and  ferocious,  who  was 
covering  the  capital  ;  while  Metellus,  in  Picenum,  confronted  Carbo, 
who  from  his  base  at  Ariminum  kept  his  grip  upon  Gaul  and  Etruria. 
Pompeius  had  apparently  accompanied  Metellus  northward,  and 
was  threatening  Etruria  from  Spoletium.  At  Sacriportus,  near 
Signia,  Sulla  came  up  with  Marius  as  he  retired  on  Praeneste, 
and  drove  him  headlong  back  on  the  great  stronghold,  whose  im- 
pregnable walls  became  henceforward  the  centre  of  the  struggle. 
This  decisive  action  uncovered  Rome,  which  was  evacuated  by 
the  pra?tor  L.  Brutus  Damasippus.  He  signalised  his  departure 
by  a  supplemental  massacre  of  the  remaining  optimates.  The 
aged  Q.  Scjevola,  who  had  barely  escaped  the  dagger  of  Fimbria, 
was  one  of  the  victims.  Leaving  Ofella  to  blockade  Marius,  Sulla 
entered  Rome,  and  passed  on  to  Etruria,  to  join  in  combined 
operations  against  Carbo.  He  utilised  his  short  stay  to  seize  the 
government  and  turn  the  legal  machinery  against  his  opponents. 

Campaign  in  North  Italy.— Carbo,  who  had  checked  the  suc- 
cessful advance  of  Metellus,  on  learning  the  news  of  Sacriportus, 
retreated  to  Ariminum,  and  thence  moved  into   Etruria,  leaving 


442  II/STORV  OF  ROME 

Norbanus  to  hold  the  valley  of  the  Po.  Sulla  attacked  them  on 
three  sides  at  once.  Metellus,  passing  by  sea  into  Cisalpine 
Gaul  and  pushing  on  to  Faventia,  cut  Ariniinuni  from  the  Po 
and  threatened  the  enemy's  rear  while  his  legate  Lucullus  moved 
on  Placentia.  Pompeius,  who  had  already  harassed  Carbo's  march, 
advanced  with  Crassus  through  Umbria  ;  Sulla  himself  proceeded 
from  Rome  direct.  An  indecisive  battle  was  fought  at  Clusium, 
which  so  far  brought  Sulla  to  a  halt  that  Carbo  could  detach 
Carrinas  to  relieve  Prjencste.  But  the  expedition  was  defeated 
by  Pompeius  and  Crassus,  and  its  leader  shut  up  in  Spoletium, 
whence  he  escaped  with  difficulty.  A  second  attempt  in  force, 
under  Marcius,  was  once  more  baffled  by  Pompeius.  Norbanus, 
too,  after  defeating  Lucullus,  was  himself  utterly  routed  at  Faventia 
by  Metellus.  This  decisive  victory  was  followed  by  the  break 
up  of  the  democratic  cause  in  the  north.  There  had  been  serious 
desertion  before  ;  now  even  the  Lucanian  contingents  went  over, 
and  one  commander  bought  his  own  acceptance  by  murdering 
his  colleagues  in  his  tent.  The  army  of  the  north  was  scattered, 
and  the  road  to  Etruria  was  open.  Norbanus  fled  to  Rhodes, 
where  he  only  avoided  extradition  by  suicide.  Carbo,  threatened 
on  all  sides,  despatched  two  legions  under  Damasippus  to  delay 
Sulla  by  a  combined  effort  at  Pr?sneste,  but  when  this  also  failed, 
abandoned  hope,  and  fled  to  Africa.  Such  of  his  troops  as  were 
not  destroyed  or  dispersed  marched  with  Carrinas  to  relieve  Marius. 
Here,  at  Praeneste,  the  plot  was  thickening.  The  Samnites  and 
Lucanians,  under  Pontius  of  Telesia  and  Lamponius,  reinforced  by 
the  garrison  of  Capua,  in  all  70,000  men,  had  come  up  from  South 
Italy  with  the  same  object.  Sulla,  leaving  a  corps  to  contain 
Carbo,  hurried  ofi"  to  support  Ofella,  and  arrived  in  time  to  baffle 
the  attempt. 

Battle  at  the  Colline  Gate. — Unable  even  with  the  aid  of  Dama- 
sippus to  dislodge  their  dogged  opponent,  and  now  aware  of  their 
discomfiture  in  Etruria  and  the  north,  the  democrats  thought  to  copy 
the  strategy  of  Hannibal,  and  force  Sulla  to  raise  the  siege  before  the 
arrival  of  Metellus  and  Pompeius,  by  a  sudden  rush  on  the  "wolves' 
lair."  Success  might  secure  everything  ;  failure  would  at  least 
ensure  revenge.  Strategically  it  was  a  rash  move  ;  they  ran  the 
risk  of  being  caught  and  crushed  between  Metellus  and  Sulla  ;  but 
the  possession  of  Rome  was  all  in  all,  and  Marius,  set  free,  would 
guard  their  line  of  retreat.  With  sudden  resolve  they  broke  camp, 
and  marched  swiftly  and  fiercely  forward.  Sulla  heard  it  with 
dismay,  and  followed  by  a  forced  march  on  parallel  lines.      It  was 


BATTLE   OF   THE   COLLIN E   GATE  443 

a  race  for  life  and  death.  The  insurgents,  marching  by  the  Latin 
way,  had  scattered  a  sally  of  volunteers  from  Rome  and  pitched 
their  camp  by  the  Colline  gate,  ready  for  the  assault,  when  Sulla, 
whose  cavalry  had  preceded  him  at  full  speed,  arrived  on  the 
scene  towards  noon,  and  leaving  short  space  for  rest  and  food, 
flung  his  weary  troops,  in  defiance  of  all  advice,  with  obstinate 
decision  on  the  foe.  The  battle  began  in  the  late  afternoon  of 
the  1st  of  November  82  li.c.,  and  lasted  well  into  the  night — the 
bloodiest  and  most  desperate  wrestle  in  Roman  history.  The 
frenzied  hate  of  the  Samnite  pushed  the  veterans  of  Sulla's  wing 
to  the  walls  of  Rome,  the  general  hacking  and  hewing,  like  a 
common  soldier,  in  peril  of  his  life,  till  the  closed  gates  forced 
them  back  to  the  fight.  When  darkness  closed  the  struggle  for 
a  while,  Sulla  stood  on  the  field  half  despairing  of  victory.  It 
was  only  in  the  course  of  the  night  that  he  learned  the  success 
of  Crassus,  who  had  routed  the  enemy's  left.  In  the  morning  he 
pressed  the  now  retreating  Samnites.  The  end  came  when  3000 
deserters  turned  their  swords  against  their  friends.  The  Sam- 
nites were  exterminated  ;  the  prisoners,  even  the  deserters,  were 
butchered  by  masses  in  cold  blood  within  earshot  of  the  appalled 
Senators,  sitting  in  the  temple  of  Bellona  to  hear  the  victor's  har- 
angue. He  bade  them  attend  to  his  discourse  ;  the  noise  they  heard 
came  from  a  few  malefactors  whom  he  was  chastising. 

End  of  the  War. — Praeneste  fell  ;  Marius  died  by  his  own  hand  ; 
the  garrison  and  its  officers,  with  the  majority  of  the  citizens,  were 
put  to  the  sword  ;  and  the  ancient  and  loyal  ally  of  Rome,  so  vainly 
proud  of  its  cherished  independence,  was  almost  destroyed.  The 
remaining  strongholds  were  gradually  reduced — Norba,  Neapolis, 
Nola,  and  y4£sernia.  The  doom  of  destruction  went  out  against 
Samnites  and  Etruscans.  The  "  curse  of  Sulla"  still  rests  on  their 
wasted  lands,  the  worst  visitation  falling  on  ravaged  and  depopu- 
lated Samnium.  Nola,  indeed,  held  out  till  80  n.c,  and  \^olaten"as 
stood  a  two  years'  siege,  but  the  country  was  rapidly  pacified,  the 
fortresses  garrisoned,  and  the  embers  of  rebellion  stamped  out. 
As  for  the  provinces,  Sardinia  surrendered  to  Philippus,  Gaul  soon 
came  in,  and  Perperna,  who  commanded  in  Sicily,  evacuated  it 
on  the  appearance  of  Pompeius  with  six  legions  and  120  ships. 
Pompeius,  having  executed  the  democratic  leaders  captured  at 
Cossyra  (Pantellaria),  with  scant  generosity  to  his  protector, 
Carbo,  passed  over  to  Africa,  defeated  Cn.  Domitius  Aheno- 
barbus  (81  K.C.X  drove  out  the  usurper,  Hiarbas  of  Numidia,  re- 
stored Hiempsai  II.,  and  re-established  the  authority  of  the  Senate 


444 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


in  forty  days.     On  his  return  he  was  ordered  to  dismiss  his  army 
and  was  denied  an  illegal  triumpli,  but  Sulla  yielded  to  the  murmurs 


ETRUSCAN    ARCH    AT    VOLATERR.^5:. 


of  the  troops  and  the  discontent  of  the  young-  general,  permitted 
an  equestrian  to    triumph   for   the  first  time,  and  added  to  the 


SULLA   AND  POMPEY  445 

honour  the  title  of  IMagnus.  The  man  who  warned  the  optimates 
against  Ca:sar,  ut  male praciiictum pucrtiin  ccwcrcnt^  and  spared  his 
life  reluctantly,  knew  as  well  the  character  as  he  recognised  the 
services  of  Caesar's  future  rival.  In  Spain.  Q.  Sertorius  was  obliged 
for  the  present  to  give  way,  and  lefrTHe  country  with  uncertain 
aims.  In  the  East,  Murena,  to  gain  credit  and  keep  his  Fimbrians 
employed,  picked  a  C[uarrel  with  Mithradates,  who  was  occupied 
in  restoring  his  power  in  Colchis  and  the  Crimea,  reopened  the 
war  in  defiance  of  the  king's  complaints  and  Sulla's  remonstrance, 
crossed  the  Pontic  frontier,  plundering  as  he  w^ent,  and  was 
promptly  defeated  by  the  still  powerful  king  (83  B.C.).  The  Roman 
garrisons  were  driven  from  Cappadocia.  Sulla  again  interfered, 
and  peace  was  re-established.  Only  Mytilene  gave  trouble  till 
79  B.C.,  when  it  was  taken  and  destroyed.  In  the  storm  the  }oung 
Caesar  earned  the  civic  crown. 

So  the  wars  were  ended  ;  the  democracy  and  its  allies  lay 
prostrate  ;  Rome,  saved  by  the  soldiership  of  Sulla  and  his  army 
in  that  last  grim  battle  of  the  Colline  gate,  was  ready  for  the 
statesman's  hand.     Sulla  had  not  trusted  his  star  in  vain. 


CHAPTER  XLIII 

THE    PROSCRIPTIONS   AND    THE   NEW    DICTATORSHIP 

81  B.C.     A.U.C.  673. 

Sulla's  Executions. — Sulla's  original  programme  had  been  to 
reward  his  friends  and  punish  his  enemies,  and  to  give  security  to 
the  government  of  the  Senate.  The  Romans  found  him  in  both 
respects  a  man  of  his  word  and  a  man 'of  method.  The  hour  ©f 
compromise  was  past  ;  the  failure  of  88  B.C.,  the  severity  of  the 
campaign,  the  unexpected  toughness  of  the  democratic  resistance, 
and  that  moment  of  the  Samnite  terror  had  taught  him  a  lesson. 
It  was  no  longer  a  question  of  mere  retaliation  and  punishment. 
It  was  necessary  to  clear  the  ground  thoroughly  for  his  proposed 
reconstruction.  He  meant,  in  his  cool,  ironical  way,  to  stamp  out, 
so  far  as  blood  and  iron  could,  all  democratic  ideas,  to  smash  and 
pulverise  the  democratic  party,  to  annihilate  its  supports,  and  to 
leave  no  chance  for  a  counter-revolution.  His  was  a  dangerous, 
not  a  vindictive  or  an  irritable,  temperament ;  he  set  no  value  on 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 

human  life,  yet  for  his  time  and  race  could  show  comparative 
moderation.  The  rejected  overtures,  the  broken  truce,  the  re- 
peated massacres,  might  well  have  palliated  a  fierce  outburst  in 
the  hour  of  victory.  But,  making  every  allowance  for  vengeful 
passions,  for  all  indulgence  to  friends  and  connivance  at  unwar- 
ranted executions,  the  solid  part  of  Sulla's  bloody  work  remains 
due  to  deep  conviction  of  political  necessity.  Modern  sentiment, 
unfamiliar  with  ancient  doctrines  of  the  rights  of  war  and  the 
ferocity  of  ancient  political  revolutions,  when  death,  exile,  and 
confiscation  were  the  constitutional  methods  of  resigning  power, 
stamps  the  proscriptions  unfairly  as  mere  atrocities.  More  to  the 
point  was  Caesar's  censure,  when  he  called  Sulla  a  tyro  in  poli- 
tics ;  but  Caesar  died  a  victim  to  his  clemency,  Sulla  peacefully 
in  his  bed. 

Proscriptions.  —  In  pursuance,  then,  of  a  fixed  purpose,  he 
ordered  the  promiscuous  execution  of  all  the  leading  revolu- 
tionaries who  had  been  in  active  opposition  since  the  truce  of 
Teanum.  Public  horror  was  enhanced  by  the  uncertainty,  which 
was  turned  to  purpose  by  unscrupulous  partisans,  until,  in  response 
to  appeals  from  Metellus  and  Catulus,  Sulla  issued  definite  lists 
of  the  proscribed.  Hasty  and  ill-considered  as  the  lists  were,  their 
issue  made  Sulla  personally  responsible,  and  substituted  a  sort  of 
system  for  indiscriminate  murder.  Even  so,  they  were  grossly 
abused,  and  indeed  falsified,  to  satisfy  private  grudges  or  mere 
greed.  No  plea,  no  sanctuary,  availed.  The  victims  were  cut 
down  without  the  barest  form  of  even  a  drum-head  court-martial. 
Throughout  Italy  the  work  went  on  ;  Sullan  emissaries  and  local 
partisans  out-heroded  Herod  ;  debtors  murdered  their  creditors  ; 
this  man  fell  a  victim  to  his  baths,  that  to  his  palace  or  gardens. 
"  Wretch  that  I  am,"  said  a  curious  gazer  who  found  his  name  on 
the  list,  "  my  Alban  villa  pursues  me."  Private  friends  and  inform- 
ing scoundrels  perverted  the  criminal  indulgence  of  the  master,  and 
the  vilest  names  of  the  following  epoch  are  to  be  found  among  the 
Sullan  executioners.  The  worst  punishment  fell  upon  the  equites, 
who,  as  jurors  and  speculators,  had  combined  the  business  of 
condemning  senators  and  purchasing  their  estates.  Sulla  grati- 
fied an  ignoble  malice  by  tearing  the  bones  of  Marias  from  their 
grave  and  breaking  his  monuments  in  pieces.  Gratidianus,  the 
adopted  nephew  of  Marius,  was  tortured  to  death  by  the  younger 
Catulus  at  the  tomb  of  his  murdered  father.  While  ail  who  aided 
the  proscribed  were  punished,  the  casual  assassin  received  indem- 
nity and  a  fixed  reward  ;  the  heads  were  numbered  and  accounted 


THE   PROSCK/PT/ONS  4<j2_ 

for — a  gruesome  work  which  Sulla  is  said  to  have  supervised  in 
person.  As  he  surveyed  the  exposed  head  of  the  younger  Marius 
he  sneered  at  it  with  the  quotation  from  the  Greek  poet,  "  Before 
one  seizes  the  helm  one  ought  to  have  pulled  at  the  oar."  The 
agony  of  suspense  was  prolonged  by  the  successive  issue  of  supple- 
mentary lists,  till  the  proscriptions  closed,  on  June  i,  8i  B.C.,  the  out- 
side limit  for  Italy  ;  for  in  Rome  the  business  was  got  over  earlier. 
The  death-roll,  as  we  are  told,  of  4700  names  included  forty  senators 
and  1600  equites.  But  later  writers  gloated  with  rhetorical  exagge- 
ration over  this  loathsome  mass  of  cold-blooded  butchery. 

Confiscations. — The  effect  was  deepened  by  the  confiscation  of 
the  property  of  the  victims  and  the  disqualification  of  their  sons 
and  grandsons  for  the  privileges,  while  they  were  left  liable  to  the 
burdens,  of  their  birth  and  position,  a  measure  extended  to  the 
relatives  of  the  fallen.  The  forfeitures  produced  a  financial  revolu- 
tion, not  only  by  the  change  of  ownership,  but  by  the  depreciation 
of  estates  in  an  overloaded  market,  and  were,  besides,  scandalously 
turned  to  profit  by  Sulla's  immediate  friends  and  dependents.  It 
was  thus  that  M.  Crassus,  a  skilful  fisher  in  troubled  waters,  laid 
the  foundation  of  his  famous  fortune.  Nor  was  this  unnatural  or 
wholly  inconsistent  with  ancient  ideas,  especially  as  the  Sullans 
had  themselves  suffered  the  extremity  of  sudden  impoverishment, 
and  in  the  old  world  the  "spoils  system"  in  party  victories  was 
carried  out  at  the  expense  of  the  individual.  In  spite  of  all  the 
laxity  and  depreciation,  the  auctions  brought  in  to  the  exchequer 
an  immense  sum.  The  fall  in  prices  and  the  appreciation  of  gold 
was  counteracted  by  the  pressure  put  on  the  wealth)-  to  support 
the  government  by  liberal  purchases.  Indignation  was  deep  if 
not  loud,  but  the  disqualification  of  the  children,  an  essential  point 
of  policy,  left  a  more  rankling  sore  behind. 

Punishment  of  the  Hostile  Italians. — Such  was  the  Sullan  fury, 
differing  from  its  various  predecessors  more  in  its  extent  and 
policy  than  in  its  illegality  or  cruelty.  There  was  no  protest,  no 
movement  of  revolt  ;  terror  lay  too  heavy  even  for  speech.  It  wa.s 
a  crime,  but  it  was  n6  less  a  blunder.  A  few  years  showed  how 
vain  was  the  hope  to  build  a  constitution  upon  blood,  or  to  destroy 
a  party  in  a  whirlwind  of  persecution.  Along  with  these  measures 
may  be  taken  the  various  punishments  inflicted  after  searching 
inquiry,  and  in  accordance  with  a  special  decree  and  the  laws  of 
war,  on  the  revolted  communities  who  had  refused  Sulla's  original 
terms,  more  particularly  those  in  Lucania,  Etruria,  and,  above  all, 
in  Samnium.    On  these,  who  had  dared  to  dream  of  the  destruction 


448  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  Rome,  the  tables  were  turned  with  a  vengeance.  They  were 
loaded  with  burdens,  their  walls  razed,  their  rights  annulled,  their 
lands  forfeited.  "  Now  it  was  Rome  indeed,  and  room  enough," 
in  Italy.  In  his  earnest  centralising  policy  Sulla  sacrificed  to 
Romanisation  all  that  was  left  of  the  local  laws,  languages,  and 
customs,  even  of  the  prosperity  of  rural  Italy. 

Colonies  of  Veterans. — With  the  ager  publicus  thus  accjuircd 
Sulla  carried  out  a  vast  scheme  of  colonisation,  settling  troops  to 
the  number  of  1 20,000  in  Etruria  particularl)',  but  also  in  Latium 
and  Campania — Samnium  was  deliberately  excepted — providing 
at  once  for  his  veterans,  for  repopulation,  for  the  restoration  of 
small  holdings,  and,  as  he  fondly  hoped,  for  the  security  of  his 
new  constitution.  These  settlements  differ  from  the  old  maritime 
burgess  colonies  of  soldier-citizens  and  the  socialistic  foundations 
of  the  Gracchi,  as  the  arbitrary  work  of  a  single  man,  and  in  the 
strictly  military  character  he  meant  the  settlers  to  retain  as  the 
Senate's  army  of  reserve.  They  approximate  rather  to  the  founda- 
tions of  Pompeius,  Caesar,  and  the  Empire.  But  as  the  lawyers 
disregarded  the  acts  of  disfranchisement,  so  the  colonies  failed  to 
effect  their  purpose.  Among  the  most  troublesome  elements  of 
later  years  must  be  counted  these  Sullan  soldiers,  who,  trained  in 
the  license  of  the  camp  and  the  luxury  of  the  East,  refused  to 
labour  on  a  small  allotment.  The  impracticable  prohibition  of 
alienation  was  speedily  set  at  naught.  Meanwhile  the  homeless, 
helpless,  evicted  exiles,  endowed  with  a  mockery  of  the  lowest  Latin 
status,  swelled  the  ever-growing  army  of  beggars  and  banditti. 

Sulla  Dictator. — These  measures,  so  far  as  they  were  not  acts 
of  war,  were  subsequently  sanctioned  by,  or  were  done  in  virtue 
of,  special  powers  conferred  upon  the  hitherto  unauthorised  saviour 
of  society.  The  proconsul  had  no  idea  of  just  handing  back  the 
government  to  Senate  and  magistrates  as  if  nothing  had  happened  ; 
still  less  did  he  mean  to  be  hampered  in  his  work  by  a  perverse 
colleague  and  a  merely  reactionary  council.  He  wanted  more 
thoroughness  than  would  commend  itself  to  the  lawyers,  oppor- 
tunists, or  Tory  politicians  who  were  left  alive  in  the  well-thinned 
nobility.  He  restored  the  oligarchy  as  the  one  possible  system  ; 
for  the  average  oligarch  he  had  little  use  and  less  respect.  Ac- 
cordingly he  had  sent  a  suggestion,  which  amounted  to  an  order, 
by  letter  to  the  Senate,  that  to  meet  the  crisis  a  dictator  should 
be  appointed,  with  supreme  power,  for  an  indefinite  time,  and  de- 
clared his  willingness,  if  elected,  to  accept  the  post.  With  such 
formality  as  was  possible  L.  Valerius  Flaccus,  as  inter-rex,  proposed, 


SULLA    DICTATOR  449 

and  the  people  readily  ratified,  welcoming  this  mockery  of  a  free 
choice,  the  appointment  of  L.  Cornelius  Sulla  as  dictator,  without 
limit  of  time,  powers,  or  appeal,  legihus  faciundis  reipnbliac  con- 
stititciuicc.  His  measures,  past,  present,  and  future,  were  sanctioned 
en  bloc ;  he  received  supreme  authority,  legislative,  executive,  and 
judicial ;  he  was  set  firmly  in  the  saddle  of  the  state,  and  left  to 
dismount  when  he  pleased.  The  dictatorship  had  been  the  tradi- 
tional means  of  concentrating  executive  power  to  deal  with  a 
temporary  crisis  ;  but  the  old  office  had  long  been  dead,  and  the 
present  revival  was  one  only  in  name.  Elected  for  a  definite 
purpose,  the  old  dictator  was  limited  in  time  and  in  prerogative,  as 
well  as  by  the  right  of  appeal  (449  B.C.)  and  the  co-existence  of  the 
regular  magistrates.  Sulla  was  in  effect  a  monarch.  He  wielded  his 
power  indeed  in  the  spirit  of  a  Roman  aristocrat,  used  it,  as  he 
was  expected  to  use  it,  in  the  restoration  of  the  Republic,  and  duly 
resigned  when  his  task  was  finished.  Yet  forgetful  Rome  was 
startled  by  his  four-and-twenty  lictors,  his  absolute  rule  was  branded 
as  a  Sulhuium  rcoiium^  and  his  abdication  was  wondered  at  and 
admired.  It  was  one  more  precedent  for  the  empire,  one  more 
proof  that  the  constitution  was  becoming  unworkable,  and  that  in 
the  failure  of  the  Senate  the  only  resource  was  the  single  man. 
Hence  his  regime  was  as  unacceptable  to  the  moderate  conser- 
vative as  it  was  to  the  democrat,  whose  political  machinery  it 
borrowed  for  reactionary  purposes.  To  destroy  democracy  by  the 
army  was  once  more  to  drive  out  Satan  by  Beelzebub,  and  Sulla's 
failure  only  precipitated  the  alliance  of  the  kindred  elements.  His 
despotism  was  a  precedent  for  Pompeius  and  Caesar. 


CHAPTER  XLIV 

THE    CONSTITUTION    OF    SULLA 

B.C.  A.U.C. 

Sulla,  as  Dictator,  frames  his  Constitution    .        .  81-80       673-674 

Sulla  resigns  the  Dictatorship 79  675 

Death  of  Sulla 78  676 

With  his  new  powers,  Sulla  could  put  his  acts  of  destruction 
on  a  legal  and  systematic  footing,  and  then  proceed  to  construc- 
tive work. 

The  People. — He  retained  as  a  basis  the  extended  and  equal- 

2   F 


450  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

ised  franchise,  rendered  harmless  by  the  results  of  the  war  and 
the  elimination  of  disloyal  allies,  and  by  so  doing-  completed,  with 
some  exceptions,  the  abolition  of  privilege  and  the  unification  of 
Italy.  Hence  followed  in  rapid  course  the  assimilation  of  the 
Italian  towns  to  a  single  municipal  type,  organised  with  a  gradu- 
ally developed  system  of  local  government,  the  disappearance  of 
local  distinctions,  and  a  growing  uniformity  in  law  and  administra- 
tion. Only  the  reasonable  disqualification  of  the  freedmen  was 
revived.  But  neither  Sulla  nor  the  new  citizens  themselves  could 
get  rid  of  the  ancient  view  that  the  franchise  must  be  directly 
exercised.  To  give  the  new  votes  their  value  demanded  a  repre- 
sentative system.  What  power  the  Comitia  had,  remained  with 
the  urban  electors  ;  rural  and  conservative  Italy  drifted  away  from 
Roman  politics.  Sulla  himself  took  no  trouble  even  to  revise  the 
burgess-roll ;  to  secure  a  majority,  strong  with  votes  and  fists,  in 
the  fickle  and  badly  attended  assemblies  he  swamped  the  electorate 
with  10,000  emancipated  slaves  of  the  proscribed,  endowed  with 
the  proper  qualification  and  the  name  of  Cornelii.  It  was  a  sneer 
and  an  insult  to  the  people,  as  it  was  a  satire  on  the  constitution. 
No  good  was  to  be  got  by  jerrymandering  the  constituencies. 

The  Comitia. — Since  he  neither  wished  to  mend  nor  end  the 
Comitia,  with  their  obsolete  sovereignty,  it  remained  to  reorganise 
them  in  a  reactionary  sense,  to  degrade  and  utilise  them.  Thus 
the  legislative  functions  of  the  Tribes  were  once  more  curtailed, 
and  the  Concilium  reduced  to  nullity  by  subjecting  the  tribunes 
again  to  the  auctoritas  of  the  Senate,  and  removing  at  least  their 
freedom  of  initiative,  if  not  indeed  their  power  of  proposing  ^/^(^/j- 
cita  altogether.  With  this  restriction,  though  it  was  not  enforced 
against  the  curule  magistrates  in  the  Comitia,  vanished  for  a 
time  the  interference  of  this  Assembly  and  its  leaders  in  executive 
and  judicial  business.  But  a  more  searching  reform  was  really 
needed  to  prevent  parliamentary  intrigues,  capricious  decrees,  and 
votes  snatched  by  chance  or  violence  from  the  fluctuating  majorities 
of  this  ignorant  and  unwieldy  mass.  As  to  the  Centuriata,  pro- 
bably Sulla  did  not  attempt  to  revive  the  proposals  of  88  B.C.  and 
restore  its  ancient  organisation  and  obsolete  privileges.  Certain 
rights  this  form  of  assembly  had  always  retained,  such  as  the  elec- 
tion of  the  higher  magistrates,  the  decision  of  peace  or  war,  the 
trial  of  capital  cases  on  appeal.  Of  its  legislative  powers  it  had 
never  been  actually  deprived  ;  nor  was  it  necessary  to  give  them 
back.  It  gained  indirectly  by  the  limitation  of  its  popular  rival,  and 
consular  laws  may  have  superseded  to  some  extent  \\\q. plebiscita. 


REFORMS  OF  SULLA  451 

In  spite  of  democratic  changes  it  had  kept  a  certain  property 
quahfication  and  a  certain  regard  for  age  and  rank.  Representing 
as  it  did  the  whole  people,  it  differed  from  the  plebeian  body  only 
in  this  particular  and  in  its  organisation.  It  is  highly  improbable, 
especially  after  his  experiences  in  88  B.C.,  that  Sulla  should  have  tam- 
pered with  the  existing  arrangements  of  the  centuries  and  the 
census.  To  raise  the  property  qualification  would  merely  favour  the 
capitalists.  It  is  doubtful  again  if  he  subjected  legislation  in  this 
assembly  also  to  the  previous  sanction  of  the  Senate.  Taking  the 
outside  of  what  he  did,  Sulla  threw  the  legislative  function  into  the 
hands  of  the  Senate,  and  the  right  of  ratification  into  the  hands  of 
the  more  aristocratic  and  conservative  Comitia,  which  elected  the 
higher  magistrates.  In  the  elective  function  no  direct  changes 
were  made.  There  was  no  formal  disfranchisement  or  repeal,'  but 
obsolete  powers  were  revived,  and  the  predominance  of  the  Senate 
in  legislation  and  administration  at  last  legally  secured.  The 
choice  of  priests  by  the  seventeen  tribes  was,  however,  cancelled, 
and  co-optation  by  the  colleges  completely  restored,  while,  to 
assuage  social  rivalries,  these  distinguished  and  exclusive  clubs 
were  enlarged.  The  corn  largesses,  the  original  sin  of  the  demo- 
crats, and  now  the  common  bribe  of  both  parties,  were  discon- 
tinued. But  as  no  attempt  was  made  to  substitute  any  organisation 
of  industry  for  this  pauperising  and  wasteful  system  of  relief,  the 
law  scarcely  survived  its  author. 

The  Tribunate. — The  Romans  transformed,  but  rarely  abolished, 
an  office  or  an  institution.  Thus  the  tribunate,  the  especial  weapon 
of  Gracchus  and  the  democracy,  was  reduced  from  the  strongest 
force  in  the  state  to  its  position  in  the  war-period,  as  the  instrument 
of  the  Senate  in  controlling  recalcitrant  officials  and  managing 
the  popular  Assembly.  Its  unconfined  powers  of  veto,  indictment, 
arrest,  and  legislation,  exercised  as  they  had  lately  been,  led 
straight  to  anarchy  or  monarchy,  according  as  they  fell  into  the 
hands  of  an  all-powerful  individual  or  were  exercised  by  different 
holders  for  conflicting  purposes.  The  members  of  the  college 
were  now  not  merely  deprived  of  at  least  their  free  initiative  in 
legislation,  but  were  at  the  same  time  disqualified  at  once  for 
holding  any  higher  office,  a  regulation  intended  to  exclude  ambi- 
tious men  and  degrade  the  office  in  general  estimation.  The  abuse 
of  their  privileges  of  obstruction,  fine,  and  arrest  was  subjected 

1  The  distinctioii  between  Concilium  plebis  and  Comitia  tributa,  presided 
over  respectively  by  Tribunes  and  Curule  magistrates,  is  practically  obsolete. 


4S2  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

to  penalties.  The  tribunate  was  left  "a  shadow  without  substance,' 
sacrosanct  indeed,  and  enjoying  its  old  rights  of  vetoing  executive 
acts  and  protecting  the  individual  plebeian,  but  under  strict  limi- 
tations, debarred  from  free  access  to  its  own  Assembly,  placed  in 
the  hands  of  nobodies,  and  carrying  an  exclusion  from  the  curule 
chairs  which  went  back  to  the  old  days  of  the  struggle  of  the  orders. 
In  this  conservative  reform  there  was  an  element  of  sarcasm. 

The  Magistrates. — In  dealing  with  the  mode  of  election  and 
the  prerogatives  of  the  magistrates  it  was  Sulla's  aim  to  secure 
the  authority  of  the  Senate  alike  from  the  whims  of  popular  caprice 
and  the  insubordination  of  the  individual.  Here  also  the  reform  was 
thoroughly  conservative  in  character.  The  re-enactment  of  the  Lex 
Villia  Annalis  of  1 80  B.C.  and  the  law  of  342  B.C.  enforced  an  interval 
of  at  least  two  years  between  one  office  and  another,  and  secured 
a  proper  order  and  limit  of  age  in  the  succession  to  magistracies. 
Ten  years  at  least  were  to  elapse  between  two  tenures  of  the 
same  office.  The  a^dileship,  an  office  now  possible  only  to  the 
rich,  ceased,  if  indeed  it  had  ever  been  such,  to  be  a  necessary 
step  in  the  career  of  honores. 

To  meet  the  increase  in  special  functions  and  departments  of 
public  business,  actual  and  contemplated,  Sulla  raised  the  number 
of  pn^tors  from  six  to  eight,  and  of  cjuaestors  from  an  uncertain 
number  to  twenty.  But  even  this  was  inadequate.  Hitherto  the 
Senate  had  dealt  with  any  press  of  afifairs,  outside  the  special 
departments  of  the  praetors  and  the  ordinary  business  of  the 
supreme  magistrates,  either  by  uniting  several  civil  functions  in 
a  single  person  {cui/iulalio),  or  by  proroguing  the  military  com- 
mand, the  general  or  governor  continuing  to  act  pro  prcctore  or 
pro  consule  pending  the  arrival  of  his  successor.  The  duty  of  de- 
fining and  providing  for  the  \a.r\ov\s  pro2>itia'a',  special  or  ordinary, 
fell  by  prescriptive,  not  by  legal,  right  to  the  Senate.  With  the 
growth  of  special  functions — governorships,  military  commands,  and 
judicial  commissions — unaccompanied  by  any  adequate  increase  in 
the  number  of  officials,  the  system  grew  up  by  which  the  Senate 
filled  the  vacancies  at  its  discretion.  Thus  the  people,  the  nominal 
source  of  supreme  power,  lost  all  direct  control  over  the  most 
valuable  appointments,  while  the  originally  annual  magistrates 
enjoyed,  as  a  rule,  a  second  term  of  office.  The  city  magistrate, 
whom  his  work  detained  at  Rome,  looked,  at  the  expiry  of  his 
service,  for  a  lucrative  provincial  command  to  recoup  his  elec- 
tioneering expenses  and  gain  his  triumph,  and  for  this  purpose 
his  imperium  could  be  readily  prolonged. 


REFORMS  OF  SULLA  453 

Separation  between  Civil  and  Military  Authority. — This  usage 
played  into  the  Senate's  hands,  and  Sidla  liad  only  to  make  it 
regular  and  formal.  It  was  he  who  practically,  and  it  may  be 
legally,  established  the  rule  that  consuls  and  praetors  should  dis- 
charge civil  functions  auring  their  year  of  office  at  Rome,  except 
in  case  of  a  special  decree  of  the  Senate,  and  should  then  pro- 
ceed to  the  provinces  as  pro-magistrates  with  military  authority. 
The  arrangement  of  the  departments  was  now  definitely  vested 
in  the  Senate.  Thus  was  completed  the  separation  between 
the  home  and  foreign  command,  the  civil  magistrate  and  the 
military  pro-magistrate,  a  separation,  as  Sulla  himself  had  shown, 
fraught  with  danger  to  the  Republic.  Hitherto  ihe pomeriuvi  had 
been  the  local  limit  between  the  exercise  of  the  civil  jurisdiction 
and  the  full  imperium  of  any  single  officer  ;  now  a  deeper  division 
was  set  up.  These  regulations,  together  with  the  inclusion  of  Italy 
in  Rome,  led  to  the  administrative  separation  of  civil  Italy,  ex- 
tending from  the  Straits  to  the  Rubicon,  from  Cisalpine  Gaul  and 
Illyricum,  which,  being  mainly  composed  of  non-Italian  elements 
and  needing  a  military  force,  became  a  province  in  the  ordinary 
sense.  Italy,  under  the  general  supervision  of  Senate  and  consuls, 
was  withdrawn  from  the  sphere  of  the  military  imperium,  and 
stood  as  a  whole  in  strong  contrast  to  the  dependent  territories. 
The  pomcritnn  was,  so  to  speak,  advanced  to  the  Rubicon.  Thus 
the  senatorial  control  of  the  home  officers  was  assured  ;  it  re- 
mained to  enforce  responsibility  abroad  and  limit  the  freedom  of 
action  enjoyed  by  the  provincial  governor.  Hitherto  the  traditional 
obedience  to  the  ruling  board  had  been  supported  only  by  the 
existence  of  a  vague  and  ancient  law  of  treason  {perdtiellid),  and 
by  the  Lex  Calpitrnia  de  Repetiiudis.  These  were  now  reinforced 
by  a  Lex  Cornelia  de  Maiestate^  reviving,  defining,  and  modifying 
previous  laws,  and  designed  to  curb  the  license  and  control  the 
actions  of  men  who,  like  Sulla  himself,  were  but  too  apt  to  turn 
their  independent  and  ill-defined  authority  against  the  liberties 
of  the  subjects,  the  rights  of  neighbours,  or  the  government  of 
their  own  country.  They  were  now  forbidden  to  declare  war, 
invade  a  foreign  state,  or  transgress  the  boundaries  of  their  pro- 
vince without  permission,  or  to  remain  within  the  boundaries  more 
than  thirty  days  after  their  successors'  arrival.  The  well-meant 
and  necessary  law  lacked  only  some  power  to  enforce  its  provisions. 

These  business-like  and  practical  arrangements  brought  a  clear 
and  orderly  system  into  the  government.  They  provided  at  once 
for  the   continuous    administration   of   Rome    and    Italv   bv   the 


454  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

resident  consuls,  of  the  civil  courts  by  the  urban  and  peregrine 
pnrtors,  and  of  the  now  reorganised  criminal  courts  by  the  six 
other  praetors,  while  the  ten  great  foreign  commands  were  held  by 
the  same  officials  in  their  second  year.  The  Senate  gained  by  the 
division  of  functions,  and  by  the  restrictions  upon  tenure  and  re- 
election and  upon  irregular  prolongations  and  cumulations  of 
office.  Its  authority  both  over  the  people  and  the  individual  was 
strongly  fortified  when  it  received  the  legal  right  to  dispose  of  the 
military  appointments.  It  could  dismiss  as  it  could  appoint  an 
extraordinary  official,  when  to  depose  a  consul  or  praetor  would 
have  been  illegal.  Checks  were  placed  in  every  direction  on 
irregularity,  ambition,  and  intrigue.  Sulla,  taught  by  his  own 
example  and  that  of  Marius,  attempted  earnestly,  if  in  vain,  to 
capture  the  military  force  for  the  governing  body. 

The  censorship  was  allowed  to  fall  into  abeyance  ;  the  qua?stor- 
ship,  by  a  law  of  Sulla,  carried  a  seat  in  the  Senate,  and  this  auto- 
matic method  of  filling  vacancies  rendered  a  part  of  the  censors'  work 
unnecessary.  The  revision  of  the  census  was  of  no  real  importance 
now  for  army,  Comitia,  or  taxation  ;  for  the  purity  of  the  equestrian 
list  Sulla  had  no  care.  The  financial  duties  of  the  office  could  be, 
as  they  often  had  been,  transacted  by  the  consuls.  If  its  disappear- 
ance removed  the  crown  of  the  official  career,  yet  the  Senate  as  a 
body  was  delivered  from  the  caprices  of  its  odious  supervisors. 

The  Equites. — The  equites,  a  Gracchan  creation,  and  the 
object  of  Sulla's  especial  dislike,  were  as  a  middle  order  abolished. 
With  temporary  disturbances,  they  had  kept  their  places  in  the 
courts  till  now,  and  had  turned  their  position  to  immense  advan- 
tage as  a  means  of  intimidating  the  Senate  and  of  levying  black- 
mail. All  this  was  now  lost.  Their  special  honours  and  privileges 
were  for  the  time  taken  away,  together  it  may  be  with  the  farming 
of  the  Asian  taxes.  The  blow  was  not  undeserved.  The  essentially 
selfish  policy  of  the  capitalists,  directed  mainly  towards  monetary 
interests  and  class  privileges,  and  their  maladministration  of  justice, 
robbed  them  of  all  sympathy,  whether  from  the  democrats  with 
whom  they  had  coquetted,  the  Italians  whose  claim  they  had 
resisted,  or  the  nobles  on  whose  prerogatives  they  had  encroached. 

Note. — If  ihe  collection  of  the  tithe  was  taken  from  them,  as  Mommsen 
holds,  it  was  soon  restored.  More  probably  Sulla  established  the  prin- 
ciple of  fixed  payment  as  against  tithe,  not  for  taxation  but  only  in  the  case 
of  the  war  indemnity  imposed  by  him  on  the  province.  In  any  case  Asia 
remained  the  liappy  hunting-ground  of  the  usurer  and  speculator. 


REFORMS  OF  SULLA  455 

The  Senate. — The  position  of  the  Senate,  the  keystone  of  the 
Siillan  faljiic,  may  be  inferred.  By  a  new  and  striking  departure 
its  ranks  were  tilled  by  the  special  election  in  the  tribal  Assembly 
of  300  men  of  equestrian  fortune,  mainly,  no  doubt,  agents  and 
adherents  of  the  new  regime,  nominated  by  the  dictator.  As  the 
quaestors  also  were  elected  in  the  Comitia  Tributa,  the  Senate, 
filled  by  a  self-acting  arrangement,  would  rest  for  the  future  on  a 
basis  of  indirect  popular  appointment.  The  new  method  was  the 
natural  development  of  existing  usage  and  of  the  Ovinian  law, 
which  had  practically  confined  the  censors  to  the  revision  of  a 
list  constituted  by  the  public  choice.  The  lapse  of  the  censorship, 
however,  made  the  senator  irremovable.  The  number  of  members 
was  roughly  doubled,  from  a  variable  300  to  about  600,  not  too 
many  to  meet  the  increase  of  judicial  functions.  Thus  recruited, 
and  emancipated  from  censorial  revision,  strong  in  a  life  tenure, 
and  resting  indirectly  on  popular  election,  the  Senate  received  the 
legal  gift  of  supreme  control  in  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial 
affairs  alike.  Its  prerogatives  were  not  merely  restored,  they  were 
placed  on  a  formal  footing,  and  strengthened  at  the  expense  of 
Comitia,  tribune,  eques,  and  general. 

The  Courts. — To  complete  his  work  Sulla  thoroughly  reformed 
and  reorganised  the  courts  of  criminal  justice.  The  popular  courts 
and  the  ordinary  civil  procedure  remained  as  they  were,  except 
that  the  single  judices,  who  decided  civil  cases  under  the  directions 
of  the  prii:?tor,  were  now  drawn  from  the  Senate,  and  their  action 
was  limited  by  the  institution  of  new  tribunals.  The  extraordinary 
procedure,  whether  in  the  shape  of  special  or  standing  commissions 
{qiiccstiones),  underwent  reform.  The  qiuTsiioiies perpctucr, of  \\hich 
several  had  now  been  created,  and  which  were  taking  over  the 
judicial  business  of  the  assembly  of  the  people,  were  increased  in 
number,  their  procedure  and  competence  were  carefully  regulated, 
and  additional  praetors  provided  to  act  as  presidents.  Here  again 
senators  were  substituted  for  knights  as  jurymen.  Apart  from 
the  temporary  political  purpose  served,  this  was  the  soundest  part 
of  Sulla's  reforms.  It  was  the  beginning  of  a  clear  distinction 
between  civil  and  criminal  jurisprudence,  a  first  attempt  to  codify 
criminal  law  and  procedure.  Since  only  the  people  could  con- 
demn to  death  or  imprisonment,  and  since  there  was  no  appeal 
from  these  standing  delegations  of  the  people,  the  direct  sentence 
of  death  for  treason  and  crime  was  practically  abolished.  The 
dangerous  special  commissions  were  rendered  unnecessary,  and 
the  rough  methods  of  popular  justice  set  aside.     But  it  was  im- 


456  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

possible  at  Rome,  in  the  total  absence  of  the  judicial  spirit,  to 
deliver  the  administration  of  criminal  justice  from  party  bias  and 
social  prejudice. 

Finance,  &c. — The  financial  situation  was  improved,  apart  from 
temporary  but  severe  measures  of  taxation  and  confiscation  at  the 
expense  of  rebels,  subjects,  and  allies,  by  the  abolition  of  the  grain 
largesses  and  the  resumption  of  the  Campanian  domains.  With 
the  usual  inconsistency  of  Roman  debauchees,  the  dictator  attempted 
to  restrain  extravagance  by  sumptuary  legislation. 

Summary. — Such  were  the  institutions  of  Sulla.  To  the  modern 
critic  it  may  seem  that  he  lost  a  great  opportunity.  If  he  \\ould 
neither  grasp  himself  nor  permit  another  to  grasp  the  c  row  n,  an 
act  for  which  the  time  was  scarcely  yet  ripe,  it  was  in  his  power 
to  reform  the  Assembly,  to  secure  the  loyal  interest  of  Italy,  to  give 
the  Senate,  recruited  with  new  Italian  blood,  a  less  official  and 
more  directly  representative  character,  while  he  relieved  the  execu- 
tive of  some  of  those  checks  and  balances  that  paralysed  strong 
and  responsible  government.  The  criticism  is  beside  the  mark. 
Sulla  was  essentially  a  Roman  and  a  noble.  Of  radical  reform  he 
had  no  notion.  He  had  started  with  no  ideals,  and  now,  profoundly 
convinced  of  the  danger  of  existing  tendencies,  bent  on  making 
the  best  of  what  was  there,  and  perceiving  that  the  constitutional 
defect  lay  in  the  ill-defined  position  of  the  Senate  and  the  weakness 
of  its  safeguards,  he  saw  no  remedy  but  to  put  back  the  hands 
upon  the  clock,  and  to  bolster  up  in  the  most  legal  and  formal 
way  the  power  of  the  only  strong  republican  institution.  The  Senate 
had  made  Rome  great  ;  by  setting  aside  its  authority  the  tribunes 
and  the  Comitia  had  made  wreck  of  the  old  system.  The  demo- 
cratic leaders  had  failed  in  their  self-appointed  task  ;  they  had 
proved  to  the  hilt  their  incapacity  for  reform.  Sulla  saw  the  danger 
of  government  by  opposite  factions  bidding  hungrily  for  the  support 
of  the  hungry  mob,  and  found  the  only  alternative  in  the  recon- 
struction of  the  Senate.  What  it  had  been  de  facto  he  would  make 
it  de  jure.  Like  all  conservatives,  his  mind  went  back  to  a  half- 
ideal  past,  and  thus  he  parted  with  no  historical  institution.  He 
neither  abolished  the  tribunate  nor  did  away  with  the  Comitia  ; 
possibly,  in  the  face  of  existing  ideas,  he  had  not  the  full  courage 
of  his  convictions.  With  the  means  at  his  disposal  and  the  ideas 
of  a  reactionary  he  did  all  it  was  possible  to  do,  and  carried  his 
work  through  with  unswerving  resolution,  with  consistency  and 
success.  He  armed  and  fortified  the  Senate  against  the  capitalist, 
the  proletariate,  and  the  proconsul,  but  his  work  was  doomed  to 


CRITICISM  OF  SULLA  457 

failure.  He  could  not  educate  his  party,  could  not  give  it  vigour, 
morale,  and  policy.  He  built  his  constitution  with  blood  and  iron, 
which  are  rarely  durable  materials.  Above  all,  he  worked  with 
\\'orn-out  ideas.  He  attempted  to  make  dead  bones  live.  He  con- 
tended against  Destiny,  the  one  goddess  of  his  belief,  when  he  tried 
to  stem  the  aiivancing  tide  of  republican  corruption  and  military 
despotism.  AThere  is  nothing  new  in  Sulla's  constitution.  As  a 
soldier,  indeed,  he  rescued  the  empire  of  the  East,  he  broke  the 
rebellion  of  Samnium,  he  saved  the  city  itself;  as  an  administrative 
and  judicial  reformer  he  did  some  sound  and  permanent  work. 
It  was  he  who  settled  the  Italian  question  and  centred  the  power 
of  united  Italy  in  Rome.  But  his  constitution  is  a  tissue  of  revivals 
and  restorations  of  ancient  usage  and  existing  prescription.  He 
left  behind  him  no  problem  solved,  and  all  parties  discontented. 
The  populace  had  kept  its  vices  and  lost  its  aliment ;  the  equites 
were  at  daggers  drawn  with  the  optimates  ;  the  moderates  and 
lawyers  were  thoroughly  dissatisfied.  The  army  had  learned  its 
power  ;  the  proconsul  could  study  Sulla's  precedent.  The  social 
and  economic  sores  were  unhealed  ;  nothing  had  been  done  for  the 
pro\inces  ;  the  fairest  regions  of  Italy  lay  waste  ;  town  and  country 
were  full  of  dangerous  exiles  and  discharged  soldiersJ  The  Sullan 
rcgiine  is  a  parenthesis  in  a  continuous  development.  In  ten 
years  the  forces  he  fought  against  met  to  destroy  it  ;  in  twenty  the 
patchwork  was  rent  to  rags.  But  the  fault  lay  less  with  Sulla 
than  with  the  vices  of  the  age,  in  which  he  shared  himself,  and 
the  weakness  of  the  men  to  whom  he  left  the  government.  He 
exhausted  the  possibilities  of  senatorial  reconstruction.  To  him 
and  to  his  work  of  consolidation  is  due,  after  all,  the  very  existence 
of  Rome,  and  of  any  material  or  opportunit)-  for  future  progress. 

For  the  moment  the  constitution  was  universally  accepted. 
Only  in  Spain,  Sertorius,  who  had  returned  to  try  his  fortune  once 
more,  headed  a  Lusitanian  insurrection,  and  began  that  eventful 
and  romantic  war  by  which  his  name  is  best  known.  Moreover, 
Sulla  knew  how  to  maintain  it  against  his  own  lieutenants.  If 
he  yielded  ironically  to  Pompeius,  and  stomached  the  impudent 
reminder  that  men  turn  from  the  setting  to  the  rising  sun,  yet 
when  Ofella,  the  besieger  of  Praeneste,  presumed  on  his  services  and 
persisted  in  disregarding  the  laws  relating  to  candidature,  he  had 
him  cut  down  in  the  open  Forum,  and  silenced  the  murmurs  of  the 
mob  with  the  significant  fable  of  the  countryman,  the  coat,  and  the 
troublesome  parasites.  Yet  these  ambitious  officers  remained  a 
force  to  reckon  with  in  the  future,  and  the  events  of  the  war,  in  wliich 


458  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

six  generals  had  been  murdered  by  tlieir  troops,  and  which  had  been 
marked  b)'  notorious  treachery  and  desertion,  had  accentuated  the 
dangerous  qualities  of  the  professional  fighters  they  commanded. 

Resignation  of  Sulla. — Meanwhile  Sulla  had  conducted  the 
home  and  foreign  administration  of  P..C.  8i  and  80,  making  as  little 
use  as  might  be  of  his  exceptional  powers.  Senate  and  people, 
in  their  different  spheres,  were  duly  consulted,  and  the  ordinary 
magistrates  appointed  for  81  B.C.  In  80  B.C.  he  took  the  consulship 
with  Metellus  Pius,  and  thus  paved  the  way  for  the  restoration  of 
the  republican  order.  He  refused  re-election  for  79  B.C.,  and  at  the 
beginning  of  the  year  resigned  his  dictatorship.  Whatever  share 
indifference  and  the  desire  of  ease  may  have  had  in  his  deter- 
mination, this  act  was  the  logical  outcome  of  his  ideas.  Enig- 
matical as  it  seemed,  it  was  politically  necessary  if  he  was  not  to 
stultify  his  own  legislation.  More  than  this  ;  unless  he  accepted 
permanent  office  he  could  not  accept  office  at  all  ;  he  was  too 
big  a  man  for  the  machine  he  had  created.  Calling'  the  people 
together,  to  their  surprise  and  admiration,  he  laid  down  his 
power,  dismissed  his  lictors  and  guard,  offered  to  give  a  reckoning 
ior  his  acts,  and  passed  away  unchallenged  to  his  home,  a  private 
citizen,  amid  the  breathless  wonder  of  the  crowd.  Not  long  after, 
he  retired  from  Rome  to  his  villa  near  Puteoli,  where,  in  the 
following  year,  he  died.  Rome's  "  iron  Chancellor"  retired  of  set 
purpose,  satisfied  with  his  creation,  interested  in  its  success,  ready 
to  return  to  its  rescue,  but  clear  that,  if  it  was  to  go  at  all,  it  had 
better  go  without  leading-strings.  He  could  not  remain  in  power 
but  not  in  office,  or  expose  himself  to  be  slighted  and  ignored  as 
an  ordinary  private  politician. 

Sulla  in  Retirement. — In  spite  of  all  the  bloodshed,  the  per- 
sonal feuds,  the  harassed  interests,  he  left  the  scene  of  the  pro- 
scriptions without  fear  or  hesitation,  relying  on  the  terror  of  his 
name,  the  reserve  of  veterans,  the  new  interests  he  had  created, 
with  contemptuous  self-confidence  and  indifference  to  events.  The 
remainder  of  his  days  were  spent  in  his  quiet  country  villa  at 
Cumre,  surrounded  by  his  family  and  friends.  His  beloved  wife, 
Csecilia  Metella,  mother  of  his  twin  children,  whom  he  had  named 
Faustus  and  Fausta,  in  honour  of  his  fortune,  died,  and  was 
buried  with  unlawful  splendour.  But  he  married  again,  for  the 
fifth  time,  a  young  and  cocjuettish  maiden  called  \'aleria,  drew 
round  him  a  circle  of^iterary  men  and  artists,  and  amused  his 
leisure  with  the  writing-  of  his  famous  memoirs.  While  he  grati- 
fied to  the  full  his  lifelong  love  of  pleasure,  and   the  scandal  of 


DEATH  AND    CHARACTER   OF  SULLA  459 

his  day  accused  the  "  mulberry-faced  dictator "  of  every  form  of 
sensual  indulgence,  he  found  time  and  strength  for  field  sports 
and  regulated  the  municipal  affairs  of  Puteoli.  His  passionate 
masterfulness  broke  out  once  more  in  the  murder  of  the  Mayor 
of  that  town,  an  outbreak  Avhich  was  fatal  to  him,  though  a  later 
legend  declared  that  the  man  of  blood  was  eaten  of  worms.  He 
died  in  his  sixtieth  year  (78  B.C.),  still  vigorous  in  mind  and  body, 
fortunate,  as  ever,  in  the  moment  of  his  death.  .Successful  in  his 
\\ell-considered  schemes,  more  so,  as  he  said,  in  his  impromptu 
actions,  he  assumed  the  title  of  Felix,  and  fortune,  faithful  to  the 
last,  did  not  falsify  the  assumption.  His  one  failure,  deeply  felt, 
was  the  failure  to  complete  the  restoration  of  the  burnt  temple  of 
Jupiter,  undertaken  in  his  latest  days. 

Funeral  and  Character  of  Sulla. — His  body  was  brought  to 
Rome  in  solemn,  ever-lengthening  procession  of  friends  and 
veterans  and  awe-stricken  spectators.  With  sombre  pomp  the 
funeral  was  celebrated  ;  the  ashes  were  honoured  with  burial  in 
the  Campus  Martius.  Vainly  the  consul  Lepidus  opposed  the 
demands  of  public  feeling  and  private  loyalty  ;  awe  of  the  dead 
man  and  his  li\ing  soldiers  kept  the  peace  about  his  corpse. 
Senate  and  magistrates,  priests  and  priestesses,  equites  and 
people,  were  there.  Hatred,  revenge,  and  calumny  were  silent  for 
a  moment,  as  the  greatest  man  in  Rome,  the  reorganiser  of  the 
state,  the  one  bulwark  of  order,  crumbled  to  dust  on  his  pyre, 
while  the  soldiery,  w  hom  he  alone  could  rule,  defiled  around  the 
body  of  their  chief.  But  the  passions  suppressed  for  the  moment 
broke  out  again  soon  after,  and  pursued  the  name  of  Sulla  with 
vindictive  exaggeration  of  his  vices  and  crimes.  To  his  character, 
as  we  have  described  it,  he  was  true  even  in  last  houi-s.  The 
small  ambitions  of  his  circle  did  not  touch  him.  It  was  his  aim 
to  get  the  most  out  of  life.  The  force  of  circumstances  and  his 
position  provoked  and  compelled  the  man  of  fashion  and  pleasure 
to  put  out  his  powers,  to  be  a  great  general  and  a  great  statesman. 
He  did  the  business  of  the  moment  as  it  came,  trusting  the  future 
to  fortune,  and  gave  up  power  and  place  with  the  same  indiffer- 
ence that  he  took  them.  His  leading  characteristic,  perhaps,  was 
just  this  ironical  cynicism,  this  cool,  frank  nonchalance.  He  has 
been  censured,  with  reason,  for  his  lax  morality,  his  self-indulgence, 
his  connivance  at  the  malpractices  of  friends,  his  breach  of  his  own 
laws,  his  carelessness  of  human  life.  He  was  no  more  a  moral  hero 
than  he  was  a  political  idealist  ;  he  combined  the  vices  of  liis  time 
and  nation  with  the  constitutional  ideas  of  a  bygone  age. 


46o  III  STORY  OF  ROME 


CHAPTER  XLV 

THE    RULE   OF    THE    SULLAN    RESTORATION 

B.C.       A.U.C. 

Lusitanian  Rising  under   Sertorius— Despatcli  of  Metellus 

Pius  to  Spain 

Death  of  Sulla-  Democratic  Proposals  of  Lepidus  . 

Defeat  and  Death  of  Lepidus— Pompey  sent  to  Spain 

Insurrection  of  Gladiators  under  Spartacus 

Murder  of  Sertorius— End  of  the  War  in  Spain 

Crassus  ends  the  Slave  War  by  the  Defeat  and  Death  of 

Spartacus 71        683 

Pompey  and  Crassus,  as  Consuls,  repeal  the  Constitutional 

Measures  of  Sulla 70       684 


80 

674 

78 

676 

77 

677 

73 

68 1 

72 

68z 

Opposition  to  the  Sullan  Regime. — Sulla  had  re-established  the 
Roman  oligarchy  in  a  strong  position,  but  he  had  failed  to  heal 
the  disorders  of  the  state  or  to  infuse  a  new  spirit  into  the  govern- 
ment. Within  the  camp  of  the  aristocrats  all  was  confusion  when 
their  champion  was  gone  ;  outside  its  narrow  bounds  numerous 
secret  or  open  enemies  were  gathering  their  forces  for  an  assault 
on  the  dictator's  organisation  of  the  Republic.  Many  and  various 
were  the  elements  of  discontent  grouped  together  and  covered  by 
the  vague  name  of  the  popular  party.  The  strict  adherents  to  the 
party  programme  of  the  past  demanded  the  restoration  of  the 
tribunician  power,  which  Sulla  had  shorn  of  its  chief  prerogatives. 

Caesar. — In  their  ranks  was  numbered  one  man,  C.  Julius 
Caesar,  who  was  destined  to  see  the  emptiness  of  partisan  watch- 
words. Already  men  looked  forw?  rd  with  hope  to  his  career,  but 
at  present  he  was  a  mere  youth  (born  102  B.C.),  a  leader' of  fashion 
rather  .than  of  politics.  Though  of  the  bluest  patrician  blood,  he 
was  bound  to  the  democrats  by  family  ties,  for  his  aunt  \\'as  the 
widow  of  Marius  and  his  wife  the  daughter  of  Cinna.  Rather 
than  divorce  her  at  the  bidding  of  Sulla,  he  fled  for  his  life,  and 
wrung  from  the  dictator  the  saying,  "  In  that  young  fop  there  are 
hidden  many  Mariuses."  In  the  next  ten  years  he  proved  his 
mettle  by  his  services  against  Mithradates  at  Mitylene  and  else- 
where in  Asia. 

Cicero. — Another  young  man  of  promise,  the  eloquent  advocate, 
M.  Tullius  Cicero,  first  made  his  mark  by  daring  to  oppose  the 
great  dictator.  In  defending  Sext.  Roscius  of  Ameria  he  laid  bare 
the  iniquities  of  Sulla's  freedman,  Chrysogonus,  and  covertly  cen- 
sured the  carelessness  of  the   too  indulgent  master      After  the 


orrosirioN'  to  sullan  system  461 

trial  he  ttiought  it  wise  to  retire  to  Rhodes  and  study  rhetoric  for 
two  years,  but  his  speech  had  done  its  work.  It  had  given  voice 
to  the  general  hatred  among  the  men  of  law  and  order  for  the 
violence  which  characterised  the  Sullan  ft'giine.  In  the  same 
spirit  the  strict  jurists  refused  to  recognise  the  validity  of  the 
Cornelian  laws  depriving  several  Italian  communities  of  the 
franchise.  Lovers  of  peace  and  quiet  stood  aghast  at  Sulla's 
proscriptions  and  confiscations,  and  at  the  atrocious  injustice  and 
cruelty  perpetrated  in  his  name. 

The  Ordo  Equester.^With  these  moderate  men  went  the 
whole  equestrian  order.  The  merchants  and  bankers  of  the 
Roman  world  were  by  turns  irritated  by  the  inefficiency  of  sena- 
torial government  into  giving  their  support  to  the  opposition,  and 
frightened  by  democratic  excesses  into  the  arms  of  the  aristocracy. 
The  leaders  of  the  order  were  the  farmers  of  the  provincial  taxes, 
who  for  half  a  century  had  used  the  position  of  their  class  on  the 
jury-bench  to  make  the  magistrates  in  the  provinces  their  humble 
servants.  The  knights  had  also  contrived  to  secure  for  themselves 
immunity  from  accusations  both  of  provincial  extortion  and  of 
judicial  corruption.  Even  Sulla  had  acquiesced  in  this  monstrous 
exemption.  But  the  dictator  had  decimated  the  knights  by  his 
proscriptions  and  degraded  them  by  his  laws.  They  were  ex- 
pelled from  their  seats  of  honour  in  the  theatre,  and  from  their 
more  profitable  position  in  the  jury-box.  At  the  same  time  their 
ranks  had  been  recruited  from  the  substantial  burgesses  of  the 
Italian  towns  and  the  landholders  of  the  country  districts.  These 
men  were  made  Romans  by  the  enfranchisement  of  Italy,  they 
shared  with  the  financiers  of  the  capital  their  dread  of  violence 
and  their  jealousy  of  the  nobles,  and  thus  were  ready  to  follow  the 
leaders  of  their  order  in  opposition  to  the  Sullan  men  and  the 
Sullan  measures. 

Again,  many  of  the  country  towns,  especially  in  Etruria,  re- 
sented or  dreaded  the  confiscation  of  their  lands.  Be. ween  the 
Alps  and  the  Po  there  was  a  continual  agitation  for  the  coveted 
boon  of  the  full  Roman  franchise.  Nearer  home,  the  freedmen 
repined  at  their  confinement  to  the  four  urban  tribes,  and  the  city 
populace  grieved  over  the  loss  of  the  dole  of  corn.  Finally,  the 
children  of  those  whom  the  dictator  had  proscribed  saw  no  hope 
of  restoration,  save  in  the  overthrow  of  that  society  which  had 
made  them  outcasts.  The  agitation  found  a  fruitful  soil  in  a  land 
disorganised  by  ten  years  of  war  and  violence.  Ruined  nobles 
and  poor  plebeians  looked  to  another  revolution  as  their  one  hope 


462  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

of  salvation.  Even  Sulla's  veterans,  the  garrison  whose  mission 
it  was  to  defend  the  new  constitution,  were  now,  in  their  eagerness 
for  fresh  opportunities  of  plunder,  ready  to  follow  the  banner  of 
rebellion. 

The  Aristocratic  Clique. — The  aristocrats  were  in  no  state  to 
meet  the  forces  of  disorder.  Their  ideal  of  government  was  a 
close  hereditary  oligarchy.  Election  to  office  was  secured  by  open 
and  organised  bribery  of  the  people,  immunity  from  punishment 
by  no  less  shameful  corruption  of  the  senatorial  juries.  Sub- 
division and  frequent  rotation  of  offices  were,  as  in  old  days, 
adopted  as  safeguards  against  unrepublican  pre-eminence  of  in- 
dividuals. But  these  precautions,  without  securing  their  object, 
enhanced  the  difficulty  of  governing  the  wide  provinces  of  the 
e;mpire,  and  showed  most  clearly  how  incapable  the  narrow  clique 
of  oligarchs  was  of  guiding  the  destinies  of  Rome.  In  their  camp 
there  were  indeed  able  officei-s,  such  as  Metellus  Pius  and  Lucius 
Lucullus,  and  men  of  high  culture  and  character,  such  as  the  solid 
and  respectable  Q.  Lutatius  Catulus.  But  their  political  creed  was 
a  blind  belief  in  oligarchy,  which  led  them  to  regard  narrow  and 
obstinate  partisanship  as  the  only  true  patriotism.  And  even  to 
the  service  of  faction  they  only  devoted  what  time  they  could  spare 
from  the  pleasures  of  the  table  and  the  patronage  of  literature. 

Crassus. — Two  of  the  most  powerful  men  in  Rome  were  at 
present  pledged  to  neither  party.  M.  Licinius  Crassus,  a  man  of 
high  birth  but  without  loyalty  to  his  caste,  a  soldier  of  no  mean 
capacity,  as  he  had  proved  in  the  service  of  Sulla,  and  an  orator 
whose  undoubted  success  was  due  rather  to  persistence  and  in- 
sistence than  to  any  rhetorical  gift,  had  become  by  adroit  specu- 
lation the  richest  man  in  Rome  and  a  power  in  the  state.  As 
the  representative  of  the  moneyed  classes  he  aimed  at  political 
preponderance  by  mercantile  means,  and  would  sacrifice  the  pre- 
eminence of  his  order  to  the  interests  of  the  capitalists  and  a  vague 
personal  ambition,  A  vein  of  vanity  and  a  desire  for  military 
renown  crossed  his  more  material  projects.  His  crooked  policy  is 
the  natural  result  of  a  crooked  character  drawn  in  different  direc- 
tions by  diverging  aims.  Oratory  and  wealth  alike  he  used  to 
build  up  power  ;  he  shrank  from  no  useful  associates,  readily  con- 
sorting even  with  anarchists,  and  formed  a  political  connection  by 
lending  money  to  statesmen  of  all  parties.  No  leader,  however 
reckless,  dare  provoke  "  the  bull  of  the  herd,"  as  Crassus  was 
called.  And  now  the  great  speculator  was  prepared  to  make  a 
daring  bid  for  the  prize  of  power. 


CRASSUS  AND  POMPEY  463 

Pompey. — If  the  moneyed  interest  put  their  faith  in  Crassus, 
the  popular  voice  was  for  another  rising  young  Sullan  officer,  Cn. 
Pompeius.  While  still  too  young  to  enter  on  the  career  of  office, 
Pompeius  had  raised  an  army  and  won  victories  for  Sulla,  from 
whose  half-ironical  admiration  he  had  extorted  a  triumph  and  the 
surname  of  Magnus.  The  unbroken  success  of  his  military  career 
won  the  hearts  of  the  soldiery,  and  the  respectability  of  his  private 
life  the  esteem  of  the  citizens.  But  for  political  leadership  he  had 
none  of  the  necessary  talents.  He  wished  to  be  the  lirst  man 
in  the  state,  and  yet  to  avoid  the  responsibility  of  leadership. 
Unable  to  escape  from  the  domination  of  ancient  ideals  and  tradi- 
tions of  whose  existence  he  was  impatient,  he  was  a  man  in  a  false 
position,  neither  the  true  champion  of  constitutional  liberty  longed 
for  by  Cicero,  nor  the  miserable  poltroon,  letting  "  I  dare  not  wait 
upon  I  would,"  portrayed  by  Mommsen.  While  he  shrank  with 
horror  from  appealing  to  force,  he  could  not  see  that  the  deference 
he  expected  was  incompatible  with  true  republicanism.  Incon- 
sistent in  his  ends,  he  was  still  more  unhappy  in  his  choice  of 
means.  Ignorant  of  men,  shrouded  in  self-conceit,  without  tact, 
taste,  or  affability,  with  no  comprehension  of  the  drift  of  events, 
or  even  of  his  own  true  position  and  power,  he  was  incapable  of 
an  independent  and  consistent  policy,  unable  to  act,  and  unwilling 
to  remain  obscure.  At  one  time  he  would  strive  to  mask  his 
indecision  under  the  guise  of  a  deep  and  subtle  policy  ;  at  another 
he  would  snatch  at  any  assistance  which  promised  to  relie\e  him 
from  his  immediate  difficulties.     Throughout  his  life  men  looked 


HEAD   OF    POMPEY   ON    A    COIN    STRUCK    CIRC    38-36   B.C. 


to  him  for  guidance  in  their  perplexities  and  deliverance  from 
danger,  and  found  too  late  that  there  was  neither  light  nor  leading 
in  the  idol  which  they  had  set  up  for  worship. 

Revolt  of  Lepidus. — Pompey's  first  interference  in  politics  was 
in  the  support  he  gave  to  AI.  /Emilius  Lepidus  in  his  canvass  for 


464  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  consulship.  Sulla  in  vain  warned  him  of  the  levity  and  rash- 
ness of  his  new  ally,  from  whom  Cicsar  wisely  stood  aloof,  but 
did  not  live  to  see  the  fulfilment  of  his  predictions.  Before  the 
dictator  was  buried,  the  consul  Lepidus  had  begun  to  agitate  for 
the  overthrow  of  the  constitution  with  all  a  renegade's  ardour. 
The  distribution  of  corn  was  revived,  and  the  restoration  of  the 
tribunician  power  and  of  confiscated  lands,  as  well  as  the  recall 
of  the  proscribed,  openly  advocated.  A  revolt  at  Faesula;  terrified 
the  Senate  into  the  absurdity  of  entrusting  Lepidus  as  well  as 
Catulus  with  an  army.  It  thus  provided  the  insurrectionary 
leader  with  a  regular  force,  and  when  it  decreed  his  recall,  he 
met  the  order  with  a  demand  for  the  reinstatement  of  the  pro- 
scribed and  his  own  re-election  to  the  consulship.  Fortunately  the 
ensuing  war  was  brief  and  decisive.  Pompey,  convinced  of  error 
or  alarmed  at  revolution,  forced  M.  Brutus,  the  lieutenant  of 
Lepidus  in  the  valley  of  the  Po,  to  shut  himself  up  in  Mutina,  and 
eventually  to  surrender  at  discretion.  Lepidus  himself  attempted 
to  surprise  Rome,  but  was  met  and  vanquished  by  Catulus  on 
the  field  of  Mars,  near  the  Mulvian  bridge.  He  made  good  his 
retreat  to  Sardinia,  but  died  before  he  could  secure  the  island. 
The  remnant  of  his  troops  found  their  way  to  Spain,  under  the 
command  of  the  praetor  M.  Perperna  {']^  B.C.). 

The  Insurrection  in  Spain. — Spain  had  for  some  time  been  the 
refuge  of  the  partisans  of  Marius.  Q.  Sertorius,  despatched  to  that 
province  in  83  B.C.,  and  chased  thence  by  the  officers  of  Sulla,  had, 
after  taking  Tingis  (Tangiers),  returned  to  Spain,  and  accepted  the 
command  of  the  revolted  Lusitanians.  Covering  his  hastily  orga- 
nised legion  with  swarms  of  Spanish  irregulars,  he  routed  L. 
Fufidius  on  the  BiEtis  (Guadalquiver),  and  despatched  his  own 
lieutenant,  L.  Hirtuleius,  to  the  Iberus  (Ebro),  where  he  destroyed, 
in  succession,  the  armies  of  Hither  Spain  and  Southern  Gaul. 
Meanwhile  the  best  senatorial  general,  Metellus  Pius,  had  pene- 
trated into  Lusitania,  only  to  find  himself  baffled  and  outwitted  at 
every  turn  by  the  rebel  leader.  Sertorius,  refusing  to  risk  a  pitched 
battle  and  scorning  the  pedantry  of  scientific  warfare,  by  a  series  of 
ambushes  and  surprises  so  harassed  his  methodical  opponent  that 
he  could  call  nothing  but  his  camp  his  own. 

Sertorius.  — Sertorius  was  now  supreme  in  Spain.  In  the  attain- 
ment of  his  power  he  had  shown  himself  a  general  ;  in  its  employ- 
ment he  proved  himself  yet  greater  as  a  statesman.  He  strove, 
not  unsuccessfully,  to  reconcile  Roman  rule  with  the  national 
aspirations  of  the  Spaniards.      In  one  aspect  he  was  the  Roman 


SEKTOR/US  465 

governor,  distinguished  from  others  only  by  the  gentleness  of  his 
rule  over  the  provincials  and  the  strictness  of  his  discipline.  In 
another,  he  was  the  national  leader  of  Spain,  the  hero  of  the  chival- 
rous nobility,  and  the  favourite  of  the  goddess  Diana,  who  sent 
him  her  counsels  by  a  milk-white  fawn.  But  his  final  aim  was  to 
Romanise  the  provincials,  and  for  that  purpose  he  had  the  children 
of  the  nobles  educated  at  Osca  in  the  learning  of  Greece  and 
Rome.  Had  time  been  granted  him,  the  great  democratic  adven- 
turer and  soldier  of  fortune  might  have  forestalled  in  Spain  the 
work  of  the  early  emperors. 

Pompey  and  Metellus  in  Spain. — But  the  fall  of  Lepidus  set 
Pompey  and  his  legions  free  for  service  abroad.  Unwilling  as 
the  Senate  was  to  violate  in  his  favour  the  established  rules  of 
precedence,  it  had  no  alternative.  No  general  but  Pompey  was 
willing  to  match  himself  with  Sertorius,  and  Pompey  demanded 
the  post  with  scarcely  veiled  threats.  The  command  in  Hither 
Spain,  with  proconsular  authority,  was  irregularly  conferred  on 
the  young  eques  by  the  Senate.  One  summer  was  spent  in  re- 
pressing the  disturbances  excited  by  Sertorius  in  Gaul,  during 
which  time  Hither  Spain  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  rebel 
leader.  In  the  next  campaign  (76  B.C.),  Metellus,  who  had 
maintained  himself  in  Btetica,  drove  Hirtuleius  from  that  province 
by  the  \ictory  of  Italica,  while  Pompey  forced  the  passage  of  the 
Ebro  and  captured  \'alentia  after  defeating  the  lieutenants  of 
Sertorius.  But  when  that  general  took  the  field  in  person,  he 
completely  outmanoeuvred  Pompey  and  took  the  town  of  Lauro 
before  the  eyes  of  the  relieving  army.  In  75  B.C.,  however, 
Metellus  routed  Hirtuleius  at  Segovia,  and  marched  towards 
Valentia  to  join  Pompey.  With  inexcusable  jealousy  the  young 
commander  accepted  battle  on  the  Sucro,  without  waiting  for 
his  colleague,  and  was  only  saved  from  disaster  by  his  opportune 
arrival.  "  If  the  old  woman  had  not  come  to  help  him,  I  should 
have  whipped  this  stripling  back  to  Rome,"  said  Sertorius,  with 
grim  humour.  One  more  pitched  battle  was  risked  by  the 
rebel  chief,  and  once  more  Metellus  retrieved  the  half-lost  day. 
The  Spanish  levies  dispersed,  and  never  again  faced  the  legions 
in  the  field,  but  Sertorius  clung  obstinately  to  his  strongholds 
on  the  Ebro,  and  still  harassed  the  Roman  generals  by  a 
guerrilla  warfare.  In  the  next  two  campaigns  Metellus  recovered 
Southern  and  Central  Spain,  while  Pompey  steadily  wore  down 
Sertorius'  strength. 

Death  of  Sertorius. — In  his  perplexity  that  statesman  was  driven 

2  G 


466  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

to  look  round  for  liclp  ainon^-^  the  enemies  of  Rome.  He  allied 
himself  with  the  pirates  whose  galleys  swept  the  Mediterranean, 
and  with  Mithradates,  king  of  Pontiis.  But  even  so  he  would 
cede  to  the  demands  of  the  Eastern  sultan  only  the  client  kingdoms 
on  the  frontiers,  not  a  foot  of  Roman  soil.  In  return  for  this  con- 
cession and  for  the  promise  of  Roman  troops  and  an  officer  to  lead 
his  armies,  the  king  agreed  to  send  forty  ships  and  3000  talents. 
But  this  coalition  came  too  late  to  save  Sertorius.  The  discontent 
which  was  spreading  among  the  hard-pressed  Spaniards  was  aggra- 
vated by  the  e.xecution  of  the  chieftains'  sons  whom  lie  had  held 
as  hostages  at  Osca.  At  last  a  conspiracy  was  formed  against 
the  general's  life  by  the  members  of  his  own  staff.  The  severity 
with  which  he  punished  detected  conspirators  only  inflamed  those 
who  escaped  discovery.  The  heroic  soldier  and  far-seeing  states- 
man, whom  his  own  party  had  feared  and  distrusted,  whom  the 
Sullan  Senate  had  made  a  rebel  and  a  menace  to  Rome,  was 
assassinated  at  a  banquet  by  his  own  officers  (72  B.C.).  Their 
leader,  Perperna,  gained  little  by  his  base  treachery.  He  was 
routed  and  taken  prisoner  by  Pompey  at  their  first  encounter.  A 
craven  attempt  to  save  his  life  by  surrendering  the  correspondence 
of  Sertorius  was  frustrated  by  the  prudence  or  magnanimity 
of  Pompey,  who  burned  the  letters  unread  and  executed  the 
traitor. 

The  Gladiatorial  War. — While  the  armies  of  the  Republic  were 
engaged  in  Spain,  a  dangerous  outbreak  took  place  almost  at  the 
gates  of  Rome.  A  band  of  gladiators  escaped  from  the  training 
school  at  Capua,  and  took  refuge  on  Mount  ^'esuvius.  Their 
leaders  were  Spartacus,  a  Thracian,  and  two  Gauls,  Crixus  and 
GInomaus  i^j'^  B.C.).  They  dispersed  the  division  of  militia  sent 
to  blockade  their  stronghold,  and  e\ading  the  praetor  \'arinius, 
retired  into  Lucania,  the  ancient  home  of  brigandage.  Here 
Spartacus  routed  the  raw  legions  of  Varinius,  and  raised  the 
herdsmen-slaves  of  the  South  Italian  pastures  in  revolt.  The 
open  country  was  given  up  to  the  insurgents  ;  even  considerable 
towns  were  stormed  and  sacked.  In  the  following  year,  though 
a  detachment  under  Crixus  was  cut  to  pieces  near  Mount  Garganus, 
Spartacus  himself  defeated  both  consuls  and  the  proconsul  of  Cis- 
alpine Gaul.  It  was  his  aim  to  force  a  passage  over  the  Alps  and 
secure  for  his  followers  a  return  to  their  homes  in  Gaul  and  Thrace. 
But  his  undisciplined  banditti,  unworthy  of  their  far-sighted  leader, 
could  not  bear  to  leave  Italy  unplurdered,  and  while  they  roamed 
about  the  country,  gave  M.  Crassus  time  to  collect  a  force  of  eight 


SPARTACUS 


467 


legions.  By  wholesome  severity  he  tauglit  his  raw  troops  to  face 
the  rebels,  and  driving-  Sparlacus  before  him,  blockaded  him  in 
the  extreme  corner  of  Bruttium.  In  tlie  hope  of  rekindling  the 
servile  war  in  Sicily,  Spartacus  bribed  the  pirates,  who  then  were 
masters  of  the  Sicilian  waters,  to  transport  his  troops  across  the 
straits.  The  faithless  corsairs  broke  their  word,  but  Spartacus, 
still  unconquered,  pierced  the  strong   lines  with  which   Grassus 


GLADIATORS— COMBATS    OF    SKCUTOR    AND    RF.TIARIUS. 


had  hemmed  him  in,  and  reappeared  in  Lucania.  Only  the  dis- 
union and  insubordination  of  his  followers  saved  Rome  from 
disaster.  The  Celts  and  Germans  again  broke  off  from  the 
main  body,  and  were  slaughtered  to  the  last  man.  Yet  once 
more  the  undaunted  Spartacus  inflicted  a  defeat  on  his  cowardly 
enemies,  but  his  victory  was  fatal  to  himself  His  followers, 
elated  by  success,  insisted  on  fighting  a  decisive  battle  in  Apulia, 


468  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  suffered  a  defeat  made  crusliiny  by  the  loss  of  their  gallant 
leader. 

Crassus,  who  had  been  appointed  to  the  command  in  the  hour 
of  danger,  and  had  vindicated  the  honour  of  the  Roman  arms,  was 
the.  true  conqueror  of  Spartacus.  But  Pompey  came  home  from 
Spain  in  time  to  cut  to  pieces  a  division  of  5000  fug-itives,  and  to 
join  in  hunting  down  and  crucifying  the  rebellious  slaves.  With 
characteristic  egotism  he  claimed  for  himself  the  honours  and 
rewards  of  victory  as  the  man  who  had  ended  the  gladiatorial  as 
well  as  the  Spanish  war. 

Pompey  and  Crassus  adopt  the  Democratic  Programme. — The 
conquering  generals  lay  with  their  armies  before  the  gates  of 
Rome.  Within  the  city  the  democrats  had  long  been  agitating 
for  the  restoration  of  the  full  powers  of  the  tribunate.  Already, 
by  a  law  of  the  moderate  C.  Cotta,  the  holding  of  the  tribunate 
had  ceased  to  be  a  disqualification  for  higher  office,  but,  in  spite 
of  the  zealous  efforts  of  Licinius  Macer  and  Cjesar,  the  tribunes 
remained  without  independence,  bound  hand  and  foot  to  the 
service  of  the  Senate.  The  opposition  also  demanded  a  searching 
reform  of  the  governing  corporation.  They  asked  for  the  dis- 
placement of  the  venal  and  unfair  senatorial  jurors  in  favour  of 
the  knights,  and  for  the  revival  of  the  censorship  to  purge  away 
the  corruptions  of  the  Senate  itself.  These  old  cries  gained  new 
strength  and  significance  in  the  altered  state  of  affairs.  Pompey, 
officer  of  the  Senate  and  partisan  of  Sulla  as  he  had  been,  could 
only  hope  to  gain  the  objects  on  which  his  heart  was  set  by  open 
force  or  by  the  aid  of  the  democrats.  A  jealous  Senate  might 
perhaps  have  granted  to  his  youth  and  victories  the  illegal 
triumph  and  the  curule  chair ;  it  would  never  have  confirmed  his 
supremacy  by  giving  lands  to  his  veterans,  or  the  coveted  com- 
mand in  the  East  to  himself.  Crassus,  the  typical  financier,  was 
not  inclined  to  risk  his  fortunes  in  an  unequal  contest  with  his 
popular  rival  on  behalf  of  the  Senate.  The  democratic  leaders 
adroitly  turned  the  discontent  of  the  generals  to  their  own  ends. 
Pompey  and  Crassus,  smothering  their  jealousies  for  a  time, 
agreed  to  adopt  the  democratic  programme,  and  in  return  were 
promised  the  consulship.  Pompey  was  also  to  receive  a  triumph 
and  allotments  of  land  for  his  soldiers  ;  Crassus,  the  inferior 
partner  in  the  alliance,  had  to  content  himself  with  a  simple 
ovation. 

Overthrow  of  the  Sullan  System. — Pompey  and  Crassus  were 
elected  consuls  for  the  ensuing  year  (70  B.C.)  without  opposition. 


OVERTHROW  OF  SULLAN  SYSTEM 


469 


and  at  once  began  the  task  of  reversing  the  ordinances  of  Sulla. 
The  tribunes  received  again  their  old  prerogatives,  and  in  par- 
ticular the  right  of  initiating  legislative  proposals  ;  once  more 
the  censors  revised  the  list  of  the  Senate,  and  justified  their 
appointment  by  erasing  no  less  than  sixty-four  names  from  the 
roll.  The  senators,  whose  corrupt  perversion  of  justice  had  been 
branded  by  Cicero  in  the  orations  against  that  prince  of  pillagers, 
C.  Verres,  the  scourge  of  the  Sicihans,  were  not,  however, 
entirely  excluded  from  the  jury-box.  The  praetor  L.  Cotta,  a 
moderate  politician,  effected  a  compromise  known  as  the  Aurelian 


HELMET   OF    A    GLADIATOR. 


Law,  under  which  the  jury  in  criminal  cases  was  composed  of 
three  pannels,  one  of  senators,  one  of  knights,  and  one  of  tjibuiii 
icran'i.  ^ 

The  overthrow  of  the  oligarchy  set  up  by  Sulla  was  now 
accomplished.     All  that  was  left  of  the  great  dictator's  work  was 

1  The  tribuni  cerarii  were  originally  responsible  for  the  payment  of  the 
troops,  and  derived  their  name  from  this  function  ;  but  whether  they  are  to  be 
identified  with  the  curatores  of  the  350  centuries  {vide  supra,  p.  295/. ),  who  suc- 
ceeded to  the  presidents  of  the  old  Servian  tribes,  or  were  at  all  times  merely 
private  men  of  substance,  whose  name  is  a  survival  from  a  long-obsolete  func- 
tion, is  much  disputed.  In  Cicero's  time  they  were  reckoned  at  least  by 
courtesy  with  the  equestrian  order. 


470  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  new  system  of  criminal  procedure,  with  ;i  few  minor  business 
arrangements.  Tlie  fall  of  his  political  institutions,  which  all  his 
proscriptions  and  massacres  had  maintained  for  ten  years  only, 
was  an  apparent  triumph  for  the  popular  party.  The  tribunate, 
restored  to  life  and  vigour,  found  employment  in  passing  a  series  of 
laws  which  prohibited  loans  to  provincials  in  Rome  or  to  envoys 
of  foreign  states,  and  in  restoring  to  the  knights  their  scats  in  the 
theatre  (67  B.C.)  ;  but  the  real  strength  of  the  new  coalition  lay  in 
the  armies,  which  their  leaders  kept  outside  the  gates  of  Rome 
during  their  consulate.  The  true  alternative  to  senatorial  oligarchy 
was  not  democracy,  but  military  monarchy.  The  fact  was  already 
dimly  seen,  and  the  people  paid  Pompey  willing  homage.  When 
the  censors  made  their  review  of  the  knights,  Pompey  appeared 
at  their  head  leading  his  horse.  To  the  question  whether  he  had 
served  all  the  campaigns  required  by  law,  he  proudly  answered, 
"  I  have  made  them  all  under  my  own  leadership."  This  haughty 
reply  was  greeted  by  the  crowd  with  thunders  of  applause,  and 
the  censors,  taking  the  hint,  rose  and  escorted  the  young  consul 
to  his  house.  All  seemed  to  point  to  the  absolute  rule  of  Pompey. 
Crassus,  inferior  both  in  popularity  and  in  military  reputation,  had 
the  will  but  not  the  power  to  oppose  the  elevation  of  his  rival  to 
empire. 

Refusal  of  Pompey  to  grasp  Supreme  Power. — The  dreaded 
catastrophe  was  averted  by  Pompey's  loyalty  and  want  of  insight, 
and  by  the  tact  of  the  popular  leaders.  They  induced  Crassus 
to  make  advances  to  his  colleague,  and  to  offer  to  disband  his 
army.  Pompey  was  obliged  to  accept  his  overtures  and  follow 
his  example,  or  else  to  seize  supreme  power  by  force.  From  the 
latter  alternative,  if  indeed  he  realised  its  existence,  he  shrank 
with  honest  abhorrence.  \The  decision  to  discharge  his  veterans 
flung  him  back  into  political  obscurity.  With  an  army  at  his 
back  he  was  the  greatest  power  in  Rome  ;  without  it  he  was  a 
quaiititd  negligeable.  Too  proud  to  accept  an  ordinary  pro\ince 
or  to  endure  the  petty  routine  of  public  life  in  the  capital,  he 
retired  from  politics,  waiting  for  an  occasion  worthy  of  his  mili- 
tary genius,  and  for  a  call  to  arms  from  his  fellow-citizens.  After 
two  years  the  discomfiture  of  the  Roman  forces  on  sea  and  on 
land  led  to  the  reappearance  of  Pompey  as  the  saviour  of  his 
country.  \ 


THE    PIRATES  471 


CHAPTER  XLVI 

THE    WARS    WITH    THE    PIRATES    AND    MITHRADATES 

POMPEY    IN    THE    EAST 

ii.C.        A.U.C. 

L.  Lucullus  and  M.  Cotta  given  Command  against  Mithra- 

dates,  M.  Antonins  against  the  Pirates  .        -74  680 

Relief  of  Cyzicus 73  681 

Victory  of  Cabira — Conquest  of  Pontus      ....  72  682 

Capture  of  Tigranocerta .         .     69  685 

Capture  of  Nisibis 68  686 

Defeat  at  Ziela— Mithradates  recovers  liis  Kingdom — Lex 

Gabinia — Pompey  conquers  the  Pirates       .  .        -67  687 

Lex  Manilia — Victory  of  Nicopolis— Submission  of  Tigranes    66  688 

Death  of  Mithradates—Settlement  of  the  East  .        .63  691 

In  the  Eatit  as  well  as  in  the  West  the  empire  of  Rome  was 
shaken  to  its  foundations  through  the  negligence  of  the  Sullan 
oligarchy.  In  the  Balkan  peninsula,  it  is  true,  the  raids  of  the 
robl^cr  tribes  were  checked  by  a  combined  attack  from  Dalmatia 
and  Macedonia,  which  ended  in  the  conquest  of  Thrace  by  M. 
Lucullus  (73  B.C.).  But  the  two  powers  which  threatened  serious 
danger  to  Rome,  the  corsairs  of  the  Levant  and  the  sultans  of  the 
East,  Mithradates  of  Pontus  and  Tigranes  of  Armenia,  were  pro- 
voked by  ineffectual  opposition  to  further  aggression. 

The  Pirates. — The  pirates  were  now  no  longer  isolated  gangs 
of  freebooters  and  slavers,  but  formed  an  organised  state  of  bucca- 
neers. Their  dominion  was  the  Mediterranean,  which  was  abso- 
lutely under  their  control.  They  had  harbours  of  refuge  commanded 
by  rock  castles  wherever  its  jutting  capes  and  sheltering  islands 
offered  them  safe  shelter,  but,  above  all,  in  the  island  of  Crete  and 
the  craggy  fastnesses  of  Cilicia.  The  supporters  of  lost  causes,  the 
refugees  of  all  nations,  joined  a  state  which  promised  them  revenge 
on  their  oppressors  and  freedom  for  themselves.  The  decayed 
Roman  navy  was  utterly  unable  to  cope  with  their  light  galleys, 
the  forerunners  of  the  Algerine  corsairs,  and  left  the  trade  of  the 
Mediterranean  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  pirates.  The  towns 
and  cities  of  the  coast,  such  as  Cnidus,  Samos,  and  Colophon,  were 
plundered  outright,  or  suffered  to  redeem  themselves  by  paying 
heavy  ransoms.  Sulla  himself  saw  Clazomense  and  lassus  pillaged 
before  the  eyes  of  his  victorious  army,  but  was  powerless  to  avenge 
the  insult.     As  a  state  the  corsairs  made  treaties  with  Mithradates 


472  III  STORY  OF  ROME 

and  with  Sertorius,  but  liad  not  the  judgment  or  the  courage 
to  throw  themselves  heart  and  soul  into  the  struggle  against 
Rome. 

Campaigns  in  Cilicia. — At  length  the  Senate  was  goaded  into 
action.  Publius  Servilius  defeated  the  pirates'  fleet  off  Patara, 
and  destroyed  their  strongholds  in  Lycia,  Pamphylia,  and  Cilicia. 
Not  content  with  subduing  the  brigands  of  the  sea,  he  crossed  the 
Taurus  and  captured  the  mountain  fastnesses  of  the  Isaurians. 
Three  severe  campaigns  (78-76  B.C.)  proved  the  valour  of  the 
general  and  gained  him  the  honourable  title  of  Isauricus  ;  but  the 
beaten  corsairs  betook  themselves  to  their  old  haunts  in  Crete,  and 
laughed  at  the  empty  triumph  of  their  conqueror. 

Failure  of  M.  Antonius. — At  last,  in  74  B.C.,  the  Senate  saw 
the  necessity  of  operations  on  a  large  scale,  but  unfortunately  M. 
Antonius,^  the  admiral  entrusted  with  the  task  of  clearing  the  seas, 
proved  incompetent.  After  driving  the  pirates  from  the  coasts  of 
Italy,  he  was  defeated  by  the  Cretans  off  Cydonia.  The  Senate 
resolved  to  avenge  this  disgrace  to  the  Roman  arms,  but  instead 
of  strengthening  their  fleet,  despatched  Metellus  with  an  army  to 
subdue  Crete  (68  B.C.),  The  much-abused  Cretans  fought  bravely  in 
defence  of  their  liberties,  and  it  took  the  proconsul  two  campaigns  to 
reduce  their  cities  and  earn  the  title  of  Creticus.  Meanwhile  the 
pirates  scoured  the  waters  of  the  Mediterranean  unhindered.  Italy 
itself  was  no  longer  safe.  A  Roman  fleet  was  burnt  in  the  roads 
of  Ostia,  two  praetors  with  their  retinue  were  seized  ;  worst  blow  of 
all,  the  corn-ships,  on  which  the  very  life  of  Rome  depended,  could 
no  longer  cross  the  narrow  seas.  Famine  and  riot  stared  the  rulers 
of  the  Republic  in  the  face. 

Tigranes  of  Armenia. — The  incapacity  of  the  government  dis- 
played itself  with  equal  plainness  in  its  management  of  the  affairs 
of  the  East,  though  its  errors  were  in  part  covered  by  the  brilliant 
successes  of  its  general.  For  several  years  Tigranes  had  been 
suffered  to  prove  himself  king  of  kings  by  a  career  of  conquest. 
In  Media  Atropatene,  in  Corduene  and  Northern  Mesopotamia 
he  made  himself  over-lord  in  place  of  the  Parthian.  To  secure  his 
hold  on  the  Euphrates  he  seized  Eastern  Cappadocia  and  passed 
on  into  Cilicia.  The  distracted  house  of  the  Seleucids  could  offer 
no  serious   opposition   to   his   assumption  of  the   Syrian   crown. 

^  The  power  given  to  Antonius  {imperium  infinitum  ccquum),  that  is,  an 
authority  equal  to  that  of  a  provincial  governor,  but  not  limited  to  a  single 
province,  is  interesting  as  a  precedent  for  the  Gabinian  Law  {vide  infra,  p.  477). 


T/GRANES  AND  MITHRADATES 


473 


Tigranes  aspired  to  play  the  part  of  the  old  Ikibylonian  and  P'er- 
siaii  monarchs  ;  like  Nebuchadne/:zar,  he  would  build  a  j^reat  city, 
Tigranoccrta,  and   carry   thither   the    captives    from    his    frontier 


/•••-*-• 


w 


^ 


COIN    OF   TIGKANKS    STRUCK    IN    SVKIA   BEFORE   69    B.C.  —  (l)    HEAD   OF 
TIGRANES  ;    (2)    ANTIOCH    SEATED   ON    A    ROCK. 


provinces.  Like  Xerxes,  he  never  appeared  in  public  without 
all  the  pomp  and  show  of  royalty. 

Mithradates. — Mithradates,  who  had  learnt  by  experience  the 
power  of  Rome,  studiously  refrained  from  all  aggression.  He 
strengthened  himself  in  his  new  kingdom  by  the  Bosphorus,  and 
made  his  fleets  and  armies  ready  for  the  coming  struggle.  Rome, 
far  from  acting  on  the  ofifensive,  would  not  even  take  up  the 
challenge  of  Tigranes  or  assert  the  rights  over  Egypt  and  Cyprus 
given  her  by  the  will  of  the  last  legitimate  king,  Alexander  (8i  B.C.). 
The  outbreak  of  war  was  due  in  the  end,  not  to  any  schemes  of  con- 
quest, but  rather  to  mutual  distrust.  Rome  feared  that,  while  her 
energies  were  distracted  by  civil  war,  Mithradates  would  fall  on 
Asia  Minor  ;  the  Eastern  monarch,  with  justifiable  alarm,  suspected 
new  aggression  when  Rome  took  over  Bithynia  under  the  will  of 
its  last  king,  Nicomedes  (75  B.c.).^ 

Third  Mithradatic  War.  —  Mithradates,  once  aroused,  strove 
with  characteristic  energy  to  unite  all  the  enemies  of  Rome  against 
her.  With  Tigranes  his  envoys  had  no  success.  But  Sertorius 
sent  him  Roman  officers  to  drill  his  troops,  and  the  pirates,  who 
flocked  to  his  aid,  enabled  him  to  raise  a  large  fleet.  In  74  B.C.  the 
great  Pontic  army  poured  down  on  Roman  Asia.  One  corps  was 
sent  to  Cappadocia,  another  to  Phrygia,  but  the  main  army,  sup- 


1  These  political  testaments  recur  with  suspicious  frequency  (:'.  s.,  p.  328 


474  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

ported  by  a  large  fleet  on  the  Eiixine,  marched  along  the  north 
coast  into  Hithynia.  To  meet  these  vast  forces  L.  Lucullus  had 
only  one  fresh  and  four  veteran  legions,  two  of  which  were  com- 
posed of  Fimbria's  disorderly  troops.  Many  of  the  Greek  cities, 
weary  of  Roman  exactions,  massacred  their  oppressors  once  again, 
and  hailed  Mithradates  as  a  deliverer.  The  wilder  tribes,  the 
Pisidians,  Isaurians,  and  Cilicians,  joined  his  standard.  Had  not 
Deiotarus,  a  Galatian  tetrarch,  made  a  gallant  stand  against  the 
Pontic  generals,  the  whole  province  might  have  been  lost.  Nor 
was  this  widespread  revolt  the  only  danger  which  menaced 
Lucullus.  His  colleague,  M.  Cotta,  shut  up  in  Chalcedon  by  the 
main  Pontic  army,  risked  a  naval  battle  in  which  he  lost  his  whole 
fleet,  and  forced  Lucullus,  who  was  in  Galatia,  to  hasten  back  to 
his  rescue  (74  B.C.). 

Mithradates  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  shut  up  in  the  penin- 
sula of  Chalcedon.  Put,  with  short-sighted  strategy,  he  neglected 
the  enemy  in  the  field,  and  after  securing  Lampsacus,  sat  down  to 
reduce  the  island  town  of  Cyzicus.  He  succeeded  in  seizing  the 
bridge  that  joined  it  to  the  mainland,  and  even  in  establishing 
himself  on  the  heights  close  to  the  town.  But  the  citizens  de- 
fended their  walls  stoutly,  while  Lucullus  occupied  a  strong  position 
in  rear  of  the  Pontic  host  and  cut  off  its  communications.  Mithra- 
dates, shut  in  between  an  impregnable  city  and  an  immovable 
army,  was  dependent  for  supplies  on  his  fleet.  Famine  and  pesti- 
lence decimated  the  helpless  and  demoralised  soldiery  ;  storms 
destroyed  the  siege-works.  When  spring  began  even  the  self- 
willed  sultan  was  convinced  of  the  hopelessness  of  prolonging  the 


GOLU   STATEK    UF    MITHRADATES   VI. 


siege.  He  sought  safety  on  board  his  fleet,  and  sailing  to  Lamp- 
sacus, picked  up  there  such  remnants  of  his  great  army  of  in- 
vasion as   escaped   from   the   swords   of  the   pursuing    Romans. 


LUCULLUS  475 

Liicullus  now,  leaving  his  lieutenant  to  complete  the  conquest  of 
Iiithynia,  took  the  command  of  a  hastily  collected  fleet,  and  de- 
stroyed the  Pontic  squadron  which  had  \entured  into  the  /Egcan. 
At  length,  uniting  all  his  forces  for  a  combined  attack  on  Nicomedia, 
he  drove  the  king  before  him  in  solitary  flight  to  Sinope. 

Invasion  of  Pontus. — In  the  autumn  Lucullus  invaded  Pontus, 
and  pursued  the  retreating  enemy  far  over  the  old  Hmit  of  tlie 
Halys.  Compelled  by  the  return  of  winter  to  stay  his  advance, 
he  still  blockaded  the  principal  towns,  Amisus  and  Themiscyra. 
Next  spring  the  weary  and  discontented  legions  were  urged  forward 
once  more  to  meet  the  fresh  levies  of  the  irrepressible  Mithradates. 
Near  Cabira  the  long  struggle  was  at  last  decided.  The  three 
legions  of  Lucullus  were  compelled  by  the  strong  Pontic  cavalry  to 
keep  their  station  on  the  hills,  but  the  flower  of  the  king's  army 
was  cut  to  pieces  in  an  attempt  to  seize  the  Roman  convoy  on 
its  wa\-  from  Cappadocia.  The  king's  preparations  for  further 
retreat  spread  a  panic  in  his  army,  which  was  butchered  almost 
without  resistance  as  it  turned  to  flee.  Mithradates  sought  refuge 
in  the  dominions  of  Tigranes,  who,  after  refusing  the  alliance  of 
the  king  of  Pontus,  now  provoked  victorious  Rome  by  granting 
protection  to  the  homeless  exile. 

Lucullus  spent  two  years  in  reducing  the  Greek  towns  on  the 
coast,  which  were  heroically  defended  by  their  citizens  with  the 
aid  of  the  pirates.  Sinope,  Heraclea,  and  Amisus  had  nothing  to 
fear  from  a  blockade  while  the  sea  was  open,  and  their  scientific 
fortifications  rendered  an  assault  difficult.  They  surrendered  only 
when  all  hope  of  the  restoration  of  Mithradates  seemed  at  an  end. 
A  more  serious  task  for  Lucullus  was  the  reorganisation  of  his 
province,  which  had  been  desolated  no  less  by  the  tax-gatherers 
of  Rome  than  by  the  armies  of  the  enemy.  With  imprudent  firm- 
ness, Lucullus  limited  the  exactions  of  the  creditors  to  12  per  cent. 
a  year,  without  compound  interest,  and  thus  mortally  offended  the 
powerful  financiers  of  the  capital  and  earned  the  useless  grati- 
tude of  the  oppressed  provincials. 

War  with  Tigranes. — Heedless  of  the  murmurs  of  the  Roman 
capitalists,  and  of  the  weak  desire  of  the  government  to  avoid 
further  intervention  in  the  East,  Lucullus  pressed  forward  to  the 
completion  of  his  great  work,  the  deliverance  of  the  Greeks  from 
Oriental  dominion.  This  was  still  unfinished  while  Tigranes  ruled 
in  Syria  and  claimed  sovereignty  over  the  whole  East.  But  the 
commission  given  to  Lucullus  was  limited  to  the  war  against 
Mithradates,  so  the  proconsul  sought  and  found  formal  justifica- 


476  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tion  for  his  wider  schemes  by  sending,'  Appius  Claudius  to  the 
Armenian  king  to  demand  the  surrender  of  Mithradatcs  under 
pain  of  war.  Tigrancs  at  once  accepted  war,  and  ordered  a 
general  levy  of  his  troops.  On  his  side,  Lucullus,  after  providing 
for  the  occupation  of  Pontus,  had  only  two  legions  left  for  the 
invasion  of  Armenia.  Further,  these  were  composed  of  Fimbria's 
veterans,  who  hated  the  aristocratic  pride  and  stern  discipline  of 
their  general,  from  whom  they  not  unreasonably  demanded  their 
discharge  earned  by  thirteen  campaigns  and  numerous  victories. 

Victory  of  Tigranocerta.  —  In  spite  of  these  difficulties,  Lucullus, 
in  the  following  spring,  marched  straight  on  Tigranocerta,  the  new 
capital  of  the  Armenian  Empire.  By  negotiations  with  the  princes 
of  Cappadocia  and  Sophene,  he  secured  a  safe  passage  over  the 
Euphrates.  His  vanguard  dispersed  the  regulars  and  Bedouins 
A\ho  tried  to  bar  his  path,  and  advanced  swiftly  into  the  heart  of 
the  country.  Before  the  grand  army  of  the  king  of  kings  could 
be  gathered  from  the  distant  provinces  of  his  empire,  Lucullus 
had  laid  I'egular  siege  to  Tigranocerta.  Refusing  to  raise  the 
blockade  on  the  approach  of  the  relieving  army,  he  advanced  to 
meet  it  with  only  10,000  men.  Tigranes  was  amazed  at  the  little 
band  of  Romans,  who  seemed  to  him  too  many  for  an  embassy 
and  too  few  for  an  army.  Scorning  the  advice  of  Mithradates  to 
starve  out  the  enemy,  he  attempted  to  crush  them  beneath  swarms 
of  mail-clad  lancers.  But  Lucullus  seized  a  height  which  com- 
manded the  position  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  by  a  sudden 
charge  threw  them  back  in  confusion  on  their  infantry,  and  thus 
rolled  up  the  Armenian  line  of  battle  at  a  blow.  We  need  not 
believe  that  but  five  Romans  fell  in  slaughtering  a  hundred  thou- 
sand of  the  enemy,  but,  beyond  all  question,  the  battle  cost 
Tigranes  his  newly  won  dominions.  The  princes  of  Syria  accepted 
the  suzerainty  of  Rome  ;  the  very  capital,  Tigranocerta,  was  be- 
trayed by  Greek  settlers  to  the  conquerors. 

Failure  of  Lucullus  owing^  to  Mutiny. — Tigranes  passed  from 
overweening  confidence  to  the  depths  of  despair,  till  his  fainting 
courage  was  revived  by  Mithradates.  The  old  monarch  felt  that 
his  only  hope  lay  in  resistance,  and  made  a  last  effort  to  unite  the 
nations  of  the  East  against  Rome.  But  Phraates  of  Parthia  pre- 
ferred to  secure  the  recovery  of  his  lost  provinces  on  the  Euphrates 
by  negotiations  with  Rome  rather  than  risk  further  losses  in  a 
war.  The  wild  border  tribes  proved  more  willing,  and  from  their 
levies  Mithradates  formed  a  picked  body  of  infantry,  drilled  by 
Pontic  officers.      The   plan   of  campaign  adopted  was  to  avoid 


I.UCrT.I.US  477 

pitched  battles  and  draw  the  Roman  army  farther  and  farther  into 
the  mountains  of  Armenia,  while  the  king's  strong  force  of  cavahy 
cut  off  their  supphes.  Luculkis  resolved  to  force  a  battle  by  an 
attack  on  the  ancient  Armenian  capital,  Artaxata.  In  the  summer 
of  68  B.C.  he  made  his  way  on  to  the  high  plateau  of  Armenia, 
but  his  march  had  been  delayed  by  continual  skirmishes,  and  was 
interrupted  by  the  snowstorms  of  a  northern  winter.  The  Roman 
legions  refused  to  advance  farther  into  the  realms  of  snow  and 
ice,  and  compelled  their  general  to  lead  them  back  to  the  plains. 
Lucullus  turned  the  enforced  retreat  to  good  account  by  storming 
Nisibis,  where  he  wintered.  But  in  his  absence  the  weak  detach- 
ments left  to  hold  his  conquests  were  defeated  by  the  two  kings. 
Tigranes  kept  L.  Fannius  shut  up  in  a  fort  near  Tigranocerta  ; 
Mithridates  defeated  the  Roman  troops  in  Pontus,  and  wintered 
at  Comana. 

Defeat  at  Ziela :  Retreat  of  Lucullus.  —  In  the  ensuing  spring-, 
Lucullus  was  forced  by  the  entreaties  of  his  hard-pressed  lieutenants 
and  the  discontent  of  his  troops  at  Nisibis  to  turn  his  march  west- 
ward. He  came  in  time  to  relieve  his  Armenian  garrison,  but 
found  Pontus  all  but  lost.  His  legate,  Triarius,  had  been  forced 
to  give  battle  at  Ziela  by  the  clamour  of  his  soldiers,  and  had 
lost  the  pick  of  his  troops  in  a  defeat  which  led  to  the  capture 
of  the  Roman  camp.  The  pusillanimous  refusal  of  Q.  Marcius  to 
send  help  from  Cilicia,  and  of  the  consul  M'.  Acilius  Glabrio  to 
assume  the  command  to  which  he  had  been  appointed  in  68  B.C., 
forced  Lucullus  to  confront  the  enemy  at  the  head  of  a  mutinous 
soldiery.  Instead  of  marching  to  meet  the  Armenians,  the  troops 
retreated  into  the  province  of  Asia,  and  left  Mithradates  in  undis- 
turbed possession  of  Pontus.  Thus  the  fruit  of  the  many  victories 
of  Lucullus  was  wasted  by  the  insubordination  of  his  soldiers  ;  all 
that  his  masterly  generalship  could  secure  was  a  safe  retreat, 
glorious  to  the  leader  alone.  Rome  had  undertaken  to  curb  the 
license  of  the  pirates  and  to  humble  the  pride  of  the  monarchs  of 
the  East,  and  in  both  instances  had  courted  disaster  by  the  inade- 
quacy of  her  preparations,  and  had  met  with  defeats  ignominious 
for  a  great  nation. 

The  Gabinian  Law. — The  hour  of  his  country's  necessity  was 
Pompey's  opportunity.  For  two  years  he  had  lived  in  retirement, 
waiting  for  a  summons  from  the  people  to  take  up  the  work  to  which 
the  senatorial  government  had  proved  itself  unequal.  And  now 
(67  B.C.)  the  tribune  Aulus  Cabinius  proposed  the  appointment  of  a 
new  high  admiral  to  clear  the  sea  of  pirates.     Rut  the  wide  powers 


478  H/STORY  OF  ROME 

and  unparalleled  character  of  the  proposed  office  stamped  the 
measure  as  revolutionary.  A  private  individual  was  to  be  given 
supreme  command  for  three  years  over  the  whole  Mediterranean, 
and  co-ordinately  with  the  provincial  governors  over  the  coasts 
for  fifty  miles  inland.  He  was  authorised  to  levy  a  fleet  of  200 
sail  and  an  army  of  120,000  men,  and  for  this  purpose  to  dispose 
of  the  state  treasure  as  he  pleased.  He  was  allowed  to  nominate 
twenty-five  lieutenants,  whom  the  law  invested  with  pnetorian 
powers.  In  fine,  magistrates,  Senate,  and  people  were  all  to 
divest  themselves  of  their  old  prerogatives  and  bow  down  before  a 
new  military  authority,  the  germ  of  imperial  monarchy.  Though 
the  Senate  had  been  granted  the  right  to  choose  the  general 
from  the  whole  body  of  consulars,  only  one  choice  was  possible— 
Pompey.  The  democrats  might  secret!)'  fear  him  ;  honest  aristo- 
crats, like  old  Q.  Catulus,  might  openly  oppose  him  ;  but  the 
voice  of  the  people  was  decisive  in  his  favour.  In  vain  did  one 
tribune,  bolder  than  the  rest,  L.  Trebellius,  interpose  his  veto  ; 
Gabinius  instantly  took  a  vote  of  the  people  on  a  motion  to  dis- 
miss him  from  office,  and  so  compelled  him  to  give  way,  when 
seventeen  tribes  out  of  the  thirty-five  had  declared  against  him. 
The  people  with  one  voice  demanded  the  appointment  of  their 
only  general. 

Success,  of  Pompey. — And  the  general  justified  their  choice. 
In  forty  days,  while  his  lieutenants,  each  in  his  appoint^!  district, 
were  chasing  the  pirates  from  the  coasts  of  Spain  and  C.aul, 
Pompey  himself  swept  clean  the  Sicilian,  African,  and  Sardinian 
waters,  and  reopened  the  main  routes  of  the  corn  trade..  Then 
he  sailed  eastward  with  sixty  of  his  best  ships.  Ofi"  Coracesium 
the  bold  Cilician  sea-kings  met  with  a  decisive  defeat  in  the 
one  great  battle  of  the  war.  With  wise  clemency,  Pompey  granted 
life  and  liberty  to  all  who  would  submit.  The  great  majority 
of  the  corsairs  gladly  consented  to  yield  their  fastnesses  in  Lycia 
and  Cilicia,  and  were  permitted  to  settle  in  the  deserted  towns 
which  the  victorious  general  refounded.  In  ninety  days  Pompey 
had  crushed  the  pirates,  and  had  restored  commerce  to  the  seas 
and  abundance  to  the  capital.  The  only  dissentient  voice  amidst 
the  triumphant  applause  which  hailed  the  conqueror  came  from 
Crete.  There  the  optimate  governor,  Metellus,  refused  to  recognise 
the  right  of  Pompey's  lieutenants  to  accept  the  submission  of  the 
Cretan  cities  (though  Crete  was  undoubtedly  within  the  province 
assigned  to  Pompey  by  the  Gabinian  Law),  and  actually  fought 
against  the  troops  sent  by  Pompey  to  the  island.      But  this  colli- 


GAPIXIAN'  AND   MAMLTAX  LAWS  479 

sion  with  an  ill-tempered  aristocrat  in  no  way  sullied  tlie  fame  of 
Pompeys  achievements. 

Manilian  Law. — Greater  triumphs  awaited  the  conqueror  of 
the  pirates.  'l"o  undertake  the  war  with  Mithradates  and  the 
settlement  of  the  East  had  long  been  his  cherished  ambition.  And 
now  he  was  on  the  coasts  of  Asia  with  an  army,  just  when  Lucullus' 
retreat  had  thrown  all  into  confusion  and  dismay.  A  complaisant 
tribune,  C.  Manilius,  proposed  to  recall  AciliusGlabrio  from  Bithynia, 
and  Marcius  Rex  from  Cilicia,  and  entrust  these  provinces,  together 
with  the  whole  care  of  the  Pontic-Armenian  war,  to  Pompey.  The 
financiers  were  led  by  their  interest  in  the  taxes  of  Asia,  and  the 
moderates  by  the  necessity  for  ending  the  war,  to  support  this 
extraordinary  Bill.  The  democrats  dare  not  break  with  Pompey  ; 
only  Catulus  and  Hortensius  protested  against  handing  over  to 
an  individual  the  empire  of  Asia.  Pompey  at  once  assumed  the 
functions  of  captain-general  in  the  East.  He  made  alliance  with 
Phraates,  who  was  induced  to  support  a  son  and  namesake  of 
Tigranes  in  his  intrigues  against  his  father.  He  prepared  a  force 
of  50,000  men  for  active  service  in  the  ensuing  spring-,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  Danala,  in  Galatia,  to  take  over  the  command  from 
Lucullus.  A  bitter  quarrel  took  place  between  the  mortified  aristo- 
crat and  the  egotistic  hero,  destined,  as  usual,  to  wear  the  laurels 
won  by  the  victories  of  others.  Pompey's  unworthy  jealousy 
annulled  the  acts  of  his  predecessor  subsequent  to  his  own  arrival 
and  threw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  his  well-earned  triumph. 

Final  Defeat  of  Mithradates  at  Nicopolis. — In  the  spring  of 
66  ac.  Pompey  invaded  Pontus.  A  futile  demand  for  the  uncon- 
ditional submission  of  the  king  led  to  a  desultory  campaign,  At 
length,  on  the  arrival  of  his  Cilician  legions,  Pompey  contrived  to 
blockade  Mithradates  in  his  camp  near  the  Upper  Euphrates. 
Flight  to  the  unknown  wilds  of  the  east  was  the  king's  only 
resource.  But  Pompey  forestalled  the  manoeuvre  by  secretly 
occupying  a  defile  on  the  line  of  retreat.  The  unsuspecting 
Asiatics  encamped  under  the  heights  held  by  the  legions.  A 
surprise  by  night  threw  them  into  hopeless  confusion  ;  trodden 
down  by  their  friends  or  put  to  the  sword  by  the  enemy,  the  last 
levies  which  Mithradates  led  against  Rome  melted  away. 

Submission  of  Tigranes. — The  king  himself  fled,  with  a  few 
faithful  followers,  to  Armenia.  But  Tigranes,  who  had  with  difli- 
culty  repelled  the  assaults  of  the  Parthian  army  headed  by  his 
rebellious  son,  was  in  no  mood  to  imperil  his  negotiations  with 
Rome  for  the  sake  of  Mithradates.     The  exiled  king,  finding  that 


4So  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

.1  price  had  been  set  on  his  head  in  Armenia,  fled  nortlnvard  to 
his  principality  on  the  Cimmerian  Bosphorus.  I'ompey  turned 
aside  from  the  pursuit  to  dictate  peace  with  Armenia.  As  he  lay 
encamped  near  Artaxata,  the  king-  of  kings  rode  up  and  begged 
for  admission  into  his  presence.  In  token  of  submission,  he  threw 
himself  dow  n  at  the  feet  of  the  victor,  and  placed  his  diadem  in 
Pompey's  hands.  He  was  graciously  reinstated  on  the  throne  of 
Armenia,  at  the  price  of  a  war  indemnity  and  the  surrender  of 
all  his  conquests.  The  great  king  was  reduced  to  a  serviceable 
Roman  vassal. 

Conquest  of  the  Caucasus  :  Death  of  Mithradates. — The  brave 
nations  of  the  Caucasus,  the  Iberians  and  Albanians,  were  not 
disposed  to  bow  down  before  the  new  lords  of  the  East.  But  two 
decisive  defeats  compelled  them  to  submit  to  the  will  of  the  con- 
c[uering  general.  Pompey  passed  on  in  pursuit  of  Mithradates, 
but  when  he  had  reached  the  mouth  of  the  Phasis  he  shrank  from 
this  difficult  and  dangerous  expedition,  and  after  a  fresh  victory 
over  the  Albanians  returned  to  Pontus.  In  truth,  further  pursuit 
of  the  vanquished  sultan  was  needless.  Mithradates  did  indeed 
reach  Panticapa^um  and  deprive  his  renegade  son  Machares,  who 
had  submitted  to  Rome,  of  his  kingdom  and  his  life  ;  but  his  larger 
schemes  miscarried.  His  plan  for  in\ading  Italy  by  way  of  Paiv 
nonia,  at  the  head  of  wild  tribes  of  Scythians  and  Gauls,  alienated 
the  affections  of  the  army  which  he  had  raised.  The  suspicions 
and  cruelties  of  the  old  king  led  to  desertion  and  insurrection. 
His  favourite  son  Pharnaces  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  in- 
surgents, and  was  joined  by  the  army.  Shut  up  in  his  palace, 
Mithradates  in  vain  begged  for  the  mercy  he  had  never  himself 
shown.  At  last,  in  the  true  spirit  of  Eastern  despotism,  he  resolved 
to  perish  with  all  his  house.  His  wives  and  daughters  died  of 
the  poisoned  cup,  but  the  king  himself  found  poison  unavailing, 
and  owed  his  death  to  the  sword  of  a  Gallic  attendant  (63  B.C.).  His 
body  was  sent  by  Pharnaces  to  Pompey  in  Palestine,  and  was 
by  his  orders  laid  in  the  tombs  of  the  kings  at  Sinope.  The  great 
leader  of  the  East  against  the  West,  the  man  who  had  proved  no 
unworthy  opponent  of  Sulla,  of  Lucullus,  and  of  Pompey,  was  dead, 
and  his  death  was  a  greater  gain  to  Rome  than  many  A'ictories. 

Syria  and  Judaea. — Pompey  had  still  to  establish  order  in  the 
East.  In  Syria,  Arab  emirs  at  the  head  of  Bedouin  tribes,  robber 
chiefs  in  Mount  Lebanon,  like  the  modern  Druses,  and  the  Naba- 
t^ans  from  the  desert  round  Petra  were  tearing  to  fragments  the 
kingdom  of  the  Seleucids.    One  stable  power,  the  Jewish  monarchy, 


POMPEY  IN  THE  EAST 


481 


2  H 


482  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

founded  l)y  the  Maccabees,  had  for  a  time  promised  to  restore  order 
in  the  south.  But  after  the  death  of  the  able  Alexander  Jannaeus 
the  Jewish  nation  was  split  into  contending  factions.  The  Saddu- 
cees,  headed  by  Aristobulus,  a  son  of  Jannaeus,  made  the  temporal 
power  their  object,  and  hoped  to  re-establish  the  kingdom  of 
David ;  the  Pharisees,  whose  nominal  leader  was  Hyrcanus,  another 
son  of  Jannaeus,  regarded  Judaism  as  a  spiritual  force,  and  aimed 
at  the  religious  reunion  of  Jews  throughout  the  world.  Worsted  by 
their  enemies  in  civil  war,  the  latter  called  in  the  aid  of  Aretas,  the 
Nabatican  chieftain,  who  kept  Aristobulus  and  his  Sadducee  parti- 
sans shut  up  in  Jerusalem.  Pompey,  who  had  sent  forward  various 
lieutenants  to  reconcile,  if  possible,  all  these  jarring  elements,  reached 
Syria  himself  in  the  winter  of  64  B.C.  The  all-powerful  master 
of  the  legions  chastised  the  robber  chieftains  and  drove  back  the 
Arab  sheiks  into  their  native  deserts.  But  the  stubborn  fanaticism 
of  the  Jews  could  not  brook  the  command  to  renounce  the  mon- 
archy and  conquests  won  by  the  Hasmonean  princes.  Aristobulus 
himself  was  undecided  whether  to  submit  or  fight,  but  his  adherents 
defended  the  Temple  for  three  months  against  the  Romans.  When 
at  last  the  legions  effected  an  entrance  while  the  besieged  were 
resting  on  the  Sabbath,  Pompey  insisted  on  entering  the  Holy  of 
Holies,  but  otherwise  treated  the  Temple  and  religion  of  the  Jews 
with  respect  ;  politically  he  carried  out  the  ideas  of  the  Pharisees, 
making  Judtea  a  Roman  dependency  under  the  rule  of  its  high 
priests  (63  B.C.). 

Reorganisation  of  the  East.  -The  organisation  of  the  new 
territories  was  the  last  and  greatest  of  the  tasks  imposed  on  Pompey. 
New  provinces  were  formed  (1)  from  Bithynia  together  with  a 
part  of  Pontus,  (2)  from  Syria,  and  (3)  from  the  island  of  Crete. 
Cilicia  was  enlarged  by  the  addition  of  Pamphylia  and  Isauria,  so 
that  the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor  were  now  directly  governed  by  the 
Romans.  The  interior  was  still  left  in  the  hands  of  dependent 
princes.  Foremost  among  them  were  the  king  of  Cappadocia,  to 
whom  was  entrusted  the  district  of  Sophene  and  the  guardianship 
of  the  passages  of  the  Euphrates,  and  Deiotarus  of  Galatia,  whose 
fidelity  was  rewarded  by  the  grant  of  the  Eastern  Pontus,  or  Lesser 
Armenia.  But  the  great  and  distinguishing  merit  of  the  Roman 
reorganisation  of  the  East  w-as  the  encouragement  of  city  com- 
munities. As  the  champion  of  Western  ideas  in  opposition  to  the 
feudal  despots  of  the  East,  Rome  everywhere  in  Asia  promoted 
urban  civilisation  and  commerce.  Already  Lucullus  had  rewarded 
Cyzicus,  and  repeopled  Sinope  and  Amisus.     Pompey  now  under- 


POMPEY  IN  THE  EAST 


483 


took  the  work  of  colonisation  on  a  large  and  generous  scale.  The 
subjugated  pirates  were  allowed  to  settle  in  many  places  in  Cilicia, 
and  in  particular  at  Soli,  now  named,  after  its  second  founder, 
Pompeiopolis.  Including  these  settlements,  Pompey  founded  no 
less  than  thirty-nine  towns,  the  most  noted  of  which  were  on  the 


GOLDEN  GATE  OF  TEMPLE  AT  JERUSALEM. 


battlefields  of  the  late  war,  at  Ziela,  at  Cabira  (Diospolis),  and 
at  Nicopolis,  where  his  invalided  veterans  formed  a  settlement 
to  commemorate  the  last  and  crowning  victory  over  Mithradates. 
Nor  were  the  claims  of  existing  Greek  cities  forgotten.  Autonomy 
was  granted  to  Antioch  and  Seleucia  in  Syria,  and  to  Mitylene 
in  Asia   Minor.     There  was  nothing  original  or  striking   in  the 


484  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

reorganisation  of  the  ]\nman  rule  which  made  Pompey's  a  name 
to  conjure  with  throughout  the  East.  Just  as  his  victories  were 
won  by  careful  attention  to  the  plain  maxims  of  the  military  art, 
so  in  his  administrative  achievements  honesty  of  purpose  and  con- 
scientious study  of  details  are  his  principal  merits.  The  greatest 
problem  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the  day,  the  relation  of  Rome  to 
Parthia,  he  did  not  attempt  to  solve.  He  had  not  the  courage 
to  go  to  war,  nor  the  wisdom  to  establish  peace  on  firm  foundations. 
He  wounded  the  vanity  of  Phraates  by  refusing  him  the  empty  title 
of  king  of  kings,  and  aroused  his  suspicions  by  refusing  to  respect 
the  boundary  of  the  Euphrates.  For  the  moment  the  Parthian 
king  submitted  to  the  loss  of  Northern  Mesopotamia,  but  he  was 
simply  waiting  for  an  opportunity  for  revenge,  rl^he  half-hearted 
policy  of  Pompey  was  to  bear  bitter  fruit  for  I<o?ne  on  the  field 
of  Carrhi^.  But  when  all  deductions  have  been  made,  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  conqueror  of  the  pirates  and  of  Mithradates  were 
considerable.  He  had  restored  peace  to  the  MediteiTanean  and  in 
the  East ;  and  peace  was  a  priceless  blessiiig,  alike  to  the  Roman 
merchant  and  the  sorely  distracted  provinces. 


CHAPTER  XLVII 

CICERO    AND    CATILINE 

15. C.      A.U.C. 

First  Conspiracy  of  Catiline  (?) 66        688 

Crassus  (Censor)  proposes  Enfranchisement  of  Transpadanes 

and  Annexation  of  Egypt 65        689 

Election  of  Cicero — Conspiracy  of  Catiline  begins  .        ,  64       690 

Renewed  Intrigues  of  Populares  —  Cicero  defeats  Rullus' 
Agrarian  Law — Trial  of  Rabirius — Popular  Election  to 
the  Priesthood— Caesar  Pontifex  Maximus — Second  De- 
feat of  Catiline  for  Consulship — Outbreak  in  Etruria  — 
Arrest    and    Execution    of    Conspirators    at     Rome     by 

Cicero 63       691 

Defeat  and  Death  of  Catiline 62        692 

It  is  a  hopeless  task  to  unravel  the  complicated  tissue  of  intrigues 
which  goes  by  the  name  of  the  Catilinarian  conspiracy.  It  is 
easier  to  accept  an  ex  parte  statement  and  dismiss  the  affair  with 
a  conventional  account.  The  evidence  is  tainted  throughout  by 
political  purpose  and  party  prejudice,  by  rhetorical  exaggeration,  and 
by  literary  adjustment.     Apart  from  the  light  thrown  on  the  state 


PARTY  STRUGGLES  485 

of  society  and  politics  at  Rome,  the  sole  points  of  historical  interest 
lie  in  the  relation  of  the  plot  to  the  undoubted  manoeuvres  of  Caesar 
and  Crassus  for  power,  and  the  opportunity  it  afforded  to  the  great 
parvenu,  M.  Cicero. 

Party  Struggles. — The  absence  of  Pompeius  in  the  far  East 
seemed  for  the  moment  to  leave  the  field  clear  for  statesmen  at 
Rome  to  bustle  in.  At  once  the  old  party  names  and  divisions, 
the  old  contests  in  the  Forum  and  in  the  law  courts,  revive.  But 
there  is  no  life  and  reality  in  the  traditional  opposition  of  the 
democrats  to  the  senatorial  oligarchy.  Besides  the  essential  hollow- 
ness  of  the  Roman  party  system,  the  fate  of  Rome,  as  all  men  felt, 
lay  in  the  hands  of  the  a.bsent  soldier.  Neither  Cresar  nor  Cicero, 
but  Pompey,  is  the  man  of  the  hour,  the  centre  of  the  political 
situation.  If  Pompey  should  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  his  master, 
Sulla— as  he  threatened  to  do  at  a  later  day — there  was  no  party  and 
no  leader  at  this  time  who  could  stand  for  a  moment  against  him. 
Accordingly,  beneath  the  open  warfare  of  the  parties  there  runs 
a  dark  undercurrent  of  plot  and  counterplot,  parliamentary  and 
other,  dimly  discernible  after  the  lapse  of  years.  The  leaders  of 
both  parties  are  awaiting  the  return  of  the  great  captain  with 
mingled  fear  and  hope — fear  that  his  reorganisation  of  the  East 
may  be  the  prelude  of  a  reconstruction  of  the  central  government, 
and  hope  that  they  may  be  able  to  turn  his  notorious  irresolution  to 
their  own  purposes  and  use  his  prestige  in  the  interest  of  a  faction. 
Both  sides  were  casting  about  for  means  to  strengthen  their  posi- 
tion. The  populares  in  particular  were  acutely  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  the  Assembly  could  not  now  overthrow  the  military  dictator- 
ship whose  aid  it  had  invoked.  The  democracy,  like  Frankenstein, 
had  made  a  monster  whose  giant  strength  was  utterly  beyond 
its  control.  Hence  throughout  these  years  (66-63  B.C.)  Ccesar  and 
Crassus  are  engaged  in  fruitless  efforts  to  win  for  themselves  a 
power  and  position  which  would  enable  them  to  meet  Pompey  on 
equal  terms.  This  purpose,  veiled  under  the  cloak  of  an  attack  on 
the  oligarchy,  may  be  detected  both  in  the  measures  they  openly 
advocated  and  the  secret  encouragement  given  to  the  designs  of 
extreme  politicians.  For  in  truth  the  populares,  as  ever,  are  leaders 
without  a  party,  and  the  so-called  parties  are  groups  and  factions 
connected  with  individuals  rather  than  definite  organisations  with 
a  definite  programme.  The  Senate  alone  represents  a  clear  pur- 
pose— the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  In  the  coming  conflict 
its  object  is  threefold — to  discredit  the  populares,  to  acquire  a 
commanding  position,  and  to  give  Pompeius  no  reason  for  armed 


486  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

interference.  Even  within  the  Senate  we  must  distinguish  the 
extreme  conservatives,  led  by  Catulus  and  Metellus,  the  personal 
enemies  of  Pompey,  and  by  the  independent  and  impracticable 
Cato,  from  the  moderate  constitutionalists,  directed,  half  against 
their  will,  by  Cicero,  to  -whose  skilful  tactics  the  Senate  owed  its 
temporary  triumph.  Under  the  rough  heading  of  populares— a 
union  of  malcontents — are  lumped  the  anarchists,  the  few  remain- 
ing democratic  idealists,  and  individual  statesmen  like  Gaius  Cassar, 
pushing  their  own  interests  and  policies,  and  followed  by  the  more 
restless  members  of  the  young  nobility.  Pompeius  meanwhile,  the 
conscious  or  unconscious  object  of  so  many  schemes,  pursued  his 
path  of  conquest  in  apparent  or  real  indifference. 

Catiline. — At  the  head  of  the  anarchists  stood  a  ruined  and  dis- 
solute patrician,  L.  Sergius  Catilina,  whose  character,  superfluously 
blackened  by  all  parties,  it  is  equally  superfluous  to  whitewash.     A 
partisan  of  Sulla  who  had  shared  in  Sulla's  atrocities,  he  had  passed 
through  the  ordinary  career  of  office,  as  quEestor,  praetor,  and  pro- 
prietor (of  Africa).    Accused,  in  ordinary  course,  of  extortion,  he  ex- 
hausted his  plunder  in  procuring  the  ordinary  acquittal  in  a  trial  at 
which  Cicero  certainly  thought  of  acting  as  his  counsel.      He  had 
managed  to  retain  his  place  in  the  Senate  in  spite  of  the  censors,  but 
had  been  considered  sufficiently  dangerous  to  ensure  a  steady  resist- 
ance, under  various  pretexts,  to  every  candidature  for  the  consulship 
from  66  B.C.  downwards.    Though  the  fouler  charges  levelled  against 
him  may  be  dismissed  as  calumnies  of  the  regular  electioneering 
and  partisan  description,  it  remains  clear  that  he  was  a  bad  speci- 
men of  a  bad  type  ;  a  man,  it  is  true,  of  no  ordinary  talent  and 
qualities,  personally  brave,  physically  powerful,  socially  attractive, 
but  at  the  same  time  an  unscrupulous,  needy,  and  daring  adven- 
turer, who  lacked  only  patience  and  political  gifts  to  be  dangerous. 
His  restless  energy  and  desperate  courage  qualified  him  to  lead 
the  extreme  section.     Bankrupt  debauchees  of  rank,  attracted  by 
his  evil  fascination,  gathered  round  the  passed-master  of  social  vice. 
Ruined   gamblers,  forfeited   senators,  and  discredited  statesmen 
sighed  for  the  stirring  times  of  Cinna  and  Sulla.     In  the  background 
lay  a  wealth  of  revolutionary  matter  ready  to  the  hand  :  the  idle 
proletariate,  gaping  for  change  ;  the  veterans  of  Sulla,  sick  of  labour ; 
the  Italian  yeomen  whom  those  veterans  had  dispossessed  ;  the 
children  of  the  outlawed  Marians.     Still  farther  in  the  background 
lay  the  agricultural  slaves  and  the  herdsmen  of  South  Italy.     The 
centre  of  discontent  was  already  perhaps  to  be  found  in  Etruria. 
Later  on  it  was  hoped  that  the  excited  Transpadanes  and  distressed 


CA  TILINE  487 

provincials  might  rally  round  the  standard  of  revolt.  For  finance 
they  might  rely  on  the  secret  contributions  of  silent  partners  in 
high  quarters  and  the  subsidies  of  intriguing  and  abandoned 
women.  The  material  was  plentiful,  but  Catiline  lacked  the  power 
to  organise  it. 

The  First  Conspiracy. — An  obscure  affair  is  related  in  66  B.C. 
The  two  consuls-designate,  P.  Cornelius  Sulla  and  P.  Autronius 
Pietus,  had  been  unseated  for  bribery,  while  Cotta  and  Torquatus 
were  declared  duly  elected  in  their  place.  The  disappointed  and 
degraded  candidates,  with  the  assistance  of  Catiline,  whose  name 
the  presiding  officer  had  refused  to  receive,  apparently  conspired 
to  murder  their  triumphant  competitors,  and  possibly  to  massacre 
the  oligarchs  who  had  quashed  their  election.  In  this  rather 
dubious  plot  a  later  version  implicated  Ceesar  and  Crassus,  who 
had  probably  supported  Sulla  and  Ptetus  as  democratic  repre- 
sentatives, while  another  story  emphasises  the  activity  of  Catiline. 
This  last  account  is  a  part  of  a  systematic  exaggeration  caused 
on  the  one  hand  by  a  desire  to  throw  the  intrigues  of  Ctesar  into 
the  shade,  on  the  other  by  the  exigencies  of  the  Ciceronian  party, 
who  sheltered  themsehes  by  blackening  the  character  of  their 
adversary.  The  version  implicating  Caesar  and  Crassus  main- 
tained that  Crassus  was  to  be  dictator,  and  Cassar  his  Master  of 
the  Horse,  with  power  to  levy  an  army  ;  that  young  Cn.  Piso  was 
to  secure  Spain  ;  and  that  the  coup  iVetat  was  only  frustrated  once 
by  the  hesitation  of  Crassus,  and  again  by  the  precipitancy  of  his 
bandmaster  Catiline.  It  derives  credence  only  from  the  acknow- 
ledged and  open  intrigues  of  the  populares  ;  it  rests  on  the  mere 
assertion  of  aristocratic  pamphleteers,  and  is  discredited  by  analysis 
of  the  evidence. 

Censorship  of  Crassus.  —  In  65  B.C.  M.  Crassus  was  censor,  and 
used  his  position  to  forward  two  daring  schemes  in  the  interests 
of  the  populares.  Egypt  had  long  been  a  Roman  dependency, 
which  the  corrupt  and  suspicious  policy  of  the  Senate  had  allowed 
to  remain  in  the  weak  hands  of  its  actual  rulers.  Crassus  pro- 
posed to  take  the  opportunity  of  a  rebellion,  in  which  King  Ptolemy 
Auletes  had  been  driven  from  his  capital,  to  convert  the  valley  of 
the  Nile  into  a  Roman  province.  The  tribunes  proposed  to  send 
Ctesar  to  govern  the  only  country  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
as  yet  unoccupied  by  Pompey's  armies.  The  democratic  leader, 
once  established  on  Pompey's  flank,  intervening  between  him  and 
Italy,  and  able  to  thrust  a  fleet  across  his  communications,  occupy- 
ing a  land  of  boundless  fertility  whose  financial  system  concen- 


48^  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tiated  power  in  the  hands  of  the  master  of  Alexandria,  could  have 
played  the  part  of  a  second  Sertorius,  if  Pompey  should  prove  a 
second  Sulla.  The  attempt  to  secure  a  refuge  for  the  democrats 
and  the  basis  of  a  counter-revolution  miscarried  ;  nor  was  the 
second  scheme  more  succcessful.  In  pursuance  of  the  standing- 
policy  of  the  democrats  to  favour  the  extension  of  the  franchise, 
Crassus,  zealously  supported  by  Caesar,  proposed  to  enrol  as  full 
citizens  the  inhabitants  of  Transpadane  Gaul.  Both  attempts 
failed  in  face  of  the  opposition  of  his  colleague,  the  aristocratic 
Catulus,  and  both  censors  resigned  office  ;  but  the  Transpadane 
franchise  remained  a  burning  question,  and  the  democratic  leaders 
secured  an  active  support  in  the  northern  district. 

Elections  of  64  B.C. — The  elections  of  64  B.C.,  at  which  five  candi- 
dates appeared,  resolved  themselves  into  a  bitter  party  struggle 
between  optimates  and  populares,  and  a  bitter  personal  struggle 
between  Catiline,  who  had  been  unable  to  stand  in  65,^  and  M. 
Tullius  Cicero,  standing  for  the  first  time.  The  gold  and  influence 
of  the  democrats  supported  the  joint  candidature  of  Catiline  and 
Gaius  Antonius  Hybrida,  uncle  of  the  triumvir,  a  weak  and  corrupt 
noble,  who  willingly  lent  himself  to  their  designs.  There  were  no 
principles  at  stake.  It  was  the  purpose  of  the  populares  to  use  the 
consulate  as  a  lever  of  revolution,  to  seize  the  reins  of  power,  and 
then  to  arm  Italy  and  the  West  against  Pompey.  Cn.  Piso,  whom  the 
Senate,  possibly  at  Crassus'  instigation,  had  already  sent  to  Hither 
Spain  as  quaestor  pro  prastore,  would  counteract  Pompey's  interest 
in  that  country  ;  the  Transpadanes  would  receive  the  franchise,  and 
all  the  forces  of  disorder  would  be  combined  in  resistance  at  once 
to  the  Senate  and  the  army  of  Asia.  These  far-reaching  designs 
\vere  signally  frustrated.  The  dread  of  the  suspected  conspiracy 
produced  a  coalition  of  respectable  men  in  defence  of  law  and 
order,  and  in  support  of  the  moderate  candidate,  Cicero.  That 
eloquent  and  successful  advocate,  whose  birth  at  the  provincial 
town  of  Arpinum  had  made  him  at  once  a  representative  of  Italian 
ideas  and  an  anti-Sullan  politician,  whose  legal  studies  had  made 
him  a  constitutionalist  seeking  his  ideal  in  the  great  days  of  Re- 
publican Rome,  whose  social  status  as  an  eques  and  novus  homo 
thre^\-  him  into  opposition,  and  whose  bent  of  mind  and  special 
capacities  rendered  him  an  opportunist  and  a  parliamentary 
tactician,  had  won  his  spurs  by  attacking  a  Sullan  freedman,  by  ex- 
posing the  corruption  of  the  narrow  Sullan  oligarchy,  in  particular 

1  Owing  to  the  impeachment  for  extortion  in  Africa. 


CICERO 


489 


by  denouncing-  Verres  for  his  shameless  oppression  of  Sicily.  He 
had  taken  his  chances  to  win  distinction  as  an  advocate  and 
promotion  as  a  magistrate  ;  in  a  critical  period  his  policy  had 
wavered.  An  eques  and  a  patriot,  he  had  supported  strong 
action  in  the  East  and  the  appointments  granted  to  Pompey,  to 
whom  he  was  drawn  by  personal  and  political  sympathies.  As 
the  democratic  movement  developed  he  naturally  grew  out  of  his 


BUST  OF  CICERO. 


"popular"  notions,  and  now,  in  64  B.C.,  definitely  passed  over  to 
the  optimate  side,  to  which  he  remained  attached,  though  never  an 
extreme  conservative.  As  a  politician  and  a  statesman  alike  his 
chance  came  with  the  election  of  64  B.C.  Despite  the  obscurity 
of  his  birth,  the  nobles  were  grudgingly  compelled  to  accept  the 
brilliant  parvenu  who  commanded  the  support  of  so  many  sec- 
tions. He  could  now  realise  his  ideal  scheme  of  uniting  the  re- 
spectable classes  in  defence  of  constitutional  government,  in  which 


490  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

lie  lioped  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  Pompey.  Pompey's  friends 
remembered  his  support  of  the  Lex  Maiiilia;  the  moneyed  interest, 
led  by  his  friend  Atticus,  and  the  moderates,  backed  the  champion 
of  order.  The  country  voters,  profoundly  indifferent  to  urban 
squabbles,  eagerly  supported  the  municipal  whom  the  patrician 
Catiline  sneered  at  as  the  inqiiilitius  civis^  the  man  with  the  lodger 
franchise.  Personal  popularity  and  assiduous  canvassing  placed 
Cicero  easily  at  the  head  of  the  poll.  Antonius,  however,  was  re- 
turned as  the  other  consul,  defeating  Catiline  by  the  vote  of  a  few 
centuries  One  string  of  the  plot  was  thus  broken  ;  another  cracked 
when  Cicero  bought  up  his  needy  colleague  by  ceding  to  him  the 
lucrative  province  of  Macedonia.  Piso  had  already  fallen  by 
assassination  in  Spain.  But  the  danger  was  not  yet  over.  An- 
tonius, the  double-dyed  traitor,  remained  a  constant  anxiety.  The 
game  of  intrigue  recommenced.  The  persistent  Catiline  prepared 
to  renew  his  candidature,  and  an  attempt  to  condemn  him  also, 
along  with  some  other  of  the  Sullan  ruffians  brought  to  justice 
by  Ccesar,  had  been  frustrated  by  that  cynical  president  of  the 
court  of  murder.  Nor  was  he  dismayed  by  the  severe  penalties  of 
the  later  Lex  Tullia  de  Anibitu^  probably  made  and  provided  for 
his  benefit  (63  B.C.). 

Rullan  Law. — Again,  at  the  close  of  64  B.C.,  on  the  very  day  the 
new  tribunes  took  office,  P.  Servilius  Rullus,  one  of  their  number, 
proposed  an  agrarian  law  obviously  meant  to  make  the  democratic 
leaders  masters  of  the  Roman  state.  By  this  Bill  all  the  public 
lands  acquired  since  88  B.C.  mainly  by  the  arms  of  Pompey,  were 
to  be  sold,  and  with  the  proceeds,  at  the  cost  of  the  public  funds, 
lands  were  to  be  purchased  in  Italy  for  colonisation.  The  execu- 
tion of  the  measure  was  vested  in  ten  commissioners  enjoying 
military  and  judicial  authority  {imperium)  for  five  years.  A  clause 
requiring  the  presence  of  candidates  at  Rome  was  expressly  devised 
to  exclude  Pompeius,  to  whose  power  this  new  decemvirate  {decern 
reges)  was  obviously  intended  to  be  a  counterpoise.  On  the  first 
day  of  his  consulate  (63  B.C.)  Cicero,  as  Pompey's  friend,  took  up 
the  challenge,  and  harangued  the  people  against  the  insulting  Bill. 
He  found  no  difficulty  in  persuading  the  city  rabble  to  reject  the 
bribe  of  land  and  labour,  and  keep  their  dole  of  corn  and  seats  at 
games.     In  view  of  inevitable  defeat,  the  Bill  was  withdrawn. 

Cicero's  Position. — These  speeches  definitely  committed  the 
new  consul.  He  stood  for  Pompey  and  the  status  quo.  He  hoped 
to  save  the  Republic  by  combining  the  respectable  classes  in  sup- 
port of  senatorial  government  as  he  understood  it.     He  relied  on 


CICERO  AND    CAISAR  491 

the  conservative  instincts  of  the  Italian  middle  class  ;  he  would 
use  the  bugbear  of  anarchy  to  secure  the  equites  ;  Pompeius  should 
become  the  Scipio,  the  figurehead,  of  the  restored  commonwealth, 
to  whom  Cicero  himself  would  play  the  part  of  friend  and  adviser. 
For  a  moment  he  attained  a  striking  success.  The  countr)'^  and 
the  capitalists  rallied  to  the  cause  of  order,  and  Pompey,  resentful 
of  the  attacks  on  his  position,  inclined  to  the  side  of  the  Senate. 
But  the  policy  of  republican  concentration,  the  one  hope  of  saving 
the  constitution,  was  predestined  to  failure.  Equites  and  Senate 
were  equally  selfish  and  equally  suspicious  of  each  other  ;  the 
Senate  jealous  for  its  privileges,  the  equites  looking  to  material 
interests  alone.  There  was  no  cohesion  in  the  new  alliance,  and 
no  power  to  regenerate  society  in  this  hollow  agreement  of  the 
comfortable  classes  to  preserve  their  persons  and  purses.  Italy 
was  unorganised  and  Pompeius  a  broken  reed. 

Trial  of  Rabirius. — Ci^jsar,  thwarted  in  his  wider  designs,  had 
at  least  forced  the  hand  of  the  "popular"  consul  and  disposed  of 
a  possible  rival.  He  now  returned  with  unabated  ^■igour  to  more 
direct  attacks  on  the  aristocracy.  He  had  already  ventured  to  dis- 
play the  bust  of  Marius  at  the  funeral  of  Julia,  his  widow,  and  to 
restore  the  Cimbrian  trophies  thrown  down  by  Sulla  (65  B.C.).  He 
had  agitated  for  the  restoration  of  the  children  of  the  proscribed, 
and  procured  the  condemnation  of  some  Sullan  butchers.  He 
now  came  forward  to  vindicate  once  for  all  the  two  palladia  of 
the  democracy,  the  personal  inviolability  of  the  tribune  and  the 
right  of  the  people  to  try  capital  cases.  At  his  instigation  the 
tribune  Labienus  impeached  Rabirius,  an  obscure  old  man,  who 
was  believed  to  have  killed  Saturninus  in  the  riot  of  B.C.  100. 
Rabirius  had  acted  in  obedience  to  the  summons  of  consul  and 
Senate,  but  the  real  aim  of  the  impeachment  was  to  contest  the 
right  assumed  by  the  Senate  of  declaring  a  citizen  a  public  enemy, 
and  proclaiming  martial  law  in  virtue  of  the  so-called  nltinium 
decretum.  The  accused,  condemned  by  the  irregularly  appointed 
duuniviri  pei-diiellionis^  Caesar  and  his  uncle,  appealed  in  form  to 
the  people,  but  was  only  saved  from  condemnation  by  a  device 
more  obsolete  than  the  rusty  machinery  of  the  prosecution.  The 
prjetor  dissolved  the  Comitia  by  striking  the  flag  on  Janiculum,  a 
warning  of  danger  from  the  Etruscan  foe  (p.  59).  The  trial  served 
its  purpose  as  a  vindication  of  popular  rights  and  a  warning  to 
the  Senate  not  to  attempt  a  coup  d^eiai  at  the  expense  of  popular 
leaders.  A  greater  triumph  attended  the  co-operation  of  Labienus 
with  his  future  chief  in  Gaul.     The  office  of  Pontife.x  Maximus  was 


492  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

now  vacant  by  the  death  of  Metellus  Pius.  C?esar  was  a  candidate 
for  this  great  prize,  but  without  prospect  of  success,  so  long  as  the 
election  lay  with  the  college  of  priests.  Labienus  promptly  carried 
the  repeal  of  the  ordinance  restored  by  Sulla  {cf.  p.  451),  and  re- 
established the  form  of  popular  election  provided  by  the  Lex 
Dfliiiitia  (104  B.C.).  The  noble  demagogue,  so  aided,  easily  dis- 
tanced his  distinguished  competitors,  Catulus  and  Servilius  Isauri- 
cus,  and  earned  the  undying  enmity  of  Catulus,  who  had  offered 
contemptuously  to  buy  him  off  by  paying  his  debts.  Those  debts, 
largely  due  to  the  magnificent  games  he  had  given  as  aidile, 
65  B.C.,  and  swollen  by  the  expenses  of  this  candidature  and  by 
the  praetorian  elections,  in  which  he  was  again  successful,  of  the 
present  year,  were  partly  liquidated  by  Crassus,  partly  wiped  out 
by  the  proceeds  of  his  proprietorship  in  Spain. 

Second  Conspiracy  of  Catiline. — But  these  apparent  triumphs, 
wrested  from  a  baffled  aristocracy,  were  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  the  failure  of  all  the  attacks  on  Pompey's  power.  The  demo- 
cratic leaders  seemed  like  the  pigmies  of  fable  vanquished  by 
Hercules  without  an  effort.  Their  desperate  situation  financially 
and  politically,  their  acknowledged  coquetries  with  the  forces  of 
disorder,  the  hesitation  of  the  government  in  dealing  with  the 
conspirators,  and  suspicious  points  in  their  own  conduct  and  char- 
acter, have  lent  probability  to  the  view  largely  entertained  in 
ancient  as  well  as  modern  times,  that  Ciesar  and  Crassus  were 
not  merely  conscious  of  coming  troubles,  but  were  active  supporters 
of  an  armed  rebellion — that  last  throw  of  desperate  gamblers. 
What  is  clear  is  this,  that  Catiline,  weary  of  parliamentary  intrigues, 
resolved,  after  one  last  effort  to  secure  the  consulship  by  force 
or  fraud,  to  make  a  bold  bid  for  power  by  calling  to  arms  the 
discontented  and  oppressed,  and  leading  the  "  headless  masses  " 
against  the  government  of  noble  senators  and  capitalists.  It  is 
clear  that  he  was  outmanoeuvred  and  defeated  at  every  point  by 
the  consul  Cicero.  It  is  clear  that  his  defeat  redounded  to  the 
infinite  credit  of  consul  and  Senate,  and  the  infinite  discredit  of 
the  suspected  democrats.  It  is  probable  that,  for  party  purposes, 
the  character  of  the  danger  has  been  exaggerated  ;  it  is  evident 
that  information  was  skilfully  manufactured,  and  that  the  govern- 
ment adroitly  turned  the  whole  business  to  good  political  account. 
That  Ca;sar  and  Crassus  knew  that  trouble  was  brewing  is  certain, 
but  a  criticism  of  the  evidence  makes  it  improbable  that  Ctesar 
shared  in  so  shallow  and  ill-organised  a  venture,  or  that  the 
Rothschild  of  Rome,  for  all  his  crooked  policy,  proposed  to  cancel 


COXSPIRACY  OF  CATILINE  493 

his  own.  debts  and  burn  his  own  houses.  It  was  even  asserted 
that  CcCsar  gave  important  evidence,  while  Crassus  played  the* 
part  of  Lord  Monteagle  to  this  prototype  of  Guido  Fawkes.  The 
attempt  to  storm  the  consulship,  supported  or  not  by  the  populares, 
was  disconcerted  by  lavish  bribery  and  the  vigilance  of  Cicero. 
Kept  well  posted  by  his  spies,  he  denounced  the  plans  of  the 
conspirators  on  the  very  day  they  had  hoped  to  carry  the  election 
(Oct.  21,  63),  secured  a  vote  of  exceptional  powers,  got  the  Comitia 
postponed,  and  on  the  actual  day,  arrayed  in  a  breastplate,  bore 
down  intimidation  by  an  armed  bodyguard  and  a  theatrical  appeal 
to  popular  sentiment.  The  result  of  the  elections  (October  28)  was 
the  return  of  the  government  candidates,  Silanus  and  Murena. 
Yet  Catiline  remained  in  Rome,  frankly  sustaining  the  thunders 
of  the  consul,  and  offering  himself  for  arrest  when  menaced  with 
prosecution.  E\en  when  the  war  began  in  Etruria,  and  the  old 
centurion  Manlius,  at  Fa^sula;,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  and 
demanded  relief  for  the  oppressed  debtors,  there  was  no  movement 
at  Rome.  Catiline  was  not  yet  ready,  and  Cicero  obviously  had  not 
adequate  information.  The  usual  omens  appeared  ;  troops  were 
raised  and  measures  of  security  taken.  The  object  of  the  consul 
was  clearly  to  drive  Catiline  into  overt  action,  thus  anticipating 
the  expected  treachery  of  Antonius  and  avoiding  the  dangers  of 
an  illegal  decree , of  jexile.  On  November  5  or  6  there  was  a  meet- 
ing at  the  house  of  Porcius  Laeca,  and  an  alleged  plot  was  formed 
to  murder  Cicero,  foiled  once  more  by  the  watchfulness  of  his 
friends.  No  arrest  followed.  With  incredible  effrontery,  Catiline 
reappeared  in  the  Senate  which  met  under  guard  at  the  temple 
of  Jupiter  Stator.  But  even  his  audacity  quailed  before  the  torrent 
of  invective  with  which  the  indignant  orator  assailed  him.  Ail 
men  shrank  away  from  the  detected  assassin.  He  made  one  use- 
less effort  at  defence,  then  burst  from  the  House,  assumed  the 
proconsular  insignia,  and  hurried  off  to  lead  the  levies  of  Manlius, 
flinging  down  the  gage  of  social  revolution.  The  Senate  declared 
the  t\\  o  leaders  outlaws,  and  offered  amnesties  to  their  followers ; 
but  the  decrees  fell  flat.  The  work  of  suppression  they  entrusted, 
strangely  enough,  to  the  justly  suspected  Antonius. 

The  Arrests  at  Rome.—  The  rising  at  Rome  was  left  in  the 
hands  of  the  remaining  conspirators.  It  was  their  aim,  we  are 
told,  to  assassinate  the  consul  and  set  fire  to  the  city — aims  of 
which  no  evidence  was  subsequenth'  offered.  But  the  cowardly 
and  incapable  praetor,  the  consular  Lentulus  Sura,  whose  rank 
placed  him  at  the  head  of  the  conspirators,  shrank  from  adopting 


494  III  STORY  OF  ROME 

the  bold  counsels  of  Cethej,'^us.  Instead  of  strikinj^  at  once,  he 
fell  into  the  trap  prepared  for  him  by  Cicero,  who  now  exe- 
cuted his  master-stroke.  Deputies  from  a  l)roken  and  bankrupt 
clan,  the  once  powerful  Allobroges,  had  come  to  press  their  griev- 
ances at  Rome.  Lentulus  negotiated  with  these  hopeful  allies,  who, 
after  consulting  their  patronus,  Fabius  Sanga,  sold  their  information 
to  Cicero.  The  consul  was  furnished  at  once  with  the  crushing 
evidence  he  needed.  Utilising  the  deputies  to  secure  autograph 
evidence  sealed  with  the  conspirators'  seal,  he  had  his  agents 
arrested  as  they  left  the  city  (December  2  or  3).  Confronted 
with  the  Allobroges  and  the  documents,  the  baffled  blunderers 
confessed  their  guilt  before  the  Senate  (December  3).  The  letter 
of  Lentulus  hinted  at  a  servile  revolt,  and  the  atrocious  project 
of  a  Gallic  rising  gave  credence  to  the  dark  rumours  of  massacre 
and  incendiarism.  The  sympathies  of  the  masses  swung  round 
to  the  side  of  the  government,  and  in  the  storm  of  fury  raised 
by  the  revelations  of  Cicero  vigorous  action  became  possible.  Five 
men  only,  however,  were  arrested. 

The  Execution. — But  panic  betrayed  the  partisans  of  order 
into  needless  and  dangerous  violence.  On  December  5  Cicero 
consulted  the  Senate  on  the  fate  of  his  prisoners,  whose  custod)', 
by  a  clever  stroke  of  policy,  had  been  partly  entrusted  to  the 
leading"  democrats.  The  chief  speakers  one  and  all  supported  the 
motion  of  the  consul-elect,  Silanus,  for  the  e.xtreme  penalty,  till 
C;esar,  who  himself  proposed  a  severe  sentence,  with  open  protests 
and  obscure  menaces  shook  their  resolution,  fearlessly  maintaining 
to  the  end,  at  some  risk  to  himself,  the  right  of  the  citizen  to 
public  trial,  and  hinting  at  the  vengeance  which  would  fall  on  the 
authors  of  violent  measures.  Silanus  himself  prevaricated  ;  the 
consulars  wavered  ;  it  was  even  proposed  to  adjourn  the  debate, 
in  spite  of  the  unconcealed  anxiety  of  Cicero  for  a  definite  sen- 
tence, when  the  young  tribune-elect,  M.  Porcius  Cato,  sprang  to 
his  feet,  unveiled  the  menaces  and  retorted  the  protests  of  Ciesar, 
and  shamed  the  waverers  into  courage.  The  Catilinarians,  he 
urged,  were  criminals  caught  in  the  act,  enemies  of  the  state,  and 
liable  as  such  to  summary  punishment.  The  legal  quibble,  exactly 
suited  to  the  Roman  mind,  satisfied  the  scruples  of  constitu- 
tionalists. The  motion  for  immediate  execution,  carried  by  a  large 
majority,  was  at  once  put  into  effect.  Cicero  himself  conducted 
the  prisoners  to  the  dungeon  by  the  Capitol,  caused  them  to  be 
there  strangled,  and  announced  their  death  to  the  assembled  crowds 
by  the  ominous  word  "  vixcftint.'''' 


THE   CONSPIRACY  CRUSHED  495 

Defeat  and  Death  of  Catiline. — The  stroke  succeeded  for  the 
moment.  At  Rome  the  frightened  masses  hailed  the  consul  as 
saviour  of  the  countr)'  ;  in  Etruria  the  rebel  forces  wasted  away. 
But  the  execution,  emphatically  illegal  in  face  of  the  successive 
charters  of  appeal,  was  a  confession  of  miserable  weakness.  Five 
criminals  were  refused  a  legal  trial,  for  the  decision  of  the  Senate 
had  no  legal  force,  because  the  executive  dared  not  trust  its  prisons 
for  a  week.  The  sole  justification  must  lie  in  the  dangerous  nature 
of  the  crisis,  not  in  a  quibble  about  citizens  and  public  foes.  And 
the  government  could  scarce!)'  find  a  serious  danger  in  an  ill- 
organised  rebellion  of  half-armed  bankrupts.  Catiline  met  a  death 
more  honourable.  He  had  mustered  to  his  standard  a  motley 
crew  of  10,000  ill-equipped  men,  whose  numbers  sank  rapidly 
when  the  news  from  Rome  leaked  out.  At  length  he  found  himself 
near  Pistoja,  at  the  head  of  a  poor  6000  followers,  cooped  up  be- 
tween the  armies  of  Q.  Metellus  Celer  on  his  line  of  retreat  to 
Gaul,  and  C.  Antonius  pressing  on  his  rear.  In  a  narrow  mountain 
valley  he  turned  to  bay.  Antonius  had  the  grace  to  shirk  the 
execution  of  his  former  allies,  and  gave  up  the  command  to  his 
lieutenant,  M.  Petreius.  A  fierce  struggle  ensued  ;  quarter  was 
neither  given  nor  taken.  At  last  Petreius  with  his  guard  broke 
through  the  enemy's  centre  and  decided  the  battle.  The  rebels 
fell  in  their  ranks  as  they  had  fought,  and  Catiline,  who  had  shown 
the  gifts  of  a  general,  sought  and  found  a  soldier's  death  (63  K.c). 

Result. — The  conspiracy  of  Catiline  remains  an  historical  riddle. 
It  is  hard  to  resist  the  impression  that  its  character  and  importance 
have  been  grossly  magnified.  The  designs  of  the  associates,  like 
the  villainies  of  their  leader,  have  been  to  some  extent  exagge- 
rated and  distorted.  Stripped  of  rhetorical  ornament,  it  is  the 
attempt  of  an  angry  and  vindictive  Italian,  foiled  in  the  pursuit 
of  power,  to  avenge  himself  on  his  enemies  and  secure  his  ends 
at  the  cost  of  social  ruin  and  anarchy.  Destitute  of  g^enuine  aims, 
or  of  any  true  democratic  sympathy,  he  was  equally  destitute  of 
organising  power.  Catiline  was  never  truly  formidable,  and  his 
attempt  might  be  relegated  to  obscurity  with  the  efforts  of  Lepidus, 
except  for  the  part  it  played  in  the  tactics  and  movements  of  greater 
men.  In  the  hand  of  Cicero  its  collapse  was  a  trump  card.  In 
their  fall  the  anarchists  dragged  down  the  democrats,  whom 
public  feeling  accused  of  complicity,  and  who  were,  if  not  guilty 
of  this  attempt,  yet  tarred  with  the  same  brush.  Cicero  wisely 
resisted  the  attempt  to  implicate  them  by  false  or  true  evidence. 
It  was  enough  to  have  baffled  them.     Their  desperate  efforts  to 


496  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

seize  the  reins  of  power  had  ended  in  discomfiture  and  dis{,'race  ; 
the  poUticians  who  had  aspired  to  measure  swords  with  the  con- 
queror of  the  East  had  been  defeated  by  the  advocate  of  Arpinum. 
The  result  of  their  intrij,''ues  had  been  to  consolidate  the  moderates 
under  the  leadership  of  Cicero,  by  driving  the  propertied  classes 
into  the  arms  of  the  government,  and  to  discredit  the  party  of 
reform  by  its  supposed  alliance  with  the  party  of  revolution. 
Pompey,  exasperated  but  not  weakened  by  their  treacherous 
attacks,  was  on  his  way  home  at  the  head  of  his  conquering 
veterans. 


CHAPTER  XLVIII 

THE    FORMATION    OF    THE    FIRST    TRIUMVIRATE 

B.C.      A.U.C. 

Pompey  lands  in  Italy  and  disbands  his  Army         .        .         .62  692 

Pompey  in  Rome — Caesar  Pro-praetor  in  Farther  Spain  .  61  693 
Breach  between  Pompey  and  the  Senate — Union  of  Caesar, 

Pompey,  and  Crassus  60  694 

Caesar,   as   Consul,   carries  an  Agrarian  Law,    and  is  given 

the  Governorship  of  Gaul  for  Five  Years   .        .  -59  69S 

Clodius  Tribune — Banishment  of  Cicero 58  696 

Position  of  Pompey. — -The  whole  Roman  world  lay  at  the  mercy 
of  Pompey.  In  the  East  he  had  already  received  regal  honours 
from  the  provinces  he  had  conquered  ;  in  Italy  all  was  prepared 
for  the  erection  of  his  throne.  The  pitiful  weakness  of  the  Senate 
and  the  base  intrigues  of  the  democrats  had  fatally  discredited  the 
republican  form  of  government.  Men  saw  at  last  that  they  had  to 
choose  between  monarchy  and  anarchy,  and  were  ready  to  accept 
the  great  conqueror  as  the  ruler  of  the  world.  His  agent,  Metellus 
Nepos,  reached  Rome  in  time  to  be  elected  tribune  in  December 
63  B.C.  He  had  come  to  claim  for  Pompey  the  command  against 
Catiline  and  the  consulship  for  the  year  61  B.C.  But  the  coteries  of 
his  personal  enemies,  Lucullus  and  Metellus  Creticus,  were  strong 
enough  to  ensure  the  opposition  of  the  Senate  to  these  demands, 
and  thus  forced  Nepos  to  ally  himself  with  the  democrats. 

The  leader  of  the  populares,  making  a  virtue  of  necessity, 
executed  a  prompt  and  skilful  change  of  front.  On  the  first  day  of 
his  pmstorship  (January  i,  62  B.C.)  Ca;sar  proposed  to  transfer  the 
rebuilding  and  dedication  of  the  Capitoline  temple  from  Catulus  to 
Pompey,  and  by  this  stroke  of  policy  at  once  set  Pompey  and  the 


POSITION  OF  POMPEY  497 

aristocrats  at  variance.  To  inscribe  his  name  on  Rome's  proudest 
temple  was  just  the  kind  of  honour  to  delight  the  great  soldier,  and 
to  bring  him  back  to  the  side  of  his  ancient  allies.  On  the  same 
day  Metellus  Nepos,  as  tribune,  silenced  Cicero  when  he  wished  to 
address  the  people  on  the  glories  of  his  consulship,  saying  that  he 
who  had  condemned  citizens  unheard  should  not  himself  have  a 
hearing.  Nepos  also  was  supported  by  Cccsar  in  pressing  his  Bill 
appointing  Pompey  to  a  military  command  in  Italy.  The  measure 
was  brought  before  the  people,  but  vetoed  by  Cato,  and  after  a 
scene  of  riot  and  disorder  the  assembly  broke  up.  The  Senate 
replied  by  proclaiming  martial  law  and  suspending  Cassar  and 
Nepos  from  their  offices.  Both  protested  against  this  illegal  step, 
Nepos  taking  refuge  in  his  patron's  camp,  while  Cassar  retired  to 
his  own  house  till  the  Senate  withdrew  its  interdict. 

In  the  autumn  Pompey  landed  at  Brundisium.  He  at  once 
disbanded  his  veterans,  and  by  so  doing  proclaimed  his  loyalty  to 
the  Republic  and  effaced  himself.  Pompey  had  no  mind  to  found 
a  military  monarchy.  He  aimed  at  the  position  of  universal  referee, 
in  power  if  not  in  office,  the  protector  of  the  Roman  commonwealth. 
He  wished  to  be  the  first  citizen  in  a  free  state,  and  to  find  in 
the  goodwill  of  the  citizens,  not  the  swords  of  the  legionaries, 
the  foundations  of  his  power.  But  unfortunately  he  was  unfitted 
both  by  nature  and  training  to  play  the  part  of  Pericles.  He  was 
far  too  unskilful  to  retain  as  a  statesman  the  influence  he  had 
won  as  a  soldier.  His  policy  was  weak  and  hesitating,  his  speeches 
cold  and  unmeaning  ;  his  plans  miscarried  and  his  agents  blundered. 
His  first  manifesto  fell  flat  upon  disappointed  ears,  an  omen  of 
his  future  career.  Within  twelve  months  of  his  triumphant  return 
Pompey  stood  almost  alone,  helpless  in  the  face  of  the  paltry 
opposition  of  senatorial  factions. 

Trial  of  Clodius. — When  Pompey  arrived  in  Rome  the  struggle 
between  the  Senate  and  democrats  was  being  fought  out  in  the 
law  courts.  During  the  celebration  of  the  mysteries  of  the  Bo/ia 
Dea,  which  only  women  might  attend,  P.  Clodius,  who  was  suspected 
of  an  intrigue  with  Caesar's  wife,  entered  the  forbidden  precincts 
in  Ctesar's  house.  Though  disguised  in  woman's  attire,  he  was 
detected  and  identified.  His  presence  was  not  only  a  stain  on 
Caesar's  honour,  but  a  serious  act  of  sacrilege.  For  this  he  was 
tried  ;  but  though  his  defence — an  alibi — broke  down  through  the 
evidence  of  Cicero,  profuse  bribery  secured  an  acquittal  from  the 
jury.  Cresar  professed  ignorance  of  the  culprit's  guilt,  but  divorced 
his  wife,  because  "  Caesar's  wife  must  be  above  suspicion."     The 

2  I 


498 


HISTORY  OF  ROME 


course  and  result  of  the  tri.il  demonstrated  the  weakness  of  the 
aristocratic  part)',  sowed  the  seeds  of  disunion  between  the  Senate 
and  the  knights,  and  clinched  the  hatred  of  Clodius  for  Cicero. 

Quarrel   between   Pompey  and   the   Senate. — C;csar,  who  had 
been  detained  in  Rome  partly  by  the  trial  of  Clodius  and  partly 


SACRAKIUM    (in    A    HOUSE    AT    POMPEII) 


by  his  debts,  was  now  enabled  by  Crassus'  help  to  satisfy  his 
pressing  creditors  and  depart  in  due  course  to  his  governorship 
in  Spain.  While  he  was  gaining  there  military  e.xperience  by 
campaigns  against  the  hill  tribes,  and  reputation  by  the  justice  of 
his  government,  Pompey  at  Rome  was  drifting  towards  a  coalition 
with  his  future  rival.     The   Senate  had  oniy  itself  to  thank  for 


"THE  FIRST  TRIUMVIRATE''  499 

this  disastrous  trend  of  affairs.  Instigated  by  Pompey's  opponents, 
it  had  refused  to  ratify  en  bloc  his  arrangements  in  the  East  ;  it 
failed  to  furnish  his  veterans  with  the  lands  promised  them  by 
their  general  ;  it  discouraged  his  expectations  of  a  second  con- 
sulship. This  folly  it  crowned  by  provoking  a  rupture  with  the 
knights.  Following  the  honest  but  stupid  guidance  of  Cato,  it 
refused  to  revise  in  the  interest  of  the  tax-gatherers  the  contracts 
for  the  taxes  of  Asia.  At  the  same  time  it  attempted  to  make 
knights  as  well  as  senators  amenable  to  penalties  for  judicial  cor- 
ruption. The  union  of  the  orders,  on  which  Cicero  rested  his 
policy,  had  vanished  like  a  dream.  Pompey  turned  from  the 
Senate  to  the  people  ;  but,  as  usual,  he  was  badly  served  by  his 
agents.  Though  he  courted  the  favour  of  the  masses  by  the 
abolition  of  the  Italian  harbour  dues,  a  measure  carried  by  the 
praetor  Metellus  Nepos  in  60  B.C.,  the  people  showed  no  eagerness 
to  pass  the  proposal  of  L.  Flavins  to  assign  lands  to  Pompey's 
veterans.  The  Bill  was  first  amended,  and  then  dropped  by  its 
author,  who  found  that  persis'.ence  in  face  of  the  Senate's  opposi- 
tion would  only  lead  to  defeat. 

Coalition  of  Pompey,  Caesar,  and  Crassus. — When  Cii^sar  re- 
turned from  Spain  he  found  Pompey  fretting  under  an  opposition 
he  could  not  quell,  and  ready  to  snatch  eagerly  at  any  means  of 
escape  from  an  intolerable  position.  He  at  once  abandoned  the 
empty  honour  of  a  triumph,  in  order  to  present  himself  as  a  can- 
didate for  the  consulship.  He  then  made  terms  with  Pompey, 
offering  to  secure  for  him  the  ratification  of  his  settlement  of  Asia 
and  a  grant  of  land  to  his  veterans  in  return  for  his  support. 
Crassus  and  his  friends  the  tax-gatherers  were  included  in  the 
bargain,  and  became  partners  in  the  new  alliance.  Caesar  was 
the  chief  gainer  by  the  coalition  known  to  history  by  the  irregular 
title  of  the  First  Triumvirate.  [By  it  he  obtained  not  merely  the 
consulship,  but  the  province  and  army,  which  were  necessary  for 
the  further  development  of  his  plans.  Pompey,  by  permitting 
this,  sacrificed  his  position  as  the  only  general  of  Rome,  to  pur- 
chase release  from  his  deep  embarrassments  and  the  satisfaction 
of  his  immediate  needs.  He  was  probably  unaware  of  the  sacrifice. 
Perhaps  no  one,  till  59  B.C.,  thoroughly  realised  the  aims  and  gifts 
of  the  intriguing  demagogue  and  man  of  fashion,  which  were  only 
beginning  to  be  clear  to  CiEsar  himself  in  that  atmosphere  of  paltrv 
ambition  and  petty  manoeuvres  in  which  the  Roman  politician  lived.^^ 

Caesar's  Laws. — The  coalition  easily  carried  Caesar's  election 
to  the  consulship.  *A11  the  aristocrats  could  effect  by  a  gigantic 


500  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

system  of  bribery  was  to  give  him,  as  his  colleague,  a  rancorous 
and  obstructive  opponent,  M.  Bibulus  (59  u.c).  As  consul,  C;csar 
at  once  proceeded  to  fulfil  his  pledges  to  his  allies.  But  he  acted 
with  moderation,  and  a  due  regard  to  tradition,  in  laying  his 
measures  in  the  first  instance  before  the  Senate.  He  proposed 
to  buy  land  in  Italy  with  the  revenue  and  resources  derived  from 
Pompey's  conquests  in  the  East,  and  distribute  it  among  the 
veterans  and  other  poor  citizens,  to  confirm  Pompey's  arrange- 
ments in  Asia,  and  to  remit  a  third  of  the  sum  payable  by  the 
aggrieved  tax-farmers.  Only  when  the  Senate  refused  even  to 
discuss  the  measures  laid  before  it,  and  took  refuge  in  simple 
negation  or  barefaced  obstruction,  did  Caesar  fall  back  on  a  direct 
appeal  to  the  people.  Such  an  appeal  was  perfectly  legal  ;  but 
the  inconvenience  of  bringing  complicated  measures  before  the 
assembly,  where  discussion  and  amendment  were  alike  impossible, 
might  well  make  a  statesman  pause.  Yet  Caesar  had  no  alternative, 
and  he  was  not  the  man  to  turn  back  when  once  he  had  put  his 
hand  to  the  plough.  In  vain  did  a  tribune  interpose  his  veto  ;  in 
vain  did  Bibulus  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  actions  of  his  col- 
league. He  was  driven  from  the  Forum  by  Pompey's  veterans, 
and  his  proclamations  that  he  would  watch  the  heavens  for  omens, 
and  thus  prevent  the  holding  of  any  assembly,  were  treated  with 
contempt.  Bibulus  shut  himself  up  in  his  house  for  eight  months, 
and  employed  his  time  in  composing  scathing  lampoons  on  his 
colleague,  to  which  we  are  probably  indebted  for  some  of  the 
stories  against  the  great  dictator.  Caesar  went  on  his  way  un- 
moved. He  added  to  his  original  agrarian  law  a  proposal  for  the 
distribution  in  allotments  of  the  Campanian  domain  ^  land  and  for 
the  foundation  of  a  colony  at  Capua.  An  appended  clause  compelled 
all  senators  and  candidates  for  office  to  swear  to  treat  its  provisions 
as  valid,  and  so  secured  it  for  a  time  from  attack  in  the  Senate. 

The  confirmation  of  Pompey's  regulations  in  the  East  followed 
as  a  matter  of  course,  and  the  alliance  between  the  two  most 
powerful  men  in  Rome  was  sealed  by  Pompey's  marriage  to 
Ctesar's  daughter  Julia.  What  Crassus  got  from  the  bargain  is 
not  so  evident ;  perhaps  he  was  contented  with  the  remission  of 
one-third  of  the  price  which  the  tax-farmers  had  agreed  to  pay 
for  the  right  of  collecting  the  tithes  in  Asia.  This  sacrifice  of 
financial  probity  to  political  expediency  is  a  blot  on  Caesar's  fame. 

1  This  rich  corn-land  had  been  leased  out  to  small  tenants  since  the 
destruction  of  Capua  (211  B.C.),  and  brought  in  a  considerable  revenue  to  the 
treasury. 


calsar's  consulship  501 

But  his  other  provhicial  measure,  the  famous  law  against  extortion, 
redeems  him  from  the  charge  of  indifference  to  the  interests  of 
the  subject  peoples.  This  law  attempted  to  meet  all  the  numerous 
devices  of  unjust  governors  ;  it  forbade  the  levying  of  illegal  taxes 
and  the  acceptance  of  presents  ;  it  applied  not  only  to  the  governor. 


tUST   OF  JULIUS    CESAR    (nAFLES). 


but  to  his  retinue  also,  and  it  punished  transgressions  severely. 
Expulsion  from  the  Senate  and  restitution  of  four  times  the  amount 
extorted  were  the  mildest  penalties  inflicted.  Exile  was  reserved 
for  the  worst  cases.  Another  decree  passed  at  the  instigation  of 
Caesar  was  nothing  more  than  a  device  for  extorting  money.  For 
two-and-twenty  years  Rome  had  hesitated  whether  to  assert  her 


502  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

claims  under  the  will  of  Alexander  and  annex  Egypt  or  not.  The 
triumvirs  now  received  a  bribe  of  6000  talents  for  procuring  the 
recognition  of  Ptolemy  Auletes  as  king. 

Caesars  whole  work  would  have  been  futile  had  he  not  secured 
an  important  province.  The  Senate,  guessing  the  successful  can- 
didates before  their  election,  had  proposed  to  give  the  outgoing 
consuls  the  charge  of  the  roads,  woods,  and  forests  of  Italy.  But 
the  people  voted,  on  the  motion  of  the  tribune  Vatinius,  that  Cisal- 
pine Gaul  and  Illyricum,  with  a  force  of  three  legions  and  ten 
legates  of  proprtetorian  rank,  should  be  entrusted  to  C;csar  for 
five  years.  The  Senate  found  itself  compelled  by  disturbances  in 
Farther  Gaul  to  add  the  province  of  Narbo  and  an  additional 
legion.  Caesar  was  now  in  a  position  to  realise  the  imperial  destiny 
of  Rome  in  the  West,  and  to  extend  her  dominion  from  the  Rhone 
to  the  Atlantic,  while  at  the  same  time  he  could  keep,  from  his 
Italian  province,  a  close  watch  on  the  course  of  affairs  at  Rome. 

Exile  of  Cicero. — Before  Citsar  finally  departed  to  Gaul  and 
left  Pompey  in  charge  of  the  home  government,  he  thought  it 
better  to  remove  the  two  chief  opponents  of  the  coalition.  He 
would  willingly  have  enlisted  Cicero  on  the  side  of  the  triumvirate, 
but  the  orator  refused  to  abandon  the  cause  of  the  Republic  ;  nor 
would  he  purchase  security  by  accepting  a  place  on  the  agrarian 
commission  or  on  Citsar's  staff,  for  he  was  determined  at  all 
hazards  to  maintain  his  political  independence.  As  he  could 
not  be  cajoled  into  submission,  the  triumvirs  determined  to  use 
violence.  Clodius  had  never  forgiven  Cicero  for  bearing  witness 
against  him,  and  was  now  able  to  gratify  his  malice.  With  the 
support  of  Ccesar  and  the  connivance  of  the  ungrateful  Pompey, 
he  had  gone  through  the  form  of  adoption  into  a  plebeian  family, 
and  subsequently  secured  his  election  to  the  tribunate.  The 
policy  of  this  notorious  demagogue  was  a  parody  of  that  of  the 
Gracchi.  He  made  the  largesses  of  corn  gratuitous,  he  forbade 
the  censors  to  degrade  senators  or  knights  except  after  a  formal 
accusation,  and  prohibited  the  magistrates  from  obstructing  the 
holding  of  assemblies  on  religious  grounds.  Finally,  he  made 
himself  master  of  the  streets,  by  re-establishing  the  clubs  or  guilds, 
suppressed  in  68  B.C.,  and  thus  giving  the  proletariate  a  semi- 
military  organisation.  In  his  proceedings  against  Cicero,  Clodius 
kept  within  the  letter  of  the  law  though  he  violated  its  spirit.  He 
proposed  in  the  tribal  assembly  a  measure  in  general  terms  inter- 
dicting fire  and  water  to  any  man  who  had  put  a  citizen  to  death 
without  trial  before  the  people.     The  Bill  was  obviously  aimed  at 


CICERO  AND   CLOD  I  US  503 

the  consul  wlio  liacl,  on  the  advice  of  the  Senate,  executed  the 
accomplices  of  Catiline.  Cicero  and  his  friends  went  into  mourn- 
ing, and  appealed  to  the  compassion  of  the  people.  The  senators 
and  knights  showed  their  sympathy  for  the  unfortunate  orator,  \\ho 
had,  so  unwisely,  fixed  the  cap  on  his  own  head.  But  Clodius  had 
at  his  back  the  mob  of  the  Forum,  and  boasted  that  he  was  but  the 
agent  of  the  triumvirs.  Cicero  was  not  prepared  to  fight  a  pitched 
battle,  and  after  a  last  piteous  appeal  to  Pompey,  to  whose  promises 
he  had  vainly  trusted,  he  left  Rome  in  a  panic.  On  the  very  day 
of  his  departure  Clodius'  measure  was  carried,  and  by  a  later 
resolution  declared  to  apply  to  Cicero,  whose  flight  was  treated 
as  a  confession  of  guilt  (58  B.C.). 

The  triumvirs  made  use  of  the  same  serviceable  tool  in  the 
removal  of  Cato.  On  the  proposal  of  Clodius,  Cato  was  entrusted 
by  the  people  with  a  delicate  financial  mission.  He  was  sent  to 
Cyprus  to  depose  the  reigning  Ptolemy,  who  had  neglected  to 
purchase  recognition  of  his  title  from  the  triumvirs,  to  annex  the 
island,  and  secure  the  royal  treasure  for  the  people  of  Rome.  Cato 
did  not  dare  to  decline  the  invidious  honour,  and  embarked  for 
Cyprus  without  delay.  The  last  champions  of  the  Republic  against 
the  new  three-headed  despotism  were  frightened  or  lured  away,  and 
Ca?sar  could  turn  from  the  punishment  of  political  opponents  to  the 
defence  of  Gaul. 


CHAPTER  XLIX 

THE    CONQUEST    OF    GAUL 

Defeat  of  the  Helvetii  at  Bibracte,  and  of  Ariovistus  and 
the  Germans  near  the  Rhine  ...... 

Subjugation  of  the  Belgae— Defeat  of  the  Nervii 

Subjugation  of  the  Veneti  and  the  Aquitani 

First  Expeditions  to  Germany  and  Britain        .... 

Second  Expedition  to  Britain— Revolt  of  the  Eburones  under 

Ambiorix 54        700 

Great  Revolt  of  Gaul  headed  by  Vercingetorix  and  the 
Arverni — Caesar  storms  Avaricum,  but  fails  at  Gergovia 
— Victory  of  Alesia,  and  Surrender  of  Vercingetorix        .     52        702 

Subjugation  of  remaining  Rebels 51        703 

Gaul:  The  Roman  Province. — The  Roman  province  beyond 
the  Alps  was  but  a  small  part  of  Gaul.  Little  change  had  been 
made  in  its  boundaries  since  the  days  of  Marius.  The  Rhone 
formed    its   frontier   on    the    north   from   Geneva    to    \'ienne,  the 


S8 

696 

57 

697 

56 

698 

S5 

699 

504  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

Cevennes  and  the  fortress  of  Tolosa  (Toulouse)  guarded  it  to 
the  west,  while  the  great  Domitian  road  that  led  along  the  coast 
to  Spain  was  secured  by  the  colony  of  Narbo  Martius.  Massilia, 
now  the  most  powerful  Greek  state  under  Roman  protection,  had, 
in  the  days  of  her  independence,  spread  the  elements  of  culture, 
the  use  of  writing  and  of  coinage,  the  cultivation  of  the  vine  and 
olive,  in  this  part  of  Gaul.  The  whole  district  swarmed  with 
Roman  merchants  and  money-lenders,  farmers  and  graziers.  The 
national  language  and  habits  were  giving  way  before  this  tide  of 
immigration. 

Condition  of  Gaul. — Ctesar  saw  in  this  fertile  region  a  new 
heritage  for  his  fellow-countrymen,  but  he  looked  far  beyond  the 
narrow  boundaries  of  his  province.  In  the  Romanisation  of  that 
one  small  district  he  saw  the  future  destiny  of  the  entire  land 
from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Rhine.  He  saw  that  the  whole  race 
of  the  Celts  in  Gaul,  in  Britain,  as  well  as  in  Italy  might  be  won 
for  the  empire  of  Rome.  The  condition  of  the  Celts  in  Gaul  was 
that  of  a  nation  which  has  paused  half-way  between  barbarism 
and  civilisation.  Though  they  had  made  some  advance  in  agri- 
culture, they  still  preferred  the  breeding  of  horses  and  cattle  to 
the  labour  of  the  plough.  Again,  they  had  some  skill  and  practice 
in  mining  and  the  working  of  metals,  but  the  designs  on  their 
coins  are  but  deformed  imitations  of  Greek  originals,  and  their 
ornaments  are  barbaric  in  character. 

The  political  state  of  the  country  presents  the  same  features. 
Though  the  Southern  Gauls  at  least  had  walled  towns,  the  city 
never  superseded  the  clan  as  the  basis  of  the  state.^  The 
cantons  in  the  north  still  preserved  the  old  form  of  constitution, 
the  chief,  the  council  of  elders,  the  assembly  of  freemen  ;  but 
in  the  south  the  nobility  had  set  aside  monarchy  and  usurped 
the  powers  of  the  people.  Like  the  barons  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
they  surrounded  themselves  with  retainers,  and  by  marriages 
and  alliances  among  themselves  they  made  themselves  stron;^ 
enough  to  defy  the  law  and  the  constituted  authorities.  But  this 
order  of  nobles,  though  it  broke  up  the  old  tribal  states,  favoured 
the  formation  of  wider  leagues.  The  other  great  order,  the  Druids 
or  priests,  was  yet  more  distinctly  national.  Throughout  Gaul  it 
spread  schools  ;  from  all  Gaul,  a:nd  even  from  Britain,  representa- 

1  The  persistent  vitality  of  the  tribe  in  Gaul  even  under  Roman  rule  is 
illustrated  by  the  modern  names  for  the  towns ;  e.g. ,  Paris  recalls  the  Parisii, 
not  Lutetia ;  Bourges,  the  Bituriges,  not  Avarioum  ;  Beauvais,  the  Bellovaci ; 
Rheims,  the  Remi. 


STATE   OF  GAUL 


505 


tives  came  to  its  annual  councils.  The  Druids  not  only  elected 
their  own  head  and  had  complete  control  in  all  religious  matters, 
but  held  courts   of  justice   whose  authority   rivalled   that   of  the 


STATER    OF    PHILIP    I.    OF    MACEDON— (l)    HEAD    OF   APOLLO; 
(2)   CHARIOTEER. 


GALLIC    IMITATION    OF   STATER    OF   PHILIP. 


chiefs.  Still,  though  the  Druids  and  nobility  had  national  aspira- 
tions, yet  no  national  league  was  ever  formed.  In  place  of  such 
an  union  we  find  separate  confederacies  in  different  parts  of  the 
country.  In  the  north  the  Belgxc,  on  the  coasts  round  Brittany 
the  Armorican  tribes,  were  united  together  ;  but  in  Central  Gaul 
there  was  a  strife  and  rivalry  between  the  partisans  of  the  /Edui 
and  those  of  the  Arverni  and  Sequani. 

The  Germans  in  Gaul. — These  internal  dissensions  naturally 
led  to  foreign  inter\ention.  The  Sequani  and  Ar\erni  pro\ed  no 
match  for  the  yEdui,  and  summoned  to  their  aid  Ariovistus,  king 
of  the  Suebi.  German  tribes,  such  as  the  Aduatuci,  had  long  since 
passed  the  frontier  of  the  Rhine,  to  find  new  homes  in  Gaul,  but 
Ariovistus  was  the  first  German  chieftain  to  aim  at  the  conquest  of 
the  land.  After  defeating  the  ^dui  he  took  hostages  from  them, 
and  bound  them  by  oath  to  pay  him  tribute.  The  Sequani  found 
their  German  ally  even  more  oppressive  than  their  Gallic  enemies. 
Yet  the  appeals  of  the  .4^dui  to  Rome  fell  on  deaf  ears,  for  the 
politicians,  absorbed  in  party  tactics,  preferred  to  temporise,  and 


5o6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tried  to  propitiate  Ario\istus  by  styling  him  "ally  of  Rome." 
Citsar  saw  that  such  an  attitude  encouraged  aggression,  and  went 
to  his  province  determined  to  drive  the  Germans  back  and  assert 
the  supremacy  of  Rome. 

The  Helvetii. — A  yet  more  pressing  danger  claimed  his  atten- 
tion. The  Helvetii,  a  Celtic  tribe  mhabiting  Switzerland,  weary 
of  German  raids,  determined  to  desert  their  countrj'  and  seek  a 
new  home  in  Southern  Gaul.  They  proposed  to  burn  their  towns 
and  villages,  concentrate  on  Genava,  and  so  march  down  the  Rhone 
into  Gaul.  As  the  road  along  the  northern  bank  is  narrow,  they 
asked  permission  of  Ctesar  to  cross  over  and  march  along  the 
Roman  side.  CfEsar,  who  had  but  one  legion  on  the  spot,  gained 
time  by  negotiating,  broke  down  the  bridge  at  Genava,  and  set  to 
work  to  fortify  the  bank  for  some  ten  miles  south  of  that  point. 
Farther  down,  rapids  in  the  stream  and  rocks  on  the  banks 
forbid  a  passage ;  for  these  ten  miles  the  river  is  here  and  there 
fordable.  When  his  works  were  ready  he  forbade  the  Helvetii 
to  cross,  and  beat  back  their  assaults  on  his  lines.  But  by  the 
mediation  of  Dumnorix,  the  leader  of  the  anti-Roman  party  among 
the  ^dui,  the  Helvetii  persuaded  the  Sequani  to  let  them  pass 
through  the  narrow  defile  between  the  Jura  and  the  Rhone.  Caesar 
hurried  back  to  Italy  to  bring  up  reinforcements,  and  returned  at 
the  head  of  six  legions  in  all,  to  find  the  Helvetii  slowly  crossing 
the  Aran  He  destroyed  their  rear-guard,  which  was  still  on  the 
left  bank,  and  then  crossing  the  river,  pushed  the  main  body  north- 
ward. For  fifteen  days  Caesar  hung  on  the  enemy's  rear,  but  the 
untrustworthiness  of  his  Gallic  horse  and  the  failure  of  supplies 
forced  him  to  turn  aside  to  Bibracte,  the  capital  of  the  ^dui. 
This  emboldened  the  tribesmen  to  attack  in  their  turn,  and  Caesar, 
drawing  up  his  legions  in  three  lines,  accepted  battle  in  a  strong 
position.  The  furious  charge  of  the  Helvetii  was  broken  by  the 
firm  stand  of  the  Roman  infantry,  but  as  the  legions  pushed  the 
enemy  down  to  the  plain  their  flank  was  attacked  by  the  Helvetian 
rear-guard,  to  meet  which  Caesar  had  to  form  a  new  line  with  his 
reserves.  The  battle  raged  till  far  into  the  night,  yet  at  length 
the  barricade  of  waggons  round  the  enemy's  camp  was  taken,  and 
their  whole  host  took  to  flight.  After  their  defeat  the  fugitives 
could  get  no  succour  in  Gaul,  and  were  soon  obliged  to  surrender 
at  discretion.  Caesar  sent  the  survivors  back  to  their  old  homes 
to  defend  the  frontier  against  the  Germans  (58  B.C.). 

Caesar  and  Ariovistus. — By  his  victory  over  the  Helvetii,  Ciiesar 
strengthened  the  hands  of  the  partisans  of  Rome  among  all  the 


Boy,  ,%-L,tu,hi  a.^-,,,  P:„ 


Loi.rijfuiit.'- .  Gremi  <i-  (.«. 


^ 


GALLIA 


J.    ..    Caesars   Pr<>via<'C«    b'/\>r^  "-^  (iaJUi<,yfar 
3 CaKseuTis    Coiiquest.a, 


KTia-Vtsh   Miles 


-rn 


o      vo     *o 


^Y 


"V'  r 


tbrc  us  TIC  trsj     x^^.^^-       ^ 

j  S  I  N  LT  S  \  /  Poi- 


4- 


M       H 


n.  !^KW  York  .(,fia,nh.x 


THE  HELVETir  AND   ARIOVISTUS  507 

Gallic  tribes.  At  their  general  council  he  listened  to  the  com- 
plaints brought  by  the  vEdui  and  Sequani  against  the  tyranny  of 
Ariovistus.  But  when  he  demanded  from  the  German  chief  the 
restoration  of  the  ^^duan  hostages  and  a  promise  that  no  more 
Germans  should  cross  the  Rhine,  Ariovistus  haughtily  refused 
compliance.  Ceesar  saw  that  arms  alone  could  put  a  stop  to 
German  immigration,  and  moved  at  once  against  the  enemy.  By 
forced  marches  he  reached  Vesontio  (Besan^on),  the  chief  town 
of  the  Sequani,  before  Ariovistus  could  seize  it,  and  by  its  occupa- 
tion secured  abundant  supplies  for  his  troops.  There  he  had  to 
rally  the  fainting  spirits  of  his  followers,  who  were  in  deadly  terror 
of  the  hardy  and  gigantic  Germans.  The  carpet-knights  who  had 
come  with  him  from  Rome  sought  leave  of  absence  or  bewailed 
their  expected  fate  in  their  tents.  The  common  soldiers  were 
making  their  wills  for  fear  of  the  worst,  and  were  expected  to 
mutiny  if  ordered  to  advance.  Caesar  summoned  his  officers  and 
centurions  to  a  council  of  war,  and  by  telling  them  that,  if  no  one 
else  would  follow,  he  would  go  on  with  the  tenth  legion  alone, 
shamed  them  into  fresh  courage.  He  then  advanced  rapidly 
through  the  plain  between  the  Vosges  and  the  Jura  towards  the 
Rhine.  Ariovistus,  after  a  fruitless  conference,  marched  along  the 
spurs  of  the  Vosges  past  Caesar's  camp,  and  so  cut  off  the  Romans 
from  their  base.  Ca?sar  in  vain  offered  battle,  and  at  length  was 
obliged  to  imitate  the  crafty  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  formed 
a  small  camp  for  two  legions  beyond  their  position.  At  last  he 
forced  battle  by  posting  his  light-armed  troops,  drawn  up  to  re- 
semble two  legions  of  regulars,  in  front  of  this  smaller  camp,  and 
advancing  with  all  the  rest  of  his  forces  against  the  enemy's  lines. 
On  the  right  wing  Caesar  drove  the  Germans  back,  but  on  the 
left  the  Romans  were  only  saved  from  defeat  by  young  Crassus, 
who  brought  up  the  reserve  at  the  decisive  moment.  The  foe  fled 
in  confusion  across  the  Rhine,  but  few,  among  whom  was  Ario- 
vistus, escaped  the  pursuit  of  the  Roman  cavalry.  Thus  in  a 
single  summer  Ciesar  broke  the  two  powers  that  threatened  the 
peace  of  Gaul,  and  first  brought  the  Roman  legions  to  the  great 
river  that  he  was  to  make  once  for  all  the  boundary  of  the 
empire  (58  B.C.). 

The  Conquest  of  the  Belgae. — Caesar  showed  that  he  did  not 
intend  to  relinquish  the  ground  that  he  had  won,  by  leaving  his 
legions  in  winter  quarters  among  the  Sequani.  The  great  con- 
federacy of  the  Belg;t,  which  reached  from  the  Seine  to  the  Rhine, 
considered  themselves  threatened  by  this  advance,  and  gathered 


So8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

early  in  the  spring  to  resist  any  attack  on  tlieir  frontiers.  But 
Cfesar,  with  his  usual  rapidity,  had  already  reached  the  land  of 
the  Remi  (near  Rheims),  and  accepted  their  offers  of  friendship. 
This  opened  his  path  up  to  the  Axona,  where  he  was  met  by  the 
whole  force  of  the  Belgic.  Though  he  had  now  eight  legions,  he 
did  not  dare  to  engage  300,000  men,  but  took  up  a  strong  defen- 
sive position,  and  defeating  an  attempt  to  cut  his  communications, 
waited  for  discontent  and  dissensions  to  break  up  the  confederated 
tribes.  After  a  time  the  Belgic  chiefs  were  persuaded  by  the 
Bellovaci,  whose  land  was  being  ravaged  by  the  yEdui,  to  order 
their  clansmen  to  return  to  their  homes.  Their  retreat  \\as  turned 
into  a  disorderly  flight  by  the  hot  pursuit  of  the  cavalry  and  three 
legions  under  Labienus.  Ciesar  took  full  advantage  of  his  bloodless 
victory.  He  fell  suddenly,  first  on  the  Suessiones,  and  then  on 
the  Bellovaci,  and  compelled  them  to  disarm  and  give  hostages 
as  pledges  of  submission.  But  the  Nervii  (in  Hainault)  were 
made  of  sterner  stuff.  Gathering  their  clients  and  allies,  they  laid 
an  ambush  for  Csesar  on  the  Upper  Sambre.  As  Ctesar's  six 
veteran  legions  were  pitching  their  camp  on  one  bank,  and  the 
cavalry  and  light-armed  were  exploring  the  woods  on  the  farther 
side,  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  swept  down  the  slope,  brushed 
aside  the  cavalry,  crossed  the  stream,  and  fell  on  the  infantry. 
On  the  left  the  famous  tenth  legion,  with  the  ninth,  soon  drove 
the  enemy  back  across  the  river,  but  the  cavalry  took  to  flight, 
and  the  two  legions  on  the  right  wing  were  rolled  up  in  confusion. 
Caesar  threw  himself  into  their  ranks,  and  by  voice  and  example 
encouraged  the  faltering  troops.  Back  to  back  the  two  legions 
stubbornly  held  their  ground,  till  Labienus  sent  the  fighting  tenth 
to  their  aid,  and  the  cavalry  returned  to  the  charge.  The  Nervii, 
who  resisted  to  the  last,  were  surrounded  and  almost  annihi- 
lated. The  defeat  and  surrender  of  this  tribe  and  their  allies 
secured  the  supremacy  of  Rome  among  the  Belgic  clans.  The 
winter  camps  of  the  legions  were  on  the  Upper  Loire,  in  the  heart 
of  Gaul  (57  B.C.). 

The  Veneti. — During  the  winter  Caesar  learnt  that  the  \'eneti 
and  the  kindred  tribes  on  the  coasts  from  the  Loire  to  the  Seine 
had  repented  of  their  submission  to  P.  Crassus,  and  seized  the 
Roman  envoys  sent  to  recjuisition  corn  from  them.  In  the  spring 
Labienus  was  ordered  to  keep  the  Belga;  quiet,  Sabinus  to  hold 
the  Upper  Loire,  P.  Crassus  to  advance  into  Aquitaine,  while 
Caesar  himself  led  an  army  against  the  chief  offenders.  The 
Veneti,  a  hardy  seafaring"  people,  defended  themselves  with  sue- 


THE  BELGAi  AND    VENETI 


509 


cess  on  the  cliffs  and  islets  round  the  mouth  of  the  Loire.  At 
length  Decimus  Brutus  brought  up  the  fleet  which  C;csar  had 
ordered  to  be  built  in  the  winter.  By  cutting  the  rigging  of  the 
sailing-ships  of  the  \'eneti  he  made  them  a  helpless  prey  to  the 
oared  Roman  galleys,  and  utterly  destroyed  their  fleet.  Cicsar 
punished  their  defection  and  the  seizure  of  his  envoys  by  putting 
the  chiefs  to  death  and  selling  the  whole  tribe  as  slaves.     Mean- 


FIGUKE-HEAU    OF   KUMAN    SHIP. 


while  his  lieutenants  were  equally  successful  in  the  performance 
of  their  appointed  tasks,  P.  Crassus  subduing  the  whole  land  of 
Aquitaine  up  to  the  Pyrenees  (56  B.C.). 

Encounters  with  German  Tribes. — Ctesar  had  now  established 
the  suzerain  power  of  Rome  throughout  Gaul,  but  he  had  yet  to 
secure  his  new  conquests.  The  discontented  Celts  might  call  in 
the  assistance  of  their  kinsmen  in  Britain,  or  of  the  Germans  across 
the  Rhine.     The  latter  danger  had  to  be  faced  at  once.     Two 


SIO  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

tribes,  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  dislodged  by  the  Suebi  from 
their  old  homes,  had,  with  the  connivance  of  the  Menapii,  crossed 
the  Rhine  and  settled  in  their  land.  C;csar  marched  rapidly  down 
the  Meuse  to  prevent  their  further  advance,  and  met  their  request 
for  lands  on  the  Gallic  side  of  the  Rhine  with  a  curt  refusal.  Their 
attempts  to  negotiate  he  treated  as  subterfuges  to  gain  time  for 
the  return  of  the  bulk  of  their  horsemen.  Final!}-,  enraged  at  a 
treacherous  attack  on  his  cavalry,  he  seized  the  chiefs  who  came 
to  apologise  for  the  breach  of  the  truce,  and  fell  upon  the  leaderlcss 
tribes.  Helpless  masses  of  Germans  were  slaughtered  or  driven 
into  the  Rhine.  Caesar  determined  to  complete  the  terror  caused 
by  this  massacre  by  crossing-  the  river.  In  twelve  days  he  built 
a  bridge  of  piles,  and  then  led  his  legions  across  it  to  the  help  of 
the  Ubii.  Their  oppressors,  the  formidable  Suebi,  withdrew  into 
their  trackless  forests,  and  Caesar  contenting  himself  with  laying 
waste  the  lands  of  the  Sugambri,  after  eighteen  days  recrossed  the 
Rhine  and  broke  down  the  bridge  (55  B.C.). 

First  Landing  in  Britain. — In  the  autumn  a  similar  demonstra- 
tion was  made  against  Britain.  Ctesar  gathered  eighty  ships  at 
Portus  I  tins  (Wissant),  placed  two  legions  on  board,  and  set  sail 
across  the  Channel.  Next  morning  he  came  in  sight  of  the  white 
cliffs  of  Britain,  and  sailing  west,  reached  at  last  a  low  shore, 
probably  that  of  Romney  marsh,  where  it  was  possible  to  land. 
But  the  soldiers  feared  to  leap  into  the  water  in  face  of  the  Britons 
on  the  beach,  till  the  standard-bearer  of  the  tenth  set  them  an 
example,  which  was  speedily  followed.  Directly  they  reached  firm 
ground  the  enemy  fled.  Soon  afterwards  the  Britons  sent  envoys 
to  offer  their  submission,  but  on  learning  that  a  storm  had  destroyed 
many  of  Caesar's  vessels  and  driven  back  the  fleet  carrying  his 
cavalry,  they  returned  to  the  attack.  Ctesar,  who  easily  repulsed 
their  assaults,  was  yet  glad  to  regain  the  Gallic  coast  without 
further  misadventure  (55  B.C.). 

Second  Expedition  to  Britain. — Next  summer  Caesar  repeated 
his  expedition  to  Britain,  and  took  with  him  a  much  larger  force. 
The  natives  did  not  dare  to  oppose  the  landing  of  his  five 
legions.  Again  a  storm  compelled  him  to  repair  his  disabled 
ships  and  delayed  his  advance.  When  at  length  he  marched 
inland,  Cassivellaunus,  the  leader  of  the  Britons,  retreated,  but 
harassed  the  Romans  by  sudden  attacks  with  his  war-chariots. 
Ccesar  crossed  the  Thames  and  took  the  fortified  camp  of  the 
enemy,  but  found  the  concjuest  of  the  country  a  task  beyond  his 
powers.     He  was  satisfied  to  return  to  Gaul  after  receiving  from 


REVOLT  IN  GAUL  511 

Cassivellaunus  a  promise  to  pay  tribute  and  to  abstain  from 
attacking,"'  the  Trinobantes,  a  friendly  tribe.  No  Roman  army  set 
foot  on  British  soil  for  nearly  another  century  ;  the  country  \\as 
wild,  and  offered  no  prospect  of  booty  to  tempt  the  greed  of 
invaders. 

Revolts  headed  by  Ambiorix. — Withm  Gaul  itself  there  were 
dangerous  signs  of  discontent,  fostered  doubtless  by  this  injudi- 
cious dissipation  of  strength.  The  yEduan,  Dumnorix,  had  refused 
to  go  with  Ciesar  to  Britain,  and  had  been  cut  down  as  a  deserter 
on  his  way  home.  While  C«sar  was  in  Britain  the  Gallic  nobles 
organised  a  widespread  insurrection.  Unfortunately  for  him 
scarcity  of  supplies  compelled  Caesar  to  station  his  legions  in  si.x 
separate  and  distant  camps  for  the  winter.  He  himself  remained 
at  Samarobriva  (Amiens),  having  one  legion  with  him  and  three 
within  call.  He  stationed  Labienus  in  the  land  of  the  Treveri, 
and  Q.  Cicero  among  the  Nervii.  In  the  most  distant  camp  at 
Aduatuca,  Sabinus  and  Cotta  had  a  legion  of  recruits  and  five 
cohorts  of  veterans.  This  corps  was  furiously  assailed  in  iti 
new  winter  quarters  by  the  Eburones  under  Ambiorix,  but  might 
easily  have  held  its  entrenchments.  In  a  weak  moment  Sabinus 
listened  to  the  treacherous  tale  told  by  Ambiorix  of  a  general 
assault  on  the  scattered  legions,  and  accepted  his  offer  of  a  safe 
conduct  for  his  soldiers  to  the  camp  of  Labienus.  The  little  force 
was  decoyed  into  a  trap  by  the  wily  chief,  and  Sabinus,  who 
attempted  to  make  terms,  murdered  with  many  of  his  officers. 
Cotta  fought  bravely  to  the  last,  till  the  unequal  struggle  ended 
in  the  total  annihilation  of  the  Roman  division  (54  B.C.). 

Q.  Cicero  relieved  by  Caesar.— Flushed  with  victory  and  re- 
inforced from  the  neighbouring  cantons,  the  insurgents  flung  them- 
selves on  the  camp  of  Q.  Cicero.  But  that  officer  met  their  attack 
with  coolness,  and  doggedly  refused  to  treat  with  an  armed  enemy. 
Messenger  after  messenger  was  seized  on  his  way  to  Ca;sar,  yet 
at  length  a  Gallic  horseman  reached  Amiens.  Caesar  started  next 
morning  with  but  two  legions  to  rescue  his  lieutenant.  Within 
five  days  the  smoke  of  burning  villages  announced  his  coming  and 
drew  off  the  hosts  of  the  enemy.  Caesar  kept  within  his  camp  as 
though  in  fear,  and  then  by  a  sudden  sally  dispersed  the  Gauls 
in  confusion.  But  the  insurrection  could  not  be  stamped  out  in 
winter.  As  spring  drew  on,  Indutiomarus,  the  chief  of  the  Treveri, 
attacked  Labienus,  but  fell  in  a  cavalry  skirmish.  His  tribesmen 
summoned  the  Germans  to  their  aid,  but  a  feigned  retreat  drew 
them  into  a  hot  pursuit  after  Labienus,  and  led  to  their  destruction 


512  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

before  their  German  allies  had  come  up.  Caesar,  who  had  already 
reduced  to  subjection,  besides  the  Senones  and  Carnutes,  the  fierce 
Nervii  and  the  hitherto  unconcjuered  Menapii,  now  followed  up 
the  easy  victory  of  his  lieutenant  by  a  second  military  promenade 
across  the  Rhine.  The  only  task  left  was  the  punishment  of  the 
guilty  Eburones,  who  were  hunted  down  with  merciless  severity. 
By  the  end  of  the  summer  Northern  Gaul  had  been  terrified  into 
the  peace  of  despair  (53  R.C.). 

Vercingetorix  raises  Southern  Gaul  in  Revolt. — Worse  was 
yet  to  come.  While  Cicsar  was  in  North  Italy  the  patriots  of 
Southern  Gaul  made  a  final  effort  to  rouse  the  nation  to  resistance. 
At  their  head  was  a  young  Arvernian  chief,  \^ercingetorix,  who 
speedily  won  over,  first  his  own  tribe,  and  then  the  clans  of 
Western  Gaul.  His  plan  was  to  cut  off  Caesar  from  his  legions 
by  preventing  his  return  from  the  province.  While  Vercingetorix 
was  engaged  in  the  /Eduan  district  his  friend  Lucterius  threatened 
the  province  itself.  But  Caesar  defeated  their  manoeuvres  by  his 
extraordinary  rapidity.  Cutting  his  way  through  the  snows  of  the 
Cevennes  in  the  depth  of  winter,  he  drew  Vercingetorix  off  to  the 
defence  of  his  own  clansmen,  and  then  with  a  handful  of  cavalry 
dashed  through  the  land  of  the  yEdui  to  the  camps  of  his  legions. 
Vercingetorix  fell  back  on  the  plan  of  starving  out  the  enemy. 
The  country  was  to  be  laid  waste,  the  towns  and  stores  burnt,  and 
the  Romans  prevented  from  foraging  by  the  fine  Gallic  cavalry. 
Only  Avaricum  (Bourges),  the  chief  town  of  the  Bituriges,  was 
spared.  Round  that  devoted  city  the  war  now  centred.  The 
Gallic  infantry  lay  secure  in  impassable  morasses  ;  the  cavalry  cut 
off  Ctesar's  communications.  Still  his  famished  legions  refused  to 
raise  the  siege,  and  at  length  triumphed  over  the  heroic  garrison. 
The  town  was  stormed  and  the  inhabitants  massacred  by  the 
maddened  soldiery  (52  B.C.). 

Caesar  repulsed  at  Gergovia. — C?esar  now  despatched  Labienus 
with  four  legions  northwards  to  hold  the  Carnutes  and  Senones 
in  check,  while  he  himself  turned  south  against  the  Arverni. 
Labienus,  however,  made  little  progress  on  the  Seine,  and  Caesar 
found  his  advance  arrested  by  the  impregnable  fortress  of  Gergovia. 
He  had  not  troops  enough  to  blockade  a  hill  a  mile  long  and  half 
as  broad,  and  was  compelled  to  try  to  storm  the  defences.  The 
legions  penetrated  into  the  Gallic  camp,  but  fell  into  confusion 
a  rash  assault  on  the  wall  of  the  city,  and  were  driven  down  the 
hill  with  considerable  loss.  Their  commander  for  the  first  time 
was  compelled  to  beat  a  retreat,  and  that  retreat  was  the  signal 


REVOLT  OF   VEKCIMGETOKIX 


5*3 


for  the  defection  of  the  /Edui  and  risings  among  the  Belgjp. 
Timid  counsellors  advised  Caesar  to  retire  into  the  old  province 
now  threatened  by  the  enemy,  but  he  would  not  desert  Labienus. 
That  able  general  fought  his  way  out  of  the  country  of  the  Seine 
and  joined  C;vsar  at  Agedincum. 

Siege  and  Capture  of  Alesia. — The  united  army  now  moved 
southward  to  protect  the  province.  On  the  borders  of  the  Sequani, 
Vercingetorix,  fresh  from  his  election  as  general  of  all  Gaul,  came 


CAVALRY  CAMF;^t/\[V'        #  ~* 

Grei,ign^0Y       ^  Montagne 


Menetieux 


n^^u,  i^h^.,u,,^^. 


PLAN    OF    ALESIA. 


up  with  the  Roman  army.  The  Gallic  cavalry  was  met,  and,  to 
its  surprise,  vanquished  by  C?esar's  newly  raised  German  horse. 
Despairing  of  success  in  the  open  field,  Vercingetorix  shut  himself 
up  in  a  fortified  camp  on  the  steep  isolated  hill  of  Alesia.  But  now 
CiEsar  had  all  his  forces  united,  and  was  enabled  to  draw  his  lines 
right  round  the  town.  In  vain  the  Celtic  cavalry  tried  to  keep 
the  communications  open  ;  they  were  beaten  back  by  Caesar's 
Germans,  and  had  to  be  sent  away  before  they  were  completely 

2   K 


514  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

heinmcd  in.  Tlie  in<lcf;iti,i;;ihlc  Irj^^ionaiics,  warring;,  as  oftcil, 
with  the  spade,  carried  a  doiil^le  line  of  entrenchments  ten  miles 
long,  right  round  Alesia,  and  so  guarded  themselves  not  only 
against  the  beleaguered  garrison,  but  also  against  the  expected 
army  of  relief.  When  the  besieged  had  come  to  the  verge  of 
famine,  a  vast  host,  gathered  from  all  Gaul,  appeared  before  Caisar's 
lines.  Two  sharp  combats  led  up  to  the  final  struggle  that  was 
to  decide  the  fate  of  Gaul.  At  one  point  the  Gauls  were  repulsed 
only  by  the  arrival  of  Cassar  with  the  reserve  ;  at  another  the  lines 
were  actually  forced  ;  but  Labienus  threw  himself  on  the  enemy 
with  every  man  he  could  collect,  and  with  one  mighty  effort  hurled 
back  the  Celtic  host.  The  cavalry  sent  by  C;csar  fell  on  their 
rear  and  completed  the  rout  (52  r,.c.). 

The  Fate  of  Vercingetorix  and  of  Gaul. — Vercingetorix  deter- 
mined to  resign  the  hopeless  struggle  and  offer  himself  as  a  victim 
for  the  nation.  A  true  knight  to  the  last,  he  rode  full  armed  to 
Caesar's  camp,  and  there  surrendered  himself  to  the  mercy  of  the 
conqueror.  CjEsar  reserved  him  to  grace  his  triumph,  and  to  suffer 
death  at  the  foot  of  the  Capitol.  A  Roman  never  forgot  and  never 
forgave  the  deadly  foes  of  his  country  ;  and  though  Gaul  was  now 
utterly  prostrate,  and  had  proved  her  degradation  by  surrendering 
her  only  hero  to  purchase  her  own  safety,  Vercingetorix  was  the 
greatest  enemy  Rome  had  met  since  the  days  of  Hannibal.  Gaul 
was  now  subdued.  Though  the  Bellovaci  attempted  again  to 
assert  their  independence  and  the  remnants  of  the  rebels  held 
out  stoutly  in  Uxellodunum,  there  was  no  hope  that  these  isolated 
risings  could  stem  the  tide  of  Roman  conquest.  After  their  failure 
C;esar  devoted  the  last  year  of  his  governorship  to  conciliating  and 
organising'  the  wide  territories  he  had  won.  The  establishment  of 
the  full  provincial  system  was  interrupted  by  the  outbreak  of  the 
civil  war,  and  not  carried  out  till  the  days  of  Augustus.  But 
Caesar's  heir  worked  on  the  lines  which  Caesar  had  laid  down,  and 
in  the  new  Romanised  Gaul  of  the  early  empire  we  may  see  the 
fruit  of  Cfesar's  labours.  Finally,  the  conquest  and  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  Gaul  prepared  him  for  the  career  before  him,  for  the  military 
glories  of  the  civil  war,  and  the  unique  position  of  first  emperor 
of  Rome.  In  Gaul  Caesar  learnt  to  look  at  the  narrow  politics  of 
the  Forum  from  outside,  and  to  estimate  aright  their  pettiness  and 
folly.  Trained  in  the  hard  school  of  toil  and  anxiety,  and  breath- 
ing the  free  air  of  a  provincial  command,  he  rose  above  the 
shibboleths  of  a  partisan  creed,  and  kept  his  mind  fixed  on  the 
duties  of  Rome  to  her  empire.    Gradually  the  conviction  was  forced 


CAiSAR  JN  GAUL 


515 


upon  him  that  the  sovereign  state  would  never  inake  the  welfare 
of  her  subjects  her  first  object  until  her  own  constitution  was  re- 
modelled. Cajsar  was  not  selfishly  anxious  to  force  on  this  neces- 
sary reform  ;  but   he  possessed   naturally  the  power  of  inspiring 


KOMAN    ARCH    AT   S.    REMY   (FRANCE) 


devotion  in  his  followers,  and  had  acquired  the  insight,  the  patience, 
and  the  perseverance  needed  for  the  proper  use  of  this  power.  The 
man  was  ready  to  take  up  the  great  task  of  reconstruction,  when 
the  destined  hour  came. 


5i6  HISTORY  OF  ROME 


CHAPTER  L 

THE    RULK    OF    THE    TRIUMVIRATE    AND    ITS    DISSOLUTION 

n.c.  A.u.c. 

Recall  of  Cicero •        ...  -57  697 

Conference  of  Luca  ....    56  698 

Consulship   of   Pompey   and   Crassus — The   Triumvirs   given 
Provinces  for  Five  Years— Cassar,  Gaul ;  Pompey,  Spain 

Crassus,  Syria 55  699 

Departure  of  Crassus— Death  of  Julia        ....  54  700 

Battle  of  Carrhae— Death  of  Crassus 53  701 

Murder  of  Clodius — Pompey  sole  Consul 52  702 

Question  of  Caesar's  Resignation  of  his  Province  .        .     50  704 

Disorder  at  Rome. — While  Cicsar  in  Gaul  was  winning  fame 
and  power,  Pompey  was  left  at  home  to  rule  the  capital.  But  to 
keep  order  in  a  city  still  seething  with  revolution  required  what 
Pompey  had  not — the  iron  hand  in  the  velvet  glove.  He  was 
without  police  or  soldiers  to  suppress  by  force  the  bands  of  black- 
guards, led  by  noble  adventurers,  whose  type  and  chief  was  to  be 
seen  in  the  tribune  P.  Clodius.  The  mob  under  his  leadership 
ran  riot  in  the  streets  of  Rome,  murder  and  arson  became  crimes 
of  daily  occurrence,  and  anarchy  arrogated  to  herself  the  sacred 
name  of  liberty.  Pompey  attempted  to  meet  Clodius  with  his  own 
weapons,  but  in  this  warfare  of  the  street  the  triumvir  was  no 
match  for  the  tribune,  and  after  a  time  he  shut  himself  up  in  his 
house,  in  fear  of  assassination.  At  length  the  insolence  and 
violence  of  Clodius  drove  Pompey  to  retaliate  by  promoting  the 
recall  of  Cicero.  Clodius  retorted  by  trying  to  set  up  Crassus 
against  Pompey,  and  by  forming  an  unnatural  alliance  with  Bibulus 
and  the  extreme  senatorials,  who  still  questioned  the  validity  of 
Caesar's  measures.  But  when  his  tribunate  was  over,  Clodius  was 
reduced  to  fighting  with  his  old  weapons.  In  T.  Annius  Milo, 
now  tribune,  his  enemies  found  a  champion  to  meet  him  on  his 
own  ground,  who  would  repel  the  ruffians  of  Clodius  with  hired 
swordsmen.  For  months  Rome  was  the  scene  of  violent  en- 
counters between  the  rival  mobs,  but  at  length,  in  August  57  B.C., 
the  centuries  were  formally  assembled,  and  recalled  Cicero  with 
acclamation.  Immense  crowds  from  all  parts  of  Italy  flocked  to 
the  capital  to  vote  for  the  great  orator's  restoration  to  his  country, 
and  made  his  journey  homeward  a  triumphal  progress. 

Deceived  by  his  reception,  Cicero  dreamed  that  the  state  might 
yet  be  rescued  from  the  domination  of  the  triumvirs  and  Pompey 


POMPEY  AT  ROME  517 

recalled  to  the  path  of  political  virtue.  There  was  much  in  the 
state  of  affairs  to  favour  the  illusion.  Now  that  the  true  nature 
of  the  coalition  was  seen,  the  triumvirate  was  unpopular  with  all 
classes  at  Rome.  The  people  as  well  as  the  Senate  deplored  their 
lost  independence,  and  clamoured  against  the  three  men  who  set 
themselves  abo\e  the  law.  Pompey  himself  was  supposed  to  be 
discontented  with  his  position  ;  he  felt  that,  while  he  had  secured 
the  shadow,  Ca;sar  had  the  substance  of  power.  He  saw  with 
alarm  and  surprise  the  glories  of  his  past  career  pale  before  the 
fresh  lustre  of  Caesar's  GalHc  victories.  In  fine,  he  felt  it  necessary 
to  secure  a  new  command,  and  in  his  perplexity  turned  to  the 
Senate  for  help. 

Intrigues  of  Pompey. — The  scarcity  of  corn  at  Rome  formed 
the  excuse  for  a  Bill  brought  forward  by  an  obsequious  tribune, 
Messius  (57  B.C.),  which  would  have  given  Pompey  control  of  the 
corn-supply  throughout  the  empire.  The  free  disposal  of  the 
state  treasure,  the  command  of  an  army  and  a  fleet,  and  a  power 
in  every  province  superior  to  that  of  the  actual  governor  {inaius 
imperiuni)  were  included  in  the  functions  assigned  to  the  com- 
missioner in  this  improved  edition  of  the  Gabinian  law.  But  the 
Senate  dared  not  trust  him  again  with  power  so  vast,  and  withheld 
the  authority  over  other  officials,  and  the  army  and  fleet,  which 
he  coveted  in  secret,  but  would  not  openly  demand.  It  gave,  on 
Cicero's  proposal,  only  proconsular  power  and  the  management  of 
the  corn-supply  for  five  years,  which  pro\ided  Pompey  with  an 
honourable  and  popular  employment,  but  did  not  confer  any  sub- 
stantial power.  Accordingly,  in  the  very  next  year  (56  B.C.)  Pompey 
is  again  a  candidate,  by  indirect  methods,  for  an  important  commis- 
sion. He  desired  to  be  entrusted  with  an  army  to  restore  Ptolemy 
Auletes  to  his  throne,  but  the  Senate  unearthed  an  oracle  which 
declared  it  impious  to  send  an  army  to  Egypt,  and  by  playing  off 
the  rival  candidates  for  this  lucrative  mission  against  each  other, 
succeeded  in  shelving  the  whole  business.  Once  more,  as  in  62  B.C., 
the  incompatibility  of  Pompey's  pretensions  with  republican  equality 
was  demonstrated  ;  once  more  the  Senate  rejected  the  overtures  of 
the  man  whom  they  should  have  enlisted  on  their  side. 

Conference  of  Luca. — At  the  moment  the  repulse  of  Pompey 
seemed  like  the  triumph  of  the  Senate  over  the  coalition.  The  con- 
sular and  praetorian  elections  (September  57  B.C.),  and,  above  all,  the 
failure  of  Caesar's  tool,  Vatinius,  to  attain  the  ccdileship  (January  56 
B.C.),  confirmed  the  view  that  there  was  a  republican  reaction.  The 
trial  of  }'.  Sestius,  who  (March)  was  accused  by  Clodius  of  rioting 


5i8  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

gave  Cicero  llie  opportunity  of  recounting  the  exertions  of  Sestius  in 
promoting  his  recall,  and  at  the  same  time  putting  forth  a  political 
manifesto.  Encouraged  by  the  unanimous  acquittal  of  his  client, 
and  reckoning  on  the  mutual  jealousy  of  Pompey  and  C;esar,  the 
orator  was  bold  enough  to  give  notice  (April)  that  he  would  call  in 
question  the  validity  of  the  Julian  law,  under  which  the  Campanian 
land  had  been  distributed  in  allotments.  But  he  had  miscalculated 
once  more  his  own  strength,  and  failed  to  grasp  the  drift  of  events. 
The  challenge,  which  was  meant  to  rally  the  republicans,  in  effect 
healed  the  divisions  between  the  triumvirs.  Ca:sar,  who  had 
already  summoned  Crassus  to  Ravenna  to  consult  over  the  state 
of  affairs,  now  arranged  a  conference  with  Pompey  at  Luca.  The 
meeting  of  the  three  potentates  was  attended  by  many  provincial 
governors  and  two  hundred  senators.  Its  result  was  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  the  coalition  on  a  firmer  basis.  Pompey  and  Crassus 
were  to  be  given  the  power  and  the  official  position  which  they 
coveted.  After  holding  the  consulship  together  for  the  second 
time,  Pompey  was  to  receive  Spain  and  Crassus  Syria  for  five 
years,  by  decree  of  the  people,  while  Caesar  secured  the  renewal 
of  his  own  command  for  the  same  period,  and  the  reversion  of 
the  consulate  at  its  close.  Historians  have  wondered  why  Cassar 
granted  such  favourable  terms  to  his  discredited  rival.  But  the 
army  assigned  to  Crassus  for  the  invasion  of  Parthia  formed  a 
counterpoise  to  the  Spanish  legions  of  Pompey,  and  neither  Caesar 
nor  his  soldiers  were  yet  prepared  to  march  on  Italy.  Caesar  was 
not  a  deliberate  schemer  aiming  at  despotism,  but  a  man  whose 
heart  was  set  on  doing  the  work  of  the  hour,  confident  in  his  own' 
ability  to  rise  to  the  height  of  future  emergencies.  With  the  true 
spirit  of  a  statesman  and  soldier,  he  concentrated  himself  on  the 
immediate  problem  to  the  momentary  neglect  of  other  issues.  His 
present  purpose  was  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Gaul,  and  for 
that  end  he  chose  to  run  the  risk  of  strengthening  Pompey.  The 
time  was  not  yet  ripe  for  revolution,  and  Caesar  would  not  bid  his 
army  turn  its  weapons  against  fellow-citizens  while  there  remained 
a  chance  of  a  peaceable  reformation  of  the  government. 

The  renewed  Triumvirate. — The  conference  of  Luca  placed 
the  government  of  the  world  in  the  hands  of  the  triumvirs.  All 
the  chief  provinces  and  armies  were  dutifully  placed  at  their  dis- 
posal by  the  assembly  of  the  tribes,  but  Pompey  illegally  left  to 
lieutenants  the  care  of  Spain,  and  stayed  himself  in  Rome  to  watch 
over  the  interests  of  the  coalition.  The  aristocrats  submitted  to 
superior  force,  and  accepted  the  position  of  dependence  to  which 


THE  RENEWAL    OF   THE    TRIUMVIRATE  519 

they  were  reduced.  Cicero,  who  frankly  confesses  the  futiHty  of  his 
attempt  to  assert  his  independence,  quietly  withdrew  his  obnoxious 
motion,  and  atoned  for  it  by  his  eloquent  praises  of  the  conqueror  of 
(kiul  (56  B.C.).  He  "had  found  the  nobility  a  broken  reed,  and  was 
now  content  to  be  the  mouthpiece  of  the  triumvirs.  He  felt  the  shame 
of  defending-  his  old  enemies,  Gabinius  and  Vatinius,  bitterly,  but 
bowed  to  the  dictates  of  necessity  (54  B.C.).  Only  the  uncompromis- 
ing Cato,  whose  action  showed  more  zeal  than  discretion,  maintained 
the  cause  of  liberty.  Riotous  obstruction  to  the  measure  of  Tre- 
bonius,  which  gave  Pompey  and  Crassus  their  provinces,  and  a 
motion  in  the  Senate  to  hand  over  Ciesar  to  the  survivors  of  the 
murdered  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  were  the  chief  demonstrations 
attempted  by  the  remnant  of  the  republicans. 

Republican  Opposition. — Yet  an  unceasing  warfare  was  main- 
tained at  the  elections  and  in  the  law  courts.  The  elections  were 
at  this  period  the  scene  of  the  most  open  and  shameful  bribery. 
The  numerous  opportunities  afforded  by  the  complicated  and  old- 
fashioned  system  of  polling-  were  used  both  by  the  constitutionalists 
and  the  triumvirs  to  the  full.  But  we  may  note  that,  whereas  in 
55  B.C.  Pompey  and  Crassus  were  easily  elected  consuls,  and 
Vatinius,  Citsar's  ready  tool,  distanced  Cato  for  the  prtetorship, 
next  year  Cato  was  successful,  and  the  aristocrat  Domitius  gained 
the  consulship.  Again,  in  the  law  courts  the  tools  of  the  triumvirs, 
Vatinius  and  Cabinius,  were  attacked  with  envenomed  animosity 
by  the  constitutionalists.  Vatinius  was  saved  only  by  the  inter- 
vention of  Citsar.  Pompey,  with  his  usual  maladroitness,  suffered 
Gabinius  to  fall  a  victim  to  the  resentment  of  Crassus  and  the 
capitalists. 

The  East  and  Egypt. — While  disorder  reigned  at  Rome,  in 
the  East  there  arose  a  cloud  which  was  the  herald  of  the  coming 
storm.  Already  a  Parthian  attack  on  Armenia  and  civil  strife 
between  two  pretenders  to  the  Parthian  crown  had  given  the 
active  governor  of  Syria,  A.  Gabinius,  grounds  for  interference. 
But  before  he  could  intervene  with  effect  he  was  called  away  to 
restore  Ptolemy  to  the  throne  of  Eg^ypt.  The  Roman  army  twice 
defeated  the  insurgents,  at  Pelusium  and  on  the  Nile,  and  easily 
re-established  the  oppressive  rule  of  the  legitimate  king.  Gabinius 
had  acted  without  authority  from  the  Senate,  but  in  accordance 
with  the  wishes  of  the  triumvirs  (55  B.C.). 

Crassus  invades  Parthia  :  Battle  of  Carrhae.^On  his  return  he 
found  Crassus  ready  to  take  over  the  command  of  the  army  des- 
tined to  invade  Parthia.     Crassus,  who  was  burning  to  emulate 


520  IirSTORY  OF  A'OME 

the  military  glories  of  Caesar  and  Pompey,  thought  himself  a 
second  Alexander.  A  reconnaissance  in  force  confirmed  him  in 
an  ill-judged  preference  for  a  march  direct  across  the  desert  over 
the  circuitous  but  safer  route  through  the  Armenian  mountains. 
He  would  not  even  move  down  the  Euphrates,  but  plunged  head- 
long into  the  trackless  wastes  of  sand  known  as  the  Alesopotamian 
desert.  The  faithless  sheik  Abgarus,  who  guided  the  Romans, 
led  them  to  their  ruin.  Suddenly  the  legions  found  themselves 
surrounded  by  thousands  of  mail-clad  lancers  and  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  mounted  archers.  With  wise  discretion,  the  Parthian 
vizier  had  sent  all  the  infantry,  under  King  Orodes,  against  Armenia, 
and  kept  only  cavalry  for  this  service  (53  B.C.). 

The  legionaries,  whose  crowded  ranks  made  them  an  easy 
mark  for  archers,  could  not  close  with  the  swiftly  moving  enemy 
on  the  boundless  desert.  In  vain  young  P.  Crassus,  Ciiesar's  brave 
legate,  led  his  Gallic  horsemen  and  picked  light  infantry  to  the 
attack.  The  Parthians  let  him  separate  himself  from  the  main 
army,  and  then  enveloped  him  in  clouds  of  cavalry.  Young  Crassus 
and  his  officers  slew  themselves,  and  of  his  6000  men  none  escaped 
death  or  captivity.  The  attack  on  the  main  body,  which  had 
slackened  for  a  time,  was  renewed  with  vigour  till  night  fell.  Then 
the  Parthians  rode  off,  and  the  Romans,  leaving  their  sick  and 
wounded  to  be  massacred  by  the  enemy,  fled  to  Carrha?.  Hence 
the  beaten  army  made  a  push  for  Sinnaca,  hoping  to  find  shelter 
in  the  Armenian  hills.  Fearing  that  the  prey  might  yet  escape 
him,  the  vizier  proposed  a  conference,  to  which  Crassus  was 
forced  by  his  troops  to  consent.  The  Roman  officers  suspected 
the  Parthians  of  attempting  to  seize  the  person  of  their  chief,  and 
made  a  vain  resistance.  In  the  fray  that  followed  the  general 
and  his  staff  were  cut  down,  and  their  leaderless  troops  were 
captured  or  dispersed.  Of  the  army  which  invaded  Parthia,  half 
had  perished,  a  quarter  with  many  eagles  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  conquerors,  and  but  a  quarter  returned  to  tell  how  misplaced 
confidence  had  led  to  ruin  and  disgrace.  The  disaster  of  Carrhse 
was  the  inevitable  consequence  of  exposing  a  large  force  of  infantry, 
armed  with  javelins  of  short  range,  to  the  attacks  of  overwhelming 
cavalry  in  an  open  plain,  and  one  more  example  of  the  permanent 
inadequacy  of  the  cavalry  arm  in  the  Roman  service.  Their 
African  experiences  had  failed  to  drive  the  obvious  lesson  home. 

Cassias  repulses  the  Parthians. — The  Parthians  failed  to  follow 
up  their  success  with  energy.  C.  Cassius,  who  alone  of  the  officers 
under  Crassus  had  behaved  with  resolution  in  the  hour  of  defeat, 


CARRHAL  AND  AFTER  521 

easily  checked  the  raids  of  their  roving  horsemen.  At  last  a  great 
invading  army,  under  the  prince  Pacorus,  overran  Syria  and  shut 
up  Cassius  in  Antioch.  But  with  two  weak  legions  formed  from 
the  remnants  of  Crassus'  army,  he  beat  off  their  assaults,  and 
by  entrapping  them  into  an  ambush  as  they  retreated  along  the 
Orontes,  inflicted  upon  them  a  severe  loss.  The  new  governor 
of  Syria,  the  stubborn  and  incompetent  M.  Bibulus,  was  saved 
from  danger  merely  by  the  fact  that  Pacorus,  making  a  truce  with 
Rome,  turned  his  arms  against  his  father,  Orodes  (51  B.C.). 

The  Rift  in  the  Triumvirate. — The  death  of  Crassus  left  his 
colleagues  open  ri\'als.  Pompey's  beloved  wife  Julia,  who  might 
have  softened  the  differences  between  her  husband  and  her  father, 
had  died  a  year  before,  in  the  flower  of  her  age.  Though  there 
was  as  yet  no  open  breach  between  them,  and  in  53  B.C.  Czesar 
could  still  borrow  a  legion  from  Pompey  to  meet  an  emergency,  the 
whole  current  of  events  tended  to  carry  Pompey  away  from  Ca?sar 
and  towards  the  Senate.  At  the  beginning  of  52  B.C.  the  faction- 
fights  between  Clodius  and  Milo,  who  was  now  standing  for  office 
against  the  interest  of  the  triumvirs,  ended  in  the  murder  of  the 
former  after  a  chance  scuffle  on  the  Appian  Way.  The  dregs 
of  the  Roman  populace  were  gathered  together  by  his  surviving 
lieutenants  to  weep  over  their  lost  leader's  body.  After  some  wild 
speeches  in  the  Forum  a  riot  broke  out,  and  the  venerable  Senate- 
house  of  Rome  was  used  as  the  funeral  pile  of  the  dead  demagogue. 
Milo  was  besieged  in  his  house  and  Pompey  saluted  as  dictator 
by  the  excited  mob.  Pompey  was  indeed  prepared  to  accept 
dictatorial  power,  but  only  from  the  Senate.  Accordingly,  on  the 
proposal  of  Cato,  he  was  made  sole  consul,^  and  acted  with  energy 
in  his  new  part  of  saviour  of  society.  Electioneering  intrigues  and 
oratorical  license  in  the  law  courts  were  strictly  repressed. 

A  special  commission  nominated  by  Pompey  inquired  into  the 
late  disorders.  With  rare  impartiality,  it  condemned  alike  Milo 
and  the  tribunes  Plancus  and  Rufus,  who  had  incited  the  riot  in 
the  Forum.  Cicero  was  bound  by  every  tie  of  honour  and  gratitude 
to  undertake  the  defence  of  Milo.  But  the  drawn  swords  of  the 
troops  with  which  Pompey  had  lined  the  Forum  and  the  excite- 
ment of  the  crowd  shook  the  orator's  nerves,  and  he  delivered,  not 
the  magnificent  published  defence,  but  a  poor  and  halting  speech. 
When  Milo,  in  exile,  received  a  copy  of  the  oration  in  its  perfected 

1  A  consul  without  a  colleague  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  ;  that  the  same 
man  should  be  both  consul  and  proconsul — that  is,  his  own  substitute — is  a  yet 
greater  absurdity. 


522  II/SJ'OA'V  OF  ROME 

form,  he  sarcastically  obsei-ved,  "It  is  just  as  well  Cicero  did  not 
deliver  it,  or  I  should  never  have  known  the  taste  of  these  excellent 
mullets  of  Massilia."  Cicero  had  his  revenge  by  procuring-  the 
conviction  of  Plancus,  in  spite  of  I'ompey's  efforts  on  his  behalf 

Throughout  the  year  52  H.C.  Pompey  busied  himself  with  secur- 
ing his  own  supremacy,  and,  perhaps  unconsciously,  with  paving  the 
way  for  a  reconciliation  with  the  aristocrats.  He  summoned  Italy 
to  arms,  and  caused  the  levies  to  take  the  oath  of  military  allegiance 
to  himself.  On  August  i  he  chose  as  his  colleague  in  the  consul- 
ship his  new  father-in-law,  Metellus  Scipio,  and  at  the  same  time 
procured  a  prolongation  of  his  own  command  in  Spain  for  five 
more  years.  By  enforcing  an  interval  of  five  years  between  office 
in  the  city  and  a  command  in  the  provinces,  he  enabled  the  Senate 
to  fill  all  the  vacant  governorships  for  the  next  four  years  with  fts 
own  nominees.^ 

Alliance  of  Pompey  and  the  Senate.  —  For  the  moment  had 
come  for  an  alliance  between  Pompey  and  the  republican  majority 
in  the  Senate.  The  republicans  needed  a  leader  of  more  weight 
than  the  impracticable  Cato,  and  an  army  to  fight  against  the 
Gallic  legions.  Their  lamentable  failure  in  56  B.C.  had  taught  them 
that  they  must  use  Pompey  to  destroy  Citsar.  They  trusted  that 
his  known  indecision  would  prevent  him  from  using  his  \ictory  to 
overthrow  the  Republic.  Pompey  on  his  side  needed  an  excuse 
for  a  rupture  with  Cai^sar,  and  meant  to  find  it  in  the  defence  of 
the  constitution  against  revolutionary  designs.  But  the  new  allies 
were  not  i-eady  to  strike  at  once.  Pompey  was  hampered  by  his 
obligations  to  Caesar,  and  the  senatorial  majority  by  a  remnant  of 
regard  for  the  forms  of  the  constitution.     Before  the  meshes  of 

1  The  principal  measures  passed  by  Pompey  were  : — ■ 

1.  A  general  law  "  de  iniibitii,"  which  limited  forensic  oratory,  shortened 
procedure,  and  checked  the  activity  of  political  clubs  by  imposing  severe 
penalties  for  bribery. 

2.  A  law  "  de  VI,"  with  similar  provisions,  but  directed  specially  against 
the  recent  riots. 

3.  A  law  "  de  iure  magistratnum ,"  providing  tliat — 

a.  Candidates  for  office  must  come  to  Rome  and  canvass  in  person. 

b.  Magistrates  should  receive  provinces,  not  immediately  on  leaving 

office,  but  after  the  lapse  of  five  years. 
This  law  he  broke  himself  by  the  continuance  of  his  Spanish  governorship, 
and  by  dispensing  in  Caesar's  case  with  the  necessity  of  a  personal  canvass, 
just  as,  despite  the  other  laws,  he  intervened  in  favour  of  Plancus  and  .Scipio 
{cj.  Tac.  Ann.  iii.  28).  It  was  a  consequence  of  this  law  that  Cicero  became 
proconsul  of  Cilicia, 


CJESAR,   rOMPEY,   AND    THE  SENATE  523 

the  net  in  which  Cnesar  was  to  be  entangled  were  all  woven, 
Ciesar  had  surmounted  his  greatest  danger  in  Gaul,  the  revolt  of 
Vercingetorix. 

The  Question  between  Caesar  and  the  Senate. — The  question 
at  issue  between  Caesar  and  the  Senate  was  by  no  means  simple. 
For  Caesar  the  vital  point  was  the  retention  of  his  provincial  com- 
mand until  he  assumed  the  consulate  on  January  i,  48  B.C.  If 
he  resigned  the  one  before  he  was  invested  with  the  other  office, 
he  became  liable  to  the  impeachment  threatened  by  Cato,  which 
might  well  have  entailed  on  him  political  extinction.  On  the  other 
hand,  once  at  the  head  of  the  state,  he  hoped  to  out-manoeuvre  his 
opponents  and  carry  the  reforms  peacefully  which  he  afterwards 
effected  by  force.  But  there  were  two  legal  obstacles  in  Caesar's 
path.  In  the  first  place,  the  date  at  which  his  command  expired 
was  March  i,  49,  and  the  consular  elections  were  never  held  before 
the  summer  ;  and,  secondly,  the  law  prescribed  a  personal  canvass 
for  the  consulship,  and  by  presenting  himself  in  Rome  as  a  can- 
didate Ca:?sar  would,  by  the  Sullan  law,  forfeit  his  command.  Ctesar 
had,  of  course,  foreseen  both  these  dangers.  But  since  it  was  the 
rule  for  magistrates  to  proceed  at  once  to  their  province  on  laying- 
down  office  at  Rome,  no  one  could  be  sent  to  succeed  Ca-sar 
before  January  i,  48.  The  consuls  of  50  B.C.  were  bound  to  take 
up  provincial  commands  in  January  49  B.C.,  and  Gaul  was  not  vacant 
till  March.  But  the  consuls  of  49,  by  Sulla's  arrangements,  could 
not  leave  Rome  till  January  i,  48  B.C.,  so  that  Caesar  could  reckon  on 
the  customary  extension  of  his  command  till  that  date.  But  all 
this  was  altered  by  Pompey's  law  enforcing  an  interval  between 
the  consulship  and  proconsulate.  The  Senate  could  now  send  out 
a  governor  at  any  time  in  the  year,  and  thus  acquired  the  power 
to  supersede  Caesar  on  March  i,  49  B.C.  Caesar's  reasonable  expec- 
tation of  an  extension  till  the  end  of  the  year  was  frustrated  by 
the  political  trickery  of  his  opponents.  The  second  obstacle,  the 
necessity  of  a  personal  canvass  in  Rome,  Caesar  had  cleared  away 
by  a  tribunician  law  which  absolved  him  from  this  obligation. 
This  law  Pompey  supported,  but  with  characteristic  inconsistency 
he  cancelled  the  privilege  thus  granted  by  a  general  law  which 
expressly  declared  the  necessity  of  a  candidate  presenting  himself 
in  person  for  election.  Lastly,  in  response  to  Caesar's  complaints 
against  this  injustice,  Pompey  appended  a  clause  declaring  that 
this  law  did  not  apply  to  those  exempted  from  its  provisions  by 
the  people.  But  this  supplement  apparently  was  never  brought 
before  the  people  at  all,  and   though   morally  it  bound   Pompey, 


524   .  HISTORY   OF  ROME 

on  whose  authority  it  was  added,  technically  it  was  null  and  void. 
According-  to  the  letter  of  the  law  the  Senate  was  justified  in 
demanding  from  Coesar  the  resignation  of  his  province  in  March 
49  P..C.,  and  a  personal  canvass  in  Rome  before  election  to  the 
consulship,  but  their  ends  had  been  compassed  by  twisting  the 
laws  to  suit  their  own  purposes. 

Course  of  the  Quarrel. — The  aristocratic  consul,  M.  Claudius 
Marcellus,  first  attempted  to  bring  forward  the  question  of  super- 
seding Cresar  in  the  middle  of  51  B.C.,  but  on  Pompey's  sugges- 
tion the  discussion  was  eventually  postponed  till  March  50  B.C.  In 
the  meantime  Caesar  had  purchased  the  aid  of  two  valuable  allies, 
one  of  the  new  consuls  (50  B.C.),  yEmilius  Paullus,  and  a  renegade 
aristocrat,  C.  Curio.  This  leader  in  the  fashionable  world  of  the 
day  now,  as  tribune,  aspired  to  be  accounted  a  statesman,  and 
showed  a  talent  for  intrigue  and  oratorical  powers,  which  made 
him  at  least  a  most  serviceable  tool  in  the  hands  of  a  master. 
He  detected  the  weak  point  in  the  armour  of  his  opponents, 
and  met  the  demand  for  Caesar's  resignation  with  the  reply  that 
Caesar  and  Pompey  should  retire  simultaneously.  The  bewildered 
Senate  fell  into  the  trap.  After  passing  a  resolution  that  Ctesar 
should  resign  his  command,  and  rejecting  a  similar  proposal  about 
Pompey,  it  assented  by  an  overwhelming  majority  to  Curio's 
motion  that  both  should  retire  at  once.  Beaten  on  their  own 
ground,  the  extreme  aristocrats  were  yet  determined  to  push  the 
.Senate  into  war.  To  form  the  nucleus  of  an  army,  they  had  de- 
manded a  legion  from  both  C;t?sar  and  Pompey  for  the  expected 
Parthian  war.  As  Pompey  now  requested  Caesar  to  return  the 
legion  lent  him  a  few  years  before,  the  Gallic  army  was  weakened 
by  the  loss  of  both  legions.  Nor  was  this  force  sent  to  Syria,  but 
kept  at  Capua  to  be  used  against  its  old  chief. 

In  October,  C.  Marcellus,  on  the  strength  of  a  lying  report 
that  C?esar  had  transferred  four  legions  to  Cisalpine  daul,  moved 
that  he  be  declared  a  public  enemy,  and  that  Pompey  be  ordered 
to  march  against  him  with  the  legions  at  Capua.  Curio  proved 
the  report  groundless  and  vetoed  the  proposal  ;  the  Senate  refused 
to  approve  the  motion  ;  yet  the  consul,  accompanied  by  the  consuls 
designate,  hurried  to  Pompey,  entreated  him  to  save  the  country, 
and  authorised  him  to  take  the  command  of  the  troops  at  Capua 
and  raise  further  levies.  With  this  informal  commission  Pompey 
had  to  be  content  :  civil  war  was  precipitated  by  the  passionate 
haste  of  a  few  bitter  aristocrats. 

Caesar's  Ultimatum. — Caesar  knew  how  to  turn  the  violence 


CAESAR'S   ULTIMATUM  525 

and  illegality  of  his  opponents  to  the  best  account  by  acting 
himself  with  studied  moderation.  He  offered  to  give  up  his 
Transalpine  province  and  eight  of  his  legions,  if  he  were  allowed 
to  retain  Cisalpine  Gaul  and  two  legions  up  to  the  time  of  the 
consular  elections.  He  conceded,  in  fact,  all  that  his  more 
moderate  opponents  demanded.  Probably  he  saw  that  the  ex- 
treme party  had  gone  too  far  to  recede,  but  he  may  have  learnt 
from  Curio,  who  had  ngw  joined  him  at  Ravenna,  that  his  party 
was  strong  enough  to  baffle  the  schemes  of  the  aristocrats,  should 
they  accept  his  terms.  At  all  events  he  determined  that  the  Senate 
should  have  his  case  properly  laid  before  them.  On  the  first  day  of 
the  new  year,  when  the  consuls  entered  on  office,  Curio  reappeared 
in  the  Senate  with  a  letter  from  Caesar.  The  consuls  refused 
him  a  hearing,  but  his  friends,  the  tribunes  M.  Antonius  and 
Q.  Cassius,  insisted  that  the  letter  should  be  read.  The  terms  of 
compromise  were  those  already  offered,  with  the  difference  that 
in  his  ultimatum  Ctesar  proposed  as  an  alternative  that  he  and 
Pompey  should  disarm  simultaneously,  and  distinctly  threatened 
to  march  on  Rome  if  his  offers  were  rejected.  The  consuls  C. 
Marcellus  and  Lentulus  Crus,  dogged  aristocrats,  refused  to  allow 
a  division  to  be  taken  on  any  of  Caesar's  proposals.  Pompey  let 
it  be  known  through  his  usual  mouthpiece,  Metellus  Scipio,  that 
he  would  fight  for  the  Senate  now  or  never.  At  last  the  intimi- 
dated majority  voted  that  Caesar  must  give  up  his  provinces  and 
army  before  a  fixed  day  or  be  proclaimed  a  traitor.  Antonius 
and  Cassius  vetoed  the  decree,  but  their  opposition  only  em- 
bittered the  passions  of  the  oligarchs.  A  few  days  later  the  Senate 
formally  declared  the  country  in  danger  in  customary  form,  and 
called  on  all  loyal  magistrates  to  provide  for  its  defence.  The 
Caesarean  tribunes,  accompanied  by  Ca^Iius  and  Curio,  fled  in 
disguise  to  Caesar's  camp  :  their  expulsion  gave  him  an  admirable 
pretext  for  an  appeal  to  arms.  At  Ravenna  he  addressed  the 
only  legion  he  had  with  him.  He  spoke  of  the  violation  of  the 
sacred  office  of  the  tribunes,  he  recalled  the  glories  of  the  Gallic 
war,  and  bade  his  veterans  avenge  the  injuries  and  insults  heaped 
upon  their  general,  and  so  turn  the  plots  of  his  enemies  to  their 
own  confusion.  When  he  had  assured  himself  of  their  unswerving 
fidelity,  Caesar  sent  orders  to  hasten  the  march  of  the  legions  left 
in  Farther  Gaul,  and  crossed  the  Rubicon  to  invade  Italy. 

Cicero. — While  these  great  events  were  taking  place  in  Italy, 
the  consular  Cicero,  who  had  never  taken  a  province,  found  him- 
self compelled,  under  the  new  arrangements  made  by  Pompey  and 


526  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

the  Senate,  to  accept  the  governorship  of  CiHcia.  In  this  iin- 
wiUing  exile  he  gained  a  high  reputation  for  clemency  and  justice 
to  the  provincials  and  a  deeper  insight  into  the  ways  of  his 
optimate  and  equestrian  allies.  A  considerable  sum  of  ready 
money  honestly  saved  from  his  legal  allowance  was  a  welcome 
relief  to  the  impoverished  statesman  ;  but  the  title  of  imperator 
and  laurelled  fasces,  earned  by  a  success  over  a  robber  tribe  in 
Mount  Amanus,  proved  a  troublesome  honour  on  his  return 
to  Italy. 


CHAPTER    LI 

THE    CIVIL    WAR 

B.r.       A.U.C. 

Outbreak  of  Civil  War  Pompey  evacuates  Italy— Capitula- 
tion of  Afranius  and  Petreius  at  Ilerda — Submission  ol 
Massilia     Defeat  and  Death  of  Curio  in  Africa  .  49        70s 

Battle  of  Pharsalus— Death   of  Pompey — Csesar   shut  up  in 

Alexandria 48        706 

Caesar    crushes    the    Alexandrine    Insurrection   and    defeats 

Pharnaces 47        707 

African  Campaign — Battle  of  Thapsus — Death  of  Cato  .         •     46        708 

Victory  of  Munda 45        709 

Caesar's  Resources. — When  C;rsar  crossed  the  Rubicon  the 
odds  seemed  all  against  him  in  the  coming  conflict.  The  field  of 
his  power  was  limited  to  the  provinces  he  ruled,  and  while  Cis- 
alpine Gaul  espoused  his  cause  with  enthusiasm,  many  of  the 
Transalpine  Celts  were  lukewarm  or  secretly  hostile  to  their  con- 
queror. Among  the  soldiers  and  statesmen  of  Rome  none  sup- 
ported him  but  his  own  lieutenants  and  personal  adherents,  chiefly 
young  men  of  ability  bought  with  Gallic  gold  ;  and  so,  when  the 
ablest  of  his  marshals,  Labienus,  deserted  to  the  enemy,  he  was 
left  without  an  officer  fit  to  be  entrusted  with  an  important  separate 
command.  But  this  disadvantage  was  more  than  compensated 
by  the  absolute  supremacy  of  Caesar  in  his  own  camp,  which  gave 
an  unity  to  his  plans  and  a  swiftness  to  his  movements  that  utterly 
paralysed  his  enemies.  Caesar  stood  so  far  above  his  adjutants 
as  to  be  beyond  all  thought  of  rivalry  ;  he  was  the  idol  of  the 
veterans  he  had  led  so  often  to  victory,  and  who  would  now  go 
anywhere  and  do  anything  for  their  beloved  commander.  His 
nine  veteran  legions  were  the  backbone  of  his  power,  and  the 
levies  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  were  ready  to  fill  the  gaps  which  war 
might  make  in  their  ranks. 


THE   CIVIL    WAR  527 

Power  of  the  Coalition. — All  the  pomp  and  show  of  power  lay 
with  liis  opponents.  The  Senate  was  the  legitimate  government 
of  Rome,  and  the  Senate  had  allied  itself  with  Pompey.  Old 
quarrels  between  the  confederates  led  still  to  mutual  distrust, 
but  their  alliance,  though  weakened  by  secret  jealousies,  was  not 
broken  by  open  discord.  The  possession  of  the  capital  placed  in 
Pompe\'s  hands  the  machinery  of  government  and  enabled  him 
to  pose  as  a  loyal  patriot,  forced  to  repel  an  unprovoked  assault 
on  his  country.  The  financiers,  fearing  confiscations,  and  the 
small  landholders,  dreading  anarchy,  saw  in  Pompey  the  saviour 
of  society.  But  this  apparent  unanimity  in  Italy  was  deceptive. 
The  Senate  was  torn  by  internal  faction,  and  secretly  distrusted 
the  champion  it  had  called  to  arms.  Noble  lords  wasted  time  and 
energy  in  quarrelling  with  one  another  and  discussing  the  conduA 
of  their  commander,  just  as  if  there  had  been  no  enemy  at  the 
gates.  The  capitalists  and  yeomen  would  not  sacrifice  a  single 
coin  or  acre  for  the  good  cause,  and  soon  saw  reason  to  idolise 
the  moderation  and  uprightness  of  the  man  whom  they  had  sus- 
pected of  anarchical  designs.  The  support  of  Italy  proved  a 
broken  reed  in  the  hour  of  danger. 

There  remained  the  provinces  and  client  princes.  The  provincial 
commands  had  been  recently  filled  up  with  ardent  supporters  of 
the  Senate  ;  the  Eastern  dynasts  for  the  most  part  owed  their 
crowns  to  Pompe\'.  Juba  of  Numidia  feared  to  lose  his  kingdom 
if  Cfesar  triumphed.  Nor  were  the  forces  at  the  disposal  of  the 
general  of  the  Senate  inconsiderable.  Greece  and  the  East  supplied 
a  formidable  fleet ;  Spain  was  guarded  by  seven  warlike  legions  ; 
Italy  was  rapidly  arming.  If  Caesar  delayed  to  strike,  he  would 
be  crushed  between  the  army  of  Spain  and  the  levies  now  being 
raised  in  Italy.  Their  numbers,  amounting  to  some  60,000  men, 
justified  the  proud  boast  of  Pompey  that  he  had  only  to  stamp 
with  his  foot  to  cover  the  land  with  soldiers.  But  Italy  was  not 
yet  prepared  for  war.  The  only  troops  ready  for  action  were  the 
two  legions  filched  from  Csesar,  which  could  not  be  trusted  to 
oppose  their  old  general.  The  rest  of  the  bands  gatherings  there 
had  not  yet  been  mobilised  or  consolidated  into  an  army. 

Caesar  advances  and  takes  Corfinium  (49  B.C.). — Cjcsar,  though 
he  had  but  a  single  legion  at  his  back,  pushed  on  at  once  to 
Ariminum.  A  last  offer  of  peace,  on  condition  of  both  sides  dis- 
arming at  once,  met  with  the  reply  that  Caesar  must  first  retire 
to  his  province  and  dismiss  his  army,  and  then  Pompey  would  go 
to  Spain.    Such  an  answer  provoked  instant  action.    Caesar  ordered 


528  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

M.  Antonius  to  occupy  Arretium  and  protect  his  flank  while  he 
advanced  by  the  P'laminian  road  along  the  east  coast.  Town 
after  town  opened  its  gates.  The  levies  of  Picenum,  devoted  as 
ever  to  Ponipey,  were  scattered  like  chaff  before  the  wind  and 
the  whole  district  lost.  The  panic  caused  by  the  terrible  swiftness 
and  activity  of  the  monster,  as  Cicero  styles  C;esar,  spread  to  the 
capital  itself.  The  consuls  fled  in  such  haste  that  they  failed  even 
to  secure  the  money  in  the  treasury.  Pompey  himself  hurried  to 
the  camp  at  Luceria,  in  Apulia,  and  sent  Vibullius  Rufus  to  dispute 
Picenum.  He  still  hoped  that  district  might  be  held  till  he  could 
come  to  the  support  of  his  lieutenant,  but  it  was  already  too  late, 
and  Vibullius  could  but  lead  the  faithful  remnant  of  its  levies  to 
join  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  at  Corfinium.  Pompey  had  selected 
Apulia  as  the  rallying-point  for  his  troops  to  cover  an  evacuation 
of  Italy,  should  that  be  necessary,  perceiving  clearly  that  to  attempt 
mobilisation  in  front  of  Rome  would  be,  in  the  actual  state  of  his 
forces,  to  court  disaster.  Accordingly  he  now  ordered  Domitius 
to  retire  on  Luceria.  But  that  headstrong  aristocrat,  believing 
himself  able  to  check  the  advance  of  Caesar,  and  to  compel  his 
own  commander  to  come  to  his  rescue,  disregarded  the  judicious 
orders  of  his  chief  He  was  shut  up  in  Corfinium,  and,  after  a 
seven  days'  defence,  was  at  last  convinced  that  Pompey  dare  not 
attempt  to  relieve  him.  He  then  resolved  to  desert  his  post  and 
make  his  escape  by  night  with  his  officers,  but  the  soldiery,  sus- 
pecting his  treachery,  mutinied  and  surrendered  to  Cfesar.  That 
general,  with  his  wonted  clemency,  released  all  the  prisoners  un- 
conditionally, and  enlisted  the  common  soldiers  in  his  ranks.  This 
conduct  did  much  to  reconcile  Italy  to  his  victory. 

Retreat  of  Pompey. — Disappointed  in  the  hope  of  maintaining 
himself  in  Italy,  Pompey  effected  a  masterly  evacuation,  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  a  larger  scheme  of  operations.  He  now  rested  his 
chief  hopes  on  his  fleet.  With  its  help  he  could  bafifie  the  pursuit 
of  Caesar  and  defend  the  eastern  provinces  from  assault.  By 
cutting  off  the  supplies  of  corn  he  thought  to  starve  Italy  into 
submission  ;  and,  finally,  when  he  had  disciplined  and  organised 
his  motley  forces,  covered  by  his  fleet,  he  could  resume  the  offensive 
at  pleasure.  As  a  first  step  he  retired  to  Brundisium,  and  sent 
half  his  forces  over  to  Epirus,  before  the  enemy  could  come  up 
with  him.  Nor  could  Caesar,  when  he  reached  Brundisium,  shut 
up  his  rival  in  that  town.  With  more  than  his  accustomed  activity 
and  skill,  Pompey  defeated  all  efforts  to  block  the  harbour  by 
means  of  moles,  and  made  good  his  escape  to  Dyrrhachium  without 


THE    WAR   IN  ITALY  AND  SPAIN  529 

serious  loss.  The  want  of  a  fleet  made  further  pursuit  impossible. 
Once  more  Caesar  was  placed  between  two  hostile  forces,  the 
armies  in  Spain  and  Epirus,  which,  if  allowed  to  combine,  might 
crush  him  in  Italy,  and  once  more  he  disconcerted  the  tedious 
strategy  of  his  opponents  by  a  rapid  attack.  But  first  he  had  to 
regulate  affairs  at  Rome. 

Provisional  Arrangements  of  Caesar.  —  Already  his  humanity 
and  moderation  had  dispelled  the  apprehensions  of  proscription 
and  confiscation.  His  spendthrift  followers  grumbled  at  the  up- 
rightness of  his  measures,  but  the  mass  of  the  Italian  people 
welcomed  with  enthusiasm  a  conqueror  whose  victory  was  not 
stained  by  pillage  and  murder.  The  senseless  threats  of  the  noble 
emigres  in  Pompey's  camp  completed  the  work  begun  by  Caesar's 
clemency.  Italy  accepted  with  thankfulness  the  blessings  secured 
for  her  by  his  firm  and  just  administration.  But  he  was  compelled 
to  work  alone,  and  in  defiance  of  the  forms  of  the  constitution. 
The  rump  of  the  Senate  convoked  by  the  tribunes  at  Rome  would 
not  help  him  to  conduct  the  government,  and  dared  not  carry  his 
offers  of  peace  to  Pompey.  Eventually  he  was  forced  to  break 
open  the  doors  of  the  treasury  in  defiance  of  the  tribune  Metellus, 
and  to  make  provision  for  the  government  of  Italy  by  appointing 
the  prxtor  .^milius  Lepidus  prefect  of  the  city,  and  committing 
the  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  country  to  the  tribune  M. 
Antonius.  To  secure  the  corn-supply,  Sicily  and  Sardinia  were 
occupied,  almost  without  a  blow. 

The  Campaign  in  Spain. — Cajsar  now  hurried  away  to  meet 
his  rival's  olficers  in  Spain.  "  I  go,"  he  said,  "  to  encounter  an 
army  without  a  general ;  I  shall  return  to  attack  a  general  without 
an  army."  He  was  delayed  for  a  moment,  but  not  diverted,  by 
the  revolt  of  Massilia,  which  was  encouraged  to  declare  itself  for 
Pompey  by  the  arrival  of  Domitius.  Leaving  Trebonius  to  besiege 
the  city,  and  Decimus  Brutus,  his  trusted  admiral,  to  meet  the 
Massiliots  on  the  sea,  he  hastened  to  join  the  six  legions  which, 
under  Fabius,  had  already  crossed  the  Pyrenees.  Afranius  and 
Petreius,  who  had  assembled  their  five  legions  and  numerous 
auxiliaries  too  late  to  hold  the  mountain  passes,  determined  to 
defend  the  line  of  the  Ebro.  But  the  position  they  occupied 
at  Ilerda  was  twenty  miles  north  of  their  true  line  of  defence. 
However,  by  holding  the  town,  with  its  stone  bridge  over  the  river 
Sicoris  (Segres),  they  kept  command  of  both  banks  of  that  stream 
and  secured  abundant  supplies.  Citsar,  so  soon  as  his  own  bridges 
were  ready,  at  once  forced  a  battle.     He  attempted  to  seize  a  hill 

2  L 


530 


HTSTORY  OF  ROME 


wliicli  lay  between  tlie  tow  n  and  tlic  I'ompeian  camp,  Init  was  re- 
pulsed with  loss,  and  only  saved  from  disaster  by  the  staunchness  of 
his  troops.  To  complete  liis  misfortunes,  a  flood  carried  away  his 
bridges,  \\hile  that  at  Ilerda  escaped  damage  ;  so  that  Ctesar  was 
cooped  up  in  a  narrow  strip  of  exhausted  country,  while  the  Pom- 


_J  Kilometers 
^  Roman  Miles 


//  'aUer  GrBoutall  sc 


peians  could  operate  on  both  sides  the  Sicoris.  U  ndaunted  by  defeat 
and  famine,  Cssar  set  his  men  to  build  light  boats  covered  with 
skins  (like  the  coracles  he  had  seen  in  Britain),  crossed  the  river 
twenty  miles  above  his  camp,  and  secured  a  fortified  post  on  the 
other  side.     He  built  a  bridge  in  two  days,  and  completely  turned 


TLERDA  531 

the  tables  on  the  Pompeians,  whose  light  troops,  instead  of  cutting 
off  his  convoys,  were  now  themselves  at  the  mercy  of  his  ca\'alry. 
Afranlus  and  Petreius  resolved  to  retreat  across  the  Ebro  into 
Celtiberia,  where  Pompey's  name  was  still  a  power.  But  from  the 
moment  they  left  Ilerda,  CcCsar's  cavalry  hung  upon  their  rear, 
and  before  night  came  his  infantry  had  got  over  the  Sicoris  by 
a  dangerous  ford  and  overtaken  the  retreating  Pompeians.  Both 
armies  pushed  on  for  the  rocky  ground  near  the  Ebro,  Cfesar  o\'er 
the  hills,  the  Pompeians  across  the  plain  ;  but  Caesar  won  the  race 
and  closed  the  defiles  against  the  enemy.  In  despair,  Afranius 
and  Petreius  tried  to  retrace  their  steps  to  Ilerda,  but  again 
were  caught  and  surrounded.  As  they  had  neither  provisions  nor 
water,  they  were  glad  to  obtain  quarter  for  their  soldiers  by  promis- 
ing to  disband  their  army.  Varro,  who  was  in  Farther  Spain  with 
two  legions,  was  obliged  by  the  provincials  to  submit  to  the  con- 
queror. The  peninsula  which  had  so  often  resisted  invasion  for 
years  was  won  in  three  months  by  a  brilliant  campaign,  and  by 
the  generous  clemency  of  the  conqueror  (49  B.C.). 

Defeat  of  Curio  in  Africa. — Caesar,  on  his  way  back  to  Italy, 
received  the  submission  of  Massilia,  and  in  the  few  days  he  spent 
in  Rome  did  much  to  restore  order  and  credit  in  Italy.  He  had 
now  secured  the  western  half  of  the  empire,  and  was  eager  to 
bring  on  a  decisive  conflict.  In  two  points  only  had  his  plans 
miscarried.  Curio,  after  seizing  Sicily,  had  passed  over  to  Africa. 
With  inexcusable  rashness  he  pressed  forward  to  the  plains  of  the 
Bagradas,  and  was  surrounded  and  cut  to  pieces  with  his  whole 
force  by  the  Libyan  cavaliy  of  King  Juba  ;  and  on  the  Illyrian 
coast  Pompey's  admirals,  Octavius  and  Libo,  destroyed  Cassai-'s 
squadrons  and  compelled  the  legions  which  had  landed  there  to 
lay  down  their  arms. 

Cffisar  lands  in  Epirus. — During  the  respite  afforded  him  by 
the  Spanish  campaign  Pompey  had  organised  the  forces  of  the 
East.  From  the  troops  he  had  gathered  in  the  West  he  had 
formed  five  legions,  and  had  summoned  three  more  to  his  aid 
from  Syria  and  Cilicia.  The  kings  of  the  East  furnished  him  with 
a  fine  body  of  horsemen,  the  best  contingents  being-  supplied  from 
Calatia,  Thrace,  and  Numidia.  His  fleet  held  undisputed  sway  in 
the  Adiiatic.  Despite  all  this,  Ctesar  resolved  to  cross  at  once  to 
Epirus.  Pompey  was  moving  but  slowly  along  the  great  high- 
road from  Thessalonica  to  Dyrrhachium,  and  his  Syrian  legions 
were  still  in  Asia.  His  admiral,  Bibulus,  expected  nothing  less 
than  so  rash  an  enterprise.     But  Citsar,  though  he  could  only  find 


ir^lker   ^■'  Vvl.lull  i(. 


DYRRHACHIUM 


533 


transport  for  half  his  arm),  landed  on  the  coast  with  20,000  men 
and  secured  the  seaports  of  Oricum  and  Apollonia.  Pompey 
arrived  in  time  to  save  his  arsenal  and  stores  at  Dyrrhachium,  and 
reduced  Ceesar  to  inaction  till  reinforcements  should  arrive  from 
Italy.  At  last  Antony  eluded  the  now  unsleeping  vigilance  of 
the  Pompeian  admirals,  and  fleeing  before  their  galleys,  reached 


ii'alkcr  CrBoutalls^^ 


the    port   of  Lissus   barely  in   time   to   escape   the  storm  which 
scattered  his  pursuers  (48  B.C.). 

Pompey  repulses  Csesarnear  Dyrrhachium. — Even  now  Pompey 
might  have  prevented  Antony's  junction  with  Ccesar,  but  he  allowed 
himself  to  be  out-manoeuvred,  and  retired  to  a  strong  position 
near  Asparagium.  By  a  sudden  dash  Caesar  cut  him  off  from 
Dyrrhachium,  but  Pompey,  who  could  trust  to  his  fleet  for  supplies, 


534  in  STORY  OF  ROME 

([iiietly  entrenched  himself  on  the  liill  of  I'etra,  just  south  of  that 
town.  With  incredible  audacity  C;csar  attempted  to  blockade 
him  in  his  entrenchments,  but  Pompey  extended  his  lines  till  the 
task  of  cIrcum\'allation  was  beyond  the  powers  of  C;csar's  small 
forces.  At  length  Pompey  found  that  \\"ax\\.  of  fodder  and  water 
was  decimating  the  horses  of  his  cavalry,  and  by  a  great  effort 
forced  his  way  out  through  the  unfinished  lines  at  their  southern 
end.  On  the  same  day  C;esar  made  an  attack  with  his  full  strength 
on  an  outlying  camp  of  the  Pompeians,  but  met  with  a  severe 
defeat.  His  men  got  entangled  in  the  enemy's  entrenchments, 
and  fled  in  confusion  before  the  troops  sent  by  Pompey  to  the 
rescue. 

Retreat  of  Caesar. — Pompey  was  victorious,  but  he  failed  to 
reap  the  fruits  of  victory.  Ciesar  retreated  to  Apollonia  so  swiftly 
as  to  baffle  his  pursuers,  and  then  passed  into  Thessaly.  His 
object  was  to  draw  Pompey  away  from  his  base  on  the  sea,  by 
threatening  to  fall  upon  Scipio,  who  was  coming'  from  the  east 
with  reinforcements.  Pompey  marched  eastwards  in  the  hope  of 
crushing  Ctesar's  lieutenant,  Domitius  Calvinus,  between  his  own 
army  and  that  of  Scipio,  whose  advance  Domitius  had  been  de- 
tached to  check.  Calvinus  had  but  just  time  to  escape  over  the 
mountains  into  Thessaly  ;  there  he  rejoined  Caesar,  and  the  united 
armies  encamped  near  Pharsalus. 

Battle  of  Pharsalus. — Pompey  pursued  with  his  whole  force, 
45,000  foot  and  7000  horse,  and  encamped  first  at  Larissa,  and 
then  in  face  of  Ca'sar's  position.  Before  the  great  struggle  which 
was  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  Roman  world  there  was  a  pause 
of  suspense.  Pompey  still  clung  to  his  cautious  tactics,  but  the 
noble  lords  in  his  camp  clamoured  for  immediate  action.  For 
some  days  Pompey  would  not  move  from  the  hill  on  which  his 
camp  stood,  but  at  length  he  was  emboldened  to  offer  battle,  his 
right  wing  resting  on  the  river  Enipeus  and  his  left  flanked  by 
his  cavalry  and  archers.  Cyesar,  whose  infantry  was  but  half  as 
strong  as  Pompey's,  nevertheless  at  once  accepted  the  challenge. 
He  saw  that  Pompey  intended  to  overwhelm  his  weak  division 
of  horse  and  roll  up  his  right  wing  ;  at  the  post  of  danger  he 
stationed  the  famous  tenth  legion,  supported  by  a  reserve  of  picked 
troops.  When  the  battle  began  Pompey's  infantry  met  with  firm 
front  the  charge  of  Caesar's  veterans,  while  his  clouds  of  horsemen 
and  archers  swept  away  the  opposing  cavalry.  But  as  they  swooped 
on  the  flanks  of  the  infantry  they  were  met  by  the  picked  cohorts 
of  the  reserve,  who,  instead  of  throwing  their  javelins  as  they 


FALL   OF  POMPEY  535 

charged,  used  them  as  spears  to  thrust  with,  and  by  this  unex- 
pected method  of  attack  utterly  discomfited  the  Pompeian  horse- 
men. As  the  victorious  infantry  wheeled  round  upon  the  enemies' 
legions  in  the  centre,  Caesar  ordered  his  whole  third  line  to  ad- 
vance, and  by  this  movement  decided  the  battle.  The  Pompeians 
broke  and  fled  in  confusion  to  their  camp,  but  hardly  had  they 
reached  its  shelter  when  Ctesar  led  his  men  to  the  assault  and 
stormed  their  lines.  Not  staying  to  plunder,  the  conquerors  pur- 
sued the  main  body  of  the  fugitives,  and  catching  them  at  night- 
fall, compelled  them  to  surrender  by  threatening  their  water 
supply.  The  struggle  between  East  and  West,  between  the  old 
Republic  and  the  new  monarchy,  ended  in  the  complete  triumph 
of  the  disciplined  levies  of  the  West  over  the  motley  hosts  of  the 
East,  and  of  the  new  spirit  of  obedience  and  loyalty  over  the  dis- 
sensions of  the  worn-out  Republic. 

Flight,  Death,  and  Character  of  Pompey. — The  fallen  leader 
fled  on  horseback  to  Larissa.  Had  he  possessed  the  energy  to 
renew  the  struggle,  he  might  have  found  in  Africa  an  almost 
impregnable  base  of  operations  for  his  unbeaten  navy.  But 
Pompey  the  fortunate,  unnen-ed  by  his  first  disaster,  fled  eastward 
in  the  vain  hope  that  his  past  triumphs  would  secure  him  a  refuge. 
Repulsed  by  Cyprus  and  Syria,  he  sought  an  asylum  from  young 
Ptolemy  of  Egypt.  But  as  he  landed  at  Pelusium  he  was  treacher- 
ously murdered  by  Achillas,  the  king's  general,  and  Septimius, 
once  a  centurion  of  his  own.  The  tragedy  of  his  death  and  the 
splendour  of  his  achievements  have  made  Pompey  a  great  figure 
in  histor}'.  A  true  Roman  in  his  faults  and  virtues  alike,  Pompey 
was  a  better  man  and  an  abler  soldier  than  his  detractors  allow. 
In  an  age  of  lax  morality  and  of  unblushing  peculation,  he  was 
a  good  husband  and  father,  and  upright  in  his  dealings.  In  war 
he  proved  himself  a  respectable  strategist,  an  able  tactician,  and 
a  great  organiser  of  victory,  though  even  there  he  lacked  the  pene- 
tration to  divine  the  plans  of  his  opponent  and  the  genius  to 
inspire  his  followers  with  devotion.  TTn  politics  he  was  a  man  of 
second-rate  capacity  in  a  first-rate  posifion.  Splendidly  adapted 
for  the  part  devised  for  him  by  the  quick  wit  of  Cicero,  that  of 
ornamental  chief  of  an  optimate  Republic,  the  irony  of  fate  placed 
him  in  a  position  with  which  there  was  no  paltering,  where  he  must 
be  king  or  nothing.  It  was  his  misfortune  to  be  born  too  late  or 
too  early,  and  to  serve  as  a  foil  for  a  more  brilliant  rival.  \ 

Caesar  at  Alexandria. — Caesar,  following  quickly  on  the  track 
of  his   fallen   foe,  was   deeply  moved  when   he   learnt   his   fate. 


536  II J  STORY  OF  ROME 

Though  he  had  liiit  four  thousand  men  vvitli  liim,  lie  at  once  took 
upon  himself,  as  consul,  the  settlement  of  the  disputed  succession 
to  the  Egyptian  throne.  Yet  it  may  be  that  the  charms  of  Cleo- 
patra had  more  effect  in  prolonging  Ca:sai-'s  stay  in  Egypt  than 
a  political  question  of  second-rate  importance.  Caesar  in  his 
youth  had  been  the  darling  of  the  greatest  ladies  in  Rome,  and 
though  never  the  slave  of  any  woman,  may  well  have  fallen  under 
the  spell  of  Cleopatra's  fascinating  personality.  Whatever  was 
his  motive,  the  result  of  his  intervention  in  Egyptian  affairs  was, 
that  he  was  detained  in  that  country  when  his  presence  was  sorely 
needed  elsewhere.  The  turbulent  mob  of  Alexandria  was  moved 
to  fury  by  the  sight  of  a  Roman  calmly  awarding  the  crown  of 
Egypt,  and  even  the  half- Roman  army  of  Ptolemy  was  stung  into 
resistance  by  the  disdainful  pride  of  Caesar's  handful  of  legionaries. 
For  months  Caesar  was  besieged  in  the  eastern  quarter  of  the 
town,  and  kept  his  communications  open  only  by  the  desperate 
tenacity  with  which  he  clung  to  the  lighthouse  island  and  its 
eastern  harbour.  At  last  Mithradates  of  Pergamum  brought  up 
an  army  of  relief  through  Pelusium  and  Memphis.  Ptolemy,  who 
had  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  insurgents  directly  Caesar 
released  him  from  the  palace,  marched  off  to  meet  him,  but  failing 
to  prevent  his  junction  with  Caesar,  was  utterly  defeated  on  the 
Nile,  and  drowned  in  the  river.  Caesar  assigned  the  throne  to 
Cleopatra  and  her  younger  brother,  but  left  a  garrison  of  two 
legions,  to  ensure  the  obedience  of  monarch  and  people  alike  to 
Roman  rule.  After  dallying  three  months  more  in  Egypt  with 
Cleopatra,  Caesar  passed  through  Syria  and  Cilicia,  regulating'  the 
affairs  of  cities  and  of  princes  with  all  his  usual  speed.  In  his 
absence  Pharnaces  had  dared  to  claim  his  father's  kingdoms  of 
Pontus  and  Lesser  Armenia.  He  had  defeated  the  Galatian  and 
Pontic  levies  of  Caesar's  lieutenant,  Domitius  Calvinus,  and  now 
ventured  to  negotiate  with  Caesar  himself.  Ca?sar  demanded 
instant  submission,  and  with  such  troops  as  were  at  hand,  defeated 
and  destroyed  the  king's  army  at  Ziela  after  a  five  days'  campaign 
(47  B.C.).  This  speedy  success  Caesar  recorded  in  the  three  famous 
words,  "  Vcui^  vi'di,  via." 

The  Republicans  rally  in  Africa.  —  Further  troubles  were 
gathering  thickly  in  the  West.  After  the  battle  of  Pharsalus  the 
chief  republicans  met  together  in  council  at  Corcyra.  Cicero, 
who  had  wavered  long  before  joining  Pompey  in  Epirus,  and 
while  in  his  camp  had  vented  his  disgust  at  the  hesitation  of  the 
general  and  the  bloodthirsty  threats  of  his  aristocratic  followers 


ALEXANDRIA    AND  AFRICA 


537 


in  bitter  sarcasms,  now  resolved  to  make  his  submission  to  the 
conqueror.  Cato,  agreeing  that  resistance  was  hopeless,  preferred 
to  fall  himself  with  the  falling  Republic.  Gradually  all  the  men 
who  clung  to  the  lost  cause,  Cato  and  Scipio,  Labienus  and  the 
younger  Pompeys,  drew  together  in  Africa.  Cato  was  the  life  and 
soul  of  this  revival  of  the  republican  cause,  but,  with  his  usual 
fonnalism,  he  insisted  that  Scipio  should  be  the  nominal  general. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  molest  them.     Cicsar's  lieutenant  in  Far- 


HE.\D   OF   CLEOPATRA. 


ther  Spain,  Q,  Cassius  Longinus,  who  had  orders  to  invade  Africa, 
made  himself  so  unpopular  in  his  province  that  C.  Trebonius  had 
to  be  sent  in  all  haste  to  supersede  him  and  restore  order.  Even 
when  Caesar  arrived  in  Italy,  he  was  delayed  by  press  of  urgent 
business  and  by  a  military  mutiny.  His  veterans,  enervated  by  a 
year's  ease  in  Campania,  refused  to  embark  for  Africa,  and  march- 
ing to  Rome,  tumultuously  demanded  their  discharge.  Caesar 
at  once  granted  their  request,  and  promised  that  they  should 
nevertheless   share   in  the   substantial   rewards,  though    not    the 


538  ■  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

honours,  of  his  coming  triumph  ;  and  when  he  addressed  them 
no  longer  as  comrades,  but  as  mere  citizens,  the  veterans  broke 
down  and  begged  to  be  received  again  into  his  serxice.  After 
a  politic  delay  Ciosar  granted  their  prayer,  and  at  once  set  out 
for  Africa. 

Battle  of  Thapsus. — On  the  voyage  his  fleet  was  dispersed  by 
a  storm,  and  he  was  compelled  to  entrench  himself  near  Ruspina 
with  but  3000  infantry  and  150  horsemen.  Even  after  the  arrival 
of  more  of  his  transports,  the  legions  could  make  no  headway 
against  the  African  cavalry  and  archers  led  against  them  by 
Labienus.  Not  till  he  had  been  joined  by  his  veterans,  and  had 
accustomed  his  troops  in  two  months'  skirmishing  to  the  enemy's 
mode  of  warfare,  did  Caesar  determine  to  force  an  engagement. 
With  this  aim  he  marched  on  Thapsus,  and  so  induced  the  in- 
competent Scipio  to  risk  a  battle  to  relieve  the  garrison.  Caesar's 
men  for  once  got  out  of  hand.  They  flew  upon  the  enemy 
without  waiting  for  his  orders,  drove  their  elephants  back  into 
their  ranks  to  add  to  the  general  confusion,  and  butchered  the 
crowd  of  fugitives  without  mercy.  The  battle  of  Thapsus  was 
the  death-knell  of  the  Pompeian  cause.  Of  the  leaders,  only 
Labienus  and  the  two  Pompeys  escaped.  Afranius  was  mur- 
dered by  Caesar's  soldiers  ;  Scipio,  Petreius,  King  Juba,  and  Cato 
chose  to  die  rather  than  fall  alive  into  the  hands  of  the  conqueror 
(46  B.C.). 

Character  of  Cato. — Cato  alone  is  of  interest  to  the  historian. 
In  Cato  he  finds  the  true  champion  of  the  Republic.  The  in- 
flexible stoic  who  would  not  bow  to  the  opportunism  of  the  empire 
has  left  a  name  respected  even  by  his  enemies.  Not  his  ideal, 
which  was  narrow,  nor  his  policy,  which  was  too  often  pedantic, 
have  won  him  his  niche  in  the  temple  of  fame,  but  that  faithful- 
ness unto  death  which  made  him  the  martyr  of  a  lost  cause.  The 
suicide  of  Cato  was  an  undying  protest  against  the  hollow  pre- 
tence of  constitutional  liberty  with  which  the  new  monarchy  sought 
to  clothe  its  despotism.  It  inspired  the  stoics  of  the  empire,  and 
in  a  sense  enabled  the  vanquished  Republic  to  triumph  over 
its  conqueror ;  for  the  spirit  of  Cato  lived  again  in  Marcus 
Aurelius. 

Battle  of  Munda:  Triumph  of  Caesar. — After  the  victory  of 
Thapsus,  Caesar  was  able  to  give  some  months  to  the  work  of 
reorganising  the  empire.  He  celebrated  a  well-earned  triumph, 
in  which  Gaul  and  Egypt,  Pontus  and  Numidia,  attested  the  world- 
wide prowess  of  the  conqueror,  but  no  single  captive  Roman  was 


THAPSUS  AND  MUNDA  539 

led  behind  his  chariot.  Citsar  only  triumphed  over  the  foes  of 
Rome,  not  o\er  personal  opponents.  Soon  a  rising  in  Spain  under 
Labienus  forced  him  to  hurry  thither  in  the  depth  of  winter.  After 
a  brief  but  fierce  campaign,  Caesar,  at  Munda,  crushed  the  army 
of  desperate  men  who  fought  to  the  last  against  him,  and  slew 
their  leaders,  Labienus  and  young  Gneeus  Pompeius  (45  B.C.). 
Private  animosity,  not  true  patriotism,  inspired  this  last  revolt 
against  his  rule  ;  it  could  not  stay  his  hand,  but  only  make 
the  task  of  restoring  order  amidst  all  this  turmoil,  and  calling 
forth  peace  from  all  this  deadly  strife,  more  and  more  difticult. 
Monarchy  could  not  now  be  averted,  but  its  temper  might  well 
have  been  softened  by  timely  submission. 


CHAPTER  LII 

THE     RULE     OF     C/ESAR 

The  New  Monarchy. — In  the  few  short  intervals  of  peace 
allowed  him  by  the  unrelenting  hatred  of  his  enemies  Cassar 
took  in  hand  the  reorganisation  of  the  Roman  state.     The  work 


DENARIUS   44    B.C.-    (l)    HEAD    OF   CVi:SAK  ;    (2)    VENUS    WITH    VICTORY. 


of  reform  was  cut  short  by  his  death,  but  was  eventually  carried 
out  on  Ctesar's  lines  by  his  heir,  Augustus.  Often  we  cannot  tell 
how  much  that  adroit  statesman  inherited  from  his  predecessor, 
and  how  far  he  altered  and  transformed  the  political  ideas  of 
Ceesar.  But  enough  remains  of  the  undoubted  work  of  the 
earlier  and  more  original  genius  to  show  that  the  ideas  on 
which  the  Roman  Empire  rested  were  conceived  by  that  master- 


540  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

mind,  even  if  the  details  of  tlie  dcsij,m  were  left  incomplete.  For 
j^ood  and  for  c\il  C;csar  was  the  founder  of  the  new  monarchy 
at  Rome. 

Caesar's  Moderation. — The  first  measures  of  Caesar  were 
directed  to  the  immediate  restoration  of  order  and  the  recon- 
ciliation of  the  factions  whose  discord  had  led  to  the  civil  war. 
Throughout  C;tsar  refused  to  follow  the  evil  precedent  set  by 
Sulla  in  proscribing  his  opponents  ;  but  this  was  not  all.  When 
his  victory  was  assured  he  used  his  power,  not  for  the  furtherance 
of  party  ends  or  measures,  but  for  the  reasonable  and  moderate 
settlement  of  the  difficulties  of  the  hour.  When  the  prajtor,  Cielius 
Rufus,  an  out-at-elbows  man  of  fashion,  passionate  in  his  hates 
and  loves,  cynical  and  unscrupulous  in  his  political  changes, 
attempted  to  cancel  debts  by  law,  he  was  deposed  from  office. 
Thereupon  Ctelius  endeavoured  to  raise  Italy  against  CiEsar  by 
promising  release  from  their  debts  to  the  impoverished  and 
liberty  to  slaves  ;  but  the  attempted  revolution  was  a  fiasco,  and 
ended  with  the  fall  of  its  leaders,  Civlius  and  Milo.  Next  year 
the  tribune  Dolabella  tried  to  revive  the  agitation  against  the 
creditors,  but  CcEsar's  return  from  the  East  put  an  end  at  once 
and  for  ever  to  these  anarchical  proposals  (47  B.C.). 

Amnesty  and  Attempt  to  reconcile  Republicans  to  New  Regime. 
— While  he  thus  disappointed  the  hopes  of  his  own  extreme  parti- 
sans, Caesar  strove  hard  to  calm  the  fears  of  his  opponents.  All 
common  soldiers,  except  those  who  had  taken  service  under  the 
alien  Juba,  were  let  off  scot  free.  The  officers  and  senators  of 
the  Pompeian  party  who  fought  against  Ctesar  after  the  capitula- 
tion ot  Ilerda  were  liable  to  banishment  and  the  loss  of  their 
property  and  political  rights,  but  in  many  cases  the  full  penalty 
was  not  imposed.  Only  those  who  rejoined  the  enemy  after 
accepting  a  pardon  from  Caesar  were  sentenced  to  death.  At 
last  a  general  amnesty  was  issued  in  B.C.  44.  But  no  amnesty 
could  reconcile  the  republicans  to  the  new  government.  Open  oppo- 
sition was  impossible,  though  showers  of  pamphlets  and  epigrams 
harassed  and  annoyed  the  ruler  of  the  world.  Neither  the  answers 
of  Cassar  and  his  pamphleteers  nor  the  arbitrary  censorship  of  the 
press  were  able  to  stifle  the  chorus  of  praise  in  honour  of  Cato. 
But  while  this  literary  opposition  might  well  be  disregarded,  it 
was  more  dangerous  to  despise  the  underground  plots  of  the 
defeated  party.  Yet  Ctesar  refused  to  retain  his  bodyguard,  and 
insisted  on  the  younger  members  of  the  constitutional  party 
accepting   honours    and    offices    under    the   new    administration. 


THE  NEW  MONARCHY  54 1 

Like  William  III.,  he  tried  to  absorb  and  unite  in  the  govern- 
ment all  the  healthy  elements  in  the  commonwealth,  and  by  this 
truly  statesmanlike  policy  earned  the  hatred  of  all  parties.  Caesar 
might  prefer  the  welfare  of  his  country  to  the  programme  of  a 
party,  but  neither  his  followers  nor  his  opponents  had  the 
breadth  of  mind  to  comprehend  the  principles  which  guided  his 
conduct. 

Political  Problem  :  Centralisation  of  Power  in  the  Hands  of  an 
Individual. — The  problems  which  Ciusar  set  liimself  to  soI\e  were 
of  two  kinds — political  and  social.  The  most  obvious  political 
necessity  of  the  time  was,  that  the  central  government  should  be 
radically  changed.  Instead  of  the  weak  and  vacillating  control 
of  a  selfish  oligarchy,  there  was  crying  need  of  a  firm  and  stable 
power  to  rule  and  guide  the  empire  ;  and  this  power  must  of 
necessity  be  given  to  a  single  person.  Such  a  despotism  could 
only  be  justified  by  the  utter  demoralisation  of  the  ancient  world. 
It  was  not  a  blessing,  but  a  stern  necessity  ;  it  could  not  give  new 
life  to  a  worn-out  society,  but  it  mitigated  the  evils  caused  by  the 
reckless  misgovernment  of  a  slave-holding  aristocracy.  Nothing 
could  raise  from  the  dead  the  lost  spirit  of  national  freedom,  but 
a  beneficent  despotism  might  secure  for  the  world  some  centuries 
of  peace  and  order,  Caesar  is  justified  in  the  view  of  history, 
because  by  establishing  a  despotism  he  saved  the  world  from 
anarchy. 

The  centralisation  of  executive  powers  in  the  hands  of  an 
individual  was  the  cardinal  principle  of  Caesar's  new  constitution, 
but  the  precise  form  which  he  intended  this  autocracy  ultimately 
to  take  cannot  be  determined.  Among  the  many  offices  and 
honours  showered  upon  him  by  a  subservient  majority,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  distinguish  the  permanent  from  the  temporary  elements 
in  the  new  order  of  things.  Provisionally,  Ciesar  assumed  an 
almost  absolute  authority,  but  he  may  well  have  purposed  to 
resign  some  of  his  powers  when  he  had  carried  out  the  most 
urgent  and  pressing  reforms.  From  the  character  of  his  pro- 
visional government  it  is  clear  that  the  new  constitution  was  to 
be  a  despotism,  not  the  premiership  of  a  Pericles,  but  it  is  not  clear 
whether  the  coming  monarchy  was  to  be  open  and  avowed,  or 
clothed  and  veiled  by  republican  fomis,  like  the  principate  estab- 
lished by  Augustus. 

Caesar's  Offices  and  Titles.— The  office  which  Cctsar  himself 
chose  to  express  his  absolute  power  after  Pharsalia — the  dictator- 
ship— was  essentially  temporary.     This  magistracy,  which  he  had 


542  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

held  for  eleven  days  in  B.C.  49,  was  given  him  for  indefinite  time 
in  K.c.  48.  Like  Sulla,  it  was  as  dictator  that  he  undertook  the 
reorganisation  of  the  state.  This  dictatorship  was  understood  to 
be  the  means  of  reconstructing  the  government,  and  not  itself  a 
permanent  part  of  the  constitution.  When,  after  the  battle  of 
Munda,  it  was  declared  perpetual,  it  aroused  the  slumbering  ani- 
mosity of  all  republicans,  because  such  a  dictatorship  rendered 
constitutional  liberty  impossible.  The  fact  that  Caesar  now  styled 
himself  "imperator"  expressed  in  another  way  the  absolute  and 
unlimited  character  of  his  power.  With  the  title  he  assumed  the 
laurel  wreath,  the  triumphal  dress,  and  the  sceptre  of  a  conquering 
general.  But  Cjesar  refused  to  rest  his  authority  on  mere  force  ; 
he  disbanded  his  veterans  and  settled  them  on  Italian  farms,  and 
tried  to  neutralise  the  militaiy  associations  of  the  word  "  imperator" 
by  assuming  also  more  popular  civil  titles.  He  held  the  consul- 
ship often,  in  B.C.  48  accepted  the  tribunician  power  for  life,  and 
in  46  B.C.  a  censorship  of  manners  {prcefeciiira  nioruvi)  for 
three  years. 

Impatience  of  Constitutional  Forms. — Yet  Caesar  could  not 
prevent  his  contempt  for  forms  and  ceremonies  from  becoming 
unpleasantly  evident  to  the  constitutional  party.  He  treated  the 
election  of  magistrates  as  subject  to  the  pleasure  of  the  dictator. 
At  one  time  Rome  would  be  without  magistrates,  left,  like  a  mere 
country  town,  in  charge  of  the  dictator's  pra^fects  ;  at  another  she 
was  overrun  with  men  designated  for  office  by  his  command  many 
years  beforehand.  He  raised  the  number  of  the  Senate  to  nine 
hundred  by  the  admission  of  sons  of  freedmen  and  provincials 
from  Gaul  and  Spain.^  The  Senate  is  henceforth  to  be  the 
council  of  the  emperor,  not  the  stronghold  of  the  Roman  origarcliy. 
In  fine,  Rome  is  no  longer  to  be  the  mistress  of  the  world,  but 
only  the  first  city  in  the  empire.  Her  magistrates,  her  Senate, 
and  her  assemblies  are  to  be  confined  more  and  more  to  municipal 
business,  and  in  imperial  affairs  are  to  be  entirely  subordinate  to 
the  supreme  authority  of  Ceesar. 

Caesar  perhaps  aimed  at  founding  a  Dynasty. — It  is  probable, 
though  by  no  means  certain,  that  Cssar  contemplated  the  trans- 
mission of  his  despotic  powers  to  his  natural  heir,  C.  Octavius.  In 
fa\'our  of  the  view  that  he  aimed  at  founding  an  hereditary  monarchy, 
we  may  cite  the  fact  that  he  placed  his  statue  with  those  of  the 

1  The  wits  of  the  town  put  up  notices  begging  that  no  one  would  show  the 
new  senators  the  way  to  the  Senate-house. 


THE  NEW  MONARCHY  543 

seven  old  Roman  kings  on  the  Capitol,  and,  like  the  monarchs  of  the 
East,  stamped  his  image  on  the  coinage.  The  oracles  which  fore- 
told that  only  a  king  could  conquer  the  Parthians,  and  Antony's 
famous  proffer  of  the  diadem  at  the  Lupercalia,  are  straws  which 
show  which  way  the  wind  was  blowing.      The  purple  robe  and 


BUST   OF   C.    OCTAVIUS,    AFTERWARDS    AUGUSTUS. 


golden  seat  seem  symbols  chosen  to  connect  the  new  monarchy 
with  the  old,  just  as  Napoleon  tried  to  represent  himself  as  the 
successor  of  Charlemagne.  But  whether  CcCsar  intended  to  found 
a  dynasty  or  not,  undoubtedly  he  was  determined  to  retain  his 
powers  for  life.     His  perpetual  dictatorship  and  tribunate,  which 


544  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

en.'il)led  liiin  to  contnil  let^islalion  nnd  llie  elections,  were  supple- 
mented by  numerous  special  powers.  He  alone  could  make  war 
and  peace,  he  could  appoint  pr;etors  to  provincial  commands,  he 
could  summon  before  him  such  offenders  as  he  chose  ;  in  a  word, 
in  all  departments  of  political  activity  C;csar  is  supreme. 

Elevation  and  Extension  of  Local  Self-Government. — This 
autocracy  was  plainly  inconsistent  with  the  political  ideal  of 
antiquity,  the  free  and  self-governing  city-state.  But  for  half  a 
century  at  least  the  true  city-state  had  ceased  to  exist.  Rome, 
by  admitting  all  Italians  to  the  franchise,  had  grown  to  a  size 
which  made  such  a  government  an  absurdity.  The  Italians  had 
lost  their  patriotic  devotion  to  their  own  cities,  and  not  acquired 
much  influence  or  interest  in  the  government  of  Rome.  The  pro- 
vincials, even  where  they  were  permitted  to  play  at  autonomy,  felt 
themselves  slaves  in  the  presence  of  the  Roman  governor.  The 
old  independent  city  had  everywhere  become  an  anachronism,  and 
had  been  absorbed  in  larger  political  unions.  But  Cnssar  was  not 
minded  to  sacrifice  the  remnants  of  local  patriotism.  He  could 
not,  indeed,  restore  the  old  civic  liberty,  for  that  would  have  de- 
stroyed the  peace,  order,  and  unity  of  the  empire.  The  monarch 
must  be  placed  above  its  jarring  races,  creeds,  and  customs,  as 
an  impartial  arbiter  between  them.  But,  so  far  as  was  consistent 
with  this  central  despotism,  C;tsar  was  for  the  fullest  develop- 
ment of  local  self-government.  He  reorganised  the  municipalities 
of  Italy  and  Cisalpine  Gaul  on  the  pattern  of  Rome,  and  strove 
to  elevate  the  political  life  of  these  country  towns,  that  in  muni- 
cipal patriotism  he  might  provide  a  substitute  for  the  lost  ideal 
of  civic  liberty.  He  foreshadowed  the  great  work  of  the  empire, 
the  gradual  extension  of  this  municipal  organisation  throughout 
the  West,  by  the  foundation  of  burgess  colonies  at  Arelate  (Aries), 
Arausio  (Orange),  and  Forum  Julii  (Frejus),  and  the  resettlement 
of  Narbo  in  Southern  Gaul  ;  by  the  bestowal  of  the  full  franchise, 
an  unprecedented  boon,  on  a  provincial  community,  Gades,  in 
Spain  ;  and  by  the  projected  colonisation  of  the  sites  of  Carthage 
and  of  Corinth.  Further,  Latin  rights,  the  natural  stepping-stone 
to  the  full  franchise,  were  to  be  given  to  Sicily  and  to  many  com- 
munities in  Narbonese  Gaul.  Wherever  either  franchise  was 
bestowed,  municipal  organisation  and  local  self-government  ac- 
companied the  gift.  It  is  not,  therefore,  fanciful  to  see  in  Caesar's 
uncompleted  schemes  the  germs  of  the  system  of  imperial  days. 
In  the  East,  Rome  is  still  the  protectress  of  the  Greek  civic  life, 
which  the  genius  of  Alexander  and  the  policy  of  the   Seleucid 


KEFOKMS  OF  CAiSAR  545 

kings  had  naturalised  in  Asia  ;  in  the  West  she  has  a  yet  higher 
mission.  As  she  brought  its  rude  tribes  within  the  charmed  circle 
of  civilisation,  she  endowed  them  with  those  forms  of  civic  self- 
government  which  she  herself  had  dc\eloped  in  the  days  of 
liberty. 

The  Condition  of  Rome  :  Caesar's  Treatment  of  its  Evils. — 
The  political  reforms  of  Ciesar  were  not  the  most  difficult  part 
of  the  work  before  him.  Moral  decay  and  social  disintegration 
were  the  most  deadly  of  the  diseases  which  were  ruining  the 
commonwealth.  The  city  of  Rome,  which  was  utterly  without 
free  and  healthy  industries,  was  nevertheless  inhabited  by  a  vast 
population.  Thither  had  flocked  the  dispossessed  Italian  yeomen, 
thither  came  a  motley  crowd  of  slaves,  orientals  from  Syria  and 
Phrygia,  barbarians  from  Gaul  and  Spain,  who,  when  enfranchised, 
went  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  proletariate.  This  rabble  of  beggars 
and  idlers,  who  were  attracted  to  Rome  by  the  shows  and  games, 
lived  on  the  doles  of  corn  distributed  by  the  government.  Their 
clubs  and  guilds  became,  under  Clodius'  direction,  unions  for  the 
promotion  of  riot  and  murder  in  the  streets  of  Rome.  Police 
there  was  none,  and  disorder  reigned  unchallenged  in  the  capital. 
Ccesar  could  not,  of  course,  do  more  than  mitigate  these  gigantic 
evils.  But,  despite  his  democratic  sympathies  and  traditions,  he 
dealt  firmly  with  the  city  mob.  He  broke  up  the  clubs  formed 
by  Clodius,  and  placed  all  similar  societies  under  strict  supervision. 
He  transformed  the  demoralising  system  of  doles  instituted  by 
Gracchus  into  a  more  reasonable  system  of  relief  by  confining  the 
distribution  to  the  poor,  and  thus  reducing  the  number  of  recipients 
from  320,000  to  150,000.  He  provided  employment  in  Rome  by 
constructing  new  buildings  for  the  assemblies  in  the  Campus 
Martins,  and  for  the  law  courts  in  the  Forum  Julium.  But  he 
relied  most  of  all  on  emigration  to  thin  the  ranks  of  the  pro- 
letariate. By  reviving  the  great  designs  of  transmarine  colonisa- 
tion originated  by  C.  Gracchus,  he  endeavoured  to  provide  the 
unemployed  with  a  decent  livelihood,  and  to  re-establish  in  Greece 
and  Africa  industries  which  Rome  had  destroyed. 

The  State  of  Italy. — The  condition  of  Italy  was  to  the  eye  of 
the  statesman  no  less  grave  than  that  of  Rome.  The  yeomen  of 
Italy,  once  the  backbone  of  her  armies,  had  now  almost  dis- 
appeared. Their  little  farms  had  been  swallowed  up  in  the  large 
estates  of  the  slave-owning  capitalist.  The  hills  of  Samnimn  and 
the  plains  of  Apulia  had  always  been  pasture,  but  now  grazing 
and  stock-farming  had  superseded  corn-growing  in  the  greater 

2  M 


546  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

part  of  the  peninsula.  There  was  no  sound  and  healthy  middle 
class  left.  Over  against  the  mass  of  slaves  and  paupers  there 
stood  a  tiny  knot  of  capitalists,  who  devoted  their  energies,  not 
to  the  encouragement  of  trade  and  manufactures,  but  to  cultiva- 
tion of  vast  estates  by  means  of  slaves,  and,  above  all,  to  the 
business  of  money-lending  on  a  large  scale.  Naturally  in  such 
a  society  there  was  the  sharpest  contrast  between  rich  and  poor. 
But  among  the  oligarchs  as  well  as  the  populace  debt  was  pre- 
valent. The  boundless  and  tasteless  extravagance  of  the  wealihy 
classes,  which  showed  itself  in  palaces  crowded  with  costly  furni- 
ture and  ornaments,  in  parks,  in  fish-ponds,  and  in  aviaries,  but 
above  all  in  the  luxury  of  the  table,  brought  many  nobles  to 
poverty.  The  expenses  of  a  political  career,  the  games,  the  shows, 
and  largesses  necessary  to  win  the  favour  of  the  populace,  ruined 
others.  In  fine,  the  world  of  quality  was  deep  in  debt,  as  is  shown 
by  the  power  of  the  financier  Crassus  and  by  the  frequent  insurrec- 
tions, whose  cry  was  for  a  "  clear  sheet "  {/lovcc  tabula;).  Mean- 
while the  growth  of  egotism  and  the  decay  of  family  life  led 
in  the  upper  classes  to  a  laxer  morality  among  women  and 
an  increasing  aversion  to  the  responsibilities  of  marriage.  In 
the  lower  orders  the  same  features  may  be  traced.  It  is  no 
wonder,  then,  that  Italy  suffered  more  and  more  from  de- 
population, or  that  her  once  crowded  cities,  as  Varro  says,  stood 
desolate. 

Caesar's  Laws  on  Debt. — This  moral  and  social  decay  of  the 
nation,  for  which  the  capitalist  slave-holding  oligarchs  were 
primarily  responsible,  was  essentially  incurable.  Even  Caesar 
could  only  deal  with  the  worst  symptoms  of  the  deej>- seated 
disease.  Luxury  he  sought  to  restrain  by  the  old  ineffectual  curb 
of  direct  sumptuary  legislation,  and,  with  more  prospect  of  success, 
by  the  reimposition  of  custom  duties  at  the  Italian  ports,  whose 
weight  fell  chiefly  on  Eastern  goods.  Debt  was  a  yet  more  rampant 
evil.  To  meet  the  crisis  caused  by  the  civil  war,  Caesar  ordered  that 
debtors  should  be  entitled  to  deduct  from  the  capital  of  the  debt 
all  interest  already  paid,  and  in  repaying  the  residue  to  make 
over  their  real  and  personal  property  at  its  estimated  value  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  justification  of  such  exceptional 
measures  is  to  be  found  in  their  acceptance  by  all  moderate  men, 
and  in  the  necessity  of  delivering  the  unfortunate  debtors  from 
the  grinding  tyranny  of  the  capitalists.  C;i;sar's  permanent 
legislation  is  of  unimpeachable  soundness,  socially  and  economi- 
cally.    His  chief  measure  was  a  law  of  bankruptcy.     By  it  an 


REFORMS  OF  CAESAR  547 

insolvent  debtor  escaped  imprisonment  by  becoming  a  bankrupt 
and  giving  up  his  property  to  his  creditors.  The  great  maxim 
that  liberty  should  be  forfeited  by  the  criminal  only,  and  not  also 
by  the  unfortunate,  was  clearly  enunciated.  Caesar  also  attempted 
to  discourage  usury  and  revive  Italian  agriculture  by  compelling 
capitalists  to  invest  half  their  money  in  land. 

Encouragement  of  Agriculture. — Indeed  the  encouragement  of 
agriculture  was  a  prominent  feature  in  Caesar's  reforms,  as  it  must 
be  in  the  programme  of  every  Italian  statesman.  Besides  attempt- 
ing to  breathe  new  spirit  into  municipal  government,  he  laboured 
more  directly  for  that  end.  In  his  distribution  of  land  to  his 
veterans  he  avoided  the  mistakes  of  Sulla.  He  did  not  make  a 
clean  sweep  of  existing  holders  and  settle  whole  battalions  of 
veterans  together  on  the  soil,  but  scattered  them  about  among 
the  agricultural  population.  He  thus  contrived  to  respect  private 
rights  and  to  infuse  a  new  and  healthy  element  into  Italian 
country  life.  Further,  he  compelled  stock-farmers  to  give  em- 
ployment to  poor  freemen,  by  enacting  that  at  least  a  third  of 
their  herdsmen  must  be  free  citizens.  And,  lastly,  the  programme 
of  public  works  planned  by  Caesar  included  the  draining  of  the 
Fucine  lake  and  the  construction  of  a  great  high-road  through 
the  Apennines,  necessary  for  the  transport  of  the  produce  of 
Central  Italy. 

The  Provinces. — The  provmces  groaned  under  a  yet  worse  load 
of  misgovernment  than  Rome  and  Italy.  In  the  Western  pro- 
vinces, vSpain  and  Gaul,  there  were  still  vigorous  races  left  whose 
union  with  Rome  was  destined  to  produce  new  forms  of  culture. 
But  most  of  the  countries  round  the  Mediterranean  had  long  lost 
their  liberty  and  become  the  willing  slaves  of  foreign  or  domestic 
tyrants.  Yet  it  may  be  doubted  if  any  Western  government  has 
ever  laid  on  its  subjects  a  heavier  yoke  than  did  the  Roman 
oligarchy  at  this  period.  The  taxes  imposed  by  the  central  govern- 
ment were  not  heavy,  but  the  illegal  exactions  of  its  agents  swelled 
the  total  paid  by  the  provincial  to  an  incredible  amount.  It  was 
admitted  that  a  town  on  which  Roman  troops  were  quartered 
suffered  nearly  as  much  as  one  stormed  by  an  enemy.  The  pro- 
consul hoped  to  make  thi'ee  fortunes  out  of  his  province  :  one  to 
pay  his  debts,  another  to  bribe  the  jury  if  he  were  brought  to 
trial,  and  a  third  for  himself;  his  retinue  expected  to  be  maintained 
in  luxury,  and  his  friends  at  home  demanded  presents  of  money, 
or  wild  beasts  for  the  sports  of  the  amphitheatre.  Often  the 
Roman  officials  were  little  better  than  a  gang  of  robbers  let  loose 


548  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

on  the  provincials.  Sheer  despair  drove  the  SiciHans  under  V'erres 
to  leave  half  their  farms  fallow. 

Yet  the  governor  was  a  less  evil  than  the  tax-farmer  and  the 
usurer.  The  virtuous  Brutus  lent  money  to  the  town  of  Salamis, 
in  Cyprus,  at  48  per  cent.,  and  his  energetic  agent,  Scaptius,  be- 
sieged the  municipal  Senate  in  the  council-house  till  five  of  their 
number  were  starved  to  death.  The  smaller  land-owners  in  Illy- 
ricum  and  Asia  were  in  point  of  fact  the  bondsmen  of  their 
creditors.  These  usurers  made  the  Roman  name  a  byword,  and 
brought  on  their  own  heads  the  massacres  by  which  the  conquests 
of  Mithradates  were  sullied. 

Caesar" s  System. — Both  governor  and  tax-gatherer  were  sternly 
checked  by  Ctesar.  Asia  was  delivered  altogether  from  the  tithe- 
system  and  its  attendant  evils  ;  the  other  provinces  were  relieved 
from  the  arbitrary  exactions  of  the  governor  and  his  suite.  For 
these  governors  were  no  longer  independent  potentates  acting 
in  contemptuous  disregard  of  the  wishes  and  orders  of  the  home 
government,  but  mere  functionaries  under  the  control  of  a  strict 
and  powerful  master.  The  deeper-seated  evils  of  usury  could 
not  be  so  promptly  checked,  but  at  least  a  new  spirit  was  infused 
into  the  provincial  administration.  The  magistrate  became,  not 
a  ringleader  of  the  strong  who  trampled  on  the  weak,  but  a  refuge 
for  the  oppressed,  a  protector  of  the  helpless. 

Practical  Character  of  Caesars  Measures.  —  No  account  of 
Caesar's  measures  would  be  satisfactory  which  failed  to  emphasise 
the  practical  character  of  his  genius.  Like  Napoleon,  he  was  filled 
with  a  passion  for  order  and  organisation — government  is  to  Ca;sar 
a  science.  The  days  of  haphazard  finance  and  hand-to-mouth 
legislation  are  over.  Cassar  was  the  first  of  Roman  statesmen 
to  conceive  the  idea  of  a  budget,  of  a  regular  estimate  of  the 
income  and  expenditure.  Like  Alexander,  he  established  an 
imperial  gold  coinage,  current  throughout  the  empire.  The 
existing  coinage  was  either  entirely  superseded  or  retained  but 
a  local  and  limited  currency.  The  same  spirit  is  shown  in  his 
reform  of  the  calendar.  Miscalculation  and  mismanagement  had 
brought  the  old  calendar  to  anticipate  the  true  time  by  sixty-seven 
days.  Ctesar  substituted  for  the  old  year  of  355  days  with  irregular 
intercalations  the  Julian  system,  which  is  the  basis  of  our  present 
calendar. 

Conspiracy  to  assassinate  Caesar. — Yet  the  projects  ^\•hich 
Cffisar  was  able  to  carry  out  were  but  a  portion  of  his  scheme. 
Had  time  been  allowed  him  he  would  ha\e  forestalled  Augustus 


REFORMS  OF  CA^.SAR  549 

in  the  rectification  of  the  frontiers  of  the  empire,  and  Justinian 
in  the  codification  of  Roman  law.  But  the  work  of  centuries  was 
not  thus  to  be  compressed  within  the  narrow  limits  of  a  single 
life.     Admirable  as  were  Caesar's  administrative  reforn-is,  the  new 


BUST  OF   M.    BRUTUS. 


order  of  things  was  utterly  opposed  -to  the  ideas  and  sentiments 
of  the  Roman  nobility.  Despotism,  which  might  be  endured  as 
a  temporary  expedient,  was  intolerable  as  a  pennanent  principle 
of  government.      While  the  tide  of  popular  adulation  rose  high, 


550  HISTORY  OF  ROME 

and  flatterers  pressed  on  Cncsar  divine  as  well  as  regal  honours, 
the  old  republicans  were  plotting  his  assassination.  C.  Cassius, 
who  had  surrendered  the  Ponipeian  fleet  after  Pharsalia,  had 
been  pardoned  and  received  into  favour.  But  he  felt  slighted 
when  M.  Brutus,  a  younger  and  less  distinguished  man,  was 
placed  above  him  on  the  list  of  prostors.  M.  Brutus  himself  was 
a  narrow-minded  student,  who  saw  in  Caesar  nothing  more  than 
a  Greek  tyrant,  but  who  gave  dignity  to  the  conspiracy  by  his 
honest  enthusiasm.  Among  the  other  conspirators  were  Caesar's 
trusted  lieutenants,  D.  Brutus  and  Trebonius,  as  well  as  Casca 
and  Cimber,  on  whom  he  had  bestowed  offices.  The  day  finally 
chosen  for  the  murder  was  the  Ides  of  March,  when  Caesar  was 
to  announce  to  the  Senate  his  resignation  of  the  consulship  in 
consequence  of  his  approaching  expedition  against  Parthia.  When 
the  time  came  Caesar  was  kept  at  home  by  the  warnings  and 
entreaties  of  his  wife,  till  the  traitor  D.  Brutus  lured  him  into 
the  snare.  When  Caesar  had  entered  the  Senate  and  taken  his 
seat,  Tillius  Cimber  pressed  on  him  a  petition  fo'-  his  brother's 
pardon.  The  other  conspirators  crowded  round,  till  Cimber  seized 
his  hands  and  robes  as  if  entreating  grace.  Meanwhile  Casca 
crept  behind  Caesar  and  smote  him  an  ill-aimed  blow  as  he  rose 
and  called  for  aid.  The  signal  once  given,  the  conspirators  fell 
upon  their  victim  with  reckless  haste  ;  Caesar  staggered  beneath 
a  shower  of  blows  to  the  base  of  Pompey's  statue,  and  there  fell 
dead  at  the  feet  of  the  rival  thus  horribly  avenged. 

The  Greatness  of  Caesar. — The  assassination  of  Caesar  could 
not  prevent  the  empire.  It  only  plunged  the  world  into  renewed 
strife  and  confusion,  till  the  man  on  whom  Caesar's  mantle  fell 
restored  peace  and  order.  It  left  the  great  work  conceived  by 
Caesar  to  be  completed  by  smaller  men  in  a  less  noble  way.  But 
though  his  career  was  cut  short  and  his  work  unfinished,  Caesar 
stands  out  as  the  one  original  genius  in  Roman  history.  We 
may  justly  admire  the  unaffected  simplicity  of  his  history  of  the 
Gallic  wars,  we  may  wonder  at  the  transcendent  military  ability 
which  saw  in  rapidity  of  movement  the  surest  means  of  victory, 
but  above  all  we  must  recognise  in  Caesar  a  man  who  studied  the 
problems  of  pohtics  in  a  scientific  spirit,  and  amid  the  chaos  and 
confusion  of  a  worn-out  world  laid  the  foundations  of  a  new,  har- 
monious, and  enduring  order.  His  work  must  be  judged  impartially 
by  the  standards  of  his  own  age,  and  the  possibilities  of  the 
time.  To  glorify  his  vigorous  application  of  force  is  as  needless, 
as  it  is  idle  to  condemn  him  from  the  standpoint  of  modern  con- 


DEATH  OF  CALSAR 


SSI 


ditions  and  ideas.  The  administrative  problems  before  him  he 
grasped  with  comprehensive  insight,  and  solved  with  unexampled 
rapidity  and  success.  It  was  rather  his  misfortune  than  his  fault 
that  he  failed  to  give  a  permanent  shape  to  his  institutions,  and 
to  satisfy  public  opinion  by  reconciling  the  new  regime  with  the 
forms  and  traditions  of  the  past. 


rARODY   OF    A    SCENE    IN    SCHOOL. 


How  &.Leiah's  lU 


:  <^  Co..  Lonrion  .  7V>»i-  Yor^k  ASomhctk: 


APPENDIX    I 

ASSEMBLIES   AT    ROME 

COMITIA  are  assemblies  of  the  whole  people  {p  pitliis);  a  con- 
cilium, though  loosely  used  of  any  meeting,  means  strictly  an 
assembly  of  a  part  only  of  the  people.  There  are  three  ordinary 
forms  of  Comitia,  Curiata,  Centuriala,  and  Tributa,  and  one  im- 
portant concilium,  that  of  the  plebs. 

I.  The  Comitia  Curiata,  in  which  the  people,  meeting  in  the 
comitium,  voted  by  curies  {cf.  pp.  44,  45),  was  in  the  regal  period 
the  only  form  of  assembly,  but  in  later  times  its  functions  were 
purely  formal  (p.  50),  e.g.,  the  lex  ciiriaia  de  imperio. 

II.  The  Comitia  Centuriata,  in  which  the  people  voted  by  cen- 
turies, met  under  the  presidency  of  a  magistrate  cum  imperio  in  the 
Campus  Martins  outside  the  city.  (For  its  original  form,  cf.  pp. 
27,  28,  45,  46  ;  and  for  its  reform  in  241  B.C.,  pp.  293-296.)  Its 
principal  functions  were — 

1.  The  election  of  the  higher  magistrates,  whether  ordinary,  as 
consuls,  praetors,  and  censors,  or  extraordinary,  as  decemvirs  and 
consular  tribunes. 

2.  Judicially  it  is  the  highest  court  of  appeal  in  all  cases  affect- 
ing the  "caput"  of  a  citizen  {cf.  pp.  48,  71,  352). 

3.  In  legislation  it  always  retains  the  right  of  declaring  war. 
In  early  times  all  laws  proposed  by  consuls  came  before  it,  but 
from  the  time  of  the  Punic  Wars  consuls  often  preferred  to  make 
use  of  the  more  convenient  Comitia  Tributa  {cf.  pp.  450,  451). 

III.  The  Comitia  Tributa,  in  which  the  people  voted  by  tribes, 
met  under  the  presidency  of  a  curule  magistrate  in  the  forum 
{cf.  pp.  71,  72,  294,  295,  451  n.).     Its  principal  functions  were — 

I.  The  election  of  curule  asdiles,  quaestors,  and  other  minor 
magistrates  of  the  populus,  as  well  as  of  some  among  the  tribuni 
militum. 

5.S3 


554  APPENDIX 

2.  Judicial  appeals  against  penalties  imposed  by  the  curule 
asdiies  or  pontifex  maximus. 

3.  Legislative.  From  the  first  all  laws  proposed  by  praetors, 
later  most  of  those  proposed  by  consuls  were  brought  before  the 
Comitia  Tributa. 

4.  A  special  form  of  this  assembly  (Comitia  Sacerdotum),  in 
which  only  seventeen  tribes  taken  by  lot  took  part,  elected  the 
priests  (c/.  pp.  2S8,  289,  385,  451,  492). 

IV.  The  concilium  plebis,  meeting  in  the  forum  under  the 
presidency  of  a  tribune  or  a^dile  of  the  plebs,  voted  originally 
by  curies,  but  after  472  B.C.,  always  by  tribes  (c/.  pp.  55,  72). 
Legally  this  assembly  was  confined  to  plebeians,  but  this  restriction 
was  not  enforced  in  practice.     Its  principal  functions  were — 

1.  The  election  of  plebeian  tribunes  and  aediles. 

2.  Judicial  appeals  against  fines  imposed  by  these  officials. 

3.  Legislative.  It  could  never  pass  laws  {leges),  but  at  least 
after  the  lex  Hortensia,  287  B.C.,  its  resolutions  {plebiscita),  proposed 
by  plebeian  tribunes  and  aediles,  had  the  force  of  law,  and  in  fact 
most  important  statutes  are  passed  by  it  {cf.  pp.  96,  294,  450,  451). 


APPENDIX    II 

LIST  OF  THB  MOST  IMPORTANT  ROMAN  ROADS 
OF  REPUBLICAN  TIMES 

l^ia  Appia. — To  Capua,  312  ri.C.  ;  to  Venusia,  291  B.C.  ;  to  Brun- 

disium,  circ.  268  B.C. 
Via  Laiina. — To  Anagnia,  Fregellai",  and  Casilinum,  where  it  joined 

the  Via  Appia. 
Via  Salaria. — To  Reate,  Asculum,  and  the  Adriatic. 
Via   Valeria. — To   Carsioli  and  Alba  Fucens,  circ.  299  B.C.,  ex- 
tended later  to  Corfinium. 
Via  Flaminia.- — To  Narnia,  299  B.C.  ;  to  Fanum  and  Ariminum, 

220  B.C. 
Via  jEmilia. — From  Ariminum  to  Bononia,  Mutina,  Parma,  and 

Placentia,    187    B.C.  ;    with    a   cross    road   from    Bononia  by 

Florentia  to  Arretium,  circ.  187  B.C. 
Via  Cassia. — To  Sutrium,  Chisium,  and  Arretium  ;  reconstructed 

and  continued  to  Luca  and  Luna,  171  B.C.  or  later. 
Via  Aurelia. — The  coast-road  to  Pis£e  and  Luna  after  180  B.C.  ; 

continued  by  the  Via  A^jtiilia  (Scauri),  to  Genua,  109  B.C. 
Via  Postinnia. — From  Genua  by  Dertona  to  Placentia  ;  thence  by 

Cremona  and  Verona  to  Aquileia,  148  B.C. 
Via  Popillia. — From  Capua  by  Nola  to  Salernum,  and  thence  by 

Consentia  to  Regium,  132  B.C.  {vide  Inscription,  p.  339).     To 

the  same  period  (and  in  part,  i.e.,  from  Ariminum  to  Atria  to 

the  same  Consul,  Popillius  L^enas),  were  due  the  roads  from 

Ariminum  to  Aquileia  and  from  Fanum  southwards  to  Brun- 

disium. 
Via  Egnaiia. — From  Apollonia  and  Dyrrhachium  to  Thessalonica, 

circ.  146  B.C.,  continued  later  to  the  Hebrus. 
Via  Domitia. — From  the  Rhone  to  the  Pyrenees,  circ.   121   B.C., 

connected  with  Genua  by  the  Massiliot  coast-road. 


INDEX 


R.  C.  =■  Roman  Colony,  L.  C  =  Latin  Colony.     In  distinguhhing  members 
of  afat?iily,  "  his  son,"  5fc.,  refers  to  the  name  immediately  preceding. 


AniJERA,  429. 

Abeliix,  214. 

Abgarus,  520. 

Abydos,  257,  260,  269. 

Acarnania,  213,  257,  261,  280. 

Accensi.  103,  138. 

Acerrae,  202,  405,  407. 

Achasus,  327. 

Achaean  League,  165,  212,  213,  254  ;  con- 
stitution and  power  of,  257-9,  261,  264-8, 
272,  276;  leaders  e.xiled,  280,  released, 
283;  war  with,  284-7. 

Achaia,  settlement  of,  286,  287,  428,  429. 

Achillas,  535. 

Achradina  (Syracuse),  210,  211. 

Acilius.     See  Giabrio. 

Addua(Adda)rv.,  8,  85. 

Adherbal,  361,  362. 

Adoption  (adrogatio),  45,  502. 

Aduatuca,  511. 

Aduatuci,  381,  505. 

^acides,  124. 

/Ecs,  191. 

/Eclanum,  402,  409. 

jEdiles,  300,  305,  349,  452 ;  curiile,  92,  94  ; 
plebeian,  55,  71  ;  cf.  Appendix  I. 

■^dui,  373,  505,  507,  508,  512,  513. 

/Egates  Insulcc,  battle  of,  161. 

j'F.giuin,  258,  284. 

^Tiiilianus.    5'f(?  Scipio  and  Fabiu>. 

yEmilius.  See  Barbula,  Lepidus,  Papus, 
Paullus,  Regillus,  Scaurus. 

iEmilius,  M.,  185. 

^neas,  20,  37. 

./Equi,  16,  59,  61,  62,  77,  78,  98,  115. 

ALrariiim,  138.     See  also  Quiestorcs. 

^sernia,  L.  C.,  164  «.,  201  «. ,  404,  405, 
410,  443. 

iEsis  R.,  131. 

^•Esium  or  ^sis,  R.  C,  164  n. 

i^itolians,  165,  212,  213,  254;  constitution 
and  power  of  League,  257,  258,  259-64, 
267,  268,  272,  280.     See  also  Cavalry. 

Afranius,  L. ,  529-31,  538. 

Africa,  wars  in,  155-7,  224-31,  245-53, 
360-71,  531,  536-8. 

Africa,  province  of,  253,  359,  417,  437,  438. 

Africanus.    See  Scipio. 

Agatha,  372. 

Agathocles,  iii,  120,  125,  127,  148,  150,  155. 

Agediucuni,  513. 

557 


Agelaus,  239. 

Ager  Cainpanns,  210,  306,  335,  347,  359, 
456,  500,  518. 

Ager publicus,  53,  56,  91,  92,  164,  i66,  209, 
279.  306,  335/,  347,  359,  389,  500.  i,ee 
also  Assignatio,  Leges  Agraria;.  ■ 

Agis  of  Tarentum,  124. 

Agis  of  Sparta,  337. 

Agriculture,    Italian,    306,    316-8,    334-6, 

372  «■.  545-7- 
Agrigentum  (Acragas),   18,   151,   211,  212, 

327- 
Agron,  165. 

Ahala,  C.  Serviliiis,  76,  77  n. 
Ahenobarbus,  Cn.  Domitius,  373, 
Ahenobarbus,  Cn.  Domitius  (his  son),  385. 
Ahenobarbus,  Cn.  Domitius  (his  son),  443. 
Ahenobarbus,   L.   Domitius  (his  brother), 

519,  528,  529. 
Ala,  139. 
Alba  Fiicens,  16;  L.  C,  115   209,  279,  373, 

405,  405. 
Alba  Longa,  16,  20,  21,  24,  25. 
Alban  Lake,  8,  80,  81,  84  «.  ;  Mount,  16. 
Albani  (in  the  Caucasus),  480. 
Albinus,  A.  Postumius,  365. 
Albinus,  L.  Postumius,  165,  194,  199,  204. 
Albinus,    Sp.    Postumius  (cos.    321    B.C.), 

108-110. 
Albinus,    Sp.    Postumius   (cos.    no    B.C.), 

36s,  366. 
Aleria,  154. 

Alesia,  siege  of,  513,  514. 
Aletrium,  115. 

Ale,\ander  the  Great,  124,  125,  330,  544. 
Ale.xaiider  the  Molossian,  105,  106,  124,  125. 
Alexander,  pseudo-,  283,  326. 
Alexandria.  488,  536. 
Algidus,  Mount,  59,  61,  62,  78. 
AlHa  (R.),  battle  of,  12,  85,  86,  loS. 
Allies  {socii)  in  army,  137,   139,  261  ;  man 

fleet,    142,    152,    155,      See   Italians  and 

Latins. 
AUifae,  192,  209. 

AUobroges,  178,  3:3,  373,  377,  494. 
Alps,  Mountains,  3,  5  ;  passes  of,  178-82, 

372. 
Alsium,  R.  C,  164  «. 
Amanus,  Mount,  526. 
Amastris,  426. 
Ambiorix,  511. 


558 


INDEX 


Ambracia,  124,  272. 

Ambrones,  375,  381,  382. 

Amisus,  424,  475,  482. 

Amphipolis,  279,  280. 

Anai;nia.  16,  114. 

Anapus  R.,  211. 

Anares,  166. 

Ancona,  4,  85,  166,  439. 

Ancus  Marcius,  25,  34. 

Andriscus,  282. 

Anicius,  L.,  278. 

Anicius,  M.,  202. 

Anio  R.,  6,  38,  90,  115,  209. 

Antigonus  Doson,  165,  254. 

Antigonus  Gonatas,  130. 

Antioch,  254,  483,  521. 

Antiochus  III.  (the  Great),  254  ;   attacks 

Egypt,  260-2      eastern  wars,  265,  266  ; 

war   with   Rome,    266-71  ;   peace   with, 

271,  272. 
Antiochus  IV.  (Epiphanes),  281,  329. 
Antipolis  (.'\ntibes),  372. 
.\ntium,  L.  C,  58  ;  R.  C,  104,  no. 
Antonius,  C.  (Hybrida),  488,  490,  493,  495. 
Antonius,  M.  (orator),  387,  390,  393,  395, 

399-  437- 
Antonius,  M.  (son  of  the  last),  472. 
Antonius,  M.  (iSlark  Antony),  i,  525,  523, 

529.  533,  543- 
Antullius,  Q.,  354. 
An.vur,  R.  C.    See  Tarracina. 
Aous  R.,  262. 

Apennines,  Mountains,  3,  4,  188,  317,  403. 
Apollonia,   142,    165,    212,    261,    267,   276, 

282,  533-  534- 
Appian,  92,  246. 
Apsus  R. ,  262. 
Apulia,  4,  7,  8,  106,  107,  108,  no,  in,  igi, 

206,  207,  221,  222,  335,  409,  410,  436,  440, 

528,  545.  _ 
Aqu?e  Sextiae,  373,  381,  382. 
Aquileia,  5;  L.  C,  239,  275,  309. 
Aquillius,  M'.  (cos.  129  B.C.),  328,  329,  346, 

420,  421. 
Aquillius,  M'.(cos,  loi  B.C.),  393,395,  425-7. 
Aquilonia,  battle  of,  119. 
Aquitania,  50S,  509. 
Arar  (Saone)  R.,  506. 
Aratus,  254,  258. 
Arausio,  377,  378,  387,  544. 
Arcbelaus,  426,  428-33. 
Archidannis,  105. 
Archimedes,  211. 
Ardaa,  30,  40,  84,  87. 
Arelate,  544. 
Aretas,  482. 
Arevaci,  242,  244. 

Argos,  130,  258,  262,  264,  284,  2S5,  359. 
Ariarathes  IV.,  255,  271. 
Ariarathes  VI.,  424. 
Ariarathes  VII.,  424. 
Ariarathes  (son  of  Mithradates),  428. 
Aricia,  104. 
Ariminum,  L.  C. ,  164  «.,  166-8,  185,   187, 

22 1_,  225,  436,  439,  440-2,  527. 
Ariminum,  ius  of,  309. 
Ariobarzanes,  425. 
Ariovistus,  505-7. 
Aristaenus,  262. 


Aristion,  428-30. 

Aristobulus,  482. 

Aristonicus,  328,  329,  421. 

Aristotle,  i,  434. 

Armenia,  238,  271,  330,  420,  425,  426,  471, 
472,  476,  477,  479>  480,  519,  520. 

Armenia  Minor,  424,  482,  536. 

Army  of  Carthage,  148  ;  under  Hamilcar, 
170;  under  Hannibal,  176,  igi,  231,232. 

Army,  Greek.     Sec  Phalanx. 

Army,  Roman,  of  Romulus,  23 ;  Servian, 
45,  46  ;  manipular,  102,  135-41  ;  re- 
organised by  Marius,  369,  379-81  ;  pay 
of,  80,  138  ;  service  in,  loi,  136,  349, 
350  n.  ;  minimum  census  for,  46,  293, 
369;  arms  and  tactics  of,  102,  139,  140, 
I96,_  23o,_  263,  264,  279,  534,  535  ;  pro- 
fessionalism in,  224,  233,  314,  379,  538  ; 
decay  of,  245,  313,  411,  416.  See  also 
Allies,  Cavalry,  Legion,  Phalanx, 
Veterans. 

Arnus  (Arno)  R.,  6;  marshes  of,  12,  188. 

Arpi,  192,  201,  ?o6. 

Arpinum,  114,  115,  366,  367,  488. 

Arretium,  112,  115,  121,  166,  167,  187,  220, 
224,  225,  528. 

Arsa,  C.  Terentilius,  66. 

Arsacids,  329,  425. 

Artaxata,  477,  480. 

Artaxiads,  271,  420. 

Arverni,  218,  373,  374,  378,  505,  512. 

Asculum,  400,  405-9. 

Asellio,  A.  Sempronius,  411,  413. 

Asia,  state  of,  253^?,  271,  272,  329/., 
420/,  472,  473,  482-4. 

Asia  Minor,  320,  327,  428. 

Asia  (province),  328,  396,  420,  427,  434, 
475  ;  taxes  of,  351,  454  «.,  499,  500,  548. 

Asparagium,  533. 

Aspendus,  battle  of,  270. 

Assembly.  See  Appendix  I.,  Coinitia, 
Concilium  plebis. 

Assignatio  (allotment),   57,  82,  306,   335, 

336,  338>  343,  359- 
Astapa,  219. 
Atella,  no. 
.\ternus  R.,  7,  403. 
Athamanes,  261,  268. 
Athenio,  392,  393. 
Athens,  i,  19,  261,  264,  2S0,  283,  428  ;  siege 

of,  429,  430. 
Athesis  (Adi^e)  R.,  5,  382. 
Atilius,  C,  182. 
Atiliu.s.      See    also    Calatinus,    Regulus, 

Serranus. 
Atria,  5,  12. 
Attalids,  257,  328. 
Attalus  I.,  257,  261. 
Attains  III.,  328,  329,  33S. 
Attica,  327,  392. 
Atticus,  T.  Pomponius,  490. 
Aufidus  R.,  7,  195. 
Augurs,  95,  292.     See  Priests. 
Augustus  (C.  Octavius),  1,  3,  5,  79  «.,  245, 

326,  514,  539,  541,  542,  548. 
Aurelius.    See  Cotta,  Orestes,  and  Scaurus. 
Ausculum,  battle  of,  128. 
Ausonians,  in. 
Auspiciuy  291-3. 


INDEX 


559 


Autarltus,  163. 

Avaricum,  504  «.,  512. 

Aventine,   Mount,   21,   25,   27,  38,  58,  66, 

355-       . 
Axona  (Aisne)  R.,  508. 


Bacchanalia,  291,  292,  321. 

Bactria,  330. 

Baecula,  battles  of,  217,  218. 

Bcetis  k.,  214,  240,  464. 

Bagradas  R.,  229,  247,  367,  531. 

Baliaric    Isles,    146,   218,    219,    245,    330 ; 

sliiigers,  148,  190,  197,  379. 
Ballot.     See  Lex  tabellaria. 
Barbula,  L.  ^milius,  124. 
Bastarnse,  275,  424. 
Belgse,  373,  381,  505,  507,  50S,  513. 
Bellovaci,  504  «.,  508,  514. 
Beneventum,   battle  of,   130,   131  ;    L.   C. 

164  «.,  192,  201  «.,  206,  404. 
Bestia,  L.  Calpurnius  Piso,  364,  365,  399. 
Betuitus,  373. 
Bibracte,  373,  506. 

Bibulus,  M.  Calpurnius,  500,  516,  521,  531. 
Piithyas,  251. 
Bithynia,  267,  269,  271,  275,  276,  278,  329, 

392,  424-7,  433,  444,  473,  474  ;  province, 

482. 
Bituriges,  85,  504  «.,  512. 
I'lossiiis,  C,  337. 
Bocchus,  364,  367,  369,  371,  416. 
BcEotia,  257,  261,  265,  267,  428,  429,  431, 

432- 
Boii  (Bohemian),  374. 
Boii  (Cisalpine),    85,    122,    166,    16S,    175, 

238,  239. 
Boiorix,  37S,  383. 
Bolae,  77,  78. 

Bomilcar  (Punic),  204,  211. 
Bomilcar  (Numidian),  365,  367. 
Bononia  (Felsina),  12,  79  ;  L.  C,  239. 
Bosphorus,  kingdom  of,  424,  473,  480. 
Bovianum,  15,  iii,  114,  207,  409,  410. 
Brennus,  86,  87. 
Britain,  504,  510,  511,  530. 
Britomaris,  121. 
Brixia,  85,  166. 
Brundisium,  4,  95  ;  L.  C,  164  «.,  201,203, 

207,347,  439,  440,  497.  528. 
Bruttii,  16,  17,  127,  129,  130,  200,  201,  209, 

220,  223-5,  231,  335,  347,410,419,  467. 
Brutulus,  Papius,  108. 
Brutus,  D.  Junius  (cos.  138  B.C.),  244,  245, 

355,  372,  375- 
Brutus,    D.    Junius   (Caesar's   lieutenant), 

509,  529,  550.^ 
Brutus,  L.  Junius,  30-2. 
Brutus,  L.  Junius  Daniasippus,  441,  442. 
Brutus,  M.   Junius  (Lepidus'  lieutenant), 

464. 
Brutus,    M.    Junius  (Caesar's   murderer\ 

548-50- 
Byrsa  (Carthage),  145,  249,  252. 
Byzantium,  257,  260,  267,  276,  282,  432. 


Cabira,  475,  483. 
CcEcilius.     See  Metellus. 


Ca;lius,  INFount,  25,  38. 

C^lius,  M.  Rufus,  525,  540. 

Cspio,  Q.  Servilius  (cos.  140  B.C.),  243 

Csepio,  Q.  Servilius  (cos.  106  B.C.),  377, 
378,  384,  385,  387,  392- 

Ca;p:o,  Q.  Servilius  (his  son),  38S,  396, 
397.  406. 

Csere,  79,  85,  86,  88,  89,  141. 

Caerite  franchise,  89,  go,  104,  114. 

Caesar,  C.  Julius  (aedile),  413,  437. 

Caesar,  C.  Julius,  85,  86,  325,  373,  408, 
429;  and  Sulla,  445,  446,  448,  449,  460; 
a  democrat,  460,  464,  468,  491  ;  and 
Catiline,  485-7,  490,  4927^;  pontifex 
niaximus,  491,  496,  497  ;  coalition  with 
Pompey  and  Crassus,  499  ;  laws  as  con- 
sul, 499-502;  in  Gaul,  503-15;  in  Britain, 
510,  511  ;  at  Luca,  517,  518,  519,  521, 
522  ;  and  the  Senate,  523/!  ;  in  civil  war, 
525-39;  rule  of,  539-51;  offices  and 
titles,  541,  542  ;  reforms,  544-8  ;  assas- 
sination, 549-51. 

Caesar,  L.  Julius,  404,  405,  407,  437. 

Caesar,  Sext.  Julius,  284. 

Caesarism,  133,  323,  325,  326,  356,  357,  449, 

470,  539/ 
Calatia,  no,  114.     (.Srir  Errata.) 
Calatinus  (Caiatinus),  A.  Atihus,  159,  160. 
Calavii  (Capua),  in,  201. 
Calendar,  Roman,  181  «.,  291,  548. 
Cales,  L.  C,  104,  109,  192,  203,  206.  405, 
Callicinus,  277. 
Callicrates,  272,  280,  283. 
Callicula,  Mount,  192. 
Callidromos,  Mount,  268. 
Calor  R. ,  7,  404. 

Calpurnius.     See  Bestia,  Bibulus,  Piso 
Calvinus,  Cn.  Domitius,  534,  536. 
Cannae,  409  ;  battle  of,  7,  194-8,  200. 
Canuleius,  C,  73. 
Canusium,  7,  no,  198,  223,  405. 
Camillus,    J\l.    Furius,    So- 4,   87,   SS,  92, 

138. 
Camp,  Roman,  140. 
Campania,  8,  13,  16,  17,  79,  100-4,  109-11, 

114,  116,  118,   119,   192,   193,   20iyi,  309, 

317.  340.  4o?-5>  407'  409,  410,  440,  448. 
Campus  Martius,  39,  46,  59,  459,  545 
Capena,  80,  82,  88. 
Capite   Censi  (^proletarii),    28,    136,    295, 

343,  369,  379- 
Capitol,  21,  22,  38,  86,  87,  354,  543. 
Cappadocia,  255,    271,   329,  424  -  7,     433, 

434.  445,  472-6,  482. 
Capsa,  369. 
Capua,  Samnite,  79,  95,    100,  107  ;  status, 

104,    no,    in,   210,  309;    in   2nd    Punic 

war,  192,  201/C,  207-10;  proposed  colony, 

347.  358,   500;    Sulla  at,  414,  416,  440; 

risings  at,  392,  466  ;  Pompey  at,  524. 
Carbo,    C.   Papirius  (Gracchan),  343,  344, 

358,  395-  ... 

Carbo,  Cn.  Papirius  (his  brother),  377. 
Carbo,  Cn.  Papirius  (Marian),  435,  439-43. 
Caria,  254,  260,  427. 
Carneades,  283. 
Carnutes,  512. 
Carpetani,  172. 
Carrhae,  battle  of,  484,  520. 


56o 


INDEX 


Carrinas,  C. ,  442. 

Carsioli,  i6  ;  L.  C,  115,  405. 

Carteia,  314. 

Carthage,  19  ;  treaties  with,  99,  129,  142, 
149;  and  Pyrrhus,  125,  129-31;  people 
and  power  of,  135,  141,  142,  143-9  ;  city 
of,  143-5,  249;  1st  Punic  war,  150- 
162  ;  mercenary  war  and  Rome,  162, 
164  ;  and  Barcids,  169-71  ;  and  Hanni- 
bal, 172,  175,  176,  200,  204-6,  211,  213, 
224-31  ;  and  Syphax,  214  ;  parties  at, 
169,  170,  228,  229,  247  ;  peace  witli,  231, 
232,  240;  3rd  Punic  war,  245-53; — 261, 
267,  315,  31S,  322,  337,  417;  revival  of, 
347.  348.  354>  358,  359>  544- 

Carthago,  Nova,  171,  176,  217,  219. 

Carthalo,  157. 

Carvilius,  Sp.  (cos.  293  B.C.),  iig. 

Carvilius,  Sp.  (his  son),  203,  310,  345. 

Casca,  P.  Servilius,  550. 

Casilinum,  7,  192,  202,  206,  207,  405. 

Casinum,  192. 

Cassander,  124. 

Cassias,  C.  Longlnus,  520,  521,  550. 

Cassius,  L.  Longinus  (cos.  107  k.c),  377. 

Cassius,  L.  Longinus  (Ravilla),  335. 

Cassius,  Q.  Longinus,  525,  537. 

Cassius,  L.,  426,  427. 

Cassius,  Spurius,  57,  58  «.,  63,  64,  97,  306. 

Cassivellaunus,  510,  511. 

Castrum  Novum,  R.  C.,  119. 

Castulo,  219. 

Catilina,  L.  Sergius,  conspirator,  486-90, 
492-5- 

Cato,  C.  Porcius  (cos.  114  B.C.),  365,  375. 

Cato,  L.  Porcius  (cos.  89  B.C.).  407,  408. 

Cato,  M.  Porcius  (censor),  in  Spain,  241  ; 
and  Carthage,  247,  248,  251  ;  at  Ther- 
mopylee,  268  ;  sayings  of,  283  ;  as  a  poli- 
tician, 302-6,  320,  331  ;  author,  40,  335. 

Cato,  INI.  Porcius  Uticensis,  optimate 
leader,  486,  494,  497,  499,  519,  521-3  ;  in 
Cyprus,  503 ;  character  and  death,  537, 

538,  54°-  .      , 

Catulus,  C.  Lutatius  (cos.  242  B.C.),  160-2, 

172. 
Catulus,  Q.  Lutatius  (cos.  102  B.C.),  382-4, 

437.  404- 
Catulus,  Q.  Lutatius  (his  son),  446,  462, 

464,  478,  479,  486,  492,  496. 
Cauca,  242. 

Caucasus.  Mount,  426,  480. 
Caudine  Forks,  108-10,  112,  119,  243,  244. 
Caulonia,  220. 
Cavalry,  Roman,  136,  139,  175,  313,  520  ; 

Campanian,  118;  auxiliary,  263,  314,  379, 

513  ;  Pompeian,  531  f.  ;    Eastern,   254, 

476,  520  ;  Gallic,  513. 
Celts.     See  Gauls  and  Galatians. 
Celtiberia,  240,  372,  531. 
Cenomani,  85,  166-8,  185,  186,  238. 
Censors    appointed,    74-6 ;    admission    of 

plebeians,  94,  133,  346  ;  under  Sulla,  454, 

455  ;    revived,    468,  469 ;    limited,  502  ; 

functions — census,    74;     financial,    211; 

moral,  346,  386,  387  ;  selecting  Senate, 

74,  299-301,  469 ;  review  knights,  470  ; 

term  of,  74,  95,  96. 
Censorinus,  C.  Marcius,  442. 


Censorinus,  L.  Marcius,  248,  249. 
Census,  28,  74,  294-6,  379,  454  ;  minimum 

census,  293,  369  ;  census  eque.^ter,  350. 
Centenius,  M.,  207. 
Centumalus,   On.   Fulvius  (cos.   298  B.C.), 

116. 
Centumalus,  Cn.    Fulvius  (cos.   229  B.C.), 

165. 
Centumalus,  Cn.   Fulvius  (cos.   211  B.C.), 

219. 
Centuria,  23,  28,  294-6,  i,(><)\ pra^rogativa, 

296,  349. 
Cephallenia,  272. 
Cephissus  R.,  431. 
Cercina,  417. 

Cerretanus,  Q.  Aulius,  iii. 
Cethegus,  C.  Cornelius,  494, 
Cethegus,  IVL  Cornelius,  226. 
Cevenna,  Mount,  374,  504,  512. 
Chferonea,  battle  of,  431,  432. 
Chalcedon,  260,  432,  474. 
Chalcis,  254,  261,  262,  267,  276,  285,  428-31. 
Chaldasans,  321. 
Chariots  in  war,  270,  271,  510, 
Charops,  262,  280. 
Chersonesus,  Thracian,  271  ;  Tauric,  424; 

city  of,  424.  425. 
Chios,  260,  268,  432. 
Chrysogonus,  460. 
Cicero,  ]\L  Tullius,  birth,  384  ;  and  Sulla, 

460,  461  ;  in  Verrem,  469  ;  and  Catiline, 

485,  486  ;   character,   488,   489  ;   policy, 

325,  489-91,  499  ;  crushes  Catiline,  492-6, 

and  Clodius,  497,  498  ;  exile,  502,  503  ; 

recall,  516;  and  Pompey,  463,  517,  535  ; 

and  triumvirs,   518,  519;  defends  Milo, 

521,   522;    in  Cilicia,   525,   526;  in  civil 

war,  328,  536,  537  ;  quoted,  63,  313,  388, 

413- 
Cicero,  Q.  Tullius,  511. 
Cilicia,  254,  255,  271,  330;  province,  393, 

394,    420,    482,    483,    522  «.,    525,    526  ; 

pirates,  471,  472,  477-9. 
Cimber,  L.  Tillius,  550. 
Cimbri,  364,  372,  375-8,  381-3. 
Ciminian  lake  and  hills,  8,  13,  82,  88,  112. 
Cincinnatus,  L.   Quinctius,  61,  62,  65  «., 

77_«. 
Cincius,  L.  Alimentus  (annalist),  180,  212. 
Cineas,  124,  127,  128. 
Cinna,  L.  Cornelius,  419,  435-9,  460. 
Circeii,  78,  417. 

Cirta,  227,  247,  361,  362,  366,  367,  369. 
Cissis,  battle  of,  213. 
Citizenship.     See  Civitas  and  Franchise. 
Cius,  260. 
Civitas  sine  snjfragip,  90,  94,  104,  115,  iig, 

135..  137  «M  296,  309. 
Ciassis,  27,  28,  46,  294-6. 
Clastidium,  185,  186. 
Claudius  (emperor),  8,  40. 
Ckiudius,  Appius  (cos.  495  B.C.),  54. 
Claudius,  Appius  (decemvir),  67-9. 
Claudius,  Appius  Caecus  (censor),  94,  95, 

iir,  116,  128. 
Claudius,  Appius  Caude.x,  151. 
Claudius,  Appius  Pulcher  (cos.  212  B.C.), 

200,  207,  210. 
Claudius,  Appius  Pulcher  (192  B.C.),  267. 


INDEX 


561 


Claudius,  Appius  Pulcherfiyo  B.C.),  277. 
Claudius,  Appius  Pulcher  (SuUan),  419. 
Claudius,   Appius   I'ulcher  (lieutenant   cf 

Lucullus),  476. 
Claudius,  Appius  Pulcher  (cos.   143  B.C.), 

326,  337,  341,  343i  372- 
Claudius,  C,  150. 
Claudius,  C.  Cento,  261. 
Claudius,  C.  Nero,  207,  215,  218,  221  ;  at 

the  iMetaurus,  222,  223  ;  censor,  228. 
Claudius,  P.  Pulcher  (cos.  249  B.C.),   159, 

321. 
Claudius.     See  Clodius  and  Marcellus. 
Clazomenae,  471. 

Cleomenes  111.  of  Sparta,  254,  257,  337. 
Cleon  (bandit),  327,  393. 
Cleonymus,  112. 
Cleopatra,  Syrian,  266,  2E1. 
Cleopatra,  Pontic,  424. 
Cleopatra  of  Egypt,  536. 
Clients,  23,  41,  305,  313,  318. 
Cloacce,  26,  38. 
Clodius  (Claudius),  P.    Pulcher,  497,  49S, 

502,  503,  516,  517,  521,  545. 
Cluentius,  L. ,  409. 
Clusium,  6,  8,  85,  117,  167,  442. 
Cnidos,  432,  471. 
Coele-Syria,  255,  281. 
Co-eiiiptio,  70. 
Cohors  pmtorin,  245,  380. 
Cohorts,  138,  139,  379. 
Coinage,  debasement  of,  160,  294,  296,  397  ; 

Italian,  403  ;  Gallic,  504 ;  of  Caesar,  548. 
Colchis,  424,  445. 

Collegia  (clubs),  71,  502,  522  «.,  545. 
Colline  gate,  battle,  443. 
Colonies,  Greek,  18,  424. 
Colonies,  Latin,  57,  88,  99,  104,  iii,   115, 

135,  164  «.,  220,  239,  309,  345,  404,  405, 

408,  411. 
Colonies,  Roman,  57,  104,  134,  142,  164  it, 

239,  309,  345  ;  founded  by  Gracchus,  347, 

348,  354,  357  ;  after  Gracchus,  353,  354, 
358,,  373,  389,  397  ;  Sulla's,  448  ;  Pom- 
pey's,  483  ;  Cjesar's,  500,  544. 

Colophon,  270,  432,  471. 

Comitia,  133,  224,  287,  288,  292,  29S,  299, 

304,   305,   .307,   308,   324,   325,   331,   332, 

339,. 342,  41?.  500,  502. 
Comitia    Curiata.      See    Appendix     I  — 

calata,  70. 
Comitia  Centuriala,  50,  51,  67,  74,  94,  261, 

349,  418,  450,  451,  491.  See  also  Appen- 
dix I. 

Comitia  Tributa,  94,  98,  417,  418,  450-2, 
455,  502.  See  also  Appcndi.x  I.  and 
Concilium  plebis. 

Comitium,  39,  44. 

Comum,  168,  238. 

Concilium  plebis,  65  «.,  167,  287,  293,  340, 
417,  418,  478,  502.    See  also  Appendix  I. 

Confarreatio,  70. 

Consentia,  105,  203. 

Consulship  created,  31,  47,  48,  66;  opened 
to  plebeians,  92,  94  ;  re-election  to,  94, 
300,  37iyl ;  deposition  from,  435  ;  of 
Pompey,  468,  521  «.,  and  Ca;sar,  522-4, 
542.     See  also  Magistracy 

Coracesium,  battle  of,  478 


Corcyra,  124,  165,  261,  536. 

Corduba,  243. 

Corduene,  472. 

Corfinium,  7,  403,  409,  528. 

Corinth,   254,   258,   262,   263  ;  fall  of,  284, 

285.  315  ;  revivals  of,  347,  359,  544. 
Coriolanus,  C'n.  JMarcius,  59-6i,.64  ?;.,  65 «. 
Corioli,  59,  60. 
Cornelia  (mother   of   the    Gracchi),    336. 

^3.S3-  .. 

Cornehi,  450. 

Cornelius.  See  Cethegus,  Cinna,  Cossus, 
Dolabella,  Lentulus,  Merula,  Scipio, 
Sulla. 

Corsica,  13,  19,  154,  164,  239. 

Cortona,  13,  112,  188. 

Coruncanius,  L.,  165. 

Co>vus,  152  «. ,  154,  156. 

Corvus,  I\I.  Valerius,  90,  100,  loi,  378. 

Corycus  (Cyssus),  268. 

Cosa,  L.  C. ,  164  w.,  201,  214. 

Cosconius,  C,  409,  410. 

Cossus,  .^.  Cornelius,  79,  80  n. 

Cossyra,  443. 

Cothon  (Carthage),  145,  249,  251,  252. 

Cotta,  C.  Aurelius  (cos.  75  B.C.),  399,  468. 

Cotta,  L.  Aurelius  (cos.  65  B.C.),  469,  4S7. 

Cotta,  L.  Aurelius  (cos.  119  B.C.),  375. 

Cotta,  M.  Aurelius  (cos.  74  B.C.),  474. 

Cotta,  L.  Aurunculeius,  511. 

Cotys,  275,  277._ 

Crassus,  C.  Licinlus,  385. 

Crassus,  L.  Licinius  (orator),  387,  395-7. 

Crassus,  M.  Licinius  Dives,  in  civil  war, 
440-3  ;  wealth  of,  447,  463,  546  ;  char- 
acter, 462  ;  conquers  gladiators,  466-8  ; 
consul,  468-70,  519  ;  and  Catiline,  485, 
487,  488,  492,  493  ;  fir.st  triumvirate,  498- 
500,  516,  518  ;  at  Carrhs,  520,  521. 

Crassus,  P.  Licinius  Dives  (his  son),  508, 
509,  520. 

Crassus,  P.  Licinius  (cos.  171  B.C.),  276, 
^77-       _        .  .   . 

Crassus,  P.  Licinius  Dives  (cos.  97  B.C.), 
372,  404,  405,  437. 

Crassus,   P.    Licinius  Mucianus  (cos.   131 

B.C.),   328,    337,  343. 

Cremera  R. ,  62. 

Cremona,  85,  166;  L.  C,  168,  177,  183,  238. 

Crete,  264  ;  and  pirates,  330,  471,  472,  47S; 

province,  482. 
Crispinus,  T.  Quinctius,  21  r,  220,  221. 
Critolaus  (Athenian  philosopher),  283. 
Critolaus  (Achaean  strategus),  285. 
Crixus,  466. 

Croton,  18,  122,  129,  131,  204,  228. 
Cumae,  13,  18,  37,  100,  104,  202,  204,  458. 
Curia   Hostilia  (Senate    House),  39,   354, 

391,  521,  542. 
Curia,  23,  44,_  45.  _ 
Curio,  C.  Scribonius,  524,  525,  531. 
Curius,  M'.  Dentatus,  6,  95,  96,  119,  130. 
Cursor,   L.    Papirius    (dictator),   107,   112, 

"3- 
Cursor,  L.  Papirius  (his  son),  119,  130. 
Curule.     See  yEdiles,  Magistracy. 
Cybele  {jiiagna  water),  226,  291,  321. 
Cydonia,  472. 
Cvnoscephate,  263,  276,  281. 

2   N 


562 


IMDnX 


Cyprus,  255,  329,  473 ;  occupied,  503,  548. 
Cyrene,  145,  255,  329  ;  Roman,  393,  394. 
Cyzicus,  257,  474,  482. 


Dalmatia,  165,  239,  275,  374,  375. 

Damocritus,  284. 

Danala,  479. 

Danube  (Ister)  R.,  375,  424. 

Dardani,  261,  262,  275,  375. 

Dardanus,  433. 

Debt,  laws  of,  53,  70,  91,  96,  loi,  411,  418, 

438,  546,  547.     See  Interest. 
Decemviiate,  66  f. 

Decemviri  litibus  iitdicandis,  55,  71. 
Decius  P.   Mus  (cos.  340  B.C.),  100,   102, 

103. 
Decius  P.  Mus  (his  son),  n6-i8. 
Decius  Magius,  201. 
Decutnie  (provincial),   164,  311,   351,   454, 

499,  500,  548. 
Deiotarus,  474,  482. 
Delium,  conference  of,  433. 
Delmiiiium,  374. 

Delos,  280,  281,  285,  327,  359,  428,  430. 
Delplii,  258,  374  ;  Apollo  of,  30,  37,  80,  81, 

84,  431. 
Demetrias,  254,  267,  428,  430. 
Demetrius  Poliorcetes,  124,  125. 
Demetrius  of  Pharos,  165,  166,  193,  205. 
Demetrius,  son  of  Philip  V.,  274. 
Demetrius  Soter,  282,  329. 
Democrats.     See  Populares. 
Diaeus,  283,  2S5. 
Dictator,  in  Latin  towns,  98. 
Dictator,  early,  49,  50,  71  «.  ;  elected,  190, 

191  ;  two  at  once,  193  ;  chooses  Senate, 

203  ;  dictatorship,  decay  of,  297,  298  ;  of 

Sulla,  448,  449  ;  of  Caesar,  541-3. 
Didius,  M.,  375. 
Didius,  T. ,  372,  394,  404,  409. 
Diodorus  Siculus  (historian),  85,  88. 
Diogenes,  283. 
Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  (historian),  35, 

53.  57,  68,  77. 
Dionysius  I.  of  Syracuse,  65  n.,   79,    125, 

210. 
Diophanes,  337. 
Dioscurias,  424. 
Dium,  277. 
Divico,  377. 
Dolabella,  P.  Cornelius  (cos.  283  B.C.),  121, 

122. 
Dolabella,  P.  Cornelius  (cos.  44  B.C.),  540. 
Domitius,  Cn.,  270. 

iJomitius.  See  Ahenobarbus  and  Calvinus. 
Dorylaus,  432. 
Drepana,  154,  159,  160. 
Dromichaetes,  430. 
Druids,  504,  505. 

Drusus,  M.  Livius,  353,  354,  358,  359,  375. 
Drusus,  M.  Livius  (his  son),  395-8,  400, 

413-  438. 
Duilius,  C,  153-4. 
Dumnori.\,  506.  511. 
Druentia  (Durance  R.),  176,  179,  180. 
Duria  (R.),  326. 
Durius  (Douro  R.),  242,  244-5. 
Dyrrhachium,  282,  434,  528,  531-4. 


Edurones,  511,  512. 

Kcnomus,  battle  of,  155,  156. 

Egypt  and  Pyrrhus,  124,  130  ;  early  rela- 
tions with  Rome,  131,  164,  165,  219,  232; 
position  and  power  of,  254,  255,  259 ; 
and  Syria,  260,  261,  265-7,  281  ;  pro- 
tected by  Rome,  281,  473,  487  ;  feuds  in, 
329,  394,  419,  502,  517,  519;  Ca;sar  in, 
535,  536.  . 

Elephants  in  war,  126-8,  151,  157,  186, 
187,  248,  263,  270,  271. 

Eleusis,  my.steries  of,  165. 

Elis,  212,  258,  268,  272. 

Elpius  R.,  278. 

Emporia,  the,  226,  247. 

Emporiae,  171,  213,  241. 

Enipeus  R.,  534. 

Enna,  211,  233,  327,  328,  392. 

Ennius,  35,  230. 

Ephesus,  255,  266,  268,  269,  328,  427. 

Epicydes,  204,  210. 

Epidamnus,  165,  282. 

Epirus,  105,  124,  125,  257,  267,  26S,  277, 
280-2,  374,  428,  528,  529,  531-4- 

Eporedia,  R.  C,  372. 

Egiiester  Ordo,  133;  growth  of,  315,  316, 
412,  461  ;  policy  of,  332,  389-91,  435, 
438,  461,  491  ;  and  C.  Gracchus,  350, 
351,  357,  358;  and  Senate,  395^.,  499; 
and  Sulla,  446,  447,  454,  455  ;  restora- 
tion of,  469  ;  in  civil  war,  527. 

Kqiiites  equo  />ublico,  centuries  of,  siv 
patrici.in,  23,  26,  28,  45,  51  ;  eighteen, 
28,  45,  51,  139,  294-6,  300,  3:5,  316,  333, 
388,  390,  470. 

Erbessus,  151. 

Ercte,  Mount,  i5o. 

Ergastida  (slave-barracks),  327,  436. 

Erisane,  243. 

Eryx,  160. 

Eshmun,  temple  of,  252. 

Esquiline,  Mount,  27,  38. 

Etruria  (Roman)  in  Hannibalic  war,  167, 
191,  207,  220,  224,  225,  231  ;  agriculture 
'II.  317,  327,  334,  337 ;  in  social  and 
civil  war,  402,  407,  410,  441-3,  447,  448  ; 
and  Catiline,  486,  493,  495. 

Etruscans  (Rasenna),  12-15,  ^"^J  Fabii,  62, 
63  ;  decline  of,  19,  78,  79,  112,  115.  141  ; 
disasters  of,  79-85,  88-90,  100,  J12,  116, 
117,  120,  121;  architecture,  13,  39,  40; 
soothsaying,  14,  80,  84. 

Etruscan  kings  at  Rome,  26,  39,  40,  84  n. 

Euboea,  267,  285,  428. 

Eudamus,  270. 

Euganci,  374. 

Euhemerism,  35,  321. 

Eumenes  I.,  257. 

Eumenes  II.,  270,  271,  276,  278,  280,  281, 
328. 

Eunus  (Antiochus),  327,  328. 

Euphrates  R.,  420,  425,  472,  476,  4S2,  484, 
520. 

Euxine  Sea,  421,  424,  425,  474. 

E.xile,  352,  501-3, 


Fabii,  legend  of,  62,  63,  65  «. 
Fabius,  C.  (legate  of  Caesar),  529. 


INDEX 


563 


Fabius,  M.  Buteo,  203. 

Fabius,  C  Hadrianus,  440. 

Fabius,  Q.  Maximus  RiiUianus,  censor,  95  ; 
Magister  eguitiiai,  107,  108  ;  dictator, 
III  ;  conquers  Etruria,  12,  112  ;  in  Sam- 
niuin,  113,  116,  117  ;  at  Sentinum,   118, 

^  '.9- 
Fabius,  Q.  Maximus  Gurges  (his  son),  119. 
Fabius,    Q.    Maximus    (cunctator),    174  ; 

dictator,  190,   igi  ;  tactics  of,  191-4  ;  in 

Hannibalic  war,  200,  202,  203,  206,  219, 

220,  225,  228,  229. 
Fabius,  Q.  Maximus  ^milianus,  243. 
Fabius,  Q.  Maximus  Servilianus,  243. 
Fabius,  Q-  Maximus  Allobrogicus  (son  of 

iEmilianus),  373. 
Fabius,  Q.  Sanga  (Maximus  Allobrogicus), 

^494- 

Fabius,  Q.  Pictor  (annalist),  59,  112,  200. 

Fabrateria,  104;  R.  C,  345,  405. 

Fabricius,  C.  Luscinus,  96,  122,  128,  129. 

Fasulse,  167,  1 83,  464,  493. 

Falerii,  80,  82,  88,  89,  121,  164. 

Falernus  ager,  9,  192. 

Falto,  P.  Valerius,  i6t. 

Faiiiilia,  40. 

Fannius,  C.,  353. 

Fannius,  L.,  477. 

Fasces,  26,  31,  49,  50,  526. 

Faustulus  (Faunus),  21,  36. 

Faventia,  442. 

Felsina.     See  Bononia. 

Ferentina,  spring  of,  60,  65  tj. 

Ferentinum,  115. 

Fericp  LathiiF,  16,  398 

Fetiales,  24,  109. 

Fidenae,  38,  79. 

Fimbria,  C.  Flavius,  432-4,  441,  474,  476. 

Finance  (Roman),  160,  203,  205,  206,  219, 

.314,  315.  318,  4'o.  4".  447>  546,  548- 
Firmum,  L.  C,  164  «.,  405,  407. 
Flaccus,  Cn.  Fulvius,  207. 
Flaccus,  L.  Fulvius,  108. 
Flaccus,  M.   Fulvius  (cos.    125  B.C.),  343, 

345,  353-5,  373.. 
Flaccus,  Q.  Fulvius,  202,  207-10,  219. 
Flaccus,  Q.  F'ulvius  (liis  son),  241. 
Flaccus,  L.  Valerius  (cos.   195   B.C.),  268, 

.304- 
Flaccus,  L.  Valerius  (cos.   100  B.C.),  389, 
^439,448. 
Flaccus,  L.  Valerius  (cos.  86  B.C.),  431,  432, 

438. 
F/aiiien,  24,  86,  95,  321. 
Flamininus,  T.  Quinctius,  262-5,  268,  273, 

274;  302- 
Flaminius,  C,  agrarian  law,  166. 1C7,  305-S; 

democrat,  187,  296  «.,  342  ;  in  Cisalpine 

Gaul,  16S  ;  at  Lake  Trasiniene,  188-90. 
Flavius,  Cn.,  94. 
Flavius,  L. ,  499. 
Fonteius,  T. ,  215. 
Formije,  104. 
Forum,  26,  39,   113,  354,   521  ;    Boarium, 

167  ;  Julium,  545. 
Forum  Julii  (Fr6jus\  544. 
Fossa  Cluilia,  24,  38,  60. 
Franchise,  use  of,  by  Rome,  134,  401,  402  ; 

■extension  of,  94,  104,  108,  115,  345,  346, 


353.  357,  396,  397.  407,  408,  4"  ;  restric- 
tion of,  95,  309,  310,  412-14,  removed, 
438 ;  Sulla's  settlement,  450 ;  Trans- 
padane,  488,  544.  See  also  Caerite, 
Civitas,  Italians. 

Freedmen,  41,  94,  95,  136,  293,  295,  296, 
305,  316,  318,  336,  406,  413,  414.  435, 
450,  461,  542. 

Fregella;,  L.  C,  7,  104,  106,  109-11,  2oq, 
220,  345,  346. 

Fregenae,  R.  C. ,  164  n. 

Frentani,  15,  no,  403. 

Frusino,  115. 

Fucinus  Lacus,  7,  8,  15,  40S,  547. 

Fufidius,  L.,  464. 

Fulvius.  See  Centumalus,  Flaccus,  and 
Nobilior. 

Fundi,  104. 


Gabii,  29,  30,  37,  209. 

Gabinius,  A.,  410. 

Gabinius,  A.  fcos.  58  n.c),  477,  478,  jtq 

Gades,  146,  170,  217,  219,  242,  544. 

Gaesatae,  167,  168. 

Gaetuli,  367,  369,  371. 

Galatians,  255-7,  281,  374,  424,  474,  482. 

Galba,  C.  Sulpicius,  365. 

Galba,   P.   Sulpicius  (cos.   200  B.C.),   261, 

262. 
Galba,  S.  Sulpicius,  242,  243,  304. 
Gallaeci,  241;. 
Games,  Isthmian,   165,  264  ;  Roman,  233, 

320. 
Garganus,  Mount,  4,  7,  466. 
Gauda,  371. 
Gaul,   Cisalpine,   3,   5,   12,   166,  16S,   175, 

188,  204,  225,  231,  238,  239,  317,  408,  441, 

442;    province,    412,    453,    502,    523-6; 

Transpadane,  309,  374,  461,  486,  488. 
Gaul  (Narbonensis),  province,  373-4,  438, 

443,  502-4,  544- 

Gaul,  Transalpine,  Hannibal  in,  176-8 ; 
wars  in,  239,  345,  372  ff.,  465  ;  Caesar 
in,  504  JC  ;  province,  514,  523-6,  547. 

Gauls,  in  Italy,  11,  12,  79;  tribes  of,  84, 
85,  166 ;  character  of,  84,  85 ;  attack 
Rome,  85-8,  90;  wars  with  Rome,  115- 
118,  121,  122,  166-8,  177,  199  ;  in  Cartha- 
ginian army,  148,  186-8,  196.  197,  221, 
223  ;  in  Greece,  254,  278  ;  in  Balkan 
Peninsula,  374,  Transalpine.  377,  504, 
505- 

Gellius,  Egnatms,  116-8. 

Gelo  of  Syracuse,  65  n.,  125. 

Genava,  503,  506. 

Gens,  41,  42. 

Genthius,  276,  278. 

Genua,  3,  225. 

Genucius,  Cn.,  tribune  (472  B.C.),  58. 

Genucius,  L.,  tribune  (339  B.C.  ),ioi. 

Gereonium,  192,  194. 

Gergovia,  512. 

Germans,  3757C,  505-7,  509,  510. 

Glabrio,  M'   Acilius  (cos.  191  B.C.),  268. 

Glabrio,    M'.  Acilius  (cos.   67   B.C.),  477, 

479- 
Gladiators,    14,    100,    233,    320,   379;   war 

with,  466-8. 


5^4 


INDEX 


Glauria,  C.  Servilius,  388-91. 
Gordius,  424-6. 

Gracchi,  the,  187  ;  ideas  of,  320,  338,  373, 
385,  389,  417,  448,  502;  failure  of,  325, 

357,  359>  398.. 

Gracchus,  Cloehus,  61. 

Gracchus,  C.  Sempronius,  character,  337, 
346:  agrarian  law,  341,  343,  347;  and 
Italians,  346,  353;  colonies,  347,  348, 
354,  545,  lex  frumentaria,  348,  349 ;  and 
equites,  350,  351,  394,  420,  454;  other 
reforms,  351,  353,  451  ;  fall  of,  353-6  ; 
criticism  of,  356,  3^7. 

Gracchus,  Ti.  Sempronius  (238  B.C.),  164. 

Gracchus,  Ti.  Sempronius  (cos.  215  I'-.c), 
202-4,  206,  207. 

Gracclius,  Ti.  Sempronius  (cos.  177  n.c), 
239,  241,  242,  245,  303,  336.  _ 

Gracchus,  Ti.  Sempronius  (trib.  133  n.c), 
at  Numantia,  244  ;  character,  336,  337  ; 
agrarian  law,  337-40,  343,  347  ;  fall  of, 

341,  342>  346>  352- 

Gracchus,  pseudo-,  390. 

Graecia,  Magna,  18,  100,  120,  126. 

Greece,  contrast  with  Italy,  2,  3  ;  factions 
of,  212,  258,  262,  265,  280;  decay  of, 
265,  276,  283  ;  and  Rome,  257-60,  264, 
265;  conquest  of,  284-7;  Mithradatic 
war,  428,  429.  See  also  Achaia  and 
Hellenism. 

Grumentum,  204,  222,  405. 

Gulussa,  250,  365. 


Hadrumetum,  228-30. 

Halys  R.,  271,  422,  475. 

Hamse,  204. 

Hamilcar,  Punic  general,  154,  156. 

Hamilcar,  officer  of  Mago,  238. 

Hamilcar  Barca,  147 ;  in  Sicily,  160-2 ; 
in  mercenary  war,  163,  164  ;  statesman, 
i6q  ;  in  Spain,  170,  171. 

Hannibal,  son  ofGisgo,  150,  151,  154. 

Hannibal,  son  of  Hamilcar,  158. 

Hannibal,  son  of  Hamilcar  Barca,  168, 
17c;  character,  171,  172;  plans,  175; 
takes  .Saguntum,  172-4  ;  march  to  the 
Rhone,  176-8  ;  crosses  the  Alps,  178-82  ; 
victories  of  the  Ticinus,  183  ;  the  Trebia, 
185  7  ;  crosses  Apennines  and  Arno,  187, 
188;  at  Trasimene,  i8g,  190  ;  and  Fabius, 
191-3  ;  at  Canna;,  194-8  ;  at  Capua,  201 
_/?,  and  Macedon,  205,  212,  213  ;  takes 
Tarentum,  206;  fails  at  Capua,  207-10; 
march  on  Rome,  208,  209  ;  and  Sicily, 
210-12 ;  in  South  Italy,  219-25  ;  re- 
called to  Carthage,  228  ;  at  Zama,  229- 
231;  makes  peace,  231,  232;  exile  of, 
247  ;  and  Antiochus,  266-70 ;  death  of, 

273-. 
Hannibal  the  Rhodian,  158. 
Hanno,  Punic  admiral  (264  B.C.),  150. 
Hanno,  son  of  Hannibal,  151. 
Hanno,    Punic    general    (262    B.C.),    151, 

156. 
Hanno  in  Corsica,  154. 
Hanno,  Admiral,  at  Lilybaeum,  161. 
Hanno  "the  Great,"  169,  171. 
Hanno  in  Spain  (218  B.C.),  176,  213. 


Hanno,  son  of  Bomilcar,  178. 

Hanno,    officer    of    Hannibal,    204,    206, 

207. 
Hanno  in  Sicily  (211  n.c),  212. 
Hanno  in  Spain  (208  B.C.),  218. 
Hasdrubal,  officer  of  Hannibal,  197,  198. 
Hasdrubal,  grandson  of  Massinissa,  249. 
Hasdrubal  Calvus,  205. 
Hasdrubal  the  Fat,  248-53. 
Hasdrubal,   son  of  Gisgo,   214,   215,   218, 

219,  225-7. 
Hasdrubal,    son   of    Hamilcar   Barca.    in 

Spain,    176,   213-5,   217,   218;  march  to 

Italy,  221  ;  at  the  Metaurus,  222,  223. 
Hasdrubal,  son-in-law  of  Hamilcar  Barca, 

170,  171. 
Hasdrubal,  son  of  Hanno,  156,  157. 
Hastati,  138,  230. 
Hatria  (Hadria),  L.  C,  119,  122. 
Hellenism  at   Rome,   234,   262,   265,   303 

304,  320,  321,  333,  337,  356  ;  in  the  East 

422,  424. 
Hellespont,  238,  268-70,  428,  432,  433. 
Helvetii,  239,  374,  377,  506. 
Heraclea,   129,   135,   206,  309,  411;  battle 

of,  126,  127. 
Heraclea    Pontica,    475  ;    Heraclea    Tra- 

chinia,  285. 
Herculaneum,  107,  409. 
Herdonea,  201  ;  battles  of,  207,  219. 
Hermaean,  Cape,  battle  of,  157. 
Herminius,  '1'.,  32,  33. 
Hernici,  16,  78,  So,  98,  99,  102,  113,  114; 

league  with,  64. 
Herodotus,  12  n.,  37. 
Hiarbas,  443. 
Hiempsal  1.,  361. 
Hiempsal  II.,  417,  443. 
Hiero  I.,  13,  78,  79,  125. 
Hiero  II.,  policy  and  position  of,  18,  163, 

164,  204,  210,  247  ;  finance  of,  311  ;  ally 

of  Rome,  151,  159,  185,  187  ;  and  Mamer- 

tines,  150,  151  ;  death,  204. 
Hieronymus  (his  son),  204,  210. 
Himera,  157;  battles  of,  146,  212. 
Himilco  (at  Lilybaium),  158. 
Himilco  (2nd  Punic  war),  211,  214, 
Himilco  Phameas,  249,  251. 
Hippocrates,  204,  210,  211. 
Hirpini,  15,  17  «.,  201,  409,  410. 
Hirtuleius,  L.,  464,  465. 
Horatius,  M.  Barbatus,  69. 
Horatii,  legend  of,  24,  25,  37. 
Horatius,  M.,  32. 
Horatius  Codes,  32,  59. 
Hortensius,  Q.,  479. 
Hortensius,  L.,  429-31. 
Human  sacrifice,  200,  385. 
Hypsaeus,  L.  Plautius,  328. 


Iapvdes,  374,  375. 

lapygians,  16,  17. 

lassus,  471. 

Ibera,  battle  of,  214. 

Iberus  (Ebro)   R.,    171,    213-5,   4^4,   465, 

529.  53'- 
Ilerda,  carnpaign  of,  529-31,  540. 
Iliturgi,  214,  21Q. 


INDEX 


565 


Ilium,  433. 

Illyria,  4,  17,  165,  166,  168,  213,  277,  278, 

280,  326,  375,  377. 
Illyricuin,  453,  502. 
Imagines,  73,  300,  369. 
Iiiipetinm,  of  king,  42,  46  ;  of  consul,  47, 

49,    54 ;   of  dictator,    50,    54 ;    doiiii    ct 

tnilitiie,  49,  452-4. 
Iiii/'eriuin  prxonsulare,   107,   297,   31 1-3, 

325,    452-4,    472   «.,    517;  conferred    Ijy 

people,  478,  479;  irregidar,  464;  taken 

away,  378,  385. 
Indutiomarus,  511. 
Iiisiibres,  85,  166,  168,  175,  183,  238. 
Interamna,  Lirinas,  7;  L.  C,  iii,  ii3. 
Interamna  (Terni),  6. 
Intercatia,  242. 
Iiitercessio,  of  a  consul,   47  ;  of  tribune, 

54,  72.  298.  340.  34' >  352.  353.  364,  45 •> 

452,  478,  525-        ^       , 
Interest,  rate   of,   fixed  by  law,   70,   loi, 

411  ;  high  rates,  317,  475,  548. 
Inter-rex,  42,  95,  109,  448. 
Intibili,  214. 

Ipsus,  battle  of,  124. 

Isara  (Isere)  R.,  178-80,  373. 

Tsauri,  472,  474,  482. 

Issa,  165. 

Istria,  168,  239,  374. 

Italia  (Corfinium),  403. 

Italica  (in  Spain),  240,  314,  465. 

Italians,  relation  of  communities  to  Rome, 
133-5,  308-10,  401,  402,  411,  412,  450; 
misgovernment  of,  302,  309,  310,  40T, 
402  ;  expelled  from  Rome,  309,  345,  353  ; 
franchise  of,  345,  346,  353,  357,  389,  395, 
397-9,  407,  408 ;  and  agrarian  laws, 
340.  343-S>  347.  359  ;  "n  social  war,  399- 

412  ;  and    Sulla,    447,    448,    461  ;    and 
Cicero,    516;    and    Csesar,    525-9,    531, 

544-7-  ,  .     , 

Italy,  and  Rome,  i,  ig,  20;  geographical 
position,  2,  142,  143  ;  mountains  of,  3-5  ; 
rivers  of,  5-7  ;  lakes  of,  8  ;  races,  n-18  ; 
climate  and  products,  8-ii  ;  agriculture 
in,  316-18,  334-6,  347,  545-7  ;  extension 
to  the  Padus,  408,  cf.  453  ;  contrast  with 
Greec",  2,  3,  11  ;  contrast  with  provinces, 

310.  3".  453- 
Itius,  Portus,  510. 


Janiculum,    Mount,   19,    24,  25,   38,  59, 

86,  96,  491. 
Jannajus,  Alexander,  482. 
Jerusalem,  482. 
Jews,  329,  480-2. 
Juba  I.,  527,  551,  538,  540. 
Judacilius,  C,  405,  406,  408. 
Judices,  297,  350,   397,  408,  455;  461,  469. 

See  also  Equester  Ordo,  Lex  iudiciaria, 

and  Quirstioncs. 
Jugurtha,  character,  361  ;  war  with  Adher- 

bal,  361,  362  ;  at  Rome,  364,  365  ;  war 

with,  364-71  ;  capture  and  death,   371, 

379-     . 
TuUa,  wife  of  Marius,  368,  491. 
Julia,  daughter  of  Caesar,  500,  521. 
Julius.     See  Caesar. 


Junius.    ^■fV  Brutus,  Pennus,  Pera,  Pullus, 

and  Silanus. 
Junonia  (Carthage),  348. 
Jupiter,  Juno,  &c.     See  Temple. 
Jura  Mountain,  506. 
Jtis  Arhnini,  309. 
/its  auspiciorutn,  291. • 
Jus  coniibii  et  coimuercii,  98,  103,  134  n. 
Jus  gentium,  297. 

Kakni,  362,  374,  375. 

Kings  at  Rome,  powers  of,  42-4 ;  com- 
pared with  consul  and  diet. tor,  47-50; 
dominion  of,  58,  59 ;  kingship  revived 
by  Cresar,  542-4. 

Knights.     See  Equester  Ordo,  Eqiiites. 

Labici,  77,  78. 

Labienus,   T.,   491,   492,   50S,   51 1-4,   526, 

537-q- 
Laconians,  264,  428. 
Lade,  260. 

Lseca,  M.  Porcius,  493. 
Laelius,  C.  (cos.  190  B.C.),  216,  225,  227, 

230. 
Laelius,  C.  Sapiens  (his  son),  243,  252,  336, 

345- 

Lsenas,  C.  Popillius(cos.  172  B.C.),  276,  281. 

Laenas,  M.  Popillius  (cos.  173  B.C.),  276. 

Laenas,  M.  Popillius  (cos.  139  n.c),  243, 
244.  _ 

Laenas,  P.  Popillius  (cos.  132  B.C.),  339, 
34?,  352,  358-  ,     .       , 

Laivmus,  M.  Valerius  (cos.  210  B.C.),  203, 
204,  212,  220,  225. 

Laivinus,  P.  Valerius  (cos.  280  B.C.),  126, 
127. 

Lamponius,  M.,  405,  410,  442. 

Lampsacus,  474. 

Lanuvium,  104. 

Laodicea,  427. 

Larissa,  263,  267,  268,  276,  277,  534,  535. 

Lartius,  Sp.,  32. 

Lartius,  T. ,  33. 

Latins,  magistrates  of,  98  ;  rights  of,  98  ; 
demands  of,  loi  ;  war  with,  102,  103  ; 
help  Rome,  So,  127.     See  also  Italians. 

Latin  league,  16  ;  allied  with  Rome,  63, 
64,  97,  98 ;  closing  of,  99  ;  dissolution 
of,  103  ;  reorganised  under  Rome,  103, 
104,  135  n. 

Lata  ills,  103,  104,  135,309,  310,  353,  401  ; 
extended  outside  Italia,  408,  544.  See 
Franchise  and  Colonies. 

Latium,  14,  16,  142,  145. 

Lautulae,  pass  of,  95,  loi,  in. 

Law,  primitive  Roman,  66 ;  twelve  tables, 
70,  71,  352 ;  formulas  published,  95  ; 
connected  with  religion,  290-2  ;  adminis- 
tration of,  297 ;  equity,  297  ;  code  of 
Sulla,  455.  See a\^o Lex unAQuees tiones. 

Lebanon,  Mount,  480. 

Lectum,  433. 

Legends,  of  the  kings,  20-31  ;  sources  of, 
34-7  ;  of  the  early  Republic,  31-4,  59- 
63;  criticism,  59,  64,  65  «. ",  of  decem- 
virate,  68,  69 ;  of  Maelius,  76,  77 ;  of 
Camillus  and  the  Gauls,  8o-go. 


566 


INDEX 


Legion,  development  of,  102,  137-9,  379  '• 

contrasted  with  phalanx,  125,   126,   128, 

263,  264,  279.     Scf  Army  and  Phalanx. 
Ligioncs  CafiiuHses,   198,    200,   203,   207, 

224,  230. 
I.emnos,  280. 
Lentulus,    Cn.    Cornelius  (cos.   201   B.C.), 

231. 
Lentulus,    L.    Cornelius    (cos.    275   n.c), 

130. 
Lentulus,  L.  Cornelius,  Crus.  (cos.  49  B.C.), 

525- 
Lentulus,  P.  Cornelius,  231. 
Lentulus,  P.  Cornelius  Sura,  493,  494. 
Leontini,  210;  land  of,  211,  325,  335. 
Lepidus,  M.  .iEmilius  (cos.  187  h.c),  260. 
Lepidus,  M.  .i^imilius  (Porcina),  (cos.  137 

B.C.),  244. 
Lepidus,  M.  .(Emilius  (cos.  78  B.C.),  4.59, 

463-5- 
Lepidus,  M.  /Emilius  (his  son),  triumvir, 

529- 

Leucas,  280. 

Le.\  JEWa.  Fufia,  293 

Leges  agrariae,  57,  58,  95,  359 ;  Licinia, 
9ti  92,  336,  338  ;  Flaminia,  166,  167, 
306-8  ;  Sempronia,  338,  341,  343-5,  347  ; 
Livia,  353,  354  ;  Thoria,  359  ;  Appuleia, 
387,  389,  391  ;  Servilia,  490  ;  Julia,  500. 

Leges  Appuleiae.  387,  391. 

Lex  Aurelia  iudiciaria,  469. 

Lex  CKcilia  Didia,  394. 

Lex  Calpurnia  de  Repetundi-;,  313,  333, 
■  45'- 

Lex  Canuleia,  73. 

Lex  Claudia,  315,  317. 

Leges  CornelisE  (88  B.C.),  417,  418,  cf. 
438.  (81-80  B.C.),  387,  449-56.  <:/•  469. 
47°- 

Lex  curiata  de  imperio,  51. 

Lex  Domitia,  289,  385,  492. 

Leges  Frumentariae,  Sempronia,  348,  349  ; 
various,  j6o,  388,  390,  396,  451,  456,  464, 
502  ;  Julia,  545. 

Lex  Gabinia,  472  «.,  477,  478. 

Lex  Hortensia,  96,  417. 

Lex  Icilia,  55. 

Leges  iudiciariae.  See  Lex  Aurelia,  Cal- 
purnia, Cornelia,  Livia,  Sempronia, 
Servilia. 

Le.\  Julia  (90  B.C.),  407. 

Leges  Julia;  (59  B.C.),  499-5oi-  (49-4  + 
B.C.),  544-8. 

Lex  Junia  de  peregrinis,  345,  346. 

Leges  Liciniae  Sexti^,  91,  92,  336,  338. 

Lex  Licinia  Mucia,  395. 

Leges  Ljviae  (122  B.C.),  353,  354. 

Leges  Li  viae  (91  B.C.),  396,  397, 

Lex  Manilla,  479. 

Lex  Ogtilnia,  95,  288. 

Lex  Ovinia,  96,  I33,  455. 

Lex  Peducaea,  385. 

Lex  Plautia  Papiria,  407,  413. 

Lex  Poetelia,  96. 

Lex  Pompeia  (9  B.C.),  408. 

Leges  Pompeiae  (52  B.C.),  522-5. 

Lex  Publilia  Voleronis,  55. 

Leges  Publiliae  Philonis,  94. 

Lex  Roscia,  470. 


Lex  Sacrata,  55,  56. 

Leges  Sempronia;  of  Ti.   Gracchus,  337- 

341  ;  of  C.  Gracchus,  346-54. 
Lfjges  ServiliiE  iudiciariae,  360,  384,  388. 
Leges  Sulpicia;,  413,  414,  4:7. 
Leges  sumptuari«e,  206,  320,  456,  546. 
Leges  tabellaria;,  333,  344,  377. 
Lex  Valeria,  48,  71. 
Leges  ValerieE  Horatiae,  71. 
Lex  Villia  Annalis,  300,  452. 
Libo,  L.  Scribonius,  531. 
Libyans,  145,  146,  230. 
Licinius.     See  Crassus,  LucuUus,  Macer, 

i\Iurena,  Nerva,  Stolo. 
Liger  (Loire)  R.,  508,  509. 
Ligurians,  11,   166,  225;  troops,   148,  221, 

379  ;  wars  with,  164,  239,  276,  372,  373. 
Lilybaeum,    129,    157-62,    176,    185,    203, 

.393- 
Lingones,  85,  166,  168. 
Lipara,  154,  157,  185. 
Liris  (R.),  7,  16,  95,  99,  104,  no,  114,  345, 

405,  417. 
Lissus,  165. 
Liternum,  203. 
Livius,  C,  268,  269. 
Livius.     See  Drusus  and  Salinator. 
Livy  (T.  Livius),  53,  57,  59,  63,  64  «.,  68, 

69,  78,  79«.,  85  «.,  87,  88,  go,  116,  177, 

179,  180,  185,  190. 
Locri,  122,  129,  130,  204,  220,  221,  225. 
Longus,  Ti.  Sempronius,  177,  182  «.,  1S5, 

186. 
Luca  (Volscian),  104. 
Luca  (Lucca),  187  ;  conference  at,  518. 
Lucania,  116,  122,  130,  207,  219,  222,  223, 

405,  410,  419,  466,  467. 
Lucanians,  16,  17,  100,  105,  106,  112,  116, 

120,    126,    127,   129,    130,   201,   231,  402, 

403..  435,  441,  442,  447- 
Luceria,    108,    no;   L.    C,   in,   118,   127, 

?oi,  204,  206,  528. 
Luceres,  23,  44. 
Lucilius,  C,  345. 
Lucretia,  legend  of,  31. 
Lucretius,  C,  276,  277. 
Lucterius,  512. 

Lucullus,  L:  Licinius  (cos.  151  B.C.),  242. 
LucuUus,  L.  Licinius  (his  son),  393. 
Lucullus,  L.  Licinius  (his  son),  admiral  of 

Sulla,  430,  432,  433  ;  war  with  Mithra- 

dates,    474,    475  ;    with    'I'igranes.,    475, 

476  ;  retreats,  477  ;  recalled,  479  ;  in  his 

province,  328,  475,  482  ;  at  Rome,  462, 

''96-  ,  .  .  . 

Lucullus,  M.  Licmius  (his  brother),  442, 

471. 
Luenus,  373. 

Luna,  1S7  ;  R.  C,  239,  372. 
Lupercus,    21,    36;   Luperci,    38;    Luper- 

calia,  543. 
Lupus.     See  Rutilius. 
Lusitanians,  242-4,  304,  372,  457,  464. 
Lutatius.     Sec  Catidus. 
Lycia,  255,  427,  472,  478. 
Lyciscus,  276,  2S0. 
Lycortas,  258,  273. 
Lysimachia,  260,  266. 
Lysimachus  of  Thrace,  124,  125. 


INDEX 


5^7 


Maccabees,  329,  4S2 

Macedon,  kingdom  of,  and  Pyrrlius,  124, 
125,  130;  and  Rome,  164,  165;  and 
H.innibal,  175,  191,  200,  204,  205;  wars 
witli,  212,  213,  261-5,  276-9;  power  and 
policy  of,  254,  257-60,  272  ;  settlement 
of,  279-80 ;  revolts,  282 ;  made  a  pro- 
vince, 282,  283. 

Macedonia,  province,  282,  283,  286,  31  r, 
326,  372,  374,  428,  429,  432,  433,  471, 
490. 

Macer,  C.  Licinius,  468. 

Machanidas,  213. 

Machares,  480 

Maelius,  Sp.,  76,  77. 

Mscnius,  104,  III. 

Magalia  (Megara),  249,  251. 

Magister  cqnituiit,  48,  50. 

Magistracy,  collegiate  character  of,  47,  48, 
76,  141  ;  division  of,  76,  96,  175,  298, 
299  ;  control  of,  by  Senate,  97,  133,  258, 
209;  annual  tenure,  47,  48,  141,  175; 
order  of  (cursus  honorinii),  300,  301  ;  re- 
organised by  Sulla,  452-4,  and  Pompey, 
522,  and  CcEsar,  542. 

Magius  Minatius,  402,  409. 

Magnesia,  under  Mount  Sipylus,  427  ; 
battle,  270,  271,  272,  281,  420. 

Mago,  son  of  Hamilcar  Barca,  under 
Hannibal,  175,  188,  200;  at  the  Trebia, 
186  ;  in  Spain,  214,  215,  218,  219  ;  in 
Liguria,  225  ;  dies,  226. 

Mago,  Pujiic  author,  318. 

Maharbal,    173,  175,  190,  197,  200. 

Matesfas,  3S7,  398,  408,  453. 

Mallius,  Cn.  IVLwiimus,  377,  378. 

Mamertines,  127,  129,  131,  150. 

Mamertine  prison.     See  TuUianum. 

Mamiliu^.  C.  Limetanus,  365. 

Mancinus,  A.  Hostilius(cos.  170  B.C.).  277. 

Mancinus,    C.    Hostilius   (cos.    137    li.c), 

244.  i:-7- 

Mancinus,  L.  Hostilius  (cos.  145  B.C.),  251. 
Maniiius,  C. ,  479. 
Manilius,  M'.,  24*^,  249. 
Manlius,  C,  493. 

Manlius,  M.  (Capitolinu.s),  87,  88,  91  «. 
Manlius.     See  Torqu-.tus  and  Volso. 
Mantinea,  battle  of  (207  B.C.),  213. 
Marcellus,  C.  L  laudius  (cos.  50  B.C.),  524. 
Marcelhn,  C  Claudius  (cos.  49  B.C.),  525. 
Marcellus,  M.  Claudius,  vi'ins  sjf>olia  o/>i ma, 

168  ;  in  Campania,  202-4,  206  ;  in  Sicily, 

210;   takes  Syracuse,   211,   219;   death, 

220,  221. 
Marcellus,  M.  Claudius,  his  son  (cos.  ig6 

B.C.),  238. 
Marcellus,  M.  Claudius  (cos.  51  B.C.),  524. 
Marcius,  C,  215. 
Marcius,  Q.  Tremulu=,  114. 
Marcius.       See    Censorinus,    Coriolanus, 

Re.\,  Philippus,  Rutilus. 
Marius,   C. ,    tribune,   360,   361;  in   Spain, 

245,  372  ;  legate  of  Metellus,  366,  367  ; 
character  and  consulate,  367,  368;  com- 
mands in  Africa,  369-71  ;  reorganises 
army,  314,  325,  378-81  ;  at  Aquae 
Sextiae,  3S1,  382  ;  at  Raudii  Canipi, 
382-4  ;  in   politics,    384,   388,  389  ;  and 


.Satmninu-,  3S9-91  ;  fall,  391  ;  in  Social 
war,  404,  406,  408  ;  and  Sulpicius,  412- 
414,  416  ;  flight,  417  ;  return,  436  ;  mas- 
sacres and  death.  437,  438,  446 ;  and 
Cae.sar,  460,  503. 
Marius,  C.  (the  younger),  417,  435,  440-3, 

447- 
Marius,  Egnatius,  405.  409. 
Marius,  M.  Gratidianus,  446. 
Marriage.     See  Confai  reatio,  Co-eviptio, 

Usns.  Ins  conubii. 
Marrucini,  15,  403,  406,  408. 
Mars,  15,  21,  35. 

Marsi.  7,  15,  113,  115,  220,  403,  406,  408. 
Massilia,  141,  142,  145,   177,  178,  239,  286, 

320,  359,  372,  373,  504,  522,  529,  531. 
Massinissa,  214,  219,  225-7,  229-31,  247-9, 

360,  361. 
M;4ssiva,  365. 
Mastanabal,  250,  361. 
Matho,  163. 

Mauretania.  247,  360.  364. 
Meddi.x  Tuticus,  201. 
Mediolanum,  85,  166,  168. 
Megellus,  L.  Postumius,  114  (i^^r  Errata), 

iiS,  123. 
Melita  I.,  146,  185. 
Melpum,  12,  79,  84. 
Memmius,  C,  364,  389-91. 
Menapii,  510,  512. 
Menenius  Agrippa,  54. 
Mercenaries,  at  Carthage,  148;  war  with, 

162,  163.  169. 
Merula,  L.  Cornelius,  435,  437. 
Mesopotamia,  420,  472,  484,  5i'o. 
Messalla,  M'.  Valerius  Ma.ximu^,  151. 
Messana,  18,   127,   129,   131,   150,  151,  164, 

327- 
Mfssene,  258,  264,  26S,  272,  273. 
Messius,  C,  517. 
Metapontum,  112,  206,  223. 
Metaurus  R.,  7  ;  battle  of,  222,  223. 
Metella,  Caecilia,  458. 
Metellus,  L.  CeEcilius  (cos.  251  B.C.),  157, 

'58. 
Metellus,  Q.  Caicilius  Baliaricus  (cos.  123 

B.C.),  245,  330. 

Metellus,  Q.  Cacilius  Celer  (cos.  60  B.C.), 

495- 
Metellus,    Q.    Csecilius   Creticus  (cos.   6g 

B.C.),  472,  478,  496. 
Metellus,    L.    Cjecilius   Creticus   (trib.   49 

B.C.),  529. 
Metellus,    L.    Caecilius    Dalmaticus  (cos. 

119  B.C.),  375. 
Metellus,   Q.  CsEcilius  Macedonicus,  244, 

2S2,  285,  337,  345,  346,  355. 
Metellus,  Q.  Cascilius  Nepos  (cos.  98  B.C.), 

394- 
Metellus,  Q.  Caecilius  Nepos  (cos.  57  B.C.), 

496,  497,  499-  .    . 

Metellus,    Q.    Cacilius    Numidicus   (cos. 

109    B.C.),     in    Num  dia,    366-9,    371  ; 

censor,  388  ;  e.\iled,  390  ;  returns,  391. 
Metellus,  Q.  Csecilius  Pius  (cos.  80  B.C.), 

in  social  and  civil  war,  410,  419,  4^6,  437, 

440-2  ;  and  Sulla,  446,  458  ;  politician, 

462,    486 ;    in    Spain,    464,    465 ;   dies. 


568 


INDEX 


Metellus,  Q.  Cacilius  Scipio,  522,  525,  534, 
537-  538- 

Metilius,  M.,  193. 

Mevaiiia,  battle  of,  113. 

Mezentius,  20,  40. 

Micipsa,  250,  361. 

Miletus,  260. 

Milo  (Epirot),  124,  129,  130. 

ISIilo,  T.  Annius,  516,  521,  522,  540 

]\Iinciiis  R.,  5,  8,  11,  12,  238. 

Minervia,  347. 

Minturna;,  7;  R.  C,  119,  417. 

Minucius,  L.  (Augurinus,  cos,  45S  n.c  ), 
61. 

Minucius,  L.  (?  C.)  (Augurinus),  76. 

Minucius,  Ti.,  114. 

Minucius,  M.  Rufus,  magister  equittiin, 
191  ;  co-dictator,  193,  198,  305. 

Minucius,  M.  (?  Q.)  Rufus  (cos.  no  n.c.)i 
375- 

Mithradates  I.,  of  Parthia  (Arsaces),  329. 

Mithradates  V.,  of  Pontus,  329,  420, 
421. 

Mithradates  VI.,  of  Pontus,  the  Great, 
accession  of,  329,  421  ;  intrigues,  388, 
391,  410  ;  and  Sulla,  394  ;  and  Sertorius, 
466;  aggressions  of,  412,  424-6;  char- 
acter of,  421,  422  ;  1st  war  with,  426-33  ; 
2nd  war  with,  445,  460  ;  3rd  war  with, 
471,  473-7-  479.  480;  death,  480. 

Mithradates,  of  Perganium,  536. 

Mitylene  (iMytilene),  427,  445,  460,  483. 

Molochath  R.,  360,  369. 

Mommsen,  Prof.  Th.,  58  «.,  64,  65  «.,  69, 

77  «.,  85  «.,  91    «.,  99  II.,    103  «.,    122  ft., 

296  «.,  463. 
Morgantia,  392. 
Mosa  (Meuse)  R. ,  510. 
Motye,  145. 
Mucins.     See  Scsevola. 
Mulvius,  Pons,  464. 
Mummius,  L. ,  242,  285    286. 
Munatius,  429,  430. 
Mnnda,  539,  542. 
Municipal  system,  134,  135,  408,  411,  412, 

4So,_  544,   545,    cf.  482,   483.      See   also 

Latin  league. 
Municipia,    135,    309,    411.      See    Ceerite 

franchise,  Civitas  sine  siiffragio. 
Munychia,  430. 

Murena,  L.  Licinius,  430,  434,  445,  493. 
Muthul  K.,  366.  _ 

Mutilus,  C.  Papius,  404,  405,  409,  410. 
Mutina,  R.  C,  168,  239,  464. 
Muttines,  212. 
Mylse,  battle  of,  154. 
Myonnesus,  battle  of,  270. 
Mytilene.     See  Mitylene. 


NABAT^ANa,  480,  482. 

Nabis,  257,  262,  264,  267. 

Nar  R.,  6,  15. 

Naraggara,  229. 

Narbo  Martius,  R.  C,  34B,  358,  373,  504, 


Narnia  (Nequinum),  L.   C,   15,  115,   16 
222,  296  n.,  405. 


Nasica.     See  Scip!o. 

Naupactus,  254,  258,  259,  268. 

Navy  of  Carthage,  142  _^.,  :52,  156,  175, 
176,  231,  232. 

Navy  of  Mithradates,  428y!,  474,  475. 

Navy,  Roman,  weakness  of,  141-3,  149, 
152,  165  ;  inactivity  of,  232  ;  creation  of, 
152,  153,  157,  158,  160;  allies  in,  152; 
decay  of,  302,  314,  429,  471  ;  drawn  from 
allies,  261,  262,  268-70,  282,  430,  432, 
433  ;  under  Pompey,  478,  527,/^ 

Neapolis,  18,  106,  107,  135,  193,  202,  203, 
309,  402,  411,  443. 

Nemossus,  373. 

Nepete,  82  ;  L.  C,  88,  405. 

Nepheris,  252. 

Neptunia  (Tarentum),  347. 

Nero.     See  Claudius. 

Nerva,  P.  Licinius,  392. 

Nervii,  508,  511,  512. 

Nicaea  (Nice),  372. 

Nicanor,  263. 

Nicomedes  IL,  392,  420,  424,  425. 

Nicomedes  IIL,  425,  426,  473. 

Nicomedia,  475. 

Nicopolis,  479,  483. 

Nile  R.,  519,  536. 

Nisibis,  477. 

Nobiles,  rise  of,  96,  287,  299-302. 

Nobilior,  KL  Fulvius(i89  h.c),  272. 

Nobilior,  Q.  Fulvius(i53  B.C.),  242. 

Nola,  107,  no,  in,  202-4,  206,  309,405, 
409,  410,  419,  435,  443. 

Nomentum,  104. 

Nonius  (Nunnius),  Q.,  389. 

Norba,  443. 

Norbanus,  C,  378,  387,  391,  413,  439,  440, 
442. 

Noreia,  374,  377. 

Norici,  374,  375. 

Novce  Tabula",  411,  540,  546. 

Novus  homo,  233,  300,  304,  394,  488. 

Nuceria,  107,  no,  113,  202,  392,  405. 

Numa  Pompilius,  24,  25,  34,  37. 

Niunantia,  242,  244,  245,  326,  342,  361. 

Numidia,  chiefs  of,  214,  218-19,  225-9  > 
kingdom  of,  247-8,  250,  251,  253,  360-1, 
371.  443>  527  ;  wars  in,  364-71,  443,  531, 
538;  . 

Numidian  cavalry,  in  Pumc  army,  146, 
148,  177,  186,  196-8,  220,  227,  230-1, 
249 ;  in  Roman  army,  251,  314,  379,  405. 


Ohnuntiatio,  293. 

Occupatio,  56,  57,  306,  317,  335,  336,  338, 

340.  343.  359- 
Ocilis,  242. 
Ocriculum,  T13,  115. 

Octavius  (Octavianus),  C.     Sec  Augustus. 
Octavius,  Cn.,  329. 

Octavius,  Cn.  (cos.  87  B.C.),  419,  435-7. 
Octavius,  M.  (tribune,  133  B.C.),  340,  341, 

353- 
Octavius,  M.  (admiral),  531. 
(Enomaus,  466. 

Ofella,  Q.  Lucretius,  441,  442,  457. 
Olcades,  172. 
Oligarchy  at  Rome,  287,  288,  299-302  ;  re 


INDEX 


569 


stored,   357,  35S,  462  ;  overtlirown,  469, 

541.     See  Of'iiviates  and  Parties. 
Opiniius,  L.  (cos.  121  B.C.),  345,  354,  356, 

358,  361.  362,  365. 
Opimius,  Q.  (cos.  154  b.c).,  239,  372. 
Oppius,  Q.,  426,  427. 
Ofitimates,   343,   412,   417,   485,   486,  488, 

522-5.     See  also  Oligarchy  and  Parties. 
Orchomenus,  battle  of,  432. 
Orestes,  L.  Aureliiis  (cos.  157  B.C.),  284. 
Orestes,  L.  Aiirelius  (cos.  126  B.C.),  346. 
Oreslis,  264. 
Oricum,  533. 
Oringis,  218. 
Orodes,  520,  521. 
Oropiis.  283. 
Ortygia,  210,  21 1. 
Osca,  465,  466. 
Oscans,  14,  16,  17,  106,  107. 
Ossa  Mountain,  277. 
Ostia,  6;  R   C,  25,  38,  191,  202,  349,  387, 

4 '7.  436,  472- 
Otacilius,  T.  Crassus,  194. 
Cxyntas,  405. 


Pacorus,  521. 

Padus  (Po)  R.,  5,  383;  plain  of,  ii,  13, 
85,  166,  442,  464.  Sec  also  Gaul,  Cis- 
alpine. 

Pasligni,  15,  113,  278,  403,  406,  408. 

Pa;stum,  7,  11,  105  ;  L.  C,  164 «.,  193,  201, 

Pa;tus,  P.  Autronius,  487. 

Palsopolis.  106,  107. 

Palatine,  Mount,  21,  22,  27,  37,  38. 

Palestine,  28 1,  480. 

Pallantia,  242,  244. 

Palma,  ^j^o. 

Paniphylia,  255,  2S1,  472,  482. 

Pana;tius,  320.  345. 

Paniuin,  Mount,  battle  of,  266. 

Panormus,  145,  154,  157,  160;  battle  of, 
157.  158. 

Panticapaeum,  424,  480 

Paphlagonia,  424-7,  433. 

Papirius.     See  Carbo,  Cursor. 

Papius.     See  Brutulus  and  Mutilus. 

Papus,  L.  /Emilius,  167. 

Parma,  R.  C,  239. 

Parthia,  ri^e  of,  238,  254,  255,  329,  330, 
4?o  ;  and  Sulla,  394,  425  ;  and  Tigranes, 
472,  476,  479  ;  and  Pompey,  484 ;  and 
Crassus,  518-21  ;  and  Cassar,  543.  550. 

Parties  at  Rome,  beginnings  of,  187,  193, 
194  ;  nullity  of,  235,  287,  304,  324,  332, 
358  ;  struggles  of,  ;84,  391,  434/,  A,to/., 
485,  486,  497,  498,  519. 

Patara,  472. 

Fairia  potestas,  40,  70. 

Patricians,  government  of,  51,  52;  e.\ , 
clusiveness  of,  73.  74  ;  power  broken,  96. 

Patruin  atictoritas,  44,  50,  51,  94. 

Paullus,  L.  yEmilius  (cos.  219  b.c),  166, 
194.  196,  198. 

Paullus,  I,.  ./Emilius  (Macedonicus,  cos. 
181  B c),  in  Spain,  241,  251  ;  at  Pydna, 
278,  279,  281.  282  ;  Hellenist,  320. 

Paullus,  L.  jEmilius  (Lepidus,  cos.  50  B.C.), 
524. 


Pedum,  104. 

Pella,  278. 

Peloponnesus,  258,  264,  268,  272,  276,  283 

Pelusium,  281,  519,  535,  536. 

Pennus,  M.  Junius,  345. 

Pera,  M.  Junius,  202,  298. 

Petduetlio,  377,  453,  491. 

Pergamum,  kingdom  of,  255-7  !  I  olicy  of, 
259,  260  ;  and  Antiochus,  262,  267,  270, 
271  ;  and  Rome,  212,  232,  264,  271,  272, 
2S0,  281  ;  left  to  Rome,  328  ;  town  of, 
427,  428,  432. 

Pericles,  i,  356,  357,  497,  541 

Perperna,  C,  406. 

Perperna,  M.  (cos.  130  B.C.),  328. 

Perperna,  M.  (Marian),  443,  464,  466. 

Perseus,  274-9,  282. 

Perusia,  13,  112,  118,  188. 

Pessinus,  226,  291. 

Petelia,  203,  220. 

Petra  (Arabia),  480. 

Petra  (Epirus).  534. 

Petreius,  M.,  495,  529-31,  538. 

Phalanna,  277. 

Phalan.v,  Greek,  125,  126,  128,  130,  254, 
263,  264,  270,  271,  278,  279  ;  Italian,  46, 
85.  i.S7,.294- 

Phanagoria,  424. 

Pharisees,  482. 

Pharnaces,  480,  536. 

Pharos,  165,  166. 

Pharsalus,  battle  of,  534,  535. 

Phasis  R.,  480. 

Philetccrus,  257, 

Philippi,  429. 

Philip  V.  of  Macedon,  166  ;  and  Hanni- 
bal, 200,  202,  205,  225  ;  ist  war  with 
Rome,  212,  213  ;  power  of,  254  ;  ch:ir- 
acter,  259  ;  and  Antiochus,  260,  261, 
265-8,  272  ;  2nd  war  with  Rome,  261-5  '• 
last  years,  273-5 

Philippus.  L.  Marcius  (cos.  gi  B.C.),  396, 
3.97,  438,  440,  443- 

Philippus,  Q.  Marcius  (cos.  1S6  B.C.), 
276-8,  280. 

Philip,  pseudo-,  251,  282. 

Philo.     See  Publilius. 

Philocharis,  122. 

Philocles,  262. 

Philopoemen,  213,  258,  261,  267,  272, 
273. 

Phocaeans,  19,  145. 

Phoenicia,  ^55,  268  ;  Phoenicians  (in  Sicily), 
18,  125,  143,  146,  149. 

Phraates,  476,  479,  484. 

Phrygia,  254,  329,  420,  421,  473. 

Picentines,  15,  115,  403. 

Picenum,  166,  191,  204,  220,  400,  405-8, 
440,  441,  52S. 

Pilutit,  102,  139. 

Pinna,  402. 

Piraeus,  267,  428,  430,  431. 

Pirates  (Baliaric),  245,  (Illyrian)  165, 
278,  280,  374,  (Cretan,  &c.),  314,  327, 
(Cilician)  393,  426,  466,  467,  473  ;  power 
of,  471  ;  war  with,  472 ;  ended  by 
Pompey,  478,  483. 

Pisae,  166,  167,  182,  187,  372. 

Pisaurum,  R.  C,  239. 


570 


INDEX 


Piso,  C.  Calpurnius  (cos.  i8o  B.c.)i  241. 
Piso,   Cn.  Calpurnius  (Catilinariaii),  487, 

48S,  490. 
Piso,  L.  Ca'purnius  (Frugi,  cos.  133  B.C.), 

333- 
Piso,  L.  Calpurnius  (Ca;sonnius,  cos.   112 

n-t.).  377- 

Piso.     See  also  Bestia. 

Placentia,  L.  C,  5,  168,  177,  183,  185-7, 
221,  238,  239,  442_. 

Plaiicus,  '1'.  Munatius  Bursa,  521,  522. 

Plautius,  M.  Silvanus,  408. 

Plebs  origin  of,  41,  42,  44  ;  secessions  of, 
54,  6g,  96  ;  admitted  to  the  Senate,  50  ; 
to  decemvirate,  67  ;  to  consular  tribu- 
nate, 73,  74,  76  ;  to  quaestorship,  76  ;  to 
consulate,  92,  cf.  296  ;  to  other  offices, 
94,  cf.  346  ;  to  priesthoods,  95,  28S,  291, 
292;  grievances  of,  52_/C,  72,  73,  82; 
and  the  ius  conubii,  71,  73;  later  mean- 
ing of,  349.  See  also  Concilium  and 
Tribunes. 

Plebiscitnin,  55,  96,  294,  450.  See  also 
Appendix  I. 

Pleniinius,  Q.,  225. 

Plotius,  A.,  407. 

Plutarch  (author),  59. 

I'ollentia,  330. 

Polybius  (historian),  6,  g,  12,  87,  90,  122  «., 
179,  180,  185  n.,  190,  198  «.,  209  «.,  251, 
253,  305  ;  (statesman),  280,  283,  286,  320, 

345- 

Polyxenidas,  268-70. 

Pomerium,  37,  416,  453. 

Pompeii,  107,  409. 

Pompeius,  Q.  {co^.  141  B.C.),  244. 

Pompeius,  Q.  Rufus,  his  son  (?)  (cos.  88 
B.C.),  414,  416,  4'9.  435- 

Pumpeius,  Q.  Rufus,  his  grandson  (trib. 
52  B.C.),  521. 

Pompeius,  Cn.  Strabo  (cos.  89  B.C.),  399, 
404,  406-8,  410,  419,  435,  436,  440. 

Pompeius,  Cn.  Magnus  (his  son,  Pompey), 
born,  384  ;  in  civil  war,  440-5  ;  and 
Sulla,  444,  445,  457  ;  character  of,  388, 
389,  463,  535  ;  and  Lepidus,  463,  464  ; 
in  Spain,  465,  466  ;  first  consulate,  468, 
469  ;  retires,  470 ;  conquers  pirates, 
477,  478  ;•  war  with  Mithradates  and 
Tigranes,  479,  480  ;  reorganises  the 
East,  480-4  ;  and  Roman  parlies,  485-7, 
489-91,  496  ;  return^,  497  ;  triumvirate, 
49S-503  ;  intrigues,  516,  517  ;  at  Luca, 
517,  518  ;  second  consulate,  519  ;  sole 
consul,  521,  522  ;  alliance  with  the 
Senate,  522-5  ;  war  with  Caesar,  527-35  ; 
defeat  and  death,  534,  535  ;  sets  pre- 
cedents for  Cassarism,  323,  325,  449,  478, 

479.  521- 
Pompeius,  Cn.  Magnus  (his  son),  537-9. 
Pompeius,   Sext.    Magnus  (also   his   son), 

537-9- 
Pomptine  marshes,  16,  95. 
Pontile  Insulas,  L.  C,  in. 
Poutifex  Maximus,  288,  328,  385,  491. 
Pontifices,  24,  49,  95,  291,  292. 
Pontius,  Gavius,  108-10,  119. 
Pontius  Telesinus,  442. 
Pontus,  kingdom  of,  rise  of,  238,  255,  329, 


330,  420,  421  ;  extent  of,  422-4  ;  wars 
with,  426-33,  445,  473^,  536. 

PopiUius,  C,  377. 

Popillius.     .!)V(rLa;nas. 

Po/>itliires,  324,  358,  384,  388,  391,  412, 
438,  460,  468,470,478,  485-8,  490/1,496, 
497-    . 

Population  cf  Italy,  137  ;  decline  of,  228, 
317,  318,  336,  546;  increase  in,  343. 

Populonia,  battle  of,  122. 

Porcius,  L. ,  221. 

Porcius.     See  Cato. 

Porsenna,  Lars,  32,  33,  40. 

Portoria,  abolished,  499  ;  re-iniposed,  546. 

Possess/0.      See  Occuj/iatio,  Ager publicus. 

Postumius,  M.  Pyrgensis,  207. 

Postumius.  See  Albinus,  Megellus,  Reg- 
illensis. 

Potentia,  R.  C,  239. 

Potitus,  L.  Valerius,  69. 

Prcejectiira  {Prcefictiis  iuri  dicuitcio'),  90, 
no,  135,  210,  405,  411. 

Priefectus  iirhi,  48,  529. 

Praeneste,  16,  98,  99,  104,  309,  441-3- 

Praetor,  old  name  for  consul,  98  ;  special 
office  instituted,  92  ;  open  to  plcbs,  94  ; 
increase  of,  297,  by  Sulla,  452  ;  func- 
tions of,  297,  313,  453.  454- 

Priests,  colleges  of,  49,  74,  95,  290-2  ;  elec- 
tion of,  288,  289,  333,  385,  abolished, 
451,  restored,  492.  See  also  Appen- 
dix I. 

Princifics,  138,  230. 

Privernum,  104,  108. 

Proconsul  and  propraetor,  107,  311-13,  452- 

454.  547- 

Proscriptions,  417,  41S,  445-8,  461,  486, 
491. 

Provinces,  government  of,  310-13,  547  ; 
law  of  C.  Gracchus,  351,  352;  Sulla's 
law,  452,  453,  523  ;  Pompey's  law,  522, 
523  ;  Cffi^ar's  reforms,  501,  548  ;  Sicily, 
164,  232  ;  Sardinia,  164  ;  two  Spains, 
232,  240,  464,  465  ;  Macedonia,  282  ; 
Africa,  253  ;  Asia,  328,  329 ;  Gallia 
Narbonensis,  323  ;  Cilicia,  393,  482  ; 
Gallia  Cisalpina,  412,  453  ;  Crete,  Syria, 
Bithynia,  482  ;  Gallia  Comata,  514. 

Pr02>inci(i,  310,  351,  412,  452,  502. 

Fiwocatio,  32,  48,  66,  71,  352,  449,  491, 
494.  502,  503. 

Prusias  I.,   255,  260,  270,  271,  273. 

Prusias  II.,  255,  281. 

Ptolemaic,   394. 

Ptolemy  1.,  Soter  son  of  Lagus,  124 

Ptolemy  II.    Philadelphus,  165,  255. 

Ptolemy  III.   Euergeles  1.,  255. 

Ptolemy  IV.    Philopator,  255,  760. 

Piolemy  V.  Epiphanes,  255,  260,  266. 

Ptolemy  VI.  (VII.)  Philometor,  281,  329. 

Ptolemy  VII.  (IX.)  Euergetes  II. 
Physcon,  281,  329,  393,  419. 

Ptolemy  X.  (XII.)  Alexander  II.,  473,  502. 

Ptolemy  XI.  (XIII.)  Auletes,  487,  502,  517, 

Ptolemy  XIT.  (XIV.),  535,  536. 
Ptolemy  XIII.  (XV.),  536. 
Ptolemy  Apion  of  Cyrene,  393. 
Ptolemy  of  Cyprus,  503. 


INDEX 


571 


Publicani  {\.a.x-ia.rmerf.),  311,  312,  315,  327, 

350.  35',  392>  420i  454>  461,  475.  479.  499. 

500,    548.      See    Equcstcr    Ordo     and 

Tiixation. 
Publicola,  P.  Valerius,  31,  32,  48 
Publilius,  Q    Philo,  94,  107. 
Publilius,  Volero,  55. 
Pullus,  L.  Junius,  160. 
Punic  wars,   ist,  149-162  ;  2nd,   174-234  ; 

3rd,  245-53. 
Punicus,  242. 

Puteoli,  206,  207,  349,  458,  459. 
Pydna,  battle  of,  278-9. 
Pyla;menes,  424. 
Pyrenees  Mountains,  2,  176,  213,  372,  529. 

Pyg'.  79-  ,     ,.. 

Pyrrhus,  and  Tarentum,  123  ;  early  life, 
124,  125  ;  schemes  of,  106,  125  ;  victories 
of,  126,  12S  ;  and  Sicily,  18,  icg,  131, 
143,  149,  150  ;  defeat  of,  130  ;  death,  130. 

Pythium,  pass  of,  278. 

QucFstiones  special,  ordered  by  Senate, 
291,  342,  356,  forbidden  by  Gracchus, 
352  ;  ordered  by  people,  365,  368,  387, 
398,  399,  408,  abolished  by  Sulla,  455  ; 
cjf.  however  497,  521. 

QiicFstiones  /'crpetuie  (standing),  Calpur- 
nian  de  Repetundis,  313,  333,  352  ; 
Sempronian,  350,  352,  353 ;  Cornelian, 
455,  456-     See  also  Leges  iudiciaiije. 

Quiesto7-es, parricidii et  (Frarii,  48,  72  ;  for 
military  chest,  76  ;  classici,  142  ;  in  pro- 
vinces, 297,  311,  315,  346;  Ostian,  349, 
387  ;  proprKtore,  488  ;  number  increased 
by  Sulla,  452 ;  elected  by  tribes,  76  ; 
right  to  sit  in  Senate,  454-5. 

Quinctius,  243.  See  Cincinnatus,  Cris- 
pinus,  Flamininus. 

Quirinal,  Mount,  22,  27,  38,  62. 

Quirinus,  23,  24,  35,  86. 


Rap.irius,  C,  491. 

Raeti,  12  «.,  374. 

Kamnes,  23,  44. 

Raphia,  battle  of,  265. 

Rasenna.     Sec  F^truscant'. 

Raudii  Campi,  battle  of,  383. 

Ravenna,  5,  525. 

Kegia,  39. 

Regillensis,  A.  Postumius,  33,  34. 

Regillensis,  M.  Postumius,  77. 

Regillus,  Lake,  battle  of,  33,  59. 

Regillus,  L.  yEmilius,  269. 

Regulus,  C.  Atilius  (cos.  225  B.C.),  167. 

Regulus,  M.  Atilius  (cos.  294  B.C.),  118. 

Regulus,  M.  Atilius  (cos.  256  b.c),  148, 
155-7,  '5^1  2°°- 

Regulus,  M.  Atilius  (cos.  217  B.C.),  193. 

Religion,  Roman,  compared  with  Greek, 
35,  290 ;  character  of,  288-93  ;  and 
politics,  187,  291-3 ;  foreign  worships, 
226,  290,  291,  321  ;  decay  of,  320,  321  ; 
superstition,    385,    386 ;    sacrilege,    385, 

497- 
Remi,  504  «.,  508. 
Remus,  21,  35,  36. 


Re/>etiind(P,  242,  313,  333,  353,  453,  501. 

Rex,  Q.  Marcius  (cos.  118  n.c),  575. 

Rex,  Q.  Marcius  (cos.  68  B.C.),  477,  479. 

Rex  sacroruiii,  or  sacrijiciilus,  47,  95. 

Rhegium  (Regium),  4,  18,  122,  146,  402; 
seized  by  Campanians,  127,  129,  150 ; 
retaken  by  Rome,  131,  150;  in  2nd 
Punic  war,  203,  209,  210,  220. 

Rhenus  (Rhine)  R.,  504,  507,  510,  512. 

Rhodanus  (Rhone)  R.,  11,  176-8,  182, 
37^,  374,  503.  506. 

Rhodes,  power  and  policy,  255,  257,  259 ; 
and  Philip,  260,  264 ;  and  Antiochus, 
266-8,  270,  272  ;  and  Perseus,  276,  278  ; 
humiliation  of,  280,  2B1,  304,  315  ;  and 
Mithradates,  427,  430  ;  refuge,  442,  461. 

Rome,  positinn  of,  i,  ig  ;  trading  centre, 
6,  19,  42,  141,  142  ;  original  settlements, 
37,  38 :  unification,  38-40 ;  sack  and 
rebuilding  of,  86-8  ;  threatened  by  Han- 
nibal, 208,  209  ;  by  Samnites,  442,  443  ; 
under  Caesar,  545. 

Romulus,  21-3,  34-7. 

Roscius,  Sext. ,  460. 

Rostra,  104,  417,  437. 

Rubicon  R. ,  5,  408,  453,  525,  526. 

Rufus.  See  Caelius,  Klinucius,  Rutilius 
.Sulpicius,  Vibullius. 

RuUus,  P.  Servilius,  490. 

Rupilius,  P.,  328. 

Ruspina,  538. 

Rutilius,  P.  Lupus,  404,  406. 

Rutilius,  P.  Rufus,  366,  379,  396. 

Rutilus,  C.  Marcius  (diet.   356  B.C.),  94, 

lOI. 

Rutilus,  C.  Marcius  .  (Censorinus,  cos. 
310  B.C.),  I  12. 


SabelliaiN'S,  14,  15,  78,  107,  191,  231. 

Sabines,  14,  15,  167  ;  rape  of,  22,  36;  and 
civitas,  119,  305. 

Sabinus,  Q.  Titurius,  508,  511. 

.Sabis  (Sambre)  R.,  508. 

Sacer  Mons,  54. 

Sacraiircnt-uin,  jj,  1^9,  380. 

Sacriportus,  battle  of,  441. 

Sacroianct,  54,  71,  432. 

Sadducees,  482. 

Saguntum,  171-4,  177,  191,  214,  242. 

Salamis  in  Cyprus,  548. 

Salapia,  201,  219,  409. 

Siilassi,  166,  180,  326,  372. 

Salii,  24,  38. 

Salinator,  M.  Livius,  166,  221-3,  225,  228. 

Sallustius,  C.  Crispus  (Sallust),  360,  361, 
365.  .368. 

Salluvii,  373. 

Salonae,  375. 

Salvius  (IVyphon),  392. 

Samarobriva,  511 

Samnites,  iribes  of,  15-17,  118;  attack 
Volsci,  78,  99  ;  seize  Campania,  79,  100; 
ist  war  with,  100;  alliance  with,  loi, 
102  ;  2nd  war  with,  106-14  ;  3rd  war  with, 
115-19;  and  Pyrrhus,  120,  123,  126, 
127,  129,  150;  and  Hannibal,  201;  in 
Social  war,  402-5,  408-10,  419  ;  in  civil 
war,  435,  436,  438,  441-3. 


57: 


INDEX 


Samniiiiii,  4,  130,  206,  209,  239,  448,  545. 

Samos,  255,  268,  269,  471. 

Sardinia,  11,  19;  and  Carthage,  13,  146, 
154;  i)roviiice,  163,  164,  J46,  351;  re- 
bellions in,  205,  239,  336 ;  in  civil  wars, 

438,  440,  443,  464,  529. 
Saticula,  L.  C. ,  in. 
Satricum  (near  Antiuni),  78,  99. 
Satricum  (near  Arpinum),  no. 
Saturninu.s,   L.   Appuleius,  378,  381,  387, 

389-91,  491. 
SccEvola,  C.  Mucius,  33,  59. 
Scsevola,  P.  Mucius  (cos.   133  n.c),  337, 

343- 
ScJEVola,  Q.  Mucius  (augur,  cos.  117  n.c), 

39t,  396. 
Scaevola,   Q.    Mucius  (pontif.    nia.\.,  cos. 

95  B-c.),  395,  396,  441. 
ScHptius,  548. 
Scarpheia,  battle  of,  285 
.Scato,  P.  Vettius,  405,  406. 
Scaurus,  M.  /Emilius  (cos.  115  b.c),  360-2, 

364,  365.  375>  387.  391.  396,  399- 
Scaurus,  M.  Aurelius,  378. 
Sciathus,  428. 
Scipio,    L.    Cornelius   Barbatus  (cos.   298 

B.C.),  116,  IT7. 

Scipio,  Cn.  Cornelius  Asina,  his  son  (cos. 
260  B.C.),  154,  157. 

Scipio,  L.  Cornelius,  his  brother  (cos.  259 
B.C.),  154. 

Scipio,  Cn.  Cornelius  Calvus,  his  son  (cos. 
222  B.C.),  16S,  178,  213-5, 

Scipio,  P  Cornelius,  his  brother  (cos.  218 
B.C.),  against  Hannibal,  177-9,  182-7  ■ 
in  Spain,  193,  213-5. 

Scipio,  P.  Cornelius  Africanus  (his  son),  at 
the  Ticinus,  183  ;  at  Cannae,  200;  char- 
acter of,  215,  216;  commands  in  Spain, 
216-9  !  consul,  224,  225  ;  in  Africa,  226- 
231  ;  at  Zama,  229,  230  ;  in  Asia,  268- 
271  ;  death,  273  ;  and  politics,  300-5  ; 
and  Caesarism,  133,  323. 

Scipio,  L.  Cornelius  Asiaticus  (his  brother), 
218,  268,  273,  303. 

Scipio,  P.  Cornelius  .lEmilianus  Africanu'=, 
in  Spain,  242,  244,  245,  248,  313,  361, 
367  ;  at  siege  of  Carthage,  248-53,  313  ; 
in  tlie  East,  330  ;  censor,  331,  346  ;  char- 
acter of,  332,  333  ;  policy  of,  337,  342-4  ; 
Hellenist,  320,  337  ;  death  of,  345. 

Scipio,  L.  Cornelius  Asiaticus  (cos.  83  b.c), 

439,  440 

Scipio,  P.  Cornelius  N.isica  Corculum  (cos. 

162  B.C.),  248,   331,   374. 

Scipio,  P.  Cornelius  Nasica  Serapio  (cos. 

138  B.C.),  341,  342. 
Scipio.     See  also  Metellus. 
.Scirthasa,  battle  of,  393 
Scodra,  165,  264,  276,  ;74. 
Scordisci,  326,  374,  375 
Scylacium  (Scolacium),  R.  C. ,  347. 
Scythians,  329,  330,  424,  425,  480. 
Segesta,  siege  of,  154. 
Segovia,  465. 
Seleucia,  483. 
Seleucids,  254,  472,  544. 
Seleucus  I.  Nicator,  124. 
Selinus,  145. 


Sellasia,  battle  of,  165,  175,  254. 

.Sempronius.  Sec  Asellio,  Gracchus, 
Longus,  Tuilitanus. 

Sena  Callica,  R.C.,  122,  221. 

Senate,  of  the  kings,  23,  42,  44;  of  the 
early  republic,  50-53  ;  resists  reforms,  53, 
66,  74,  92  ;  patricio-plebeian,  ascendency 
of,  96,  97,  128,  133,  287,  288,  297-Q,  304  ; 
controls  army,  136,  137;  controls  reli- 
gion, 207^  291  ;  controls  administration 
of  provinces,  228,  271,  279,  311-13,  351  ; 
struggles  with  consuls,  224,  276  ;  with 
comitia,  261,  307,  308,  339-42,  3477^'.,  390, 
414  ;  foreign  policy  of,  228,  234-7,  262- 
265,  271,  272,  280-2,  322,  323,  330,  331, 
393i  394)  47i~3  \  failure  to  govern,  325, 
32^>  331-3,  357.  358,  360-  365  ;  number 
increased,  455,  542  ;  and  Drusus,  395-7  ; 
restored  by  Sulla,  418,  449  yl  ;  over- 
thrown, 469,  470,  478,  479;  and  triumvirs, 
497-500  ;  and  Pompey,  522,  523,  527  ; 
of  Caesar,  529,  542. 

Senatus  consniiziin  de  Bacchanalihus, 
291-2  ;  ultimum,  298,  352,  435,  491,  493, 

497>  525-  .    ^      , 

.Senones,  15,  85, 121,  122, 166  ;  in  Gaul,  512. 
Sentinum,  battle  of,  118,  iiy. 
Sentius,  C,  428. 
Septimius,  L.,  535. 
Se/itiinontiittii,  37,  38. 
Septumuleius,  L.,  356. 
Sequana  (Seine)  R.,  507,  508,  572,  573. 
Sequani,  505,  507,  513. 
.Serranus,  A.  Atilius,  267. 
Sertorius,  Q  ,  in  civil  war,  435-8  ;  in  Spain, 

372,440,  445,  457,_  464-6,  472,  473. 
Servilius,  C.  (in  .Sicily),  393. 
Servilius,  C.  (praetor,  91  B.C.),  400. 
Servilius,    Cn.    Geminus    (cos.    217    B.C.), 

190,  191,  193,  197,  198,  214. 
Servilius,  P.  Vatia  Isauricus  (cos.  79  BC  ), 

472,  492.    _ 
Servius  Tullius.  26-9 ;  wall  of,  27,  38,  39  ; 

constitution  of,  27-9,  45-7. 
.Sestius,  P.,  517,  518. 
Sestos,  269. 

Sextius,  C.  Calvinus,  373. 
.Sextius,  L.  Lateranus,  91,  92. 
Sibylline  books,  30,  292. 
Sicily,  2,  18,   19;  and  Pyrrhus,    125,   129- 

131;  and  Carthage,  143,   145,   146,  169; 

in    ist    Punic    war,     149-62 ;    province, 

164;   tithes   of,    311,    317,    351;   in   2nd 

Punic  war,  185,  200,  203-6,  210-12,  224, 

225  ;   slave  wars  in,  326-8,  392,  393  ;  in 

civil  wars,  438,  443,  529,  531  ;  and  Verres, 

469,  489. 
Sicoris  (Segres)  R.,  529-31. 
Sicyon,  2:;8,  262. 
Silanus,    D.    Junius   (cos.    62    B.C.),    493, 

494. 
Silanus,  M.  Junius  (praetor,  212  B.C.',  216, 

218. 
Silanus,  M.  Junius  fcos.  log  b.c),  377. 
Silo,  Q.  Pompaedius,  404-6,  410. 
Silva  Litana,  200. 
Sinnaca,  520. 

Sinope,  421,  424,  425,  475,  482. 
Sinuessa,  R.  C,  119. 


INDEX 


573 


Siris  R.,  126. 

Siscia,  374,  375. 

Slavery,  forms  and  influence  of,  316/.,  327, 
546  ;  in  Sicily,  164,  212,  326-8,  392,  393. 

Slaves  in  army,  202-5  ;  tax  on  manumission 
of,  220. 

Smyrna,  268,  270,  396. 

Social  war,  causes  of,  395,  400-2  ;  import- 
ance of,  399  ;  course  of,  405-10  ;  results 
of,  410-12. 

Socii.     See  Allies,  Italians,  Latins. 

Socrates  of  Mithynia,  425,  426. 

Soli  (Pompeiopolis),  483. 

Solon,  66,  337. 

Solus,  145. 

Sophene,  329,  476,  482. 

Sophonisba,  218,  219,  223,  227. 

Sora,  104,  III,  114;  L.  C.,  115. 

Sosis,  211. 

Spain,  2,  3  ;  conquered  by  Carthage,  145, 
169,  170-5,  178  ;  in  2nd  Punic  war,  202, 
205,  210,  213-19  ;  ceded  to  Rome,  231  ; 
provinces,  232,  240,  242,  311,  312  ;  wars  in, 
240-5,  368,  371,  372,  392  ;  and  Sertorius, 
440,  445,  457,  464-6;  and  Piso,  4S7, 
490;  Caesar  in,  492,  498,  529-31,  537, 
539;  under  Pompey,  518,  522,  527; 
under  Csesar,  544,  547. 

.Spanish  sword,  139,  217. 

Spanish  troops,  137,  148,  190,  196,  214,  218, 
223,  225,  227. 

Sparta,  165,  212,  213,  254,  258,  267,  272, 
273,  283-5. 

Spartacus,  4G6-8. 

Spendius,  163. 

Spina,  5. 

Spoletium,  L.  C,  15,  164  «.,  168,  igi, 
296  «.,  405,  441,  442. 

SpoUa  opiiiia,  22,  79,  80  «.,  168. 

Stabias,  409. 

Statins  Gellius,  114. 

Sthenius  Statilius,  120,  122. 

Stipenditun  (provincial),  253,  311.  See 
Ta.xation, 

.Stffini,  375. 

Stoics,  297,  321,  387. 

Stolo,  C.  Licinius,  91,  92,  306. 

Subura,  27,  38. 

Sucro  R.,  465. 

Suebi,  505,  510. 

Suessa  Aurunca,  L.  C,  iii,  192,  209. 

Suessiones,  373,  508. 

Suessula,  203,  204,  206,  207. 

Suetonius  (biographer),  87. 

Sugambri,  510. 

Sulla,  Faustus  Cornelius,  458. 

Sulla,  L.  Cornelius  Feli.\,  9,  17  ;  captures 
Jugurtha,  369-71  ;  in  Cilicia,  394,  425  ; 
in  Social  war,  404-6,  409,  410;  character 
of,  414-16  ;  march  on  Rome,  416  ;  first 
legislation,  417,  418;  and  Mithradates, 
429-34,  471  ;  in  civil  war,  439-45  ;  pro- 
scriptions, 417,  445-8,  486  ;  colonies, 
44S  ;  dictator,  448,  449  ;  constitution  of, 
325,  411,  412,  449-58,  overthrown,  461-4, 
469,  470,  492  ;  resignation  and  death  of, 
45S,  459  ;  and  Cajsar,  445,  446.  460,  491, 
540,  542,  547  ;  and  Pompey,  440,  443-5, 


.Sulla,  P.  Cornelius  (Catilinarian),  487. 
Sulpicius,   P.    Rufus  (trib.   88  B.C.),   396, 

413..414,  4'7: 

Sulpicius,  Servius  (in  Social  war),  406,  407. 

.Sura,  Bruttius,  428. 

Suthul,  365. 

Sutrium,  82;  L.  C,  88,  112,  405. 

Sybaris,  18. 

.Syphax,  214,  218,  225-7,  247." 

.Syracuse,  q,  18  ;  naval  power  of,  79, 
165  ;  and  Pyrrhus,  125,  128,  129,  131  ; 
.and  Carthage,  141,  142,  146,  163  ;  in  ist 
Punic  war,  149  f.  ;  allied  with  Rome, 
151;  with  Carthage,  204;  subdued  by 
Marcellus,  210-12,  219  ;  Roman,  349,  392. 

Syria,  and  Pyrrhus,  124,  130;  position  and 
power  of,  212,  254,  255,  259  ;  war  with, 
265-72  ;  and  Perseus,  275,  276,  278 ; 
Rom.in  Protectorate,  281  ;  decay  of,  329, 
330,  420  ;  under  Tigranes,  472,  475,  476  ; 
and  Pompey,  480-2  ;  province,  482,  518, 
519.  521.  535.  536. 


T.4!NIA,  the,  at  Carthage,  249,  251. 

Tagus  R.,  242. 

Tamesis  (Thames)  R.,  510. 

Tannetnm,  177. 

Tarentum,  17,  iS,  95  ;  and  Lucanians,  loi, 
105-7,  i">  112,  119,  120;  treaty  with, 
122,  142;  war  with,  122-30;  and  Car- 
thage, 131,  135,  146,,  150;  in  2nd 
Punic  war,  203,  206,  207,  210-12,  219, 
221,  222  ;  Neptunia,  347. 

Tarquinii,  88,  89,  99,  112.    i 

Tarquinius  Collatinus,  30,  31. 

Tarquinius,  L.  Priscus,  25,  26,  38,  40. 

Tarquinius,  L.  Superbus,  29-34,  38,  40. 

Tarquinius,  Se.xtus,  29-31,  37. 

Tarracina  (Anxur),  78,  95  ;  K.  C,  104. 

Tarraco,  213,  218,  219,  242,  372. 

Tartessus  (Tarshish),  170. 

Tatius,  T.,  22,  23,  35. 

Taurini,  166,  180,  183. 

Taurisci,  374,  377. 

Tauromeniuni,  328. 

Taurus,  Mount,  270,  271,  472. 

Tautamns,  244. 

Taxation  in  Italy:  Tributnm,  46,  82,  135, 
138,  295,  315;  vicesittta  manumissio- 
H7it>i,  220,  315  ;  extraordinary,  205, 
206  ;  portoria,  499,  546  ;  in  provinces  : 
decu)n(F,  164,  311,  351,  454,  499,  500, 
548  ;  stipenditiin  or  tributuiii,  242,  279, 
280,  311  ;  methods  of,  311,  314,  315. 

Taxiles,  431. 

Teanum,  Appulum,  110. 

Teanum,  Sidicinum,  100,  192,  202,  209,  405, 
440,  441,  446. 

Tectosages,  in  Galatia,  257  ;  in  Gaul,  381. 

Tegea,  285. 

Telamon,  battle  of,  167,  168,  188,  436. 

Tempe,  pa-iS  of,  262,  263,  277,  278. 

Temple,  at  Jerusalem,  482  ;  of  Persephone, 
at  Locri,  130  ;  of  Juno  Lacinia,  228 ; 
Juno  at  Veil,  81,  82,  84  n. 

Temples  at  Rome,  of  Bellona,  443  ;  of 
Castor  and  Pollux,  34;  of  Concord,  92, 
356  ;  of  Diana,   27  ;  of  Fides,    24,  341  ; 


574 


IMDEX 


of  Janus,  24  ;  of  Juno  on  the  Aventine, 
82  ;  of  Jupiter  Capitolinu*;,  26,  30.  32,  40, 
341  ;  burnt,  441  ;  restored,  496,  497  ;  of 
Jupiter  Feretrius,  22,  79  ;/.  ;  of  Jupiter 
Stator,  22,  36,  37,  493  ;  of  Rediculus 
Tutanus,  209  ;  of  Vesta,  34,  42,  43. 

Tencteri,  510,  519. 

'I'enedos,  433. 

Terentius,  P.  Afer  (Terence),  345. 

Terentius.     See  Varro. 

Teres,  282. 

Termantia,  244. 

Terminus  (a  god),  24,  30. 

Teuta,  Queen,  165. 

Teutoboduus,  381. 

Teutones,  381,  382. 

'I'liala,  367,  369. 

Thapsus,  battle  of,  538. 

Thasos,  260. 

Thebes,  263,  285,  429,  431. 

Theniiscyra,  475. 

Thena;,  253. 

Theodosia,  424 

Thermae,  157. 

Thermon,  258. 

Thermopylae,  258,  263,  268,  285. 

Thespiae,  428. 

Thetsalonica,  282,  531. 

Thessaly,  254,  262,  264,  267,  268,  274,  277, 
282,  429,  432,  534,  535. 

Thrace,  266,  268,  270,  274,  374,  428,  432, 
47i._ 

Thurii,  120,  122,  123,  203,  2o6,  225. 

Tiber  R.,  6,  15,  19,  32,  33,  38,  85  n.,  86, 
.113- 

Tibur  (Tivoli),  6,  16,  98,  99,  104,  209,  309. 

Ticinus  R.,  5,  8  ;  battle  of,  1S3. 

Tifata,  Mount,  100,  203,  208,  440. 

Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia,  420,  424-6, 
47 1-3.  475-7.  479.  480. 

Tigranes  (his  son),  479. 

Tigranocerta,  473,  476,  477. 

Tigurini,  377,  3S1. 

Tilphossium,  Mount,  429. 

Tingis  (Tangiers),  464. 

Titles,  23,  35,  44  ;  Titii,  35. 

Titius,  Sext.,  391. 

Tolenus  R.,  406. 

Tolistoboii,  257. 

Tolosa,  374,  377,  504. 

Tolumnius,  Lars,  79. 

Torquatus,  L.  Manlius  (cos.  65  B.C.),  487. 

Torquatus,  T.  Manlius,  Imperiosus  (cos. 
340  B.C.),  90,  101-3. 

Torquatus,  T.  Manlius  (cos.  235  B.C.),  164, 
202,  205. 

Tougeni,  377,  381. 

Transpadanes.     See  Franchise  and  Gaul. 

Trapezus,  424. 

Trasimene,  Lake  of,  8  ;  battle  at,  i8g,  190. 

TrebeDius,  L.,  478. 

Trebia  R.,  5  ;  battle  of,  183-7. 

Trebonius,  C,  529,  537,  550. 

Trebula,  115. 

Tremellius,  L.,  283. 

Trerus  R.,  7,  16,  64,  78,  no,  114. 

Treveri,  511. 

Triarii,  103,  138. 

Triarius,  C.  Valerius,  477. 


Tribuni  cerarU,  469  «. 

Tribiini  villi tuiii,  136,  139,  300,  380. 

Tribuni  militnut  consulari  potestate,  73, 

74-  .   . 

Tribum pubis,  origin  of,  54-6  ;  sacrosanct, 
54,  71,  72,  452,  491,  525  ;  number  in- 
creased, 66  ;  powers  increased,  72,  97  ; 
instruments  of  Senate,  97,  224,  298,  308  ; 
again  popular  leaders,  308,  338  _/C,  341, 
342,  346  /.,  387  /,  413,  414  ;  powers 
limited,  417,  418,  450-2,  restored,  468-70; 
office  of,  suspended,  66,  67,  deposition 
from,   340,  341,  cf.  478,   re-election   to, 

341.  344.  34''.  353- 

Tribnnicia  potestas,  542,  543. 

Tribits  of  Romulu-,  23.  44  ;  Servian,  27, 
46,  47  ;  number  increased,  88,  104,  108, 
115,  134;  number  completed,  293;  and 
centuries,  295,  296  ;  size  of,  305.  ^^calso 
Comitia  tributa,  Concilium  plebis,  and 
Franchise. 

Tributuin  (Roman),  46,  82,  135,  138,  295, 
315  ;  (provincial),  see  Stipeniiinin  and 
Ta.\ation. 

Trifanum,  battle  of,  103. 

Trinobantes,  511. 

Tritiundinuin,  394. 

Triocala,  393. 

"Triumvirate,  First,"  formed,  499  f.  ;  re- 
newed, 518-20;  breach  in,  52iy^ 

Triumviri  mensarii,  203. 

Trocmi,  257. 

Troy,  20,  84. 

Tuditanus,  C.  Sempronius,  344,  375. 

Tullianum,  25,  38,  370,  371,  494. 

Tullius,  Attius,  60. 

TuUus  Hostilius,  24,  25,  34. 

Tunes  (Tunis),  156,  227,  249. 

Turdetani,  240. 

Turnus,  20,  40. 

Turpilius,  T.  Silanus,  357. 

Tusca,  247;  R.,  253. 

Tusculum,  99,  108. 

Twelve  Tables,  70,  71. 

Tyndaris,  battle  of,  155. 

Tyrrhenian  =  Etruscan,  12,  79;  coast  and 
sea,  4,  13. 


Ubii,  510. 

Umbria,  116,  118,   191,  204,  222.   224,  402, 

405,  407,  408,  442. 
Umbrians,  14,  15,  113,  167, 
Unciarium  fenus,  70. 
Usipetes,  510,  519. 
Us  Its,  70. 

Usury.     See  Debt  and  Interest. 
Utica,   143,    146,    163,   226,    227  ;    Roman 

ally,  248,  253,  359,  362,  368,  394. 
U.xellodunum,  514. 


Vacc^i,  172,  242,  244. 

Vadimo,  Lake,  first  battle  of,  112  ;  second 

battle  of,  122,  166. 
Vaga,  366. 
Valentia,  243,  465. 
Valeria,  legend  of,  60,  61. 
Valeria,  wife  of  Sulla,  458. 


INDEX 


575 


Valerius.      See    Corvus,    Falto,     Flaccus, 

Laivinus,  Messalla,  Puljlicula,  Triarius. 
Valerius,  L.  (admiral),  122,  123. 
Valerius,  M'.  Maxinnis    54. 
Vardaei,  326,  375. 
Varinius,  P.,  466. 
Varius,  Q.,  398,  35)9. 
Varro,   C.  Terentius  (cos.   216   B.C.),   193, 

194  ;  at  Cannae,  196-8,  200 ;  204,  305. 
Varro,    M.    Terentius    (author),    80,    180, 

546  ;  in  Spain,  531. 
Varus,  P.  Quintilius,  226. 
Vaiinius,  P.,  502,  517,  519. 
V'ectigal.    See  Ager  Catiipaniis  and  Ager 

ptiblicus. 
Veil,  59,  62,  63,  79-S2,  84,  86,  88. 
Velabrum,  37,  39. 
Velia,  32,  38. 
I 'elites,  138,  139,  379. 
Velitrae,  40,  59,  78,  104,  108. 
Venafrum,  405. 

Veneti  (in  Italy),  12,  87,  166,  167,  374. 
Veneti  (in  Gaul),  508,  509. 
Venusia,   L.   C,   119,   126,   127,   201,   220, 

404,  405,  407,  410. 
Vercelte,  battle  of,  383,  389. 
Vercingetorix,  512-4,  523. 
Vermina,  231. 
Verona,  5,  375,  382. 
Verres,  C.,  469,  480,  ^48. 
Verulfe,  115. 
Vesontio,  507. 

Vestal  Virgins,  24,  35,  49,  85,  86,  385,  386. 
Vestini,  15,  403,  408. 
Vesuvius,  Mount,  5,  466;  battle  of,  103. 
Veterans,  Scipio's,  224,  240,  314;  Marius', 

369,    379,    390 ;    Sulla's,    448,    462,  483 ; 

Pompey's,  4S6,  499,   500 ;  Caesar's,  537, 

538,  542.  547- 
Vetilius,  C,  243. 
Vettius,  T.,  392. 
Vettones,  242. 
Veturia,  60,  6t. 
Veturius,  T.,  108. 
Viae.     .9t'<;  Appendix  II. 
Via  Aimilia,  239. 
Via  Appia,  7,  95,  in,   114,   iig,  192,  207, 

209,  404,  440,  521. 
Via  A'lrelia,  348. 
Viii  Doiititia,  348,  374,  504. 


Via  Egnatia,  282,  531. 

\'ia  Flainiiiia,   15,   115,   168,  188,  iqd  n., 

405,  528  ;  nova,  239. 
\'ia  Cabinia,  375. 
I'ia  Latina,   7,   192,   202,   203,   208,  405, 

443- 
I'ia  Valeria,  115.  209,405,406;  Claudta- 

I'aleria,  7. 
VibuUius,  L.  Rufus,  528. 
J''icesi)na  tiianujnissioniiiii,  220,  315, 
Vicus  sceleraiiis,  29. 
Viminal,  Mount,  27,  38. 
Vindaliuni,  battle  of,  373. 
Virginia,  legend  o(,  68,  69. 
Viriathus,  243,  244. 
Viridomarus,  168. 
Vocontii,  180,  373. 
Volaterrae,  13,  116,  443. 
Volci,  40,  126. 

Volsci,  16,  40,  59-61,  65  «.,  78,  98,  99,  104. 
Volsinii,  82,  118,  126;  lake  of,  8. 
Volso,  Cn.  Manlius  (cos.  189  B.C.),  271. 
Volso,  L.  Manlius  (cos.  256  B.C.),  156. 
Volso,  L.  Manlius  (praetor,  218  B.C.),  177 

182. 
Volturnus   R.,  7,   95,    106,   192,   201,   208 

,  404.  4p5- 
Volumnia,  60,  61. 
Volumnius,  L.,  116. 


Wall  of  Romulus,  37  ;  of  Servius  Tuliius 

27,  38.  39- 

Wills,  Roman,  45,  70. 

Women,  old  position  of,  41,  65  «.  ;  emanci- 
pation of,  320. 


Xanthifpus,  157. 


Yeomanry,  decay  of,  233,  317,   318,  334, 

335,  545-. 
Yoke,  passing  under,  62,  109,  365. 


Zacvnthu.s,  268,  272,  432.  . 

Zama  Regia,  367  ;  battle  of,  178,  229,  230, 

273. 
Ziela,  477,  483,  536. 


Printed  by  Ballantynf,   Hanson  v5*=  Co, 
Edinburgh  <5^  London 


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UCSD  Libr, 

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